ML15261A428
ML15261A428 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Oconee ![]() |
Issue date: | 02/24/1994 |
From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML15261A430 | List: |
References | |
NUDOCS 9405020211 | |
Download: ML15261A428 (48) | |
Text
DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ATTACHMENT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Remove Pages Insert Pages 4.6-1 through -3 4.6-1 through -4 9405020211 940224 PDR ADOCK 05000269 PDR
4.6 EMERGENCY POWER PERIODIC TESTING Applicability Applies to the periodic testing surveillance of the emergency power sources.
Objective To verify that the emergency power sources and equipment will respond promptly and properly when required.
Specification 4.6.1 Monthly, a test of the Keowee Hydro units shall be performed to verify proper operation of these emergency power sources and associated equipment.
This test shall assure that:
- a. Each hydro unit can be automatically started from the Unit 1 and 2 control room.
- b. Each hydro unit can be synchronized through the 230 Kv overhead circuit to the startup transformers.
- c. Each hydro unit can energize the 13.8 Kv underground feeder.
- d. The 4160 volt startup transformer main feeder bus breakers and standby bus breaker shall be exercised.
4.6.2
- a. Annually, the Keowee Hydro units will be started using the emergency start circuits in each control room to verify that each hydro unit and associated equipment is available to carry load within 25 seconds of a simulated requirement for engineered safety features.
- b. Promptly following the above annual test, each hydro unit will be loaded to at least the combined load of the auxiliaries actuated by ESG signal in one unit and the auxiliaries of the other two units in hot shutdown by synchronizing the hydro unit to the offsite power system and assuming the load at the maximum practical rate.
- c. Also, the ability of the Keowee Unit ACBs to close automatically to the underground path will be tested on an annual frequency.
4.6.3 Monthly, the Keowee Underground Feeder Breaker Interlock shall be verified to be operable.
4.6.4 During each refueling outage, a simulated emergency transfer of the 4160 volt main feeder buses to the startup Oconee 1, 2, and 3 4.6-1
transformer (i.e.,
- CT1, CT2 or CT3) and to the 4160 volt standby buses shall be made to verify proper operation.
4.6.5 Quarterly, the External Grid Trouble Protection System logic shall be tested to demonstrate its ability to provide an isolated power path between Keowee and Oconee.
4.6.6 Annually and prior to planned extended Keowee outages, it shall be demonstrated that a Lee Station combustion turbine can be started and connected to the 100 kV line.
It shall be demonstrated that the 100 Kv line can be separated from the rest of the system and supply power to the 4160 volt main feeder buses.
4.6.7 At least once every 18 months, it shall be demonstrated that a Lee station combustion turbine can-be started and connected to the isolated 100 kV line and carry the equivalent of the maximum safeguards load of 'one Oconee unit (4.8 MVA) within one hour.
4.6.8 Annually, it shall be demonstrated that a Lee station combustion.turbine can be started and carry the equivalent of the maximum safeguards load of one Oconee unit plus the safe shutdown loads of two Oconee units on the system grid.
4.6.9 Batteries in the Instrumentation and Control, Keowee, and Switching Station shall have the following periodic inspections performed to assure maximum battery life. Any battery or cell not in compliance with these periodic inspection requirements shall be corrected to meet the requirements within 90 days or the battery shall be declared inoperable.
- a. Weekly verify that:
(1)
The electrolyte level of each. pilot cell is in between the minimum and maximum level indication marks.
(2) The pilot cell specific gravity, corrected to 770F and full electrolyte level, is 21.200.
(3) The pilot cell float voltage is 2 2.12 VDC.
(4) The overall battery float voltage is 2125 VDC.
- b. Quarterly verify that:
(1) The specific gravity of each cell corrected-to 77 0 F and full electrolyte level, is 21.200 and is not less than 0.010 below the average of all cells measured.
(2) The voltage of each cell under float charge is Oconee 1, 2, and 3 4.6-2
>2.12 VDC.
(3)
The electrolyte level of each connected cell is between the minimum and maximum level indication marks.
- c. Annually verify that:
(1) The cells, end-cell plates and battery racks show no visual indication of structural damage or degradation.
(2) The cell to cell and terminal connections are clean, tight and coated with anti-corrosion grease.
4.6.10 Annually, a one hour discharge service test at the required maximum load shall be made on the instrument and control batteries, the Keowee batteries, and the switching station batteries.
4.6.11 Monthly, the operability of the individual diode monitors in the Instrument and Control Power System shall be verified by imposing a simulated diode failure signal on the monitor.
4.6.12 Semiannually, the peak inverse voltage capability of each auctioneering diode in the 125 VDC Instrument and Control Power System shall be measured and recorded.
Bases The Keowee Hydro units, in addition to serving as the emergency power sources for the Oconee Nuclear Station, are power generating sources for the Duke system requirements.
As power generating units, they are operated frequently, normally on a daily basis at loads equal to or greater than required by Table 8.1-1 of the FSAR for ESF bus loads.
Normal as well as emergency startup and operation of these units will be from the Oconee Unit 1 and 2 Control Room. The frequent starting and loading of these units to meet Duke system power requirements assures the continuous availability for emergency power for the Oconee auxiliaries and engineered safety features equipment.
It will be verified that these units will carry the equipment of the maximum safeguards load within 25 seconds, including instrumentation lag, after a simulated requirement for engineered safety features. To further assure the reliability of these units as emergency power sources, they will be, as specified, tested for automatic start on a monthly basis from the Oconee control room.
These tests will include verification that each unit can be synchronized to the 230 kV bus and that each unit can energize the 13.8 kV underground feeder.
Also, the verification of the ability of the Keowee Unit ACBs to automatically close to the underground power path will be performed by the annual tests.
Oconee 1, 2, and 3 4.6-3
The interval specified for testing of transfer to emergency power sources is based on maintaining maximum availability of redundant power sources.
Starting a Lee Station gas turbine, separation of the 100 kV line from the remainder of the system, and charging of the 4160 volt main feeder buses are specified to assure the continuity and operability of this equipment.
The one hour time limit is considered the absolute maximum time limit that would be required to accomplish this.
REFERENCE FSAR, Section 8 Oconee 1, 2, and 3 4.6-4
DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ATTACHMENT 2 MARKUP OF CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.6
4.6 EMERGENCY POWER PERIODIC TESTING Applicability Applies to the periodic testing surveillance of the emergency power sources.
Objective To verify that the emergency power sources and equipment will respond promptly and properly when required.
Specification 4.6.1 Monthly, a test of the Keowee Hydro units shall be performed to verify proper operation of these emergency power sources and associated equipment.
This test shall assure that:
- a. Each hydro unit can be automatically started from the Unit 1 and 2 control room.
- b. Each hydro unit can be synchronized through the 230 Kv overhead circuit to the startup transformers.
- c. Each hydro unit can energize the 13.8 Kv underground feeder.
- d. The 4160 volt startup transformer main feeder bus breakers and'standby bus breaker shall be exercised.
4.6.2
- a. Annually, the Keowee Hydro units will be started using the emergency start circuits in each control room to verify that each hydro unit and associated equipment is available to carry load within 25 seconds of a simulated requirement for engineered safety features.
