ML16148A650
| ML16148A650 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1992 |
| From: | Belisle G, Binoy Desai, Harmon P, Poertner W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16148A649 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-92-10, 50-270-92-10, 50-287-92-10, NUDOCS 9206120039 | |
| Download: ML16148A650 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1992010
Text
'pJR REG,,
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.: 50-269/92-10, 50-270/92-10 and 50-287/92-10
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
P. 0. Box 1007
Charlotte, NC 28201-1007
Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287, 72-4
License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55, SNM-2503
Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station
Inspection Conducted: March
- April 25, 1992
Inspe t
- r,
_0" P. E. Harmon, tenior
sident Inspector
Date Signed
B. B. Des i, Reside
Insp
Date Signed
. K. Poertner, Resid
t lnsp
t
Date Signed
Approved by:
7)
G. A. B lisle, Sectio
ief
Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, resident inspection was conducted in the areas of operations,
surveillance testing, maintenance activities and follow-up on previous inspection
findings.
Results:
Three violations identified during the Oconee Shutdown Risk and Outage
Management Inspection are documented in this inspection report. The violations
concern an incorrectly performed nuclear instrument reliability check, lack of
.
independent safety tag verification, and failure to perform a safety
9206120039 920520
ADOCK 05000269
G
2
evaluation for a temporary modification (paragraph 2.e). Each of the instances
involved failure to follow approved procedures on the part of station staff. The
specifics surrounding these violations are described in NRC Inspection Report Nos.
50-270/91-202.
REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- H. Barron, Station Manager
- S. Benesole, Safety Review
D. Coyle, Systems Engineering
- J. Davis, Safety Assurance Manager
D. Deatherage, Operations Support Manager
B. Dolan, Manager, Mechanical/Nuclear Engineering (Design)
W. Foster, Superintendent, Mechanical Maintenance
- J. Hampton, Vice President, Oconee Site
- O. Kohler, Regulatory Compliance
C. Little, Superintendent, Instrument and Electrical (I&E)
- M. Patrick, Performance Engineer
B. Peele, Engineering Manager
- S. Perry, Regulatory Compliance
G. Rothenberger, Work Control Superintendent
- R. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members, and staff engineers.
NRC Resident Inspectors:
- P. Harmon
- W. Poertner
- B. Desai
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Plant Operations (71707)
a.
General
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting
period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical
Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs,
shift turnover records, temporary modification log and equipment
removal and restoration records were reviewed routinely. Discussions
were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health
physics, instrument & electrical (l&E), and performance personnel.
2
Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily
basis. Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during
weekdays and on weekends. Some inspections were made during
shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover performance. Actions
observed were conducted as required by the licensee's Administrative
Procedures. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift
inspected met or exceeded the requirements of TS. Operators were
responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant
conditions.
Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine
basis. The areas toured included the following:
Turbine Building
Auxiliary Building
CCW Intake Structure
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility
Units 1, 2 and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms
Units 1, 2 and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms
Units 1, 2 and 3 Penetration Rooms
Units 1, 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Rooms
Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area
Standby Shutdown Facility
Keowee Hydro Station
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,
equipment status, and radiation control practices were observed.
Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactory.
b.
Plant Status
All three units operated at essentially full power the entire reporting
period.
c.
Potential Low Control Power Voltage
On April 7, 1992, the inspectors were informed by the licensee that
the control power voltage to close the Unit 3 Standby Breakers could
be lower than the manufacturer's minimum rated voltage of 90 VDC
assuming worst case voltage conditions. The breakers were declared
inoperable and a modification was initiated to correct the potential low
control power voltage condition at the Standby Breakers. The
modification consisted of installing an interposing relay in the control
3
power circuitry and rewiring the control power circuitry to reduce the
voltage drop from the 125 VDC panelboard to the breaker cubicle.
Subsequently, the licensee determined that similar low voltage
conditions might also occur on the Unit 1 and 2 Standby Breakers,
Unit 1, 2 and 3 Startup Breakers and the Keowee Standby Breakers.
The licensee determined that the Unit 3 Standby Breakers were the
worst case and that voltage could be as low as 63.3 VDC assuming
worst case conditions. The licensee held discussions with the
manufacturer and determined that similar breakers had been tested
and closed with control voltages as low as 60 VDC. The licensee
tested all six Standby Breakers and both Keowee Standby Breakers to
determine the voltage at the breaker close coil required to actually
close the breaker. Seven of the eight breakers closed at a voltage of
58.5 VDC or less and the eighth breaker closed at a voltage of 63.5
VDC. The Unit 1 Standby Breaker had the highest required closing
voltage (63.5) and the licensee calculated that the worst case
available voltage at the breaker would be 78.5 VDC.
Based on the test data obtained, the licensee determined that the
Unit 1, 2 and 3 Startup Breakers and the Keowee Standby Breakers
were still capable of closing under worst case voltage conditions. The
licensee decided to modify all three units' Standby Breakers within the
72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limiting condition for operation, and then modify the Startup
Breakers and the Keowee Standby Breakers one at a time. This
modification would return the voltage at the breaker closing coils back
to the manufacturer's minimum voltage requirement.
A conference call was conducted between the licensee, Region II, and
the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to discuss the
licensee's findings and planned corrective actions. The inspectors
reviewed the licensee's proposed modification, witnessed the testing
conducted on the Standby Breakers and Keowee Standby Breakers,
observed the installation of the modification package on the Standby
Breakers, and followed the work activities on the Startup and Keowee
Standby Breakers. The modification packages were completed on the
Units' 1, 2 and 3 Standby Breakers on April 10, 1992. The
modification packages were completed on the Startup and Keowee
Standby Beakers on April 15, 1992. The inspectors will review this
item further during review of the licensee's LER that is required to be
issued within 30 days of the event.
