IR 05000333/2022002
| ML22221A058 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 08/10/2022 |
| From: | Erin Carfang Division of Operating Reactors |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2022002 | |
| Download: ML22221A058 (20) | |
Text
August 10, 2022
SUBJECT:
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2022002
Dear David Rhoades:
On June 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. On July 28, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Tim Peter, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.
The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Erin E. Carfang, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000333 License No. DPR-59
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000333
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2022-002-0032
Licensee:
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC
Facility:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Location:
Oswego, NY
Inspection Dates:
April 1, 2022 to June 30, 2022
Inspectors:
Eric D. Miller, Senior Resident Inspector
J. England, Resident Inspector
H. Anagnostopoulos, Senior Health Physicist
S. Elkhiamy, Operations Engineer
B. Fuller, Senior Operations Engineer
S. Haney, Senior Project Engineer
J. Hawkins, Senior Project Engineer
Eric C. Miller, Reactor Inspector
B. Sienel, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Erin E. Carfang, Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Identify and Correct Condensate Accumulation in the HPCI System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000333/2022002-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71111.15 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Criterion XVI was identified for Constellation's failure to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with condensate accumulation in the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI)system. As a result, when the system's condensate removal pump failed to remove condensate that accumulated from a leaking steam supply valve (23MOV-14) due to a failed logic relay, water filled the turbine casing greater than 50 percent, which resulted in a challenge to HPCI system operability on April 29, 2022.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000333/2021-002-00 LER 2021-002-00, Automatic High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Function Prevented by Control Circuit Relay Failure 71153 Closed LER 05000333/2021-003-00 LER 2021-003-00, Air Solenoid Valve Condition Results in Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Fast Closure Test Failure 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
FitzPatrick began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On May 7, 2022, operators reduced reactor power to 73 percent to perform a control rod pattern adjustment. On May 8, 2022, operators restored reactor power to rated thermal power. On June 11, 2022, operators reduced reactor power to 73 percent to perform a control rod pattern adjustment, turbine valve testing, and individual control rod scram time testing. On June 12, 2022, operators restored reactor power to rated thermal power. FitzPatrick remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal hot temperatures for the 115-kilovolt and 345-kilovolt switchyard, and the 'A' and 'B' 125 volts direct current battery rooms on June 3, 2022.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Process radiation monitors on April 1, 2022 (2)
'A' residual heat removal (RHR) and RHR service water systems during planned maintenance on the 'B' RHR system on April 5, 2022
- (3) Standby liquid control system on May 3, 2022
- (4) Reactor core isolation cooling on May 6, 2022 (5)
'A' and 'C' emergency diesel generators on June 7, 2022 (6)
'A' standby gas treatment system on June 23, 2022
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during complete walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) High pressure coolant injection system on June 15, 2022
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Emergency diesel generator, elevation 272', fire areas 5 and 6/fire zones EG-1 through EG-6, on April 8, 2022
- (2) Battery room complex, fire area/zone III/BR-1, BR-2, IV/BR-3, BR-4, XVI/BR-5, on April 12, 2022
- (3) Reactor building, elevation 369', fire area/fire zone IX/RB-1A, on May 5, 2022
- (4) Reactor building, elevation 326', fire area/zone IX/RB-1A, on May 6, 2022
- (5) Reactor building, elevation 344', fire area/zone IX/RB-1A, on June 10, 2022
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
- (1) Emergency diesel generators and switchgear rooms on June 23, 2022
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam administered from April to May 2022.
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) Biennial Requalification Written Examinations
The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered during 2021.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.
Requalification Examination Security
The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee.
Operator License Conditions
The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.
