ML15261A431

Keowee Single Failure Analysis

ML15261A431
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	04/21/1993
From:	Beaver R, Schaeffer C DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML15261A430	List: ML15261A428 ML15261A431 ML20070M597 ML20070M607
References
OSC-5096, NUDOCS 9405020222
Download: ML15261A431 (82)

Text

DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ATTACHMENT 6 KEOWEE SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS 9405020222 940224 PDR ADOCK 05000269 p

PDR

01077 (R ")

F FORM 101.1 REVISION 13 CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION STATION AND UNIT NUMBER Oconee Unit 1, 2, & 3 TITLE OF CALCULATION Keowee Single Failure Analysis CALCULATION NUMBER OSC-5096 ORIGINALLY CONSISTING OF:

PAGES 1

THROUGH 25 TOTAL ATTACHMENTS 8

TOTAL MICROFICHE ATTACHMENTS 0

TOTAL VOLUMES 1

TYPE 1 CALCULATIONS/ANALYSIS YES E3 No TYPE 1 REVIEW FREQUENCY THESE ENGINEERING CALCULATIONS COVER QA CONDITION 1

ITEMS.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES, THE QUALITY HAS BEEN ASSURED AND I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE CALCULATION HAS BEEN ORIGINATED, CHECKED OR PROVED AS NOTED BELOW:

ORIGINATED BY C.E. Schaeffer DATE 1/20/93 CHECKED BY R.L. Beaver Y&,

/

DATE 1/20/93 APPROVED B DATE L 01 ISSUED TO TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISIO DATE 1/b0/

REVIEWED BY TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION DATE 4/73 MICROFICHE ATTACHMENT LIST: YES 13 No SEE FORM.101.4 REVN CALCULATION PAGES(VOL)

ATTACHMENTS(VOL)

VOLUMES ORIG CHKD APPR ISSUE DATE REVISED DELETED ADDED REVISED DELETED ADDED DELETED ADDED DATE DATE DATE REC'D DATE

CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C.E. Schaeffercf DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver DATE:

1/20/93 Page 1 A.

PROBLEM:

This calculation is being performed to document a Single Failure Analysis of the Keowee Hydro units when operating in parallel with the offsite network.

Concerns about this subject were raised during a Self Initiated Technical Audit of the Oconee Emergency Power system (reference 21), which was completed on May, 19,1992.

B.

RELATION TO QA CONDITION: This Calculation is QA-1 C.

DESIGN METHODS:

Section H documents an analysis of Emergency Power System response during Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), LOCA w/Degraded Grid (LOCA w/DG), and Loss of Offsite Power/LOCA (LOOP/LOCA) DBE's, concurrent with credible equipment failures or electrical faults, to determine if the potential exists for a common-mode loss of the redundant Emergency Power paths.

One unit/path may be lost due to a Single Failure. A fault or failure on safety related equipment is referred to as a "Single Failure".

Where the initial fault/failure is not a single failure (i.e. a fault on non-safety-related portion of the 230KV switchyard), an additional equipment failure (e.g. a PCB failing to trip to isolate a fault) is analyzed in combination with the fault/failure.

As long as at least one Keowee unit and associated path remains available after the fault/failure (and additional single failure if applicable), emergency power would be available to all Oconee units through either the overhead or underground path, and a conclusion of "No Safety Significance" is reached for that failure.

The equipment failure modes considered include; Spurious actuation of protective relaying; Failure of a circuit breaker to perform a function (Reposition Open or Closed) required during a DBE; Credible electrical faults (Ground & Phase-to-Phase) on 600V, 13.8KV and 230KV equipment; Failure of protective or control relaying to perform a function required during a DBE.

When considering electrical faults, it is necessary to consider if the fault.

will be cleared fast enough to ensure that the Keowee units remain stable.

Instability could cause a common-mode loss of both units, due todamage from a large current pulse that would occur if synchronism with the rest of the system is lost.

If damaged, the units would be unavailable to provide emergency power.

An analysis of potential faults and system response times is located in section H of this document.

At the time of the Self Initiated Technical Audit, it was thought that a fault on the power grid could cause the lockout of both units due to actuation of the '40G' Loss of Field Relay.

This was based on the knowledge that Keowee Unit characteristics will enter the operating region of the 40G impedance unit, which is one of the three units that the Type KLF-1 relays uses to detect a loss of field condition.

This calculation will compare unit response curves during the fault and post-fault periods, as determined by a dynamic power system model, with relay operating curves, to analyze if there is a potential for 40G relay operation.

CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C.E. Schaeffer c(j DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver DATE:

1/20/93 Page 2

Keowee characteristics of voltage, impedance, and Reactive Power, during and after the clearing of a fault, will be compared to the KLF-l relay operating curves to determine if relay operation may possibly occur. This will be analyzed by modeling the transient Keowee characteristics during and after a fault with the dynamic model mentioned previously, and comparing unit response to the 40G relay setting curves.

Faults connected for times above 0.279 seconds (Ter) have already been shown unsuitable due to stability concerns, and are protected against.

For a fault which remains connected longer, unit transient swings will have larger amplitudes, and thus are more likely to enter and remain in the operating region of the 40G relay.

Thus, the longest fault time less than Ter (0.278 seconds) is used for this part of the analysis.

Figure 1: 40G Relay & 86E LOR Elementary Diagram

+-DC DEEN V - 40G UndezVoltage Unit (Operates a 54V)

X D - 40G Directional Unit (Contact Closes when V

Reactive Pwr flows into Keowee Unit).

X Z - 40G Impedance Unit (Contact Cleses when Keowee enters Impedance Circle).

Ics3 X - 40G Telephone Relay (Relay Drops Out 0.25 sec. after coil shorted out).

ANX ICS - 40G-Indicating Contactor Switch 8SE 40X - Loss of Field Alarm Relay 86E - Unit Emergency Lockout Relay

-DC A lockout due to KLF-1 relay operation requires that all three of the relay's units [Directional (D), Impedance (Z), and Voltage (V)] are made concurrently for 0.25 seconds (see figure 1 and reference 22).

The 0.25 seconds is the time required for the X unit in the 40G relay to drop out after it is shorted out by the D, Z, & V unit contacts. The Keowee 86E Unit LOR will pickup if all four contacts (X, D, Z, & V) are closed.

If the D or Z unit drops out or the V unit re-energizes before the X relay times out, the X relay will re energize, and the 86E relay will not trip.

The KLF-1 relay undervoltage (UV) unit setpoint will be compared to the Keowee Unit's voltage during the transient period, to eliminate time frames in which relay actuation is blocked by the UV unit.

The period that Keowee terminal voltage is below the UV unit setpoint will be further analyzed by comparing Unit Impedance and Reactive Power with the Z & D unit operating curves, to examine if relay operation can be predicted.

CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C.E. Schaeffer (3 DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver K';

DATE:

1/20/93 Page 3

D.

APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS (NAME, NUMBER, DATE, REVISION):

See References.

E.

OTHER DESIGN CRITERIA:

OSS-0254.00-00-2004

• 230KV Switchyard DBD OSS-0254.00-00-2005

• Keowee Emergency Power DBD F.

RELATED SAR CRITERIA (PSAR OR FSAR, PAGE, AMENDMENT):

FSAR Chapter 8

• Electrical Power FSAR Table 8-3

• Single Failure Analysis of Keowee Hydro Station.

FSAR Table 8-4

• Single Failure Analysis for the Emergency Electric Power Systems G.

ASSUMPTIONS:

Page 3 H.

ANALYSIS:

Page 5 to Page 17 I.

CONCLUSIONS :

Page 22 J.

REFERENCES :

Page 23 G.

ASSUMPTIONS:

The analysis was performed using the following assumptions:

1)

The LOCA (Engineered Safeguards Signal)/LOOP event is assumed to occur simultaneously at T=0.

2)

A sustained Degraded Grid is assumed to exist prior to LOCA for LOCA w/DG events.

3)

A Single Failure is assumed to occur on demand.

4)

During a LOCA event, power will remain available to each unit's startup transformer from the switchyard unless interrupted by the fault/failure being considered.

For most failures, the LOOP/LOCA DBE is more limiting, and the analysis will assume LOOP/LOCA unless specified.

5)

Electrical faults on Keowee 13.8KV equipment which are protected by fast acting differential devices whose operating time + ACB-1 & 2 opening time is much less than Tcr.

Since the equipment is safety related, no additional failures need be taken.

No formal comparison to T, will be performed for these faults.

CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C.E. Schaeffere n DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver r

DATE:

1/20/93

/

Page 4

6)

This calculation assumes normal Keowee Auxiliary Power system alignment with ACB-5 & 6 closed and transfer switches in automatic.

It will also consider, where appropriate, the current Dedicated Alignment, which is a temporary configuration with the Auxiliary Load Center (lX & 2X) transfer switches in Manual and Standby transformer CX supplying the unit aligned to the underground.

7)

Assume both Units generating to the grid through PCB-8 & 9, at rated output.

8)

Values for various equipment operating times from manufacturer information are; Struthers Dunn 219XXB -

25mSec.

Cutler Hammer Type M -

lOmSec. GE Type HEA -

l5mSec.

GE Type PVD21 Differential Relay 20mSec.

Type AR High Speed Aux. Relay -

2mSec.

BFU TD Setting 133mSec. Switchyard PCB operating time -

33mSec (2 Cycles).

Square D relay type XUDO40 -

37mSec.

Distance Relay type KD 25mSec. SDG Distance Relay -

12.5mSec.

Type HU Differential Relay -

25mSec.

9)

Spurious actuation of switchyard protective relays will not affect the Underground Path, or either Keowee Unit (other than causing a Normal Lockout on overspeed during Unit load rejection, which is covered section H, Failure #2).

Thus, the worst case result of failures on switchyard protective relays would be a loss of the overhead path, and these failures will not be formally considered.

H.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer (C' DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver DATE:

1/20/93 Page 5 FAULT/FAILURE ANALYSIS FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM WHEN TWO KEOWEE HYDRO UNITS ARE GENERATING TO THE GRID COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT Normal Spurious Actuation No Safety Significance - The Keowee unit and output to overhead (ACB 1 Lockout or 2) breaker associated with the failed relay would trip, but would Relay 86N remain available to provide emergency power since the 86N trip to both is overridden by an emergency start signal.

The other Keowee unit would remain unaffected, and both units would remain available to provide emergency power.

Ref. KEE-114-3 2

Protective Spurious Actuation No Safety Significance -

With the exception of three devices, signals relays that which pick up the 86N relay would not affect unit emergency response.

actuate 86N The following devices will override the Emergency Start signal and drop out shutdown solenoid 99SX which will trip the associated unit, Unit Overspeed (Device # 12), Turbine Guide Bearing Oil Level Switch (63TB),

and Generator Bearing Oil Level Switch (63BL/HX & 63BL/LXTD).