- b. Promptly following the above annual test, each hydro unit will be loaded to at least the combined load of the auxiliaries actuated by ESG signal in one unit and the auxiliaries of the other two units in hot shutdown by synchronizing the hydro unit to the offsite power system and assuming the load at the maximum practical rate.
0 Also, the ability of the Keowee Unit ACBs to close automatically to the underground path will be tested on an annual frequency.
4.6.3
- Monthly, the Keowee Underground Feeder Breaker Interlock shall be verified to be operable.
4.6.4 During each refueling outage, a simulated emergency transfer of the 4160 volt main feeder buses to the startup Oconee 1, 2, and 3 4.6-1
transformer (i.e., CT1, CT2 or CT3) and to the 4160 volt standby buses shall be made to verify proper operation.
4.6.5 Quarterly, the External Grid Trouble Protection System logic shall be tested to demonstrate its ability to provide an isolated power path between Keowee and Oconee.
4.6.6 Annually and prior to planned extended Keowee outages, it shall be demonstrated that a Lee Station combustion turbine can be started and connected to the 100 kV line.
It shall be demonstrated that the 100 Kv line can be separated from the rest of the system and supply power to the 4160 volt main feeder buses.
4.6.7 At least once every 18 months, it shall be demonstrated that a Lee station combustion turbine can be started and connected to the isolated 100 kV line and carry the equivalent of the maximum safeguards load of one Oconee unit (4.8 MVA) within one hour.
4.6.8 Annually, it shall be demonstrated that a Lee station combustion turbine can be started and carry the equivalent of the maximum safeguards load of one Oconee unit plus the safe shutdown loads of two Oconee units on the system grid.
4.6.9 Batteries in the Instrumentation and Control, Keowee, and Switching Station shall have the following periodic inspections performed to assure maximum battery life. Any battery or cell not in compliance with these periodic inspection requirements shall be corrected to meet the requirements within 90 days or the battery shall be declared inoperable.
- a. Weekly verify that:
(1)
The electrolyte level of each pilot cell is in between the minimum and maximum level indication marks.
(2) The pilot cell specific gravity, corrected to 77 0 F and full electrolyte level, is 1.200.
(3) The pilot cell float voltage is 2.12 VDC.
(4) The overall battery float voltage is 125 VDC.
- b. Quarterly verify that:
(1) The specific gravity of each cell corrected to 770F and full electrolyte level, is 21.200 and is not less than 0.010 below the average of all cells measured.
(2) The voltage of each cell under float charge is Oconee 1, 2, and 3 4.6-2
22.12 VDC.
(3)
The electrolyte level of each connected cell is between the minimum and maximum level indication marks.
- c. Annually verify that:
(1) The cells, end-cell plates and battery racks show no visual indication of structural damage or degradation.
(2) The cell to cell and terminal connections are clean, tight and coated with anti-corrosion grease.
4.6.10 Annually, a one hour discharge service test at the required maximum load shall be made on the instrument and control batteries, the Keowee batteries, and the switching station batteries.
4.6.11 Monthly, the operability of the individual diode monitors in the Instrument and Control Power System shall be verified by imposing a simulated diode failure signal on the monitor.
4.6.12 Semiannually, the peak inverse voltage capability of each auctioneering diode in the 125 VDC Instrument and Control Power System shall be measured and recorded.
Bases The Keowee Hydro units, in addition to serving as the emergency power sources for the Oconee Nuclear Station, are power generating sources for the Duke system requirements.
As power generating units, they are operated frequently, normally on a daily basis at loads equal to or greater than required by Table 8.1-1 of the FSAR for ESF bus loads.
Normal as well as emergency startup and operation of these units will be from the Oconee Unit 1 and 2 Control Room. The frequent starting and loading of these units to meet Duke system power requirements assures the continuous availability for emergency power for the Oconee auxiliaries and engineered safety features equipment.
It will be verified that these units will carry the equipment of the maximum safeguards load within 25 seconds, including instrumentation lag, after a simulated requirement for engineered safety features. To further assure the reliability of these units as emergency power sources, they will be, as specified, tested for automatic start on a monthly basis from the Oconee control room.
These tests will include verification that each unit can be synchronized to the 230 kV bus and that each unit can energize the 13.8 kV underground feeder.
Also, the verification of the ability of the Keowee Unit ACBs to outomatically close to the underground power path will be performed by the annual tests.
Oconee 1, 2, and 3 4.6-3
/Vo c/"r The interval specified for testing of transfer to emergency power sources is based on maintaining maximum availability of redundant power sources.
Starting a Lee Station gas turbine, separation of the 100 kV line from the remainder of the system, and charging of the 4160 volt main feeder buses are specified to assure the continuity and operability of this equipment.
The one hour time limit is considered the absolute maximum time limit that would be required to accomplish this.
REFERENCE FSAR, Section 8 Oconee 1, 2, and 3 4.6-4
DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ATTACHMENT 3 TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION
Technical Justification LER 269/92-16 describes an event where a postulated single failure could cause the loss of both the underground and overhead power paths.
The postulated failure would lock out the Keowee Unit previously aligned to the underground power path separating the Keowee Unit from the underground feeder. Also, the failure would isolate the Keowee Main Step-up transformer (overhead power path) from the Keowee Unit aligned to the overhead power path.
Immediate corrective action was taken to prevent the loss of both emergency power paths to the single failure.
The corrective actions included the alignment of one Keowee Unit to the underground power path, opening the overhead breaker disconnects for the Keowee Unit aligned to the underground, and aligning the other Keowee Unit to the overhead power path.
One of the planned corrective actions from the LER was to modify the Keowee breaker protective relaying circuitry to preclude the postulated failure.
In accordance with the planned corrective action in the LER, interlocks will be provided to ensure the availability of the underground emergency power path if the postulated failure were to occur within the overhead breaker of the Keowee Unit which has been previously selected and aligned to the underground feeder.
These interlocks function to automatically close the non-selected underground path breaker after a preset time delay when the following conditions concurrently exist:
- 1)
The Keowee Main Step-up transformer lock-out relay 86T
- tripped,
- 2)
The opposite unit's emergency lock-out relay 86E-1 or 86E-2 tripped, and
- 3)
An emergency start signal from either channel of Keowee Emergency Start Logic.
The objective of the surveillance will be to demonstrate that a failure within the overhead breaker of the Keowee Unit selected to the underground power path (which results in the above listed interlocks being satisfied) will automatically close the non selected underground breaker after a 2 second time delay.
The circuitry which actuates the automatic close will be tested on an annual frequency to verify the operability of the automatic close feature.
In the B&W Standard Technical Specifications (STS),
the surveillances for the diesel generator transfer control logic circuits have an 18 month frequency.
Also, the Emergency Power Switching Logic Automatic (EPSL) Transfer Logic has a surveillance in Technical Specification Section 4.6.4 with a refueling frequency. Restriction of the proposed surveillance to an annual frequency was based on the determination to include the test with
the annual Emergency Start surveillance.
It should be noted that the annual frequency is more conservative than the STS and EPSL surveillances. The annual frequency for this surveillance was determined to provide reliability verification without excessive equipment cycling.
This test is an additional requirement which ensures the operability of the Keowee ACB automatic close feature.
