IR 05000333/2023004
| ML24036A076 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 02/07/2024 |
| From: | Erin Carfang NRC/RGN-I/DORS |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2023004 | |
| Download: ML24036A076 (1) | |
Text
February 7, 2024
SUBJECT:
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2023004 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION INSPECTION REPORT 07200012/2023001
Dear David Rhoades:
On December 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. On February 1, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Garrick Olson, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Erin E. Carfang, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000333 and 07200012 License No. DPR-59
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000333 and 07200012
License Number:
Report Number:
05000333/2023004 and 07200012/2023001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-004-0037 and I-2023-001-0070
Licensee:
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC
Facility:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Location:
Oswego, NY
Inspection Dates:
October 1, 2023 to December 31, 2023
Inspectors:
E. Miller, Senior Resident Inspector
B. Sienel, Resident Inspector
H. Anagnostopoulos, Senior Health Physicist
E. Eve, Senior Project Engineer
C. Hargest, Health Physicist
M. Henrion, Senior Health Physicist
A. Kostick, Health Physicist
J. Kulp, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Erin E. Carfang, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Maintain Adequate Dry Cask Storage Procedures Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000333/2023004-01 Open/Closed Not Applicable 60855 A self-revealed Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 72.150, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified when Constellation failed to maintain adequate procedures to prevent dry cask storage equipment from adversely impacting the spent fuel pool (SFP) and associated equipment.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000333/2023004-02 Use of Holtec Multipurpose Canister Continuous Basket Shim Variant 60855 Open
PLANT STATUS
FitzPatrick began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On December 3, 2023, the main condenser experienced an increase in differential temperature due to debris. Operators reduced reactor power to 84 percent, flushed the debris and restored power to rated thermal power the same day. On December 9, 2023, the main condenser experienced an increase in differential temperature due to debris. Operators reduced reactor power to 80 percent, flushed the debris and restored power to rated thermal power the same day. On December 17, 2023, the main condenser experienced an increase in differential temperature due to debris. Operators reduced reactor power to 75 percent, flushed the debris and restored power to rated thermal power the same day. On December 29, 2023, operators reduced reactor power to 84 percent to flush any remaining main condenser debris following intake cleaning. Operators restored reactor power to rated thermal power on December 30, 2023. The unit remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) 'B' and 'D' emergency diesel generators (EDGs) following planned maintenance on the 'B' EDG on October 17, 2023
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) East switchgear room, fire area/zone II/SW-2, on November 7, 2023
- (2) West switchgear room, fire area/zone IC/SW-1, on November 7, 2023
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the Manhole-1 (MH-1) following water intrusion into the secondary containment (west crescent) on October 10, 2023.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed operations personnel during a downpower to 74 percent that included unlocking of the 'B' reactor water recirculation motor generator set scoop tube, and control rod scram time testing on October 6 and 7, 2023.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed a simulator evaluation that included a nuclear instrument failure, the loss of both electrohydraulic control pumps, and a failure of the reactor to scram on October 24, 2023.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) West crescent reactor core isolation cooling room enclosure structural monitoring on October 31, 2023
- (2) Maintenance Rule Periodic a(3) maintenance effectiveness assessment for the period of April 1, 2021 to March 31, 2023
- (3) Emergency diesel generators on December 14, 2023
Aging Management (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the aging management program for the following SSCs that did not meet their inspection or test acceptance criteria:
- (1) Condensate storage tank north valve pit on November 16, 2023
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Elevated risk during 'A' residual heat removal system planned maintenance on October 3, 2023
- (2) Elevated risk during 'B' emergency diesel generator planned maintenance on October 10, 2023
- (3) Elevated risk during 'B' station battery charger planned maintenance on October 17, 2023
- (4) Elevated risk during restoration of spent fuel pool rack 26 to its original location following an unintentional move during independent spent fuel storage campaign on October 26, 2023
- (5) Elevated risk during 'A' emergency diesel generator planned maintenance on October 30, 2023
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Emergency service water through-wall leaks on 'B' train in three locations upstream of the supply lines to the east crescent coolers on August 27, 2023, and August 30, 2023.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
- (1) 'A' residual heat removal system following planned system maintenance, on October 4, 2023
- (2) 'A' residual heat removal service water pump following planned maintenance, on October 4, 2023
- (3) 'B' emergency diesel generator following planned system maintenance, on October 11, 2023
- (4) 'B' and 'D' emergency diesel generator tie breaker 71-10604 following 200 rpm speed relay 93-TBR-1EDGB12 replacement and breaker replacement, on October 12, 2023