These trips are installed to protect the Keowee unit from damage, and with one exception, would be actuated only as a result of protective device, or unit support equipment failure. The failure of the protective device or support equipment, which are safety related, would be a single failure. The other Keowee unit and associated path would remain available to provide Emergency Power. Ref KEE-114-3 & KEE-111.

The exception noted above is a scenario involving the overspeed device, which is picked up if the unit reaches 180RPM.

If the unit is being operated fully loaded, and the load is shed, test results show the unit may reach peak speeds above 180RPM. Unit equipment trips that would normally occur on overspeed are bypassed by the presence of a Emergency Start signal, except a trip on the Generator Field breaker by auxiliary shutdown relay 99SY. A Field breaker close signal would be in place due to the Emer. Start signal and the breaker would be prevented to re close due to the anti-pump device.

This would not be a single failure.

If both units are operating at full power, both may be lost without a failure. If only one unit was operating, a failure which affects the other unit would have to be assumed. Thus, for this scenario, the Keowee Power system does not meet required Single Failure Criterion.

Ref. KEE-111, KEE-114-3, KEE-112-2, & PIP 0-093-0041.

H.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR: -C. Schaeffer C ~DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver DATE:

1/20/93 Page.6 COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT 3

Emergency Spurious Actuation No Safety Significance -

Spurious Actuation of relay 86E is a single Lockout failure.

It would trip the associated Keowee unit, and both generator relay 86E output breakers (ACB-l & 3 or ACB-2 & 4) for that unit.

These trips are not overridden by an emergency start signal, thus the unit would be unavailable for emergency power.

The other unit would be unaffected and available to provide emergency power through the path to which the

___________unit was preselected.

Ref. KEE-114-3.

4 Protective Spurious Actuation No Safety Significance -

A fault which actuates any of these devices is relays that a Single Failure.

The affects of a spurious actuation is similar to 3 actuate 86E above.

Unit transients which may cause pick of both unit's 40G relay

____________are discussed below.

KEE-114-3.

5 Transformer Spurious Actuation No Safety Significance -

Spurious Actuation of 86T is a single failure.

Differential It would trip and lockout both generator overhead breakers (ACB 1 & 2),

Lockout and also trip PCB's 8 & 9 through relay 9411.

This would eliminate the relay 86T overhead as an emergency power path. Both units would continue running, since an Emergency Start signal is present. The underground path and associated unit will be available to provide emergency power. Ref. KEE 17-1 6

Prtotective Spurious Actuation No Safety Significance -

A failure of these protective relays or relays that actuation due to a fault would be a single failure.

See 5 above.

actuate 86T.

7 Transformer Spurious Actuation No Safety Significance -

A spurious actuation of this relay is a single Lockout failure. This would lockout the underground path through lockout relay relay 86/CT4 a6EF, making it unavailable. The overhead path and both units would remain available.

Ref. K-700 & 0-702-A.

8 Underground Spurious Actuation No Safety Significance -

Failure of lockout relay 86EF is a single Path Lockout failure.

This failure would trip and lockout ACB-3 & 4. The overhead Relay 86EF path and both units would remain available to provide emergency power.

unitwaspreselected.

Ref.KEE.Ref K-700.

H.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer tL DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver DATE:

1/20/93 Page 7

COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT 9

Transformer Spurious Actuation No Safety Significance -

Failure of 86CX is a single failure.

This Lockout would trip and/or lockout ACB-7 & 8 and ITC-4.

No power would be Relay 86CX available to lX & 2X during a LOCA/LOOP DBE until the overhead path is re-energized. Both Keowee units can "Black Start" and accelerate to rated speed on DC power only. After the overhead unit starts and the overhead ACB automatically closes, power will be restored to lX & 2X.

Both units would remain available to supply emergency power.

With the current Dedicated Alignment (see Assumption 6), a failure of this relay would remove power to the auxiliaries of the Unit preselected to the underground.

The overhead path and Unit would remain available.

Ref. K-700 & KEE-27-2.

10 lX or 2X Spurious Actuation No Safety Significance -

Failure of this relay is a single failure.

Load Center This failure would cause the transfer of the associated load center Lo Normal Bus transformer CX.

Both Keowee units would remain available.

Incoming UV Relay 27N/lX For the current dedicated Alignment, Automatic transfer of the Load or 27N/2X Centers is prevented since the transfer switch in Manual, thus this failure will not affect either unit in this alignment. Both paths will remain available, Reference KEE-27-1, 2, & 3.

H.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer (T) DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver DATE:

1/20/93 Page 8

COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT 11 ACB-1 & 2 Fails to trip on No Safety Significance -

Assume that Unit 2 is preselected to the Emergency Start underground. Failure of ACB1 or ACB2 to trip on an Emergency Start signal is a single failure.

In the event of a failure of ACB1 to trip, both units would remain available, Unit 1 through ACB1 &.Unit 2 to the underground.

Since ACB-1 does not trip, the time delay designed into the ACB Emergency Start close logic will be inoperative. The 4 second time delay to reclose PCB-9 serves as single failure protection for the ACB 1 & 2 timer, and will allow time for the RCP's to trip. A failure of ACB-2 to trip would prevent the reclosing of ACB-1 after receiving a switchyard isolate complete signal and time delay due to voltage still being supplied to 13.8KV bus # 1 from bus #2 through the Main Stepup transformer, and both the overhead and underground paths would be energized from unit 2. Both units remain available. If Unit 1 is preselected to feed the underground, the results of this failure would be similar. Reference K-700, KEE-114 & 214.

Breaker aligned to No Safety Significance -

Failure of the overhead breaker ACB1 or ACB2 overhead path fails to to reclose as designed on a Switchyard Isolate Complete signal is a reclose.

single failure. This failure would prevent the reenergization of the overhead path. The unit and underground path would remain available.

Fault on breaker This fault is a single failure. A fault on ACB-1 or 2 outside of the Transformer/Generator Bus Zone overlap region would be detected by only one zone and is discussed below (see Fl, F2, F3, & F4).

A fault inside the overlap region would be detected by both the Generator Bus (87GB) and Transformer (87T) differential relays.

Assume Unit 1 is preselected to the underground.

If the fault is in the overlap zone for ACB-2, the fault will cause a lockout of the overhead path (by 87T) and a lockout of the Unit 2 generator (by 87GB2).

The unit selected to the underground would not be affected, and would remain available.

If the fault is in the zone overlap region on ACB-1, the 87T relay would lockout the overhead path, and the 87GB1 relay will lockout the underground unit, allowing a single failure to disable both paths of Keowee emergency power to Oconee.

If Unit 2 is preselected to the underground, the response to faults would be similar.

H.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer (7' DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver DATE:

1/20/93 Page 9

COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT 11 ACB-l & 2 Fault on breaker The single failure mode identified can be removed on a temporary basis (Continued)

(Continued) by opening the disconnects for the overhead ACB for the Unit preselected to the underground.

If the overhead breaker disconnects for the underground unit are opened, the potential for a fault in this region is eliminated. A permanent solution will have to be implemented before both Units can again be used to Generate to the grid at the same time.

Ref. K-700, KEE-114, KEE-214, & LER-269-92-16.

12 ACB-3 & 4 Spurious Trip No Safety Significance -

A spurious trip of the breaker aligned to the underground is a single failure. This would make the underground path unavailable. A modification to the control circuit for the overhead ACB's has been performed to eliminate the potential for both overhead ACB's to automatically close (if both ACB-3 & 4 are open) and tie the units together without synch. check protection, so the overhead path and unit would remain available. Reference K-700 & PIR 0-092-0409.

Fault on breaker No Safety Significance - The Underground path breakers are normally aligned such that one is closed and the other is open.

These breakers require manual action to operate, do not operate on Emergency Start, and are located in a protected enclosure. In addition, after they are manually operated, procedural requirements test the underground path, which eliminates the potential for a fault occurring during breaker operation, and not being seen until the path is energized by an Emergency Start signal to the Underground unit.

All faults that trip these breakers would be Single Failures, and are covered in other sections of this analysis.

Due to the physical location, and the lack of breaker operation during a DBE, an electrical fault occurring on the underground breaker is not considered credible.

13 Load Center Spurious Actuation No Safety Significance - A spurious actuation of this relay is a single Lockout failure. This would trip and lockout the auxiliary load center for the relay 86S/1X affected side, making the unit technically unavailable. The other unit

& 2X and associated power path would remain available.

Reference K-700, 0-702-A, KEE-114-1, & KEE-214-1.

If.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer Cr7 DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver DATE:

1/20/93 Page 10 COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT 14 ACB-5 & 6 Spurious Trip No Safety Significance -

A spurious trip of ACB-5 or 6 (lX or 2X normal incoming breaker) is a single failure. If either ACB-5 or 6 trips spuriously, the affected breaker's anti-pump circuit will prevent it's reclosing.

No mechanism exists for the closure of the Standby incoming breaker if voltage is available on the Keowee 13.8KV busses, thus the load center will remain de-energized, and that unit is assumed to be lost. During a LOCA w/DG DBE, power on the overhead is lost, while transformer CX will be available, and the load center will be re energized from CX. When power is restored to the overhead, the under voltage relay will attempt to transfer the load centers back to the Normal source, and trip the Standby Incoming breaker, removing power from the Load Center. The other Keowee unit and associated path will remain available.

With the present Dedicated Alignment, this trip will de-energize the affected Load Center. The other Keowee unit and associated path will remain available. Ref. KEE-27, 27-1 & 2.

Fails to Close When Power No Safety Significance -

This is a single failure. If ACB-5 or 6 fails to Overhead is Restored to reclose, designed transfer logic will trip the Standby incoming (LOCA DBE w/DG) breaker when power to the 13.8KV bus is restored, and the load center and Keowee unit for the affected side will again be lost. The other unit and associated path will remain available. Ref. KEE-27, 27-1 &

27-2.

Fault on Breaker This is a single failure. This fault is only considered credible during a LOCA w/DG DBE, since the breaker does not change positions during LOCA or LOOP/LOCA DBE's.

A fault on ACB-5 or 6 would be detected by the lX or 2X transformer differential relay (87T/lX or 87T/2X), which locks out the overhead path through LOR 86T.

Since power from CX is available during DG, the load centers will transfer to the standby source, and the underground path and unit will remain available. If a fault occurs inside the 87T zone, on the load center side of the Normal Incoming breaker for the unit selected to the underground path, it would trip the overhead path through 86T, and would lockout the underground unit's auxiliaries by an 86S lockout.

This would technically eliminate both paths, although the underground

H.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer <a)

DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver,/

DATE:

1/20/93 Page 11 COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT 14 Continued unit would continue running and supply emergency power. PIP 5-092-0676 was written to address this problem.

With the present Dedicated Alignment, Normal breaker operation is prevented since load center transfer switches are in Manual, and a fault on these breakers occurring on the load center side, within the Transformer Differential zone is not considered credible due to the small distance between the differential relay current transformer and the breaker contact assembly, and no breaker operation. Ref. KEE-27, 27-1 & 27-2.