- Also, the surveillance is being added to the Technical Specifications Section 4.6 to assure that proper testing requirements are maintained.
DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ATTACHMENT 4 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION EVALUATION
No Significant Hazards Consideration Duke Power Company (Duke) has made the determination that this amendment request involves a No Significant Hazards Consideration by applying the standards established by NRC regulations in 10CFR50.92.
This ensures that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(1) Involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated:
The Keowee Hydro units provide the main source of emergency power for the Oconee Nuclear units, but they are not accident initiators. The FSAR Loss of Electric Power accident assumes two types of events: (1) Loss of load (unit trip) and (2)
Loss of all system and station power.
The changes performed by the modification that added the automatic closure circuitry do not increase the likelihood of either.
Also, the modifications to the Keowee operating logic will not adversely affect the ability to mitigate LOOP,
The loss of all station power accident analysis assumptions are still valid. This modification has no adverse impact on the ability of the Keowee Units to satisfy their design requirements of achieving rated speed and voltage within 23 seconds of receipt of an emergency start signal.
The surveillance change that is included in this amendment request is provided to assure the availability of the electrical power sys.tems for mitigation of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs).
As described within the technical justification, the Keowee breaker circuitry was modified to allow the Keowee Unit that is aligned to the overhead power path to automatically close to the underground power path if the postulated fault occurs.
The surveillance change is an additional restriction not presently included in the Technical Specifications.
This amendment will ensure the operability of the Keowee Unit ACB automatic close feature and will assure that proper testing requirements are maintained.
Based on the above and the technical justification provided in, there is no significant increase in the probability of a DBA as a result of this change, nor is there a significant increase in the consequences of a DBA as a result of this change since the proposed amendment assures the availability of the electrical power systems.
(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any kind of accident previously evaluated:
The proposed change makes physical changes to the plant configuration. However, the modification simply changes the
Keowee control logic to remove the possibility of a certain postulated failure from causing a loss of emergency power to the Oconee nuclear units. The Keowee emergency power systems will remain operable and available to mitigate accidents.
Operation of ONS in accordance with these Technical Specifications will not create any failure modes not bounded by previously evaluated accidents.
Consequently, this change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any kind of accident previously evaluated.
(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety:
Margins of safety associated with these Technical Specifications have been evaluated.
No safety or design limits are adversely affected, so margins of safety as defined in the bases to any Technical Specifications are not reduced as a result of the Keowee modification.
The design basis of the auxiliary electrical systems is to supply the required ES loads of one Unit and safe shutdown loads of the other two units.
The Technical Specification amendment includes an additional surveillance restriction not presently included in the Technical Specifications.
The proposed amendment assures the continued availability of the electrical power systems; thus preserving the existing margin of safety.
Therefore, there will be no significant reduction in any margin of safety.
Duke has concluded based on the above, and the technical justification in Attachment 3 that there are no significant hazards considerations involved in this amendment request.
DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ATTACHMENT 5 KEOWEE MODIFICATION PACKAGE
n' p.6-2 INFORMATION QOGNEE NUCLEAR STATION ENGINEERING COMPLETION NOTICE
- 1. NSM #
ON-52966 UNIT #
5 (Keowee)
REV.
0 PART ALi
- 2. WID 731052966M ECN Rev.
IMPL.
X As-Built Engineering Design Acttivitlies
- 3. LIST OF TRANSMITTALS BY CREW DESIGNATIONS 340 (Crew #340) FW Sing 18,353
- 4. COMMENTS / SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
NSM
Description:
Modify Keowee ACBs 3 & 4 to Automatically Close During Postulated Single Failures to ACBs 1 & 2 Project Manager:
Ben Davis Date:
11/08/93 Engineering Implementation Activities
- 5. NSM Request Complete X Yes El N/A
- 6.
NSM 10CFR50.59 Evaluation Complete 0 Yes El N/A
- 7. NRC Approval Obtained El Yes El N/A
- 8.
Implementation Plan/Procedure Approved El Yes O N/A
- 9. Modification Test Plan Complete El Yes E N/A
- 10. QA Review Complete 0 Yes E N/A Engineering Approvals:
Discipline Accountable Date Project Manager Date This Design / Implementation Package Expires On 11/08/96 NSM Approved For Implementation:
Station Manager
__Date
NSM-ON-52966 (ALl PORTION)
PROJECT DESCRIPTION This modification provides logic in the controls of various Keowee devices, which, when implemented, will preclude postulated scenarios from adversely affecting the Keowee generators ability to function as the emergency on-site sources to the three Oconee units.
This portion of the NSM therefore addresses the following item:
- 1.
Single failure concerns relative to differential protective relays zone overlap when a failure within one of the overhead generator breakers (ACB-1 or ACB-2) is postulated.
A failure within one of the breakers noted, when the affected Keowee unit is also the one selected as the "underground path" unit will result in both emergency power paths "locked out" and unavailable. An interim solution to this problem is that of maintaining the overhead breaker, on the selected underground path unit, isolated (breaker tripped with its respective disconnects open) thus, making one of the Keowee units unavailable for system purposes.
The logic provided by this modification which addresses this concern will result in the underground breaker (not previously selected) to automatically close when indication of the postulated breaker fault occurs.
This is accomplished by providing automatic closing logic in each underground path breaker (ACB-3 and ACB-4) such that they will close when the following conditions are satisfied:
A. Main step-up transformer Lock-Out Relay 86T tripped; and B. The opposite Keowee units Emergency Lock-Out Relay 86E tripped, and C. Either channel of emergency start to the respective Keowee unit actuated.
Once satisfied, the close signal to the open underground path breaker is delayed for two seconds to preclude the highly unlikely possibility of the open breaker rapidly closing with no synchronization supervision present.
Please note that the time delay has been provided as a precautionary measure and is not required nor is its function considered to be within design basis.
November 2, 1993 OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE INTRASITE LETTER To: B. W. Davis Project Manager
SUBJECT:
50.59 evaluation for NSM ON-52966 Part AL1 "Modify Keowee ACBs 3 & 4 to Automatically Close During Postulated Single Failure to ACBs 1 & 2" File: ON-52966 Attached is the completed 50.59 evaluation for NSM ON-52966.
No unreviewed safety questions were identified. No Tech Spec or FSAR changes are necessary. Any operating procedure changes associated with this modification are not addressed by this 50.59 evaluation.
Please contact me at extension 4388, if you have any questions.
E. D. Price Jr.
Design Engineer Oconee Mechanical/Nuclear Engineering xc:
T. A. Saville M. E. Patrick
Form 45077 (10-92)
See Attached Calculation: OSC - 5600, Rev. 0 Duke Power Company 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATION (1) Station: Oconee Nuclear Station Unit(s):
1,2,3 (2) Evaluation for:
NSM-52966 Part AL1, "Modify Keowee ACBs 3 & 4 to Automatically Close During Postulated Single Failure to ACBs 1 & 2" (3) FSAR sections consulted:
6.3.3.3, 6.3.3.4, 7.1.2.2, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 15.8, 15.14, Table 8-3, Figure 8-6, 1992 Update (4) Technical specifications consulted:
3.7, 4.6, 5-18-93 update Will technical specification changes be required?
