IR 05000333/2021002
ML21215A064 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | FitzPatrick |
Issue date: | 08/03/2021 |
From: | Erin Carfang NRC/RGN-I/DORS |
To: | Rhoades D Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
References | |
IR 2021002 | |
Download: ML21215A064 (20) | |
Text
August 3, 2021
SUBJECT:
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2021002
Dear Mr. Rhoades:
On June 30, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. On July 22, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Tim Peter, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Erin E. Carfang, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000333 License No. DPR-59
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000333
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-002-0043
Licensee:
Exelon Nuclear
Facility:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Location:
Oswego, NY
Inspection Dates:
April 01, 2021 to June 30, 2021
Inspectors:
P. Boguszewski, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
J. England, Resident Inspector
H. Anagnostopoulos, Senior Health Physicist
E. Dipaolo, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Dolecki, Resident Inspector
M. Henrion, Health Physicist
C. Hobbs, Reactor Inspector
E. Miller, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Patel, Senior Reactor Inspector
B. Pinson, Reactor Inspector
C. Swisher, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Erin E. Carfang, Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
FitzPatrick started the inspection period at rated thermal power. On June 25, 2021 reactor power was lowered to 70 percent for routine testing and a rod sequence change. Power was restored to 100 percent on June 26, 2021. FitzPatrick remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident and regional inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week, increasing the amount of time on site as local COVID-19 conditions permitted.
As part of their onsite activities, resident inspectors conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal hot temperatures for the switchyard and the 'A' and 'B' 125VDC battery rooms on June 2, 2021.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)
'A' emergency service water on April 15, 2021 (2)4160-volt and 400-volt normal alternating current power distribution on April 26, 2021 (3)
'A' and 'C' emergency diesel generator (EDG) during 'B' and 'D' EDG testing on May 24, 2021
- (4) High pressure coolant injection system following governor valve position indication repair on May 26, 2021
- (5) Primary containment venting on June 15, 2021 (6)
'B' and 'D' residual heat removal (RHR) system during emergency Technical Specification amendment on June 21, 2021
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Control rod drive system on April 8, 2021
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Main control room, control room HVAC room, elevation 300', and relay room 286', fire area VII/CR-1 and RR-1, on April 1, 2021
- (2) Reactor building 272 elevation, fire area X/RB-1B and IX/RB-1A, on April 6, 2021
- (3) Site plan, fire area yard, on April 19, 2021
- (4) ISFSI pad and switch yard, 345-kilovolt and 115-kilovolt yards, fire area yard, on April 20, 2021
- (5) East electric fire bay, fire area/zone II/SW-2 on May 24, 2021
- (6) West electric fire bay, fire area/zone IC/SW-1 on May 24, 2021
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator requalification examination exam results for the annual operating exam and biennial written exam on June 29, 2021.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed reactivity operations to lower power to 70 percent for a control rod sequence exchange, control rod scram time testing, and turbine valve testing on June 25 - June 26, 2021.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator performance in the simulator which included job performance measures to place the high pressure coolant injection system in pressure control operation, and reactor pressure vessel isolation on May 6, 2021
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Core spray system on April 30, 2021
- (2) Structural monitoring walkdown of the torus room on May 19, 2021
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Elevated risk (Action Green) during scheduled maintenance activities on 'C' EDG, week of April 19-22, 2021
- (2) Elevated risk (Action Green) during planned maintenance on 71T-3 115 transformer on May 11, 2021
- (3) Emergent risk associated with electro-hydraulic control turbine intercept valve movement on May 19, 2021
- (4) Unplanned loss of 'A' reactor water recirculation speed control circuit on June 4, 2021 (5)
'B' RHR system during 'A' RHR planned maintenance on June 8, 2021
- (6) Emergency license amendment protected equipment during 'A' RHR pump maintenance on June 13, 2021
- (7) Fire risk protection due to 'A' RHR system unavailability exceeding 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> on June 14, 2021
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Control room emergency ventilation air supply system due to degraded 'B' ventilation supply fan, 70FN-6B, on April 2, 2021