Problem Identification and Resolution
The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve problems associated with licensed operator performance.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed operations personnel during a reactor power reduction and rod pattern adjustment on May 7, 2022 and May 8, 2022; and during turbine valve testing and scram time testing on June 11, 2022.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed operator requalification training on Risk Informed Completion Time implementation on June 9, 2022.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Emergency lighting batteries on May 2, 2022
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Elevated risk during planned maintenance on the 'B' residual heat removal system on April 4, 2022 (2)
'A' emergency service water pump replacement on April 11, 2022 (3)115-kilovolt power distribution system during a low voltage condition on April 18, 2022 (4)
'B' residual heat removal pump minimum flow valve 10MOV-16B failure to close on April 25, 2022
- (6) Elevated risk during 'A' residual heat removal system planned valve and motor maintenance on May 16, 2022
- (7) Elevated risk during planned HPCI pressure control valve replacement on May 25, 2022
- (8) Elevated risk during planned offsite 115-kilovolt maintenance on June 23, 2022
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)72MOD-104B 'B' battery room ventilation system following access hatch found open on April 13, 2022 (2)10MOV-16B 'B' residual heat removal pump minimum flow valve following failure to close on April 26, 2022
- (3) HPCI system following water intrusion to the turbine casing on April 28, 2022 (4)71SB-2 'B' 125 volts direct current station battery cell 5 post nut crack on June 15, 2022
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1)71SB-2 'B' 125 volts direct current station battery cell 22 cracked lid repair on June 16, 2022
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
- (1) ST-8Q emergency service water pump 'A' following replacement, on April 12, 2022 (2)23A-K31 HPCI gland seal condenser high level alarm relay following replacement on May 3, 2022 (3)02MTU-222D main steam tunnel high temperature master trip unit 'D' following maintenance on May 24, 2022 (4)23PCV-12 HPCI trip system pressure control valve following replacement on May 25, 2022 (5)
'B' 125 volts direct current station battery following cell 22 crack repair on June 6, 2022 (6)
'A' residual heat removal keep fill pump, 10P-2A, on June 7, 2022
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (2) ST-29AA, Manual Scram and RPS Channel Test Switch Functional Test (Division A),on May 20, 2022
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
- (1) AMS-4 #00913065
- (2) Telepole #078147
- (3) RO-20A #0021928
- (4) PM-12 #0090729
- (5) Chemistry hot laboratory liquid scintillation counter
- (6) Chemistry hot laboratory iSolo bench counter
- (7) Chemistry hot laboratory area radiation monitor
- (8) Argos personnel contamination monitors at the main control point (4)
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (13 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
- (1) AMS-4 #00913065
- (2) Mirion Technologies Fastscan Whole Body Counter (2020)
- (3) Telepole #078147
- (4) RO-20A #0021928
- (5) PM-12 #0090729
- (6) Chemistry hot laboratory Perkin Elmer 5110 Liquid Scintillation Counter
- (7) Mirion Technologies Fastscan Whole Body Counter (2021)
- (8) AMS-4 #00913070
- (9) AMS-4 #00901330
- (10) Telepole #074970
- (11) Eberline L-177 #0020868
- (12) RO-20A #079224
- (13) RO-20A #0019406
Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program (IP Sample 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
(1)17RM-351 Service Water Radiation Monitor (2)17RM-456B Refuel Floor Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor 'B'
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity (IP Section 02.10)===
- (1) January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021
BI02: RCS Leak Rate (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021
===71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)===
- (1) The inspectors reviewed Constellation's corrective action program for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000333-2021-003-00, Air Solenoid Valve Condition Results in Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Fast Closure Test Failure. The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in inspection report 05000333/2022001 Section 71152A. This LER is closed.
- (2) LER 05000333-2021-002-00, Automatic High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)
System Function Prevented by Control Circuit Relay Failure. The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in Section 71152S of this report. This LER is closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Identify and Correct Condensate Accumulation in the HPCI System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000333/2022002-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71111.15 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Criterion XVI was identified for Constellation's failure to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with condensate accumulation in the HPCI system. As a result, when the system's condensate removal pump failed to remove condensate that accumulated from a leaking steam supply valve (23MOV-14) due to a failed logic relay, water filled the turbine casing greater than 50 percent, which resulted in a challenge to system operability on April 29, 2022.
