ML17262A414
| ML17262A414 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1991 |
| From: | ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17262A411 | List: |
| References | |
| NSL--SA24, NSL--SA24-R3, NSL-0000-SA024, NSL-0000-SA024-R03, NUDOCS 9103140017 | |
| Download: ML17262A414 (180) | |
Text
Safety Analysis Ginna Station UFSAR Section 6.2.4 and Tables 6.2-13, 6.2-14 and 6.2-15 Changes Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 NSL-0000-SA024 Revision 3
February 26, 1991 Prepared by:
Nuclear Engineer Date Reviewed by:
Nuclear Engineer D te Approved by:
Manag
, Nuclear Safet 6 Licensing Date Page i Pi031400i7 9i0308 PDR ADOCK 05000244 PDR
Revision Status Sheet age Latest Revision Page Latest Revision Page Latest Revision 14e 14f 14g 14h 14i Attachment B
15 33 34 35 36 37 38 9
12 13 13a 13b Attachment A
14a 14b 14c 14d 2'6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 0
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Attachment C
Attachment.
D 50 Attachment E
51 Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page ii Revision 3
Safet Anal sis 1.0 2.0 Descri tion and Sco e
The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if there are any unreviewed safety questions related to updating UFSAR Section 6.2.4, Table 6.2-13, Table 6.2-14, and Table 6.2-15.
This update is necessary to reflect information obtained during a detailed review of the containment isolation system and the result of the 1988 Inservice Test (IST) Program submittal to the NRC.
References 2.1 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 5.
Section 6.2.4, Containment Isolation System.
Table 6.2-13, Containment Piping Penetrations and Isolation Valves.
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications, dated April 12, 1990.
Section 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.
Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valves.
Section 3.8.1, Refueling.
Letter from J.E. Maier, RG&E, to D.M. Crutchfield,
- NRC,
Subject:
SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Xsolation Valves (Systems);
dated August 30, 1982.
Letter from L.D. White, RG&E, to D.L. Ziemann,
- NRC,
Subject:
Discussion of Lessons Learned Short Term Requirements; dated November 19, 1979.
Letter from L.D. White, RG&E, to B.H. Grier,
- NRC,
Subject:
IE Bulletins79-06A and 79-06A Revision 1; dated June 22, 1979.
Letter from L.D. White, RG&E, to D.L. Ziemann, NRCg
Subject:
Followup Actions Resulting from the NRC Staff Reviews Regarding the TMI Unit 2 Accident; dated October 17, 1979.
Letter from D.M. Crutchfield, NRC, to J.E. Maier,
- NRC,
Subject:
Forwarding Final Evaluation Report of SEP Topic VX-4, Containment Isolation System for the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; dated April 12, 1982.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 1
Revision 2
Date 12 7
90
2.8 2.9 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15 2.16 2.17 2.18 2.19 2.19.1 2.20 Letter from J.E. Maier, RG&E, to D.M. Crutchfield,
- NRC,
Subject:
SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation System; dated December 30, 1981.
NUREG-0821, Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Systematic Evaluation Program, R.E.
Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; dated December 1982.
RG&E Inter-Office Correspondence from G.J. Wrobel, to S.T.
Adams,
Subject:
Necessary Clarifications Associated With Technical Specification Table 3.6-1; dated July 2, 1990.
RG&E Inter-Office Correspondence from G.J. Wrobel, to S.T.
Adams,
Subject:
Containment Isolation Valves AOV 745 (Penetration 124a),
MOV 749A (Penetration 127),
and MOV 749B (Penetration 128); dated June 22, 1990.
RG&E Inter-Office Correspondence from G.J. Wrobel, to S.T.
Adams,
Subject:
Technical Specification Interpretation of Containment Isolation Valves MOVs 749 A/B; dated June 21, 1990.
USNRC, Regulatory Guide 1.70, Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants; Revision 3, November 1978.
Letter from D.D. DiIanni, USNRC, to R.W. Kober, RG&E,
Subject:
SEP Topic VI-4, NUREG-0821 Section 4.22.2, Containment Isolation Valves; dated January 30, 1987.
NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Section 6.2.4,
.Revision 2, July 1981.
Letter from R.C. Mecredy, RG&E, to A.R. Johnson,
- NRC,
Subject:
Operability of AOV 745 and MOVs 749A/B; dated July 9, 1990.
Letter from R.C. Mecredy, RG&E, to A.R. Johnson'RCg
Subject:
Modification of Containment Penetration g2; dated March 13, 1990.
Ginna Station Procedure 0-2.3.1A, Containment Closure Capability in Two Hours During RCS Reduced Inventory Operations, Revision 5, dated April 28, 1990.
Ginna Station Quality Assurance Manual.
Appendix B, Inservice Inspection Program For the 1990-1999 Interval, Revision 0, dated January 1,
1990.
- 10CFR50, Appendix J, Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 2
Revision 0
2.21 2.22 Ginna Station Procedure, AP-CCW.2, Loss of CCW During Power Operation, Revision 8, dated December 12, 1989.
Altran Corporation, Instrument Air System Design Basis
- Document, dated November 27, 1989.
2.23 Ginna Station Procedure, PT-2.6, Cold/Refueling Shutdown Air Operated Valve Surveillance, Revision 29, dated October 19, 1990.
2.24 Letter from R.C. Mecredy, RGGE, to A.R. Johnson,
- NRC,
Subject:
Application for Amendment to Operating License with Respect to Technical Specification Containment Isolation Valve Table 3.6-1; dated October 15, 1990.
2.25 Letter from A.R. Johnson, NRC, to R.C. Mecredy,
- RGGE,
Subject:
Ginna Proposed License Amendment Dated October 15, 1990 Request for Additional Information", dated December 15, 1990.
3.0 Safet Anal sis 3.1 3.2 The system affected by these UFSAR changes is the containment isolation system.
This system is designed to isolate non-essential process lines which penetrate the containment to ensure that the total leakage of activity will be within design limits in the event of an accident.
In addition, the parent systems (e.g.,
Safety"Injection) of the components contained in the containment isolation system can be considered affected by this UFSAR change.
However, there is no change to the capability of these systems to perform their intended design function, only an update of their ability to isolate containment when required.
The updated UFSAR Table 6.2-13 is presented in Attachment A.
Due to the significant number of
- changes, a marked-up version of the current UFSAR table was not generated.
- Instead, Attachment B provides a
detailed listing of all changes made to the table (Revision 5).
Attachment B is divided into four (4) sub tables.
(1)
The first table provides a listing of global notes which were applied as applicable to eliminate redundancy.
(2)
The second table provides a listing of changes made to the format and overall structure of the UFSAR table.
(3)'he third table lists the changes made to each individual penetration on the UFSAR table.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 3
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26 91
(4)
The fourth table identifies all changes made to the UFSAR table notes.
However, since many modifications were made to the UFSAR table, most notes have been renumbered and revised.
Consequently, to eliminate confusion, a change associated with the notes column for a particular penetration is only identified in Table 3 if a note has been added or deleted.
There is no change identified in Table 3 if a note number has only been changed, if changes were made to the note itself, or if the note was deleted globally.
- Instead, these changes are provided in Table 4.
3.3 3.3.1 3.3.1.1 The changes to UFSAR Table 6.2-13 fall into three categories:
(1) clarifications or corrections of typographical errors and omissions, (2) updates to better represent actual plant conditions, and (3) updates for consistency between the
- UFSAR, Technical Specifications, and previous commitments made by RGEE.
The correction of typographical errors and omissions does not involve any technical change to the UFSAR table nor the function and capability of the containment isolation system.
All columns and rows in the table now contain either the necessary information or "NA".
No blanks or "-" remain in the table.
In addition, the clarifications made to the UFSAR table are minor and do not involve any technical changes.
Significant clarifications are discussed below.
The Position At Postaccident column was changed to reflect plant conditions immediately following a Containment Isolation Signal (CIS).
This column was modified since system configurations can be changed during recovery operations.
If this column was not modified, it would require most valves to list "0/C".
The column now provides a
clear listing of the valve positions prior to any operator action (i.e.,
"immediate" post accident).
The addition of Footnote "e" provides further clarification of locked closed valves.
3.3.1.2 The Notes column was changed to only supplement UFSAR Section 6.2.4.4.2 text.
All duplications of information contained in the UFSAR text was removed from the Notes.
The Notes column now only identify exceptions, references, etc.,
not contained in the UFSAR text.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 4
Revision 3
Date 2 26 91
0
3.3.1.3 3.3.1.4 3.3.2 3.3.2.1 3.3.2.2 h~ ~
1 removed from the table since they do not provide any information relevant to the UFSAR Table.
This information can be obtained from other sources including Appendix B of the Ginna Station Quality Assurance Manual.
Consequently, the information contained in these columns remains in other RGGE controlled documents.
The Position Indication In Control Room column was modified to show the type of indication instead of "Yes/No".
This is a significant enhancement since the table now identifies if there is a white status light or a red/green light associated with the valve on the Main Control Board, or both.
The updates to the UFSAR table to better represent actual plant conditions are described below.
Penetration ¹2 was added to the table.
This spare penetration was modified during the 1990 Refueling Outage to enhance containment closure during mid-loop operations.
The penetration meets all current containment penetration criteria.
See Reference 2.17.
Several valves had their positions as listed under the Position At columns in the UFSAR Table changed to a more conservative position.
That is, the valve position changed from either a "0/C" to "C",
ltOII to IIC II II On to IILCII or IICII to llLCIt
( See Table 3 of Attachment B for a detailed description of these changes on a penetration by penetration basis.)
For these
- cases, the valve is.now identified as being in an isolated or closed position which is the function of a containment isolation valve.
Valves (and penetration ¹) in this category include:
370B (¹100),
879 (¹110b),
371 (¹112),
846 (¹120a),
539 (¹120b),
547 (¹12la),
528 (12la),
508 (¹121b),
743 (¹124a),
745 (¹124a),
1569
(¹124b)g 1571
(¹124b)g 1572
(¹124b)g 1574
(¹124b)',
759B (¹125),
759A (¹126),
749A (¹127),
749B (¹128)g 1787
(¹129)g 1786
(¹129)g 7971
(¹132)g 1076B (¹202)g 1084B (¹202)g 1563
(¹203b)g 1565
(¹203b) /
1566
(¹203b) /
1568
(¹203b) g 5869
(¹204),
966C (¹205),
966B (¹206a),
5735 (¹206b),
966A (¹207a),
5736 (¹207b),
1080 (¹210),
5879
(¹300) g 6151
(¹301) g 6165 (¹301) g 6175 (¹303) g 6152 (¹303)
~
1076A (¹304) g 1084A (¹304) g 1554
(¹305c),
1556 (¹305c),
1557 (¹305c),
1559 (¹305c),
1560 (¹305c),
1562 (¹305c),
7141 (¹310a),
921
(¹332c),
922 (¹332c),
923 (¹332c),
and 924
(¹332c).
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 5
Revision Date 12 7
90
3.3.2.3 Several valves had their positions as listed under the Position At columns in the UFSAR Table changed to a comparable position.
That is, the valve position changed from either a "0" to "0/C" or "0/C" to "0".
(See Table 3 of Attachment B for a detailed description of these changes on a penetration by penetration basis.)
For these cases where the valve was listed as open, the valve and penetration was required to be evaluated previously assuming that it was open since this was the most conservative position.
Therefore, changing the valve's position for these cases does not negatively impact the penetration or containment isolation system since the valve was conservatively evaluated under open conditions previously.
Valves (and penetration ¹) in this category include:
1723 (¹107),
1728 (¹107),
313
(¹108),
1789
(¹123 bottom),
1003A (¹143),
1003B
(¹143)g 5869
(¹204)g 5735
(¹206b)g 5736
(¹207B) 5879 (¹300)I 4629
(¹308)~
4630 (¹311)I 4642
(¹312),
4643 (¹315),
4628 (¹316),
4627
(¹319)g 4641 (¹320),
4644 (¹323),
and 8418 (¹324).
3.3.2.4 Several valves had their positions as listed under the Position At Cold Shutdown column in the UFSAR Table changed to a less conservative position.
That is, the valve position changed from either a
"C" to "0" or "C" to "0/C".
(See Table 3 of Attachment B for a detailed description of these changes on a penetration by penetration basis.)
However, containment integrity is not required in the Cold Shutdown condition (Technical Specification 3.6.1).
In addition, during reduced RCS inventory operations, the position of these valves (or an automatic isolation valve in the same line) is verified by. Reference 2.18.
- Thus, these valves can be closed if needed.
- Also, during Refueling Operations, Technical Specification 3.8.1 requires that all "automatic containment isolation valves shall be operable or at least one valve in each line shall be locked closed."
Therefore, containment isolation is assured during refueling operations.
Consequently, these changes do not negatively impact the penetration or the containment isolation system since administrative controls are in place.
Valves (and penetration ¹) in this category include:
7970 (¹132),
7971 (¹132),
5393
(¹310b),
7443 (¹317),
5738 (¹321),
and 5737
(¹322).
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Date 12 7
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3.3.2.5 Several valves had their positions as listed under the Position At Normal 0 eration and Position At Immediate Postaccident columns in the UFSAR Table changed to a less conservative position.
That is, the valve position changed either from a "C" to "0/C", or "0" to "LO".
(See Table 3 of Attachment B for a detailed description of these changes on a penetration by penetration basis.)
There are two categories of valves which meet this criteria (organized by justification).
(a) 529 (112lb)
This penetration has an automatic isolation valve in the line to.
perform the necessary isolation function.
In addition, since this check valve sees the same conditions as the associated automatic isolation valve, their positions should be the same.
Consequently, the change does not negatively impact the penetration or the containment isolation system.
(b) 4629 (4308),
4630 (4311),
4642 (8312),
4643 (4315')g 4628
(@316)g 4627 (4319)g 4641 (4320),
4644
($323)
These essential Service Water System penetrations operate at a higher pressure than the containment accident pressure and are missile protected inside containment.
Consequently, the line is not required to isolate.
See UFSAR Table Note 17.
Therefore, the change in valve position does not negatively impact the penetration or the containment isolation system.
3.3.2.6 a "No" for valve 745 (g124a).
The Maximum Isolation Time column was also changed from "60" to "NA".
These changes are justified per Reference 2.16.
3.3.2.7 Several penetrations had valves added to the table, deleted, or both.
These are described below by penetration number.
(a)
Penetration 103 Valve 5129 was deleted from the table and replaced by a Blind Flange.
This change enabled the elimination of the previous note of "No longer in use" that was associated with this penetration.
The penetration now reflects the current configuration.
The use of the Blind Flange is consistent with the previous locked-closed manual valve.
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Date 12 7
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(b)
Penetration 111 Added valve 959.
The addition of this valve to the table ensures that all valves receiving a containment isolation. signal are listed.
This valve was previously missing from the table, but credit was not taken for the valve during the SEP (see Reference 2.7).
Consequently, this is not considered an actual isolation valve and is not tested per Appendix J.
(c)
Penetration 112 Valves 204A and 821 were deleted and replaced with valves
- 200A, 200B, and 202.
Valve 427 was also added.
The addition'f these valves enables explicit compliance with GDC 55 versus the use of the two redundant isolation valves. 'hese new valves are included in the current IST program (see Reference 2.19).
(d) 123 (bottom)
Added valve 1600A.
See explanation for 3.3.2.7 (b) above.
(e)
Penetration 141 Deleted valve 851A and added valve 1813A.
Valve 851A does not meet the selection criteria for 10CFR50 Appendix J, Section IIH, items 1 through 4.
Consequently, the valve was deleted from the table.
Valve 1813A was previously missing from the table.
This valve is locked-closed with its breaker locked open.
Penetration 142 Deleted valve 851B and added valve 1813B.
See explanation for 3.3.2.7 (e) above.
(g)
Penetration 205 Added valve 955.
See explanation for 3.3.2.7 (b) above.
(h)
Penetration 206a Added valve 953.
See explanation for 3.3.2.7 (b) above.
Penetration 207a Added valve 951.
See explanation for 3.3.2.7 (b) above.
Penetration 210 Added valves 10214S1 and 10215Sl.
These valves were previously missing from the table, but receive an isolation signal.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 8
- Revision, 2
3.3.2.8 Penetration 332b Deleted entire penetration branch from the table.
This penetration branch contains double isolation, fits the criteria as a
test connection, and performs no active function.
Therefore, there is no requirement to test the valves as containment isolation valves.
Consequently, this penetration branch was removed from the table.
3.3.3 Several updates were made to the UFSAR table to ensure consistency between the UFSAR, Technical Specifications, and previous commitments made by RGGE.
These changes are typically only clarifications.
The significant changes are described below.
3.3.3.1 3.3.3.2 3.3.3.3 Notes 7 and 19 were added to ensure that consistency is maintained between Technical Specification Table 3.6-1 and the UFSAR Table.
These notes mainly provide clarification and do not involve a technical change.
The Maximum Isolation Time of several valves was changed to a more conservative duration.
That is, the time was changed from "NA" to either "3" seconds for solenoid valves, or "60" seconds for AOVs and MOVs.
(See Table 3 of Attachment B for a detailed description of these changes on a penetration by penetration basis.)
The UFSAR Table now identifies an isolation time for all valves receiving a containment isolation signal.
Valves (and penetration ¹) in this category include:
1787 (¹129),
10211Sl
(@202),
10213S1
(@202),
966C
(@205),
966B (¹206a),
5735 (¹206b),
966A (¹207a),
5736 (¹207b),
10214S
(¹'210),
10215S1 (8210)~
10205S1
(¹'304)i 10209S1
(@304)~
1597
(¹305a),
1599
(@305b),
and 8418 (¹324).
The Maximum Isolation Time of several valves was changed to a less conservative duration.
There are three categories of'valves which meet this criteria (organized by justification):
(a) 749A (@127),
749B (¹128)
These valves do not receive a containment isolation signal.
Consequently, the Maximum Isolation Time was changed to "NA" since there is no need for a maximum isolation time.
(b) 5869
(@204)
This valve does not, require an isolation time since the associated blind flange acts as the isolation boundary.
See UFSAR Table Note 19.
Consequently, the Maximum Isolation Time was changed to "NA" since there is no need for a maximum isolation time.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 9
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(c) 7970 (¹132),
7971 (¹132),
7478 (¹309),
and 7445 (¹309) - The isolation time for these butterfly valves was changed from "2" seconds to "3" seconds.
Technical Specification Table 3.6-1 allows five seconds with instrument delay.
However, the Maximum Isolation Time column does not include instrument delay per Note "b".
The instrument delay time for these valves is approximately 2 seconds.
Consequently, the valve isolation time was changed to "3" seconds.
3.3.4 3.4 3.4.1 The UFSAR Figures related to containment penetrations (6.2-13 through 6.2-76) were updated to reflect the changes to Table 6.2-13.
The UFSAR Figures now reflect the updated UFSAR Table 6.2-13 (i.e., the current plant configuration).
Conseqeuntly, the basis for these changes is the same as that for the UFSAR Table 6.2-13 changes.
The following UFSAR Section 6.2 Figures were revised:
13, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 31, 32/
33'7'8'2/ 43'6'7/
55'6@
58@
64/
65/
67, 68, 73, 74, 75, and 76 (see Attachment C).
The marked-up UFSAR Section 6.2.4 is presented in Attachment C.
The majority of changes to the UFSAR text are only clarifications or provide consistency with the revised UFSAR Table 6.2-13 and the Technical Specifications.