- (2) Emergency service water due to through-wall leakage on 'B' piping on April 13, 2021
- (3) Control room emergency ventilation air system due to a degraded relay associated with 70FN-6B on May 10, 2021
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) Update (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) Revision to Severe Accident Management Guidelines
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (10 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
(1)
'A' low pressure coolant injection inverter work on April 13, 2021 (2)76P-2, electric-driven fire pump following pump replacement on April 16, 2021 (3)
'A' EDG following 'C' EDG scheduled maintenance activities on April 22, 2021 (4)
'B' EDG and 'D' EDG Force Parallel Logic Relay (93TD9M-1EDGB13) on May 4, 2021 (5)
'B' EDG following turbocharger replacement on May 6, 2021
- (6) High pressure coolant injection system following governor valve position indication repair on May 26, 2021 (7)
'D' RHR service water pump breaker swap on June 2, 2021 (8)
'A' RHR pump after failed Baker testing on June 8, 2021 (9)
'A' RHR pump following motor replacement on June 17, 2021
- (10) Control rod 26-35 following scram solenoid pilot valve replacement on June 26, 2021
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) ST-3PB, Core Spray Loop B Quarterly Operability Test, on June 4, 2021
- (2) HPCI system review for Emergency License Amendment Review, on June 12, 2021 (3)
'B' and 'D' residual heat removal system for Emergency License Amendment Review, on June 12, 2021 (4)
'B' and 'D' emergency diesel generators for Emergency License Amendment Review, on June 12,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials, and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to access high radiation areas.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the following:
Radiation Work Packages
- RWP JF-1-21-00302 TIP Area Activities
- RWP JF-1-21-00202 Radwaste Activities
- RWP JF-1-21-00209 Transportation of Radioactive Material
Electronic Alarming Dosimeter Alarms
- EAD Alarm on May 18, 2020
- EAD Alarm on September 19, 2020
- EAD Alarm on September 21, 2020
Labeling of Containers
- LSA trash bins
- Bagged laundry
- Bagged portable vacuums
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material. The inspectors:
- (1) Observed licensee survey of tools, filters, and meters for release from the radiologically controlled area
- (2) Observed workers exiting radiologically controlled area and using the small articles monitor at the main access point
- (3) Inspected radwaste packages that are stored and awaiting shipment
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of the following radiological work activities:
- (2) Testing and maintenance of 'A' residual heat removal motor-operated valves
- (3) Replacement of 'A' feed pump cooling coils
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:
- (1) Reactor building decontamination room
- (2) Reactor traversing in-core probe
- (3) Fuel pool cooling
- (4) Reactor water cleanup hold pump room
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:
- (1) Reactor building ventilation system
- (2) Control room ventilation system
Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:
- (1) Decontamination booth in radwaste
- (2) Reactor building decontamination room
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices.
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10)===
- (1) January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issue:
- (1) IR 4267056 - Spent Fuel Pool Thermal Dispersion Criteria Not Maintained
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03)
- (1) Half scram following blown fuse on reactor protection system channel A1 during response time testing of master trip unit 05MTU-212A on May 18,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Minor Violation 71152 Minor Violation: On July 25, 2019, Exelon Nuclear Oversight conducted an audit at FitzPatrick and discovered that fuel assemblies discharged into the spent fuel pool (SFP) at the end of the last refueling outage (J1R23), which ended in October 2018, had not conformed to the B.5.b thermal dispersion pattern committed to by FitzPatrick. Specifically, four fuel bundles discharged into the northeast corner of the SFP did not meet the separation criteria specified in NF-AB-309, "BWR Special Nuclear Material and Core Component Move Sheet Development," Attachment 8, which describes a Knight's Move, 6-cell pattern, similar to the way the knight piece moves in a game of chess. In this pattern, recently discharged fuel bundles that have been out of the core for less than 275 days do not share an adjacent location in the SFP with another fuel bundle that has also been discharged from the reactor core for less than 275 days. This arrangement of recently discharged fuel bundles in the SFP is a mitigation strategy to cope with the requirements of Section B.5.b of Commission Order EA-02-026 for protection against loss of large areas of the plant due to fire or explosion, and is codified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.155 (b)(2), "Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events."
