Text

Insp Repts 50-269/92-10,50-270/92-10 & 50-287/92-10 on 920329-0425.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Surveillance Testing,Maint Activities & Followup on Previous Insp Findings
	ML16148A650
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	05/20/1992
From:	Belisle G, Binoy Desai, Harmon P, Poertner W; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML16148A649	List: ML16148A650;
References
	50-269-92-10, 50-270-92-10, 50-287-92-10, NUDOCS 9206120039
	Download: ML16148A650 (9)
	v • d • e

'pJR REG,,

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.: 50-269/92-10, 50-270/92-10 and 50-287/92-10

Licensee:

Duke Power Company

P. 0. Box 1007

Charlotte, NC 28201-1007

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287, 72-4

License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55, SNM-2503

Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station

Inspection Conducted: March

- April 25, 1992

Inspe t

r,

_0" P. E. Harmon, tenior

sident Inspector

Date Signed

B. B. Des i, Reside

Insp

Date Signed

. K. Poertner, Resid

t lnsp

t

Date Signed

Approved by:

7)

G. A. B lisle, Sectio

ief

Date Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, resident inspection was conducted in the areas of operations,

surveillance testing, maintenance activities and follow-up on previous inspection

findings.

Results:

Three violations identified during the Oconee Shutdown Risk and Outage

Management Inspection are documented in this inspection report. The violations

concern an incorrectly performed nuclear instrument reliability check, lack of

.

independent safety tag verification, and failure to perform a safety

9206120039 920520

PDR

ADOCK 05000269

G

PDR

2

evaluation for a temporary modification (paragraph 2.e). Each of the instances

involved failure to follow approved procedures on the part of station staff. The

specifics surrounding these violations are described in NRC Inspection Report Nos.

50-270/91-202.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

H. Barron, Station Manager

S. Benesole, Safety Review

D. Coyle, Systems Engineering

J. Davis, Safety Assurance Manager

D. Deatherage, Operations Support Manager

B. Dolan, Manager, Mechanical/Nuclear Engineering (Design)

W. Foster, Superintendent, Mechanical Maintenance

J. Hampton, Vice President, Oconee Site

O. Kohler, Regulatory Compliance

C. Little, Superintendent, Instrument and Electrical (I&E)

M. Patrick, Performance Engineer

B. Peele, Engineering Manager

S. Perry, Regulatory Compliance

G. Rothenberger, Work Control Superintendent

R. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members, and staff engineers.

NRC Resident Inspectors:

P. Harmon

W. Poertner

B. Desai

Attended exit interview.

2.

Plant Operations (71707)

a.

General

The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting

period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical

Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs,

shift turnover records, temporary modification log and equipment

removal and restoration records were reviewed routinely. Discussions

were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health

physics, instrument & electrical (l&E), and performance personnel.

2

Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily

basis. Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during

weekdays and on weekends. Some inspections were made during

shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover performance. Actions

observed were conducted as required by the licensee's Administrative

Procedures. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift

inspected met or exceeded the requirements of TS. Operators were

responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant

conditions.

Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine

basis. The areas toured included the following:

Turbine Building

Auxiliary Building

CCW Intake Structure

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility

Units 1, 2 and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms

Units 1, 2 and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms

Units 1, 2 and 3 Penetration Rooms

Units 1, 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Rooms

Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area

Standby Shutdown Facility

Keowee Hydro Station

During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,

equipment status, and radiation control practices were observed.

Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactory.

b.

Plant Status

All three units operated at essentially full power the entire reporting

period.

c.

Potential Low Control Power Voltage

On April 7, 1992, the inspectors were informed by the licensee that

the control power voltage to close the Unit 3 Standby Breakers could

be lower than the manufacturer's minimum rated voltage of 90 VDC

assuming worst case voltage conditions. The breakers were declared

inoperable and a modification was initiated to correct the potential low

control power voltage condition at the Standby Breakers. The

modification consisted of installing an interposing relay in the control

3

power circuitry and rewiring the control power circuitry to reduce the

voltage drop from the 125 VDC panelboard to the breaker cubicle.

