ML15197A307
| ML15197A307 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/2015 |
| From: | Alexander Chereskin Plant Licensing Branch 1 |
| To: | |
| Chereskin A | |
| References | |
| NRC-1698 | |
| Download: ML15197A307 (50) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Board RE James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket Number:
05000333 Location:
teleconference Date:
Monday, June 29, 2015 Work Order No.:
NRC-1698 Pages 1-49 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
1 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB)
CONFERENCE CALL RE CONTAINMENT VENTILATION AT THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
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MONDAY JUNE 29, 2015
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The conference call was held, Samson Lee, Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, presiding.
PETITIONERS:
JESSICA AZULAY, Alliance for a Green Economy (AGREE)
PAUL GUNTER, Beyond Nuclear TIM JUDSON, Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS)
RUTH THOMAS, Environmentalists, Inc.
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS SAMSON LEE, Deputy Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Risk Assessment ALEXANDER CHERESKIN, Petition Manager for 2.206 Petition PATRICIA JEHLE, Office of General Counsel MERRILEE BANIC, Agency 2.206 Coordinator, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Policy and Rulemaking ROBERT FRETZ, Office of Enforcement MANDY HALTER, Acting Branch Chief, Orders Management Branch, Japan Lessons-Learned Division, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation BRETT TITUS, Acting Branch Chief, Containment and Balance-of-Plant
- Branch, Japan Lessons-Learned Division, Office of Nuclear Regulation TOM SETZER, Senior Project Engineer, Region I NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF DOUGLAS PICKETT, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation BOOMA VENKATARAMAN, Project Manager, Division of Operating Reactor licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 NRC REGION I NEIL SHEEHAN, Public Affairs, Region I
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 P R O C E E D I N G S 1
12:30 p.m.
2 MR. CHERESKIN: Okay, it's 12:30, so I 3
think we can start this meeting.
4 All right, thank you everybody for coming 5
to attend this meeting.
6 My name is Alex Chereskin and I am the NRC 7
Petition Manager for this Petition.
8 The purpose of today's meeting is for the 9
Petitioners to address the NRC's Petition Review Board, 10 or PRB, per their request regarding the Petition dated 11 March 9, 2012 as supplemented.
12 This meeting is scheduled from 12:30 p.m.
13 to 2:00 p.m. Eastern Time to allow the Petitioners a full 14 hour1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> to address the PRB with the introductions as well.
15 This meeting is being recorded by the NRC 16 Operation Center and the recording will be transcribed 17 by a Court Reporter. And that transcript will become 18 a supplement to the Petition and will be made publically 19 available.
20 At this time, the people present at this 21 meeting at NRC Headquarters will introduce themselves.
22 As we go around the room, I'd like everyone to state it 23 loud and clear. We do have little microphone 24 extensions off the phone, so if you could talk into one 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 of those, I'd appreciate it.
1 And I'll begin. My name is Alex Chereskin.
2 My last name is spelled C-H-E-R-E-S-K-I-N. I'm a 3
Project Manager in NRC's Division of Operating Reactor 4
Licensing. I'm also the Petition Manager for this 5
Petition.
6 CHAIR LEE: My name is Samson Lee. I'm the 7
Deputy Division Director for NRC's Division of Risk 8
Assessment and I'm the PRB Chairman for this Petition.
9 MS. HALTER: Hi, my name is Mandy Halter.
10 I'm the Acting Chief of the Orders Management Branch in 11 Japan Lessons-Learned Division at NRR.
12 MR. TITUS: My name is Brent Titus and I'm 13 the Acting Chief for Containment and Balance-of-Plant 14 Branch also in the Japan Lessons-Learned Division at 15 NRR.
16 MR. FRETZ: My name is Robert Fretz and I'm 17 representing the Office of Enforcement.
18 MS.
BANIC:
Lee
- Banic, Petition 19 Coordinator, NRR.
20 MR. PICKETT: I'm Doug Pickett. I'm the 21 NRR Project Manager for Fitzpatrick.
22 MS. JEHLE: Patricia Jehle, Office of the 23 General Counsel and the last name is spelled J-E-H-L-E.
24 MS. VENKATARAMAN: My name is Booma 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Venkataraman. I am Project Manager in the Division of 1
Operating Licensing.
2 MR. CHERESKIN: That's great. And are 3
there any other participants from NRC Headquarters on 4
the phone or from the Region?
5 MR. SETZER: Hi, this is Tom Setzer. I'm 6
the Senior Project Engineer for Region I.
7 MR. SHEEHAN: Neil Sheehan, NRC Region I 8
Public Affairs.
9 MR. CHERESKIN: Okay, I don't hear any 10 other NRC folks on the phone.
11 Are there any representatives from 12 Entergy, the licensee, on the phone?
13 MR. ADNER: Yes, this is Chris Adner, JAF 14 Regulatory Assurance Manager.
15 MR. NAPPI: Hi, this is Jerry Nappi, 16 Entergy Communications. That's N as in November, 17 A-P-P-I.
18 MR. CHERESKIN: All right, not hearing 19 anyone else from Entergy, would the Petitioners please 20 introduce yourselves for the record?
21 We'll start here at NRC Headquarters and 22 then if there are any Petitioners on the phone, we'll 23 go there afterwards.
24 MR. GUNTER: Thank you.
25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 My name is Paul Gunter and I'm Director of 1
the Reactor Oversight Project at Beyond Nuclear in 2
Takoma Park, Maryland.
3 MR. JUDSON: And Tim Judson, I'm the 4
Executive Director at the Nuclear Information and 5
Resource Service based in Takoma Park.
6 And, also, the original filing of this 7
Petition and this is the Petition that I filed when I 8
was the president of Citizens Awareness Network which 9
was one of the original Petitioners.
10 MR. CHERESKIN: All right. Do we have any 11 Petitioners joining us on the phone?
12 MS. AZULAY: Yes, good afternoon. This is 13 Jessica Azulay. I'm Program Director for Alliance for 14 a Green Economy.
15 MS. THOMAS: Ruth Thomas with the 16 Environmentalists, Incorporated.
17 MR. CHERESKIN: All right. And it's not 18 required for members of the public to introduce 19 themselves for this call. However, if there are any 20 members of the public on the phone that wish to do so 21 at this time, you may state your name for the record.