GDC exemptions related to penetrations are now clearly identified with the basis (e.g.,
references) for their acceptability provided.
The final resolution of previous committments made to the NRC related to the containment isolation system is also addressed.
In addition, UFSAR Section 6.2.4 was divided into subsections based on the five penetration classes to enhance future reference capability.
The basis for the majority of changes to UFSAR Section 6.2.4 is the same as those with respect to UFSAR Table 6.2-13.
The significant changes to UFSAR Section 6.2.4 not previsously discussed in Section 3.3 of this Safety Analysis are presented below.
Section 6.2.4.4.2.2 The discussion concerning line 140 was revised to show that only one motor-operated valve is provided for this penetration instead of the two previously listed.
There are in-fact two motor-operated valves in this line; however, credit is only taken for one of these, valves as an isolation barrier (see UFSAR Table 6.2-13 and Reference 2.7).
Consequently, the discussion was modified to reflect only a single valve.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 10 Revision Date 12 7
90
3.4.2 Section 6.2.4.4.4.2 The discussion concerning line ill was revised to show that only one motor-operated valve is provided for this penetration instead of the two previously listed.
The basis for this change is the same as discussed in Section 3.4.1.
3.4.3 Section 6.2.4.4.5.2 Additional discussion concerning penetration lines 125,
- 126, 127, and 128 is provided.
The UFSAR previously stated that these lines "satisfy the explicit requirements of GDC 57".
However, these lines are considered essential (Reference 2.4) and do not receive a
containment isolation signal due to the potential for damaging the reactor coolant pumps following a spurious signal.
Isolation capability is provided by Ginna Station procedures (Reference 2.21) which instruct operators to isolate these lines under certain loss of component cooling water scenarios.
Consequently, the new discussion provides a more accurate representation of the system configuration.
3.5 The revised UFSAR Table 6.2-14 is presented in Attachment D.
The previous table is being replaced in its entirety; consequently, only the updated table is provided.
The previous table came from the original FSAR and was difficult to follow since it did not provide valve numbers, only descriptions of system configurations.
The new table provides a listing of all air-operated valves for each penetration listed in UFSAR Table 6.2-13.
The same information which previously existed on the table is retained (i.e.,
failure position of the valves following loss of air).
In addition, it is identified for each valve whether it receives a containment isolation signal.
The information for this table was provided by References 2.22 and 2.23.
The basis for any changes to valve failure positions is provided in Section 3.3.
3.6 The marked-up UFSAR Table 6.2-15 is presented in Attachment E.
The changes to this table are mainly clarifications which provide consistency with the revised UFSAR Table 6.2-13.
All penetrations listed in UFSAR Table 6.2-13 are now specified in Table 6.2-15 along with their categorization of being essential or nonessential.
No information is being deleted from the table.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page ll Revision 2
Date 12 7
90
3.7 A review of the design basis events analyzed in the Ginna Station UFSAR and the events requiring analysis as described in USNRC Reg.
Guide 1.70 was performed.
The events related to this UFSAR change are:
3.7.1 3.7.2 (a)
Fires (b)
Seismic Events (c)
Radiological Release From a Subsystem or Component (d)
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory (e)
Events Initiating a Safety Injection Signal The changes as described in Sections 3.3 through 3.6 and Attachments A through E do not affect the capability of the containment isolation system to perform its function during a fire.
The changes to the UFSAR are mainly minor clarifications and updates to reflect current plant conditions. 'here is no physical modification to Ginna Station as a result of these changes.
No fire barriers are affected by these
- changes, nor is there any increase in area fire loadings.
The changes as described in Sections 3.3 through 3.6 and Attachments A through E do not affect the capability of the containment isolation system to perform its function during a seismic event.
The changes to the UFSAR are mainly minor clarifications and updates to reflect current, plant conditions.
No changes are made wi.th respect to the seismic design of the affected penetrations.
3.7.3 The changes as described in Sections 3.3 through 3.6 and Attachments A through E do not affect the capability of the containment isolation system to respond. to a radiological release within containment.
The containment isolation system was reviewed in depth during the SEP and 1988 IST submittal.
The changes to the UFSAR are mainly clarifications and updates to reflect current plant conditions.
There is no physical modification to Ginna Station as a result of these changes.
Consequently, the containment isolation system is still within its design basis limits.
3.7.4 The'hanges as described in Sections 3.3 through 3.6 and Attachments A through E do not create the potential for the affected penetrations to cause a decrease in RCS inventory (i.e.,
a loss-of-coolant-accident).
The containment isolation system was reviewed in depth during the SEP and 1988 IST submittal.
The changes to the UFSAR are mainly clarifications and updates to reflect current plant conditions.
No changes were made to capability of the parent systems (e.g.,
Residual Heat Removal) to perform their function.
Consequently, the containment isolationsystem and associated parent systems remain within their design basis limits.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 12 Revision 2
3.7.5 Events which initiate Safety Injection also result in the need for containment isolation.
The changes to the UFSAR do not affect the capability of the containment isolation system to perform its function.
All changes were reviewed to ensure continued compliance with the design basis for the containment isolation system and the Ginna Station Licensing Basis.
4.0 Preliminar Safet Evaluation 4.1 4.2 The proposed UFSAR changes will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
The changes to the UFSAR are to correct typographical errors, provide additional clarification, and update tables and text to reflect actual plant conditions.
All changes to UFSAR Table 6.2-13 considered "less conservative" are acceptable and do not increase the probability of occurrence as discussed in Sections 3.3.2.4, 3.3.2.5, 3.3.2.6, and 3.3.3.3.
All additions and deletions to UFSAR Table 6.2-13 are also acceptable and do not increase the probability of occurrence as discussed in Sections 3.3.1.3, 3.3.2.1, 3.3.2.7, and 3.3.2.8.
The changes to the UFSAR Figures, text, Table 6.2-14, and Table 6.2-15 as discussed in Sections 3.3.4, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 respectively, only provide additional clarification with respect to the revised UFSAR Table 6.2-13.
- Thus, there is no change in system function, nor a reduction in system reliability.
The containment isolation and parent systems will remain within their design limits.
The proposed UFSAR changes will not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
The modification does not impact or increase the. calculated radiological dose to the general public for any event evaluated, in the UFSAR.
All changes to UFSAR Table 6.2-13 considered "less conservative" are acceptable and do not increase the consequences of an accident as discussed in Sections 3.3.2.4, 3.3.2.5, 3.3.2.6, and 3.3.3.3.
All additions and deletions to UFSAR Table 6.2-13 are also acceptable and do not increase the consequences of an accident as discussed in Sections 3.3.1.3, 3.3.2.1; 3.3.2.7, and 3.3.2.8.
The changes to the UFSAR Figures, text, Table 6.2-14, and Table 6.2-15 as discussed in Sections 3.3.4, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 respectively, only provide additional clarification with respect to the revised UFSAR Table 6.2-13.
Thus, the function and capability of the containment isolation system to isolate any radiological release within containment is not degraded.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 13 Revision 2
4.3 4 ~ 4 The proposed UFSAR changes will not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
All changes to UFSAR Table 6.2-13 considered "less conservative" are acceptable and do not increase the probability of occurrence as discussed in Sections 3.3.2.4, 3.3.2.5, 3.3.2.6, and 3.3.3.3.
All additions and deletions to UFSAR Table 6.2-13 are also acceptable and do not increase the probability of occurrence as discussed in Sections 3.3.1.3, 3.3.2.1, 3.3.2.7, and 3.3.2.8.
The changes to the UFSAR Figures, text, Table 6.2-14, and Table 6.2-15 as discussed in Sections 3.3.4, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 respectively, only provide additional clarification with respect to the revised UFSAR Table 6.2-13.
Thus, the changes do not degrade the performance of the containment isolation system, nor the associated parent systems.
The proposed UFSAR changes will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR. 'he changes do not impact or increase the calculated radiological dose to the general public for any event evaluated in the UFSAR.
All changes to UFSAR Table 6.2-13 considered "less conservative" are acceptable and do not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment as discussed in Sections 3.3.2.4, 3.3.2.5, 3.3.2.6, and 3.3.3.3.
All additions and deletions to UFSAR Table 6.2-13 are also acceptable and do not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment as discussed in Sections 3.3.1.3, 3.3.2.1, 3.3.2.7, and 3.3.2.8.
The changes to the UFSAR Figures, text, Table
-6.2-14, and Table 6.2-15 as discussed in Sections 3.3.4, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 respectively, only provide additional clarification with respect to the revised UFSAR Table 6.2-13.
Thus, the function and capability of the containment isolation system to isolate any radiological release from containment is not degraded.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 13a Revision 2
Date 10 7
90
4.5 4.6 4.7 The proposed UFSAR changes will not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
These changes are mainly clarifications and updates to reflect current plant conditions.
All changes to UFSAR Table 6.2-13 considered "less conservative" are acceptable and do not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment as discussed in Sections 3.3.2.4, 3.3.2.5, 3.3.2.6, and 3.3.3.3.
All additions and deletions to UFSAR Table 6.2-13 are also acceptable and do not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment as discussed in Sections 3.3.1.3, 3.3.2.1, 3.3.2.7, and 3.3.2.8.
The changes to the UFSAR Figures, text, Table 6.2-14, and Table 6.2-15 as discussed in Sections 3.3.4, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 respectively, only provide additional clarification with respect to the revised UFSAR Table 6.2-13.
There are no adverse affects upon other systems, nor any new failure modes induced.
The proposed UFSAR changes will not create the possibility of a different type of malfunction of equipment important to safety than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
The additions and deletions to UFSAR Table 6.2-13 are acceptable as discussed in Sections 3.3;1.3, 3.3.2.1, 3.3.2.7, and 3.3.2.8.
The changes to UFSAR Table 6.2-14 are acceptable as discussed in Section 3.5.
The changes to UFSAR Table 6.2-15 are acceptable as discussed in Section 3.6.
The changes do not degrade the containment isolation or associated parent systems.
The proposed UFSAR changes will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification.
The functions and characteristics of the containment isolation system remains unchanged.
- However, changes are made to valve isolation times and the valves listed for specific penetrations.
These changes are addressed in the Amendment Request to remove Table 3.6-1 from the Technical Specifications and reference the updated UFSAR Table 6.2-13 (Reference 2.24).
4.8 Based on the above analysis, it has been determined that:
(a)
The margins of safety during normal operation and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the plant has not been reduced, and (b)
The adequacy of structures,
- systems, and components provided for the prevention of accidents and for the mitigation of the consequences of accidents have not been affected.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 13b Revision 2
Attachment A
UFSAR Table 6.2-13 Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 14 Revision
r r ~ r
~r r
CINNA/UFSAR 0
Table 6.2 13 CONTAIBS!ENT PIPINC PENETRATION3 ANO ISOLATION VuVINC Stean generator loepectiool
- - usiPr'.1 " nalntenence
<<~j3, A@istueL treasfer
~ '+4',,P!Qjb loop 1gsfett iajeetloa lb discharge s
Penetration No 29 101 Valve No.
3708 870$
889$
Valve Blind flange blind flange Ches'k Check Check Valve Operator Position ladlest ioa In Control Roon NA Posltioa Relative to Contelnesnt Inside Outside Inside Inside Outside Ouc el de Norasl Otefstion C
0 C
C Position At Cold Shutdovn OIC OIC C
C 0
0 Iaaedlste Postsceldents Poser tellers Hszlaua Isolation Trip on Tine NA NA NA NA 6.2-13 5
1.
2 6.2-13 5
2, 3
6 ~ 2-14 38 6'
1S 38 6.2-15 38 UPSAR Notes
~rH~rl
~r44~
r re AL}senate ngtoA iold leg r
Coaetruetioa fire Soap A dL
~ to uaste
,cg
~r
~stoics aster Qj+r I
> Coitalaaant sprat peep LA v'i4 r lr
'Reactor, coolest paap",A seel eater inlet',
eeherge holdup 102 383$
103 105 862A 107 1723 1728 106 SOll Cheek blind flsage Check Check Disphtsga Dlsphrega Air Alr Status Statue Inside Inside Outside Inside Outside Outside 0
0 OIC OIC 0
C C
F 2 16 38 NA NA NA
- 6. 2-17 5
NA l!A NA 6 ~ 2 18 38 PC Tee 60 6'-20 2
tC Tee 60 6.2-20 2
NA NA NA 6 ~2-19 SB Aur C 'r 1u tells ae ie 9 u Air operated valve C! ~ e Closed
~CIS 6 Contslnaent isolstloa signal Cps u Check valve 4lCN 2 tails closed
$05 u taLle open LC bL.Locked closed
, I:.id:<7=;,
HOV 7!V 0
OIC RIC Status SOV Both Notor operated valve Nansei valve Open Opea or closed Redlgreen light oa aeln control board Chits status lighc Solenoid-opereted valve RIC snd Statue 6.2-91 RKV 6 12/90 NSL-0000-SA024
'4'Sj1
-Qfjfd~g}.' <<'~
= ei -:rC:
Page 14a
\\
r'ate 2/26/91
0INNA/UPSAR I',
Reactor coolest paap seal rotor rotors line asd attic ~ letdern tO a
Peaettatlon Valse 'etus No.
No.
108 313 Cat@
Mocor both
." "Positlos Value Indication Operator Is Conttol III Position Relative to Conte)anent Outside 0
Positloa At Cold Shutdovn OIC I~disco Poeteaotdente Poser Failure AI Maxlaaa Isolation Trip on Ttae Toe 60 Tabid 6.2-)S COHFAIHMEHT PIPING PINEFRATIONS AND ISOLATION VALVIHC tGmttnaod) 6.2-21 4I 6 UFSAR Notes
~B Cl
~SA 1
bh 4
.ag,)i-,"",
I nt sprsj
.Ib Reaicor coolest 109 8628 1)Oa )cop) 30th Cheat Chest NA NA Outside C
Inside C
0 0
HA 6.2 22 Sb NA 6.2-23 3b psap b seal rater Inlet
~tj Ia)sexton st line
. 'i>tsidul host I to b told 8isxi f4tdoss to Sosetatiua t 'osaka'aber; Q>,>gbw'8 (
.Sifotj tsjosttoa bsap, lidlethsrto btaodby auxil-iacp,feodreter
'to stean aeietor )i~~
jpc r ttobea to).
saalatord-i
-2*
iiudser
.u ti it!cask,co seal jeer" I4) si tco a to4 Si
+starless 3 Ltif!~
a
'9 aster)to prsossriser>>r lafctask g iigpjg u
120 959 112 20OA 200b ~,
202 Sll "
421'i
113 119 8)OA 889A 9104A
'9105A 120s 120b 846 8623 539 546 121a 528.
541 121k 508 519 c p.
110b tboctos) 819 Clubs Cata Clobe Clobe Clobs Clubs Clobs Globe Cheat Chock Sto~hock Chest Clobe Chock Clobe Clobs Chest Globo Otepbrsta Chest Meassi Motor Alr Atr Air Atr Atr Atr Motor NA Atr Manual NA Manual RIC Scstus RIC RIC RIC both RIC RIC NA boch NA 0 csidi Inside Oacstde Inside Inside Inside Oatstde Inside Outside Oatsido Outside Inside Outside Inside Outside Outside Inside Outstde Outside Isolde C
C OIC OIC C
0 0
C C
C C
C OIC C
0 C
OIC 0
OIC C
C C
0 OIC C
C C
C OIC OIC OIC 0
OIC OIC OIC OIC C
C C
C C
C C
0 0
0 0
C C
C 0
C C
AI FC
'FC FC FC FC 10 AI NA FC NA No Tee Toe Too Tes Toe Tos Toe NA Toe NA Tes HA 6'-15 NA NA 6.2-24 6.2-24 Sb Sb 60 60 60 60 NA 6'-25 6.2 25 6.2-25 6.2-25 6.2-25 NA NA 6.2-15 F 2-15 6.2 26 6.2-26 Sb 38 HA 6.2-29 SA NA F 2-29 SA 6 ~ 2 SO SA 6.2 SO 60 6221 SA NA 6.2 21 3A 60 6.2-28 2
HA 6-2-28 2
4I)e8 4,
1 10 10 10 12 p "0)
NSL-0000-SA024 f'g<' "., '.~.~ <i
~
~ 1,.
~ -..
~
~.
-a age 14 6.2'3 Date 2/26/91 REV 6 12/90
0INNA/UfSAR Table 6.2-13 CONTAINMENT PIPINC PENETRATIONS AND ISOIATION VALVINC <Conti sued I
~garou Coatalnaeat pressure traasaltter PT94f Penetration Ho.
121c Value Ho.
PT945 1819A Valw NA Globe Value Operator NA Naaual Posltloa Indlcatloo In Control Roon NA No Position Relative to Coatafneent Outside Outside Position At NA 0
NA 0
Noraal Cold Iaaodl ace
~O ration Shucdovn Postaeeldents Pove r Fai lure NA NA Trip on CIS HA NA Narlaua Isolation Tine
~sec S
NA NA V7SAR
~Fl Uro F 2 31 6.2-31 ClaoaC Notes
~Si M
13 Contalnaent pressure troaaaltcer PT946 1216 PT946 HA NA NA Outside NA NA 18198 Clobe Haanal Ho Outside 0
0 NA 0
NA NA HA NA 6.2 )I 2
6.2-31 2
Standby aurII fary feedvater line Co stean generator IB 123 itopl 91048 Stop-cheeR.
Notor 91058 Check HA RIC NA Outside laslde AI NA No HA NA NA 6.2 26 4
6.2 26 4
- Reactor coolant drala tank to Fas analycer line Excess letdova heat exchaogor cooling vater
~apply 4 return Postaccident sir saaple to C faa Cosponent cooling "
vscer froa reoccur coolan'c puap 18 123 fbortoa) 124a 124b 125 1600A Idff 1789 743 745 1569 1511 1512 1574 7598 Clobe Clubs Diapbraga Cheek Clobs Dfayhrsga Dfapbraga Dlaphraga Dfaphragu Cato Sole sold Nanual Alr NA Air Nanual Nanual Nansei Naawi Notor No No S Cetus NA RIC No No No Ho RIC Outside Outside Outside Inside Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside 0
0 0
OIC 0
0/C C
0 C
FC HA FC HA Fc NA HA NA HA AI Tes NA Tes NA No NA NA NA NA HA HA 60 NA NA 6'
)2 2
6'-)2 2
6.2-)2 2
6.2-3) 4 6 '2-33 6.2-)4 S
6.2-34 6.2-)4 5
6.2 34 6.2-35 4
14 Coaponenr. cooling voter froa reactor coolant psap IA 126 759A Cato Notor R/0 Outside 0
0 Al Ho NA 6 ~236 4
Coaponeat cooling vates Co reaecor coolant puup IA Coo pone at cooling vatet to toacCO'r coolaot puap IB 121 128 149A 750A 7498 7508 Cate Check Cato Cheek Notor NA Notor NA R/0 NA RIG NA Outside Inside Out ~ Lda Inside 0
0 0
0 AI NA Al NA No NA No NA NA HA NA HA 6 ~ 2-31 4
6'-)7 4
6.2 38 4
F 2-)8 4
6.2-95 REV 6 12/90 j ~
Safety Analysis Revision 3
NSL-0000-SA024 Page 14c Date 2/26/91
CINNA/UFSAR Table 6.2 13 CaVTAIhMENT PII'INC PENETRATIONS AND ISOLATION VALVINC (Continued)
~gates Reactor coolant drala tank and pressuriser relief tank to coatslnnent vent header Penetration No.