Yes No
- Technical specifications affected:
- Station Regulatory Compliance personnel contacted:
(5)
USO EVALUATION APPLICABILITY Does the modification involve a Structure, System, or Component (SSC) that is evaluated in the FSAR or a smaller SSC that is part of an SSC evaluated in the FSAR, and does the modification do more than replace components with equivalent components?
Yes No SWill the modification degrade the effectiveness of an SSC important to safety in any design basis U
accident or event?
Ovies UNo Does the modification appear to require inclusion in the FSAR due to the installation of a new system significant to plant operation, or installation of a significant addition to an existing system?
flYes N
(8)
USO EVALUATION USO EVALUATION NOT APPLICABLEO May the modification:
Increase the probability of an accident evaluated in the SAR?
Yes No increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in the SAR?
OvIes gJo Create the possibility for an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR?
LYes
~No Increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR?
EYes
~No Increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR?
EYes
~No Create the possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR?
EYes jNo Will the modification:
Reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification?
EYes IXNo PROVIDE NAT H
NT TO SBTNTIATE ALL YES AND NO ANSWERS Prepared by/date:
~(2 9
Reviewed by/date:
-/
P...o 01077-e FORM 101.1 REVISION 14 CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION TION AND UNIT NUMBER Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1,2,3 OF CALCULATION USQ Review of NSM-52966 Part AL1, Modify Keowee ACBs 3 & 4 to Automatically Close During Postulated Single Failure to ACBs 1 & 2 CALCULATION NUMBER OSC -
5600 ORIGINALLY CONSISTING OF:
PAGES 1
THROUGH-4 TOTAL ATTACHMENTS-TOTAL MICROFICHE ATTACHMENTS 0
TOTAL VOLUMES 1
TYPE I CALCULATION/ANALYSIS YES NO TYPE I REVIEW FREQUENCY THESE ENGINEERING CALCULATIONS COVER GA CONDITION 1
ITEMS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES, THE QUALITY HAS BEEN ASSURED AND I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE CALCULATION HAS BEEN ORIGINATED, ECKED OR APPROVED AS NOTED BELOW:
ORIGINATED BY DATE
__/
______9__
CHECKED BY DATE
//-
3 APPROVED BY F4 Su
&k DATE I
,SUED TO DOCUMENT CONTROL DATE IVED BY DOCUMENT CONTROL DATE MICROFICHE ATTACHMENT LIST:
0YES 2gNO SEE FORM 101.4 REV.
CALCULATION PAGES (VOL)
ATTACHMENTS (VOL)
VOLUMES ORIG CHKD APPR ISSUE NO.
DATE REVISED DELETED ADDED REVISED DELETED ADDED DELETED ADDED DATE DATE DATE REC D DATE 9405020213 940224r PDR ADOCK 05000269 P
4i OC-5600 Pg 1 of 4 ByBO Date /-/-17 PURPOSE The purpose of this evaluation 'is to determine if any unreviewed safety questions (USQ) are involved with NSM ON-52966 Part AL1, "Modify Keowee ACBs 3 & 4 to Automatically Close During Postulated Single Failure to ACBs 1 & 2". The criteria of 10CFR50.59 a(2) will be used to make this determination. This evaluation is QA Condition 1 because it determines the presence or absence of a USQ.
DESCRIPTION:
This modification will change Keowee logic to prevent a certain postulated scenario from adversely impacting the ability of the Keowee hydro units to supply emergency power to the Oconee nuclear units. This modification addresses the single failure of ACB-1 or 2 rendering both the overhead path and underground unit unavailable. For more information see Reference 5.
SAFETY REVIEW The purpose of the Keowee Emergency Power System is to supply a liable source of emergency power to the Oconee Nuclear Station ring a design basis event (DBE).
This modification is being plemented to preclude a single failure of ACB 1 or 2 (overhead paths air circuit breakers for Keowee Units 1 & 2, respectively) from propagating into an event that could deprive OHS of its onsite emergency power source during a DBE. It was postulated that a failure within either ACB-l or 2, when the affected Keowee unit is also selected to the underground path would result in both power paths being locked out. As an examplet if Keowee Units 1 & 2 were generating to the grid (ACB-l & 2 closed) with Unit 1 selected to the underground path (ACB-3 underground tie breaker closed), and a fault occurred inside ACB-,
the following logic sequence would transpire:
Generator differential relay 87G picks up and initiates an 86E Emergency Lockout Relay which trips and locks out Keowee Unit
- 1. Concurrently, the Main Step-up Transformer No.. 1 differential 'relay (87T) detects the fault and operates Lockout Relay 86T to trip ALL breakers connected to the transformer (ACB 1,2,5,6 and PCB-8, 9). Thus, Keowee Unit 2 is separated from the overhead path, and both the overhead path and the underground unit are unavailable to ONS. This modification will change the operating logic such that the underground breaker not selected (ACB-4 in the previous example) will automatically close upon indication of the postulated breaker fault. ACB-3 & 4 will be provided with automatic closing logic to initiate closure if-all the following conditions exist: (1) Main Step-up Transformer Lockout Relay 86T is tripped,
- 2) the other Keowee units Emergency Lockout Relay 86E is tripped, nd (3) either channel of Emergency start to the respective Keowee
'Winit is actuated. Once these three conditions are satisfied, a two second time delay is provided to protect against the unlikely event of the open breaker rapidly closing with no. synchronization
- w ak-7' 08C-5600 Pg 2 of 4 By&?zZ Date/,-/-93 supervision present. The time delay is installed solely as a precautionary measure. These changes will remove the possibility of a single failure fault on the overhead pathway ACBs causing a loss of both emergency power paths.
[References 1, 2, 3, 5]
This modification will require addition and ihstallation of type M relays, type M relay contact blocks, and solid state timing modules.
These new devices will be Cutler Hammer
- brand, QA Condition 1, safety related components.
The need for additional cabling is expected to be minimal. The new devices will be seismically mounted and located within the mild Keowee environment.
[References 5]
This modification makes changes to the Keowee emergency power system to preclude a single failure of ACB-1 or 2 from rendering both the overhead path and the underground unit unavailable. This modification has no adverse effect on the ability of the Keowee Units to satisfy their design requirements of achieving rated speed and voltage within 23 seconds of receipt of an emergency start signal. This modification does not degrade the function of any safety system. There is no increase in the probability or consequences of any previously analyzed accidents, and no new failure modes introduced. Both Appendix R and seismic reviews of this modification have been performed. The final design for Part ALl is complete. [References 4, 5, 6]
USO EVALUATION May the modification:
- 1.
Increase the probability of an accident evaluated in the BAR?
No. The Keowee Hydro units provide the main source of emergency power for the Oconee Nuclear units, but they are not accident initiators. The FSAR Loss of Electric Power accident assumes two. types of events: (1)
Loss of load (unit trip) and (2)
Loss of all system and station power. These changes to the control logic do not increase the likelihood of either. All replacement equipment will be QA Condition 1 and seismically mounted.
- 2.
Increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in BAR?
No. The changes to the Keowee operating logic per this modification will not adversely affect the ability to mitigate LOOP, LOCA, and LOCA/LOOP accidents as described in the FSAR.