22 All right, I don't hear anyone else, so I'd 23 just like to reiterate that, again, it's important to 24 speak clearly and loudly to make sure that the Court 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Reporter can hear us and that the recording of this is 1
clear.
2 And, when you speak, if you could please 3
first state your name for the record, that'll help in 4
developing the transcript.
5 For the people on the phone for this 6
meeting, please remember to mute your phones to minimize 7
any background noise that you may have. If you do not 8
have mute button, you can press the key star and then 9
six. And if you press star, six again, it'll unmute the 10 phone.
11 And at this time, I'll turn it over to the 12 PRB Chairman, Samson Lee, for some opening remarks.
13 CHAIR LEE: Welcome to this meeting 14 regarding the 2.206 Petition submitted by Paul Gunter 15 and Company.
16 I will now share some background on NRC's 17 2.206 process.
18 Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of 19 Federal Regulations describes the petition process.
20 The primary mechanism for the public to request 21 enforcement action by the NRC in the public process.
22 This process permits anyone to petition NRC 23 to take enforcement-type actions related to NRC 24 licensees or license activities.
25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Depending on the results of this 1
evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRC 2
issue license or take any other appropriate enforcement 3
action to resolve a problem.
4 The NRC staff guidance for the disposition 5
of 2.206 petition requests is a Management Directive 6
8.11 which is publically available.
7 The purpose of today's meeting is to give 8
the Petitioner an opportunity to provide any additional 9
explanation or support for the Petition before the 10 Petition Review Board's initial consideration and 11 recommendation.
12 This meeting is not a hearing nor is it an 13 opportunity for the Petitioner to question or examine 14 the PRB on the merits or the issues presented in the 15 Petition Request.
16 No decisions regarding the merits of the 17 Petition will be made at this meeting.
18 Following this meeting, the Petition 19 Review Board will conduct its internal deliberations.
20 The outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed 21 with the Petitioner.
22 The Petition Review Board typically 23 consists of a chairman, usually a manager at the senior 24 executive service level at the NRC. It has a Petition 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Manager and a PRB coordinator.
1 Other members of the Board are determined 2
by the NRC staff based on the content of the information 3
in the Petition Request. The members have already 4
introduced themselves.
5 As described in our process, the NRC staff 6
may ask clarifying questions in order to better 7
understand the Petitioner's presentation and to reach 8
a reasoned decision whether to accept or reject the 9
Petitioner's Request for review under the 2.206 10 process.
11 The following is a summary of the scope of 12 the Petition under consideration and the joint 13 Petitioner's activities today.
14 On March 9, 2012, as supplemented March 13 15 and March 20, 2012, Mr. Paul Gunter and others submitted 16 a joint Petition to the NRC under Title 10 of the Code 17 of Federal Regulations Part 2.206 regarding the James 18 A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
19 The Petition requests the immediate 20 suspension of the Fitzpatrick operating license, that 21 Fitzpatrick be subject to public hearings with full 22 hearing rights with regards to continue operation and 23 that Entergy shall properly document post-Fukushima 24 analysis of the preexisting containment vent system for 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 independent review.
1 The Petitioners have also submitted a 2
Freedom of Information Act, FOIA, request dated October 3
11, 2012 requesting various communications between the 4
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRR 5
headquarters, the Office of General Counsel, Region I 6
and the Resident Inspectors.
7 The Petitioners received a response to this 8
request on August 7, 2013. The Petitioners had said 9
that this information was necessary in order to address 10 the PRB for a second time.
11 I will now discuss the NRC activities to 12 date.
13 On October 4, 2012, the NRC staff informed 14 the Petitioners of the PRB's initial recommendation to 15 partially accept the Petition Review under the 2.206 16 process. The NRC staff notes in this email that the 17 parts of the Petition that address containment 18 ventilation under accident conditions and the ability 19 for the disarm of vent systems to accommodate hydrogen 20 gas met the criteria to be reviewed under the 2.206 21 process.
22 The other portions of the Petition did not 23 meet the criteria for review under the 2.206 process.
24 The NRC staff first gave the Petitioners an 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 opportunity to address the PRB for a second time. After 1
the initial recommendation per MD8.11 in the October 4, 2
2012 email.
3 Since the Petitioners requested a response 4
to their FOIA request prior to addressing the PRB again, 5
the NRC staff waited until the FOIA request was answered 6
and contacted the Petitioner again on February 5, 2015 7
to give the Petitioners another opportunity to address 8
the PRB.
9 This opportunity to address the PRB is 10 being given to the Petitioners to provide additional 11 relevant explanation and support for the Petition 12 Request in light of the PRB's initial recommendation and 13 the information contained in the FOIA request and 14 response.
15 This concludes the summary of NRC 16 activities to date.
17 As a reminder for the phone participants, 18 please state your name if you make any remarks as it will 19 help us in the preparation of the meeting transcript 20 that will be made publically available.
21 I will now turn it over to the Petitioners 22 to allow them the opportunity to provide any information 23 they believe the PRB should consider as part of this 24 Petition. You have one hour for your presentation.
25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MR. GUNTER: Okay, thank you.
1 And, good afternoon. My name is Paul 2
Gunter and I represent the Petitioner, Beyond Nuclear.
3 We're based in Takoma Park, Maryland.
4 I'd like to start out by saying that it's 5
our concern that Entergy's Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power 6
Plant in Scriba, New York fits into a historic and 7
disturbing and recurring pattern of the nuclear 8
industry's failure to comply with design performance 9
criteria for the GE Mark I boiling water reactor 10 containment licensing basis and the U.S. Nuclear 11 Regulatory Commission's failure as a regulator to 12 require and enforce compliance on that licensing basis.
13 Fitzpatrick is a GE Mark I boiling water 14 reactor as were the Fukushima Daiichi units one through 15 five. Units one, two and three were power at power on 16 March 11, 2011 at the time of the earthquake and tsunami 17 and all experienced severe reactor accidents followed 18 by catastrophic containment failure and widespread and 19 persistent radiological contamination. Fukushima 20 Daiichi's units one, three and four experienced 21 hydrogen explosions.
