ML17128A109
| ML17128A109 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/2017 |
| From: | Arthur Burritt NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| Burritt A | |
| References | |
| IR 2017001 | |
| Download: ML17128A109 (32) | |
See also: IR 05000333/2017001
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713
May 8, 2017
Mr. Bryan C. Hanson
Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC
President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2017001
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On March 31, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection
at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick). On April 19, 2017, the NRC
inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Joseph Pacher, Site Vice President,
and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed
report.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRC Public Document Room
in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Arthur L. Burritt, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-333
License No. DPR-59
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000333/2017001
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Publicly Available
Sensitive Non-Publicly Available
OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP
NAME BSienel via email MDraxton ABurritt
DATE 5/4/17 5/4/17 5/8/17
1
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket No. 50-333
License No. DPR-59
Report No. 05000333/2017001
Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Location: Scriba, NY
Dates: January 1, 2017, through March 31, 2017
Inspectors: B. Sienel, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Pfingsten, Resident Inspector
G. Stock, Resident Inspector
S. Anderson, Reactor Inspector
E. Burket, Reactor Inspector
R. Rolph, Health Physicist
Approved By: Arthur L. Burritt, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 3
1. REACTOR SAFETY .............................................................................................................. 4
1R04 Equipment Alignment .................................................................................................. 4
1R05 Fire Protection ............................................................................................................. 5
1R08 Inservice Inspection .................................................................................................... 5
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance .... 8
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness ......................................................................................... 9
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control ................................... 9
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments ..................................... 10
1R18 Plant Modifications .................................................................................................... 11
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing ........................................................................................ 11
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities ...................................................................... 12
1R22 Surveillance Testing.................................................................................................. 13
2. RADIATION SAFETY .......................................................................................................... 14
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls ........................................ 14
2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation .............................................. 15
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment ............................................................................... 15
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................................ 16
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification ............................................................................ 16
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution ...................................................................... 17
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion.................................... 19
4OA5 Other Activities .......................................................................................................... 20
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit ............................................................................................ 21
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ........................................................................................ A-1
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................... A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED ..................................... A-1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ........................................................................................ A-2
LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................... A-9
3
SUMMARY
IR 05000333/2017001; 01/01/2017 - 03/31/2017; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
(FitzPatrick); Routine Integrated Inspection Report.
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
baseline inspections performed by regional inspectors. The significance of most findings is
indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined
using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, dated
October 28, 2016. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects Within
Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are
dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated November 1, 2016. The
NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is
described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6.
No findings were identified.
4
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
FitzPatrick began the inspection period operating at approximately 57 percent power, the
maximum power achievable due to fuel depletion as the reactor was at the end of this operating
cycle. Due to fuel depletion, power continued to decrease to approximately 54 percent on
January 13, 2017. On January 14, operators shut down the reactor to commence refueling
outage (RFO) 22. Upon completion of refueling and maintenance activities, operators
performed a reactor startup on February 23. The generator was placed online February 25,
2017, ending RFO 22. Operators increased reactor power to approximately 91 percent on
February 27. On February 28, operators reduced power to approximately 54 percent for a
control rod pattern adjustment. Operators increased power to approximately 100 percent on
March 1. Operators reduced power to 89 percent for another rod pattern adjustment on
March 2. Power was restored to 100 percent later that day, where it remained for the rest of the
inspection period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04 - 4 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:
B core spray system while protected for shutdown risk during RFO 22 on
January 18, 2017
A core spray system while protected for shutdown risk during RFO 22 on
January 26, 2017
Residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling during RFO 22 on February 9, 2017
A RHR system during planned maintenance on the B RHR system on
March 7, 2017
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the
reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed
applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report (UFSAR), technical specifications (TSs), work orders (WOs), condition reports
(CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in
order to identify conditions that could have impacted the systems performance of its
intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible
portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were
aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of
the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there
were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether the licensee had properly
identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP)
for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.
5
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material
condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that
the licensee controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with
administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression
equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire
barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that
station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or
inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures.
Turbine building, 272 foot elevation, fire zone TB-1 on January 20, 2017
Turbine building, 300 foot elevation and 292 foot elevation, fire zone TB-1 on
January 20, 2017
Relay room, fire area/zone VII/RR-1 on February 27, 2017
Reactor building, 272 foot elevation, fire area/zone IX/RB-1A on February 28, 2017
Reactor building, 300 foot elevation, fire area/zone VIII/RB-1C, IX/RB-1A, X/RB-1B
on March 16, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R08 Inservice Inspection (71111.08G - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
From January 23 to 26, 2017, the inspectors conducted an inspection and review of
inservice examination activities in order to assess the effectiveness of the licensees
program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary, risk-
significant piping and components, and containment systems during FitzPatrick RFO 22.
The sample selection was based on the inspection procedure objectives and risk priority
of those pressure retaining components in these systems where degradation would
result in a significant increase in risk.
Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) and Welding Activities (Section 02.01)
The inspectors observed or reviewed the following NDE activities and completed data
records:
Manual phased array ultrasonic testing (UT), volumetric inspection, American
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Class 1, 24 inch A RHR dissimilar
6
metal weld 24-10-130, and 24 inch B RHR dissimilar metal welds, 24-10-142
and 24-10-144
Visual testing (VT), visual inspection record, ASME International Welding
Engineer (IWE) Examination Category E-A, general visual examination of
exterior containment surfaces from elevations 272-369
VT inspection record and video review, ASME IWE Category E-A, general visual
examination of torus below the water line surfaces
For each evaluation, the inspectors verified NDE activities were performed in
accordance with the 2001 Edition, 2003 Addenda, of the ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel (BPV) Code requirements. The inspectors also verified the NDE activities met
the requirements contained in ASME Section XI, Mandatory Appendix VIII,
Article VIII-2000 and the examination personnel were qualified in accordance with ASME
Section XI, Mandatory Appendix VII. The inspectors verified that indications and
defects, if present, were dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code.
