ML15197A307
| ML15197A307 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/2015 |
| From: | Alexander Chereskin Plant Licensing Branch 1 |
| To: | |
| Chereskin A | |
| References | |
| NRC-1698 | |
| Download: ML15197A307 (50) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Board RE James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket Number: 05000333 Location: teleconference Date: Monday, June 29, 2015 Work Order No.: NRC-1698 Pages 1-49 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
+ + + + +
10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB)
CONFERENCE CALL RE CONTAINMENT VENTILATION AT THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
+ + + + +
MONDAY JUNE 29, 2015
+ + + + +
The conference call was held, Samson Lee, Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, presiding.
PETITIONERS:
JESSICA AZULAY, Alliance for a Green Economy (AGREE)
PAUL GUNTER, Beyond Nuclear TIM JUDSON, Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS)
RUTH THOMAS, Environmentalists, Inc.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
2 PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS SAMSON LEE, Deputy Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Risk Assessment ALEXANDER CHERESKIN, Petition Manager for 2.206 Petition PATRICIA JEHLE, Office of General Counsel MERRILEE BANIC, Agency 2.206 Coordinator, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Policy and Rulemaking ROBERT FRETZ, Office of Enforcement MANDY HALTER, Acting Branch Chief, Orders Management Branch, Japan Lessons-Learned Division, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation BRETT TITUS, Acting Branch Chief, Containment and Balance-of-Plant Branch, Japan Lessons-Learned Division, Office of Nuclear Regulation TOM SETZER, Senior Project Engineer, Region I NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF DOUGLAS PICKETT, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation BOOMA VENKATARAMAN, Project Manager, Division of Operating Reactor licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
3 NRC REGION I NEIL SHEEHAN, Public Affairs, Region I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
4 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 12:30 p.m.
3 MR. CHERESKIN: Okay, it's 12:30, so I 4 think we can start this meeting.
5 All right, thank you everybody for coming 6 to attend this meeting.
7 My name is Alex Chereskin and I am the NRC 8 Petition Manager for this Petition.
9 The purpose of today's meeting is for the 10 Petitioners to address the NRC's Petition Review Board, 11 or PRB, per their request regarding the Petition dated 12 March 9, 2012 as supplemented.
13 This meeting is scheduled from 12:30 p.m.
14 to 2:00 p.m. Eastern Time to allow the Petitioners a full 15 hour1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> to address the PRB with the introductions as well.
16 This meeting is being recorded by the NRC 17 Operation Center and the recording will be transcribed 18 by a Court Reporter. And that transcript will become 19 a supplement to the Petition and will be made publically 20 available.
21 At this time, the people present at this 22 meeting at NRC Headquarters will introduce themselves.
23 As we go around the room, I'd like everyone to state it 24 loud and clear. We do have little microphone 25 extensions off the phone, so if you could talk into one NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
5 1 of those, I'd appreciate it.
2 And I'll begin. My name is Alex Chereskin.
3 My last name is spelled C-H-E-R-E-S-K-I-N. I'm a 4 Project Manager in NRC's Division of Operating Reactor 5 Licensing. I'm also the Petition Manager for this 6 Petition.
7 CHAIR LEE: My name is Samson Lee. I'm the 8 Deputy Division Director for NRC's Division of Risk 9 Assessment and I'm the PRB Chairman for this Petition.
10 MS. HALTER: Hi, my name is Mandy Halter.
11 I'm the Acting Chief of the Orders Management Branch in 12 Japan Lessons-Learned Division at NRR.
13 MR. TITUS: My name is Brent Titus and I'm 14 the Acting Chief for Containment and Balance-of-Plant 15 Branch also in the Japan Lessons-Learned Division at 16 NRR.
17 MR. FRETZ: My name is Robert Fretz and I'm 18 representing the Office of Enforcement.
19 MS. BANIC: Lee Banic, Petition 20 Coordinator, NRR.
21 MR. PICKETT: I'm Doug Pickett. I'm the 22 NRR Project Manager for Fitzpatrick.
23 MS. JEHLE: Patricia Jehle, Office of the 24 General Counsel and the last name is spelled J-E-H-L-E.
25 MS. VENKATARAMAN: My name is Booma NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
6 1 Venkataraman. I am Project Manager in the Division of 2 Operating Licensing.
3 MR. CHERESKIN: That's great. And are 4 there any other participants from NRC Headquarters on 5 the phone or from the Region?