22 The Petitioners have requested this second 23 meeting to respond to the NRC Petition Review Board's 24 initial recommendations to reject in part and accept in 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 part while holding in abeyance actions requested in the 1
March 9, 2012 Emergency Enforcement Petition that's 2
supplemented on March 13th and March 20, 2012.
3 The Petition Review Board rejects the 4
Petitioners' request that the Fitzpatrick operating 5
license be immediately suspending pending a public 6
hearing on the power reactor's continued operation with 7
the substandard and severe accident vulnerable GE Mark 8
I Pressure Suppression Containment.
9 The power authority of the State of New York 10 refused to make modifications with the installation of 11 a hardened containment vent line as recommended in NRC's 12 Generic Letter 86-19 issued September 1, 2001 1989.
13 Now, post-Fukushima, the current operator, 14 Entergy, continues to rely upon the unmodified 15 preexisting partially hardened and partially 16 nonpressure bearing vent path that, if used under 17 accident conditions, it's highly likely to fail to high 18 pressure steam and non-condensible explosive gasses in 19 the auxiliary housing at the standby gas treatment 20 system resulting in a radiologic release at ground 21 level.
22 The Petitioners respond that Generic 23 Letter 89-16 explicitly acknowledges that the continued 24 reliance on such preexisting capability including, and 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 I quote, nonpressure bearing vent path or duct work, 1
unquote, jeopardizes the access to vital plant areas and 2
equipment and represents an, quote, unnecessary 3
complication that threatens accident management 4
strategies.
5 The Petitioners have asserted that this 6
same unnecessary complication represents an undue 7
public health and safety risk.
8 The PRB rejected the Petitioners' request 9
for immediate enforcement actions stating that there is 10 no imminent threat to the public health and safety 11 because, quote, a sequence of events like the Fukushima 12 accident is unlikely to occur in the United States and, 13 quote, continued operation and licensing activities do 14 not pose an immediate threat to the public health and 15 safety, end quote.
16 The fact is that there have now been five 17 severe nuclear accidents in the past 36 years 18 demonstrating, by observation, that the likelihood of 19 severe accidents, in reality, is greater than the NRC 20 theoretical and the industry promotional models 21 produced since 1970.
22 All the severe accident sequences were 23 unique to one another and unanticipated.
24 This reality places an emphasis on the 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 importance of regulatory enforcement to maintain NRC's 1
purported defense in depth philosophy at every level 2
including containment performance criteria for the all 3
important final barrier protecting the public health 4
and safety from radiological disaster.
5 Chapter 10 of the Code of Federal 6
Regulation Part 56 Appendix A General Design Criterion 7
16 establishes the minimum requirement for containment 8
design performance and, quote, an essentially leak 9
tight containment structure against the uncontrolled 10 release of radioactivity to the environment and to 11 assure that the containment design conditions important 12 to safety are not exceeded for as long as postulated 13 action conditions require.
14 The fact that NRC issued Generic Letter 15 8916 to the operator, Fitzpatrick, and the industry on 16 a voluntary compliance basis deferred its enforcement 17 obligation to maintain licensing agreements for the 18 containment performance criteria.
19 It further deferred its commitment to 20 maintain defense in depth at Fitzpatrick when the 21 operator opted out of installing a hardened containment 22 vent, instead, relying upon a pre-installed only 23 partially hardened containment vent system.
24 Given that Generic Letter 89-16 was 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 implemented under 10 CFR 50.59, Fitzpatrick has 1
installed partial containment, their hardware was not 2
inspected by NRC walk-down, only by a review of its 3
design.
4 The Petitioners further assert that the 5
fact that the installation of a hardened containment 6
vent as described in Generic Letter 89-16 was installed 7
at the Fukushima Daiichi units and failed to avert 8
catastrophic containment failure, but does not justify 9
the Fitzpatrick operator's decision to not install the 10 hardened contained vent from the primary containment 11 through a release point on the elevated emission stack.
12 Rather, both the multiple hardened vent 13 failures would successfully vent explosive gasses at 14 four Fukushima Mark I units and Fitzpatrick operators 15 continued reliance on the preexisting containment vent 16 amplified the Petitioners' concern with the current 17 licensing basis vulnerability.
18 We, therefore, reassert our request that 19 the Fitzpatrick unit be immediately suspended.
20 The Petitioners acknowledge that the NRC 21 issued Enforcement Action 2012-050, Order to Modify 22 Licenses with Hardened Containment Vents and 23 established the mandatory compliance date for enhanced 24 hardened containment vent on all Mark I and Mark II 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 units, including Fitzpatrick to be no later than 1
December 31, 2016.
2 On June 6, 2013, the NRC issued Enforcement 3
Action 2013-109, Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses 4
with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents 5
capable of operation under severe accident conditions 6
superseding EA 2012-050.
7 EA 2013-109 provides for compliance dates 8
for Phase I of the installation of a now enhanced 9
reliable hardened containment vent on the wet well 10 component of the containment no later than June 30, 2018 11 and for Phase II compliance no later than June 30, 2019 12 for the installation of an optional unfiltered 13 containment vent on the dry well component of the 14 containment.
15 Or an alternative mitigation strategy for 16 severe accident water addition and severe accident 17 water management that does not install a hardened vent 18 but, instead, relies upon partial flood up of the dry 19 well component while managing water addition to 20 maintain free board in the wet well so that the Phase 21 I hardened vent remains operable to relieve the 22 accident's high pressure extreme temperature and 23 noncombustible and non-condensible and combustible 24 gasses to the atmosphere.
25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 The wet well does not have an external 1
filter and relies upon the original design S-curve 2
effect in the wet well water to prevent radiological 3
releases to the environment.
4 The Petitioners now note that the addition 5
of a one and a half year delay before full implementation 6
of the Phase I wet well hardened containment vent 7
totaling as an additional three years that Fitzpatrick 8
will operate with the vulnerable Mark I pressure 9
suppression containment system and the preexisting 10 partially hardened containment vent.
11 The Petitioners reassert that extending 12 the continued operation of Fitzpatrick with an 13 unreliable containment under accident conditions 14 represents an undue risk to public health and safety.