The loss of all station power accident analysis assumptions are still valid. This modification has no adverse impact on the ability of the Keowee Units to satisfy their design requirements of achieving rated speed and voltage within 23 seconds of receipt of an emergency start signal.
OSC-5600 Pg 3 of 4 By az~Date //-/-23
- 3.
Create the possibility for an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR?
No. This modification simply changes the Keowee control logic to remove the possibility of certain postulated events from causing a loss of emergency power to the Oconee nuclear units.
The Keowee emergency power systems will remain operable and available to mitigate accidents.
No new failure modes are postulated.
- 4.
Increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR?
No. This modification removes a potential single failure of ACB-1 or 2 that could have rendered the Keowee overhead path and the underground unit unavailable.
No function of any safety related or emergency power systems/components will be degraded as a result of this modification.
- 5.
Increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR?
No. No safety related equipment will be adversely affected
- 6.
Create the possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR?
No. This modification will permanently correct a potential failure mode associated with existing breaker control logic.
No new failure modes are postulated.
Will the modification:
- 7.
Reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification?
No.
No safety or-design limits are adversely affected, so margins of safety as defined in the bases to any Technical Specifications are not reduced as a
result of thi~s modification.
CONCLUSION Based on the preceding discussion, this modification involves no safety concerns or USQs. No FSAR changes or Technical specification changes are necessary. (Reference 5]
SUMMARY
FOR 10CFR50.59 ANNUAL REPORT NSM ON-52966 Part ALl, will change Keowee breaker logic to prevent certain postulated scenarios from adversely impacting the ability
08C-5600 Pg 4 of 4 By 91 Date//*/-i3 of the Keowee hydro units to supply emergency power to the Oconee nuclear units. This modification prevents a single failure of ACB-1 or 2 from rendering both the overhead path and the underground unit unavailable.
There is no adverse impact on the function of any safety system, no increase in the probability or consequences of any previously analyzed accidents, and no new failure modes associated with this modification.
No FSAR changes or Technical Specification changes are necessary.
REFERENCES (1]
Oconee Final Safety Analysis Report, Sections 6.3.3.3, 6.3.3.4, 7.1.2.2, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 15.8, 15.14, Table 8-3, Figure 8-6, 1992 Update
[2]
Oconee Technical specifications, Sections 3.7, 4.6, 5-18-93 Update (3]
Keowee Emergency Power Design Basis Document, Rev 1A, dated 6-21-93 (4]
Personal communication between Dave Donaldson (EE) and Ed Price (MNE) on 11-1-93 to discuss overall modification design and verifying:
the mod will remove a potential single failure fault Appendix R review has been performed the final design for AL1 is complete
[5]
NSM-ON-52966 AL1 Portion, Project Description
[6]
Personal communication between Warren Bright (EE) and Ed Price (MNE) on 11-1-93 verifying Part AL1 of this modification has been evaluated for seismic concerns.
Form 45069 (R1-48)
Design Bases/Objectives DESIGN BASIS:
Interlocks have been provided to ensure the availability of the underground emergency power path if a postulated fault (single failure) were to occur within the overhead breaker (ACB-1 or ACB-2) of the Keowee Unit which has been previously selected and aligned to the underground feeder.
These interlocks function to automatically close the non-selected underground path breaker (ACB-3 or ACB-4) after a preset time delay when the following conditions concurrently exist:
- 1)
The main stepup transformer lock-out relay 86T tripped,
- 2)
The opposite unit's emergency lock-out relay 86E-1 or 86E-2 tripped, and
- 3)
An emergency start signal from either channel of KEOWEE EMERGENCY START LOGIC.
Test Acceptance Criteria Test/Measurement Reference Document Acceptable Value Including Tolerance Duke Power Company QA Cond Keowee Hydro Station Units I & 2 DB/TAC for Auto-Closure of Non-Selected Underground Path Breaker DSN/Date 4L II2"23 INS/Date 11,2-13 CHK/Dat-----)
INS/Date S
/ /L-9 APP/Dat 41i-237 INS/Date No Revisions DSN CHK APR DTE C/E ELE M/N DWG No.
KTC-0-0114-oool-001 Rev VA
Form 45069 (R10-88)
Design Bases/Objectives TEST OBJECTIVES:
To demonstrate that if a fault were to occur within the overhead breaker of the Keowee Unit selected to the underground path (which results in the above listed interlocks being satisfied) the nonselected underground breaker will automatically close after a 2 second time delay.
NOTE: As noted in Reference Document OSC-5556 the two (2) second time delay relay is added to the logic as a precautionary measure for postulated events not within design basis.
Test Acceptance Criteria Test/Measurement Reference Document Acceptable Value Including Tolerance Keowee Hydro Station Underground Path Keowee Emergency Power Syatem Breakers ACB-3 & ACB-4 Deaign Basis Document:
Maximum Time:
2 seconds
.2 secs.
Accomplish Automatic OSS-0254.0O-00-2005 Breaker closures of
&.Tech spec 3.7 the non-selected Surveillance Requirements underground path OSC-5556(ALI) breaker when the interlocks as noted are satisfied for two (2) seconds.
Duke Power Company QA Cond Keowee Hydro Station Units I & 2 DB/TAC for Auto-Closure of Non-Selected Underground Path Breaker DSN/Date 1 I
3 INS/Date CHK/Date 11-23 INS/Date SAPP/Date INS/Date No Revisions DSN CHK APR DTE C/E ELE M/N DWG No.
KTC-O-0114-0001-002 Rev MA
Form 01077 (R7-92)
FORM 101.1 REVISION 14 CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 5 STATION AND UNIT NUMBER TITLEOFCALCULATION Design Input Calculation for NSM-ON-52966 CALCULATION NUMBER OSC-5556 WF\\4 ULL ORIGINALLY CONSISTING OF:
PAGES THROUGH H_
TOTAL ATTACHMENTS One TOTAL MICROFICHE ATTACHMENTS None TOTAL VOLUMES 1
TYPE I CALCULATION/ANALYSIS YES O NO TYPE I REVIEW FREQUENCY NA THESE ENGINEERING CALCULATIONS COVER QA CONDITION 0L ITEMS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES, THE QUALITY HAS BEEN ASSURED AND I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE CALCULATION HAS BEEN IGINATED, CHECKED OR APPROVED AS NOTED BELOW:
ORIGINATED BY DATE CHECKED BY DATE APPROVED BY A
DATE
-2 3 ISSUED TO DOCUMENT CONTROL DATE
\\
RECEIVED BY DOCUMENT CONTROL DATE vj E
MICROFICHE ATTACHMENT LIST: [ Yes
%LNo SEE FORM 101.4 REV.
CALCULATION PAGES (VOL)
ATTACHMENTS (VOL)
VOLUMES ORIG CHKD APPR DSTUE NO.
DATE_
REVISED DELETED ADDED REVISED DELETED ADDED DELETED ADDED DATE DATE DATE REC'D DATE 9405020219 940224
.PDR ADOCK 0500.0269 P
Calculation No: CSc.- 6556 Originated By:
Date:
1I019 3 Sheet _ of I g Form 101.2 Revision 0 26164 (R9-89)
REVISION DOCUMENTATION SHEET Review Revision Frequency Revision Description Number Changed (Yes/No)
Calculation No: DS-555G (ALA Pboi'o Originated By:
fQAQ44Date:
I 101Q5 Sheet 2 of CONTENTS Documentation of NSM Design Inputs and Verification Methods (Power Systems)
Sheet Design Input Source Document Form (Power Systems)
Sheet NIA Power Systems NSM Engineering Checklist Sheet X. Documentation of NSM Design Inputs and Design Verification Method (Control Systems)
Sheet 3 Design Input Source Document Form (Control Systems).