6 MR. SETZER: Hi, this is Tom Setzer. I'm 7 the Senior Project Engineer for Region I.
8 MR. SHEEHAN: Neil Sheehan, NRC Region I 9 Public Affairs.
10 MR. CHERESKIN: Okay, I don't hear any 11 other NRC folks on the phone.
12 Are there any representatives from 13 Entergy, the licensee, on the phone?
14 MR. ADNER: Yes, this is Chris Adner, JAF 15 Regulatory Assurance Manager.
16 MR. NAPPI: Hi, this is Jerry Nappi, 17 Entergy Communications. That's N as in November, 18 A-P-P-I.
19 MR. CHERESKIN: All right, not hearing 20 anyone else from Entergy, would the Petitioners please 21 introduce yourselves for the record?
22 We'll start here at NRC Headquarters and 23 then if there are any Petitioners on the phone, we'll 24 go there afterwards.
25 MR. GUNTER: Thank you.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
7 1 My name is Paul Gunter and I'm Director of 2 the Reactor Oversight Project at Beyond Nuclear in 3 Takoma Park, Maryland.
4 MR. JUDSON: And Tim Judson, I'm the 5 Executive Director at the Nuclear Information and 6 Resource Service based in Takoma Park.
7 And, also, the original filing of this 8 Petition and this is the Petition that I filed when I 9 was the president of Citizens Awareness Network which 10 was one of the original Petitioners.
11 MR. CHERESKIN: All right. Do we have any 12 Petitioners joining us on the phone?
13 MS. AZULAY: Yes, good afternoon. This is 14 Jessica Azulay. I'm Program Director for Alliance for 15 a Green Economy.
16 MS. THOMAS: Ruth Thomas with the 17 Environmentalists, Incorporated.
18 MR. CHERESKIN: All right. And it's not 19 required for members of the public to introduce 20 themselves for this call. However, if there are any 21 members of the public on the phone that wish to do so 22 at this time, you may state your name for the record.
23 All right, I don't hear anyone else, so I'd 24 just like to reiterate that, again, it's important to 25 speak clearly and loudly to make sure that the Court NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
8 1 Reporter can hear us and that the recording of this is 2 clear.
3 And, when you speak, if you could please 4 first state your name for the record, that'll help in 5 developing the transcript.
6 For the people on the phone for this 7 meeting, please remember to mute your phones to minimize 8 any background noise that you may have. If you do not 9 have mute button, you can press the key star and then 10 six. And if you press star, six again, it'll unmute the 11 phone.
12 And at this time, I'll turn it over to the 13 PRB Chairman, Samson Lee, for some opening remarks.
14 CHAIR LEE: Welcome to this meeting 15 regarding the 2.206 Petition submitted by Paul Gunter 16 and Company.
17 I will now share some background on NRC's 18 2.206 process.
19 Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of 20 Federal Regulations describes the petition process.
21 The primary mechanism for the public to request 22 enforcement action by the NRC in the public process.
23 This process permits anyone to petition NRC 24 to take enforcement-type actions related to NRC 25 licensees or license activities.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
9 1 Depending on the results of this 2 evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRC 3 issue license or take any other appropriate enforcement 4 action to resolve a problem.
5 The NRC staff guidance for the disposition 6 of 2.206 petition requests is a Management Directive 7 8.11 which is publically available.
8 The purpose of today's meeting is to give 9 the Petitioner an opportunity to provide any additional 10 explanation or support for the Petition before the 11 Petition Review Board's initial consideration and 12 recommendation.
13 This meeting is not a hearing nor is it an 14 opportunity for the Petitioner to question or examine 15 the PRB on the merits or the issues presented in the 16 Petition Request.
17 No decisions regarding the merits of the 18 Petition will be made at this meeting.
19 Following this meeting, the Petition 20 Review Board will conduct its internal deliberations.
21 The outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed 22 with the Petitioner.
23 The Petition Review Board typically 24 consists of a chairman, usually a manager at the senior 25 executive service level at the NRC. It has a Petition NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
10 1 Manager and a PRB coordinator.
2 Other members of the Board are determined 3 by the NRC staff based on the content of the information 4 in the Petition Request. The members have already 5 introduced themselves.
6 As described in our process, the NRC staff 7 may ask clarifying questions in order to better 8 understand the Petitioner's presentation and to reach 9 a reasoned decision whether to accept or reject the 10 Petitioner's Request for review under the 2.206 11 process.
12 The following is a summary of the scope of 13 the Petition under consideration and the joint 14 Petitioner's activities today.