Description:
The HPCI steam supply admission valve (23MOV-14) experienced leakage past the closed valve since October 2020. This resulted in Constellation establishing an adverse condition monitoring plan (ACMP) to confirm system response and determine when action is needed. As part of the ACMP, operators monitor turbine casing temperatures, assess oil quality, and ensure condensate is draining properly. On April 28, 2022, operators received an alarm at 10:45 PM in the main control room for a HPCI exhaust drain pot high water level condition. By design, condensate would typically be removed from the HPCI system as it accumulates in the HPCI exhaust drain pot. From the exhaust drain pot, it would flow to the gland seal condenser, which contains a logic relay which starts a condensate removal pump to drain the condenser upon high water level in the gland seal condenser. Logic relay (23A-K31) had failed, preventing actuation of the condensate removal pump, allowing condensate water to fill the HPCI exhaust drain pot.
Operators' immediate investigation in the field included observing the HPCI exhaust drain pot air operated discharge valve (23AOV-54) movement and obtaining thermal camera images of the level switches for both the drain pot (23LS-98) and gland seal condenser (23LS-100).
Because the ACMP actions were not symptom based and were overly specific, operators incorrectly determined the system was draining properly and believed it was a faulty indication from the HPCI exhaust drain pot level switch. As a result, condensate continued to accumulate in the HPCI pump turbine casing.
On April 29, 2022, FitzPatrick staff conducted further investigation and determined the need to perform manual draining of the HPCI exhaust drain pot. At 12:51 PM, operators discovered water in the HPCI turbine case was approximately 6 6 above the floor level and was flowing from the HPCI turbine case gland seals. This was an indication that the HPCI turbine casing was at least 50 percent full of water at that time. The vendor manual alerts owners of operating experience with condensate carryover that may cause the steam exhaust rupture disk to fail, damage to occur from the water slug upon HPCI system startup, and possible overspeed of the turbine during recovery from the initial removal of water. Following declaration of being inoperable and unavailable, Constellation conducted extensive evaluation to understand the impact on system operability.
Corrective Actions: Operators took immediate action to manually drain the condensate from the system upon identification of the high water level in the turbine casing. On May 3, 2022, the station replaced the failed logic relay and successfully restored the condensate removal system to automatic operation. FitzPatrick staff also performed a human performance review board to identify performance gaps that allowed the event to occur. The station also completed a revision to the adverse condition monitoring plan to ensure its actions accounted for all parameters and thresholds and ensure they are symptom based.
Corrective Action References: IR 04496616
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Constellation failed to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with condensate accumulation in the HPCI system. Specifically, because ACMP actions were not symptom based and were overly specific, operators incorrectly determined the condensate removal system was draining properly, allowing condensate to accumulate in the HPCI pump turbine casing.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, Constellation's failure to identify and correct the condensate accumulation in the HPCI system resulted in high water level in the HPCI turbine casing and a challenge to system operability.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors performed a review of this finding using the guidance provided in IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, and determined this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the questions in Exhibit 2, Section A were answered No.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, the ACMP for HPCI steam supply valve leakage did not establish a well-defined decision-making process, because the actions directed in response to a HPCI exhaust drain pot high water level condition were not symptom based and were overly specific.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," states measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, from April 28, 2022 through April 29, 2022, Constellation failed to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with condensate accumulation in the HPCI system. As a result, the HPCI turbine case became filled with water up to the gland seals (50 percent), rendering the system inoperable. Upon recognition of the water leaking from the gland seals, operators took action to drain the condensate from the system.
As a result, the HPCI turbine case became filled with water up to the gland seals (50%),
which challenged system operability. Upon recognition of the water leaking from the gland seals, operators took action to drain the condensate from the system.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Minor Performance Deficiency 71152S Minor Performance Deficiency: The inspectors evaluated a sample of issues and events that occurred over the first and second quarters of 2022. The evaluation did not reveal any new trends that could indicate a more significant safety issue. The inspectors determined that, in most cases, the issues were appropriately evaluated by Constellation staff for potential trends at a low threshold and resolved within the scope of the corrective action program.