- (5) Control room ventilation following planned damper preventive maintenance, on October 18, 2023
- (6) 'A' emergency diesel generator following right bank air start motor airline restoration from a configuration control event, on November 2, 2023
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) ISP-175B2, Reactor and Containment Cooling and anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) Instrument Functional Test/Calibration, on October 19, 2023
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator scenario that included the declaration of an Alert due to an anticipated transient with an inability to manually or automatically scram the reactor on October 24,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,
and Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling, and securing the following radioactive materials:
- (1) Waste and equipment stored in the interim waste storage facility
- (2) Waste stored in the outdoor sea land metals and dry active waste loading area
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:
- (1) The modular fluidized transfer demineralization and sluice system (the advanced liquid processing system skid)
- (2) The radwaste facility 250' elevation pump room and associated waste sludge tank and spent resin tank rooms
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following characterization and classification of radioactive waste:
- (1) Title 10 CFR 61 waste profile analysis for dry active waste in 2023
- (2) The characterization of bead resins in waste shipment [[::JAF-2023-1894|JAF-2023-1894]]
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
- (1) Shipment [[::JAF-2021-1872|JAF-2021-1872]], UN3321 LSA-II, Type 2 quantity of radioactive material, ion exchange media for disposal
- (2) Shipment [[::JAF-2023-048|JAF-2023-048]], UN2915 Type A package, metal coupons for analysis
- (3) Shipment [[::JAF-2023-1894|JAF-2023-1894]], UN3321 LSA-II, bead resins for disposal
- (4) Shipment [[::JAF-2023-1909|JAF-2023-1909]], UN2915 Type A package, radioactive check sources for disposal
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (IP Section 02.15)===
- (1) For the period of July 1, 2022 through September 30, 2023
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) For the period of July 1, 2022 through September 30, 2023
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the FitzPatrick corrective action program for potential adverse trends in that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the spent fuel pool rack 26 movement due to an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) rigging event on October 25, 2023.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated the main condenser cleaning and downpower to 84 percent following debris intrusion on December 2, 2023.
- (3) The inspectors evaluated the main condenser cleaning and downpower to 80 percent following debris intrusion on December 9, 2023.
- (4) The inspectors evaluated the main condenser cleaning and downpower to 75 percent following debris intrusion on December 17, 2023.
- (5) The inspectors evaluated the intake cleaning and traveling water screen inspection on December 20,
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
60855 - Operation of an ISFSI Operation of an ISFSI
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Constellation's ISFSI activities October 30 through November 2, 2023. Specifically, the inspectors observed the following activities:
- Fuel loading and verification
- Removal of the HI-TRAC/MPC out of the SFP and transfer to the HI-TRAC processing platform
- Decontamination of loaded HI-TRAC/MPC
- Welding and non-destructive examination of MPC lid and shell
- Drying of MPC using canister processing system
- Hydrostatic pressure testing, vacuum drying, and helium backfilling of the MPC
- Transfer of the MPC/HI-TRAC down the equipment hatch and installation of the HI-TRAC onto the mating device
- Stack-up and download of MPC into overpack (HI-STORM)
- Transfer of the loaded HI-STORM out of the reactor building into the track bay
- Transportation and placement of HI-STORM on the ISFSI pad
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Maintain Adequate Dry Cask Storage Procedures Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000333/2023004-01 Open/Closed
Not Applicable 60855 A self-revealed Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR Part 72.150, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified when Constellation failed to maintain adequate procedures to prevent dry cask storage equipment from adversely impacting the SFP and associated equipment.
Description:
On October 16, 2023, during an ISFSI campaign, Constellation staff were lowering Cask #4 (reusable shielding HI-TRAC containing empty MPC) into the SFP when tighter than normal clearances were noticed in the area between the HI-TRAC and SFP storage racks immediately adjacent to the cask pit. The licensee finished fuel loading of Cask
- 4 and removed it from the SFP for further processing. On October 18, 2023, the inspectors were notified that there was a shifted SFP rack that needed to be resolved before continuing the ISFSI campaign with Cask #5. The shifted rack was identified as Rack 26, which held double blade guides but did not contain spent fuel assemblies. Constellation determined that Rack 26 had been lifted and shifted out of its normal position on October 11, 2023, when the refuel floor overhead crane was lifting the fully loaded Cask #3 out of the SFP, and the bottom flange of the HI-TRAC unintentionally hooked onto the bottom of Rack 26.
Procedure MP-019.06, MPC Loading and Sealing, Revision 35, was not adequate to ensure that the HI-TRAC bottom flange was clear of adjacent spent fuel storage racks because this revision of the procedure did not require the use of underwater camera shots so spotters could see the HI-TRAC bottom flange when the cask was being lifted in or out of the SFP and traveling past SFP storage racks in the areas immediately adjacent to the movement activities.