-15 ACB-7 & 8 Fails to Close No Safety Significance -

This is a single failure. These breakers may only be closed for a short period of time during a LOCA w/DG DBE. A failure of ACB-7 or 8 to close will temporarily deenergize the auxiliary power to the affected unit. Auxiliary power will be restored after ACB-1 or 2 close. The units are able to black start without auxiliary power on DC power only. Both units and paths would remain available.

Reference K-700 and KEE-27, 27-1 & 27-2.

Fault on breaker (LOCA w/

A fault on ACB-7 or 8 is a single failure. This fault is credible only DG DBE only) in a Normal Auxiliary alignment during LOCA w/DG, since ACB-7 or 8 does not operate during LOCA or LOOP/LOCA DBE's, or any DBE when operating in the Dedicated lineup. It would lockout transformer CX. A fault on the load center side of the breaker would also lockout the auxiliary load center on the affected side, making that unit technically inoperable. The other Unit's auxiliaries would be temporarily de energized, until the overhead path is reenergized. Both units would continue to run, and both paths would remain available.

Ref. K-700.

16 Load Center Spurious Actuation No Safety Significance -

Failure of this relay is a single failure.

lX & 2X This failure would prevent the transfer of the associated load center Standby Bus to transformer CX when the overhead path is de-energized. The load Incoming UV center will be re-energized when power is restored to the overhead Relays path.

Both units and paths.would remain available. Ref. KEE-27-1 & 2.

27E/CX1 &

27E/CX2

H.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR: C. Schaeffer 0-S DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver 2

DATE:

1/20/93 Page 12 COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT 17 13.8KV Bus Fails to Dropout When Bus No Safety Significance -

Failure of this device is a Single Failure.

UV Relay is De-energized If relay 27T on the unit aligned to the overhead path fails to dropout, 27T/1X &

the overhead breaker for that unit will not reclose on an emergency 27T/2X signal, resulting in a loss of the overhead path. The underground path will remain available.

A failure on the unit aligned to the underground would not affect the designed emergency response of the unit, and both units would remain available. Ref KEE-114 & 214.

Fails and Drops Out with No Safety Significance -

This failure is a single failure. This would Bus Energized not affect system operation of the associated overhead ACB since the lack of a Switchyard Isolate Complete signal prevents closure of the overhead ACB during LOCA DBE, and the only function provided by this relay during LOOP/LOCA or LOCA w/DG is a close permissive when the relay is de-energized. The Keowee Start/Run permissive function provided by this relay is bypassed by an Emergency Start signal, thus this failure will not affect unit operation.

Both Units and paths will remain available.

Reference KEE-113, 114, 213, & 214.

18 Emergency Failure to Actuate No Safety Significance -

Failure of this device is a Single Failure.

Start Signal Failure of one Emergency Start channel will not affect Keowee Ch. A or B operation. Each channel will independently start both Units, and both will remain available. Ref. KEE-112, 112-1, 113, 113-5, 114, 212, 212 1, 213, 213-5, & 214.

19 Fl on Electrical Fault No Safety Significance -

A fault on the Keowee Unit 1 output bus is a Single Failure. A phase-to-phase fault will be detected by the Generator Differential Protective Relays 87G1 or 87GB1.- A ground fault will be detected by the generator neutral ground fault relay 59GN1.

The 59GN1, 87G1, & 87GB1 relays actuate the emergency lockout relay 86E1.

See 4 above.

Unit 2 would remain available through its preselected path. Ref. K-700.

H.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer 4j DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver it.

DATE:

1/20/93 Page 13 COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT 20 F2 on Electrical Fault No Safety Significance -

A fault on the Keowee Unit 2 output bus is a Single Failure. A phase-to-phase fault will be detected by the Generator Differential Protective Relays 87G2 or 87GB2. A ground fault will be detected by the generator neutral ground fault relay 59GN2.

The 59GN2, 87G2, & 87GB2 relays both actuate the emergency lockout relay 86E2 (See 4 above).

Unit 1 would remain available through its preselected path. Ref. K-700.

21 F3 on Electrical Fault No Safety Significance -

A fault on the underground path is a Single Failure. A phase-to-phase fault will be detected by the underground path 50/51 overcurrent relay and trip ACB-3 or 4. A ground fault will be detected by the 59GN relay for the unit tied to the underground and lockout that unit.

The overhead path and unit will remain available.

Ref K-700.

22 F4 on Phase-to-Phase Fault No Safety Significance -

A fault on the Unit 1 13.8KV bus is a Single Failure. A phase-to-phase fault on this bus will be detected by Transformer Differential Relay 87T. The system will respond as described in 5 above, and the overhead path will be locked out.

The underground unit and path will remain available.

Ref. K-700.

H.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR: -C. Schaeffer 0-) DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver KDATE:

1/20/93 Page 14 COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT 22 F4 on Ground Fault No Safety Significance -

Assume Unit 1 is preselected to the under ground path. A ground fault on the Unit 1 13.8Kv bus would be detected (Continued) by the Generator Ground relay 59GN1, which will trip Keowee Unit 1 LOR 86E1.

Due to the Delta configuration of the Main Stepup transformer primary, the ground fault will not be seen by the protective devices for Unit 2 13.8KV bus.

A fault on the X or Z phase bus will drop one winding of the PT feeding the 27T/1X UV relay.

There are no detrimental effects if 27T/1X drops out since the Generato r & Overhead ACB for that Unit will be locked out by 86E1.

Reference 26 & 27 address issues associated with, and provides a discussion on operating with bus ground.

Day to day Unit operations for peaking power use would detect faults which might occur before an Event, which will limit the length of time running with a undetected ground.

Unit 2 will remain available to provide emergency power through the overhead path.

If Unit 1 is preselected to the overhead, this fault would trip and' lockout the overhead unit and path.

Unit 2 and the underground path will remain available.

Ref. K-700, K-707-A, & Elements of Power System

Analysis, section 12.1.

23 F5 on Electrical Fault No Safety Significance -

A fault on the Unit 2 13.8KV bus is a Single Failure.

The consequences of this fault is similar to a fault on Unit 1, see 22 above.

24 F6 on Electrical Fault No Safety Significance -

A fault on the overhead line from Keowee to the switchyard is a single failure.

F6 is assumed to occur inside the 87T differential zone.

The fault would be detected by the 87T relay, and would lockout the overhead path through lockout relay 86T.

Both Units and the underground path would remain available.

Reference K 700.

H.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer c DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver DATE:

1/20/93 Page 15 COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT 25 F7 on NOTE: Refer to attachment 3 for the trip logic path and fault clearing times for times listed in this and following sections.

Electrical Fault No Safety Significance -

A fault on the overhead line from Keowee to the switchyard is a single failure.

F7 is assumed to occur on the overhead line or between PCB-8 & 9, inside the 87L differential zone.

The fault will be detected by the 87L differential relay, and will trip ACB-1 & 2 through 86T in 330mSec.

Stability concerns are addressed by tripping PCB-8 & 9 60mSec after fault initiation. Both Keowee Units and the Underground path would remain available. Ref 0-800, OEE-39 Series.

26 F8 on Electrical Fault No Safety Significance - A fault on the Yellow bus is a single failure.

A phase-to-phase and ground fault on the Yellow bus would be detected by the Yellow Bus Differential relay 87BY and isolate the yellow bus within 83msec. The overhead path would be inoperable.

Both Keowee Units and the underground path would remain available.

Ref 0-800.

27 F9 on Electrical Fault No Safety Significance -

The Red bus is not safety related, thus a stuck PCB will be considered.

A phase-to-phase and ground fault on the Red bus would be detected by the Red Bus Differential relay 87BR and isolate the Red Bus PCB's within 83 msec. The affects of a stuck PCB are:

PCB-7, 10, 13, 16, 19, or Breaker Failure schemes will trip the appropriate breaker (PCB-8, 11, 22 fails to trip.

14, 17, 20, or 23) to isolate the fault in 218mSec. Both Keowee Units and both Emergency Power paths will remain available. A stuck PCB-4 does not impact Keowee.

H.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer 0_) DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver

(

DATE:

1/20/93 Page 16 COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT 27 F9 on PCB-26 or 28 fails to Failure of PCB-26 or 28 to trip is a Single Failure. Breaker Failure trip schemes will trip PCB-27 or 30 in 266mSec.

Both Keowee units and the (Continued) underground path will remain available.

The overhead path to Oconee Unit 2 will be unavailable for a failure of PCB-26 due to a 86T/CT2 lockout, and the Unit 3 overhead path will be unavailable for a failure of PCB-28 due to a 86T/CT3 lockout.

PCB-31 Fails to Trip Breaker Failure schemes will trip PCB-33 in 251mSec, locking out the 230/525KV Autobank Transformer. Both Keowee Units, the overhead path and the underground path will remain available.

28 F10 on Electrical Fault No Safety Significance -

Transmission lines are not safety related, and thus a sticking Bus or Bus Tie PCB will be considered simultaneously with the fault. The fault would normally be detected by either Directional Distance Phase (21L-1) or Ground (21G-1) relays and trip the Bus and Bus Tie breakers.

Bus PCB-4, 7, 10, 13, 16, If the bus PCB's fail to trip, the Breaker Failure schemes will isolate 19, or 22 fails to trip.

the Red Bus by tripping the Red Bus Lockout Relay. The fault will be isolated within 227mSec. Both Keowee Units and both Emergency Power paths will remain available.

Bus Tie Bkr PCB-11 or 14 Breaker Failure schemes will isolate the fault by tripping PCB-12 or 15 Fails to trip.

in 211mSec. Both Keowee units and paths will remain available.

Bus Tie Bkr PCB-17 Fails Failure of PCB-17 to trip is a Single Failure.

Breaker Failure schemes to trip.

will isolate the fault from Keowee by tripping PCB-18 in 251mSec. The overhead path will be lost due to a lockout of the startup transformers for ONS Unit 1.

The underground path and both Keowee units will remain available.

Bus Tie Bkr 20 or 23 Breaker Failure schemes will isolate the fault from Keowee by tripping Fails to trip.

PCB-21 or 24 in 251mSec. Both Keowee units and Emergency Power paths will remain available for PCB-20 or 23 failing to trip.

H.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer (/6 DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver DATE:

1/20/93 Page 17 COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT 28 F10 on Bus Tie Bkr PCB-8 Fails Failure of PCB-8 to trip is a Single Failure. Normal protective logic to trip.

will trip PCB-7 and the breaker at the other end of the Greenville (Continued) line.

Breaker Failure schemes will separate Keowee from the rest of the Grid by tripping PCB-9 in 203mSec, eliminating the potential for Keowee unit instability-induced damage. ACB-1 & 2 will be tripped through LOR 86T within 340mSec, isolating the fault.

Both units and the underground path will remain available.