For the general visual examinations, the inspectors ensured that difficult to access areas
or areas made visible by maintenance activities were included within the scope of the
visual examination. Additionally, the inspectors verified the basis for declaring some
containment areas as inaccessible for visual examination by comparing the basis
against previous containment visual examination records.
The inspectors also performed a walk down of the accessible areas of the drywell to
independently assess the condition of the drywell liner.
The inspectors reviewed video of the VT, including VT-3, VT-1, and EVT-1; and results
of several components examined in accordance with the licensees boiling water reactor
vessel and internals project in-vessel visual inspection program. The inspectors verified
the activities were performed in accordance with the licensees augmented inspection
program and associated examination procedure. The inspectors verified indications and
defects, if present, were dispositioned in accordance with the licensees procedures and
NRC requirements.
Re-examination of an Indication Previously Accepted for Service after Analysis
A relevant linear indication was identified in integral attachment weld 24-29-626A pipe
support saddle during the previous outage, RFO 21. An analysis was performed and the
indication was accepted for continued service until the RFO 22 refueling outage.
The inspectors reviewed the NDE summary reports for the VT, magnetic particle testing,
and liquid penetrant testing for the relevant indication to verify the activities were
performed in accordance with the 2001 Edition, 2003 Addenda, of the ASME BPV Code
requirements. The inspectors also reviewed the engineering evaluation to verify the
analysis was consistent with the guidance in ASME Section XI, IWB-3132.3, Acceptance
by Analytical Evaluation.
Modification/Repair/Replacement Consisting of Welding on Pressure Boundary Risk
Significant Systems
The inspectors reviewed the welding activity documentation and associated NDE results
for the repair of the relevant indication previously identified on the ASME Class 1 main
7
steam system integral attachment weld 24-29-626A. The inspectors verified that the
welding, NDE, and acceptance were performed in accordance with the 2001 Edition,
2003 Addenda of the ASME BPV Code requirements and the licensees repair and
replacement program. Specifically, the inspectors verified the welding procedure
specification contained the essential, and where applicable, the supplemental essential
variables, in conformance with ASME Section IX, QW-200, and that the weld variables
were within the range qualified by the supporting procedure qualification record as
required by ASME Code Section IX, QW-250.
Identification and Resolution of Problems (IMC 02.05)
The inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs which identified NDE indications, deficiencies,
and other nonconforming conditions since the previous RFO. The inspectors verified
that nonconforming conditions were properly identified, characterized, evaluated,
corrective actions identified and dispositioned, and appropriately entered into the CAP.
b. Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) during the inspection
and concluded that additional information was needed to determine if a performance
deficiency existed and if so, whether the issue is more than minor and/or involves a
violation of regulatory requirements. Specifically, the inspectors noted a discrepancy in
the license renewal application for FitzPatrick and subsequent response to an audit
question regarding the existence and inspection of a moisture barrier in the drywell
between the concrete floor and metal liner.
Description. While evaluating drywell containment examination records, the inspectors
reviewed FitzPatrick license renewal documents related to the drywell and identified an
issue for which more information is needed to determine whether there is a performance
deficiency. Specifically, the inspectors noted that NUREG-1905, Safety Evaluation
Report Related to the License Renewal of James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant,
(ML081510826) referenced a drywell floor moisture barrier in Section 3.5.2.1.1.
However, during a drywell walkdown, the inspectors noted that no moisture barrier
existed on the drywell floor between the drywell liner and the concrete floor. The
inspectors further noted that Section 3.5.2.2.1.4 of the initial license renewal application
(ML062160494) submitted in July 2006, described a moisture barrier that was to be
inspected as part of the IWE Program and Structures Monitoring Program, and that in
Amendment 9 to the license renewal application (ML071060390), an audit question
discussed the moisture barrier condition.
The inspectors noted that this location in the drywell was visually inspected once per
period in accordance with the licensees Fourth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Inspection
Program, SEP-ISI-007, and that inspection results have not shown significant liner
degradation. Additionally, the licensee performs augmented UT thickness inspections of
the drywell liner interface in accordance with their augmented inspection program.
In response to the inspectors concerns, the licensee entered this issue into the CAP as
CR-JAF-2017-00906 for further evaluation. For the first corrective action (CA 1) in the
CR, the licensee reviewed inspection reports, design requirements, and drawings to
determine whether a moisture barrier previously existed between the containment
drywell liner and containment drywell concrete floor. The licensee concluded on
8
February 16, 2017, that the moisture barrier had never existed in that location. The
licensee has a planned corrective action (CA 2) to determine the appropriate actions to
address the apparent discrepancy in information with a due date of May 24, 2017. The
inspectors will review the licensees conclusions and assessment of the issue and
independently determine whether there is a performance deficiency and if so, whether
the issue is more than minor and/or involves a violation of regulatory requirements.
Pending resolution, this issue is an URI. (URI 05000333/2017001-01, Drywell Moisture
Barrier Description in License Renewal Application)
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
(71111.11Q - 2 samples)
.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a licensed operator simulator exam on March 22, 2017, which
included an earthquake and unisolable torus leak. The inspectors evaluated operator
performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant
operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures.
The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications,
implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the
oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified
the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager
and the TS action statements entered by the crew. Additionally, the inspectors assessed
the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document crew performance
problems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room
a. Inspection Scope
On January 14, 2017, the inspectors observed control room operators during the reactor
shutdown for RFO 22. Portions of the reactor shutdown including crew briefs; control
rod insertion; removal of the main generator from service; and main turbine, nuclear
instrumentation, and rod worth minimizer testing were observed. The inspectors
observed crew performance to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and
coordination of activities between work groups met established expectations and
standards.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
9
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of
maintenance activities on structure, system, and component performance and reliability.
The inspectors reviewed system health reports, CAP documents, maintenance WOs,
and maintenance rule basis documents to ensure that the licensee was identifying and
properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the maintenance rule. For
each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the structure, system, or component
was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in accordance with Title 10 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria
established by licensee staff was reasonable. As applicable, for structures, systems,
and components classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and
corrective actions to return these structures, systems, and components to (a)(2).
Additionally, the inspectors ensured that licensee staff was identifying and addressing
common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule system
boundaries.