An Extent of Condition analysis was conducted in IR 04267056, and it was determined that the software program utilized for planning and executing fuel moves in the SFP had not correctly modeled the dimensions between racks in the SFP in the northeast corner of the pool. This was a latent error that had existed since FitzPatrick first began using the ShuffleWorks software for planning fuel moves in the 2004 through 2006 timeframe. On August 23, 2007, FitzPatrick adopted a License Amendment committing to the offloading of fuel assemblies into the Knight's Move B.5.b dispersal pattern in the SFP. Exelon determined that the four fuel assemblies identified on July 25, 2019, had already been in the SFP for greater than 275 days, therefore, it was not necessary to move the fuel into a new location in the pool. Additional corrective actions taken by Exelon included a review of FitzPatrick refueling procedures, an update to the ShuffleWorks fuel movement software, and fleet actions to have each Exelon plant perform a check to determine if the fuel movement software at that facility modeled the actual physical rack dimensions in the SFP at that facility.
For the review of FitzPatrick refueling procedures, Exelon determined that adequate steps already existed in OS-66.001, "Management of Refueling Activities," and NF-AB-309, "BWR Special Nuclear Material and Core Component Move Sheet Development" to describe the B.5.b fuel thermal dispersion pattern, and to incorporate this strategy into reactor core offloads during refueling outages. Therefore, Exelon determined that no procedural changes were necessary. The ShuffleWorks program at FitzPatrick was modified to place a constraint violation on the locations in the SFP that do not meet the B.5.b thermal dispersion distance separation requirements, so that a warning box appears if a fuel assembly is placed in one of these locations during fuel movement planning operations. The inspectors conducted interviews with reactor engineers, and reviewed the corrective actions taken by Exelon in response to the B.5.b thermal dispersion issue identified on July 25, 2019, and determined they were adequate.
Corrective Action Reference: IR 04267056
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors determined that the failure to comply with the B.5.b thermal dispersion pattern described in NF-AB-309, Attachment 8 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, NF-AB-309, "BWR Special Nuclear Material and Core Component Move Sheet Development," Revision 3, Step 4.4.9 requires that fuel move sheets are generated using approved and controlled move planning software, that ensures the required prerequisites and recommended constraints are followed, and that the move planning software is up-to-date.
The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was minor due to the low number of fuel assemblies impacted, and that the small dimensional discrepancy between assemblies would not have a significant effect on the heat removal capability of the SFP during a postulated Beyond Design Basis scenario.
Enforcement:
FitzPatrick License Condition 2R.(b)(7), "Mitigation Strategy License Condition," requires in part that SFP mitigation measures are developed and maintained to address large fires and explosions. Contrary to the above, from August 23, 2007, the date the License Condition was implemented, until July 25, 2019, fuel assemblies loaded into the northeast corner of the SFP from the reactor core in every other refueling outage, were not in compliance with the B.5.b thermal dispersion separation requirements specified in NF-AB-309,"BWR Special Nuclear Material and Core Component Move Sheet Development."
Following identification of the issue, Exelon took corrective actions to restore compliance.
This failure to comply with License Condition 2R.(b)(7) constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Semi-Annual Trend 71152 The inspectors evaluated a sample of issues and events that occurred over the first and second quarters of 2021. The evaluation did not reveal any new trends that could indicate a more significant safety issue. The inspectors determined that, in most cases, the issues were appropriately evaluated by Exelon staff for potential trends at a low threshold, and resolved within the scope of the corrective action program. The inspectors identified a trend associated with additional equipment failure that resulted in additional monitoring and unplanned maintenance, which included the 'A' reactor water cleanup pump seal failure, an immersion heater failure associated with the 'C' emergency diesel generator, unexpected movement of the turbine intercept valves, and failure of the 'A' residual heat removal pump motor. The inspectors also identified a trend with increasing failure of emergency battery lights.