129 Valve No.
1713 1786 1787 1793 Valve
~T Check Dlaphragn Diaphrags Dfapbrags Valve Operator NA Air Alr Nanual Position Iadlcatfon In Control Roon NA Status Status No Posl'clou Relative to Contafnsent Outside Outside Out ~ lde Outside Norssl OEcrst fan C
0 0
LC OIC C
C OIC C
C C
LC Position At Cold Insediate Sbutdoun Postaccidcnta Paver Failure NA FC FC NA Trip on CIS NA Tes Tea NA Naxlnus Isolation Tine
~scc S
NA eo 60 NA UFSAR
~FI ure 6.2-39 6.2 39 6.2-39 6.2-39 Cia est 3A 3A 3A 3A Notes rl 12 Conponeat coollnf, uater fros reactor auppot't cooling 130 814 Cato Notor Both Outside 0
0 Al Yes 60 e.2-40 4
Conpoaeat cooling eater to rose'tor supporc cooliog 131 Cate Notor Both Outside 0
0 AI Yes 60 6.2-40 4
Cootalosoot sial-purfo exhaust Resfdual bast tenoval pssp suctloo Iron A hot leg 132 7970 butterfly Alr Both Insfdo OIC OIC 7971 Butterfly Alr Both Outside C
OIC 140 701 Cat ~
Notor RIC Inside C
0 FC Tes 6.2-41
'fC Tes 3
6'-41 S
AI No NA 6.2-42 I
7, 8 Residual base rcsoval punp A
~uctloa Iron
~ uop b Residual boar.
renovsL pusp B
~uctloo Iron cusp b I41 142 830A 1813A 830B 1813b Cate Cate Cate Cate Notor Notor Notus Notor RIC RIC RIC RIC Outside Out ~ Ide Outside Outside C
OIC C
OIC 0
C AI AI AI Al No No No No NA NA NA NA 6.2 42 3
e.7-42 6 ~ 2-42 3
IS.2 42 3
IS 8
IS 8
Reactor coolant drsla taok discharge line 143 1003A 1003b 1721 Die phragn Dfafbrags Dlaphrags Alr Air Alr Status Scatus Status Outside Outside Outside 0
0 0
OIC OIC 0
fC Tcs 60 6.2-43 2
FC Tes 60 6.2 43 fC Tes 60 6.2-42 Reactor 201 Itopi c os pa 'rtoe nt 201 Ibotton) cooling unite A and 8 4737 4636 butterfly Butterfly Nanasl Nanual No No Outside Outside 0
0 0
0 NA NA NA NA 6.2 44 4
6.2-4S 4
16 17 b hydrogen 202 rotc%binet IPilot and nein) 1076B 10848 1021181 1021381 Dlaphrags Dlspbfsgn Clobs Globe Nansei Nanua1 Solenoid Solenoid No No Status Status Outside Outside Outside Outside LC LC C
C LC LC C
C LC LC C
C NA NA NA NA FC Tes fC Tes NA NA 3
IS.2.46 6.2 46 3
6.2-46 e.2-46 s
18 Ig 6.2'7 REV 6 12/90 9.nXL'3:Ps 9 NSL-0000-SA024
%age 1'45 Revision 3
Dat:e 2/26/91
I I*
32
,y CINNA/VFSAR Table 6.2 13 C(NTAINNINT PIPINC PINEYRATIONS AND ISOLATION VALVINC (Continued)
~Satan Coatalnaent pressure crsnsnfccsr PT947 aod PT948 Penetration No.
20)a Valve No.
PT947 PT948 I8)9C 1819D Valve NA NA Globe Clobe Valve Oplracor NA NA Nansei Naaua I Position Indicscfon In Control Roon NA NA No No Outside Outside Outside Out ~ ide NA NA 0
0 Post tion Relative to Nor l d
d n
d Position At Cold Sbutdovn NA NA 0
0 NA NA 0
0 Inacdlace Postaccldcnt Foes r
'failure NA NA NA NA Trip oa CIS NA HA NA NA Hex(nun Isolation Tine
~scc s
NA NA NA NA UFSAR
~fl urc 6.2-47 6.2-47 6.2 47 6.2-47 Clues~
Not~ s
~dd d
dl
)3 13 Posracctdeat air
~aapl ~ to D Can Purge supply duct Loop 8 hot leg saaple Preseurlrer liquid space saaple Stean generator A
saapl ~
Ffe o o utIs er ~ 'cc s n
~ pace sasple 203b 204 205 20da (top) 20db (botton) 20)a (top) 1563 1565 IS66 IS68 NA 5869 955 95dD 966C 953 956K 9668 5733 573$
951 956f 966A Dlaphraga DIs phrs ga Dlaphragn Diaphraga Slfnd flange Suttertly Clobe Clobo Clobe Clobe Globe Cloba Globe Slobs C lobe C lobe C lobe Nansei Nansei Nsnual Nanual NA Air Alr Nanual Air Alt Nanual Alr Nanwl Air Alr Nanw1 Air No No No No NA Doth Scacao No Status Status Ho Scacus Ho SCOCus Sceeen No St ~cu ~
Outside Outside Outside OutsMO Iaslde 0 teide Inside Octa(de Outside Inside Outside OutsMO Oatslde Outside Inside Outside Outside C
0 C
C 0
C 0
0 C
0 C
0 OIC C
0 C
C 0
C 0
C C
0 C
C 0
C 0
C NA NA NA NA HA FC FC NA FC FC HA FC fC NA FC NA HA NA NA NA Yes Tes NA Tea Tes NA Tes NA Yes Tes NA Yes NA NA HA NA NA NA NA NA 60 NA NA 60 NA 60 NA NA 60 6.2-48 6.'2 48 6.2 48 6.2-48 6.2-49 6.2 49 6.2 50 F 2-$ 0 6.2-50 6.2-51 6.2 $ 1 6.2-51 6.2-52 6.2 52 6.2-53 6.2-$ 3 6.2-53 2,
19 19 Reactor cospaftnaat cooling unite A
and 8 209 (top) 209 (bottoa)
Stesa generator 8
20)b (botton)
~ aspic 5734 5736 463$
4758 Clobe Clobe Sutterfly Succcrfly Nanual Air Nansei Naaual No SC ~ Cu ~
Outside Outside Outside Outside 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
C NA FC NA
'Yes NA HA NA 60 F 2-$ 4 6.2 54 6.2-44 6.2 45 16 17 ldn)
Oxygen w)Leap co A 6 8 reconblncrs Purge exhaust duce Ancillary SCean supply to contalnnent 210 301 1080A 102148 1021481 102158 1021581 NA
$879 6151 6165 Clobe Clobe Cloba C lobe Clubs Sllnd flange Suttcrfly Cate Cate Nansei Solano(d Solano(d SolenoM SolcnoM NA Air Nansei Nanusl Ho Statue Status Status Sta'cus NA Doth No No 0 raids Outside Outside Outside Outs fdc Inside Outside Outside Cats(de LC C
C C
C LC C
C C
C 0
OIC LC C
C C
C HA FC FC FC FC NA FC NA NA NA Tes Ye ~
Tea Yes NA Ycs NA NA NA S
3 S
3 NA NA NA HA 6.2 5$
6.2-5$
5 F 2-55 5
6.2-55 5
6'-5$
5 6.2 56 5
6.2-56 5
6.2-$ 7 4
6.2 57 4
18, 9 18 IS, 9
IS 2,
19 19 6.2-99 REV 6 12/90 R@ity 'Aii'ilyeis'-'.
NSL-0000-SA024
'age 14e Revision 3
I
CINNA/UFSAR Apt- (j;.,
Aclxiliot7 stean cgj
" "i" condenssto return
-~~.ig='4
'I"':>ca 4, '5 A hydtoges uuf 7 4reconblner ipilot pand, nein) c I Penetration l.
303 Valve No.
6)f2 6175 1076A 1084A 10205 51 1020931 Valve Naphrsys Disphrsga Dlsphrsgn Naphrayc Clobe Clobo Valve Oplretor Nansei Nssual Nsnusl Nsnllal Solenoid Solenoid Position Indication In Control Roou No No No No Status Status Position Relative to Conte)asset Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Homal Oforstloa LC LC C
C Positios At Cold gbutdovn LC LC C
C LC LC C
C I~diets Possess)dusts Poser Ps)lure Trip on CI8 NA NA Tee Tes Nsxisua Isolation Tine
~ssc b
NA NA HA NA 3
3 VESAR
~EI re 6.2 57 6.2-57
- 6. 2-58 6.2-58 6'
58 6.2-58 Clause Notes
~PP 4
bi 18 18 Table 6.2-13 CONTAIN)QÃT PIPIHC PINETRATIOHS AHD ISOLATION VALVINC <Continued)
Containaest air c;++9 'ontaisaeat air
- L -C
'oetaccld one
)era <Ncvfca
~star rvfco us'tot k) g
'ftoa A fsn cooler 305a fbotton)
SOfb (top) 1596 1597 1598 1599 1554 1556 1557 1559
)f60
)f62 9227 9229 4629 Clobe Disphtsga Nsphrsga Di a phrs yc Nsphrays Nsphrega Diapbrayc Naphrsga Diephrays Naphtsga Cato Cbec'k lstterfly Air Air Nsnusl Nsnusl Nsseal Nsseal Nsnasl Nsseal No loth loth loth No No No No No No Doth NA No Outside 0 teide Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Inside Outside 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
C OIC 0
C C
C NA EC EC EC EC HA NA Tss Tee Tes Yes NA NA 60 NA NA
)CA NA NA HA 60 NA NA 6.2-59 6.2-59 6.2-60 6.2 60 6.2 61 6.2-61 6.2-61 6.2-61 6'
61 6.2-61 6.2-62 6.2 62 6.2-63 SA 3A 16 r',
6~
c s c)IP
'0
'Service outer
, iron S fsn cooler
'Service vatat to
'D faa cooler go test deptossurfratfon cia p Service rater roe C fan cooler r,
I Servfca astor to S'fan cooler NR t x~NLni purge supply Iv's
- r$'?',.4
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'I,t i)
~accusant air to s ~tafnasnt 1~I 309 S10a fbottoa) 310b itop) 311 312 313 315 316 7445 7478 7141 7226 SS92 SS93 4630 4642 NA 7444 4643 4628 Sutterfly lutterfly Cate Check Clobe Chock luttetf17 lutterfly llind flange Butterfly Sutterfly lu't'torfly Air Air Nsnual NA Notor Nssusl loth loth loth NA No No NA gta'tus Outside Inside Outside Inside Outside Inside Outside Outside Inside Outside Outside Outside OIC OIC
'0 0
C C
C C
OIC OIC 0
0 0IC OIC C
C OIC OIC C
C C
C EC EC EC 1)A HA Al HA Tee Tes Tes NA NA F 2 64 6.2-64 6.2-6$
6.2-65 6.2-66 6.2-66 6.2-63 6.2-63 3A SA SA SA NA NA 6.2-67 6.2-67 6.2-63 NA 6.2-63 4
16 17 19 16 17 6.2-101 REV 6 12/90 NSL-0000-SA024 Page 14f Revision 3"
Date 2/26/91
CIHHA/UPSAR 0
ee'i
~gates faaksge 'tost
/supply Penetration Ho.
317 Valve No.
NA 7443 Valve iliad flange lutterfiy Valve Operator NA Nator tosftfon Iodicatios In Control Roon NA Statue Position Relative to Contalnusnt Inside OutsMO NoTsal Operation C
C 0
0 C
C Poeltlos Ate Cold Issedfate Shutdovs Postsccldents Poser Pi410T0 NA AI Trip on CIS NA Tee Naxfsun Isolatioo Tine
~ssc b
NA NA OF)AN
~Fl ure 6.2'6 6'-66 NA Classt Note ~
~IS b
bb HA 19 20 Table 6 ~ 2-13 COHTAIHHI)IT PIP1HC PXNETRATIOHS AND ISOLATION VALVIHC IContlnuedi HC fan cooler boreas generator blovdorn
~\\b
~ 6 I
vv 5 ]II I '
.$ ;:A.
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~
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arses gesetetor
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)1 Deslneralisad recut to contaissent r
Coatafssenc pteeoute trasssf tt0ro ~
t2944, P7949, ond PT9$0
. Bydrogen sonftor fustrusentatf on line
-Deadveight tester T"
5II I lb rvfce rater to b~(
~
i fan cooler r y~+ilcgetvfce vatar to
)16 319 320 321 322 323 324 3$ 2a
$)2c 4627 4641 5701 SISS 5702 5737 4644 6414 6419 72944 PT949 PI9$0 16192 1619P IS19C 921 922 923 924 lutterfly lucterfiy Clobe Clobs Clobe Clobs Butterfly Globe Check NA NA NA Clobs Clobe Clobe Cate Cate Cate Cate Nansei IIanual IIanuaf Air Nanual Air Ifanual NA NA NA Nanual Nansei Nansei Solenofd SolenoM Solenoid Solenoid No Status No Status loth NA NA NA NA No No Ho loch loth loch loch Outside 0 cslde Outside Outside OutsMO Outside Outside Outside Inside Outside Outside Outside Oucside Outside Outefde Outside Outside Outside Outside 0
0 0
0 C
C NA NA NA 0
0 0
C C
C C
OIC OIC 0
OIC 0
OIC OIC OIC OIC HA HA NA 0
0 0
C C
C C
0 C
0 C
C C
NA NA NA 0
0 0
C C
C C
NA NA NA HA NA NA HA NA NA Tes NA Tea Tee NA NA NA HA NA NA NA Tea Tee Tee Tes NA NA NA 60 NA 60 HA 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2 69 6.2 69 F 2-70 6.2 70 6.2-63 6.2-71 6.2-71 6.2-72 6.'2-72 6.2-72 6.2-72 6'-72 6.2-72 6.2-73 6 ~ 2 7) 6.2-73 6'-73 17 17 16 1) 13 13 5
21 5
21 5
21 5
21 55 IBsfn stean fros A
~Cess genatotor vf s,stean gros l areas generator 4
AbIC 6.
LA
~
~
401 402 3505A
)507 3517 3519 3521 S504A 3506 3516 SSIS
$520 Cata Cat@
Svlng check Check Cs'te Cata Cato Sving check Check Cata Notor Ilanual Air HA Ifanual Notor Hansel Air NA Hansel RIC No RIC NA No RIC Ho RIC NA No Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside C
0 0
0 0
C 0
0 0
0 C
C C
C 0
C C
C C
0 0
0 C
C 0
0 0
C C
0 AI NA Al NA HA AI NA Al NA No NA No NA HA Ho HA No NA NA NA KA NA NA NA 6.2-74 6.2 74 6.2-74 6.2-74 6.2-74 6.2-74 6.2-74 6 ~ 2-74 F 2-74 6.2-74 6.2-103 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 REV 6 12/90 NSL-0000-SA024 Page 14c4 Revision 3
Date 2/26/91
I CLNHh/ViSAR Table 6.2-I3 COKTAIIOIEÃT PIPIKC PINPTAATIQIS ANO ISOLATION VALVINC (Cent lnuedl
'~bt IRetos i i<>)'
Pes4vster line to A ocean Senerator Peastratlua Ne.
403 I
>ttf: t
$>XIiN'pssdvator line to 404 Jri:,
.It
~) stean Senorstor Valve Ko.
3993 399$
4000C 4003 400$
40II 3992 3994 40000 4004 4004 40I2 Vs Lv@
~T Check Clobe Check Check Clnbs Clnbs Check Clubs Chock Check Clubs Clubs Valve Operator NA Ifsnusf NA NA Ifsnusf Hansel NA Nsnusf NA NA Neuusf Nenes I PosLtion Indication Ia Coacrnl Noes NA No NA NA No No KA No NA NA No No Poslcfos Selatfve to Cesreluaest Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Out olde Outside Outside Oucelds Oucslde Outside Outside Noraaf
~Oretf en 0
0 C
C 0
0 0
0 C
C 0
0 Position At
'Cold Shutdevn C
0 C
C 0
0 C
0 C
C 0
0 C
0 0
0 0
0 1~diets Per 't e c cI4 e nt C
0 0
0 0
0 Pave r failure HA HA HA NA HA KA KA NA KA NA NA KA Trfp nn CI9 HA NA NA NA KA NA NA NA NA HA HA NA Ifsxious Isulacfon Tine
~sec b
NA KA HA KA NA NA KA HA NA HA NA NA UPSAN
~PI ure 6'tl5 6 ~ 2-25 6.2 75 6 ~ 2-25 6 ~ 2-25 6 ~ 2-25 6.2 35 6 ~ 2-25 6 ~ 2-25
- 4. 2-35 4 ~ 2-35 6.2-3$
Closet Hates
~54 t
cl II IIII IIIIll IIIIIIIIIIII 1000 NA O~
I=OARk~~
~f-v,~f-'P ~tC5%
O~
tIIS. Pereuoael batch KA HA NA HA Inside C
OIC r
eHI Oucsfde INqufposse hatch 2000 HA NA NA lucida C
OIC 4
Outside fera to position fmadfately fu'LluvlnS receipt of contalnseac isolation siSnsl an4 coacslaoent veatf lotion isolation slcoal.
, ~
pf
.Zbo sanious isolation ciao does not include diesel start cfss acr fnstrusenc delay tfse.
P~
~ I ettlsfers to classes defined ln Sectlua 6 ~2.4 ~4.
Hates oofy used tn sepplsaeac Section 6 ~ 2 4 ~ 4 ~
f hata5kg ff5~xnVWk$& X5,&k C5 cn,~t txnA n~npc~A 2
',,:4Q 'l KA HA NA NA NA 3.S 3l NA NA 3.4-30 NA f5 ~
k$~~
yhui Q IMQ z.J~(
~a "i
6.2-105 REV 6 12/90 NSL-0000-SA024 r
Page 14h Revision
- 3 Date 2/26/91
TAle 6.2-13 CONTAINMIÃT PIPINC PENETRATIONS AND ISOLATION VALVINC (Continued)
RKV 6 12/90
- -'II,;,'ij I
';;=
'7 i /'ci c).
~~cia '
(I)
Penetration ausbsr 2 vss added as a result ot EUR 4996 to fseHitste steas generator sstatsnsnce actfvltles during reduced lnveatory operation.
This penetrstfoa Ls closed by a double gssketed on both esdsl bowver, oaly one ot tbe tvo (langue ls oeeesssry for eontatssent integrity purposes.
(2)
This penetration ts provided vith redundant seals ssd ls closed during norusl operation.
-.: -l,, (3)
The and of the fuel crsasfer tube inside eontatccsent ls closed by a double-gssketed blind flange, to prevent Ieskste of spent fuel pool vster into tbe coatatnaent during plant operation.
This c""
flange also serves as protect(os against leakage froa tbe contalsseat tollovlng ~ Ious-ot-coolest accident.
~c ~<<b2, 0'P (4)
This Ls a closed systes outside contatnsent.
VerttLeatioa of this closed systes ss s contalnaent isolation bcendsry le aeeoupllshed vta tnservlee andlor shutdova leakage shucks.
This sppILes to ths tolloving systeasl safety lnjeetloa, eontatnrent spray, charging, residual best resovsl, and coaponent eoollng vster.
2 u>>"c). '5)
This penetration vss oaly utHtsed during Lntttsl pleat construetlon snd ts sslntalned fnsetfve.