Main steam isolation valve (MSIV) local leak-rate test results during RFO 22
Residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) keep full service water supply line silt
buildup on January 25, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the
maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that the licensee
performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The
inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the
reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that
licensee personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and
that the assessments were accurate and complete. When the licensee performed
emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and
managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and
discussed the results of the assessment with the stations probabilistic risk analyst to
verify plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also
reviewed the TS requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems,
when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid, and applicable
requirements were met.
66UC-22H, east crescent area unit cooler isolation following identification of
increased erosion on January 3, 2017
Shutdown risk assessment for risk window 2/3 during RFO 22 on January 18, 2017
10
Outage risk assessment during operation with a potential for draining the reactor
vessel (OPDRV) window on January 23, 2017
Outage risk during emergent welding activities (OPDRV) on February 1, 2017
Planned maintenance on the A low pressure coolant injection inverter the week of
March 20, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-
conforming conditions based on the risk significance of the associated components and
systems:
CR-JAF-2017-0575 concerning operability of the B source range monitor on
January 26, 2017
CR-JAF-2017-0610 regarding operability of 10AOV68B after failing to fully stroke for
surveillance testing on January 26, 2017
EC 69512 concerning RHR strainer functionality during the RFO 22 performance of
ST-9CB with a temporary repair installed (before the temporary modification
installation) on February 1, 2017
CR-JAF-2017-0848 regarding core cell 38-39 operability with a loose alignment pin
and modified fuel support casting on February 7, 2017
CR-JAF-2017-0812 concerning RHR strainer operability with temporary modification
installed for operating cycle 23 on February 14, 2017
The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to
assess whether TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or
system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The
inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the
TSs and UFSAR to the licensees evaluations to determine whether the components or
systems were operable. The inspectors confirmed, where appropriate, compliance with
bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Where compensatory measures
were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures
in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by the licensee.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
11
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications listed below to determine whether
the modifications affected the safety functions of systems that are important to safety.
The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 documentation and post-modification testing
results, and conducted field walkdowns of the modifications to verify that the temporary
modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and performance
capability of the affected systems.
Engineering change (EC) 66088, provide isolation between RHRSW and secondary
containment for work on 10MOV-89B on January 31, 2017
EC 69507, temporary RHR suction strainer shells on February 7, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Permanent Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated a permanent modification to replace 10MOV-89B, RHR heat
exchanger B service water outlet isolation valve, implemented by EC 67365, 10 MOV-
89A/B replacement. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and
performance capability of the affected system were not degraded by the modification. In
addition, the inspectors reviewed modification documents associated with the upgrade
and design change. The inspectors also reviewed the successfully completed
surveillance test conducted to verify system operability following the valve replacement.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 8 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed
below to verify that procedures and test activities adequately tested the safety functions
that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in
the procedure were consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis
and/or design basis documents, and that the test results were properly reviewed and
accepted and problems were appropriately documented. The inspectors also walked
down the affected job site, observed the pre-job brief and post-job critique where
possible, confirmed work site cleanliness was maintained, and witnessed the test or
reviewed test data to verify quality control hold points were performed and checked, and
that results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.
12
WO 341278, B standby liquid control relief valve replacement on January 21, 2017
WO 52473778, C main steam line isolation valve, 29AOV-80C, actuator
replacement on January 27, 2017
WO 453213, Hydraulic control unit (HCU) 26-23 directional control valve
replacement on January 31, 2017
WO 403664, C safety relief valve replacement on February 9, 2017
WO 396857, fuel cell 38-39 fuel support casting modification on February 9, 2017
WO 52607951, inspections and post-maintenance tests for multiple completed
maintenance activities during ST-39H, reactor pressure vessel system leakage test
and control rod drive Class 2 piping inservice test, on February 22, 2017
WO 457224,A reactor water recirculation pump motor generator voltage regulator
replacement on February 27, 2017
WO 466553, A RHR suction strainer temporary modification installation on
February 10, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the stations work schedule and outage risk plan for FitzPatrick
RFO 22, conducted January 14 through February 25, 2017. The inspectors reviewed
the licensees development and implementation of outage plans and schedules to verify
that risk, industry experience, previous site-specific problems, and defense-in-depth
were considered. During the outage, the inspectors observed portions of the shutdown
and cooldown processes and monitored controls associated with the following outage
activities:
Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth,
commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with
the applicable TSs when taking equipment out of service
Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung
and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated
work or testing
Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature
instruments to provide accurate indication and instrument error accounting
Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that
TSs were met
Monitoring of decay heat removal operations
Impact of outage work on the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool
cooling system
Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative
means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss
Activities that could affect reactivity
Maintenance of secondary containment as required by TSs
Refueling activities, including fuel handling and 100 percent core verification
Fatigue management
13
Tracking of startup prerequisites, walkdown of the drywell (primary containment) to
verify that debris had not been left which could block the emergency core cooling
system suction strainers, and startup and ascension to full power operation
Identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 8 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of
selected risk-significant structures, systems, and components to assess whether test
results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR, and licensee procedure requirements. The inspectors
verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational
readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had
current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application, tests were performed
as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied.
Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that
equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. The inspectors
reviewed the following surveillance tests:
ST-9BB, Emergency diesel generator B and D full load test and emergency service
water pump operability test, on January 11, 2017
ST-1B, MSIV fast closure test (inservice test (IST)), on January 14, 2017
ST-39B-X7B, Type C leak test main steam line B MSIVs (IST), (inboard MSIV,
29AOV-80B), on January 17, 2017 (PCIV)
ST-39B-X7B, Type C leak test main steam line B MSIVs (IST), (outboard MSIV,
29AOV-86B), on January 17, 2017 (PCIV)
ST-6M, Standby liquid control recirculation injection test (IST), on January 21, 2017
ST-9CB, Emergency diesel generator B and D load sequencing test and 4KV
emergency power system voltage relays instrument functional test, on February 2,
2017
ST-2HB, Low pressure coolant injection initiation logic system B and reactor
pressure vessel low pressure permissive logic systems A and B functional test, on
February 3, 2017
ST-29F, RPT/ARI logic functional and simulated automatic actuation test, on
February 7, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
14
2. RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational and Public Radiation Safety
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01 - 4 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees performance in assessing and controlling
radiological hazards in the workplace. The inspectors used the requirements contained
in 10 CFR Part 20, TSs, applicable regulatory guides (RGs), and the procedures
required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.