15 And, in the interim, and prompts the call 16 for the suspension of the Fitzpatrick operating 17 license.
18 Given the history of NRC regulation, the 19 extended delay is not likely to be the last. The 20 Petitioners have asked for the suspension of the 21 suspension of operations with the preexisting 22 containment vent certainly with that in mind.
23 The Petition Review Board has rejected a 24 review of the requested action in part stating the staff 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 explicitly recognized the wide variance in the 1
reliability of the hardened vent designs among Mark I 2
plants. The design at Fitzpatrick is one example of 3
that variance.
4 Therefore, the issue should be rejected 5
pursuant to criterion two for rejecting a Petition under 6
2.206 and to quote, meaning that the raised issue has 7
already been thoroughly reviewed by the NRC and is 8
resolved such that the solution is applicable to the 9
raised issue.
10 The Petitioners note that this same wide 11 variance in reliability of hardened vent designs 12 includes not only Fitzpatrick's half-measure of a 13 containment vent that if used under severe accident 14 conditions will likely explode inside the adjacent 15 building to the reactor building.
16 It also includes the demonstrated failed 17 vent design at Fukushima Daiichi's units one, two, three 18 and four.
19 Accordingly, the NRC's Orwellian-like 20 interpretation of variance reliability includes 21 unreliable performance.
22 Again, the Petitioners reassert that 23 Fitzpatrick operating license should be suspended.
24 The Petition Review Board accepts three of 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 the Petitioners challenges for the suspension. Those 1
challenges are Fitzpatrick operators claim of, quote, 2
unlikely ignition points, unquote, in the preexisting 3
event line and release path that would otherwise cause 4
a detonation of hydrogen gas generated by a severe 5
accident.
6 Also, the NRC Inspection Report finding 7
that Fitzpatrick, quote, existing plant capabilities 8
and, quote, current procedures do not address hydrogen 9
considerations during primary venting.
10 And, Fitzpatrick's mitigation strategy and 11 current procedures do not address hydrogen 12 considerations during primary containment venting.
13 In each case, the Petition Review Board 14 references the NRC Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 15 5.1 to order licensees to include reliable hardened 16 containment vents on all Mark I and Mark II boiling water 17 reactors, namely, Enforcement Action 2013109 and Task 18 Force Recommendation 6 for a long term review by NRC to 19 identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation 20 inside containment or in other buildings as additional 21 information is revealed through further study of the 22 Fukushima Daiichi accident.
23 The Petitioners have a number of concerns 24 with the Petition Review Board's recommendation to hold 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 the requested enforcement action in abeyance while 1
Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant continues to operate 2
with a vulnerable containment structure and unaddressed 3
safety issues that involve the large amounts of 4
non-conensible explosive gasses that would be generated 5
under severe accident conditions and ignition sources 6
that can result in deflagration and detonation with 7
widespread and long lasting radiological consequences 8
that will affect large sectors of society, the economy 9
and the environment.
10 The matter of arriving at timely resolution 11 to these unaddressed issues ranks high among the 12 Petitioners concerns.
13 According to NRC presentations, the 14 current challenges to the hydrogen gas problem includes 15 very little reliable empirical data on hydrogen is being 16 used -- is being recorded since the Fukushima accident.
17 And any verifiable information on the chain of events 18 at Fukushima may not be available for ten plus years.
19 In Supporters' Petition, the Petitioners 20 submit, for the record, Natural Resource Defense 21 Council's Technical Report preventing hydrogen 22 explosions in severe nuclear accidents, unresolved 23 safety issues involving hydrogen gas generation and 24 mitigation dated March 2014, with findings that the NRC 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 and the nuclear industry are far from resolution for 1
Recommendation 6.
2 Even after Fukushima Daiichi's three 3
devastating hydrogen explosions, the NRC has regulated 4
its investigation of severe accident hydrogen 5
generation safety issues to the lowest priority of its 6
post-Fukushima Daiichi Accident Response.
7 The NRDC report finds that beyond adding 8
reliable hardened containment vents to the Fukushima 9
cell reactors, it could take decades before the U.S.
10 nuclear industry implements further hydrogen gas 11 control measures.
12 A boiling water reactor like Fitzpatrick 13 has several times more mass of zirconium in their 14 reactor core than larger pressurized reactors like 15 Indian Point Unit 3.
16 A typical BWR core with 800 fuel assemblies 17 would actually have more than 76,000 kilograms of 18 zirconium cited by the IAEA as typically present in a 19 BWR core.
20 It is the interaction of this zirconium 21 fuel colliding with steam at high temperatures during 22 a severe accident that generates the explosive gas.
23 The NRC Technical Report further finds that 24 the NRC computer models under predict hydrogen gas 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 generation rates during severe accidents, citing 1
technical reports from Oak Ridge National Laboratory 2
and the International Atomic Energy Agency which 3
account for hydrogen gas generation during the 4
evolution of a severe accident and how computer safety 5
models under predict rates of hydrogen generation that 6
would occur during the re-flooding of an overheated 7
reactor core that can cause hydrogen gas rates to vary 8
by a large degree.
9 NRDC points out that, despite these 10 reports, the NRC Near-Term Task Force failed to discuss 11 NRC computer safety models like MELCOR that under 12 predict such hydrogen gas generation rates, thus, 13 undermining defense in depth with less conservative 14 computer models.
15 And, I quote, when hydrogen generation 16 rates are under predicted, hydrogen mitigation systems 17 are not likely to be designed so that they can handle 18 the generation rates that would occur in actual severe 19 accidents, unquote.
20 As such, contrary to NRC and industry 21 claims, the reliable hardened containment vent issue is 22 not yet resolved and very likely to prove troublesome 23 to NRC and industry on holding to current implementation 24 schedules and are no more reliable than the wide 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 variance of design of its predecessors.
1 The NRDC report calls particular attention 2
to the severe accident scenarios where there is a rapid 3
containment pressure increase and uncertainty for the 4
diameter and thickness of a reliable containment vent 5
line and more certainty for the lack of reliability of 6
as-built containment vent such as relied on at 7
Fitzpatrick for the next several years at least.