Based on the overall results of the semi-annual trend review, the inspectors determined that Exelon had generally identified adverse trends at FitzPatrick before they could become more significant safety problems. The inspectors independently evaluated the deficiencies noted above for significance in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," and determined them to be minor.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 22, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. Tim Peter, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On June 10, 2021, the inspectors presented the radiological hazard assessment and exposure controls inspection results to Mr. Mohamed Khan, Director, Site Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On June 10, 2021, the inspectors presented the spent fuel pool inspection results to Mr. Philip Nichols, Reactor Engineering Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
THIRD PARTY REVIEWS
Inspectors reviewed Institute of Nuclear Power Operations reports that were issued during the inspection period for the evaluation conducted in February 2021.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
WC-JF-107-1000
Seasonal Readiness T&RM for JAF
Work Orders
05042019
Drawings
Main One line Diagram Sheet 2 Station Service
Transformers
Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 10
Flow Diagram Control Rod Drive System 03
Flow Diagram Service Water System 46
Flow Diagram Emergency Service Water System 46 & 15
ISI-FM-27B
ISI Drawing
Procedures
Emergency Service Water (ESW)
Diesel Generator Emergency Power
Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System
4160V and 600V Normal AC Power Distribution
Primary Containment Venting Without AC Power
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04414983
04417967
04417970
04417972
04417989
Fire Plans
Site Plan
Portable Fire Extinguisher Inspection Procedure
ISFSI Pad Location, Elevation 272' Fire Area/Zone/Yard
Relay Room/Elev. 286' Fire Area/Zone Vii/RR-1
Main Control Room and Control Room HVAC Equipment
Rooms/Elev. 300' Fire Area/Zone VII/CR-1
Reactor Building - East/Elev. 272' Fire Area/Zone IX/RB-
1A
Reactor Building - West/Elev. 272' Fire Area/Zone X/RB-
1B
Switchgear Room East, Elevation 272', Fire Area 2/Fire
Zone SW-2
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Switch Yard, 345 and 115 kV Yards, Elevation 272'0" Fire
Area Yard/Fire Zone Yard
Switchgear Room West Elevation 272', Fire Area/Fire
Zone IC/SW-1
Work Orders
05099562
71111.11Q Procedures
BWR Reactivity Maneuver Guidance
Control Rod Scram Time Evaluation
Main Turbine Control Valve Instrument Channel and Valve
Operability Check
Corrective Action
Documents
04404301
04390733
04394058
04404883
04404967
04412087
04416039
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04424860
04424863
04424885
04424886
04424889
04424891
04424960
04424973
04424997
Engineering
Evaluations
JAF-RPT-07-
00006
Maintenance Rule Structural Monitoring Report
006
JAF-RPT-07-
00006
Maintenance Rule Structural Monitoring Report
005
Miscellaneous
Maintenance
Rule System
Basis Document,
System 14
Core Spray System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
EDG B and D Full Load Test and ESW Pump Operability
Test
Revision 19
Corrective Action
Documents
04422793
04424128
04427658
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04423185
Load Control Unit
C
1.11-472
Intercept: Valve Pre-Amp
1.11-545
Schematic Wiring Diagram Valve Test Logic IV-1 & IV-3
1.11-588
Schematic Wiring Diagram Intercept Valve No. 1 Position
Unit
B
Flow Diagram Extraction Steam System 31
Flow Diagram Moisture Separator Reheater Drain System
S94-003.cdr
EHC Hydraulics
Miscellaneous
James A.