Radiological Hazard Assessment (1 sample)
The inspectors conducted independent radiation measurements during walkdowns of the
facility and reviewed the radiological survey program, air sampling and analysis,
continuous air monitor use, recent plant radiation surveys for radiological work activities,
and any changes to plant operations since the last inspection to verify survey adequacy
of any new radiological hazards for onsite workers or members of the public.
Instructions to Workers (1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed high radiation area work permit controls and use, and observed
containers of radioactive materials and assessed whether the containers were labeled
and controlled in accordance with requirements.
The inspectors reviewed several occurrences where a workers electronic personal
dosimeter alarmed. The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of the incidents,
documentation in the CAP, and whether compensatory dose evaluations were
conducted when appropriate. The inspectors verified follow-up investigations of actual
radiological conditions for unexpected radiological hazards were performed.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (1 sample)
The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions and performed independent
radiation measurements during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work
activities. The inspectors assessed whether posted surveys; radiation work permits;
worker radiological briefings and radiation protection job coverage; the use of continuous
air monitoring, air sampling, and engineering controls; and dosimetry monitoring were
consistent with the present conditions. The inspectors examined the control of highly
activated or contaminated materials stored within the spent fuel pool and the posting and
physical controls for selected high radiation areas, locked high radiation areas, and very
high radiation areas to verify conformance with the occupational performance indicator.
15
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (1
sample)
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance with respect to radiation
protection work requirements. The inspectors evaluated radiation protection technicians
in performance of radiation surveys and in providing radiological job coverage.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the control of in-plant airborne radioactivity and the use of
respiratory protection devices in these areas. The inspectors used the requirements in
10 CFR Part 20, RG 8.15, RG 8.25, NUREG/CR-0041, TSs, and procedures required by
TSs as criteria for determining compliance.
Inspection Planning
The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to identify ventilation and radiation monitoring
systems associated with airborne radioactivity controls and respiratory protection
equipment staged for emergency use. The inspectors also reviewed respiratory
protection program procedures and current performance indicators for unintended
internal exposure incidents.
Engineering Controls (1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed operability and use of both permanent and temporary
ventilation systems, and the adequacy of airborne radioactivity radiation monitoring in
the plant based on location, sensitivity, and alarm setpoints.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the monitoring, assessment, and reporting of occupational
dose. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, RGs, TSs, and
procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.
Inspection Planning
The inspectors reviewed radiation protection program audits, National Voluntary
Laboratory Accreditation Program dosimetry testing reports, and procedures associated
with dosimetry operations.
16
Source Term Characterization (1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed the plant radiation characterization (including gamma, beta,
alpha, and neutron) being monitored. The inspectors verified the use of scaling factors
to account for hard-to-detect radionuclides in internal dose assessments.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1 Unplanned Power Changes (1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees submittals for the Unplanned Power Changes
performance indicator for the period of January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016.
To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those
periods, inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,
Revision 7. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, maintenance
planning schedules, CRs, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to
validate the accuracy of the submittals.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Safety System Functional Failures (1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees submittals for the safety system functional
failures performance indicator for the period of January 1, 2016, through December 31,
2016. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during
those periods, inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-
02, Revision 7; and NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 10
CFR 50.73." The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, operability
assessments, CRs, event reports and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the
accuracy of the submittals.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
17
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 2 samples)
.1 Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the
inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant
status reviews to verify the licensee entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate
threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and
addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive
equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors
performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended CR
screening meetings. The inspectors also confirmed, on a sampling basis, that, as
applicable, for identified defects and non-conformances, the licensee performed an
evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Sample: Control Rod Unexpected Insertion to the Full in Position
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the licensee's evaluation and corrective
actions associated with CR-JAF-2016-01483 for the unexpected insertion of control rod
18-35 to the full in position. The CR documented that on April 24, 2016, while
performing control rod operability testing for fully withdrawn control rods, control rod 18-
35 drifted in from position 48 to 00. Operators entered Abnormal Operating Procedure
27 for a control rod drift and lowered power, ultimately to approximately 60 percent.
Maintenance replaced all four directional control valves (DCVs) with new valves and
finger filters on HCU 18-35. Following replacement of the DCVs, control rod 18-35 was
stroke timed per surveillance test ST-20N and inserted to position 46 and withdrawn to
position 48 (full out) with no abnormalities.
The inspectors assessed the licensees problem identification threshold, problem
analysis, extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and
timeliness of corrective actions to determine whether the licensee was appropriately
identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and
whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors
compared the actions taken to the requirements of the licensee's CAP and 10 CFR Part
50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. In addition, the inspectors reviewed
documentation associated with this issue, including the apparent cause evaluation and
DCV replacement schedules, and interviewed engineering personnel to assess the
effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions to resolve the issue.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
18
The inspectors determined that the licensee took appropriate actions to identify the
direct and apparent causes of the issue. The direct cause of the issue was that HCU 18-
35 DCVs failed to fully close when de-energized. The apparent cause was determined
to be the use of a performance-based preventive maintenance (PM) strategy vice a time-
based PM replacement for the DCVs. This resulted in a condition that allowed a latent
equipment issue (age-related degradation) to exist that would have been replaced under
a time-based PM strategy, resulting in the direct cause of the HCU 18-35 DCVs failing to
fully close when de-energized. The licensee replaced all four DCVs with new valves and
finger filters on HCU 18-35 and stroked control rod 18-35 in a timely manner.
The licensee also performed an extent of condition review for the other control rods in
which the HCU contained DCVs that are greater than 20 years old. The licensee
initiated a corrective action to replace all DCVs greater than 20 years old by RFO 23.
During RFO 22, the licensee replaced 149 DCVs. There are approximately 244 DCVs
that will need to be replaced by the end of RFO 23.