29 Fl on Electrical Fault No Safety Significance - The Autobank Feeder is not safety related, so a Breaker Failure will be considered.

The fault would normally be detected by Autobank primary differential relay 87AT and trip PCB-31 &

33 in 93mSec.

PCB-31 or 33 Fails to If PCB-31 or 33 fails to trip, Breaker Failure Logic will trip and Trip lockout the Red or Yellow Bus in 236mSec, isolating the fault.

Failure of PCB-33 to trip is a Single Failure, and the Yellow bus lockout would make the overhead path unavailable. The underground path and both Units would remain available. For a failure of PCB-31, both Units and paths would remain available.

Ref. OEE-86-9.

30 F12 on Electrical Fault No Safety Significance - A fault on the Startup transformer incoming bus is a single failure. This fault would be detected by CT bus or transformer differential relays and isolate the fault in 76mSec. The overhead path will not be available for the affected unit only.

The underground path and both Units remain available.

31 F13 on Electrical Fault No Safety Significance - The ONS Generator output bus is not safety related, so a stuck PCB will be considered.

PCB-20 or 23 Fails to Breaker Failure logic will trip PCB-19 or 22 in 235mSec. Both Units Trip and paths remain available.

PCB-21 or 24 Fails to Failure of PCB-21 or 24 to trip is a Single Failure. Breaker Failure Trip logic will trip all Yellow Bus breakers in 236mSec. Both Units and the underground path will remain available.

H.

ANALYSIS CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer([

DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver

• j:,'

DATE:

1/20/93 Page 18 COMPONENT MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE/COMMENT 32 F14 on Electrical Fault No Safety Significance - A fault on the Jocassee transmission line is not a single failure, so an additional breaker failure will be assumed.

PCB-11 or 14 Fails to Breaker Failure logic will trip PCB-10 or 13 in 205mSec. Both units Trip and paths will remain available.

PCB-12 or 15 Fails to Failure of PCB-12 or 15 to trip is a Single Failure. Breaker Failure Trip logic will trip all Yellow Bus breakers in 228mSec. Both Units and the underground path will remain available.

CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer (

DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:. R.L. Beaver

/

DATE:

1/20/93 Page 19 H.

ANALYSIS (Cont'd.)

The fault clearing times analyzed above and shown on Attachment 3, must be sufficiently fast to ensure the Keowee Units do not become unstable.

Stability refers to the ability of the power system to generate forces required to recover from a disturbance. The relationship of the power angle of the sending unit (Keowee), with the power angle of the receiving unit (infinite bus), is the major factor is this determination. The two Keowee units' power angles should swing together during a fault, thus no problem with instability between the two units is expected.

If the Keowee units are not connected to other power sources (the grid or the Oconee Units), no receiving unit exists and stability is no longer a concern. Thus, prevention of unit damage due to instability may be assured either by clearing the fault, or separating the unit from the infinite bus before the critical clearing time (TCr).

For a discussion of Stability, see Reference 23.

A study of the time required to ensure the Keowee Units will not become unstable was performed using a dynamic model of Keowee, the Duke power system, and the surrounding utilities (See Attachment 2).

The value of Tor from that study is.279 seconds. The response time for the protective devices necessary to isolate postulated faults is determined to insure that the fault is isolated in time to preclude instability (See Attachment 3).

For a fault on the Greenville line, the fault remains on the Units for 323msec (which is longer than T,,), but when PCB-9 opens, the Units would be separated from the rest of the grid in 203msec (eliminating instability concerns).

A fault on the overhead line (F4 on Al) will also remain connected to Keowee for longer than the value (0.308 sec) provided by the study on Attachment 2.

For this fault, no connection to the grid is available after PCB-8 & 9 trips (60msec), and thus no problems with instability will be encountered (See ).

All other faults are removed from Keowee faster than Tr, and thus protection of Keowee from instability induced damage is assured.

ANALYSISOF KEOWEE FAULT AND POST-FAULT TRANSIENT RESPONSE The following is.a comparison of Keowee Unit transient characteristics and the KLF-l Loss of Field relay operating curves, during worst case fault and post fault recovery periods, to examine if KLF-l relay operation may occur.

The KLF-1 relay will lockout it's respective Keowee unit through LOR 86E.

If this relay has the potential to operate during the worst case transient, then a common mode event would exist that could lockout both Keowee Units, if both are being used to provide peaking power.

This analysis is being performed due to questions raised in May, 1992, during the SITA audit, where it was believed that these relays could operate during system faults, or during system transients during fault recovery. This belief was based on knowledge that Keowee impedance will enter the operating circle of the KLF-1 relay impedance unit. This analysis will look at the other two (Voltage & Directional) units of the relay, to see if all three units could

CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver / ;'

DATE:

1/20/93 Page 20 actuate simultaneously. All three of the relay's units must actuate at the same time, and remain so for a period of 0.25 seconds, to allow the X relay to drop out and trip the 86E LOR.

Qualitatively, the probability of a Loss of Field relay actuation during DBE's occurring concurrently with the fault is low for the following reasons:

The directional unit can pickup if the Unit is acting as a MVAR sink when connected to a Reactive Power source. This makes a concurrent LOOP event unlikely.

During Degraded Grid condition, the 230KV switchyard voltage would be below normal, which would tend to make Keowee more of a MVAR source, instead of taking in MVAR's.

Thus, Directional unit actuation is unlikely during a Degraded Grid condition.

For a LOCA DBE, the Emergency Start signal separates the unit from the grid, which requires relay actuation before-the event. Power from the Oconee preferred source (230KV switchyard) is available.

If relay operation during fault recovery were quantitatively feasible, these factors tend to reduce the possibility of a common mode lockout of both Keowee Units, concurrent with an event where Keowee would be required to provide power to Oconee.

The settings for the KLF-l relay is documented in calculation reference 13, OSC-4300, Oconee Protective Relay Setting Calculation. The operation of this relay is described in reference 22.

This relay has three units:

1)

The Voltage unit has a setpoint of 54V, which is factory set and cannot be adjusted (reference 22);

2)

The Impedance unit, whose operating characteristics can be modeled as a circle on a R/X diagram. Present and recommended settings are documented in OSC-4300, and this calculation assumed the recommended settings.

The Impedance unit is picked up for the entire time period in question, and the setting difference will not affect the Directional Unit setting, or Voltage Unit setpoint.

Thus the difference in Impedance unit settings will not impact the results of this evaluation.

3)

The Directional unit, whose operating curves are defined by contact close, maximum torque, and two torque reversal lines which are plotted on a R/X diagram, and are defined by an angle with the +R axis as a reference (See Reference 22).

A computer model of the power system (Keowee, Duke transmission grid, and surrounding utilities) was used to determine Keowee characteristics during the post-fault period. For the purposes of this calculation, a fault was placed on the grid, and cleared just before Tc, (0.279sec).

[This is considered conservative since a fault present for a longer time would result in a larger deviation from normal steady state conditions (and thus bigger swings), than a

CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer 0'5 DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver L

DATE:

1/20/93 Page 21 fault of shorter duration.

In addition, the analysis of the relay response times showed that either the fault would be cleared, or the Unit separated from all other reactive power sources in a time less than Tr].

The model calculated and plotted Keowee characteristics of Voltage, Current, Reactive Power, Apparent Impedance, and Frequency, during and after the fault. These plots are given in Attachment 5 (A5).

After a period of 5 seconds, voltage approaches steady state (A5 pg.4), and Keowee voltage was less than the 77% KLF-1 relay undervoltage (UV) unit setpoint only for t = 0 to 0.75 seconds.

The 0 to 0.75 second period was further analyzed to verify that the Keowee impedance entered the operating circle of the Impedance unit (A5 pg.5).

Then, an analysis of Keowee impedance versus Directional unit operating curves was performed to determine if the potential for KLF-l relay operation can be eliminated during this period.

The Directional unit measures Reactive power (Q) flow into or out of'a Keowee Unit by examining the phase relationship between Unit voltage and current.

If Unit voltage angle is taken as a reference and assigned a value of 00, Keowee Unit Q flow can be related to it's impedance angle (0), which is also the angle by which Keowee terminal current leads or lags terminal Voltage.

Reactive power flow is given by formula (1), where O=LV/LI, and cos(G) = the power factor (pf).

If I & V are in phase, 0=0, pf=l, & Q=0, thus the machine is generating only Real Power (P).

Q flowing out of the machine is indicated by current lagging voltage (lagging pf or 0>0).

Q into the machine is indicated by current leading voltage (leading pf or 0<0).

The KLF-1 relay uses the impedance angle to detect Q Load Flow.

Q=V*I *sin(O)

(1)

A characteristic of a power system fault is that the angle of system current during the fault becomes more lagging (reference 24), which corresponds to a smaller pf, more positive 0, and more Reactive power out of the generators, as indicated on the Keowee Reactive Power Out plot on page 7 of Attachment 5.

The directional unit of the KLF-1 relay is designed to respond to Reactive Power flow into the unit (negative 0), thus will not operate during the fault.

The initial jump of machine impedance to the +X axis, which is well outside of the directional unit contact closing zone (page 5 of Attachment 5), provides additional proof of this.

Thus the KLF-1 relay will not operate during the time the fault is connected.

The Directional unit is designed and set such that the angle of the lines (with reference to the +R axis) is:

Contact close line at -130, maximum torque line at -430, and the torque reversal lines are at -1330 & -3130.

The torque reversal lines are set and tested to a tolerance of +/-10 at -1330 and

+/-40 at -3130.

No tolerances are specified by the manufacturer for the contact

CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer at DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver A

DATE:

1/20/93 Page 22 close and maximum torque lines, but discussions with Duke Power Company relay experts (see Attachment 4) indicate a +/-40 tolerance for those lines would be a conservative estimate.

The Directional unit will generate a signal when the unit's contacts close, which is at the -130 contact close line. According to the KLF-1 instruction book, the Directional Unit's Contact Close line is set to exactly -130, with no tolerance. To provide additional conservatism, the tolerance for this line will be taken to be +/-40, thus the minimum angle would be -90.

Keowee Transient Impedance during the 0 to.75 second period is shown plotted on A5 pg.6, along with a line representing -80.

From this figure, the times where Keowee impedance approaches the -80 line (R values between approximately 0.11 and 0.17) during the post-fault transient can be identified.

The data from which these curves are plotted is given in Attachment 6. From this data, the exact Impedance angle can be calculated for the time band when the Unit response is closest to the -8o line. The following data points were analyzed to determine the minimum impedance angle.

IMPEDANCE TIME R

X ANGLE 0.6292 0.13524

-0.018401

-7.74820 0.6500 0.14455

-0.020437

-8.04730 0.6625 0.15153

-0.021644

-8.12890 0.6667 0.15411

-0.022041

-8.13930 0.6708 0.15683

-0.022434

-8.14070 0.6750 0.15970

-0.022823

-8.13320 0.6792 0.16272

-0.023206

-8.11640 0.6833 0.16589

-0.023583

-8.09100 0.6917 0.17274

-0.024310

-8.01070 The minimum angle was found to be -8.14070, which is > 40 above the directional unit Contact Close line, and also above the assumed tolerance.