4
d.
Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater (TDEFW) Pump Testing
In NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-269, 270, 287/92-09, the
inspectors questioned the acceptability of the licensee's use of the
Auxiliary Steam (AS) header as a source of motive power for the
TDEFW pump turbine. The licensee performed an operability
determination which concluded that the (AS) header was acceptable
as the source for the turbine even though the AS system is not
seismically qualified. The conclusion is based on a Safety Evaluation
Report (SER), Seismic Qualification Of The Auxiliary (Emergency)
Feedwater System, issued January 14, 1987. The SER determined
that the turbine-driven pump could fail during a seismic event, but the
redundant, motor-driven pumps would remain intact to provide full
capacity for all safety functions. Therefore, the potential seismic
failure of the turbine-driven train or subsystem is acceptable on the
basis of sufficient unaffected redundancy.
Based on discussions with the licensee and NRR, the inspector's
questions in this area were resolved satisfactorily.
e.
Shutdown Risk and Outage Management Inspection
The shutdown risk inspection and outage management inspection was
conducted from December 2, 1991, through February 21, 1992, and
is documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-270/91-202 issued
on April 6, 1992. The inspection identified the following deficiencies:
(1) incorrectly performed nuclear instrument reliability check during
fuel movement, (2) lack of independent safety tag verification and (3)
lack of a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for a temporary
modification. These items were reviewed by the inspectors and are
identified as Violations 270/92-10-01: Incorrectly Performed Nuclear
Instrument Reliability Check,; 270/92-10-02: Lack of Independent
Safety Tag Verification, and 270/92-10-03: Failure to Perform a
Safety Evaluation For a Temporary Modification. The specifics
involving these violations are contained in NRC Inspection Report No.
270/91-202.
Three violations were identified.
3.
Surveillance Testing (61726)
A Surveillance test was reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and
performance adequacy. The completed test reviewed was examined for
5
necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical
content, authorization to begin work, data collection, independent
verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of
completed work. The test witnessed was inspected to determine that an
approved procedure was available, test equipment was calibrated,
prerequisites were met, the test was conducted according to procedure, test
results were acceptable and system restoration was completed.
The following surveillance was reviewed and witnessed.
PT/O/A/0610/05A
Solid State Relay Breaker Trip Test.
Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Activities (62703)
Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting
period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that
approved procedures in use adequately described work that was not within
the skill of the trade. Activities, procedures, and work requests were
examined to verify; proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire,
cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to service, and
that limiting conditions for operation were met.
Maintenance reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
TN/3/A/OE4601 /00
Modify Close Circuit For Unit 3 Standby
Breakers
TN/5/A/OE4604/00
Modify Close Circuit For Keowee Standby
Breaker
Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Inspection of Open Items (92700)(92701)(92702)
The following open items were reviewed using licensee reports, inspection,
record review, and discussions with licensee personnel, as appropriate:
a.
(Open) Inspector Followup Item 269,270,287/92-09-01: CBAST
Concerns.
The licensee had not completed the technical justification
6
to support their interpretation of the Technical Specification
requirement during this inspection period. The inspectors were told
that the justification would be provided during the next inspection
period. This item will remain open pending review of the licensee's
technical justification.
b.
(Closed) Violation 50-269,270,287/90-17-01: Penetration Room
Ventilation System (PRVS) Inoperable Under Certain Conditions Due to
Design Deficiencies. The licenesee's responses dated July 27 and
September 13, 1990, were reviewed and found to be acceptable.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions including the
revised program to test failure positions of valves as required by
Generic Letter (GL) 88-14, and revisions to the Oconee Final Safety
Analysis Report pertaining to the permanent resolution for valves PR
13, PR-17, PR-20. The corrective actions were acceptable.
c.
(Closed) Violation 50-269,270,287/90-17-06: Responses to GL-88
14 Were Not Complete and Accurate. Verification was not performed
for all active air operated components. The licensee's responses to
this item were dated July 17, September 13, September 20, 1990,
and the revised response to GL-88-14 was dated August 12, 1991.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions associated
with the revised responses to GL-88-14 and found them to be
acceptable.
d.
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 269/90-10: Potential Failure of
Engineered Safeguards System By Improper Valve Failure Mode Due
to Design Deficiency, Deficient Documentation. This LER associated
with PRVS was issued on July 13, 1990. The PRVS issue was
discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-269,270,287/90-17.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions including the
completed modification to the PRV system on all three units.
e.
(Closed) Licensee Event Report 269/91-01: Potential Single Failure
During a LOCA/LOOP Event May Result in the Loss of Emergency
Power Due to Design Deficiency. This LER was issued on February 7,
1991. The inspectors reviewed the temporary as well as permanent
corrective actions associated with the design deficiency.
f.
(Closed) Licensee.Event Report 50-287/90-02: Reactor Trip Caused
by Equipment Failure, Valve Limit Switch Linkage Became
Disconnected. This LER was issued on April 5, 1990. The inspectors
reviewed the completed corrective actions associated with this event.
In addition, planned corrective action to perform signature analysis
and other testing to assure 3FDW-31 will stroke, is under evaluation
by a Problem Investigation Report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 29, 1992, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. The licensee
did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by
the inspectors during this inspection.
Item Number
Status
Description/Reference Paragraph
270/92-10-01
Open
Violation - Incorrectly Performed
Nuclear Instrument Reliability Check
(paragraph 2.e).
270/92-10-02
Open
Violation - Lack of Independent
Safety Tag Verification (paragraph 2.e).
270/92-10-03
Open
Violation - Failure to Perform a
Safety Evaluation for-a Temporary
Modification (paragraph 2.e).