The inspectors determined the licensees overall response to the issue was
commensurate with its safety significance, was timely, and the corrective actions taken
and planned were reasonable. Although there was an industry recommendation to
switch to a time-based program for DCV replacement, there was not a reasonable
timeframe to replace the DCVs that were older than 20 years before this failure
occurred. Therefore, there was no performance deficiency since the failure was not
reasonably foreseeable and preventable.
.3 Annual Sample: Deferred Corrective Action Recovery
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's processes used to recover
corrective action items, including deferred corrective maintenance and permanent
modifications, following the decision not to permanently shut down FitzPatrick in January
2017. In addition to confirming the adequacy of the processes used, this inspection was
performed to identify any risk significant systems significantly affected by deferrals to
help inform future NRC inspections.
The inspectors reviewed documentation associated with this issue and interviewed
performance improvement, maintenance, work planning, and engineering personnel to
assess the effectiveness of the implemented processes.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors determined that the licensee took appropriate actions to recover
corrective action items following the decision not to permanently shut down FitzPatrick.
After Entergy announced the plan to decommission the plant, various corrective actions,
maintenance activities and surveillances were reviewed to determine whether they
should continue to be performed or should be deferred or rescheduled until after the
permanent shutdown date and ultimately not performed. The licensee had determined
the list of systems which would be required during various phases of decommissioning
to base their scheduling decisions on. Approximately twenty adverse condition
19
corrective actions were approved for extension past the permanent shutdown date.
Following the decision to continue plant operation, these items were reassessed for
scheduling. Approximately half of the items have been completed to date. The
inspectors determined the remaining items were appropriately scheduled commensurate
with their safety significance.
Surveillances and PM tasks were not cancelled or extended past their late dates. The
licensee is working to reestablish more ideal PM scheduling to get back into their
performance indicator target without the use of deep grace (close to late date) periods
for completion.
Permanent modifications were captured in the CAP if required to correct an adverse
condition. System improvement modifications remained listed in the system health
reports, so no process was required to recover them.
The inspectors reviewed the current list of corrective maintenance and key system
health work orders. No risk significant systems were adversely affected by deferrals.
The inspectors determined the licensees process to recover corrective action items
following the decision not to decommission the plant was appropriate.
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 - 1 sample)
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000333/2016-003-00: Simultaneous Opening
of Secondary Containment Airlock Doors
On June 7, 2016, personnel inside and outside the secondary containment
simultaneously opened both doors to the north reactor building, 272 foot elevation,
secondary containment airlock. TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 requires
that one secondary containment access door in each access opening is closed at all
times. Both parties were aware of this requirement, and both withdrew and closed their
respective doors within a period of approximately two seconds. However, during the
period that both doors were simultaneously open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.3 was not satisfied, and
therefore, secondary containment was inoperable per TS Limiting Condition for
Operation 3.6.4.1. The limiting condition for operation action statement requires that
secondary containment be restored to operable status within four hours. This condition
was met once one of the secondary containment access doors was closed. However,
because secondary containment is a single train system, this occurrence was reportable
under 10 CFR 50.72 as a condition that at the time of discovery would have prevented
the fulfillment of the secondary containment safety function, even though the condition
existed for less than the TS allowed outage time.
The inspectors noted that the subject secondary containment access is equipped with
three sets of green and red position indication lights, one set on each entrance to the
airlock and the third set inside the airlock. All the green lights are energized if both
airlock doors are closed. However, if either door is opened, the green lights extinguish
and all the red lights are energized. This scheme functions adequately to alert an
individual preparing to enter an airlock that another individual is already in the process of
entering from the other side. However, in the event that both doors are operated
simultaneously, the indications for both individuals are as expected for a single door
being opened, and neither recognizes a problem exists until they are positioned to see
the other open door (at which point, it is too late). Therefore, the inspectors determined
20
that this event was not due to a human performance deficiency. Given that secondary
containment differential pressure remained within specification, along with the short
duration of the event, the inspectors determined that secondary containment had
remained capable of performing its design function throughout the event. Additionally,
the issue was reported in a timely manner in accordance with the requirements of
10 CFR 50.72, so it did not constitute a traditional enforcement issue. Because the
failure to comply with TS SR 3.6.4.1.3 was corrected within the allowed outage time, no
violation of regulatory requirements occurred. Cameras and monitors have since been
installed on each side of the secondary containment airlock in question, enabling
individuals to verify that the opposing door will not be simultaneously opened. This LER
is closed.
4OA5 Other Activities
Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/192, Inspection of the Licensees Interim Measures
Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power
Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The objective of this performance-based TI is to verify implementation of interim
compensatory measures associated with an open phase condition (OPC) design
vulnerability in electric power system for operating reactors. The inspectors conducted
an inspection to determine if FitzPatrick had implemented the following interim
compensatory measures. These compensatory measures are to remain in place until
permanent automatic detection and protection schemes are installed and declared
operable for OPC design vulnerability. The inspectors verified the following:
FitzPatrick had identified and discussed with plant staff the lessons learned from the
OPC events at the U.S. operating plants including the Byron Station OPC event and
its consequences. This includes conducting operator training for promptly
diagnosing, recognizing consequences, and responding to an OPC event.
FitzPatrick had updated plant operating procedures to help operators promptly
diagnose and respond to OPC events on offsite power sources credited for safe
shutdown of the plant.
FitzPatrick had established and continues to implement periodic walkdown activities
to inspect switchyard equipment such as insulators, disconnect switches, and
transmission line and transformer connections associated with the offsite power
circuits to detect a visible OPC.
FitzPatrick had ensured that routine maintenance and testing activities on switchyard
components have been implemented and maintained. As part of the maintenance
and testing activities, FitzPatrick assessed and managed plant risk in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements.
21
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors verified the criteria were met.
