ML13162A581

PRB Closed Meeting Notes - 07/19/12 Gunter Et Al. 2.206 Requesting Enforcement Action Against James A. Fitzpatrick Plant

ML13162A581
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	07/19/2012
From:	NRC/OIS/IRSD/RFSB
To:
References
FOIA/PA-2013-0010, G20120172, TAC ME8189
Download: ML13162A581 (16)

Text

V a

10 CFR 2.206

.4 (J PRB Closed Meetina Notes - 0711912012

SUBJECT:

GUNTER ET AL. 2.206 REQUESTING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST JAMES A. FITZPATRICK PLANT (G20120172) (TAC ME8189)

PETITIONER: Paul Gunter, et al DATE: March 9, 2012, the supplements dated March 13, and March 20, 2012, and Petitioners' Presentations to the PRB in the Public Meeting on April 17, 2012.

PRB MEMBERS & ADVISORS Samson Lee (PRB Chair - Deputy Director, NRR, Division of Risk Assessment)

Bhalchandra Vaidya (Petition Manager- NRR, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing)

Sam Miranda (Branch Chief(A) - NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Reactor Systems Branch)

Robert Dennig (Branch Chief - NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Containment and Ventilation Branch)

Robert Fretz (Senior Project Manager - NRR, Japan lessons Learned Project Directorate, Projects Management Branch)

John Monninger (Associate Director - NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate)

Andrea Russell (Agency 2.206 Coordinator - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking)

David Pelton (Branch Chief - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Generic Communications Branch)

Brice Bickett (Senior Project Manager - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)

Mathew Jennerich (Project Engineer - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)

Lawrence Doerflein (Branch Chief - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety)

Ryan Eul (Enforcement Specialist - Office of Enforcement)

Mauri Lemoncelli (Senior Attorney - Assistant General Counsel - Materials Litigation and Enforcement - Office of General Counsel)

SUMMARY

OF REQUEST:

On March 9, 2012, as supplemented March 13 and March 20, 2012, Mr. Paul Gunter, et. al.,

submitted a joint petition to the NRC, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2.206, regarding James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick).

The joint petitioners request that the FitzPatrick operating license be immediately suspended as the result of the undue risk to the public health and safety presented by the operator's reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of E-FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent system. The joint petitioners state that the risks and uncertainty presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and decisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, as associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to public health and safety. The joint petitioners request that the suspension of the operating license be in effect pending final resolution of a public challenge to the adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.

The joint petitioners do not seek or request that FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) as it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple failures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at Fukushima Daiichi.

The joint petitioners request that the NRC take action to suspend the FitzPatrick operating license immediately until the following emergency enforcement actions are enacted, completed, K

b

& reviewed, and approved by the NRC and informed by independent scientific analysis:

1) Entergy Nuclear Operations' FitzPatrick nuclear power plant shall be subject to public <-

hearings with full hearing rights on the continued operation of the Mark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully hardened vent line as recommended by NRC Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick operator uniquely did not make containment modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise known as "the hardened vent," as requested by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other GE Mark I in the US;

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations shall publicly document for independent review its post- <_

Fukushima re-analyses for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system as previously identified as "an acceptable deviation" from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent System and as outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September 28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:

a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system and; b) "unlikely ignition points" as claimed in the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that would otherwise present increased risks and consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident.

In the March 20, 2012, supplement to the petition, the joint petitioners state that the Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the NRC inspection results in the "Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The joint petitioners draw attention to what is described at page 8 of the enclosure as an "apparentbeyond design and licensing basis vulnerability"involving the FitzPatrick operator's refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC in Generic Letter 89-16.

To summarize the supplement, the joint petitioners state that:

" The Commission's March 12, 2012, Order states that "Current regulatory requirement and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the US. Therefore, continued operation and continued ]icensed-aetivitie-duio pose-a-imnmi eat to public healt and-safet-. The Order further states, "While not required, hardenedVents-Iriky en in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exist with regard to the reliability.of the vents."