Subsequently, the licensee determined that similar low voltage

conditions might also occur on the Unit 1 and 2 Standby Breakers,

Unit 1, 2 and 3 Startup Breakers and the Keowee Standby Breakers.

The licensee determined that the Unit 3 Standby Breakers were the

worst case and that voltage could be as low as 63.3 VDC assuming

worst case conditions. The licensee held discussions with the

manufacturer and determined that similar breakers had been tested

and closed with control voltages as low as 60 VDC. The licensee

tested all six Standby Breakers and both Keowee Standby Breakers to

determine the voltage at the breaker close coil required to actually

close the breaker. Seven of the eight breakers closed at a voltage of

58.5 VDC or less and the eighth breaker closed at a voltage of 63.5

VDC. The Unit 1 Standby Breaker had the highest required closing

voltage (63.5) and the licensee calculated that the worst case

available voltage at the breaker would be 78.5 VDC.

Based on the test data obtained, the licensee determined that the

Unit 1, 2 and 3 Startup Breakers and the Keowee Standby Breakers

were still capable of closing under worst case voltage conditions. The

licensee decided to modify all three units' Standby Breakers within the

72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limiting condition for operation, and then modify the Startup

Breakers and the Keowee Standby Breakers one at a time. This

modification would return the voltage at the breaker closing coils back

to the manufacturer's minimum voltage requirement.

A conference call was conducted between the licensee, Region II, and

the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to discuss the

licensee's findings and planned corrective actions. The inspectors

reviewed the licensee's proposed modification, witnessed the testing

conducted on the Standby Breakers and Keowee Standby Breakers,

observed the installation of the modification package on the Standby

Breakers, and followed the work activities on the Startup and Keowee

Standby Breakers. The modification packages were completed on the

Units' 1, 2 and 3 Standby Breakers on April 10, 1992. The

modification packages were completed on the Startup and Keowee

Standby Beakers on April 15, 1992. The inspectors will review this

item further during review of the licensee's LER that is required to be

issued within 30 days of the event.

4

d.

Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater (TDEFW) Pump Testing

In NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-269, 270, 287/92-09, the

inspectors questioned the acceptability of the licensee's use of the

Auxiliary Steam (AS) header as a source of motive power for the

TDEFW pump turbine. The licensee performed an operability

determination which concluded that the (AS) header was acceptable

as the source for the turbine even though the AS system is not

seismically qualified. The conclusion is based on a Safety Evaluation

Report (SER), Seismic Qualification Of The Auxiliary (Emergency)

Feedwater System, issued January 14, 1987. The SER determined

that the turbine-driven pump could fail during a seismic event, but the

redundant, motor-driven pumps would remain intact to provide full

capacity for all safety functions. Therefore, the potential seismic

failure of the turbine-driven train or subsystem is acceptable on the

basis of sufficient unaffected redundancy.

Based on discussions with the licensee and NRR, the inspector's

questions in this area were resolved satisfactorily.

e.

Shutdown Risk and Outage Management Inspection

The shutdown risk inspection and outage management inspection was

conducted from December 2, 1991, through February 21, 1992, and

is documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-270/91-202 issued

on April 6, 1992. The inspection identified the following deficiencies:

(1) incorrectly performed nuclear instrument reliability check during

fuel movement, (2) lack of independent safety tag verification and (3)

lack of a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for a temporary

modification. These items were reviewed by the inspectors and are

identified as Violations 270/92-10-01: Incorrectly Performed Nuclear

Instrument Reliability Check,; 270/92-10-02: Lack of Independent

Safety Tag Verification, and 270/92-10-03: Failure to Perform a

Safety Evaluation For a Temporary Modification. The specifics

involving these violations are contained in NRC Inspection Report No.

270/91-202.

Three violations were identified.

3.