Information gained from this TI have been provided to the program office for further
review.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On April 19, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Joseph Pacher,
Site Vice President, and other members of the FitzPatrick staff. The inspectors verified
that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this
report.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
A-1
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
B. Sullivan, Site Vice President
T. Peter, General Manager, Plant Operations
C. Adner, Director, Manager Operations and Regulatory and Performance Improvement
D. Bittinger, Manager, Design and Programs Engineering
W. Drews, Manager, Regulatory Assurance
K. Habayeb, Supervisor, Engineering
R. Heath, Manager, Radiation Protection
J. Jones, Manager, Emergency Planning
D. Poulin, Director, Engineering
T. Redfearn, Manager, Security
M. Reno, Manager, Training
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
Opened
05000333/2017001-01 URI Drywell Moisture Barrier Description in License
Renewal Application (Section 1R08)
Closed
05000333/2016-003-00 LER Concurrent Opening of Reactor Building Airlock
Doors (Section 4OA3)
05000333/TI 2515/192 TI Inspection of the Licensees Interim
Compensatory Measures Associated with the
Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in
Electric Power Systems (Section 4OA5)
Attachment
A-2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
AOP-19A, Loss of Switchgear L16, Revision 5
ODSO-4, Shift Turnover and Log Keeping, Revision 118
OP-13, RHR System, Revision 98
OP-13D, RHR - Shutdown Cooling, Revision 30
OP-14, Core Spray System, Revision 37
Condition Report
Drawings
FM-20A, Flow Diagram RHR System 10, Revision 72
FM-20B, Flow Diagram RHR System 10, Revision 62
FM-23A, Flow Diagram Core Spray System 14, Revision 49
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
Procedures
JAF-RPT-04-00478, JAF Fire Hazards Analysis, Revision 2
JAF-RPT-04-00478, JAF Fire Hazards Analysis, Revision 2
PFP-PWR12, Relay Room Elevation 286 Fire Area VII/Fire Zone RR-1, Revision 5
PFP-PWR20, Reactor Building - East / Elevation 272 Fire Area/Zone IX/RB-1A, Revision 5
PFP-PWR21, Reactor Building - West / Elevation 272 Fire Area/Zone X/RB-1B, Revision 5
PFP-PWR24, Reactor Building - East, Elevation 300 Fire Area/Fire Zone - 8/RB-1C, 9RB-1A,
Revision 5
PFP-PWR25, Reactor Building - West, Elevation 300 Fire Area/Fire Zone - X/RB-1B,
Revision 3
PFP-PWR45, Turbine Building, Elevation 272, Fire Area/Zone IE/TB-1, Revision 06
PFP-PWR46, Turbine Building, Elevation 272, Fire Area/Zone IE/TB-1, OR-2, Revision 04
PFP-PWR48, Turbine Building, Elevation 300, Fire Area/Zone IE/TB-1, Revision 04
Drawings
FPSSK-2, Fire Area/Zone Arrangement Plan El 272-0, Revision 3
FPSSK-3, Fire Area/Zone Arrangement Plan El 300-0, Revision 3
Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0505, Ultrasonic Thickness Examination, Revision 4
CEP-NDE-0901, VT-1 Examination, Revision 4
PQR 015, Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding (GTAW), Revision 1
PQR 024, Manual Gas Tungsten and Shielded Metal Arc Welding (GTAW and SMAW),
Revision 1
PRO-ISI-IVVI-0001-GFIT1, Procedure for In-Vessel Visual Inspection (IVVI) of the James A.
Fitzpatrick BWR 4 RPV Internals, Revision 2
SEP-ISI-007, ASME Section XI Fourth 10-Year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan,
Revision 7
SI-UT-130, Procedure for the Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of Dissimilar Metal Welds,
Revision 3
A-3
WPS-CS-1/1-A, Welding Procedure Specification, Revision 0
WPS-CS-1/1-B, Welding Procedure Specification, Revision 0
Condition Reports
CR-JAF-2014-04909 CR-JAF-2014-06304 CR-JAF-2014-06884
CR-JAF-2014-07232 CR-JAF-2015-01099 CR-JAF-2015-03000
CR-JAF-2017-00480 CR-JAF-2017-00667 CR-JAF-2017-00706
CR-JAF-2017-00812 CR-JAF-2017-00822 CR-JAF-2017-00906
CR-JAF-2017-00910
Work Order 0039397101, Repair Linear Flaw in ISI Weld 24-29-626A, January 26, 2017
NDE Summary Reports
3036-NTHBIR, Closure Head Vent Nozzle IR, January 22, 2017
ISI-VT-16-012, IWE General Exam RB 272-300, January 23, 2017
ISI-VT-16-013, IWE General Exam RB 300-326, January 23, 2017
ISI-VT-17-017, VT-3 Pressure Retaining Bolting, January 26, 2017
ISI-VT-17-023, VT-3 Torus Supports, January 23, 2017
[[::JAF-RHR-130|JAF-RHR-130]], FitzPatrick DMW RHR 24-10-130, January 29, 2017
[[::JAF-RHR-142|JAF-RHR-142]], FitzPatrick DMW RHR 24-10-142, January 30, 2017
[[::JAF-RHR-144|JAF-RHR-144]], FitzPatrick DMW RHR 24-10-144, January 30, 2017
Miscellaneous
J.A. FitzPatrick RO21 Final Report, Fall 2014, Inservice Inspection - FAC, Volume 1
LO-JAFLO-2016-00035, Pre-NRC ISI Snapshot Assessment, December 5, 2016
OE-NOE-2015-00096-CA-12, NRC Information Notice 2015-04, Fatigue in Branch Connection
Welds, Revision 0
OE-NOE-2016-00145 CA#00012, NRC-RIS-2016-07 Containment Shell or Liner Moisture
Barrier Inspection, Revision 0
WPQ-EN-0229-08536, Welding Performance Qualification, December 22, 2016
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Procedures
OP-65, Startup and Shutdown Procedure, Revision 121
ST-5C, IRM-APRM Instrument Range Overlap Check, completed January 14, 2017
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
Procedures
EN-DC-205, Maintenance Rule Monitoring, Revision 6