8 The NRDC report further illuminates that 9
current NRC enforcement action does not require that 10 hydrogen be mitigated in the BWR secondary containment, 11 also known as the reactor building, in several and 12 severe accidents, despite the multiple demonstrations 13 and devastating consequence at Fukushima Daiichi.
14 In line with the NRC defense in depth 15 philosophy, hydrogen gas leakage for more than 150 16 penetration in the Fitzpatrick Mark I primary 17 containment and/or hardened containment line needs to 18 be considered and mitigated.
19 Severe accident hydrogen explosions remain 20 an unresolved safety issue. The NRDC report points out 21 that during a severe accident, large volumes of water 22 will be pumped into the Fitzpatrick's reactor core 23 creating thousands of kilograms of steam.
24 While this large quantity of steam may 25
26 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 initially create an inerting effect that can suppress 1
and prevent hydrogen gas explosions, the steam will 2
eventually condense at some point in an accident either 3
naturally or by the use of containment systems for 4
hydrogen combustion causing hydrogen combustion and 5
which will occur only with a very small amount of energy 6
from an electrical spark or a static electric charge, 7
for example, that caused the Hindenburg disaster.
8 But it is our concern that the attention 9
should be drawn to the widespread and unaccepting 10 consequences of allowing Fitzpatrick to continue to 11 operate with its substandard containment and only 12 partial measure that proves to be highly unreliable.
13 Thank you. That concludes my remarks.
14 MR. CHERESKIN: I believe Jessica has been 15 waiting.
16 CHAIR LEE: Jessica, you'd like to make 17 some remarks?
18 MS. AZULAY: Yes, thank you.
19 Thank you for the opportunity to address 20 you today. Thank you to my co-Petitioners who are there 21 in person.
22 My name is Jessica Azulay. I'm Program 23 Director for Alliance for a Green Economy, also known 24 as AGREE. And we are a New York State based coalition 25
27 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 of environmental and social justice organizations.
1 AGREE has served as the primary nuclear 2
watchdog organization in Central New York since the 3
beginning of the ongoing Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.
4 Since that catastrophe began to unfold, we 5
have sought to understand why the Mark I reactors at 6
Fukushima experience meltdowns and why their 7
containments were breached. And we have sought to 8
understand how the Mark I and their cousin, Mark II, 9
reactors in our region might be vulnerable to the same 10 kinds of meltdowns and massive radiological release.
11 Central New York is home to two Mark I 12 reactors, Fitzpatrick and Nine Mile Point 1 and one Mark 13 II reactor, Nine Mile Point 2.
14 I personally live in Syracuse, New York 15 which is about 36 miles from those reactors and I am one 16 of about a million people who live within 50 miles of 17 Fitzpatrick and Nine Mile 2.
18 Our way of life in Central New York is 19 heavily dependent on our clean water resources, our 20 farming and our forests and a clean environment is 21 essential to our health and well-being. It is 22 essential to the economy of the rest of the State of New 23 York as well.
24 A Fukushima-style accident could render a 25
28 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 large part of my region uninhabitable. Those of us 1
lucky enough to evacuate would have our lives derailed 2
and the plant and animal life and those who are not 3
evacuated could have their lives destroyed.
4 The economic blow to our state would be 5
enormous and the radiological contamination of Lake 6
Ontario, one of the world's largest sources of fresh 7
water would be a tragedy beyond words.
8 I say all this because I want to remind you 9
that your decisions have real world consequences, real 10 world risks. Your decisions matter to me personally 11 and to every person, every living thing in Central New 12 York.
13 If you make risky decisions in this case, 14 you are putting our lives at risk.
15 So, I'm calling in today really just to 16 ask a simple question of you and your colleagues at NRC.
17 Do we in Central New York deserve to be protected from 18 radiation in the case of an accident at Fitzpatrick?
19 If the answer is yes, which I hope it is, 20 will the NRC commit to enforcing right now it's General 21 Design Criterion 16 which requires a reliable leak proof 22 containment to protect the public from radiation 23 exposure during an accident?
24 That's what this Petition is all about.
25
29 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 It's about the fact that Fitzpatrick does not have a 1
containment system that will protect us from radiation 2
in the case of accident.
3 I say this as fact because I've reviewed 4
hundreds of pages dating back to the 1980s dealing with 5
this issue. And in not one of them have I found the NRC 6
or the plant operators claiming that Fitzpatrick has a 7
containment system that will prevent the release of 8
radiation in the case of a severe accident.
9 Sure, there's a lot in the documentation 10 about how unlikely an accident is. There's a lot of 11 calculation about how much an accident would cost in 12 lives and money and how events contribution to 13 preventing an accident is so small it supposedly wasn't 14 worth the $680,000.00 it would have taken back in the 15 early 1990s to install a hardened vent to the stack.
16 There is information about how this or that 17 vent design will help prevent a meltdown and how this 18 or that vent design will be easier or harder to operate.
19 But let's be real here, no one is saying 20 that in the case of an accident that radiation won't 21 escape and that we won't be contaminated.
22 So, I just want to ask you that in your 23 deliberations about how to handle our Petition, you ask 24 yourselves whether Fitzpatrick is in compliance with 25
30 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 the General Design Criterion 16 or not?
1 If an accident occurs at this plant, I 2
assure that no one will excuse inaction based on the 3
precedent of inaction.
4 Now, I will turn to the specifics of the 5
Fitzpatrick case because I want to make sure you 6
understand that Fitzpatrick is a unique case because the 7
vent plan on the books doesn't really even make a 8
pretense of protection.
9 I'm going to reference a number of 10 documents that we received through the Freedom of 11 Information Act Request and I'll email these documents 12 to our Petition Manager so that you have them at your 13 fingertips to accompany your review of my statement.
14 The documents we received through the 15 Freedom of Information Act Request suggest that the vent 16 at Fitzpatrick will not work in a station blackout 17 scenario to help prevent a meltdown or the total loss 18 of containment.
19 One document dated September 28, 1992 with 20 the subject Hardened Wet Well Vent Capability at the 21 James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Plant describes in detail 22 how the vent would not be effective in a station blackout 23 situation because by the time the pressure is high 24 enough to be vented, it would be too late to use the vent 25
31 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 effectively.