Sheet _
Control Systems NSM Engineering Checklist Sheet LI4A Documentation of NSM Design Inputs and Design Verification Method (Instrumentation)
Sheet Design Input source Document Form (Instrumentation)
Sheet Instrumentation NSM Engineering Checklist Sheet Documentation of NSM Design Inputs and Design Verification Method (Lighting, Communications and Heat Tracing)
Sheet N A Design Input Source Document Form (Lighting, Communications, and Heat Tracing)
Sheet Lighting, Communications and Heat Tracing NSH Engineering Checklist Sheet
Calculation No:
sc-5s5. (ALI PIloN,)
Originated By: 4c=ate:
1 jo Q Sheet 3 of jg ELECTRICAL DISCIPLINE DOCUMENTATION OF NSM DESIGN INPUTS AND DESIGN VERIFICATION METHOD
- Lighting, Communications, Power Control Heat Tracing, Systems X
Systems
_ Instrumentation and Tank Heating Originator:
_L_
Date:
O cf Checked:
Date:
93 Approved:
,2Y Date:
DESIGN INPUTS ANSI N45.2.11(1974) requires the documentation of design inputs used in the design of a station modification. Therefore, the following topics have been adapted from ANSI N45.2.11(1974) to serve as a guide for describing the design inputs applicable to the electrical and instrumentation portions of a station modification. The related paragraph(s) of ANSI N45.2.11 are identified by the number(s) in parentheses that follow the design input topic. In addressing these design input topics, the following guidelines should be used:
X If the NSM modifies an existing system/equipment and does not change the design basis or require new design bases or criteria, then the design inputs should be described from the perspective of the modification.
If the NSM adds a new system or a significant new function to an existing system, then the design input should be described from the perspective of the system being added or modified.
Calculation N
)SC 555S (ALI
~iK Originated By:
Date:
Lo c{3 Sheet4. of ELECTRICAL DISCIPLINE DOCUMENTATION OF NSM DESIGN INPUTS AND DESIGN VERIFICATION METHOD
- 1. State the QA Condition of the design being implemented by this portion of the modification and its basis.
QA-1 because of control interfaces with the on-site emergency power sources (Keowee Hydro Units) and the emergency underground power path (Breakers ACB-3 and ACB-4)
- 2. Identify the codes, standards and/or regulatory requirements that initiated this "modification or that are unique in implementing the design of this modification. (3)
The postulated scenario,, which this portion of the NSM addresses, was identified during the single failure analysis of the Keowee Emergency Power System and involves a single failure concern as outlined in the resulting PIP-4-092-0538 and LER 269-92-16.
- 3. Describe the basis function of the system and/or equipment affected by this modification including the various plant operating modes or events for which it is required to function (e.g., normal operation, LOCA, MSLB, LOOP, fire, security).
(1, 13, 15, 16)
Refer to Attachment 1 for the basic function and equipment affected by the ALl portion of this modification. The circuitry and logic added by the AL1 portion of this mod. is required to be operational during normal operation, LOCA, MSLB and LOOP and during a SSF/West Penetration Room Event.
- 4. Describe the performance requirements for the system and/or equipment affected by this portion of the modification (e.g., capacity, ratings, and system output).
(2, 13, 16)
The contact and timer outputs of the devices utilized to generate the logic described in Attachment 1 are fully capable of the pilot duty requirements of the closing circuitry of breakers ACB-3 and 4. Also, the timing range and tolerances of timers 62-3C and 62-4C are acceptable to perform the function as described. These conclusions are based on published manufacturer's information
- 5.
ceeg Ce nCions under which the equipment affected by this modification is required to function (e.g., seismic, vibration, environmental, and process).
(4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 27)
All components, either installed by this portion of the modification (or directly affected by it) are located in mild environment areas and are required to correctly function during seismic events.
Calculation No*
CCAL Po1-bbb iL)
Originated By' ate:
Sheet 5 of 1g ELECTRICAL DISCIPLINE DOCUMENTATION OF NSM DESIGN INPUTS AND DESIGN VERIFICATION METHOD
- 6. Describe any special functional or physical interface requirements for systems or equipment affected by this modification (e.g., non-standard power supply requirements, special mounting/orientation requirements).
(7)
None
- 7. Describe any special location, layout, or arrangement requirements related to this portion of the modification.
(14)
None
- 8. Describe the redundancy, diversity, and/or separation requirements for the systems or equipment affected by the modification.
(18)
- 1. Redundancy -
Separate, independent logic arrangements for breakers ACB-3 and ACB-4 closing circuits.
- 2. Diversity -
None
- 3. Separation -
Where encountered, separation between safety channels and individual components provided per established criteria.
- 9. Describe any design feature(s) incorporated in this portion of the modification to specifically account for the failure mode of the system/equipment affected by this modification.
(19)
As described in Attachment 1, this portion of the modification provides logic to mitiqate the consequences of a failure (fault) within breaker ACB-1 or ACB-2.
Therefore, an additional failure, postulated within the logic provided by this portion of the mod.., is outside of design basis. See Item 1 under Section 8 above and Section 11 below.
- 10. Describe any design feature(s) incorporated in the modification as a result of special system and/or equipment testing requirements.
(20)
None
- 11. Describe any other important factors considered or decisions made in the design of this portion of the modification.
Separate and redundant logic arrangements have been provided in the closing circuits of ACB-3 and 4.to assure that under the postulated single failure conditions (addressed in PIP-4-092-0538), the unaffected underground path breaker will automatically close. Although one common device is used in both of these logic arrangements (namely LOR 86T contacts) the overall result addresses the postulated breaker fault scenario and complies with established ONS single failure criteria.
The two second time delay, as explained in Attachment 1, is based on generally accepted industry practices, relating to automatic bus transfers, where a one second time delay is considered sufficient time for residual voltage to decay (on a de-energized bus) to such levels that the bus may be safely re-energized without synchronization problems.
calculation No* SC5
('ALI Originated By:
Date:
11110_
3 Sheet ( of 18 DESIGN VERIFICATION METHOD ANSI N45.2.11(1974) requires that the particular design verification method(s) to be used for a station modification be documented. Design verification is defined as the process of reviewing, confirming, or substantiating the design by one or more methods tQ provide assurance that the design meets the specified design inputs. Acceptable design verification methods include but are not limited to:
- 1) design reviews, 2) alternate calculations, or 3) qualification testing (Ref. ANSI N45.2.11, Section 6.3).
Indicate the design verification method(s) to be used for this portion of the NSM by marking the appropriate blank(s).
Design Review (Same as "Checking/Inspecting")
Alternate Calculation Qualification Testing*(includes equipment/system prototype testing or inplant testing)
Other SPECIFY Note:
If qualification testing is used as a design verification method, the appropriate design documents describing the test such as Test Acceptance Criteria or a qualification testing specification shall be generated.