• The NRC inspection report identifies that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" and "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" which is further identified as a "current licensing basis vulnerability." The joint petitioners further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" as assumed by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that "FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program."

" The Commission Order timeline setting December 31, 2016, for installing the reliable hardened vent does not address in a timely way the unique condition of FitzPatrick.

2

FitzPatrick uniquely does not have a fully hardened vent system on the vulnerable Mark I containment. As a result, FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with "a beyond design and licensing bases vulnerability, in that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program." Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the "licensing basis vulnerability" of its chosen pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension of operations pending closer scrutiny, public hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and capability in the event of a severe accident. The additional identified "vulnerability" and the relatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy places the public health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day operations where "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" and will not for nearly five (5) more years.

BASIS FOR THE REQUEST:

As a basis for the request, the joint petitioners' state that in light of the multiple failures of the GE Mark I containment and hardened vent systems at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in the days following the March 11, 2011, station black out event, the joint petitions seek the prompt and immediate suspension of the FitzPatrick operations because:

• The GE Mark I BWR pressure suppression containment system is identified as inherently unreliable and likely to fail during a severe accident.

• The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved for severe accident mitigation is not a fully "hardened vent" system.

• The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved relies upon non-conservative and faulty assumptions.

• The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent system uniquely allows for a severe nuclear accident to be released at ground level.

" The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe dramatically and exponentially changes the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analyses.

• The continued day-to-day reliance upon the significantly flawed pre-existing containment vent system as would be relied upon to mitigate a severe accident at the FitzPatrick Mark I reactor presents an undue risk to the public health and safety.

" The identified containment vulnerability, the non-conservative if not false assumption of "no likely ignition sources" in the pre-existing vent line and the unacceptable consequences of failure of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent place both greater uncertainty and undue risk on public health and safety and are not reasonably justified by arbitrarily assigning a low probability of the occurrence of a severe accident.

IS THERE A NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: (If Yes, describe)

NO.

In its internal meeting on March 20, 2012, the PRB found that there is no immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public and therefore, denied the request for emergency enforcement action based on the following considerations:

1. The Near-Term Task Force (NTTF), established by the NRC in response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear event, concludes in its report dated July 12, 2011, that continued nuclear reactor operation and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to the public health and safety and are not inimical to the common defense because of the low likelihood of an event beyond the design basis at a U.S. nuclear power plant and the current mitigation capabilities at those facilities; and, 3

2. On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-1 2-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012. The order stated that:

Current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety. However, the importance of reliable operation of hardened vents during emergency conditions was already well established and this understanding has been reinforced by the clear lessons of Fukushima. While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exists with regard to the reliability of the vents. Additionally, hardened vents are not required on plants with BWR Mark II containments although as discussed above, Mark II containments are only slightly larger than Mark I. Reliable hardened venting systems in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments are needed to ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is maintained.

The NRC staff was aware of the conclusions presented in its Safety Evaluation (SE) dated September 28, 1992, for Fitzpatrick with respect to GL 89-16, and considered this information in its overall assessment on whether or not BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark 11containments were safe to operate following the events at Fukushima. In addition, the NRC staff was cognizant of and reviewed the results of inspections performed under TI 183 at FitzPatrick (Report dated May 13, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML111330455) following the events at Fukushima. The regional staff has communicated with NTTF regarding the Vent system configuration at FitzPatrick, including the differences from GL 89-16 recommendations (Larry Doerflein e-mail) The petition for emergency enforcement action provided no new additional information relat&l to the existing containment venting capability of the Fitzpatrick plant.

DOES IT MEET CRITERIA FOR REVIEW? -rL -RC , -+. - c.-.--. .

Criteria for Reviewing Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206: , '-- , r' &c-'---,

1. The petition contains a request for enforcement-related action such as issuing an order -

modifying, suspending, or revoking a license, issuing a notice of violation, with or without a proposed civil penalty.

YES.

2. The facts that constitute the bases for taking the particular action are specified. The petitioner must provide some element of support beyond the bare essentials. The supporting facts must be credible and sufficient to warrant further inquiry.

YES.