From this it is concluded that the directional unit, and thus the KLF-l relay, will not pickup during post-fault system transients.

(NOTE: This analysis did not require use of the 0.25 second time required for the KLF-1 "X" relay to drop out, which provides additional conservatism.)

I.

CONCLUSION This analysis identified four postulated Single Failure problems. One problem has been permanently corrected with a minor modification of the ACB-1 & 2 control circuits.

The problem of a potential complete loss of Emergency power due to a fault in the overlap region of ACB-1 or 2 has been eliminated by operating with the overhead ACB disconnects open for the unit preselected to the underground. A modification of the system to eliminate this potential problem should be implemented before these disconnects are returned to the normal closed condition. This will prevent the use of both Units to generate to the grid at the same time.

The problem of a fault which would be detected by the transformer differential

CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer Q7 DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver DATE:

1/20/93 Page 23 relay and the Normal Incoming breaker amptector, on the Load Center side of ACB-5 or 6 is not credible in the present Dedicated Lineup, since these breaker do not operate during a DBE.

The Keowee Auxiliary Load Centers should be kept in the Dedicated Lineup until a modification which eliminates this problem can be implemented.

The problem with the Generator Field breaker trip on unit overspeed is presently precluded by limiting the unit power to a maximum of 66MW, which tests have shown not to cause a speed excursion above the overspeed device setpoint of 180RPM.

The fault clearing times were shown in section H to be adequate to eliminate concerns of unit damage due to instability. These times are conservative, in that they were computed for this analysis using the electro-mechanical directional distance relays as the initiating device. The actual system response times will be shorter, due to redundant Static (Solid State) relays which are faster than the electro-mechanical devices.

Analysis of the fault and post-fault Keowee transient response demonstrates that the KLF-1 Loss of Field Relay will not pickup during these transients.

The worst case transient swings are not large enough to enter the operating region of the relay's Directional unit. A history of no relay actuations due only to fault induced unit transients (See Attachment 4) supports this conclusion.

No scenarios were identified where it was significant that both units were generating at the same time. With corrections to the system, compliance with the Single Failure criteria can be accomplished, even with both units being used to generate commercial power. It is therefore concluded that, once the permanent changes discussed above are implemented, no credible Single Failure would exist that could render both units inoperable, and prevent the Emergency Power system from performing it's intended onsite safety function when operating with both Units generating peaking power to the grid.

J. REFERENCES

1.

NRC I.E. Information Notice 84-69 dated Sept. 24, 1984.

2.

NRC I.E. IN 84-69 Supplement 1 dated Feb. 24, 1986.

3.

IEEE Std 308-1980 IEEE Standard for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

4.

NRC Branch Technical Position ICSB-8, USE OF.DIESEL-GENERATOR SETS FOR PEAKING.

5.

OSS-0254.00-00-2005, Keowee Hydro Station Design Basis Document.

6.

OSS-0254.00-00-2004, 230KV Switchyard Design Basis Document.

7.

Duke One & Three Line Drawings.

CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer C(3 DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

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DATE:

1/20/93 Page 24

8.

K-700, Keowee 13.8/230KV Power System.

9.

0-800, 800A & 800B 230KV Switchyard Oneline.

10.

K-707 Series, Keowee Three Line Drawing.

11.

Duke Elementary Diagrams

a. KEE-27, 27-1 & 27-2 Load Center lX & 2X Control Elementary.

b. KEE-112 & 212 Series -

Generator Breaker Elementary Drawings.

c. KEE-113 & 213 Series -

Keowee Unit Startup Control Elementary.

d. OEE-34 through 87 -

230KV PCB Control & Protective Relaying.

e. KEE-17 Transformer Differential Elementary.

12.

Oconee Nuclear Station Relaying Training Manual (Nov. 1977 Edition)

13.

OSC-4300, Oconee Protective Relay Setting Calculation.

14.

Struthers Dunn Relay Catalog.

15.

Cutler Hammer Relay Catalog.

16.

OM-309-0063

a. GE Type PVD Differential Relay Bulletin GEH-1770.

b. GE Type HEA Aux. Relay Bulletin GEH-2058D.

c. Westinghouse Type AR Bulletin I.L.41-759.4B.

d. Westinghouse Type KD-4 Bulletin I.L.41-491.4J.

17.

Square D Product Catalog.

18.

Applied Protective Relaying, Chapter 19, System Stability and Out of Step Relaying.

19.

Elements of Power System Analysis, 4th Addition by Stevenson.

20.

Electrical Machinery, 5th Addition by Fitzgerald, Kingsley, and Umans.

21.

Section 2.4.7 of "Operation of EHG in Parallel With Offsite Grid", of Report Oconee Nuclear Station Self Initiated Technical Audit [SITA 92-01 (ON)],

Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection (EDSFI) performed by Southern Technical Services inc".

22.

Westinghouse Bulletin I.L.41-748.1, Instruction Book for Westinghouse Type KLF-l Loss of Field Relay.

23.

Westinghouse Applied Protective Relaying Manual, chapter 19, System Stability and Out of Step Relaying.

24.

Westinghouse Applied Protective Relaying Manual, chapter 2, section IV.B., Characteristics of Faults

CALCULATION/ANALYSIS NO.

OSC-5096 ORIGINATOR:

C. Schaeffer=lf DATE:

1/20/93 CHECKER:

R.L. Beaver DATE:

1/20/93 Page 25

25.

FSAR Section 3.1, Conformance with NRC General Design Criteria, AEC criteria 39, Emergency Power for Engineered Safeguards Features (Category A).

26.

Industrial Power Systems Handbook, D. Beeman, Mc Graw Book Co., 1955.

27.

ANSI/IEEE C37.20.2, IEEE Standard for Metal-Clad and Station-Type Switchgear, 1987.

K. LIST OF ATTACHMENTS Al Drawing showing location of hypothetical Faults considered, 1 page.

A2 Study of Fault Clearing Time for Keowee Units, 20 pages.

A3 Isolation Logic and Device Times for Faults where Comparison with Tr is necessary, 4 pages.

A4 Conversation Record Kept for Various Conversations Between P. Drum (Duke Power Co. Relay Expert) and C. Schaeffer, 1 page.

A5 Keowee Output Characteristic Plots as ran on the PSS/E-20 Power System Simulator for this calculation by W. Quaintence. Also includes a short Introduction of the Program (A5-pg.3). Significant Plots are the Keowee Voltage (A5-pg.4) and Keowee Impedance (A5-pgs.5-6).

A6 Data Sheets for the Significant Time Period (0 to 1 sec), from which the Plots in Attachment 5 were created.

A7 Communication Records between D. Garrison of System Planning, and C.

Schaeffer, ONS Electrical Engineering, discussing the method of calculation, and meaning of the times given in Attachment 2 (3 pages).

A8 Relay Cutsheets showing relay operating times (9 pages).

00 ACB6(LO.2XFROM Ul 4160V L.C. 1TC-4 2X ACB6 L.2 CSc0 ACB2 CD K2 230KV/525KV 0

F5 Ll 0

F,6, ACB4 F3 UDR LTBN F6x GROUND Fc0ATOAKo ACB3P F4 p

F4GREENVILLE OCONEE CALHOUN>

LL~~

11

/K KFACB1 F1 ACB7 3-

)ACB5..

LIX)c57 10 13 16 19 231=

FU F7 AUX PWR 1

4 1

32 OVERHEAD PATH

>0 GREENILLEOCNEE m-"4 11 0

LC.

X 4'

FROTU 4160 LC 3 1T z

Fl12 Fl12 W~

F13

April 30, 1992 TO:

Dhiaa Jamil

SUBJECT:

Fault Clearing Time for Keowee Units Studies indicate a fault on the Oconee 230 kV bus must be cleared within 0.279 seconds for the Keowee Units to be stable.

A state-of-the-art dynamic model of Keowee, Duke and surrounding utilities was used for this study. This model is able to perform calculations of the Keowee rotor angle as a function of time for various system conditions.

For this study a fault was placed on the Oconee 230 kV bus and removed a fraction of a second later.

The model was run an additional period of time to see if the Keowee rotor angle would settle back toward a constant.value indicating stability.

A constantly increasing angle would indicate instability.

A search process varying the fault clearing time was conducted.

Once a clearing time which resulted in stable operation was determined, it was not necessary to check shorter clearing times since they would be less stressful and always result in stable operation.

Successively longer clearing times were run until instability was indicated.

A process of dividing the interval between stable and unstable operation was conducted to identify the maximum clearing time within 0.004 seconds. The maximum time for stable operation was identified as 0.279 seconds. A run with the clearing time increased to 0.283 seconds indicated unstable operation. Plots of the Keowee rotor angle as a function of time for these runs are attached.

Additional runs were completed in the same manner to determine the clearing time required for a fault at Keowee on the high side of the step-up transformer.

The required time was found to be.308 seconds.

Lastly, per your request, a run was made to determine the electrical power, reactive power and terminal voltage for'a Keowee unit.

For this run a fault was placed at the Oconee 230 kV bus for 0.275 seconds and removed.

Monitoring continued for several seconds beyond removal of the fault.

A plot of this information is attached.

Dhiaa Jamil Page 2 April 30, 1992 Data from these runs is also provided on the enclosed 3 1/2" disk on file KEOWEE.WK1.

David L. Garrison System Planning and Operating Dept.

DLG/dpw Attachments xc:

John G. Dalton

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P T I 111T RAC TIVE P L 0 TTING PR 0 G R A - -

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DUKE POWER COMPANY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION REPORT PROJECT Oconee Emergency Power System Analysis FILE NO.

OSC-5096 SUBJECT PERSON CALLED Paul Drum, Relay Expert for Duke Power, Power Delivery 382-6505.

DATE 12/9/92, 12/10/92, & 12/16/92 TIME PERSON CALLING Chris Schaeffer SPECIFICATION NUMBER SUBJECT DISCUSSED Discussed KLF-1 relay operation, tolerances, operating history, and Unit Stability Analyses.

RECOMMENDED RESOLUTION He said he believed an approach to insure against unit damage due to instability, by ensuring that the Keowee unit will be separated from, either the fault or the rest of the grid before the critical clearing time is a valid approach, since the subject of Stability addresses the relationship between a unit's power angle and the infinite bus power angle.

He agreed that separation of Keowee from that infinite bus (i.e. all other units except the other Keowee unit, since they can be expected to swing together) will be sufficient to insure no instability-induced unit damage occurs, even though the Units are supplying the fault for a time longer than We discussed the KLF-1 relay directional unit settings, the Max Torque line and the Torque Reversal Lines as represented on a R/X diagram. The KLF-1 instruction book lists a tolerance of +/-40 for the Torque Reversal Lines, and Paul felt that 40 would also be an acceptable figure for the tolerance of the directional unit Contact Close zone.