Surveillance Testing (61726)

A Surveillance test was reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and

performance adequacy. The completed test reviewed was examined for

5

necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical

content, authorization to begin work, data collection, independent

verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of

completed work. The test witnessed was inspected to determine that an

approved procedure was available, test equipment was calibrated,

prerequisites were met, the test was conducted according to procedure, test

results were acceptable and system restoration was completed.

The following surveillance was reviewed and witnessed.

PT/O/A/0610/05A

Solid State Relay Breaker Trip Test.

Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactory.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Maintenance Activities (62703)

Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting

period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that

approved procedures in use adequately described work that was not within

the skill of the trade. Activities, procedures, and work requests were

examined to verify; proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire,

cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to service, and

that limiting conditions for operation were met.

Maintenance reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:

TN/3/A/OE4601 /00

Modify Close Circuit For Unit 3 Standby

Breakers

TN/5/A/OE4604/00

Modify Close Circuit For Keowee Standby

Breaker

Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactory.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

Inspection of Open Items (92700)(92701)(92702)

The following open items were reviewed using licensee reports, inspection,

record review, and discussions with licensee personnel, as appropriate:

a.

(Open) Inspector Followup Item 269,270,287/92-09-01: CBAST

Concerns.

The licensee had not completed the technical justification

6

to support their interpretation of the Technical Specification

requirement during this inspection period. The inspectors were told

that the justification would be provided during the next inspection

period. This item will remain open pending review of the licensee's

technical justification.

b.

(Closed) Violation 50-269,270,287/90-17-01: Penetration Room

Ventilation System (PRVS) Inoperable Under Certain Conditions Due to

Design Deficiencies. The licenesee's responses dated July 27 and

September 13, 1990, were reviewed and found to be acceptable.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions including the

revised program to test failure positions of valves as required by

Generic Letter (GL) 88-14, and revisions to the Oconee Final Safety

Analysis Report pertaining to the permanent resolution for valves PR

13, PR-17, PR-20. The corrective actions were acceptable.

c.

(Closed) Violation 50-269,270,287/90-17-06: Responses to GL-88

14 Were Not Complete and Accurate. Verification was not performed

for all active air operated components. The licensee's responses to

this item were dated July 17, September 13, September 20, 1990,

and the revised response to GL-88-14 was dated August 12, 1991.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions associated

with the revised responses to GL-88-14 and found them to be

acceptable.

d.

(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 269/90-10: Potential Failure of

Engineered Safeguards System By Improper Valve Failure Mode Due

to Design Deficiency, Deficient Documentation. This LER associated

with PRVS was issued on July 13, 1990. The PRVS issue was

discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-269,270,287/90-17.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions including the

completed modification to the PRV system on all three units.

e.

(Closed) Licensee Event Report 269/91-01: Potential Single Failure

During a LOCA/LOOP Event May Result in the Loss of Emergency

Power Due to Design Deficiency. This LER was issued on February 7,

1991. The inspectors reviewed the temporary as well as permanent

corrective actions associated with the design deficiency.

f.

(Closed) Licensee.Event Report 50-287/90-02: Reactor Trip Caused

by Equipment Failure, Valve Limit Switch Linkage Became

Disconnected. This LER was issued on April 5, 1990. The inspectors

reviewed the completed corrective actions associated with this event.

In addition, planned corrective action to perform signature analysis

and other testing to assure 3FDW-31 will stroke, is under evaluation

by a Problem Investigation Report.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 29, 1992, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. The licensee

did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by

the inspectors during this inspection.

Item Number

Status

Description/Reference Paragraph

270/92-10-01

Open

Violation - Incorrectly Performed

Nuclear Instrument Reliability Check

(paragraph 2.e).

270/92-10-02

Open

Violation - Lack of Independent

Safety Tag Verification (paragraph 2.e).

270/92-10-03

Open

Violation - Failure to Perform a

Safety Evaluation for-a Temporary

Modification (paragraph 2.e).

ML16148A650

Text

Navigation menu

Search