3. There is no NRC proceeding available in which the petitioner is or could be party and through which the petitioneresconcems-couldbea.ddressed.

YES.

• L*F- -*F***? -,

4

Criteria for Reiectin~c Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:

The incoming corresponden does not ask fo an enforcement-related action or fails to provide sufficient facts to sup ion, but simply alleges wrongdoing, violations of NRC regulations, o nce of safety concerns.

2. The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question, YES, In part.

On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark 1 and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012. , c_,,- -...

Accept on the basis of NTTF Recom dation 5.1 and Recommendation 6.

Recommendation 5.1 orders lice es to include a reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark 11containments. T s order included performance objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure iable operation and ease of use (both opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO. Recommendation 6 recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealedthrovgh frther study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.,-, t . '+,. 's C.--.- -/{-.- ' 4" FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in '=-7 -K September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures,, '- - )

and-nspectkm*W The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick's positions with reH 7"' at F " containment vent system met the 2

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design

"_ bases and th design intent of GL - 89-16. - -- -- - " , ,

With respect to Fukushima accident, the NTTF evaluation and the subsequent Commission Order have concluded that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety.

3. The request is to deny a license application or amendment. NO.

4. The request addresses deficiencies within existing NRC rules. NO.

5

IS THERE A NEED FOR OE, 01, OIG. or OGC INVOLVEMENT:

The petition does not contain any allegations of licensee or NRC staff wrongdoing. However, the PRB includes representatives from OE and OGC.

RECOMMENDED APPROACH AND SCHEDULE (Next Steps):

Accept, in part, and hold in abeyance the following parts of the petition (Issue Nos. 5(b), 7, and 11 in the Table) (see Table for detailed explanation).

Three of the issues in the petition, identified and discussed as Issue Nos. 5(b), 7, and 11 in the Table, will be accepted for review by the NRC staff. However, as indicated in the Table, the NRC staff notes that these concerns are undergoing NRC review as part of the lessons-learned from the Fukushima event. Even though the Commission has issued the Order concerning Hardened Vent, the NRQ .ff is conducting further review of additional aspects of the Hardened Vent System, such as ltration. Since Issue Nos. 5(b), 7, and 11 in the Table will take longer than the target timeftame for reaching a decision on a petition, the NRC plans on accepting those issues, and holIng them in abeance , 0 ,-._.

All the other issues in the petition, identified and discussed in the Table are denied for the reasons discussed in the Table The next steps would be to:

• Ensure management agrees with the PRB initial recommendation.

• Inform the petitioners of the PRB's initial recommendation.

• Provide the second opportunity for the petitioners to address the PRB, and make the arrangements for an acceptable date and time.

6

Table This table summarizes each issue for the followina criteria).

Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteriafor K7 -

review under 2.206

,__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ process? _

1 FitzPatrick operating license be immediately No. The NTTF and J in the Commission Order have suspended as the result of the undue risk to the concluded that a sequence of events like the public health and safety presented by the operator's Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the reliance on non-conservative and wrong United States and some appropriate mitigation assumptions that went into the analysis of the measures have been implemented, reducing the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork likelihood of core damage and radiological releases.

containment vent system. The risks and uncertainty Therefore, continued operation and continued presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to decisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, as public health and safety and there is no immediate associated with the day-to-day operations of this safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to safety of the public, and therefore, the request for public health and safety. immediate action should be rejected. The Petitioners have not provided adequate basis for their argument regarding the operator's reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent system.

-ý(,_- t_ ,or ý C.

The petitioner's concerns regarding this issue do not require immediate shutdowr) f FitzPatrick based on the conclusions reached by'IfFFTand the Commission Order reaardina Reliable Hardened Vent for the US GE Mark I BWRs.

U. S. plants have implemented "beyond-design-basis" requirements such as ATWS, SBO, combustible gas control, aircraft impact assessment, mitigation of major fires or explosions, and extensive A A damage mitigation guidelines, thereby reducing the 7

Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteriafor review under 2.206

-process? ...... _ _ _ _ _ ,..

likelihood of core damage and radiological releases.