Corrective Actions: Constellation revised procedure MP-019.06, "MPC Loading and Sealing,"
to include the use of underwater cameras for viewing the bottom of the HI-TRAC while lifting it into and out of the SFP.
Corrective Action References: IR 04709988
Performance Assessment:
None. Independent spent fuel storage installations and nuclear materials facilities are only subject to traditional enforcement and therefore not subject to the Significance Determination Process outlined in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0305, "Operating Reactor Assessment Program."
Enforcement:
Severity: Consistent with the guidance in Section 1.2.6.D of the NRC Enforcement Manual, if a violation does not fit an example in the Enforcement Policy Violation Examples, it should be assigned a severity level:
- (1) commensurate with its safety significance; and
- (2) informed by similar violations addressed in the violation examples. The violation screened as having very low safety significance (Severity Level IV).
Violation: Title 10 CFR 72.150, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," states, The licensee, applicant for a license, certificate holder, and applicant for a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) shall prescribe activities affecting quality by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall require that these instructions, procedures, and drawings be followed. The instructions, procedures, and drawings must include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Contrary to the above, prior to October 16, 2023, procedure MP-019.06, MPC Loading and Sealing, Revision 35, did not contain appropriate guidance (instructions, procedures or drawings) that ensured that the lifting of the HI-TRAC could not adversely impact the SFP and associated equipment. Specifically, Revision 35 of the procedure did not require the use of underwater cameras to ensure that the HI-TRAC was clear of adjacent SFP racks when being lifted into or out of the SFP.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Unresolved Item (Open)
Use of Holtec Multipurpose Canister Continuous Basket Shim Variant URI 05000333/2023004-02 60855
Description:
The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) related to design changes on the dry storage system MPCs utilized by Constellation. On February 17th, 2021, Holtec International, the supplier of the HI-STORM 100 dry storage system for FitzPatrick, performed engineering change order (ECO) 5014-320, Revision 0 and 10 CFR 72.48 evaluation 1502, Revision 0. These evaluations performed a design change to introduce a new MPC basket design to the HI-STORM 100 dry storage system, designated as the continuous basket shim (CBS) variant.
On September 12, 2023, the NRC issued Inspection Report 07201014/2022-201 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23145A175) to Holtec International, identifying three apparent violations associated with design change. The apparent violations, related to 10 CFR 72.48 and 10 CFR 72.146 requirements, are for Holtec Internationals apparent failures to provide adequate bases that the CBS variant did not require a license amendment, failure to ensure the change did not result in a departure from the method of evaluations described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, and failure to establish design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design. At this time, the NRC has determined there is no immediate safety concern associated with the use of the modified basket design.
On August 14, 2023, FitzPatrick adopted Holtec Internationals CBS ECO/72.48 through Constellation's 72.48 program, #JAF-72SCN-23-001; evaluated Holtec Internationals 72.48 in accordance with 72.212(b)(7); and subsequently loaded the MPC-68M-CBS canisters from September 24 to November 6, 2023.
General licensees are responsible to ensure that each cask they use conforms to the terms, conditions, and specifications of a CoC or an amended CoC listed in 72.214 and regulatory requirements in 10 CFR Part 72.
Accordingly, this issue is being treated as a URI pending further inspection by the NRC staff to determine if FitzPatrick's loading of the dry storage systems constituted a noncompliance with regulatory requirements associated with the final enforcement action to Holtec International related to the design change.
Planned Closure Actions: Constellation's performance related to the adoption and use of the MPC-68M-CBS canister is unresolved at this time as the NRC has not made a final determination for the apparent violations documented in Inspection Report 07201014/2022-201. The inspectors can evaluate Constellation's compliance with regulatory requirements associated with loading of MPC baskets with the CBS variant once a final determination is made.
Licensee Actions: Constellation's loading of the CBS fuel basket MPC-68M-CBS assumes the risk of potentially being in violation of regulatory requirements pending the outcome of the NRC enforcement action involving Holtec International.
Corrective Action References: IR 04697142 Engineering Change 639367
Minor Performance Deficiency 71152S Minor Performance Deficiency: The inspectors evaluated a sample of issues and events that occurred over the third and fourth quarters of 2023. The evaluation did not reveal any new trends that could indicate a more significant safety issue. The inspectors determined that, in most cases, the issues were appropriately evaluated by Constellation staff for potential trends at a low threshold and resolved within the scope of the corrective action program.
The inspectors identified a trend associated with ground water intrusion into secondary containment through degraded penetration seals in an outdoor manhole, manhole-1 (MH-1).
Specifically, the combination of degraded seals, abandoned conduits, and sump pump failures have contributed to repeat occurrences of ground water intrusion. This ground water intrusion has affected the west crescent area radiation monitor, which is used to determine actions associated with a radioactive release during an accident in secondary containment. In addition, the degrading seals and conduits represent a reduction in available margin associated with the maximum allowable opening size permissible to support the standby gas treatment systems function to drawdown the secondary containment, treat the air, and monitor it before being released to the atmosphere.