Calculation No:
SC-55Dae 11 Originated By:
Date:
10 A 3 Sheet 7 of \\
DESIGN INPUT SOURCE DOCUMENTS DOCUMENT REVISION DESCRIPTION
- O 2.-
O5(
C KEOe 11C-mLE AILUeE A&IALfY SIs
Calculation No: oSC-55 5r (AL.(
Pbal:o')
Originated By:
Date:
1kIR Sheet S of ig ELECTRICAL DISCIPLINE NSM ENGINEERING CHECKLIST -
CONTROL SYSTEMS, CONTROL EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED MONITORING NSM NUMBER:
or,- 52R (or. (ALA Pbx-ZoN)
The Electrical Discipline NSM Engineering Checklist is provided as a tool to identify key technical considerations that may apply to a particular NSM.
This checklist will also serve to support the documentation of design inputs.
This checklist should be completed using one of the following guidelines.
Indicate which guideline applies to this NSM by marking the appropriate blank.
If the NSM modifies an existing systems/equipment and does not change the design basis or require new design bases or criteria, then the checklist should be answered from the perspective of the modification.
If the NSM adds a new system or a significant new function to an existing system, then the checklist should be answered from the perspective of the system being added or modified.
Calculation No-OSC.- 565c CALL RmoN)
Originated By:
o1Lli Date:
Sheet 9 of A. General
- 1. QA Condition(s) of this portion of the NSM A-1
- 2. Is this design/equipment required to function for any of the following conditions:
YES NO
- a. Normal Operation
- b. Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
- c. Main Steamline Break (MSLB)
- d. Lose of Offsite Power (LOOP)
- e. Station Blackout
- f. Earthquake (Seismic)
- g. SSF Event (Fire, Security, and Flood -
(ONS only)]
- h. ATWS
- i. Control Room Evacuation YES NO IA,
- 3. Has the Appendix R/Fire Protection Review been initiated (EDP 9.02 &
DC-1.04)?
w~Tt
./-ENe_-.
-rpt'IU~veR P4C_'0-'AE.
- 4. Have the following plant security aspects of this NSM been reviewed?
- a. Changes to vital or protected area barriers
- b. Security lighting
- c. Revisions to yard equipment or structures
- d. Revisions to site buildings
- e. Changes to the vital equipment control circuits
- 5. Does the scope of this modification require the application of ALARA principles?
.Calculation No. O CPO bbbb 110 t Originated By:
a xz~nDate:
H110 A3 Sheet 10 of g
A. General (cont'd)
YES NO N/A
- 6. Has the FSAR been reviewed concerning this NSM?
- a. Are changes required?
- b. Is the proposed update provided (EDP 3.2)?
- 7. Has the system descriptions(s)/design basis documents affected by this NSM been review ? 50)
- a. Are changes required?
- b. Is the proposed update provided (EDP 3.2)?
B. Control Systems
- 1. Is SSS/ASP isolation required?
Provided?
- 2. Have Control Voltage Limitations such as Max/Min Values, Uninter ruptible, Momentarily Interrup tible Blackout been considered?
- 3. Have the setpoints for automatic control, interlocks, trip, etc.
been established and documented?
(SFE A Lk Povmie or-erib46.Ks
- 4. Are control component contact make/
break rating sufficient for circuit?
Note:
DC rating is usually less than AC rating.
- 6. Are Control Power Transformers/
Power Supplies loaded within recommended limits?
- 7. Is duplicate non-safety equipment designed for alternate use to provide for equal wear?
Calculation No*O
_556 CAL IoreTro Originated By:
goQdf.Date:
\\\\
oiAS Sheetli of 7 B. Control Systems (cont'd)
YES NO NA
- 8. Have Human Factors considerations, including appropriate Operator Readouts near controls, Standard Switch Conventions, proper Labeling, Identical Nameplates at multiple control locations been appropriately applied to the components and documents affected by this modification (EDP 3.17)?
- 9. Have controls been analyzed for Sneak Circuits (circuit compo nents evaluated for possible unintentional current paths)?
- 10. Have controls been analyzed for relay race problems?
- 11. Are components applied in a manner to minimize the consequences of a failure and provide the opportunity for detection prior to operation?
- 12. Have controls been reviewed for effects of loss of power/return of power?
- 13. Are there any special testing requirements noted?
(refer to Section B26)?
Have provisions been made for routine testing (examples: jacks, isolating switches, indication, signal conditioning devices (i.e., resistors, shorting blocks, etc.)]?
- 14. Is coil monitoring required and implemented?
- 15. Are reset functions required and implemented?
- 16. Have the locations of all local remote control stations been inves tigated to provide an acceptable environment?
- 17. Are Duke's standard control wiring sizes adequate?
- 18. Are redundancy, diversity and sepa ration requirements addressed?
Calculation No*
Originated By:
Date: L 10 9 Sheet 1Iof 1I B. Control Systems (cont'd)
YES NO
- 19. Are there specific requirements or criteria for local/remote, auto/manual control?
- 20. Is compatibility with existing wiring and insulation maintained?
- 21. Have circuits been designed to allow installation with least impact on unit/plant availability?
- 22. Does this modification involve Solenoid/Air Operated Valves?
If Yes, answer the following:
- a. Are solenoid valves and their respective control circuits separately fused from other solenoid valves on the same breaker?
- b. Are solenoid valves wired with appropriate voltage (125 VDC or 120 VAC)?
- c. Are solenoid valve control cir cuits designed to require manual reset on ESF signal reset?
- d. Have all loss of air and/or power failure mode requirements been met?
- e. Are all control interlocks identified?
- f. Are the required limit switches available for response time testing?
- g. Has Plant Computer position indication been requested (examples: status, graphic display, response time)?
- h. Has High Temperature Wire on solenoid valve (Valcor 526, V709000-39, etc.) with internal blocks been specified?
Calculation No*
c1 5556 CALI PenttoMt Originated By:
i4eLQA&>-
Date: It OI.3 Sheet 13 of if B. Control Systems (cont'd)
YES NO
- 23. Does this modification involve motor operated valves?
If Yes, answer the following:
- a. Are all MOV control requirements identified in Engineering Cri teria CO-4.02 met (example:
anti-hammer)?
- b. Have limitorque valves been reviewed for limit switch heater requirements?
(Limitorques were not qualified with heater energized.)
- c. Are extended torque switch by pass requirements met?
(See NRC IE Bulletin 85-03 for re quirements.)
- d. Have MOV vendor limit/torque position requirements been met?
- e. Are overloads wired according to Engineering Criteria CO-4.01?
- f. Has Plant Computer position indication been requested (examples: status, graphic display, response time)?
- g. Are power disconnects required to assure position?
- h. Have all control interlocks been identified and properly wired?
- i. Are stem-mounted limit switches available for cross train inter locks?
Calculation No* O
_9 L
bD or..i) originated By:
Date:
0Iio(c3 Sheet I. of I B. Control Systems (cont'd)
YES NO N/A
- 24. Does this modification involve heaters, pumps or fans?
If Yes, answer the following:
- a. Have emergency trip requirements been met (examples: pressure, temperature, level)?