1 So, it seems from this and other documents 2
that we are unprotected if there is a loss of offsite 3
power and something goes wrong with the backup power 4
sources, this Fitzpatrick vent will not help us.
5 But what about cases in which the vent can 6
supposedly be used?
7 Let me review what a successful venting at 8
Fitzpatrick looks like. Because Fitzpatrick is a Mark 9
I reactor and its containment is relatively small, it 10 is not designed to be able to withstand the build up of 11 pressure that would result from a severe accident.
12 So, if the operators at Fitzpatrick find 13 themselves in an accident scenario in which proves 14 pressure is building, they will want to relieve the 15 pressure building up at the reactor.
16 The plan is to open some valves and create 17 a pathway for steam, radiation and other materials to 18 exit the reactor building through a couple of pipes and 19 enter the ductwork in the adjacent standby gas treatment 20 building where it is expected that the ductwork will 21 fail and steam and radiation will be released into the 22 building.
23 Pressure will then build up in the standup 24 gas treatment building until the doors to outside blow 25
32 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 off, releasing the steam and radiation into the 1
environment at ground level. That's if things go 2
right.
3 Again, if things go right, the area around 4
the standby gas treatment building will be contaminated 5
with radioactive steam.
6 In the hundreds of NRC pages I've reviewed 7
on this plan, I have not found any discussion about how 8
this might affect workers on the site or how it might 9
hamper recovery efforts to get an accident under 10 control. I cannot believe this never discussed and 11 never studied.
12 But, as far as I can tell, the impact on 13 workers is unknown as is the extent to which releasing 14 radiation at the ground level could compromise access 15 to important parts of the Nine Mile Nuclear Complex 16 which houses Fitzpatrick and Nine Mile Point 1 and 2.
17 The potential for this vent plan to affect 18 the other nuclear plants at the site has been completely 19 ignored by NRC, to our knowledge.
20 What is known is that the impact on the 21 public will be greater because of the ground level 22 release at Fitzpatrick. And, if there were a hardened 23 vent path going to the stack like at the other Mark I 24 reactors in the U.S.
25
33 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 A June 15, 1990 document titled Staff 1
Back-Fit Analysis for James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear 2
Plant Regarding Installation of a Hardened Wet Well Vent 3
is very clear on this point.
4 It states, quote, for venting sequences, 5
the hardened vent connected to the plant stack could 6
reduce dose consequences more effectively by 7
approximately a factor of two than venting through the 8
ductwork.
9 This reduction is due to a greater 10 effectiveness of atmospheric dispersion resulting from 11 controlled elevated relief compared to an uncontrolled 12 ground level release from ductwork, unquote.
13 So, we see that if the Fitzpatrick is used 14 as planned, the public will receive twice as much 15 radiation than if there were a vent to the stack.
16 Now, all of this was a discussion of what 17 would happen if things go according to plan. But the 18 record shows that NRC now has serious doubts about 19 whether things would go according to plan.
20 For one, it was assumed all this time that 21 there would not be an explosion in the standby gas 22 treatment building if this plan were followed, or 23 rather, I think it's more accurate to say that because 24 NRC staff was uncertain about whether there would be an 25
34 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 explosion, they let the New York power authority to 1
convince them to accept an inferior vent plan.
2 In so, with potential ignition sources in 3
the standby gas treatment building, this is clear from 4
the September 28, 1992 letter. And that the way to 5
prevent the possibility of a deflagration was to bypass 6
that building and vent to the stack.
7 But, because there was, quote, uncertainty 8
about whether the materials being vented would be 9
combustible, they allowed the inferior vent plan to 10 stand despite their reservations.
11 Quoting again from that September 28, 1992 12 document, a hardened pipe bypass around the standby gas 13 treatment system could prevent any hydrogen 14 deflagration within the SGPS room.
15 The licensee estimated the cost of this 16 modification at $680,000.00. The licensee concluded 17 that combustion in the existing vent path is not 18 significant and does not plan to modify the vent design.
19 Based on the uncertainty as to whether a 20 combustible mixture could develop, the prevention 21 potential of steam and nitrogen to suppress a hydrogen 22 deflagration, the mitigation potential of the concrete 23 wall between the SGPS room and the safety related 24 equipment and the costs associated with modifications, 25
35 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 the NRC staff concludes that the existing design is 1
acceptable and the intent of the criterion has been met, 2
close quote.
3 After Fukushima, some NRC staff thought 4
this decision should be revisited, at least it seemed 5
that way from the emails and other documents we obtained 6
through the FOIA Request.
7 For instance, a summary of TI 183 8
inspections we received states, quote, the inspectors 9
identified that the current licensing basis does not 10 require the licensee to have a hardened wet well vent 11 installed as part of their Mark I containment program 12 improvements.
13 While the decision to not install the 14 hardened vent received regulatory approval, it may be 15 appropriate to reevaluate the adequacy of the existing 16 wet well vent strategy and configuration, close quote.
17 A March 2013 email from John Rain to other 18 NRC staff reviewing the history of the Fitzpatrick vent 19 expresses skepticism as to whether the vent could be 20 manually opened by hand when power is unavailable, 21 remarking with a little dark humor, as our Japanese 22 colleagues would likely say, good luck with that.
23 And yet, you have allowed this plant to 24 continue operating knowing all of this. It seems the 25
36 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 only action taken to date was to issue guidance to the 1
plant operators that they should use caution when 2
considering using the vent because of the potential for 3
a hydrogen explosion.
4 According to an April 17, 2012 email from 5
Ed Knutson, the senior resident inspector at 6
Fitzpatrick which we obtained through the FOIA, the 7
guidance for primary containment venting without AC 8
power was changed to include in the consideration, 9
quote, venting primary containment to secondary 10 containment is likely to be an irreversible action since 11 it will result in discharge of steam and non-condensible 12 gas potentially causing fission products and hydrogen 13 to the reactor building creating an environment with 14 severe thermal radiological and combustible/explosive 15 conditions, close quote.
16 Doesn't urging caution make it less likely 17 that the vent would be used to prevent a serious accident 18 which, in turn, makes a serious accident more likely?