<<J Ai cl (6)
A eeeoa4 Lsolatloa br/sr ts provided by the voluse control task and eonneetlng piping psr letter fros D. D. Dtlanni, NRC, to R. 'U. Kober, RCLE, dated January 30, 1967 ~
Thts barrier fs noc rec(strad OCFMec t'PENT'< W. ~ (~6C<~mQ.H.. (
V ~444.'Lh., ~(7'ac+C) Y C'. PCkiCV (2( t C kl,~k Apr'c4 a. 103
,Jck, (7) 10 CPR 50, Appendix J eontsinsent Leakage testing ts aot required pr~L D. Altec Jr
~ letter to D L
Etessnnc NRCc dated Septesber 21, )976.
P' (0)
M¹ ISISAy )813gc 720 ~ snd 701 are sstntsfaed closed at pver vlth their breakers locked ott.
'<<P+>P (9); This vela receives
~ coatatnseat isolation stgnslt bowwr, eredlt ts not taken for this tsnctloa stnee the valve ts tnstde tbe slsslle barrier or outside the neeesssry class break boundary.
",'betefore, this velw le not subject to 10 CPR 50, Appendix J Leakage testing, nor does ft rec(etre a sextans Lsolsttoa tine.
The eoatainsent isolsttoa signal only eahsnces tsolseton espsbtitty.
c (10)'oatalnsent isolation stgasls wre added to AOVs 200A, 2009'nd 202 since AOV 427 falls opea on loss of pover.
The isolstioa signal for these three valves ts relayed fros AOV 427.
l' (11)
Tbe sstn stess, ssin feedvater, and standby auxiliary feedvster isolation valves are not considered cootafnsent tsolstfon valves.
The eoatsinsent bwndsry ts the stean generator secondary side and tubs.
~ cbdlk4 ~ nc)J ~at~
ttbc.p(P.so App<<h'k)
"H'l2)
Msaual valws 547 snd 1793 are locked closed and leak tested to provide ec(utvalent proteecfoa for CDC 56 and 57 (see UTSAR Seetioa 4.2.4.4 ~ I ~ Class SA).
4 cg
-cc(
Sclg)
The pressure transsttter sssesblyc by ite design, provides s eontainsent pressure bouadsry.
Tbe tatsgrity ot this boundary Ls verified by annual Leakage teste 1 (14)
Operations Ls tnstructed to annually clos ~ AOV 745 follcwtng a contatnseat isolation etgasl antH an autosstfc signal ts fnstslled through tbe necessary sodlfiestlon.
p(IS)
Susp lines are tn operation and tilled vLth flufd follovtng sn accldentl therefore, 10 CTR 50, Appgdlx J leakage testing, ts not rec(steed for this penetration.
See L. D. Uhlte, Jr., letter to D. L
- 2Lessnn, NRC, dated Septeabr 21, 197~
u Jf ~ 2 l 4
'C ( 14)
This ssnusl valve ts eub jest to sn annual hydrostatic Leakage test and Ls not sub]eet to 10 CPR 50, Appsdtx J Leakage testing.
c'0, (()7)
The service aster systes opsrstee at a higher pressers thea tbe contstusent aeeldent pressure and ls alsstle protected Lnstde contstnsent.
Therefore, this ssnusl valve fs used for flov control oaly and ie not subject to 10 CTR 50, AppendLx J Leakage testiog.
Ses latter fros J. E. Melar, ROLE, to D. M. Crutehfteld.
NRC, dated A~gust 30. 1982.
(Igl
, Thts solenot4 valve ts satatalne4 lnaettve ln the closed posttfon by resovsl of tts dc control. powr.
(19)
,- The tlsnges and associated doubl ~ seals provide eontsloaent isolation and ensure that eoatalnsent tategrlty ls sslatslned tor sll sodes of operation above sold shutdovn.
Uben the flsnges are
- resovsd, cold shutdovn coatsinseat tategrtty ls provided by the valves.
These valves do not rec(utes 10 CTR 50. Appndtx J Ieskste testing, nor a ssxtsus isolation ttae.
e46
', -cc '6 (20)
This penetration fs deeosaLssfoned snd wlded shut.
'(21)
Aceeptsbl ~ lsolatlon espabLlfty ls presided for Lnstrussnt Itnes by tvo Lsolatlon boundaries outside eontsLnaent.
Oae of the boundaries outside eontslnsent is a Seisatc Cstetory I closed systes
-0'",'4(c'hLch fs sub)ected to Type C leakage testtag under 10 CPR 50, Appeadix J.
6.2-107 NSL-0000-SA024 Page 14i
.Revision 3
Attachment B
UFSAR Table 6.2-13 Changes Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 15 Revision 0
Date 09 24 90
The blanks or "-" within columns were replaced with "NA".
Typographical clarification only.
No technical change.
2.
(1) The blanks or "-" for the Position At columns were replaced with the representative position; (2) The "No" listed under Position Indication in Control Room was replaced with "NA".
(1)
(2) The valve position and "NA" are more representative of the penetration configuration.
In addition, consistency is maintained within the table.
No technical change.
3.
The "AI" or blank for the Power Failure column for manual valves was replaced with "NA".
The "NA" is more representative of the penetration =configuration since a
manual valve does not receive any motive power.
No technical change.
4.
was replaced with "NA".
The "NA" is more representative of the penetration configuration.
In addition, consistency is maintained within the table.
No technical change.
5.
The blank or "No" for Maximum Isolation Time was replaced with "NA".
The "NA" is more representative of the penetration configuration.
In addition, consistency is maintained within the table.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 16 Revision 0
Date 9 24 90
Added "Cold" to Position At Shutdown column heading.
Minor clarification for consistency with Technical Specifications.
No technical change.
2.
(1) Added "Immediate" to Position At Postaccident column heading; (2) Added Footnote "a".
(1) (2) Clarification of column since valve position can be potentially changed during post accident recovery operations.
Column now provides clear definition of penetration configuration following receipt of a CIS.
3.
table; (2) Deleted definitions for "W" and "G" from table Legend.
(1) (2) Column did not provide any information relevant to table.
Fluid type can be inferred from
~S stem column.
4 ~
1 associated Footnote "c" from table.
Column did not provide any information relevant to table.
5.
Added definitions for "AOV", "CV",
"MOU", "MV", and "SOU" to table Legend.
Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
6.
(1) Modified Position Indication in Control Room column to reflect type of indication instead of "Yes" and "No";
(2)
Added definition for "R/G" and "Status" to table Legend.
"Both" indicates that a red/green light and status light exists.
(1) (2) The type of control room indication is more representative of the system configuration.
This is a clarification only.
No technical change.
7.
Moved Table Heading Footnotes "a", "b",
"c", and "d" to first page of table.
Minor format change only.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 17 Revis ion 3
Date 2/26/91
8.
(1)
Renamed Footnote "a" to "b";
(2)
Added "nor instrument delay time" to end of note.
(1) (2) Minor clarification only.
Note is now consistent with Standard Review Plan Section 6.2.4.
No technical change.
9.
Renamed Footnote "b" to "cme No technical change.
10.
Deleted "Line" from
~S stem column heading.
No technical change.
Added Footnote "d" to Notes column.
Minor clarification only.
The Notes column is now only used to supplement the UFSAR text which provides more information.
No technical change.
12.
Added Footnote "e" to Notes column and Position At column heading.
Minor clarification only.
The addition of this note provides consistency with 10CFR50 Appendix J criteria.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 18 Revision Date 2/26/91
Added penetration and necessary information to the table.
This spare penetration was modified to provide access for steam generator inspection and maintenance cabling during refueling outages to enhance containment closure during midloop operations.
No new valves were added.
2.
Penetration 29 (1) Global Note 1; (2)
Added Note 2.
(1)
(2)
No technical change.
3.
Penetration 100 (1) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4; (2) Added Note 4; (3)
Changed Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0/C" to "C".
(1)
(2)
No technical change.
(3) Update for better representation of system configuration since the Charging System is isolated upon receipt of a SI signal.
4.
Penetration 101 (1) Global Notes 1,
2, 4,
and 5; (2) Added Note 4; (3) Added "38" under Class for valve 8898; (4)
Reordered penetration valves.
(1)
(2)
No technical change.
(3)
Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(4) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
5.
Penetration 102 (1) Global Notes 1,
2, 4,
and 5; (2)
Added Note 4.
(1)
(2)
No technical change.
6.
Penetration 103 Deleted valve 5129 (entire line in table) and replaced with Blind Flange.
Replaced Note of "No longer in use" to reflect accurate configuration status of Blind Flange.
The use of the Blind Flange is consistent with the previously listed locked-closed manual valve.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 19 Revision 0
Date 9 24 90
7.
Penetration 105 (1) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4; (2) Added Note 4.
(1)
(2)
No technical change.
8.
Penetration 106 (1) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4; (2) Added Note 4; (3)
Changed "supply" to "Inlet" under
~S stem.
(1)
(2)
No technical change.
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
Penetration 107 (1)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "Status" for both valves; (2)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "0/C" for both valves.
(1) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(2) Update for better representation of system configuration.
10.
Penetration 108 (1) Added "and Excess Letdown to VCT" under ~Sstem; (2)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "Both";
(3)
Changed'osition At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "0/C".
(4) Added Note 4.
(5) Added Note 6.
(1) Consistency with Technical Specification Table 3.6-1.
(2) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(3) Update for better representation of system configuration since this line may or may not be used during cold shutdown conditions.
(4)
(5)
No technical change.
%09 (1) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4; (2) Added Note 4.
(1)
(2)
No technical change.
12.
Penetration 110a (1) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4; (2) Added Note. 4.
(1)
(2)
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page.20 Revision 0
13.
Penetration 110b (1) Global Notes 3
and 4; (2) Added Note 4; (3)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown and Position At Immediate Postaccident from "C" to llLClt (1)
(2)
No technical change.
(3)
Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
14.
Penetration 111 (1)
Added Note 7 to both valves; (2) Added Note 8 to valve 720; (3)
Added Note 4 to both valves; (4)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "R/G" for MOV 720; (5)
Added valve 959 and necessary information.
(1) Consistency with Technical Specifications.
(2)
(3)
No technical change.
(4) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(5) Valve receives containment isolation signal and was previously missing from the table.
15.
Penetration 112 (1) Deleted valves 204A and 821 (entire line in table) and replaced with valves
- 200A, 200B, and 202; (2)
Added valve 427 and necessary information; (3)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "Both" for valve 371; (4)
Changed Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0" to "C" for valve 371.
(1)
(2) Present configuration status; the three new valves enable explicit compliance with GDC 55 vs. the use of redundant outboard isolation valves.
The 200A,
- 200B, 202, and 427 valves have been successfully tested.
(3)
Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4) Update for better representation of system configuration since letdown is isolated upon receipt of a SI signal.
Penetration 113 (1) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4; (2) Added Note 4 to both valves; (3) Reordered penetration valves.
(1)
(2)
No technical change.
(3)
Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 21 Revision 0
Date 9 24 90
17.
Penetration 119 (1) Global Notes 1,
2, 4,
and 5; (2)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "No" to "R/G" for valve 9704A; (3) Reordered penetration valves.
(1)
No technical change.
(2) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(3) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
18.
Penetration 120a (1) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4 for valve 8623; (2)
Changed valve 846 from "Gate" to "Globe";
(3)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "Both" for valve 846; (4)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration from "0/C" to "C" for valve 846; (5)
Reordered penetration valves.
(1)
No technical change.
(2)
Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4)
Update for better representation of system configuration.
This valve remains closed unless the accumulator nitrogen blanket pressure decreases.
(5) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
19.
Penetration 120b (1)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "Status" for valve 539; (2)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration from "0/C" to "C" for valve 539; (3) Global Notes 3
4 for valve 546.
(1) Minor clarificati'on only.
No technical change.
(2) Update for better representation of system configuration.
(3)
No technical change.
20.
Penetration 121a (1) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4 for valve 528; (2)
Changed valve 547 from "Diaphragm" to "Globe";
(3)
Changed Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0" to "LC" for valve 547; (4)
Changed Position At Normal (5) Global Notes 3 and 4 for valve 547; (6) Deleted reference to "old" Note 9; (7) Added Note 12 to valve 547.
(1)
No technical change.
(2)
Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(3) Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(4)
Update for better representation of system configuration.
No technical change.
(5)
No technical change.
(6)
Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(7)
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 22 Revision 0
Date 9 24 90
21.
Penetration 121b (1)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "Both" for valve 508; (2)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration from "0/C" to "C" for valve 508; (3)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration from "C" to "0/C" for valve 529; (4) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4 for valve 529; (5) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(2)
(3) Update for better representation of system configuration.
(4)
No technical change.
(5) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
22.
Penetration 121c (1) Global Note 1 for PT945; (2) Global Notes 3 and 4 for valve 1819A; (3) Added "Gate" under (1)
(2)
No technical change.
(3)
Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
23.
Penetration 12ld (1) Global Note 1 for PT946; (2) Global Notes 3 and 4 for valve 1819B.
(1)
(2)
No technical change.
24.
Penetration 123 (bottom)
(1) Added "to" before "Gas Analyzer Line" under
~sstem; (2) Global Notes 3 and 4 fon 1655; (3)
Changed valve 1789 from "Globe" to "Diaphragm";
(4)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "Status" for valve 1789; (5)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration from "0/C" to "0" for valve 1789; (6)
Added valve 1600A; (7) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Consistency with Technical Specification Table 3.6-1.
(2)
No technical change.
(3) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(4) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(5) Update for better representation of system configuration since this line remains open.
(6) Valve receives containment isolation signal and was previously missing from the table.
(7)
Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 23 Revision 0
Date 9 24 90
25.
Penetration 123 (top)
(1) Global Notes 1,
2, 4,
and 5; (2)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "No" to "R/G" for valve 9704B.
(1)
No technical change.
(2) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
26.
Penetration 124a (1) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4 for valve 743; (2)
Changed Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0" to "C" for valve 743; (3)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "R/G" for-valve 745; (4) for valve 745; (5)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "60" to "NA" for valve 745; (6)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "C" for valve 745.
(1)
No technical change.
(2) Update for better representation of system configuration.
Operations is instructed to manually isolate this line following receipt of a containment isolation signal.
(3) -Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4)
(5) Correction of typographical error.
See letter from R. Mecredy, RG&E, to A. Johnson,
- NRC, dated July 9, 1990.
(6) Update for better representation of system configuration since excess letdown is not operational during cold shutdown conditions.
27.
Penetration 124b (1) Added "to" before "C Fan" under ~astern; (2)
Added four valves; (3)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "C" to "LC" for all four valves; (4)
Changed Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0/C" to "LC" for all four valves; (5) Global Notes 3 and 4.
(1) Minor clarification.
No technical change.
(2) Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(3)
(4) Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(5)
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 24 Revision 0
Date 9 24 90
28.
Penetration 125 (1)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "R/G";
(2)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "C";
(3) Added Note 4.
(1) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(2) Update for better representation of system configuration since RCPs are not operating during cold shutdown conditions.
(3)
No technical change.
29.
Penetration 126 (1)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "R/G";
(2)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "C";
(3) Added Note (1) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(2) Update for better representation of system configuration since RCPs are not operating during cold shutdown conditions.
(3)
No technical change.
30.
Penetration 127 (1)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "R/B" for valve 749A; (2)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "C" for valve 749A; (3) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4 for valve 750A; (4)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "60" to "NA" for valve 749A.
(1) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(2) Update for better representation of system configuration since RCPs are not operating during cold shutdown conditions.
(3)
No technical change.
(4) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
31.
Penetration 128 (1)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "R/B" for valve 749B; (2)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "C" for valve 7498; (3) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4 for valve 750B; (4)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "60" to "NA" for valve 749B.
(1) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(2) Update for better representation of system configuration since RCPs are not operating during cold shutdown conditions.
(3)
No technical change.
(4) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 25 Revision 0
Date 9 24 90
32.
Penetration 129 (1)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "NA" to "60" for valve 1787; (2)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Status" for valves 1786 and 1787; (3)
Changed Position at Cold Shutdown from "0" to "C" for valves 1786 and 1787; (4)
Global Notes 1,
2, and 4 for valve 1713; (5) Global Notes 2,
3, and 4 for valve 1793; (6) Deleted "MOV 1793 used for long-term isolation" under Notes and replaced with Note 12; (7) Added "NA" 93:
Added "Outside" under Position Relative To Containment for valve 1793; (9)
Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Consistency with Technical Specification Table 3.6-1.
(2) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(3) Update for better representation of system configuration.
(4)
(5)
No technical change.
(6) Minor clarification.
No technical change.
(7) Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(8)
Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(9) Valves now in
.numeric order.
No technical change.
33.
Penetration 130 (1)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "Both";
(2) Corrected associated valve number to 814.
(1) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(2) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
34.
Penetration 131 (1)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "Both";
(2) Corrected associated valve number to 813.
(1) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(2) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 26 Revision 0
Date 9 24 90
~$5~5:.!:~ r+5 Y4@rA%;",~ ~~8'ÃSMC>d~<~
5'~~~S4ÃiS~. 44%@4+N@44@5.AS~>AN'%@4~~4P 35.
Penetration 132 (1)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "2" to "3" for both valves; (2)
Changed Position At Normal
"/"
7971; (3)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "C" to "0/C" for both valves; (4)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "Both" for both valves.
(1) Consistency with Technical Specifications.
Valve design allows closure as rapid as 2
(two) seconds.
Minimum closure time required by Technical Specifications is 5 (five) seconds with instrument delay.
(2)
(3)
Update for better representation of system configuration.
Mini-Purge system only designed for use during shutdown conditions.
(4)
Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
36.
Penetration 140 (1)
Added Note 6; (2)
Added Note 7; (3)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to f1R/G ll (1) Consistency with Technical Specification Table 3.6-1 Note 20.
No technical change.
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(2) 37.
Penetration 141 (1) Deleted valve 851A (entire line in table);
(2) Added valve 1813A and necessary information; (3)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "R/G" for valve 850A; (4) Added Note 8 to valve 1813A.
(1) Valve 851A does not meet the selection criteria of 10CFR50 Appendix J,
Section IIH, items
-1 through 4.
Therefore, valve was deleted from table.
(2) Valve 1813A was previously missing from table.,
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4)
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 27 Revision 0
Date 9 24 90
38.
Penetration 142 (1) Deleted valve 851B (entire line in table);
(2) Added valve 1813B and necessary information; (3)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from "Yes" to "R/G" for valve 850B; (4) Added Note 8 to valve 1813B.
(1) Valve 851B does not meet the selection criteria of 10CFR50 Appendix J, Section IIH, items 1 through 4.
Therefore, valve was deleted from table.
(2) Valve 1813B was previously missing from table.
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4)
No technical change.
39.
Penetration 143 (1)
Changed Position Indication In Control Room from."Yes" to "Status" for all three valves; (2)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration from "0/C" to "0" for valves 1003A and 1003B; (3) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(2) Update for better representation of system configuration.
(3) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
40.
Penetration 201top Global Notes 3 and No technical change.
41.
Penetration 20lbottom Global Notes 3
and 4.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 28 Revision 0
42.