Following heavy rains, equipment operators discovered the sump pump for manhole MH-1 was not operating on October 9, 2023. Elevated water levels in the sump, combined with degraded seal penetrations, resulted in leakage into the secondary containment. The water damaged an area radiation monitor in the west crescent, causing it to be non-functional and require compensatory measures. This radiation monitor is credited in EOP-SC, "Emergency Operating Procedure for Secondary Containment," for determining when to insert a reactor scram or perform an emergency depressurization. On October 10, 2023, the inspectors accompanied maintenance staff to observe conditions and maintenance repairs to the sump.
The inspectors found a significant amount of water leaking through the manhole wall. In addition, penetration seals were degraded along with severe corrosion of several cables metal conduit shielding.
Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI states that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to this, between January 16, 2012, and October 10, 2023, Constellations corrective action program did not ensure that a condition adverse to quality associated with a secondary containment penetration seal leak was promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, CR-JAF-2012-00321, CR-JAF-2014-03826, CR-JAF-2016-00054, IR 04289195 on October 19, 2019, IR 04375824 on October 10, 2020, and IR 04708330 on October 9, 2023, and IR 4708354 on October 10, 2023, were entered into the corrective action program between 2012 and 2023 regarding water leakage into secondary containment through the reactor building west crescent penetration from MH-1. Constellation entered the issue into the corrective action program as IR 4708565 to document observation of the penetrations and cracks in the wall on October 10, 2023, and immediately assessed the condition for impact on secondary containment operability with satisfactory results.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors determined that Constellations failure to address this condition adverse to quality is minor because, similar to NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, Example 3.g, the degradation of the secondary containment penetration seals did not result in a loss of margin that exceeded the acceptance criteria, there were no changes to any assumptions used in the drawdown calculation to obtain favorable results, there were no revisions to calculations to establish operability, and there was no change to use a different calculation/approach from the original approach that would have resulted in unfavorable margin.
Based on the overall results of the semiannual trend review, the inspectors determined that Constellation had generally identified adverse trends before they could become more significant safety problems. The inspectors independently evaluated the deficiencies noted above for significance in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, and determined them to be minor.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 12, 2023, the inspectors presented the 71124.08 inspection results to Timothy Sollenberger, Senior Radiation Protection Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On November 2, 2023, the inspectors presented the ISFSI inspection results to Garrick Olson, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On February 1, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Garrick Olson, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Emergency Service Water (ESW)
Diesel Generator Emergency Power
Diesel Generator Room Ventilation
Fire Plans
Switchgear Room East/Elevation 272'/ Fire Area/Zone II/SW-
Switchgear Room West/Elevation 272'/ Fire Area/Zone
IC/SW-1
Miscellaneous
JAF-RPT-04-
00478
JAF Fire Hazards Analysis
Procedures
Portable Fire Extinguisher Inspection
Corrective Action
Documents
04708330
04708354
71111.11Q Procedures
Control Rod Drive Stall Flow Test
Plant Power Changes
Control Rod Scram Time Evaluation
Corrective Action
Documents
04550060
04669409
04672634
04685201
04708932
04714627
04714656
Miscellaneous
Maintenance Rule (a)(3) Periodic Maintenance Effectiveness
Assessment for the period April 1, 2021 to March 31, 2023
06/16/2023
Design Basis Document for Emergency Diesel Generator
Systems
Procedures
2-MH-271-016-
Condensate Storage Tank North Manhole, Elevation 271'
04/29/2022
ER-JF-450
James A. FitzPatrick Structures Monitoring Program
Procedures
Protected Equipment Program
Work Orders
297943-47
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
04691010
Engineering
Changes
639679
639700
639783
NDE Reports
B23UT007
Extent of Condition Locations on 15-6-WES-151-103
09/19/2023
B23UT011
Extent of Condition UT Exams on B ESW Line 15-3-WES-
151-136
09/19/2023
B23UT012
Extent of Condition UT Exams on B ESW Line 15-3-WES-
151-136
09/19/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
04708932
04714656
Procedures
Drywell Floor Drain Sump Flow Loop Functional
Test/Calibration
Reactor and Containment Cooling and ATWS Instrument
Functional Test/Calibration
CREVAS B Operability Test
RHR Loop A Quarterly Operability Test
EDG B and D Full Load Test and ESW Pump Operability
Test
Work Orders
05121000
05123104
05123426
05131119
259935
05407704
Corrective Action
Documents
04709988
04710830
04721172
04721229
Procedures
Control of Diving
96