19 How does the NRC response to this situation reflect the 20 lessons learned from Fukushima?
21 It seems the lessons have helped identify 22 a festering problem, but has not spurred adequate action 23 to protect the public.
24 As a resident of Central New York, I'm 25
37 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 desperate to know that after Fukushima, the U.S.
1 regulators are taking the lessons learned seriously and 2
are addressing any known issues they find at our local 3
nuclear reactors. And, it seems clear to me that you 4
have fallen down on the job.
5 The NRC has known for years that the Mark 6
Is simply do not provide a leak proof containment and 7
that the vent plan at Fitzpatrick carries with it 8
certain risks to the public, more risks because of the 9
potential for ground level contamination than any other 10 reactor of its type.
11 And now, the NRC knows that, based on the 12 lessons of Fukushima, that the consequences of loss of 13 power or other severe scenarios at Mark Is can be 14 catastrophic and irreversible. Yet, the only 15 assurance we get, the only rationale for inaction is 16 that an accident is unlikely.
17 This is not a satisfactory answer. We 18 deserve a real accounting of the risks at Fitzpatrick.
19 In your original preliminary recommendation, the 20 Petition Review Board told us you were planning to 21 accept portions of our Petition but to hold them in 22 abeyance because of the rulemaking happening around 23 Mark I vents.
24 But, I urge you to accept this Petition 25
38 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 without delay. Fitzpatrick poses an unacceptable risk 1
and it is not in compliance with the most basic of NRC 2
regulations requiring leak proof containment.
3 The existence of an inferior vent plan that 4
could lead to an explosion and/or ground level release 5
of radiation makes an accident more likely because 6
operators are told to be cautious about venting.
7 The cost of inaction or delay could be a 8
meltdown and the irreversible destruction of Central 9
10 If you are unwilling to shutdown the 11 reactor, I urge you to at least immediately grant the 12 public hearings we seek. Bring the situation into the 13 light of day and require Entergy to answer our questions 14 in a public forum. Entergy should be required to 15 publically document for independent review its 16 post-Fukushima reanalysis for the reliability and 17 capability of the Fitzpatrick vent.
18 Thank you very much for your time today.
19 MR. JUDSON: So, my name is Tim Judson.
20 I'm the Executive Director at the Nuclear Information 21 and Resource Service and I appreciate the Petition 22 Review Board's extension of this opportunity to address 23 you regarding the Fitzpatrick 2.206 Petition on 24 Fitzpatrick.
25
39 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 You know, I want to address some of the 1
overarching concerns that the Petitioners have 2
developed over the course of this process regarding the 3
justifications that NRC has offered for what we see as 4
really inaction on our Petition, you know, the holding 5
of our Petition in abeyance.
6 And we're very concerned that the NRC is, 7
you know, is failing to act on these issues essentially 8
the way of protecting out of compliance reactors from 9
the expense of, you know, of having to restore 10 compliance at the expense of the worker and public 11 health and safety.
12 And, you know, I think what we've seen in 13 the documents that Jessica has described is that there's 14 an acknowledgment that, you know, in this particular 15 case with Fitzpatrick, that there would be a, you know, 16 double the dose consequence to the public from, you 17 know, from the utilization of Entergy's venting 18 strategy at Fitzpatrick. And there would be the NRC 19 required compliance with the installation of a hardened 20 vent.
21 And what we're very cognizant of is that the 22 NRC is not saying that Fitzpatrick is not going to have 23 to install a hardened vent at some point, it's just that 24 you're not going to require it now even though we know, 25
40 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 based on the documentation that is now on the record, 1
that there's a known greater consequence to the worker 2
and public health and safety from deferring, you know, 3
the requirements that Fitzpatrick comply with the 4
regulations.
5 And so, and we've seen this happen -- this 6
is actually the third 2.206 Petition that many of the 7
Petitioners have been party to, you know, since 8
Fukushima at this particular reactor.
9 And I want to sort of run through the record 10 that sort of documents our concern that the NRC is acting 11 in a way to essentially lower safety regulations and 12 safety requirements in order to protect the industry 13 from financial expenses.
14 And, you know, we filed a year after this 15 Petition, we filed a 2.206 Petition alleging that 16 Fitzpatrick was in violation of financial 17 qualifications regulations and that proceeding has been 18 going on for over two years as well.
19 We submitted a vast amount of documentation 20 that Fitzpatrick is being operating at a financial loss, 21 is being under financial strain. In fact, Entergy 22 continuously acknowledges that this particular reactor 23 is operating under financial strain.
24 And we're concerned that the NRC has 25
41 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 essentially declined to enforce regulations in order to 1
prevent reactors like this from closing and -- because 2
I've reviewed the record on this.
3 You know, we know from -- there have been 4
industry analyses of this reactor and others that 5
document potentially over $130 million in financial 6
losses projected within a five year period. Now, the 7
five year period is significant in terms NRC regulations 8
because the NRC standard review plan on financial 9
qualifications for licensees establishes a requirement 10 that reactor operators present five years of cost and 11 revenue projections in order to show -- in order to 12 demonstrate that they're able to operate the reactor 13 profitably, that they're able to operate the reactor 14 safely.
15 Now, NRC has -- the NRR has issued a draft 16 decision on that Petition that projects it. But this 17 is after, you know, over two years of review and the 18 decision itself seems to be based entirely upon 19 information that was voluntarily submitted by Entergy 20 that is, as we've documented in a response to it, 21 inaccurate, irrelevant and incomplete, rather than any 22 review of the information that we've submitted that 23 documented financial problems facing this reactor 24 specifically.
25
42 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Now, in one of the documents that we've 1
submitted in relation to that was a report by the 2
investment firm, UBS, which was the initial source of 3
a lot of the documentation of the financial problems 4
facing Fitzpatrick.
5 And, in one of those reports, UBS had 6
actually visited the NRC to discuss with staff the 7
possibility that NRC was going to require the 8
installation of filtered hardened vents on Mark I and 9
II BWRs two years ago. And the UBS, based on the 10 discussion that they had had with NRC staff, expressed 11 confidence that the NRC was going to, in fact, decide 12 not to require filters on Mark I and II vents out of 13 concern for the industry's financial, you know, 14 financial considerations.