Penetration 202 (1)
Changed valves 1076B and 1084B from "Globe" to "Diaphragm";
(2)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration Cold Shutdown Immediate Postaccident from "C" to "LC" for valves 1076B and 1084B; (3) Global Notes 3 and 4 for valves 1076B and 1084B; (4) Added "No" under Position Indication in Control Room for valves 1076B and 1084B; (5)
Changed Valve No.
for IV-3B and IV-5B to 10211Sl and
- 10213S1, respectively; (6) Added "Status" under Position Indication in Control Room for valves 10211S1 10213S1; (7)
Changed Position At Power Failure from "-" to "FC" for valves 10211S1 and 1021331; (8)
Changed
~Tri on CIS from "No" to "Yes" for valves 10211S1 and 10213S1; (9)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "NA" to "3" for 10211S1 and 10213S1; (10) Reordered penetration valves.
(1). Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(2) Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(3)
No technical change.
(4)
Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(5) Update to new valve number only.
No technical change.
(6)
Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(7)
(8) Update for better representation of system configuration.
Valves receive containment isolation signal.
(9) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(10) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
43.
Penetrati'on 203a (1) Included separate lines in table for valves 1819C and 1819D; (2) Added "Outside" to Position Relative to Containment for PT947 and PT948; (3) Added "Globe".under Valve
~T e for valves 1819C and 1819D; (4)
Global Note 1 for PT947 and PT948; (5)
Global Notes 3 and 4 for valves 1819C and 1819D.
'(1) Minor clarification there are two valves.
No technical change.
(2)
(3)
Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(4)
(5)
No technical change.
S'afety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 29 Revision 0
44.
Penetration 203b (1) Global Notes 3
and 4;
(2)
Added "Diaphragm" under Valve
~T e for all four valves; (3)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown and Position At Immediate Postaccident from "C" to "LC" for all four valves.
(1)
No technical change.
(2)
Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(3) Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
Penetration 204 (1) Added Note 2 to Blind Flange; (2) Global Note 1 for Blind Flange; (3)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Both" for valve 5869; (4)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration from "0/C" to "C" for valve 5869; (5)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "0/C" for 5869; (6)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "5" to "NA" for valve 5869; (7)
Added Note 19.
(1)
(2)
No technical change.
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4)
(5) Update for better representation of system configuration.
Penetration only used during cold shutdown conditions.
Mini-purge system now used in place of purge system.
(6)
The Blind Flange acts as the isolation boundary.
Therefore, no isolation time is required for the valve.
(7)
No technical change.
46.
Penetration 205 (1)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "NA" to "60" for valve 966C; (2) Added valve 955 and necessary information; (3)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Status" for valve 966C; (4)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration and Position At Cold Shutdown from "0/C" to "C" for valve 966C; (5) Global Notes 3
and 4 for valve 956D; (6) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Consistency with Technical Specification Table 3.6-1.
(2) Valve receives containment isolation signal and was previously missing from the table.
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4) Update for better representation of system configuration.
Sampling system normally isolated.
(5)
No technical change.
(6) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 30 Revision 0
/
<?g>>xjgx~;.g~?,8?:,,g. ~....,.~,,,,w,,YI..:>,,>>:!. <<?? x"r. >>
A~z!~~
<<r.'+.. $R,k..,.
4>> w.+%,y..,. ~%?,2??,?
.,.~. ~g+>>Q$.c? '$$, y~g:4~.~~)...g?~,YP>> ~ <<~>> x?!?QgA?gW~>$gPK.;(>>+~5)(..@y.,..+g,,zg~?g<<
47.
Penetration 206a (1)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "NA" to "60" for valve 966B; (2) Added valve 953 and necessary information; (3)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Status" for valve 966B; (4)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration and Position At Cold Shutdown from "0/C" to "C" for valve 966B; (5) Global Notes 3
and 4 for valve 956E; (6) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Consistency with Technical Specification Table 3.6-1.
(2) Valve receives containment isolation signal and was previously missing from the table.
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4) Update for better representation of system configuration.
Sampling system normally isolated.
(5)
No technical change.
(6) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
- 48.
Penetration 206b (1)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "NA" to "60" for valve 5735; (2)
Changed Position-Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Status" for valve 5735; (3)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration from "0/C" to "0" for valve 5735; (4)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0/C" to "C" for valve 5735; (5) Global Notes 3,
.4, and 5 for valve 5733; (6) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Consistency with Technical Specification Table 3.6-1.
(2) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(3)
(4)
Update for better representation of system configuration.
(5)
No technical change.
(6) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 31-Revision 1
49.
Penetration 207a (1)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "NA" to "60" for valve 966A; (2) Added valve 951 and necessary information; (3)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Status" for valve 966A; (4)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration and Position At Cold Shutdown from "0/C" to "C" for valve 966A; (5) Global Notes 3
and 4 for valve 956F; (6) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Consistency with Technical Specification Table 3. 6-1.
(2) Valve receives containment isolation signal and was previously missing from the table.
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4)
Update for better representation of system configuration.
Sampling system normally isolated.
(5)
No technical change.
(6) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
50.
Penetration 207b (1)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "NA" to "60" for valve 5736; (2)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Status" for valve 5736; (3)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration from "0/C" to "0" for valve 5736; (4)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0/C" to "C" for valve 5736; (5) Global Notes 3
and 4 for 5734; (6) Reordered penetration valves'1)
Consistency with Technical Specification Table 3.6-1.
(2) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(3)
(4)
Update for better representation of system configuration.
(5)
No technical change.
(6) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
51.
Penetration 209top (1) Global Notes 3
and 4; (2) Reordered penetration valves.
(1)
No technical change.
(2) Valve order now consistent with other penetrations
~
No technical change.
52.
Penetration 209bottom
(1) Global Notes 3 and 4; (2) Reordered penetration valves.
(1)
No technical change.
(2) Valve order now consistent with other penetrations.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 32 Revision 1
53.
Penetration 210 (1) Added "A & B" before "Recombiners" under
~s stem; (2)
Added Position Indication in Control Room to "Status" for all solenoid valves; (3)
Added "Yes" under ~Tri on CIS for all solenoid valves; (4) Added valves 10214S1 and 10215S and necessary information; (5)
Changed Position At Power Failure from "-" to "FC" for all solenoid valves; (6)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration Cold Shutdown Immediate Postaccident from "C" to "LC" for 1080A; (7) Global Notes 3 and 4 for valve 1080A; (8)
Changed Valve No. for IV-2A and IV-2B to 10214S and 10215S1, respectively;=
(9)
Added Note 18 to solenoid valves; (10)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "NA" to "3" for all solenoid valves.
(1) Consistency with Technical Specification Table 3.6-1.
(2) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(3) Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(4) Valve receive containment isolation signal and was previously missing from the table.
(5)
Update for better representation of system configuration.
Valves receive containment isolation signal.
(6)
Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(7)
No technical change.
(8)
Update to new valve number only.
No technical change.
(9)
No technical change.
(10)
Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
54.
Penetration 300 (1) Added Note 19 for both valve and flange; (2) Added Note 2
to Blind Flange; (3) Global Note 1 for Blind Flange; (4)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration from "0/C" to "C" for valve 5879; (5)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "0/C" for valve 5879; (1)
No technical change.
(2)
Consistency with Technical Specifications.
No technical change.
(3) (4) Update for better representation of system configuration. Penetration only used during cold shutdown conditions.
Mini-purge system now used in place of purge system.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 33 Revision 0
55.
Penetration 301 (1) Global Notes 3 and 4;
(2)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown and Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0" to "LC" for both valves; (3)
Added Note 5 to both valves; (4)
Changed both valves from "Globe" to "Gate".
(1)
No technical change.
(2)
Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(3)
No technical change.
(4)
Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
56.
Penetration 303 (1) Global Notes 3 and 4;
(2)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown and Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0" to "LC" for both valves; (3)
Added Note 5 to both valves; (4)
Reordered penetration valves'1)
No technical change.
(2)
Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(3)
No technical change.
(4) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 34 Revision 2
57.
Penetration 304 (1)
Changed valves 1076A and 1084A from "Solenoid" to "Diaphragm";
(2)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration Cold Shutdown and Immediate Postaccident from "C" to "LC" for valves 1076A and 1084A; (3) Added "No" under Position Indication In Control Room for valves 1076A and 1084A; (4) Global Notes 3 and 4 for valves 1076A and 1084A; (5)
Changed Valve No.
for IV-3A and IV-5A to 10205S1 and
- 10209S1, respectively; (6)
Added "Status" under Position Indication in Control Room for valves 10205S1 10209Sl; (7)
Changed Position At Power Failure from "-" to "FC" for valves 10205S1 and 10209S1; (8)
Changed
~Tri on CIS from "No" to "Yes" for valve 10205S1 and 10209Sl; (9) Added Note 17 for valves 10205S1 and 10209S1; (10)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "NA" to "3" for valves 10205S1 and 10209S1; (11)- Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(2) Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(3)
Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(4)
No technical change.
(5) Update to new valve number only.
No technical change.
(6) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(7)
(8) Update for better representation of system configuration.
Valves receive containment isolation signal.
(9)
No technical change.
(10)
Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(11) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
58.
Penetration 305a (bottom)
(1)
Changed
~S stem to "Containment Air Sample Ont";
(2)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "NA" to "60" for valve 1597; (3)
Changed valve 1596 from "Diaphragm" to "Globe";
(4) Global Notes 3 and 4 for valve 1597; (5)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Both" for valve 1597; (6) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Consistency with UFSAR Drawing Title.
No technical change.
(2)
Consistency with Technical Specification Table 3.6-1.
(3)
Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(4)
No technical change.
(5) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(6)
Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 35 Revision 0
Date 9 24 90
59.
Penetration 305b (top)
(1)
Changed
~Sstem to "Containment Air Sample Inlet";
(2)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "NA" to "60" for valve 1599; (3)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Both" for valves 1598 and 1599; (4) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Consistency with UFSAR Drawing Title.
(2) Consistency with Technical Specification Table 3.6-1.
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
60.
Penetration 305c (1)
Changed
~S stem to "Containment Air Sample Postaccident";
for all six valves; (3)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown and Position At Immediate Postaccident from "C" to "LC" for all six valves; (4) Global Notes 3
and 4; (5) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Consistency with UFSAR Drawing Title.
(2) Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(3)
Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(4)
No technical change.
(5)
Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
61.
Penetration 307 (1) Switched Valve No.
for valves 9227 and 9229; (2) Added "Gate" under Valve 0 erator T
e for valve 9227; (3) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4
for valve 9229; (4)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Both" for valve 9227.
(1) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(2) Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(3)
No technical change.
(4)
Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
62.
Penetration 308 (1)
Changed Valve No.
to 4629; (2) Global Notes 3 and 4; (3)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration and Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0" to "LO"; (4)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "0/C" (5)
Added Note 17.
(1) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(2)
No technical change.
(3) Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(4) Update for better representation of system configuration since fan coolers may be isolated for maintenance during cold shutdown.
(5)
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 36 Revision 0
63.
Penetration 309 (1)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "2" to "3" for both valves; (2)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Both" for both valves; (3) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Consistency with Technical Specifications.
Valve design allows closure as rapid as 2
(two) seconds.
Minimum closure time required by Technical Specifications is 5 (five) seconds.
(2) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(3) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
64
~
Penetration 310a (1)
Changed valve 7141 from "Diaphragm" to "Gate";
(2)
Changed Position At Immediate Postaccident from "C" to "LC" for valve 7141; (3) Global Notes 3 and 4 for valve 7141; (4) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4 for valve 7226; (5) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(2) Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(3)
(4)
No technical change.
(5) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
65.
Penetration 310b (1). Changed valve 5392 from "Diaphragm" to "Globe";
(2)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Both" for valve 5392; (3)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "C" to "0" for valve 5393; (4) Global Notes 1,
2, and 4 for 5393; (5)
Added "0" under Position At Cold Shutdown for valve 5392; (6) Added "C" under Position At Immediate Postaccident for valve 5392; (7)
Changed Position at Power Failure from "-" to "FC" for valve 5392; (8) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(2) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(3) Update for better representation of system configuration since XA is used during cold shutdown conditions.
(4)
No technical change.
(5)
(6)
(7) Update for better representation of system configuration.
Valve receives containment isolation signal.
(8) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 37 Re~ision 0
Date 9 24 90
Penetration 311 (1)
Changed Posit,ion At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "0/C";
(2)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration and Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0" to "LO"; (3) Global Notes 3 and 4.
(1) Update for better representation of system configuration since fan coolers may be isolated for maintenance during cold shutdown conditions.
(2)
Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(3)
No technical change.
Penetration 312 (1)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "0/C";
(2)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration and Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0" to "LO";
(3) Global Notes 3 and 4
(1) Update for better representation of system configuration since fan coolers may be isolated for maintenance during cold shutdown conditions.
(2)
Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(3)
No technical change.
68.
Penetration 313 (1)
Added "Blind" t2)
Global Notes 1,
2, and 4 for Blind Flange; (3)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Status" from "No" to "Yes" for valve 7444; (5)
Added Note 19.
(1) Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(2)
No technical change.
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(5)
No technical change.
69.
Penetration 315 (1)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "0/C";
(2)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration and Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0" to "LO"; (3) Global Notes 3 and 4.
(1) Update for better representation of system configuration since fan coolers may be isolated for maintenance during cold shutdown conditions.
(2)
Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(3)
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 38 Revision 0
I
70.
Penetration 316 (1)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "0/C";
(2)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration and Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0" to "LO"; (3) Global Notes 3 and 4.
(1) Update for better representation of system configuration since fan coolers may be isolated for maintenance during cold shutdown conditions.
(2)
Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(3)
No technical change.
71.
Penetration 317 (1)
Added "Blind"
- Global Notes 1,
2, and 4 for Blind Flange; (3)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Status"
>><<3:
H) from "No" to "Yes" for valve 7443; (5)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "C" to "0" for valve 7443; (6) Added Note 19.
(1) Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(2)
No technical change.
(3)- Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(5) Update for better representation of system configuration.
Penetration used during cold shutdown.
(6)
No technical change.
72.
Penetration 318 (1) Global Note 1; (2}
Deleted "Decommissioned, welded shut" from Notes and replaced it with Note 20.
(1)
(2} No technical change.
73.
Penetration 319 (1)
Changed Valve No.
to "4627";
(2) Global Notes 3 and 4; (3)
Changed Position At Normal 0 eration and Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0" to "LO";
(4)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "0/C".
(1) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(2)
No technical change.
(3) Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(4)
Update for better representation of system configuration since fan coolers may be isolated for maintenance during cold shutdown conditions.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 39 Revision 0
Date 9 24 90
74.
Penetration 320 (1) Global Notes 3 and 4;
(2)
Changed Position At Normal Postaccident from "Q" to "LO"; (3)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from IIQII to IIQ/CII (1)
No technical change.
(2)
Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(3) Update for better representation of system configuration since fan coolers may be isolated for maintenance during cold shutdown conditions.
75
~
Penetration 321 (1) Global Notes 3 and 4 for valve 5701; (2)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Status" for valve 5738; (3)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "C" to "0/C" for valve 5738; (4) Reordered penetration valves.
(1)
No technical change.
(2) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(3) Update for better representation of system configuration.
(4) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
76.
Penetration 322 (1) Global Notes 3 and 4 for valve 5702.
(2)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Status" for valve 5737; (3)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "C" to "0/C" for valve 5737; (4) Reordered penetration valves.
(1)
No technical change.
(2) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(3) Update for better representation of system configuration.
(4) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
77.
Penetration 323 (1) Global Notes 3 and 4;
(2)
Changed Position At Normal Postaccident from "0" to "LO"; (3)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from IIQ II to IIQ/C II (1)
No technical change.
(2)
Consistency with Ginna Administrative Control.
(3) Update for better representation of system configuration since fan coolers may be isolated for maintenance during cold shutdown conditions.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 40 Revision
78.
Penetration 324 (1)
Changed valve 8418 from "Diaphragm" to."Globe";
(2)
Changed Position At Cold Shutdown from "0" to "0/C" for valve 8418; (3)
Changed Position Indication in Control from "Yes" to "Both" for valve 8418; (4)
Global Notes 1,
2, and 4; (5)
Changed Maximum Isolation Time from "NA" to "60" for valve 8418; (6) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(2) Update for better representation of system configuration.
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4)
No technical change.
(5) Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(6) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
79.
Penetration 332a (1) Global Note 1 for pressure transmitters; (2)
Added "Globe" 1
valves; (3) Global Note 3 for the manual valves; (4) Reordered penetration valves.
(1)
No technical change.
(2)
Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(3)
No technical change.
(4) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
80.
Penetration 332b Deleted entire penetration from table.
Penetration has double isolation and meets the criteria for a test connection.
Therefore, this penetration is not required to be tested per 10CFR50 Appendix J and does not belong on the table.
81.
Penetration 332c (1) Added "6.2-74" than 922.
(2)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "Both" for all four valves; (3)
Changed Position At Immediate Postaccident from "0/C" to "C" for all valves.
(1) Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(2)
Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(3) Update for better representation of system configuration.
System isolated upon receipt of containment isolation signal.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 41 Revision 0
Date 9 24 90
Penetration 401 (1) Added Note 11 to all valves other than 3517; (2)
Changed 3517; (3)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "R/G" for valves 3505A and 3517; (4) Global Notes 1,
2, 3,
4, and 5; (5) Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(2)
Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4)
No technical change.
(5)
Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
83..
Penetration 402 (1) Added Note 11 to all valves other than 3516 and 3518; (2)
"9 valve 3516; (3)
Changed Position Indication in Control Room from "Yes" to "R/G" for valves 3504A and 3516; (4)
Global Notes 1,
2, 3,
4, and 5; (5)
Reordered penetration valves.
(1) Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(2)
Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(3) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(4)
No technical change.
(5)
Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
84.
Penetration 403 (1) Global Notes 1,
2, from "6.2-75" to "6.2-76" for valve 3995; (3) Added "6.2-76" under UFSAR Ficiure for all valves after valve 3995; (4) Added Note 11 to all valves other than valve 3995; (5) Added "4" under Class for all valves. other than 3995; (6) Reordered penetration valves.
(1)
No technical change.
(2)
Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(3)
(4)
(5)
Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(6) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
85.
Penetration 404 (1) Global Notes 1,
2, 3,
4, and 5; (2)
Changed UFSAR Fi ure from "6.2-75" to "6.2-76" for valve 3994; (3) Added Note 9 to all valves other than 4000D; (4) Reordered penetration valves.
(1)
No technical change.
(2)
Correction of typographical error.
No technical change.
(3) Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
(4) Valves now in numeric order.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 42 Revision 0
0
86.
Penetration 1000 (1) Global Notes 1,
2, 4,
and 5; (2) Added "Both" to Position Relative to Containment;
-(3)
Added "3.8-31" to UFSAR Fi ure.
(1)
No technical change.
(2)
(3)
Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
87.
Penetration 2000 (1) Global Notes 1,
2, 4,
and 5; (2)
Added "Both" to Position Relative to Containment; (3) 0" (1)
No technical -change.
(2)
(3)
Correction of typographical omission.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 43 Revision 0
Date 9 24 90
(1) Deleted last sentence of "old" Note 1 and moved it to "new" Note 2; (2)
Renumbered remaining "old" Note 1 as Note 3.
(1) (2) The deleted sentence of the note is still applied to necessary penetrations.
No technical change.
2.
Deleted "old" Note 2.
Note was only a duplication of the UFSAR text.
See "new" Note 4.
No technical change.
3.
Deleted "old" Note 3.
Note was only a duplication of the UFSAR text.
See "new" Note 4.
No technical change.
4 (1) Deleted first two sentences of "old" Note 4; (2) Modified last sentence to reflect system configuration and testing requirements; (3) Renumbered "old" Note 4 as Note 6.