EN-DC-206, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process, Revision 3
Condition Reports
CR-JAF-2014-4381 CR-JAF-2015-3924* CR-JAF-2016-0263*
CR-JAF-2016-0324* CR-JAF-2016-0610 CR-JAF-2016-1671*
CR-JAF-2016-2356 CR-JAF-2016-2411* CR-JAF-2016-3831*
CR-JAF-2016-4815* CR-JAF-2017-0309* CR-JAF-2017-0310*
CR-JAF-2017-0501* CR-JAF-2017-0768 CR-JAF-2017-0886*
CR-JAF-2017-0920* CR-JAF-2017-0942 CR-JAF-2017-1108*
- Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Evaluations also reviewed for Condition Reports
A-4
Work Orders
451680
466890
Miscellaneous
JAF-RPT-MST-02480, Maintenance Rule Basis Document System 029 Main Steam, Revision 9
JAF-RPT-MULTI-02294, Maintenance Rule Basis Document for Service Water Systems
including System 10 (RHRSW), 46 (Normal SW), and 46-ESW (Emergency SW),
Revision 12
Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Action Plan for System 29, February 6, 2017
System Health Report for Main Steam System 3Q-2016
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Procedures
AP-10.09, Outage Risk Assessment, Revision 35
AP-10.10, On-Line Risk Assessment, Revision 9
EN-WM-104, On-Line Risk Assessment, Revision 12
ODSO-4, Shift Turnover and Log Keeping, Revision 118
OP-43C, LPCI Independent Power Supply System, Revision 23
Condition Reports (* NRC Identified)
CR-JAF-2017-0465*
Miscellaneous
R22 Revision 1 Risk Assessment Based on Schedule, December 29, 2016
Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Procedures
EN-NE-G-0032, BWR Primary System Loose Parts Analysis Considerations, Revision 1
ST-39J, Leak Testing of RHR and Core Spray Testable Check Valves (IST), Revision 18
Condition Reports
CR-JAF-2012-6414 CR-JAF-2014-5302 CR-JAF-2017-0610
CR-JAF-2017-0812 CR-JAF-2017-0848 CR-JAF-2017-0851
Work Orders
00396857
52606738
Drawing
FM-20A, Flow Diagram RHR System 10, Revision 47
Miscellaneous
ALION-CAL-SI-9389-002, Design Pressure for Strainer Clamshell Cover Modules, Revision 2
EC 69507, Temporary RHR suction strainer shells
EC 69558, Enlarge alignment slot on fuel support casting for cell location 38-39 to allow for FSC
assembly in proper orientation over guide pin in core plate
A-5
[[::JAF-194295-RP01|JAF-194295-RP01]], RHR Strainer Module Repair Report, Revision 0
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications
Procedures
EN-DC-117, Post Modification Testing and Special Instructions, Revision 8
ST-2XB, RHR Service Water Loop B Quarterly Operability Test (IST), Revision 13
ST-41D, Remote Valve Position Indication Verification Online (IST), Revision 20
Condition Report (* NRC identified)
2017-2018*
Drawings
FM-20B, Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 10, Revision 72
FP-37E, Service Water Piping Reactor Building Sh-5, Revision 22
FP-37F, Service Water Piping Reactor Building Sh-6, Revision 13
Miscellaneous
EC 66231, Provide Isolation between RHRSW and Secondary Containment for Work on
EC 66088, Provide Isolation between RHRSW and Secondary Containment for Work on
Engineering Change 67365, 10MOV-89A/B Replacement, Revision 0
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing
Procedures
EN-WM-107, Post Maintenance Testing, Revision 5
ESP-68.001, Leak Rate Test of Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Pneumatic Supply
Check Valves, Revision 5
IMP-02-184.8, Recirculating MG Set Voltage Regulator Tuning**, completed 2/27/17
MP-003.11, HCU Directional Control Valves 03SOV-120 through 123, Revision 18
RAP-7.3.39, Channel-Control Blade Interference Monitoring, completed 2/9/17
ST-2AL, RHR Loop A Quarterly Operability Test (IST), Revision 36
ST-2AM, RHR Loop B Quarterly Operability Test (IST), completed 2/22/17
ST-6HB, Standby Liquid Control B Side Quarterly Operability Test (IST), completed 1/21/17
ST-20N, Control Rod Exercise/Timing/Stall Flow Test, completed 2/4/17
ST-22A, ADS Simulated Automatic Actuation Test, Revision 24
ST-22K, Manual Safety Relief Valve Operation System Test (IST), Revision 5
ST-39B, Type B and C LLRT of Containment Penetrations (IST), Revision 36
ST-39B-X7C, Type C Leak Test Main Steam Line C MSIVs (IST), Revision 15
ST-39H, RPV System Leakage Test and Control Rod Drive Class 2 Piping Inservice Test
(ISI)**, Revision 34
ST-43G, Remote Shutdown Panel 25ASP-5 Component Operation and Isolation Verification,
Revision 6
Condition Reports
CR-JAF-2017-0409 CR-JAF-2017-1501 CR-JAF-2017-1549 CR-JAF-2017-1670
CR-JAF-2017-1676 CR-JAF-2017-1678 CR-JAF-2017-1684 CR-JAF-2017-1686
A-6
CR-JAF-2017-1689 CR-JAF-2017-1694
Work Orders
00341278 00396857 00403664 00453213 00456762 00457224
00465534 00466391 00466553 52607951
Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Procedures
EN-OM-123, Fatigue Management Program, Revision 13
ESP-65.001, Drywell Inspection, Revision 4
ODSO-4, Shift Turnover and Log Keeping, Revision 118
OP-9, Main Turbine, Revision 58
OP-11A, Main Generator, Transformers and Isolated Bus Phase Cooling, Revision 52
OP-13D, RHR-Shutdown Cooling, Revision 29
OP-21, Emergency Service Water (ESW), Revision 38
OP-30A, Refueling Water Level Control, Revision 18
OP-65, Startup and Shutdown Procedure, Revision 121
OSP-66.001, Management of Refueling Activities, Revision 8
RAP-7.4.01, Control Rod Scram Time Evaluation**, Revision 28
ST-2AN, RHR Loop A Monthly Operability Test, Revision 16
ST-2AO, RHR Loop B Monthly Operability Test, Revision 16