I asked him if had any knowledge of these relays picking up due to a fault. His only memory a KLF relay actuation occurred on Oconee Unit-3 when the 230KV & 525KV switchyards were being tied together. He said that the cause of that relay trip was due to a Unit-3 regulator problem, which was not set properly.

He said the analysis-after the trip indicated that only a miss-set regulator could have caused the trip and troubleshooting showed the regulator to be set exactly where the analysis predicted.

Paul called back a few minutes after we talked, and had taken a look at the Relay Test Procedure for the Keowee KLF-1 relay. The Directional unit is tested to +/-40 regularly.

Called Paul on 12/15/92 and left him a phonemail questioning if the reduced system voltage present during the 0 - 0.75 time period would have an effect on the Directional Unit operating angles.

On 12/16/92, I received a return message from him, and he reinforced my belief that the relay is designed to operate at reduced voltages and the reduced voltage will not affect the operating angles.

SIGNED Chris Schaeffer

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PSS/E-20 Power System Simulator Program Operation Manual Volume I T.E. Kostyniak Revised November 1991 Copy Number:

OM1663 Assigned To:

Duke Power Company Copyright@ 1990, 1991 Power Technologies, Inc.@

This program is a confidential unpublished work created and first licensed in 1976. It is a trade secret which is the property of Power Technologies, Inc. All use, disclosure, and/or reproduction not specifically authorized by Power Technologies, Inc. is prohibited. This program is protected under the copyright laws of non-U.S. countries and by ap plication of international treaties. All Rights Reserved Under the Copyright Laws.

Power Technologies, Inc.

PSS/E Program Operation Manual Introduction The PTI Power System Simulator (PSS/E) is a package of programs for studies of power system transmission network and generation performance in both steady state and dynamic conditions. PSS/E handles power flow, fault analysis (balanced and unbalanced), network equivalent construction, and dynamic simulation.

PSS/E achieves its broad capabilities by a highly modular structure and, in dynamic simulation, by encouraging the engineer to introduce his own subroutines describing his particular problem whenever the standard calculation proce dures are not appropriate. PSS/E is not set up to solve anU specific problem. Rather, it is a carefully optimized data structure associated with a comprehensive array of computational tools which are directed by the user in an interactive manner. By applying these tools in the appropriate sequence, the engineer can handle a huge range of variations on the basic "load flow and stability" theme.

PSS/E is designed on the premise that the engineer can derive the greatest benefit from his computational tools by re taining the most intimate control over their application. The interactive structure of PSS/E, therefore, encourages the user to examine the results of each step in his computation before proceeding to the next This assists the engineer in understanding the engineering capabilities of his tools without having to become a master of the mathematical fine points of computation. The execution of standard studies such as power flow and basic transient stability on PSS/E requires no programming expertise. An engineer who is able to translate his problem formulation into simple FORTRAN statements will find, however, that PSS/E allows him to handle virtually any system dynamics problem for which he can produce the requisite equipment models and input data.

The standard maximum capacities of PSS/E in terms of buses, branches, generators and other system components are the same in all of its "ACTIVITIES" and are summarized in Table i.1.

PSS/E and its auxiliary programs are documented in a set of Manuals. Your installation may not include all of the doc uments listed below, depending upon which of the optional program sections are included in your lease of PSS/E.

This Manual, PSS/E PROGRAM OPERATION MANUAL, is a guide to PSS/E operational procedures which are common to all host computers on which PSS/E is supported.

The Manual PSS/E PROGRAM APPLICATION GUIDE discusses engineering considerations in formulating prob lems for PSS/E and interpreting its results. These two Manuals discuss the use of PSS/E from different viewpoints and hence complement each other. The user is encouraged to become familiar with both of these Manuals.

Machine specific user procedures, as well as PSS/E installation instructions and documentation on several PTI sup plied utility programs, are contained in a host dependent manual (e.g., PSS/E ON THE IBM VM/CMS, PSS/E ON THE APOLLO, etc.).

The Manual GUIDE TO PRINTING AND PLOTIING describes the interface between PSS/E and the graphics and tabular output devices supported by PSS/E on the host machine. It includes both program user information as well as system related instructions required by those responsible for PSS/E installation.

Three USER'S READY REFERENCE sheets summarize the commands recognized by activities GRPG, PSAS, and PSEB.

The PSSPLT PROGRAM OPERATION MANUAL describes the use of the simulation channel output file processing program.

November 1991 i - I Introduction

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-FRARAM--PSSPLT RI, EC 1 14 LOADFLO CAS FO DYNMICSTUDIES UTHERN COPANY

-KEWEE ADED H

NEL 00027 00028 00021 00019 00023 W E Mr1FKEWE MCEX1IK ECWEE ET 1K F OWEE1KEOWEE SPD1 KEOEE u217 0.24921E-02 0.12157 0.29943 0.64500 0.22C63E-01 0.2208 0.2'922E-02 0.12157 0.29935 0.64469 0.23289E-01 0.2250 0.24923E-02 0.12157 0.29928 0.64437 0.23712E-01 0.2292 0.24924E-02 0.12157 0.29921 0.64406 0,24134E-01 0.2292 0.25239 0.24556E-01 0.62651 0,12143 0.241343-01 0.2333 0.2552 0.20 0E01 0.63246 0.12828 0.24042E-01 0.2375 0.27293 0.28900E-01 0.64654 0.14033 0.23602E-01 0.2417 0.27340 0.29978E-01 0.65181 0.14732 0.23320E-01 0.2450 0.27291 0.30904E-01 0.65603 0.15423 0.23029E-01 0.2500 0.27119 0.31384E-01 0.65863 0.15987 0.22728-01 0.2542 0.26859 0.31502E-01 0.66003 0.16420 0.22417E-01 0.2583 0.26532 0.31307E-01 0.66021 0.16729 0.22097E-01 0.2625 0.26158 0.30859E-01 0.65937 0.16922 0.21767E-01 0.2667 0.25743 0.30213E-01 0.65763 0.17011 0.21430E-01 0.2708 0.25316 0.29418E-01 0.65512 0.17007 0.21084E-01 0.2750 0.24870 0.28516E-01 0.65194 0.16924 0.20732E-01 0.2792 0.24415 0.27540E-01 0.64818 0.16772 0.20375E-01 0.2833 0.23958 0.26521E-01 0.64393 0.16561 0.20012E-01 0.2375 0.23501 0.25477E-01 0.63926 0.16302 0.196453-01 0.2917 0.23050 0.24428E-01 0.63423 0.16003 0.19274E-01 0.2958 0.22604 0.23384E-01 0.62891 0.15672 0.18901E-01 0.3000 0.22167 0.22356E-01 0.62335 0.15313 0.18526E-01 0.3042 0.21739 0.21351E-01 0.61758 0.14934 0.18150E-01 083 0.21321 0.20372E-01 0.61167 0.14538 0.17773E-01 125 0.20915 0.19423E-01 0.60563 0.14129 0.17397E-01 3167 0.20520 0.18506E-01 0.59952 0.13711 0.17021E-01 0.3208 0.20136 0.17621E-01 0.59334 0.13286 0.16646E-01 0.3250 0.19764 0.16768E-01 0.58714 0.12857 0.16273E-01 0.3292 0.19404 0.15947E-01 0.58093 0.12424 0.15902E-01 0.3333 0.19055 0.15157E-01 0.57473 0.11990 0.15533E-01 0.3375 0.18713 0.14397E-01 0.56857 0.11555 0.15167E-01 0.3417 0.13392 0.13664E-01 0.56246 0.11121 0.148053-0l 0.3458 0.18077 0.12958E-01 0.55641 0.10687 0.14445E-01 0.3500 0.17773 0.12276E-01 0.55044 0.10254 0.14089E-01 0.3542 0.17480 0.11618E-01 0.54456 0.98225E-01 0.13737E-01 0.3583 0.17197 0.10982E-01 0.53877 0.93924E-01 0.133893-Cl 0.3625 0.16925 0.10365E-01 0.53309 0.89637E-01 0.13045E-01 0.3667 0.16662 0.97661E-02 0.52752 0.85360E-01 0.12704E-01 0.3708 0.16409 0.91842E-02 0.52207 0.81093E-01 0.123683-01 0.3750 0.16165 0.86174E-02 0.51675 0.76834E-01 0.12037E-01 0.3792 0.15930 0.80646E-02 0.51155 0.725S03-01 0.11700E-01 0.3833 0.15704 0.75241E-02 0.50649 0.68325E-01 0.11386E-01 0.3875 0.15487 0.69952E-02 0.50157 0.64070E-01 0.11067E-01 0.3917 0.15270 0.34761E-02 0.49679 0.59809E-01 0.10752E-01 0.3958 0.15076 0.59663E02 0.49214 0.55542E-01 0.10441E-01 0.4000 0.14883 0.54643E-02 0.48765 0.51260E-01 0.10135E-01 0.4042 0.14598 0.49698E-02 0.48329 0.469663-01 0.9332SE-02 0.4033 0.14519 0.44815E-02 0.47909 0.42654E-01 0.95341E-02 1125 0.14348 0.39989E-02 0.47503 0.38323E-01 0.92395E-02 167 0.14184 0.35212E-02 0.47111 0.3393

-01 0.89487E-02 200 0.1';027 0.30477E-02 0.46735 0.29590E-01 0.36615E-02 0.4250 0.13876 0.25782E-02 0.46373 0.25136E-01 0.83779E-02 0.4292 0.13732 0.21119E-02 0.46026 0.20755E-01 0.30978E-02 PTI INTERACTIVE PLOTTING PROGRAM--PSSPLT

FRI, DEC 11 1992 11:14 LOAD FLOW CASE FOR DYNAMIC STUDIES FRO3M S3THERN COMPANY; KEOWEE ADDED1; WHQ

THAN NELL 0U002 /

UUU20 1

1 2

TIME CikEOWEE MCXKEOWEEPDKOWE 0.4333 0,13594 0.10488E-02 0.45364 0.l6'%

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-0.64233E-C2 0.64811E-02 583 0.12892

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-0.23304E-01

-0.10453E-01 1.0250

-1.0133

-0.3C566E-01 1.0061

-0.26343E-01

-0.95192E-02 1.0292

-0.99961

-0.32417E-01 1.0056

-0.28677E-01

-0.85806E-02 1.0333

-0.98859

-0.3408SE-01 1.0053

-0.30806E-01

-0.76378E-02 1.0375.