(1) These two sentences only duplicated UFSAR text.
No technical change.
(2)
Sentence now accurately reflects wording of the January 30, 1987 letter.
(3)
No technical change.
5.
Deleted "old" Note 5.
Note was only a duplication of the UFSAR text.
See "new" Note 4.
No technical change.
6.
Deleted "old" Note 6.
Note was only a duplication of the UFSAR text.
See "new" Note 4.
No technical change.
Deleted "old" Note 7.
Note was only a duplication of the UFSAR text.
No technical change.
8.
Deleted "old" Note 8.
Note was only a duplication of the UFSAR text.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 44 Revision 3
Date 2/26/91
>"Agk~k 'g
'S~ ">c>>">>
4>. k>>.>>.>>>>4'wr:x6>
.w.'e..c.z.4; >>': >>.> ~: >>>>.. w>>.>>>>)AS~ 4 Z'
.Wc..~>>>>;P>> ~.
9.
(1) Modified "old" Note 9; (2)
Renumbered "old" Note 9 as Note 13.
(1)
(2) Minor clarification only.
Note now describes in detail the use of the pressure transmitter as a boundary.
No technical change.
10.
Deleted "old" Note 10.
Note was only a duplication of the UFSAR text.
See "new" Note 4.
No technical change.
Deleted "old" Note 11.
Note was only a duplication of the UFSAR text.
See "new" Note 4.
No technical change.
12.
(1) Modified "old" Note 12; (2)
Renumbered to "new" Note 15; (3)
Provided new reference letter.
(1) (2) Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
(3)
New reference letter provided as a result of Reference 2.25.
No technical change.
13.
Deleted "old" Note 13.
Note was only a duplication of the UFSAR text.
No technical change.
14.
(1) Deleted last two sentences of "old" Note 14 and moved it to "new" Note 16; (2) Modified remaining "old" Note 14; (3) Renumbered "old" Note 14 as Note 17.
(1) The deleted sentence of the note is still applied to necessary penetrations.
No technical change.
(2) (3) Minor clarification of note only.
No technical change.
15.
Deleted "old" Note 15.
Note was only a duplication of the UFSAR text.
No technical change.
16.
Deleted "old" Note 16.
Note is incorrect and no longer applicable.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 45 Revision 3
Date 2/26/91
0
17.
(1) Modified "old" Note 17; (2)
Renumbered "old" note 17 as Note 21.
(1)
(2) Minor clarification of note only.
No technical change.
18.
(1) Modified "old" Note 18; (2)
Renumbered "old" Note 10 as Note 11; (3)
Provided new reference letter.
(1) (2) Minor clarification of note only.
No technical change.
(3)
New reference letter provided as a result of Reference 2.25.
No technical change.
19.
Added Note 1.
Note provides clarification on use of the penetration.
See letter from R.
- Mecredy, RGGE, to A. Johnson,
- NRC, dated March 13, 1990.
20.
Added Note 2.
Note provides generic description of penetration seals.
Note originally part of "old" Note 1.
No technical change.
21.
Added Note 4.
Minor clarification only.
Note originally part of "old" Notes 2, 3, 5, 6,
10, and ll.
Note now used on a global basis.
No technical change.
22.
Added Note 5.
Minor clarification only.
Note provides additional information related to penetration's use.
No technical change.
23.
Added Note 7.
Note provides consistency with Technical Specification Table 3.6-1 Note 20.
New reference letter provided as a result of Reference 2.25.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 46 Revision 3
Date 2/26/91
24.
Added Note 8.
Minor clarification only.
Note provides additional information related to MOV breaker'status.
No technical change.
25.
Added Note 9.
Minor clarification only.
Note provides additional information related to function of the valve.
No technical change.
26.
Added Note 10.
Minor clarification only.
Note provides detailed description of penetration valves.
No technical change.
27.
Added Note 12.
Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
28.
Added Note 14.
Note provides additional information related to penetration.
See letter from R. Mecredy, RGGE, to A. Johnson, NRC, dated July 9, 1990.
29.
Added Note 16.
Note provides clarification of leakage test requirements.
Note originally part of "old" Note 14.
No technical change.
30.
Added Note 18.
Minor clarification only.
Note provides additional information related to solenoid status.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 47 Revision 0
Date 9/24/90
I
31.
Added Note 19.
Note provides consistency with Technical Specification Table 3.6-1 Note 22 and notes related to penetrations 313 and 317.
No technical change.
32.
Added Note 20.
Minor clarification only.
Note provides additional information related to penetration's use.
No technical change.
Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 48 Revision 0
~/
GINNA/UFSAR 6.2.4.4.2 Class 1 Penetrations (Outgoing Lines, Reactor Coolant System) 6/501 Normally operaeing outgoing lines oonneoted to
~6/501 the reactor coolant system are provided with at least one automatically operated trip valve and manual isolation valves in series located outside the containment.
General Design Criterion 55, which applies to Class 1 lines, specifies that one valve should be located inside the containment and one valve should be located outside the containment, with the valves being either locked closed or being automatic isolation valves.
Furthermore, a simple check valve outside containment may not be used as an automatic isolation valve.
The following lines are included in this class:
- 108, 110b,
- 112, 140,
- 205, 206a, and 207a.
6.2.4.4.2.2 C
s e et ation Eva t o The containment isolation
- provisions for line 140 (residual heat removal system letdown line) differ from 6 the explicit requirements of GDC 55 from the stand-point of valve location.
A s<<~
LS,
\\~
is no containment isolation valve in the line outside the containment.
- However, the closed, safety-grade system outside the containment
(. esidual heat 6/501 removal system) is a suitable isolation barrier in lieu of a valve adjacent to the containment and GDC 55 permits isolation provisions that differ from the explicit requirements, provided the basis for acceptability is defined.
I Therefore, the isolation provisions for line 140 satisfy GDC 55.
gto WeC
-r:~~ v'vugg
~ '
ilgeegge. ~t e.t 6, e e ~
~.0 A~i<~
The isolation provisions for lines ~ 205,
- 206a, and 207a differ from the Qb~.
explicit requirements of GDC 55 from the standpoint ofvalve location and actuation.
Each of these lines is provided with an air-operated valve and~one inc ~
~we manual valveii,.in series ~A+6-outside the containment.
Locating both V4EkS containment isolation valves outside containmentmay ~ acceptable
+& eke CiggNe.< On the design of the piping between the containment. and the first.
'C1A.i~0g valve are sufficiently conservative to provide adequate assurance oC integrity.
4/478 037 Ke controls for the air-operated valves inside the missile barrier were modified to fail closed when the instrument air to the 6.2-54 REV 6 12/90
isolation.
The Can~O~~g~
GINHA/UFSAR I
u~
o
'V
'LO,+~
containment is automatically isolated and remain closed on reset of containment
)4ygOO The containment isolation provisions for lines 108 and 110b differ from the I
explicit requirements of GDC 55 from the standpoint of the number of isolation
'I valves.
There is no containment isolation valve in these lines inside the t
containment.
Therefore, an automatic isolation valve for line 10& and a locked-closed manual ~alve for line 110b would be required inside the containment to meet current criteria.
t s
For line 108~it was concluded that installing a second automatic isolation valve is not required.
a e a.
The line is a 3-inch line~~ has an automatic, A,hso, leak-tested, motor-operated valve outside containment, aak the line terminates in the volume control tank, which has a design pressure higher than the containment accident pressure (Reference 12).
4/600 l ais mg ei ~e>>
~ea
~e 4 a~~la ~
hl RA'ackfitting was not recommended ~for line 110b because:
1.
The penetration is isolated further upstream from the cold leg by check valves which are periodically leak tested.
2.
The penetration is isolated from the hot'egs by two check valves and a closed motor-operated valve.
3.
During safety injection the line is pressurized by the safety injection system and because the line is connected vertically to the reactor coolant system, a water seal would exist after injection.
4.
The line is of small diameter (3/4-in.).
Additionally, from a risk standpoint, the probabilistic risk this issue of low importance and estimated the impact, of the s
lowe.
4i~&~~
~>>
~
~
s a
s
'I lQ
%leap'll~
BAJA
. 'n
('.2.4.4.2 Class 2 iOntgning Lines)
- n Su~
o~ ~>~~
assessment.
ranked resolution to be
) gregal.
I I>>
to the reactor coolant system and not protected against missiles throughout 6.2-55 REV 6 12/90
GIHHA/UFSAR their length inside the containment are provided with at least one automatically operated trip valve or one remotely operated stop valve located outside the containment.
General Design Criterion 56 applies to Class 2 penetration lines and specifies that one valve should be located inside the containment and one valve should be located outside the containment with the valves being either locked closed or being automatic isolation valves.
Furthermore, a simple check valve outside the containment may not be used as an automatic isolation valve.
The following lines are included in this class:
- 107, 120b,
- 121c, 121d, 123 (bottom),
- 129, 143,
- 203a, 305a, and 332a.'3/605 6.2.4.4.3.2 C
ss valuat The containment isolation provisions for lines 107,
- 121c, 12ld,
- 143, 203a, and 332a differ, from the explicit s
requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of,valve location.
All of these lines have isolation valves located outside the containment, Wh+s-+s 6/501 It is not practical for lines 107 (sump discharge line) and 143 (reactor coolant drain tank discharge line) to have an isolation valve located inside the containment because the valve may be submerged as a result of a loss-of-coolant accident.
- 65nr.valuing arrangement for chess lines with both valves located outside the containment is acceptable Standard Review Plan 6.2.4,
. Item II.3, has provided guidance in this concern ~;
6
. ~ -.:0I Lines 121c,
- 121d, 203a,- and 332a are small sensing lines for the containment pressure transmitters and are open to the containment atmosphere; they were installed as a requirement of the TMI Lessons Learned.
The pressure trans-mitters form a closed boundary outside the containment.
A manual valve is also provided in each line for double-barrier isolation capability.
I remo e manua monitoring function of these lines, the isolation barriers wcubdsatisfy 000 56 i3/600 on some other defined basis.
The containment isolation provisions for lines 120b, 123 (bottom),
and 305a i3/605 differ from the explicit'requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve 6,2-56 REV 6 12/90
GINNA/UFSAR location and actuation.
Each of these lines is provided with an air-operated 3/605
'ex< +La. ~M Backfitting to meet explicit valve location requirements was not recommended for these lines for the following reasons:
~ ~~~
>>)
1.
As a plant design basis, the piping between the containment and the containment isolation valves is at least equal to containment design pressure.
Isolation valves are similarly rated.
2.
Piping runs between the containment penetrations and the containment isolation valves have been kept as short as possible and are Seismic Category I.
3.
All piping penetrations are. solidly anchored to the containment wall.
External guides,
- stops, increased pipe thickness, or other means are
- provided, where required, to limit motion and moments to prevent ruptures by making the penetration the strongest part of the system.
In addition, all penetrations and anchorages are designed for forces and moments that might result from postulated pipe ruptures.
4.
-dc&- piping penetrations, e
are located in areas that are protected from tornado missiles.
~o>~ &0 C Backfitting to meet explicit valve actuation requirements was not recommended for the following reasons.:
~~+, rEJa~
I CJ 1.
These lines are small (3/8 in. and 1 in.).
2.
The valves are located near the containment wall.
3.
The piping and valves are designed as Seismic Category I.
6.2-57 REV 6 12/90
GINNA/UFSAR These valves are small, air-operated, fail-closed valves and have had no previous history of failure to close at Ginna Station.
SCP Additionally, from a risk standpoint,the~pipe rupture analysis ranked this issue of low importance and estimated the impact of the resolution to be low.
o ~Veaasu 6.2.4.4.4 Class 3 (Incoming Lines)
[ 6/501 Two subclasses are identified for Class 3 penetration lines.
General Design Criteria 55 or 56 apply to Class 3 lines, depending on the line function:
6.2.4.4.4.1 C as 3A Pe et a
on Incoming lines connected to open systems outside the containment are provided with one of the following arrangements:
(1) a check valve located inside containment and a remote-operated valve or closed manual valve located outside the containment, (2) both a check valve and a remote-operated valve or closed manual valve located outside the containment, or (3) two remote-operated valves located outside containment.
The following penetration lines are included in this subclass:
- 120a, 121a,
- 121b, 129,
- 305b, 310a, and 310b.
~dySOa 3/600 The containment isolation provisions for ~a-lines 12la and 129 differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from. the standpoint ~of.valve tvpe.
A
'LtsA4.-~ M<~A<~tbid~ tt~ s WQi~~ i4'd'~ t NC y check valve and a, provide for containment isolation.
satisfy the requirements for an automatic isolation vabre. -rThe function of both pressure control valv'es 441 and 1014 is to maintain the downstream.
pressure at a constant 0.5 psig. If the downstream pressure is elevated above O.~sip (e g., in.the event of an accident),
both pressure control valves will automatically close.
However, if the downstream pressure is less than 0.5 psig, both pressure control valves may open in an attempt to raise the downstream piping pressure.
In light of this,. the performance characteristics of the valve controls do not sa-tis.fy the"retuiremenrs for an automatic isolation valve.
Consequently, the NRC concluded that li:nes 12la and 129 should be modified to meet current criteria (Reference 9).
Fo'.lines 1Yla and e
current criteria (Reference 9)P For lines 121'a and 129, RG&B agree~
~n~-.7-93,reepe iJ ra i~OS containment, which does not satisfy GDC 56 3/600 6.2-58 REV 6 12/90
V
GINNA/UPSAR
~~sdt~~~Ch ~
and 57, but provides equivalent protection.
This h was found acceptable by the NRC (Reference 10).
)3/600 The containment isolation provisions for lines 120a,
- 121b, 310a, and 310a, and 310b satisfy the explicit requirements of GDC 56 and are acceptable.
~3ydty The containment isolation provisions for line 305b differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve location.
This line has two automatic air-operated isolation valves located outside containment.
Thi.s e
ttto
~r is acceptable based on the discussion ~ Class 1-lines~ 205,
- 206a, and i'/458 3/032 6.2.4.4.4.2 C
e t t Incoming lines connected to closed systems
~6/501 outside containment are provided with at least one check valve or normally closed isolation valve located inside containment, a check valve located outside containment, or two remote-operated valves inside containment.
3/600 The following lines are included in this subclass:
- 100, 101,
- 102, 105,
- 106,
~
~
- 109, 110a,
- 111, and 113.
The containment isolation provisions for line 111, the residual heat removal supply line, differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 from the standpoint of~valve location and actuation.
The valving arrangement for this ine is the same as for line 140, with~ motor-operated valve+'ocated inside 1
C the containment that ere remotely controlled from the control room.
There is
.'7CCl1JP ~ ~I
'mi 5'i ~.mtC-~
no so ation.~valve outside the containmentr.
Since the system outside the containment is a closed, safety-grade system, it constitutes an appropriate isolation barrier in lieu of a valve in the line outside the containment.
Also, the line has a postaccident safety function and automatic isolati.on of the line is not appropriate.
Therefore, the valve location and provisions for line ill satisfy GDC 55 on some other defined basis r The containment isolation provisions for lines
- 100, 102,
- 106, and 110a, the charging lines, differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 from the standpoint of valve number.
A simple check valve in each line, inside containment, is identified as the containment isolation valve.
These lines are connected to the chemical and volume control system outside the containment.
-%he charging system does not have a required postaccident safety functi.on.
6.2-59 REV 6 12/90
GINNA/UFSAR lines would have to ~be, automatically isolated~ ~
Rxckfitting was not recommended by 3/600 1.
The piping system is designed to operate at 2250 psi, significantly above the containment design pressure.
2.
The piping is Seismic Category I.
3.
The charging pumps are positive displacement pumps and, there'afore, leakage back through the pumps is expected to be minimal.
The containment isolation provisions for lines 101 and 113, safety injection system, differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 from the standpoint of,r3~~
valve location and actuation.
Each safety injection line is provided with a check valve outside containment.
Additionally, each safety injection line is 3/600 provided with two parallel motor-operated valves inside the containment that are remotely controlled from the control room.
Since the safety injection system outside the containment is a closed, safety-grade
- system, double barrier isolation capability is provided. Consequently, GDC 55 is met on some other defined basis..
The containment isolation provisions for lines 105 and 109, the containment spray pump discharge lines, differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve number and type.
A simple check valve is provided in each line outside containment, which is not an acceptable automatic isolation valve per current criteria.
Although these lines have' postaccident safety function, they are open to the containment atmosphere and, therefore, the isolation provisions should satisfy GDC 56 on some other defined basis.
i3/600
~~ed-outs-i-de the-coneekmaent tin-or i 2/100 S6nCC Gh C- ~++ pard 6~ >+0 VLa.
Qt',
3'W26~. =&&~3.n~~r
";0"SK "'wet."'%
/
he-s 6.2-60 12/90 i
~
~/ qQ $63(ll C
,gg p666 REV 6
GINNA/UFSAR y+i 1
6.2.4.4.5 Class 4 Penetrations (Closed System, Missile Protected)
~3/605
[6/503 6.2.4.4.5.1 a
Normally operating incoming and outgoing lines,
}6/501 which are connected to a closed system inside the containment and protected against missiles throughout their length, are provided with at least one Yo.bl~
- manual, locked closed, remote manual, or automatic isolation valve outside h
13/600 outside containment.
General Design Criterion 57 applies to Class"4
- " included in this class:
- 119, 123 (top),
- 124a, 201,
- 206b, 207b,
- 209, 301,
- 303, 308,
- 311, 312,
- 323, 401,
- 402, 403, and 404.
lines. 'he following lines are/
- 125, 126,
- 127, 128,
- 130, 131,.
13/605
- 315, 316,
- 319, 320,
- 321, 322 This criterion specifies the isolation provisions for closed systems inside the containment that are neither part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor connected directly to the containment atmosphere.
For these closed systems to design since the containment isolation system is an engineered safety feature.
Further guidance is provided by Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 in this regard.
Closed systems must, in part, be protected against missiles and pipe whip, designated Seismic Category I, and classified Safety Class 2.
Furthermore, GDC 57 specifies that a locked closed, remote manual, or automatic isolation valve must be provided outside the containment and that a simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve.
6.2.4.4.5.2 C
4 va u The containment isolation provisions for lines 201,
- 209, 308,
- 311, 312,
- 315, 316,
- 319, 320, and 323 differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 57 from the standpoint of valve actuation.
All of.
~ 6/501 these lines are equipped with local manual isolation valves outside the
~ ~ o-
,~%03v AW~
containment.
These lines are served by the service water system~
Rac~es 3
ad
>23,
e upgra e
s.
6.2-61 REV 6 12/90
GINNA/UFSAR 6
t containment that are served by lines 201,l 209,
- 301, and 308 shock@-~of I
safety-Recede 0
te justffy tta applfcabf12~to
- 57. lf CDC 57 caccct be applied, GDC 56 will govern i.eef automatic isolation valves should be provided both inside and outside the contaiianant.,
In any event, the manual.
valves i'n lines 201,
- 209, 301, and 303 should be automatic feolation valves since the-Hnes are nonessential, iin order to meet current criteria I
~efererice 9).
(
~3/600 I
I I
I I
X~ a.4 hmw> s><v valves would only be needed for containment isolation if there was a signifi-cant breach of the fan cooler system>and the isolation valves~ accessible following a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident, RG&E @epee+ to upgrade the P~ e~C~p ~~ ~4 ~~V~ i~
1 3~6~4
&03-~
- 65m, existing valves, N C.63W~hOO 22~
Ch~W a.~+~4 10 CFR 50, Appendix J> limits.