ST-24J, RCIC [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] Flow Rate and Inservice Test (IST), Revision 45
ST-26J, Heatup and Cooldown Temperature Checks, Revision 24
TOP-416, Transferring from A RFP to B RFP While On the Low Flow Control Valve, Revision 0
Condition Reports
CR-JAF-2017-0706 CR-JAF-2017-0738 CR-JAF-2017-0812
CR-JAF-2017-0848 CR-JAF-2017-1142 CR-JAF-2017-1146
Miscellaneous
System Window Closeout Checklist for 11SLC (1R22-0071), January 22, 2017
System Window Closeout Checklist for B RHR (R22-0022), February 2, 2017
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
Procedures
CEP-APJ-001, Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing (10CFR50 Appendix J) Program
Plan, Revision 3
MST-011.11, Standby Liquid Control Explosive Valves (IST), Revision 14
OP-25, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System, Revision 88
OP-22, Diesel Generator Emergency Power, Revision 61
ST-1B, MSIV Fast Closure Test (IST), Revision 26
ST-6M, Standby Liquid Control Recirculation, Injection Test (IST, ISI), Revision 8
ST-6N, Reverse Closure Test of SLC Injection Line Check Valves (IST), Revision 0
ST-9BB, EDG B and D Full Load Test and ESW Pump Operability Test, Revision 15
ST-9CB, EDG B and D Load Sequencing Test and 4KV Emergency Power System Voltage
Relays Instrument Functional Test**, Revision 3
ST-29F, RPT/ARI Logic Functional and Simulated Automatic Actuation Test, Revision 17
ST-39B, Type B and C LLRT of Containment Penetrations (IST), Revision 36
ST-39B-X7B, Type C Leak Test Main Steam Line B MSIVs (IST), Revision 14
ST-43H, Circuit Breaker 10614 Remote Shutdown Operation and Isolation Verification,
Revision 11
A-7
Condition Reports
Work Orders
52698422
52733249
Drawing
FM-21A, Flow Diagram Standby Liquid Control System 11, Revision 37
Miscellaneous
Updated FSAR Section 4.6, Main Steam Isolation Valves
Updated FSAR Section 8.6, Emergency AC Power System
Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Procedures
EN-RP-100, Radiation Worker Expectations, Revision 11
EN-RP-101, Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas, Revision 12
EN-RP-102, Radiological Control, Revision 5
EN-RP-105, Radiological Work Permits, Revision 16
EN-RP-106-01, Radiological Survey Guidelines, Revision 3
EN-RP-108, Radiation Protection Posting, Revision 18
EN-RP-121, Radioactive Material Control, Revision 13
EN-RP-141-01, Job Coverage Using Remote Monitoring Technology, Revision 6
EN-RP-152, Conduct of Radiation Protection, Revision 1
Condition Reports
CR-JAF-2016-00607 CR-JAF-2016-00650 CR-JAF-2016-04668
CR-JAF-2016-05190 CR-JAF-2017-00627 CR-JAF-2017-00637
20170514 17-0514
20170609 17-0609
20170701 17-0701
20170944 17-0944
Surveys
[[::JAF-1701-0325|JAF-1701-0325]] [[::JAF-1701-0376|JAF-1701-0376]] [[::JAF-1701-0397|JAF-1701-0397]]
JAF-1701-0455 [[::JAF-1701-0495|JAF-1701-0495]] [[::JAF-1701-0520|JAF-1701-0520]]
JAF-1701-0532 [[::JAF-1701-0568|JAF-1701-0568]] [[::JAF-1701-0577|JAF-1701-0577]]
JAF-1701-0582 [[::JAF-1701-0601|JAF-1701-0601]] [[::JAF-1701-0740|JAF-1701-0740]]
JAF-1701-0757 [[::JAF-1701-0639|JAF-1701-0639]] [[::JAF-1701-0659|JAF-1701-0659]]
JAF-1701-0667 [[::JAF-1701-0698|JAF-1701-0698]] [[::JAF-1701-0720|JAF-1701-0720]]
JAF-1701-0721 [[::JAF-1701-0722|JAF-1701-0722]] [[::JAF-1701-0723|JAF-1701-0723]]
JAF-1701-0724 [[::JAF-1701-0725|JAF-1701-0725]] [[::JAF-1701-0726|JAF-1701-0726]]
JAF-1701-0732 [[::JAF-1701-0733|JAF-1701-0733]] [[::JAF-1701-0735|JAF-1701-0735]]
JAF-1701-0736 [[::JAF-1701-0737|JAF-1701-0737]] [[::JAF-1701-0744|JAF-1701-0744]]
JAF-1701-0752 [[::JAF-1701-0778|JAF-1701-0778]] [[::JAF-1701-0789|JAF-1701-0789]]
A-8
[[::JAF-1701-0798|JAF-1701-0798]]
Miscellaneous
Air Sample 17106, 17111, 17137, 17139, 17142, 17147, 17150, 17182
Section 2RS3: In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Procedure
EN-RP-131, Air Sampling, Revision 15
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedure
EN-LI-118, Cause Evaluation Process, Revision 22
Condition Reports
CR-JAF-2016-01483
Section 4OA3: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Condition Reports
Section 4OA5: Other Activities
Procedures
AOP-72, 115 KV Grid Loss, Instability, or Degradation, Revision 11
OP-44A, 115 KV System, Revision 22
Condition Reports
Work Orders
00456356
52692025
52693298
Miscellaneous
EC 48543, Provide Open Phase Detection and Protection for 115KV Switchyard - Parent EC,
Revision 0
LER 050005333-2005-006-00, Inoperable 115 KV Line in Excess of Technical Specification
Allowed Out of Service Time
A-9
LIST OF ACRONYMS
10 CFR Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BPV boiler and pressure vessel
CAP corrective action program
CR condition report
DCV directional control valve
EC engineering change
HCU hydraulic control unit
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IST inservice test
IWE International Welding Engineer
LER licensee event report
MSIV main steam isolation valve
NDE non-destructive examination
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OPDRV operation with a potential for draining the reactor vessel
PM preventive maintenance
RFO refuel outage
RG regulatory guide
RHRSW residual heat removal service water
SR surveillance requirement
TI temporary instruction
TS technical specification
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI unresolved item
UT ultrasonic testing
VT visual testing
WO work order