A sequence of events like those occurring in the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur at US GE Mark I BWRs.

The NRC NTTF report on July 12, 2011, based on review of insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, made a recommendation to the Commission to include a reliable hardened vent system.

2 The suspension of the operating license be in effect No. This is merely a statement to support the petition in pending final resolution of a public challenge to the general. This is not an enforcement related action adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the and is outside the scope of the 2.206 process and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, therefore, this request should be rejected, pursuant to Criterion 1 for reiectina a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.

3 The joint petitioners do not seek or request that No. This is merely a statement to support the petition in FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus general. This is not an enforcement related action Vent System (DTVS) Recommended by GL89-16, and is outside the scope of the 2.206 process and as it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple therefore, this request should be rejected, Pursuant failures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at to Criterion 1 for reiectina a petition under 10 CFR Fukushima Daiichi. 2.206.

4 FitzPatrick be subject to public hearings with full No. The petitioner raises issues that have already been hearing rights on the continued operation of the the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either Mark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the hardened vent line as recommended by NRC issues have been resolved, and the resolution is Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated operator uniquely did not make containment September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16.

8

Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteria for review under 2.206 process?

known as "the hardened vent,' as requested by NRC Therefore, this issue should be rejected. pursuant to Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other Criterion 2 for rejecting a petition under 10 CFR GE Mark I in the US; 2.206.

5 FitzPatrick shall publicly document for independent The licensee's response to the Order will be publicly review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the available. Subsequent NRC documentation reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre- regarding additional efforts i.e., hydrogen control, existing containment vent system as previously would also be publicly available.

identified as Oan acceptable deviation" from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent System and as outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September 28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:

a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to No. FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was justify not installing a fully hardened vent reviewed and approved by the NRC in September system and; 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-89-1 6, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16.

With respect to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, the NTTF evaluation and the subsequent Commission Order have concluded that a sequence of events 9

Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteriafor review under 2.206 process?

such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S and some appropriate mitigation measures have been implemented, reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety.

b) "unlikely ignition points" as claimed in the Yes. Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that and Recommendation 6.

would otherwise present increased risks and consequences associated with the detonation Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a of hydrogen gas generated during a severe reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark II accident. containments. This order included performance

• objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO. ,

Recommendation 6 recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.

6 The Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the No. The petitioner raises issues that have already been NRC inspection results in the "Follow-up to the the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic Event." The joint petitioners draw attention to what basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the is described at page 8 of the inspection report as an issues have been resolved, and the resolution is "apparentbeyond design and licensing basis applicable to the facility in question. The Order on 10

Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteria for review under 2.206 process?

vulnerability"involving the FitzPatrick operator's hardened containment vents (EA-12-050) has a refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC timeline of December 31, 2016, for installing the in Generic Letter 89-16. reliable hardened containment vent. Therefore, this issue should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for reiecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.

7 The NRC inspection report [per TI-2515/183] Yes. Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 identifies that FitzPatrick's "existing plant and Recommendation 6.

capabilities" and "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary. containment Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a venting" which is further identified as a "current reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark II licensing basis vulnerability." The joint petitioners containments. This order included performance further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that objectives for the design of hardened vents to FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" as assumed ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO. .

"FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air Recommendation 6 recommends, as part of the space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I longer term review, that the NRC identify insights containment improvement program." about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.

8 The Commission Order timeline setting December No. The petitioner raises issues that have already been 31, 2016, for installing the hardened vent Order does the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either not address, in a timely way, the unique condition of on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic the FitzPatrick nuclear power plant. basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16.

Therefore, this issue should be rejected, pursuant to 11

Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteriafor review under 2.206 process?

Criterion 2 for rejecting a retition under 10 CFR 2.206.

9 The FitzPatrick nuclear power plant uniquely does No. The petitioner raises issues that have already been not have a fully hardened vent system on the the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either vulnerable Mark I containment As a result, on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with "a basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the beyond design and licensing bases vulnerability, in issues have been resolved, and the resolution is that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated require the plant to have a primary containment September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the torus air space hardened vent system as part of their BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16.