FitzPatrick
Technical
Support
Guidelines,
TSGS
Procedures
Hazard Barrier Controls
Hot Primary Containment Control
Post Accident Containment Venting and Gas Control
2
Development of Risk Management Actions for the
Inclusion of Fire Insights into James A. FitzPatrick
Configuration Risk Management Program
JAF PRA Emergency Diesel Generators System
Notebook
EDG Power Assembly Maintenance
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Plan
Protected Equipment Program
006
Protected Equipment Program
OP-AA-201-012-
1001
Operations On-Line Fire Risk Management
Severe Accident
Operating
Guideline
(SAOG)-2
RPV, Containment, and Radioactive Release Control (1-4) 5
Primary Containment Venting without AC Power
Work Orders
05158736
Corrective Action
Documents
04412368
04412368
04416041
04416224
04416742
04416743
Procedures
HVAC Emergency Air Supply FN-6A and 6B Control
Room
Control Room Ventilation Temperature and Differential
Pressure Instrument Calibration
Miscellaneous
Reactor Oversight Process Changes to Address Severe
Accident Management Guidelines
February 23,
2016
Commitment to Maintain Severe Accident Management
Guidelines
December 15,
2015
Emergency Response Procedures and Guidelines for
Beyond Design Basis Events and Severe Accidents
TSGS
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Technical
Support Guidelines
Procedures
SAOG-1
RPV and Primary Containment Injection Control (1-4)
SAOG-2
RPV, Containment, and Radioactivity Release Control (1-
4)
SAOG-3
RPV Controls
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
SAOG-4
Containment and Radioactivity Release Control (5)
Corrective Action
Documents
04418483
Miscellaneous
Electric Fire Pump 76P-2 Operational Check
March 18, 2021
Electric Fire Pump 76P-2 Performance Test
March 18, 2021
Procedures
Electrical Testing of AC Motors using Baker Instrument
Advanced Winding Analyzer
4.16 kV Magne-Blast Breaker Swap/Replacing
A LPCI MOV Independent Power Supply Test
005
RHR Loop A Quarterly Operability Test (IST)*
2
EDG A and C Full Load Test and ESW Pump Operability
Test
Work Orders
04832790
04879904-47
04932365
05125609
05129031
05135425
4915588-02
26005
Miscellaneous
NFPA 20-1970
Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps
1970
Corrective Action
Documents
04372229
04377749
Procedures
Core Spray Loop B Quarterly Operability Test
Remote Shutdown Instrument Check
EDG B and D Full Load Test and ESW Pump Operability
Test
EDG B and D Load Sequencing Test and 4kV Emergency
Power System Voltage Relays Instrument Functional Test
EDG B and D Full Load Test (8 Hour Run)
Work Orders
4684948
4886078
4973154
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
5047948
5100611
23482
25380
5130230-01
5141387
5148131
51568506
71151
Procedures
Daily Surveillance and Channel Check
24
Calculations
JAF-RPT-08-
00013
GNF2 Fuel Design Cycle Independent Analysis for
Entergy FitzPatrick
Corrective Action
Documents
04155271
04174769
267056
277344
04355560
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04428127
Drawings
Drawing No.
3.52-73
Pool Layout - Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks
UFSAR Figure
No. 9.3-1
Arrangement of Aluminum High Density Racks
UFSAR Figure
No. 9.3-6
Arrangement of Spent Fuel Racks with Stainless Steel
High Density Racks
Miscellaneous
FitzPatrick Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-
NRC Information Notice 2014-09
Spent Fuel Storage or Transportation System Misloading
NRC Information Notice 2014-14
Potential Safety Enhancements to Spent Fuel Pool
Storage
FitzPatrick Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Procedures
Special Nuclear Material and Core Component Move
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Sheet Development
Special Nuclear Material and Core Component Movement
Generation of Fuel Moves Using ShuffleWorks
BWR Special Nuclear Material and Core Component
Move Sheet Development
Management of Refueling Activities
Corrective Action
Documents
04424276
Procedures
RPS Drywell Pressure Instrument Response Time Test
(ATTS)
Work Orders
2603706