- b. Have bearing wear monitoring and insulation protection requirements been met (examples: thermocouples, vibration, high current)?
- c. Are motor overloads alarmed or flashed as appropriate?
- d. Are all control interlocks iden tified?
- e. Have Plant Computer points been requested (examples: equipment run time, response time test, status indication)?
- f. Are controls designed to prevent unsafe or unwarranted restarts of equipment on the return of power?
- g. Have appropriate sequencer con tacts been requested?
- 25. Are containment penetration circuits affected?
If Yes, answer the following questions:
- a. Are redundant overcurrent protec tion devices specified of correct size to protect the penetration?
- b. Is the correct penetration type selected for circuit current/
instrument application (see DC 16.01 -
16.06)?
Calculation No: OSc-5556 (ALI Priooi)
Originated By:
Date: iL0oQ 3 Sheet15of g
B. Control Systems (cont'd)
YES NO N/A
- 26. Are there interfaces between analog voltage or current loops and analog to digital conversion devices (A/D)?
- a. If so, will the digital equivalent of the analog signal be affected by any potential spike(s) created by opening or closing the analog loop?
- b. Will this erroneous signal have an effect on the alarm/control circuits or program?
C. Control Equipment
- 1. Have the following requirements been considered -
Reg. Guide 1.97, Fire Protection, Containment Pressure Con trol, Hydrogen Mitigation, Crane Drop Zones, Attachments to Block Walls?
- 2. Do Equipment Min/Max Environmental Ratings/Qualification envelope the expected actual environment (examples: temperature, pressure, humidity, radiation, chemical spray, flooding, freezing)?
- 3. Has required qualificati n oc en tation been received?
- 4. Is any special Equipment'Protection required such as Space Heaters, Blowers, Cooling, Heat Tracing, Shielding, Limited Access?
- 5. Has equipment accessibility been considered? Access provided for All Plant Operating Conditions (operating, installation, mainte nance, testing).
- 6. If the equipment is QA Condition 1 safety-related, has the seismic qualification documentation been reviewed and approved?
- 7. If the equipment IS NOT QA Condition 1, does it require seismic anchoring?
Calculation No:
S
- 555, CALi essTnor Originated By.
e: \\\\kofq3 Sheet 16of I C. Control Equipment (cont'd)
YES NO N/A
- 8. Have any special equipment qualifi cation requirements beyond EQMM been documented?
(Consider replacement parts or main components.)
- 9. Are equipment response times adequate to satisfy required functions?
- 10. Has the purchase of spare parts or special tools been considered for specialized equipment or due to any impending availability problems?
- 11. Have cables that require special purchases been identified?
- 12. Have special equipment restrictions been considered (examples: Alumi num, Teflon or cable jackets inside Reactor Bldg.)?
- 13. Have all new manufacturing drawings/
information been sent to appropriate manufacturer's/correspondence/NSM files?
- 14. Has adequate allowance for growth been considered in the design and rating of equipment?
- 15. Does the manufacturer's equipment internal circuit design meet require ments for the application?
- 16. Have all required manufacturer's drawings been received, approved, and transmitted?
- 17. Has the required number of computer program documentation sets/
instruction books been ordered, received and transmitted?
Calculation No:
C--
55S6 Ll Po-T-Originated By:z AA Date:
11 O3 Sheet 1-of g C. Control Equipment (cont'd)
YES NO N/A
- 18. Will the following Environmental Qualification documentation be affected/required due to addition/deletion/modification of QA Condition 1 control equipment (Project Manual, Section 1000.00)?
- a. EQ Test Report/Analysis Summary (DEPM Document 1002-01)
- b. 10CFR50.49 EQ Review and Verification Calculation?
(DEPM Document 1002-02)
- c. EQ Licensing Submittal (DEPM Document 1002-03 & 1002-04)
- d. Environmental Qualification Master List (EQML)?
(DEPM Document 1002-05)
- e. Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual (EQMM)
Sections?
(DEPM Document 1002-06)
D. Monitoring
- 1. Have instrument shielding/grounding requirements been met?
- 2. Have Human Factors considerations, including labeling, scaling, and other operator interface considera tions been appropriately applied to the components and documents affected by this modification (EDP 3.17)?
- 3. Have instrument accuracies, ranges, and response time requirements been met?
- 4. Have the loop accuracy calculations been completed (revised) for new (modified) instrument loops?
(Loop accuracy calculations are normally required for all safety-related and technical specification related instrument loops or for any other instrument loop for which there is a regulatory requirement on accuracy.)
Calculation No: O c 5S6C (ALl PbeTi0N Originated By.(
Date: jjijole3 SheetlBof p1 D. Monitoring (cont'd)
YES NO N/A
- 5. Have instrument loop design require ments such as Device Compatibility, Signal Level, Analog signals to Digital or PLC interface, Power Supplies, 2 or 4 Wire, Over/Under Loading, Voltage Fluctuation, Square Root Extractors if Required, Range, Display, Human Factors been considered?
- 6. Have setpoints been selected and documented?(1I AE -rt: LAYX
- 7.
Have bypass (1.47 panel) and moni tor light requirements been met?
- 8. Have all Loop Functions been established (examples:
analog/
digital control, analog monitoring, digital alarms & status)?
- 9. Have Regulatory 1.97 Requirements been met (examples: parameters monitored, readout requirements, redundancy/diversity, qualifica tion)?
- 10. Is Heat Tracing required?
- 11. Are monitored conditions alarmed for off-normal conditions?
- 12. Are any special calibration and maintenance requirements for instruments specified?
- 13. Have alarm limits for Plant Computer Analog Points been specified?
- 14. Does the equipment.added by this modification require a new installa tion specification or a revision to an existing installation specification?
?A L-1E -16 NSM-ON-52966 (AL1 PORTION)
PROJECT DESCRIPTION This modification provides logic in the controls of various Keowee devices, which, when implemented, will preclude postulated scenarios from adversely affecting the Keowee generators ability to function as the emergency on-site sources to the three Oconee units.
This portion of the NSM therefore addresses the following item:
Single failure concerns relative to differential protective relays zone overlap when a failure within one of the overhead generator breakers (ACB-1 or ACB-2) is postulated.
A failure within one of the breakers noted, when the affected Keowee unit is also the one selected as the "underground path" unit will result in both emergency power paths "locked out" and unavailable. An interim solution to this problem is that of maintaining the overhead breaker, on the selected underground path unit, isolated (breaker tripped with its respective disconnects open) thus, making one of the Keowee units unavailable for system purposes.
The logic provided by this modification which addresses this concern will result in the underground breaker (not previously selected) to automatically close when indication of the postulated breaker fault occurs.
This is accomplished by providing automatic closing logic in each underground path breaker (ACB-3 and ACB-4) such that they will close when the following conditions are satisfied:
A. Main step-up transformer Lock-Out Relay 86T tripped ; and B. The opposite Keowee units Emergency Lock-Out Relay 86E tripped; and C. Either channel of emergency start to the respective Keowee unit actuated.
Once satisfied, the close signal to the open underground path breaker is delayed for two seconds to preclude the highly unlikely possibility of the open breaker rapidly closing with no synchronization supervision present.
Please note that the time delay has been provided as a precautionary measure and is not required nor is its function considered to be within design basis.