15 On March 9, 2012, as supplemented March 13 16 and March 20, 2012, Mr. Paul Gunter and others submitted 17 a joint Petition to the NRC under Title 10 of the Code 18 of Federal Regulations Part 2.206 regarding the James 19 A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
20 The Petition requests the immediate 21 suspension of the Fitzpatrick operating license, that 22 Fitzpatrick be subject to public hearings with full 23 hearing rights with regards to continue operation and 24 that Entergy shall properly document post-Fukushima 25 analysis of the preexisting containment vent system for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
11 1 independent review.
2 The Petitioners have also submitted a 3 Freedom of Information Act, FOIA, request dated October 4 11, 2012 requesting various communications between the 5 NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRR 6 headquarters, the Office of General Counsel, Region I 7 and the Resident Inspectors.
8 The Petitioners received a response to this 9 request on August 7, 2013. The Petitioners had said 10 that this information was necessary in order to address 11 the PRB for a second time.
12 I will now discuss the NRC activities to 13 date.
14 On October 4, 2012, the NRC staff informed 15 the Petitioners of the PRB's initial recommendation to 16 partially accept the Petition Review under the 2.206 17 process. The NRC staff notes in this email that the 18 parts of the Petition that address containment 19 ventilation under accident conditions and the ability 20 for the disarm of vent systems to accommodate hydrogen 21 gas met the criteria to be reviewed under the 2.206 22 process.
23 The other portions of the Petition did not 24 meet the criteria for review under the 2.206 process.
25 The NRC staff first gave the Petitioners an NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
12 1 opportunity to address the PRB for a second time. After 2 the initial recommendation per MD8.11 in the October 4, 3 2012 email.
4 Since the Petitioners requested a response 5 to their FOIA request prior to addressing the PRB again, 6 the NRC staff waited until the FOIA request was answered 7 and contacted the Petitioner again on February 5, 2015 8 to give the Petitioners another opportunity to address 9 the PRB.
10 This opportunity to address the PRB is 11 being given to the Petitioners to provide additional 12 relevant explanation and support for the Petition 13 Request in light of the PRB's initial recommendation and 14 the information contained in the FOIA request and 15 response.
16 This concludes the summary of NRC 17 activities to date.
18 As a reminder for the phone participants, 19 please state your name if you make any remarks as it will 20 help us in the preparation of the meeting transcript 21 that will be made publically available.
22 I will now turn it over to the Petitioners 23 to allow them the opportunity to provide any information 24 they believe the PRB should consider as part of this 25 Petition. You have one hour for your presentation.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
13 1 MR. GUNTER: Okay, thank you.
2 And, good afternoon. My name is Paul 3 Gunter and I represent the Petitioner, Beyond Nuclear.
4 We're based in Takoma Park, Maryland.
5 I'd like to start out by saying that it's 6 our concern that Entergy's Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power 7 Plant in Scriba, New York fits into a historic and 8 disturbing and recurring pattern of the nuclear 9 industry's failure to comply with design performance 10 criteria for the GE Mark I boiling water reactor 11 containment licensing basis and the U.S. Nuclear 12 Regulatory Commission's failure as a regulator to 13 require and enforce compliance on that licensing basis.
14 Fitzpatrick is a GE Mark I boiling water 15 reactor as were the Fukushima Daiichi units one through 16 five. Units one, two and three were power at power on 17 March 11, 2011 at the time of the earthquake and tsunami 18 and all experienced severe reactor accidents followed 19 by catastrophic containment failure and widespread and 20 persistent radiological contamination. Fukushima 21 Daiichi's units one, three and four experienced 22 hydrogen explosions.
23 The Petitioners have requested this second 24 meeting to respond to the NRC Petition Review Board's 25 initial recommendations to reject in part and accept in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
14 1 part while holding in abeyance actions requested in the 2 March 9, 2012 Emergency Enforcement Petition that's 3 supplemented on March 13th and March 20, 2012.
4 The Petition Review Board rejects the 5 Petitioners' request that the Fitzpatrick operating 6 license be immediately suspending pending a public 7 hearing on the power reactor's continued operation with 8 the substandard and severe accident vulnerable GE Mark 9 I Pressure Suppression Containment.
10 The power authority of the State of New York 11 refused to make modifications with the installation of 12 a hardened containment vent line as recommended in NRC's 13 Generic Letter 86-19 issued September 1, 2001 1989.
14 Now, post-Fukushima, the current operator, 15 Entergy, continues to rely upon the unmodified 16 preexisting partially hardened and partially 17 nonpressure bearing vent path that, if used under 18 accident conditions, it's highly likely to fail to high 19 pressure steam and non-condensible explosive gasses in 20 the auxiliary housing at the standby gas treatment 21 system resulting in a radiologic release at ground 22 level.