The inspectors identified a trend associated with the corrective action program causal evaluations not being thorough and adequately identifying the likely cause. Each of these involved the completion of a work group evaluation in accordance with PI-AA-125, "Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure," Revision 8, Section 4.3.5 which requires identification of cause, extent of condition, and corrective action to address the condition adverse to quality.
In each of the examples below, the requirements of Section 4.3.5 were not met. Examples include:
- On March 1, 2022, IR 04481502 documented a failure of the 'A' core spray pump to start due to high resistance on the control room switch. Following Exelon PowerLab review and station cause evaluation, a conclusion could not be made regarding the oxidation and sulfidation effects on the switch and considered operator action as another possible cause. Contrary to PI-AA-125 Section 4.3.5, per Assignment 3 of IR 04481502, Exelon PowerLab did not identify a cause and no extent of condition was assigned. The PM strategy was determined to be acceptable, which is run-to-maintenance. No other action beyond switch replacement is being pursued.
- On November 21, 2021, IR 04461845 documented a failure of the HPCI injection valve to open during logic system testing for reactor vessel low-water level. Exelon PowerLabs determined the associated relay failed due to a dimensional tolerance issue. The inspectors performed an assessment of the failure mode determined by the third-party vendor, Exelon PowerLabs. The inspectors observed a similar spare relay.
Following review of the relay the inspector determined that a valid cause may not have been identified through the corrective action program evaluation process.
However, Constellation performed acceptance testing of the replacement relay satisfactorily providing reasonable assurance of operability.
- On January 14, 2022, Exelon submitted LER 05000333-2021-003, "Air Solenoid Valve Condition Results in Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Fast Closure Test Failure."
Issue Reports 04369253 and 04369255 were associated with this failure. Following inspector review, it was determined that FitzPatrick was not able to draw adequate conclusion to the cause of the failure, but attributed potential causes such as foreign material and maintenance practices. Inspector conclusions are documented in Inspection Report 05000333/2022001.
Additionally, a weakness was identified with a corrective action program evaluation of an equipment reliability trend identified by the NRC in IR 04473958. Specifically, Constellation staff determined there were no common issues. The inspectors determined the assessment did not include potential organizational or equipment reliability common issues such as preventive maintenance strategy for components being effective maintenance practices, adequacy of maintenance procedures, or the effect of aging of equipment in accordance with PI-AA-125-1006, "Investigation Techniques," Revision 6, Attachment 15. Since this product was issued, the following additional failures of safety-related equipment that occurred, indicating a continued challenge with equipment reliability:
'A' core spray pump failing to start due to control room switch high contact resistance during a planned surveillance test
'B' residual heat removal low flow bypass valve failing to remain closed during testing
- HPCI turbine casing water accumulation following a high water level alarm relay failure
Based on the overall results of the semi-annual trend review, the inspectors determined that Constellation had generally identified adverse trends before they could become more significant safety problems. The inspectors independently evaluated the deficiencies noted above for significance in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, and determined them to be minor.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 7, 2022, the inspectors presented the radiation monitoring instrumentation inspection results to Tim Peter, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 28, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Tim Peter, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
WC-JF-107-1000
Seasonal Readiness T&RM for JAF
Work Orders
05155498
Corrective Action
Documents
04432253
Corrective Action
Documents
04476529
Corrective Action
Documents
04502173
Corrective Action
Documents
04504453
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04496005
Drawings
Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 10
Drawings
Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 10
Drawings