The NRC (Reference
- 10).
~3/600 Th~alvesi include 46/5,
- 4636, 4757, and 4758 fdr lines 201 and 209, which n
carry service water to and from the reactor compartment coolers, and 4627, 6
- 4628, 4629,
- 4630, 4641,
- 4642, 4643, and 4644 for lines 308,'11,
- 312, 315,
- 320, e
and 323, which carry service water ta-and from the containment fan coolers.
The valves have been upgraded.
The valves supplying service water to the coolers are manual, lever-operated butterfly valves, which are fully open during normal.operation.
The service water return valves are manual~ear-operated butterfly valves, which can be throttled'.as requiredlto regulate 6
seWice water returning from the coolers.
2/1012 12/1009
[3/600 Penetration lines 401 and 402 are the main steam lines.
Each line is provided with a main steam stop valve that is motor operated.
,Qe main steam blowdown A
gizmo~~
~CI.C MXt~~~
CR.
/
and-j.eak test-diem This provides two barriers outside the containment, which Figure does not satisfy GDC 56.but provides equivalent protection.
This adlai~~
~I/3~
'4 gad ~ MAC 6.2-62 REV 6 12/90
~
0 1&5 0% ~ ~~~
~g ~ ~Q ~~ ~ ~~(
~~C Z'~~
i L'vU4J ~ ~~ g iM~tg isch ~os cia,mQ +~~~ b~
).oH~3
~6,o~\\wQ, 4
\\
+~~4, iN.c A~ <~w- ~c
~0% ~~
GINNA/UFSAR branch lines 321 and 322 are provided with air-operated isolation valves.
These valves are available to automatically or remote manually isolate the main
~3/605 steam lines.
Therefore, the isolation provisions satisfy GDC 57..
~ X~0~~~n~ S).
Penetration lines 403 and 404 are the feedwater lines.
Each line is isolated AL4.6+~1~
6 by a manual valve and a check valve in series.
Cnch feedwater line has two 3-in. auxiliary feedwater lines joining it downstream of the manual valve~
Under accident conditions, the auxiliary feedwater system is automatically initiated.
The isolation provisions of lines 403 and 404 differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 57 from the standpoint of valve type.
Since the check valve in the feedwater lines outside the containment is not an appropriate automatic isolation valve, the manual valve outside the containment would have to be 5/102 702 upgraded to a remote manual isolation valve.
Backfitting for lines 403 and 404
~OCR Vahtle L ~mfber)e was not recommended for the same reasons discussed for Class 2 lines
- 120b, 123 (botton),
and 305a (Reference 10).
AW,None 'L+, aha-wea)ewoahwr (wwa <en ~5/702 p+++ ~~4 ~r-~M ~2Ishec
( i~a'r Kasz c,4 ~pic~~
zc) W~
<~me
~3/605 Containment isolation provisions for penetration lines
- 119, 123 (top),
- 124a, 130,
- 131, 206b,
- 207b, 321, and 322 satisfy the ax~~
requirements of GDC 57.
6.2.4.4.6 Class 5 Penetrations (Special Service)
(6'/501 6.2.4.4.6.1 Lines that penetrate the containment and which
~6/501 may be opened to the containment atmosphere, but which are normally closed 6RA during reactor operation, are provided with>two isolation valves in series, of these devices is located inside and the other is located outside the containment.
6/067 i3/600 General Design Criterion 56 applies to Class 5 penetration lines.
The following lines are included in this class:
g4'. 29,
- 103, 124b,
- 132, 141,
- 142, 202,
- 203b, 204,
- 210, 300,
- 304, 305c,
- 307, 309,
- 313, 317,
- 324, 3BRL and 332c.
(6/067 i3/052 6.2-63 REV 6 12/90
GINNA/UFSAR Si+~
cqbs.~04%% Mo 6.cio'4'I f.
~ASM~% ~X~g,, a~
3 Lola~r put'POLLS
~
6.2.4.4.6.2 Cl 5
va The penetration lines listed below differ'rom the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of isolation barrier type:
line having blind flanges inside s.~4.
1 o'3 gpss) lines having a blind flange inside the containment (29,204,
- 300, 313, an 317)
~0/301 d
6/049 i 3/021 A blind flange inside or outside the containment is an acceptable isolation barrier in lieu of an isolation valve, if it is leak testable.
ws=c Wkr= n w-::. ea,.n I e sans daub+~jaaee4 ~¹NNR1e Qiuije-.kWotisMaifmY3fMcciRihment;y Line 29, the fuel transfer tube, is isolated by a double-gasketed resilient seal flange inside the containment that is leak testable Line 313, leak test depressurization, and 317, leak test supply, are equipped with leak testable blind flandes inside the I3/021 containment and a motor-operated valve outside the containment.
Lines 204 and
- 300, purge supply and purge exhaust respectively, are equipped with leak testable blind flanges inside containment and air-operated valves outside containment.
Line 103, the construction fire service water line, which is no longer in use, 3O4erk4 O'Inset~
has a pip~~ inside the containment~
a e
(
dard The containment isolation provisions for lines 141 and 142, containment sump recirculation system, differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the Q
standpoint of valve actuation, ~e to their postaccident safety function a. S,<<g~~
motor-operated valve'g are used~
tEe valve actuation provisions are, acceptable and meet GDC 56 on some other defined basis (Standard Review Plan 6.2.4, Item II.3).
3 Containment isolation provisions for lines
- 124b, 202,
- 203b, 210,
- 304, and 305c differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve I
6.2-64 REV 6 12/90
GINNA/UFSAR location.
All of these lines have two isolation valves in series located l
i outside the containment.
This is acceptable,
- however, based on the discussion under Class 1 for lines ~,
- 205, 206a, and 207a
[3g6OO i3/021 Containment isolation provisions for lines 332c differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of isolation barrier type.
The isolation provisions for lines 332c, hydrogen monitor instrumentation lines, consist of a normally closed solenoid-operated valve and a closed system outside containment that is Seismic Category I and designed to withstand max-imum containment accident pressure.
The lines are 3/8-in.
(O.D.) stainless steel tubing.
GDC 56 is met on some other defined basis (Standard Review Plan 6.2.4, Item II.6) for these lines~
c m~m~ ia) 3/052 608 Containment isolation provisions for lines 132,
- 307, 309, and 324 satisfy the explicit requirements for GDC 56 and are acceptable.
o~ ch.
6.2.4.4.7 Special Cases t3/021 6/501 The containment penetrations No.
1000, personnel hatch, and No. 2000, equipment
- hatch, are not covered by the penetration classes discussed
- above, but are evaluated under containment isolation provisions.
These penetrations are described in Section 3.8.1.5 and shown in Figures 3.8-30 and 3.8-31.
These openings are provided with redundant closures and/or seals, and are closed during normal operation.
They are also leak testable.
L 6.2.4.4.8 instrumentation and Controls Evaluation 6/501 The instrumentation and control aspects of the override of the containment purge valve isolation and other engineered safety feature actuation signals were also reviewed by the NRC against current review guidelines.
The evalua-13 tion concluded that the electrical, instrumentation, and control aspects of the override of engineered safety features actuation signals are acceptable, except for a lack of adequate physical protection for some of the engineered
'afety features reset push buttons.
~ay6oo t
The review resulted in two design modifications.
One was to remove the block-ing mechanisms that existed in the actuation and reset logic of the containment 6.2-65 REV 6 12/90
I
0 TEST CONNECTION TEST CONNECTION DOUBLE-GASKETED BLIND FLANGE NO. 2 TEST CONNECTION SPENT FUEL PIT DOUBLE~KETED 1
BLINDFIANGE NO. 29 6/049 ROCHESTER GAS ANO ELECTRIC CORPORATION R. E. GINNANUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPOATEO FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2-13 S/G Inspection/Maintenance, JBta&atioa So~".-
Fuel Transfer Tube, Penetration No.
29 REV 6 12/90
~'/
I g~ I:~(5
~PFCAP)
Cigar 5130 I2:Ill IX OO LC (WELDED CAP) 5129A ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATfON R. E. GlNNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FlNALSAFETY ANALYSlSREPORT H.gure 6.2-17 Construction Pire Service Mater Penetration No.
103 REV 4 12/88
l I
l-)
l 2829 I
I 868A 864A CIV 862A 2821 860A I
ug I
PI 33A 869A 2825 8608 2857 2822 856 ROCHESTER QAS ANO ELECTRIC CORPORATION LE. QINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPOATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Figure 6.2-l8 Containment Spray Pump lA Penetration No. l05
r
~
~
~
~
FI 115 303A 9303 CIV 304A P-106 300A 2988 298 303C 9304 2225 277A g P-110 g~/
C+/~
3og8 3008 275 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R E GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPOATEO FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Figure 6.2-19 Reactor Coolant Pump "A" Seal Water Line Penetration No.
106
0
TEST LINE 2830 864B 2823 868B 869B CIV 862B 2826 860C 860D o
4 0
oc o
I UJ O
2824 2858 9338 2859 ROCHESTER GAS ANO ELECTRIC CORPORATION ILE. QINHA NUCI.EAR POWER PLANT UPOATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Figure 6.2-22 Containment Spray Pump 1B Penetration No.
109
2277 303A 3018 301A 303C 9301 9302 CIV 3008 3048 277A 300A 275 ROCHESTER GAS ANQ ELECTRIC CORPORATION R. E. GINNANUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPOATED FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2-23 Reactor Coolant Pump "B" Seal Water Inlet, Penetration No.
110a (Top)
REV 3 12/87
0
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL LOOP OUTLET VALVE TO LETDOWN um LO qCp FC SAMPLING SYSTEM CIV 720 TO SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM LO LO LO 0 X O 4l Ml UJ t/l CC 0 lal ill
~ F1 CD cC M Cl V1 O Gal O RESIDUA HEAT REMOVAL BYPASS (CLOSED SYSTEM)
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R. E. GINNANUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2-24 Residual Heat Removal to "B" Cold Leg, Penetration Ho.
111
TO PRESSURIZER REUEF TANK 203 Z
I-LQU nt CC~
K0 I
O IX O
LLlK 200A FC OB FC I
202 I
Z OO CIV 371 2231 369
@Pl 821 I
Om NONREGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R.'E. GINNANUCLEAR POWER PI.ANT UPDATED FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2-25 Lecdown eo Nonregeneraeive Hear Exchanger, Penetration No. 1l2
CIV PT 945 CIO PT 946 CIV 1819A CIV 18198 (OPEN PIPES)
P-12lc P-121d I
1818A 18188 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R. E. GINNANUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2-31 Containment Pressure Sensing Transmitters, Penetration Nos.
12lc and 121d REV 3 12l87
1717 CIV 1655 CIV 1789 1022E I
t I
1709F ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPOATED FINAI. SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Figure 6.2-32 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Gas Analyzer, Penetration No.
123 (Bottom)
1v~A vo-z X 1~~
COMPONENT COOLING SUPPLY MOV 817 COMPONENT COOL"ING PUMPS 749B 2732 816 742C c~rv Q 2776 742A 2728 749A 730 76ZB 762A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM C)
I LLl CL D 4J CQ l/1 ~
C/l ~
4J M V V X K 2723 74ZB 815A TI 606 FI 607 AOV
~
CIV 745 2727 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 744 TO SUMP
,I NSIOE CONTAINMENT MOV 813 6/077 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORAT1ON R. E. GlNNANUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FlNALSAFETY ANALYStS REPORT Figure 6.2-33 Excess Letdovn Heat Exchanger Cooling 'Mater (Supply
& Return),
Penetration No.
124a REV
813 7498 742A 2709 751A
- 752A 753A 750C CIV 750A P-127 2761 CIY 749A 2730 817 76IF ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R. E. GINNANUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2-37 Component Cooling Water to Reactor Coolant Pump 1A, Penetration No.
127 REV 3 12/87
813 749A 742A 2709 751A 752A 753A 750C CIY 750B P-128 2.761 CIV 749B 2730 817 761F ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRlC CORPORATlON R. E. GlNNANUCLEAR POIlER PLANT UPDATED FINALSAFETY ANALYSlSREPORT Figure 6.2-3S Component Cooling Water to Reactor
- Coolant, Pump )B, Penetration No.
12S REV 3 12/S7
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL LOOP INLET LINE I
l REFUELING WATER STORAGE t
FI TANK (CLOSED SYSTEM)
FROM REACTOR COOLANT FILTER OUTLET 700 CIV 701
48P
&51A LO M
I M
,'IV
- 8508 I
LO ROCHESTER GAS ANO ELECTRIC CORPORATION R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
'PDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Figure 6.2-42
'Res ioual Hear Removal
? umo Suc" ions
?enerrarion Nos.
i40, I.4i,
.:42 REV 2
'2/86
OK
~ CC U CI L4 I CX X 8431 Q O Z tX O K V 4) I FROM FUEL TRANSFER CANAL DRAINS BI t
CIV I
1721 t
I 1723 CIV 1003A IIAII TO REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANKS 8432 I
I I
I I
1709G CIV 1003B I 8 II ROCHESTER GAS ANO ELECTRIC CORPORATION R F GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPOATEO FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Figure 6.2-43 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Discharge Penetration No.
143
LO LC 8427 10768 CIV CIV 4K!8=
sow!
~ /
8428 1075B LO LC 8425 8426 1084B CIV 1083B CIV SISS
! um!5S/
4l CQ C) 4J CC ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Figure 6.2-46 "B" Hydrogen Recombiner (Pilot and Main), Penetration No.
202
CIV PT-947 CIV 1819C CIV 1819D (OPEN PIPE) ml
~l I
8[
I 1818C 1818D (CONTROLLED INTERMEDIATE BUILDING)
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R'. GINNANUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2-47 Containment Pressure Sensing Transmitters, Penetration No. 203a REV 3 12/87
1079 LO 8424 I
I I
oI
-I l
LC paz/f5/~~~
CIV TO "A" RECOMB INER
/og(cfS
~+
8423 TO CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SYSTEM 1080A CIV
/ D</+s/
( P 2/5~
~y TP ti 8ii RECOMB INER ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ILE. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Figure 6.2-55 "A" and "B" Hydrogen Recombiner Oxygen Makeup, Penetration No.
210
0 0
t t
8050 AIR SUPPLY CIA (BLIND FLANGE) 5879 I
I PI 8052 8049 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R,E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Figure 6.2-56 Purge Exhaust Penetration Vo.
300
UJ CC
, CXL LO 8433 I
LG 1084A CIV CIV
-14'- ~~q~g, CC CQ CD LIJ LO 8435 8434 t
t t
~A;o>os'sI CDI
- ICD, o
UJ CO CD UJ 8436 1075A CD I
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ILE GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Figure 6.2-58 "A" Hydrogen Recombiner (Pilot and Main), Penetration No.
304
Iz K
0O 7481
'PARE FROM MINI-PURGE SUPPLY FAN 7480 DEBRIS SCREEN C1V 7445
~I II (BLINDFLANGEON INTERMEDIATE BUILDINGROOF-IRLTVENT)
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R. E. GINNANUCI.EAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2-64 Containment Mird.-Purge Supply Penetration No.
309'EV 4
12/88
7227 I
~l t
I I
CIY I
7222 7226 LC CIV 7141 7140 7228 7221 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRlC CORPORATION R. E. GONNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINALSAFETY ANALYStSREPORT Figure 6.2-65 Service Air Penetration No. 310a (Bottom)
REV 3 12/87
I I
t l
t CI%
I (BLIND FLANGE) t I
I t
1 l
CIV 7444 (BLIND FLANGE ON INTERMEDIATE BUILDING ROOF)
/
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRlC CORPORATtON R. E. GlNNANUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2-67 Leakage Test - Oepressurization Penetration No. 313 REV 3 12l87
I c)f 7441 CIA'BLINO FLANGE)
CIV 7443 7442 I
I I
7457 474 PI ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R. E. GINNANUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2-68 Leakage Test-Supply Header Penetration No. 317 REV 3 12/87
C QP
~
~pi<<
. a wag<<~
~
~
v
- 4M PIPE CAP
~ '
~ 5 4'
~ ~
C
~
.--.CIY
~ ~
f ~
~
~
~
~
~
~
I +
'I I.
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R. E. QINNANUCLEARPOWER PLANT UPDATED FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2-73
'eak Test Instrumentation Liues, Penetratfan No
. 332h.
t
OPEN TUBE CIV 921 OPEN TUBE 7448 LC 8439 CONNECTION B1 CIV 922 925 7452 LC 8438 CIV 924 CONNECTION B2 926 TUBE CIV 923 7456 LC 8437 CONNECTION B3 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R. E. GINNANUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED F'INALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2+] <~
H2 Monitor Instrumentation Lines Penetration No. 332c REV 3 12/87
ATMOSPHERE P-401 3517 3519 M
3505A UXILIARY FEEOWATER PUMP (TURSrvE) 3507 3521 TRAP HEADER M
3504A TMOSP HERE IP ~2 3516 3518 3506 3520 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R. E. GINNANUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2+ i4 Main Steam Lines Penetration Nos.
401 and 402 REV 3 12(87
4011 4000C MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1A 3995 3993 MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP 1A 4005 4003 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 4oo4 4006 3994 3992
~tAIN FEEDWATER PUMP 18 4012 4000D MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 18 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R. E. GINNANUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPDATED FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT Figure 6.2+ T+
Feedwater Lines, Penetration
~ Nos. 403 and 404 REV 3 12/87
Attachment D
UFSAR Table 6.2-14 Safety Analysis I
NSL-0000-SA024 Page 50 Revision 2
~/
GINNA/UFSAR Table 6.2-14
EFFECT OF LOSS OF AIR SUPPLY TO AIR-OPERATED VALVES Penetration No.
~Set em Valve Ne.
Receive CIS Position Following Loss of Air 107 Sump A Discharge to Waste Holdup Tank 1723 1728 Yes Yes Fails closed Fails closed Residual Heat Removal to B Cold Leg 959 Yes Fails closed 112 Letdown to Nonregenerative Heat Exchanger 200A 200B 202 371 427 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Fails closed Fails closed Fails closed Fails closed Fails open'20a Nitrogen to Accumulators 846 Yes Fails closed 120b Pressurizer Relief Tank to Gas Analyzer 539 Yes Fails closed 121b Makeup Water to Pressurizer Relief Tank 508 Yes Fails closed 123 (bottom)
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank to Gas Analyzer Line 1789 Yes Fails closed 124a Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Cooling Water Supply
& Return 745 No Fails closed 129 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and Pressurizer Relief Tank to Containment Vent Header 1786 1787 Yes Yes Fails closed Fails closed 132 Containment Mini-Purge Exhaust 7970 7971 Yes Yes Fails closed Fails closed 143 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Discharge Line 1003A 1003B Yes Yes Fails closed Fails closed 204 Purge Supply Duct 5869 Yes Fails closed 205 Hot Leg Loop Sample 955 966C Yes Yes Fails closed'ailsclosed 206a (top)
Pressurizer Liquid Space Sample 953 966B Yes Yes Fails closed'ailsclosed 6.2-107 REV 6
12/90 1
GZNNA/UFSAR Table 6.2-14 EFFECT OF LOSS OF AIR SUPPLY TO A1R-OPERATED VALVES Penetration No.
~sstem Valve Ne.