Mark I containment improvement program." Therefore, this issue should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for reiecting a Oetition under 10 CFR 2.206.

10 Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to No. GL 89-16 urged the licensees to voluntarily install install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the hardened vent capabilities at their Mark I "licensing basis vulnerability" of its chosen pre- containments. If licensees chose not to install the existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension hardened vent capability, the NRC staff requested of operations pending closer scrutiny, public the licensee to provide their plant-specific estimates hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and of cost-s of installation of hardened vent capabilities.

capability in the event of a severe accident. The licensees were informed that the NRC staff would use the cost data to perform plant-specific backfit analyses, and to determine, if hardened vent installations could be imposed as backfits in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109.

In response to GL 89-16, FitzPatrick indicated that it had decided not to commit to install hardened vent capabilities. The NRC staff performed a backfit analysis and concluded that there will be substantial additional increase in protection to public health and 12

Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteriafor review under 2.206 process?

safety if hardened vent capability is implemented at FitzPatrick and therefore, the backfit is justified. By letter dated June 15, 1990, the NRC staff urged FitzPatrick to reconsider its decision and implement the hardened vent installation by January 1993.

Otherwise, the NRC staff intends to impose the backfit under 10 CFR 50.109.

By letters dated January 24, 2991, the NRC staff approved the licensee's request dated July 25, 1990, to integrate the results of its IPE program into its decision regarding making any modifications to existing vent system to implement GL 89-16 hardened vent design criteria. FitzPatrick provided By letters dated December 6, 1991, and August 14, 1992, FitzPatrick provided its final position regarding implementation of the hardened vent design criteria, use of IPE to re-examine the venting procedures and training of operators, insights gained from performing the IPE program, and the status of investigations into accident management strategies associated with severe accidents.

By letter dated September 28, 1992, based on the review of the information provided by FitzPatrick, and the results of the NRC inspection of the FitzPatrick hardened wetwell vent path, the NRC staff determined that the current vent path meets the hardened vent design criteria or their intent.

Furthermore, the NRC staff found that the plant 13

Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteriafor review under 2.206 process?

procedures and training are adequate to provide information and guidance necessary for operators to effectively use FitzPatrick hardened wetwell vent capability. Therefore, the NRC staff concluded that the existing wetwell vent capability at FitzPatrick is adequate. Temporary Instruction 2515/183.

"beyond design and licensing basis vulnerability[for beyond design basis accidents)'was not a consideration during GL 89-16 inspections.

The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16.

Therefore, this issue should be rejected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for reiecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.

11 The additional identified "vulnerability" and the Yes. Accept on the basis of NTI-F Recommendation 5.1 relatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy and Recommendation 6.

places the public health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a operations where "current procedures do not reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark II address hydrogen considerations during primary containments. This order included performance containment venting" and will not for nearly five (5) objectives for the design of hardened vents to J more years. ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both 14

Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteriafor review under 2.206 process?

opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO. The Commission has already considered and deliberated the issue of continued operation in establishing the requirements and due dates in the order rather than calling for immediate action.

Recommendation 6 recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.

15

0

SUMMARY

(1) The petition and the supplements do not include any new or additional information or facts that were not known to the NRC staff with respect to FitzPatrick's Containment Vent System.

(2) FitzPatrick response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16.

(3) Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark II containments. This order included performance objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO.

Recommendation 6 recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.

(4) After the issuance of the Facility Operating License, the NRC has conducted its regular and necessary inspections and assessments of the licensee's performance. The Commission has not found it necessary to issue any generic communications, based on the industry operating experience, or the plant specific communications, based on the licensee's performance, to require any changes to the design and operating requirements of the Containment Vent System. The plant continues to meet all the requirements with respect to the regulations and the licensing bases, including those with respect to the design basis accidents and natural phenomena. Fukushima events have been characterized as "Beyond Design Basis Accidents." The design and operating requirements for "Beyond Design Basis Accidents" for Containment Vent System are being addressed through the Commission-Issued Order.