15 And this is quoting from their report 16 specifically. We look for a decision from the NRC next 17 week on proposals to require the installation of 18 hardened filtered vents on all Mark I and II units.
19 We increasingly believe the NRC may not 20 require these added precautions given the added stress 21 this places on the incumbent portfolio, with NRC staff 22 initially estimating these retrofits to cost $15 23 million.
24 However, multiple other sources estimate 25
43 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 that the true cost of such installation costs could be 1
up to $40 million per unit.
2 Now, I would like to note that a cost in the 3
range of $15 to $40 million per unit is not an exorbitant 4
cost, it's not an exorbitant capital expense for nuclear 5
reactors in the United States. That, in fact, since 6
this decision was made, Fitzpatrick installed a $15 7
million condenser replacement at the reactor.
8 And this has all been because one of the 9
other Petitions that we filed was an enforcing Petition 10 to get the NRC to require Fitzpatrick to replace the 11 condenser because it was in violation of the unplanned 12 power changes cornerstone in the reactor oversight 13 program.
14 And, what happened in that case was that 15 Entergy should have known in 2012 that it needed to 16 replace the condenser and decided not to, probably for 17 these financial considerations. And NRC continued to 18 let Fitzpatrick operate in violation of a safety 19 cornerstone until their next refueling outage in the 20 fall of 2014, essentially because the question of 21 whether Entergy was going to be willing to invest $50 22 million in the future operations of this reactor was 23 going to, you know, was going to be made.
24 And, as we now know, Entergy decided that 25
44 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 the investments in the, you know, in the new condenser 1
was worth the expense and what we now see as the 2
Petitioners is, essentially, that the NRC have deferred 3
enforcing regulations that have increased the risk of, 4
you know, safety incidents at Fitzpatrick out of 5
financial considerations that Entergy has expressed.
6 And the, you know, but the fact remains 7
that, you know, the filtered vent issue at Fitzpatrick 8
presents a direct threat to the public health and safety 9
and we know, if fact, that it would, you know, have a 10 higher consequence in an accident scenario than what the 11 current plan is.
12 There's a write up that the installation of 13 a hardened vent would reduce the consequences of an 14 accident at Fitzpatrick.
15 And, what the NRC has essentially done is 16 allow Fitzpatrick to decide to replace the condenser and 17 continue running this reactor in this degraded state 18 rather than to address the basic safety problem that 19 would have been able to do at essentially the same cost 20 level.
21 And so, this raises a very serious concern 22 for us that the NRC is essentially allowing Entergy to 23 dictate the terms of regulatory enforcement based on its 24 assertions about its own financial considerations 25
45 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 rather than the NRC actually taking the reins as the 1
regulator and doing its own cost benefit analyses.
2 And I think what you would find in this case 3
is that the cost benefit analysis for enforcing the 4
regulations on Fitzpatrick regarding the hardened vents 5
are, actually, more of a time value of money than the 6
actual expense. Because if Fitzpatrick is going to 7
continue to operate, Entergy is going to make this 8
expense. The difference is whether it makes it now or 9
whether it makes it in four years.
10 And, this is -- and so, and the NRC 11 conducting a cost benefit analysis of the enforcement 12 of the regulation, I believe that this is the way that 13 it needs to be looked at is that there's the time value 14 cost of money which is actually going to be -- which will 15 actually benefit Entergy in the long run because it will 16 be able to amortize the expense of, you know, of 17 installing a hardened event over a longer period of time 18 before the end of the life so that, in fact, this would 19 actually be a benefit to Fitzpatrick to enforce the 20 requirement if they're going to continue to operate the 21 reactor.
22 And if the reality is that if Entergy is not 23 going to be willing to make this expense in order to 24 continue operating the reactor, then better to have them 25
46 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 pose it sooner rather than later because, as we know, 1
the consequence of an accident is almost certain, I 2
mean, you know, the result of an accident is almost 3
certain, you know, given, you know, given the venting 4
strategy that's being used at Fitzpatrick.
5 So, with that, I'll conclude.
6 CHAIR LEE: I'm going to make the closing 7
remarks.
8 At this time, does the NRC staff at 9
headquarters have any questions for the Petitioners?
10 How about the Region?
11 MR. SETZER: No, thank you.
12 CHAIR LEE: Does the licensee have any 13 questions?
14 MR. NAPPI: No, we do not.
15 CHAIR LEE: I'm not sure if there's any 16 member of the public, but before I conclude the meeting, 17 members of the public might provide comments regarding 18 the Petition and ask questions about the 2.206 Petition 19 process.
20 However, as stated at the opening, the 21 purpose of this meeting is not to provide an opportunity 22 for the Petitioner or the public to question or examine 23 the PRB regarding the merits of the Petition Request.
24 Is there any member of the public want to 25
47 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 make any comment or statement?
1 MR. LEWIS: Yes, I do, Marvin Lewis, member 2
of the public.
3 CHAIR LEE: Okay, Mr. Lewis, go ahead.
4 MR. LEWIS: Yes, back in '79 I had a 5
contention before the Three Mile Island Number 1 restart 6
hearing, namely concerning hardened filtered vents.
7 Thankfully, the licensee agreed with me and 8
made my contention moot after two years of whatever.
9 My problem is this, I agree with you. We 10 have to stick to procedure and that is important. But, 11 I respectfully point out that the charter of the NRC 12 specifically states protect the health and safety of the 13 public, nine times.
14 And I respectfully suggest that the NRC and 15 the Hearing Board look to the charter and see if that 16 protection of the health and safety of the public has 17 some precedence over some step, procedural step, that 18 the licensee or the NRC wants to involve itself therein.
19 Thank you.
20 CHAIR LEE: Thank you.
21 Is any other members of public want to make 22 a statement?
23 I would like to thank the Petitioners for 24 taking time to provide the NRC staff the clarifying 25
48 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 information on the Petition you have submitted.
1 And, before we conclude the meeting, does 2
the Court Reporter need any additional information for 3
the meeting transcript?
4 With that, this meeting is concluded and 5
I'm terminating the phone connection.
6 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 7
off the record at 1:29 p.m.)
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23