Receive CZS Position Following Loss of Air 107 Sump A Discharge to Waste Holdup Tank 1723 1728 Yes Yes Fails closed Fails closed Residual Heat Removal to B Cold Leg 959 Yes Fails closed 112 Letdown to Nonregenerative Heat Exchanger 200A 200B 202 371 427 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Fails closed Fails closed Fails closed Fails closed Fails open'20a Nitrogen to Accumulators 846 Yes Fails closed 120b Pressurizer Relief Tank to Gas Analyzer 539 Yes Fails closed 121b Makeup Water to Pressurizer Relief Tank 508 Yes Fails closed 123 Reactor Coolant Drain (bottom)
Tank to Gas Analyzer Line 1789 Yes Fails closed 124a Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Cooling Water Supply
& Return 745 Nob Fails closed 129 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and Pressurizer Relief Tank to Containment Vent Header 1786 1787 Yes Yes Fails closed Fails closed 132 Containment Mini-Purge Exhaust 7970 7971 Yes Yes Fails closed Fails closed 143 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Discharge Line 1003A 1003B Yes Yes Fails closed Fails closed 204 Purge Supply Duct 5869 Yes Fails closed 205 Hot. Leg Loop Sample 955 966C Yes Yes Fails closed'ailsclosed 206a (top)
Pressurizer Liquid Space Sample 953 966B Yes Yes Fails closed'ailsclosed 6.2-108 REV 6
12/90)
Attachment E
UFSAR Table 6.2-15 Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 51 Revision 2
GINNA/UFSAR 00 Penetration Number Table 6.2-15 ESSENTIAL AND NONESSENTIAL SYSTEM CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS
)
Identif cation Descri tio Essential Versus Nonessential 2
29 100 101 102 103 105 106 107 108 109 110a",
110b'11 112 113 120a:
120b 121a 121h.
121c 121d 123
( ~oovto~K 124a 124b 125 126 127 128 130 131 132 140 Steam generator inspection/maintenance Fuel transfer tube Charging line tP~'loop g Safety injection pump>1B discharge Alternate charging to~cold leg ~
nT,~c.~om ma~ so.eases Containment spray pump 1A Reactor '8 coolant pump'~seal')water inlet Sump A discharge to waste holdup tank.
Reactor coolant p~ seal water ~ and excess letdown to Containment spray pump 1B Reactor B. coolant pump,sealmater inlet Safety injection test line Residual heat removal to,cold leg g Letdown to nonregenerative heat exchanger Safety injection pump 1A discharge Nitrogen to accumulators Pressurizer relief tank to gas analyzer Nitrogen to pressurizer relief tank Rea~ ikakeup water to pressurizer relief tank Containment pressure transmitter PT-945 Containment pressure transmitter PT-946 Reactor coolant drain tank to gas analyzer Excess letdown heat exchanger
~~4~ ~~ a~c p~
~
Postaccident air sample" C fan Component cooling water from %5 reactor coolant pump
~>
Component cooling water from ~ reactor coolant pump Component cooling water to XK reactor coolant pump
~ ~
Component cooling water to Hf reactor coolant pump Reactor coolant drain tank and rOkra i~vs.t.M pressurizer relief tank to~vent header Component cooling water.M reactor support cooling Component cooling water to reactor suppoit cooling
+h'I'A% OgfO~ CY I++
Residual heat removal pump suction 'from 6 hot leg+
Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Essential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Essential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Essential Essential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Essential (6/502 6/502 6/502 6/502 6.2-107(
REV 6
12/90
GINNA/UFSAR Table 6.2-15 ESSENTIAL AND NONESSENTIAL SYSTEM CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Continued)
Penetration Number Ide t f cat o
e c Essential Versus 0
Nonessential 141 142 143 201 202 203a 203b 204 205 206a 206b 207a 207b 209 210 300 301 303 304 305a 305b 305c 307 308 309 310a 310b 311 312 313 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 Essential Essential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential
,,Essential RFP$4nessential Nonessential Nonessential
'Essential Essential Nonessential Essential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Service air to containment Instrument air to containment Service water from B fan cooler Service water to D fan cooler Leakage test depressurization Service water from C fan cooler Service water to B fan cooler Leakage test supply Dead weight tester Service water from A fan cooler Service water to C fan cooler A steam generator blowdown B steam generator blowdown Service water from D fan cooler Demineralized water to containment Residual heat removal No.
1 pump suction from sump B
2 pump suction from sump B
I
~
% I4c&~Q Reactor compartment cooling units A and B
OHydrogen recombinertpilot and maimhM Containment pressure transmitter PT-947 and 948 Postaccident air sample to B fan Purge supply duct Hot leg loop sample Pressurizer liquid space sample steam generator sample Pressurizer steam space sample B steam generator sample Reactor compartment cooling units A
and B
Oxygen makeup to A and B recombiners Purge exhaust duct Auxiliary steam supply to containment Auxiliary steam condensate return I
P Hydrogen recombinerc pilot and main)~
Containment-air;,sampla* out..
Containment air sample inlet Containment air sample postaccident Fire service water Service water to A fan cooler i~CWS -PQf&l.X 6/502 6/502 6/067 502 6/502
~O
- 6. 2-1QS REV 6 12/90
GINNA/UFSAR Table 6.2-15 ESSENTIAL AND NONESSENTIAL SYSTEM CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Continued)
Penetration Numbe 332a 332c 401 402 403 404 1000 2000 de t a io De t
Containment pressure transmitters PT-944,
- 949, and 950 Hydrogen monitor instrumentation lines Main steam from A steam generator Main steam from B steam generator Feedwater line to A steam generator Feedwater line to B steam generator Personnel hatch Equipment hatch Essential Versus Nonesse tia Essential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Essential a a
Essential Nonessential Nonessential
/502 Used for auxiliary feedwater, s ~3 ihip)
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lE, REV 6 12/90
0 Chanches Table 1
Technical Specification Changes Effect 2.
Removed reference to Table
- 3. 6-1 from Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.
Table 3.6-1 removed from Technical Specifications and information placed in UFSAR Table 6.2-13.
No technical change.
Valve listing remains in a licensee controlled document under 10CFR50.59 program.
3.
4
~
5.
Revised action statement of Technical Specification.
Revised inoperability definition of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.
Removed note associated with Technical Specification 3.6.5.
No technical change.
Consistency with Standard Technical Specifications.
No technical change. Clarification only consistent with 10CFR50 Appendix J.
Mini-purge valves have been installed so the Technical Specification can be considered effective.
No technical change.
7.
8.
Added statement that containment isolation valves are listed in UFSAR Table 6.2-13 to Basis for Technical Specification 3.6.
Added definition of "isolation boundary" to Basis for Technical Specification 3.6.
Changed Reference 2 of the Basis for Technical Specification 3.6 to "UFSAR Section 3.8.1.2.2."
No technical change.
Consistency with Standard Technical Specifications.
No technical change.
Clarification of "isolation boundary" provides consistency with UFSAR Table 6.2-13.
No technical change.
The current reference is to the FSAR which has been superseded by the UFSAR.
9.
10.
Added "Pt" and necessary definitions to Technical Specification 4.4.1.4 section a.
Added to the definition of "Lt" in Technical Specification 4.4.1.4 section b.
Addition of "Pt" provides clarification of testing type consistent with 10CFR50, Appendix J.
All terms in 4.4.1.4, section' now fully defined.
No technical change.
Added definition "Lt" provides clarification consistent with
All terms in 4.4.1.4, section b now fully defined.
No technical change.
11.
Added definition of "Pa" and "Lam" in Technical Specification 4.4.1.4 section c.
12.
Added steam generator inspection/maintenance penetration to Technical Specification 4.4.1.5 section a (ii).
13.
Revised first line of Technical Specification 4.4.1.5, section a (ii).
Addition of "Pa" and "La" provides clarification consistent with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
All terms in 4.4.1.4, section c now fully defined.
No technical change.
Addition of this penetration provides testing criteria similar to the equipment hatch and containment air locks.
Minor clarification only.
No technical change.
14.
Removed notes associated with Technical Specification 4.4.2.4 section a.
Deleted reference to section d.
15.
Added steam generator inspection/maintenance penetration to Technical Specification 4.4.2.4 section b.
Mini-purge valves have been installed so the Technical Specification can be considered effective.
Section d will be removed from Technical Specifications.
No technical change.
Addition of this penetration provides testing criteria similar to the equipment hatch and containment air locks.
16.
Removed Technical Specification 4.4.2.4 section d and associated note.
17.
Removed reference to Table 3.6-1 from Technical Specification 4.4.5.1 and revised statement.
Blind flanges have been installed so the Technical Specification can be considered effective.
No technical change.
Valve listing remains in a licensee controlled document under 10CFR50.59 program.
Consistency with Standard Technical Specifications.,
18.
Removed reference to Table 3.6-1 from Technical Specification 4.4.6.2 and revised statement.
Valve listing remains in a licensee control'led document under 10CFR50.59 program.
Consistency with Standard Technical Specifications.
Attachment C
UFSAR Section 6.2.4 and Figures Safety Analysis NSL-0000-SA024 Page 49 Revision 2
GINHA/UFSAR of postulated accidents.
Therefore, this section is not applicable to Ginna Station.
6.2.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM The following design criteria were used during the licensing of Ginna Station.
They represent the AIF version of proposed criteria issued by the AEC for comment on July 10, 1967 (see Section 3.1.1).
Conformance with 1972 General Design Criteria (GDC) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, is discussed in Section 3.1.2.
The criteria discussed in Section 3.1.2 as they apply to the containment isolation system include 54, 55, 56, and 57.
The more recent SEP evaluation of the design against these criteria is discussed in Section 6.2.4.3.1.
Criterion:
Penetrations that require closure for the containment function shall be protected by redundant valving and associated apparatus (AIF-GDC 53).
Isolation valves for all fluid system lines penetrating the containment provide at least two barriers for redundancy against leakage of radioactive fluids to the environment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.
These barriers, in the form of isolation valves or closed systems, are defined on an individual line basis.
In addition to satisfying containment isolation criteria, the valving is designed to facilitate normal operation and maintenance of the systems and to ensure reliable operation of other engineered safety features.
Wi.th respect to numbers and locations of isolation valves, the criteria applied are generally those outlined by the five classes described in Section 6.2.4.4.
Criterion:
Capability shall be provided to the extent practical for testing functional operability of valves and associated apparatus essential to the containment function for establishing that no failure has occurred and for determining that valve leakage does not exceed acceptable limits (AIF-GDC 57).
Capability is provided to the extent practical for testing the functional operability of valves and associated apparatus during periods of reactor shutdown.
The isolation valves are also sub]ect to periodic type C leak rate tests as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
6.2-47 REV 3 12/87
)
6.2.4.2.1 Functional Requirements
~
~
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The function of the containment isolation system is to isolate the non-essential pro'cess lines that penetrate the containment to ensure that the total leakage of activity will be within design limits in the event of an accident.
The system consists of many valves and the logic and circuitry necessary to automatically close these valves on a containment isolation signal.
l AA AoN,-~c.H took ~i~ +406 'pt A%3rc~~ ~~gy,~~ ~4 M~~M oA~
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~p~ ~<~ Ass isckMoh, VW~A., aJg ~M oaf Each system whose piping penetrates the containment leakage limiting boundary is designed to maintain or establish isolation of the containment from the outside environment under any accident for which isolation is required, and assuming a coincident independent single failure or malfunction occurring in 34.CUPS.
(uhlan.
any active system component within the isolated bounds.
Piping penetrating the containment is designed for pressures at least equal to the containment design pressure.
Containment isolation valves are provided as necessary in lines penetrating the containment to ensure that no unrestricted release of radioactivity can occur.
Such releases might be due to rupture of a line within the containment concurrent with a loss-of-coolant accident or due to rupture of a line outside the containment which connects to a source of radioactive fluid within the containment.
In general, isolation of a line outside the containment protects against rupture of the line inside concurrent with a loss-of-coolant accident, or closes off a line which communicates with the containment atmosphere in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.
Isolation of a line inside the containment prevents flow from the reactor coolant system or any other large source of radioactive fluid in the event that a piping rupture outside the containment occurs, even though a piping rupture outside the containment at the sam'e time as a loss-of-coolant accident is not considered credible, since the penetrating lines are Seismic Category I design 6.2-48 REV 6 12/90
GINNA/UF SAR Closure times for isolation valves are provided in Table 6.2-13.
ALC.CJS~
Containment isolation becomes ~nhatmy under the same conditions that require operation of the other engineered safety features.
The containment isolation signal is derived from the same signals which automatically activate safety in)ection.
The containment isolation valves are designed and qualified to ensure that they are capable of withstanding the maximum potential seismic loads.
To facilitate their adequacy in this respect:
1.
Valves are located, when possi51e, in a manner to reduce the accelerations on the valves.
Valves suspended on piping spans are reviewed for adequacy for the loads to which the span would be sub]ected.
Valves are mounted in the position recommended by the manufacturer.
2.
Val~e yokes. are reviewed for adequacy and strengthened as required for the response of the valve operator to seismic loads.
3.
Where valves are required to operate during seismic loading, the operating forces are reviewed to ensure that system function is preserved.
Seismic forces on the operating parts of the valve are expected to be small compared to the other forces present.
4.
Control wires and piping to the valve operators are designed and installed so that the flexure of the line does not endanger the control system.
Appendages to the valve, such as position indicators and operators,i are checked for structural adequacy.
5.
As part of the RGB seismic piping upgrade program, all containment isolation valves were reviewed and reanalyzed to ensure that current seismic criteria are met.
fluids to 6.2-49 REV 3 12/87
(
GXNNA/UFSAR
~ l.
l the emCronment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.
eserbarriers, in the form o~solation valves or. closed systems',
are c4dKnedkon an inkvidual ine basis.
In addiii t
1 on o satisfying contaimment isolation criteria, the 1
valving is designed to facilftate normaL-operation and maintenance of the I
1 systems and to ensure reliable o~eratio~f other engineered safety features I
systems.
i With respaot to'nonhero end looarions of isolation valves, the orft ia app ed
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are rally those outlinediby the five classesi described in Section
.2.4.4.2..
V The five classes described in Section 6.2.4.4~are the general categories into vhich lines penetrating containment are classified.
Also described in Section cp,~4 g,~L~
6.2.4.4 are the basic isolation valve~arrangements used to provide two barriers betveen the reactor coolant system or containment atmosphere and the iactltL&OWt bfL~rA environment.
Systems design is such that failure of one does not prevent isolation, and no manual operation is required for immediate isolation.
Automatic isolation is initiated by the containment. isolation signal.
A containment isolation signal is generated automatically by any safety injection signal or manually by depressing one of two switches on the main control board left panel.
The safety injection signals which initiate containment isolation are as follows:
2.
3.
Pressurizer low pressure Steam line lov pressure Containment high pressure
>1723 psig
>514 psig 4 psig Main steam line isolation vill occur on a high-high steam flow coincident with a safety injection signal, high steam flow and low T coincident with a avg safety injection signal, and high-high containment pressure of 18 psig.
A<<o-matic containment isolation valves are designed to isolate the process stream in a maximum of 60 sec.depending on the particular isolation valve.
6.2-50 REV 3 12/87
6.2.4.3.1 Isolation Valve Parameters Tabulation A summary of the fluid system lines penetrating containment and the valves and closed systems employed for containment isolation is presented in Table 6.2-13 S
and Figures 6.2-13 through 6.2-7P'.
The containment isolation valves are indicated in the figures by the designations CIV (containment isolation valve).
i~ ~ah%. c.a-iZ iR~c ~L Each valve is described as to type, operator, positiqn
$,ndication~d open or
~LA sW~+<~ +os'r-closed status during normal operation, shutdown and accident conditions.
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Information is also presented on valve automatic trip by the containment isolation signal, maximum isolation time Containment isolation valves are provided with actuation and control equipment appropriate to the valve type.
For example, air-operated globe and diaphragm (Saunders patent) valves are generally equipped with air diaphragm operators, with fail-safe operation ensured by redundant control devices in the instrument air supply to the valve.
Motor-operated gate valves are capable of being supplied from reliable onsite emergency power as well as their normal power source.
Manual and, check valves, of course, do not require actuation or control systems.
All containment isolation trip valves are actuated to the closed position by the containment isolation signal, derived automatically from the safety injection signal.
Nonautomatic isolation valves, i.e.,
remote stop valves and manual valves, are used in lines that must remain in service, at least for a time, following an accident.
These are closed manually if and when the lines are taken out of service.
6.2.4.3.2 Isolation Valves Operability All containment isolation valves, actuators, and controls are located so as to be protected against missiles which could be generated as the result of a loss-of-coolant accident.
Only valves so protected are considered to qualify as containment isolation valves.
Only isolation valves located inside containment are sub]ect to the high-
- pressure, high-temperature, steam-laden atmosphere resulting from an accident.
6.2-51 REV 3 12/87
~
GINNA/UFSAR Operability of these valves in the accident environment is ensured by proper design, construction, and installation, as reflected by the following h
considerations:
All components in the valve installation, including valve bodies, trim and moving parts, actuators, instrument air and control, and power wiring, are qualified to perform their safety function in a postaccident environment if they need to change position.
Provisions for valves locked in their safe postaccident conditions ensure no adverse changes of position due to accident conditions.
2.
In addition to normal pressures, the valves are designed to withstand
~aximum pressure differentials in the reverse direction imposed by the accident conditions.
Instrument air is used chiefly as the motive power for valve actuation.
The instrument air system is supplied from three air compressors, one of which is normally operating.
A second backup source is available via a connection from the service air system which can be used during periods of maintenancewa&eao of the instrument air compressors.
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loss of air to these valves were considered in the safety analysis of all systems in the plane.
Throughout the overall design of the plant, it has been acknowledged that the air supply is not a Class 1 safety-related system.
All systems have been designed accordingly with careful attention to the manner of operating equipment to ensure that each component will assume the safe position upon loss of air pressure.
6.2.4.4 Desi Evaluatio 6.2.4.4.1 Current Safety Criteria The containment isolation system conforms with the requirements of diversity in I
ce parameters used for containment isolation, i.e., automatic isolation of all nonessential systems by the containment isolation signal.
The design is such that resetting the isolation signal will not result in the automatic reopening 6.2-52 REV 3 12/87
)
GINNA/UFSAR 6.2.4.4.1 Current Safety Criteria The containment isolation system conforms with the requirements of diversity in the parameters used for containment isolation, i.e., automatic isolation of all nonessential systems by the containment isolation signal.
The design is such that resetting the isolation signal will not result in the automatic reopening of containment isolation valves but reopening will require deliberate operator action.
The essential versus nonessential system containment penetrations are given in Table 6.2-15.
The containment isolation system at Ginna Station was evaluated 'y the NRC 9,10 under the SEP Topic VI-4.
The safety criteria used in the evaluation were as follows:
l.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 54, 55, 56, and 57.
2.
NUREG 75/087, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (SRP 6.2.4, Containment Isolation
- System, where applicable).
3.
Regulatory Guide 1.11, Instrument Lines Penetrating Primary Reactor Containment.
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.141, Revision 1, Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid Systems.
There are five classes of penetrations for categorizing the lines penetrating the containment.
The following discussion addresses the conformance of each penetration class to applicable safety criteria.
pM~
I 6/501 3/600 penetration numbers (or line numbers) correspond to those provided in Table 6.2-13.~
6.2-53 REV 6 12/90