-0.98005

-0.35637E-01 1.0051

-0.32750E-01

-0.66917E-02 1.0417

-0.97391

-0.37091E-01 1.0050 70.34507E-01

-0.57434E-02 1.0458

-0.97011

-0.3151SE-01 1.0050

-0.36112E-01

-0.47939E-02 1.0500

-0.96860

-0.399165-01 1.0052

-0.37551E-01

-0.38442E-02 1.0542

-0.96937

-0.41349E-01 1.0054

-0.38351E-01

-0.28952E-02 563

-0.97245

-0.42836E-01 1.0058

-0.40019E-01

-0.19481E-02 625

-0.97787

-0.44421E-01 1.0063

-0.41075E-01

-0.10039E-02 1.0667

-0.98572

-0.4613SE-01 1.0069

-0.42026E-01

-0.63690E-04 1.0708

-0.99607

-0.48028E-01 1.0075

-0.42897E-01 0.87155E-03 1.0750

-1.0091

-0.50153E-01 1.0083

-0.43705E-01 0.18007E-02 1.0792

-1.0249

-0.52568E-01 1.0091

-0.44469E-01 0.27227E-02 1.0333

-1.0438

-0.55341E-01 1.0100

-0.45207E-01 0.36366E-02 1.0875

-1.0660

-0.58562E-01 1.0109

-0.45943E-01 0.45411E-02 1.0917

-1.0918

-0.62333E-01 1.0119 0.54353E-02 PTI INTERACTIVE PLOTTING PROGRAM--PSSPLT FRI, DEC 11 1992 11:14 LOAD FLOW CASE FOR DYNAMIC STUDIES FROM SOUTHE RN COMPANY; KEDWEE ADDED; WHQ CHANNEL 00027 00028 00021 00019 00023 TIME MCRl1KEOWEE MCX 1KEOWEE ET 1 KEOWEE Q 1 KEOWEE SPO 1K1EOWEE 1.0956

-1.1216 0.66800E-01 1.0129

-0.47498E-01 0.63181E-02 1.1000

-111559

-0.72103E-01 1.0139 0.4635-01 0.71884E-02 1.1042

-1.1953

-0.78491E-01 1.0149

-0.49307E-01 0.80453E-02 1.1083

-1.2404

-0.86239E-01 1.0160

-0.50377E-01 0.88877E-02 1.1125

--1.2922

-0.95684E-01 1.0170

-0.51577E-01 0.97146E-02

1. 1167

-1.3517

-0.10734 1.0180

-0.52934-01 0.10525E-01 1.1208

-1.4203

-0.1216 1.0190

-0.54477E-01 0.11318E-01 1.1250

-1.4998

-0.14013 1.0199

-0.562115-01 0.12093E01 1.1292

-1.5923

-0.15344 1.0206

-0.5164E-01 0.12849E-01 1.1333

-1.7006

-0.11357 1.021

-0.60340E-01 0.13585E-01

,ili!

-1.8285

-0.23316 1.0223

-0.627525-01 0.1431EE-01 17

-1.9010

-0.23621 1.0230

-0.654190-0 0.14993-01 56

-2.1046

-0.32E5 1.0236

-0.6332E-01 0.15665E-01 1.1500

-2.3384

-0.26100 1.0241

-0.71494-01 0.16314-01 1.1542

-2.6642

--0.5929 1.0245

-0.7498EE-01 0.16939E-01 1,15C3

-3.0077

-0.33285 1.024

-0.76570E-01 0.175415-01 1.1625

-3.4361

-. 3651 1.0249

-0.824575E-01 0.1091-01

Form 1021 AT 7

DUKE POWER COMPANY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION REPORT PROJECT Oconee Emergency Power System Analysis FILE NO.

OSC-5096 SUBJECT Fault Clearing time for Keowee overhead line fault (F4).

PERSON CALLED Dave Garrison, System Planning & Operating 382-4641.

DATE 1/18/93 TIME PERSON CALLING Chris Schaeffer SPECIFICATION NUMBER SUBJECT DISCUSSED Asked Dave if he could provide some insight into the method the program uses to analyze a fault and how instability is indicated. He sent me the Profs comunication on page 2 of this attachment.

PERSON CALLED Dave Garrison, System Planning & Operating 382-4641.

DATE 1/20/93 TIME 12:30 PERSON CALLING Chris Schaeffer SUBJECT DISCUSSED Fault on Keowee Overhead path on the 230KV side of the main stepup transformer. The study (A2) provided on the critical clearing time indicated that this fault should be cleared within 0.308 second to prevent instability. This analysis shows PCB-8 & 9 tripping in 60 msec, and ACB 1 & 2 tripping in 330msec. Dave agreed that the fault clearing time is not meaningful for a Unit where no other connection to the grid exists. The program assumed the fault was cleared by protective action occurring which separates the fault from the line, while the generator in question remains connected to the grid. I requested that he Profs me a written concurrence to be included in the calculation, and he sent the communication on page 3 of this attachment.

SIGNED Chris Schaeffer

From: DLG8650 --PRDC Date and time 01/20/93 12:22:48 2'3 To: CES7423 --PRDC

. David L.

Garrison System PLanning & Operating ECII-0465/ECO4N Phone:.382-4641 Fax: 382-7228

Subject:

Stability Simulations The software used for stability simulations is designed to provide a time domain accounting of interconnected generating system parameters.

In the normal course of a study a disturbance would be applied to the system (such as a fault) and remain on the system until protective devices act to remove the disturbance. System parameters would be recorded during the disturbance and for an additional period long enough to conclude whether the system returns to normal operation.

The parameters of primary interest for these stability studies are the rotor angles of generating units affected by the disturbance. A fault type disturbance causes the rotor angle of any affected unit to increase rapidly until the fault is removed. For stable operation, when the fault is removed, the rotor angle of the unit would decrease back to a normal value. Instability is indicated if the angle continues to increase.

Protective devices are designed to disconnect units in a condition of instability.

The software is unable to continue to monitor units that become isolated from the interconnected system. Other software or analysis techniques must be employed to examine a unit once it is isolated.

From: DLG8650 --PRDC Date and time 01/20/93 13:43:15 To: CES7423 --PRDC O

Reply to note of 01/20/93 12:37 David L. Garrison System PLanning & Operating ECII-0465/ECO4N Phone: 382-4641 Fax: 382-7228

Subject:

Stability Simulations I concur for a situation such as this where the fault cannot be isolated without disconnecting the unit from the system that a clearing time determination is not meaningful.

LOGIC PRODUCTS INDUSTRIAL CONTROL RELAYS TYPE X -

NEMA RELAYS A'r CLASS 8501 0

/

APPLICATION DATA VERAGE 3PERATiNG T-AES N MILLiSECONCS Vottage Range:

CONTACT RAT;NGS r'ducz;. e 3ancac I

.13

-.:,d.

• laa.num ci s:x 50 1 2e.'C.4 -. aster a aces aCa-e nc300.-

ac ce e an M

a coes. Zn

-!2:c c:r3 ar: oc 8 AC C.

CONTACT ARRANGEMENT The following tables list all 6 and 8 Pole Relay All Contacts Convertible 10 and 12 Pole Relay All Contacts Convertiole pole arrangements ana the location of the N..

o so and N.C. poles. Relays No

'4.

!0.i!

purchased from the fac-oe es i~r~e

!2s. ______

77pe

.~

7 Psei

5.

ory will correspond to these tabies. For examole:

D o 0

2 1 3 2

an X012 will have one D 0 0 S I o 0 005 0 c N.O. pole in position 1: po-o O

sitions 2 and 3 will have

0 0 0 xo0.

N.C. poles: position 4 will be a space.

C22 xce2

2. 3 and 4 Pole Relay All Contacts Convertible

(.33 XOS3 -

1 co 0 o lCi S

0, 0' O

0 S

O XOO 2 i cclI X00802l

1 0 X010020 01006 F O30 urOO O

. S

,I 3es O

O i

S xC, 101201 O011 xO31~~

0 O

X020 50 0

S

0 1 S

C X0103 2

X301

.0, a

03 000 0 1 1:i0 X00903 101 (1

X002 1

iS S

01 101:0!0 X006 X026 leu010m 0

0 0i00S100.5 3

02 30 !OS 06041 0 1 1 0

X0080410 11 3 0 OOL XCC7 5012 0

O 0

0

-mo' oan0ct00

• 0031 1

\\E0 0lo 1:

0S 1 Uoacl X0:10 0Q i

X055S0I

'1 X00o05i 0

X031

!1 0 CONTROLRELAY*

XT

& XTE Timer Attachments Xa3t7 e

0 1

e a005070m as 01d0 All Contacts Convertible m

atcn~i co1 08 Dole m

a1u 811O Num erumoer0o

~P esI I0yp1e S.

XI0008 0

0 0810 1 1 0

o 8N.C. Poles Maximum N.C. Poles Maximrnm 14 s one Cc

!aco

________cc-_onissosimplethatiti generally more economical tO

~ -N -E' u.-.ase r

-vth all contacts N.C. and convert contacts to N.C. as

• : a' tcr reiav ise sa, e agram as i -

-preferrede that oeay e factory asebedwt

.,oove ereol 01 Ie xoosol..oreloy assemledor

-n:atcn Coil Dolesrna,,rs-:.

o 333l13tic

'I0 ano N.C. contacts, change the type number SO rttio

-e

• O" the first number indicates the number ol ormaily 0c 2ntacts and the second number indicates the number

~

~<

, ~ ~'

ormail,.

)o contacts. Also, add $12.00 to mhe price shown 03 als ges 12-3 ano 12-4 for a relay having tne same tota

-"Jmoer 01

cts. Example:

a relay with 1 NO. and 2 NC. poles

• -.ou!0 be ic od as a Type X01 2 and priced at $96.00.

DISCOUNT XOO70 O 1 1 1 XO90 O C

00 12-6 O

171SCHEDULE

RELAY SELECTOR GUIDE INDUSTRIAL PLUG IN, 5-10 AMP, 2-6 POLE 219 1219 246 247 8255 A311 349 12 PIN: 2.625' x 1.469' x

1.406 2.625'x 1 469' 2.625x 1469' 2.625x 1.469' 2.625' x1469' 2625'x 1 469 2.625'x 14 14 PIN: 3.=6' x 1.469' x 5250' x 5250' x 5.250' x 4,583' x 3,406' x

a 5w 10A-

• Tme Way Relay

• Dela--erate elease

• 2 Coil Mechanical

• Sequence (Stepping)

• Over/lUndemltap

.t4Fim oreanS me S

e Latch Relay Senngea n

-A n

itFlAdashrjustale iming:

• Adjustable lining:

• ngle Lael Socke Cod a

Sn Pha

• V Pu-I et Flasher 0.1 to 300 sec 0.1 to 300 sec Wring Soke Contact Tinsla on Three Phase Enfllad CUP

• Auutable Tmng:

• Repebty Repeaab+/-3%

L3%

• Con ous Duty Enering

• F=ied or ADuna

- E ned Coil 401 sec to 3Hrs.

• No False Contacting

• Recycle ime:

Cols Deenergizing Stroa 01fferends Coar

• CJMOS Circuitry

• Polarity Protection 150 ms Max.

• Both Colls May of

• Sngle Lev Socit Cal.

• ACDC

-Not lTime:

Transient Protection Be Energized

• SI Socke Cdde contacts Poladty Sali 150 ms Max.