Flow Diagram Standby Liquid Control System
Drawings
Flow Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 13
Drawings
Flow Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System 23
Drawings
Flow Diagram Emergency Service Water
Miscellaneous
Adverse Condition Monitoring Plan for 23MOV-14 Seat
Leakage
05/04/2022
Procedures
Flow Diagram HPCI Lube Oil System 23
Procedures
JAF-NE-09-
00001
JAF Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Appendix C1 - Internal
Flooding Analysis
Procedures
Residual Heat Removal System
100
Procedures
High Pressure Coolant Injection
Procedures
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Procedures
Procedures
Emergency Service Water (ESW)
Procedures
Diesel Generator Emergency Power
Procedures
Process Radiation Monitoring System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Diesel Generator Room Ventilation
Procedures
OP-JF-112-101-
F-01
Panel Check (>25% power)
Procedures
Periodic Tests and Inspections, Completed June 12, 2022
Procedures
EDG System A Fuel/Lube Oil Monthly Test
009
Work Orders
05166535
Work Orders
05176184
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04492887
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04492914
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04494307
Fire Plans
Battery Room Complex, Fire Area/Zone III/BR-1, BR-2,
IV/BR-3, BR-4, XVI/BR-5
Fire Plans
Reactor Building / Elev. 326' Fire Area / Zone IX/RB-1A
Fire Plans
Reactor Building/Elev. 344' Fire Area/Zone IX/RB-1A
Fire Plans
Reactor Building Elevation 369 Fire Area/Fire Zone IX/RB-
1A
Fire Plans
Emergency Diesel Generator Spaces - South/Elev. 272' Fire
Area/Zone V/EG-1, EG-2, EG-5
Fire Plans
Emergency Diesel Generator Spaces - North/Elev. 272' Fire
Area/Zone VI/EG-3, EG-4, EG-6
Miscellaneous
JAF-ANAL-FPS-
269
Fire Hazard Analysis James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power
Plant
October
1985
Procedures
Portable Fire Extinguisher Inspection Procedure 71111.05
Procedures
Fire Protection System Impairment Control
Procedures
Pre-Fire Plan Manual
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Control of Transient Combustible Material
Work Orders
213803
Work Orders
222995
Work Orders
232567
Work Orders
239524
Corrective Action
Documents
04308320
Corrective Action
Documents
04430233
Corrective Action
Documents
04459079
Procedures
Maintenance Rule 18-10 - Performance Monitoring and
Dispositioning between (a)(1) and (a)(2)
Procedures
Exide/Lightguard F-100 Emergency Light Surveillance Test
Corrective Action
Documents
04496433
Corrective Action
Documents
04496616
Corrective Action
Documents
04497175
Procedures
115 KV Grid Loss, Instability, or Degradation
Procedures
115 KV System
Procedures
Protected Equipment Program
Procedures
Testing of the Emergency Service Water System (IST)
Procedures
Electrical Lineup and Power Verification
Work Orders
04850166-09
Work Orders
254332-1
Corrective Action
Documents
04492914
Corrective Action
Documents
04495410
Corrective Action
Documents
04496616
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
04505316
Drawings
Flow Diagram Administration and Control Room Heating
Vent and Air Conditioning System 72
Procedures
Plant Barrier Control Program
Procedures
Battery Room B Ventilation Equipment Operability Test
Corrective Action
Documents
04499337
Corrective Action
Documents
04499340
Corrective Action
Documents
04505715
Engineering
Changes
636789
Repair of Cracks Discovered in 71SB-2 125 V Station Battery
'B'
Corrective Action
Documents
04483150
Corrective Action
Documents
04486274
Corrective Action
Documents
04499337
Corrective Action
Documents
04499340
Corrective Action
Documents
04500293
Corrective Action
Documents
04501693
Corrective Action
Documents
04502001
Corrective Action
Documents
04503378
Corrective Action
Documents
05180737
Procedures
PCIS Instrument Functional Test/Calibration (ATTS)**
Procedures
High Pressure Coolant Injection
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Testing of the Emergency Service Water System (IST)
Work Orders
04850166
Work Orders
04972429
Work Orders
254332
Work Orders
260279
Work Orders
5090036
Work Orders
203694
Work Orders
238521
Procedures
HPCI System Loop Low Flow Bypass Valve Instruments
Procedures
Manual Scram and RPS Channel Test Switch Functional
Test (Division A)
Procedures
HPCI Quick-Start, Inservice, and Transient Monitoring Test
(IST)
Procedures
West Diesel Fire Pump 76P-1 Operational Check
71151
Corrective Action
Documents
04498431
71151
Procedures
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator - RCS
Specific Activity
71151
Procedures
Daily Surveillance and Channel Check
25
Miscellaneous
NRC Inspection
Procedure 03.03
Personnel Performance