• Single Level Socket Simultaneously-W I m Socket1 Ibty AC

• Transient Protection Winng No damage Outy Col DC+/-0.2%

• Single Level Socket

• No False

• No False Contacting Wiring Contacting Recycle Time: 60 ms

• rLael Socket 2 Form C to 4 Form C or 2 Form C to 2 Form A 2 Form C to 2 Form A 2 Form C: 3 Form C 2 Form C, 3 Form C or 2FMC 2 Form up to 6 Form A-Form 8

& 2 Form C

& 2 Form C Up to Four Form NAl ConTilnel Combinalilons SII. Cad.

idp--

SII. Cad. Oxide-Sit. Cad. Oxide-Si. Cad. Oxide-Si. Cad. Oxide-S. Go(dds So.

Gol 01ffused Gold Diffused Gold Diffused Gold Diffused Gold DIffused 3M C 30&C

10A, Make 30A, Carry 10A, Make 30A. Carry 104, Make 30. Carry 10A, Make 30A. Carry 10, BrtI Break 1A Break 10A Break 104 Break 10A 5A Makea Make 30, Cany 10A.

Maie 30. Carry 10A, Make 30A, Carry IA, Make 30, Cany 10A.

Make 30A. Carry 1OA, Ma Brak SA Break5A Break 5A Break SA Make 30A. C 10A Make 30A. C 1A, Make 30A. C 1A, Make 30A, 1A, Make 30A. Ca 10A.

0.1A Brek rekBreak Break Break 0.

61to240 24 to 120 24 to 240 24 to 240 6to240 8 toW240 6 to 125(25Wwlh 24 to 125 24 to 125 24 to 125 6 to 125 250V with 8 to125(25t?

4 awlruinkr series resistor)

Series resistor) 5 1.8W 5

5 5 OP 3 RESET 1.8(25W 12WM 118 1.8 1.8

.OP 19RESET 11..s

-101Ca C to +650C

-100 to +459C AC

-100C to +450C AC

-100C

+600C

-10*Ci+1n90.C

-10OC to +70 0C DC -10aC to +700 C DC Selecled As Selected 20 ms 2-5 ns 35 l~it 20 s 20 ms As Selected 2, ns 35 1000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100.000 1

500,000 50000 500,000 500.000 504000 10 Mion 20 million 10 illon 10 million 10 rmillion 5 millon Iulicor Lamp inicator Lamp Indicator Lamp Indicalor Lamp Indicator Lamp IMAcrwD Manual Actuator Mauual Actuator Manual Actuator Manual Actuator Manual Actuator

Cod, Bifurcated Contacts Bfircated Contacts Bifurcated Contacts Bifurcated Contacts Bifurcated Contacts Cl sion Perm. Mag. Blohlout Magnetic Blowout Magnetc Blowout M

Blowout Seques

. Blout Fie Tmifng Fixed Timing Fixed Tining Suppression 130rC Remote Adjust.

Remote Adjust.

Time Delay on Nuclear Quaifed Reset Coil U, CSA-UL, CSA UL UL.CSA uM M D s

Ino 7W00range St.,Darilngton, SC 29532-9986; (803) 393-5421; FAX: (803) 393412re,

• 6

'~

) C - 6263 INFORMATON CUTLER-HAMMER AC AND DC RELAYS AT*

1-I P UBUCATION (O8 D26 D26 Type M Multipole Relay

//1191 W

ESCRIPTION (Continued)

Base Ac Coils The base is an aluminum die casting. It houses the Ac Coil Specifications magnet assembly and mounts the decks. It provides a Coil Power Operating Time metal to metal mounting arrangement, eliminating the Wattspoor feel of mounting molded feet to a metal panel.

Relay Watt:

VA Milliseconds The casting provides guiding for the magnet carrier Inrush Sealed jInrusth Sealed 2-12 Pole 95.0

9.

155.

22.

Pick-up 1

which actuates the contact push bar.

Latch Coil 1 18.5 11 j

41.

1.

Drop-oput 8-26 R a De k ( 26 B

Ac Relay Coil Identification The rear deck, which houses the I member of the magnet, Voft:/Hertz Coil Pt. No.

is considered a part of the basic magnet assembly. It 120/60 - 110/50 9-1989-1 attaches to the base with four screws, making a complete 240/60 - 220/50 9-1989-2 ountn 480/60 - 440/50 9-1989-3oprtnui.

600/60 - 550/50 9-1989-4 The rear deck has four slots for mounting four contact 208/60 9-1989-9 poles: either NC, NO or combinations of both. The 277/60 9-1989-10 contact poles are ordered separately. The poles are 380/50 9-1989-15 6/60 9-1989-5 operated by the push bar actuator built into the rear deck.

12/60 9-1989-6 The poles are held in place by either a cover plate if the 24/60 9-1989-7 relay is to be afour pole relay or a front deck if the relay 32160 9-1989-8 has more than 4 poles.

Dc Coils When dc voltage is applied to the relay coil, both the pickup and hold windings are energized and the relay operates As the armature moves to the sealed position, a I f

.te rag rcoil clearing contact (marked df removes pol:from the pickup winding. The armature is then ain the operated position until voltage is removed from the hold winding. Thi's design does not require the use of Projecting through and out the front of the deck is a pull external resistors.

rod indicator. Its function is to indicate relay energization and to permit manual operation. When the relay is nenergized, the rod extends out about a 1/4" exposing a eband of red color on the rod. The nylon end is ribbed to permit manual operation of the pull rod.

L MC LATE OPENING LSI HOLD Front Decks (D26MD1 0).

L--J-1,7 PIKUPThe front deck mounts up to four additional poles on the DC TYPE M RELAY relay. It is constructed much like the reardeck, exceptthat it is approximately 3/4" shorter in height.

De Relay Coo Spfialiss Colt Power Operating Time Relay Average Inrush Sealed Milliseconds 2-11 Poles 168 13.2 Pick-up 10 Latch Coil 21.6 Intermittent Drop-out 16 Dc Coil dentification The front deck has an nsulator, within it for each pole.

Oc Volts Coil Pt. No.

This insulator serves as electrical clearance between the 12 9-2404-5 rear pole and the front pole. It is held captive in the deck 24 9-2404-4 and need not be put in or taken out in the field.

48 9-2404-3 A front deck can be added to any rear deck 4 pole relay in 120 9-404-1the field. The only requirement is that there is a rear pole 120 9-2404-1 for every front pole added. To mount the rear deck, 240-9 remove the cover plate. Remove the short nylon pull rod See note on installation and use of product at bottom of page 1.

iaoTxN Printed in USA Thefrot dck as n nulaorwitin t fr ech ole

7-Lcp-Z 7j:7-

,2A2 6/

/

c T-L

~ ~

~

~

~

S i

5 5

GEH-2058 (1)zC 24~~

V0 R

IN VAIU VOLAGE 40

.. J I

• 1 I

T C

S 325 VOLTI 144 2VOLTSTNGI IOU VOLTA

-H4 Fig 4. (02A50o yiclTm-otg CaatrsisofTp E ea 12 60 7

1 1 f i l I

! i ;

I l.

TYPE KD-4 RELAY f-A(

L j

TYICL PERATING TIECRE D4 REA 140 S=I, M=O MAX TORQUE ANGLE 75 FOR PHASE TO PHASE UNIT 60* FOR THREE PHASE UNIT. LINE ANGLE OF 75' OPERATING TIME IN CYCLES OPERATING TIME IN CYCLES OPERATING TIME IN MILLISECONDS 0

HASF TO PHAFNT 9

9 Lo 40149 j

NLOCATION OF FAULT IN Z

%OF RELAY SETTINGS 7

1LATN UI0 90%90 00 2

0 5%

6 100 30 40 5 6

50%

6-0 O580 0--0%

5 60

~44 604 rL

~33 402 2

0 lo 2 0 30 40 50 60 TO S0

.30 0

10 0

3 40 50 60 70 80 90 1Z (CURRENT TIME IMPEDANCE SETTING) 188A296 Fig. 10 Typical Operating Time curves of Type KD-4 Relay. Normal vltage before the faults is 720 volts.

directional sense for zero voltage phase-to-phase Distance Characteristic

- 3 Phase Unit faults. For this condition the fault current must be n

The three-phase unit has a'characteristic circle not less than

0. 030 relay amperes with an ohm setting Tetrepaeui a

hrceitccrl which passes through the origin as shown in Figure 9.

Pick up current is proportionally higher in S = 2 and This circle is independent of source impedance. The 3aps.

three-phase unit is also inherently directional and S = 3taps.does not require a separate directional unit.

The KD-4 relay may be set without regard to possible overreach due to d-c transients. Compensa-If a solid-three phase fault occurs right at the tors basically are insensitive to d-c transients which relay location, the entire voltage triangle collapses attend faults on high-angle systems. The long time-to zero to give a balance point condition, as shown constant of a high-angle system provides a minimum by the relay characteristic in Figure 9 which passes rate of change in flux-producing transient current

_ through the origin. However, since the YZ volt with respect to time, and therefore induces a minimum also drops to zero, the relay would be unable to of uni-directional voltage in the secondary. Asymetri calcurrents resulting from faults on low-angle systems To correct this condition, a resonant circuit is added aving a short time constant can induce considerable to the 23 voltage circuit of the relay which allows the voltage in the secondary, but for the first half cycle, YZ voltage to collapse gradually, thus giving a refer

1. he transient-derived voltage subtracts from the ence voltage to determine whether the fault is inside n eady-state value. This transient decays so rapidly the protected line section or behind the relay.

at it is insignificant during the second half cycle T

ahe it ads toigiic n thein sed-te valu l

cce The maximum torque angle of this unit is set when it adds to the steady-state value, for less than the line impedance angle of the phase-

L.41-496.5A 87 SOG, SOG-t, SDG-2. RELAY (T1ME INCLUOES TRANSIENT BLOCKING TIME)

SDG-3,SDG -4 RELAY 25 10-0 O

0 510 20 30 60 80 100 4.3 117 Tot T)

CURRENT TIME COMPENSATING SETTING 837A123

?ig. 21 Typical Operating Time Curves of t-e Type SDG-Line Relay.

TA118 TYPICAL OPERATING TIML OF THE PVD21 RELAY 7 L'UNIT sO C

50 01 PICKUP TIME 30 IN MILLISECONDS 20

-t C-)

MUT1

I.L. 4 1-34 7.1Q 1SC 6

6 t

MAIN UNIT INSTANTANEOUS TRIP f

UNIT EI 04

)12 16

.20 OPERATINC CURRENT IN MULTIPLES OF TAP VALUE CURRENT Curve 538029 O Fig. 19. Typical Tripping Time Characteristic 400 300 as 200 0

0 40 80 120 1I0 200 240 280 FREQUENCY IN HERTZ Sub. 2 Curve 471052 p

Fig. 20. Typical Frequency Response of the HU and HU-1 Relays (60 Hertz).

34