23 The Petitioners respond that Generic 24 Letter 89-16 explicitly acknowledges that the continued 25 reliance on such preexisting capability including, and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
15 1 I quote, nonpressure bearing vent path or duct work, 2 unquote, jeopardizes the access to vital plant areas and 3 equipment and represents an, quote, unnecessary 4 complication that threatens accident management 5 strategies.
6 The Petitioners have asserted that this 7 same unnecessary complication represents an undue 8 public health and safety risk.
9 The PRB rejected the Petitioners' request 10 for immediate enforcement actions stating that there is 11 no imminent threat to the public health and safety 12 because, quote, a sequence of events like the Fukushima 13 accident is unlikely to occur in the United States and, 14 quote, continued operation and licensing activities do 15 not pose an immediate threat to the public health and 16 safety, end quote.
17 The fact is that there have now been five 18 severe nuclear accidents in the past 36 years 19 demonstrating, by observation, that the likelihood of 20 severe accidents, in reality, is greater than the NRC 21 theoretical and the industry promotional models 22 produced since 1970.
23 All the severe accident sequences were 24 unique to one another and unanticipated.
25 This reality places an emphasis on the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
16 1 importance of regulatory enforcement to maintain NRC's 2 purported defense in depth philosophy at every level 3 including containment performance criteria for the all 4 important final barrier protecting the public health 5 and safety from radiological disaster.
6 Chapter 10 of the Code of Federal 7 Regulation Part 56 Appendix A General Design Criterion 8 16 establishes the minimum requirement for containment 9 design performance and, quote, an essentially leak 10 tight containment structure against the uncontrolled 11 release of radioactivity to the environment and to 12 assure that the containment design conditions important 13 to safety are not exceeded for as long as postulated 14 action conditions require.
15 The fact that NRC issued Generic Letter 16 8916 to the operator, Fitzpatrick, and the industry on 17 a voluntary compliance basis deferred its enforcement 18 obligation to maintain licensing agreements for the 19 containment performance criteria.
20 It further deferred its commitment to 21 maintain defense in depth at Fitzpatrick when the 22 operator opted out of installing a hardened containment 23 vent, instead, relying upon a pre-installed only 24 partially hardened containment vent system.
25 Given that Generic Letter 89-16 was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
17 1 implemented under 10 CFR 50.59, Fitzpatrick has 2 installed partial containment, their hardware was not 3 inspected by NRC walk-down, only by a review of its 4 design.
5 The Petitioners further assert that the 6 fact that the installation of a hardened containment 7 vent as described in Generic Letter 89-16 was installed 8 at the Fukushima Daiichi units and failed to avert 9 catastrophic containment failure, but does not justify 10 the Fitzpatrick operator's decision to not install the 11 hardened contained vent from the primary containment 12 through a release point on the elevated emission stack.
13 Rather, both the multiple hardened vent 14 failures would successfully vent explosive gasses at 15 four Fukushima Mark I units and Fitzpatrick operators 16 continued reliance on the preexisting containment vent 17 amplified the Petitioners' concern with the current 18 licensing basis vulnerability.
19 We, therefore, reassert our request that 20 the Fitzpatrick unit be immediately suspended.
21 The Petitioners acknowledge that the NRC 22 issued Enforcement Action 2012-050, Order to Modify 23 Licenses with Hardened Containment Vents and 24 established the mandatory compliance date for enhanced 25 hardened containment vent on all Mark I and Mark II NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
18 1 units, including Fitzpatrick to be no later than 2 December 31, 2016.
3 On June 6, 2013, the NRC issued Enforcement 4 Action 2013-109, Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses 5 with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents 6 capable of operation under severe accident conditions 7 superseding EA 2012-050.
8 EA 2013-109 provides for compliance dates 9 for Phase I of the installation of a now enhanced 10 reliable hardened containment vent on the wet well 11 component of the containment no later than June 30, 2018 12 and for Phase II compliance no later than June 30, 2019 13 for the installation of an optional unfiltered 14 containment vent on the dry well component of the 15 containment.
16 Or an alternative mitigation strategy for 17 severe accident water addition and severe accident 18 water management that does not install a hardened vent 19 but, instead, relies upon partial flood up of the dry 20 well component while managing water addition to 21 maintain free board in the wet well so that the Phase 22 I hardened vent remains operable to relieve the 23 accident's high pressure extreme temperature and 24 noncombustible and non-condensible and combustible 25 gasses to the atmosphere.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
19 1 The wet well does not have an external 2 filter and relies upon the original design S-curve 3 effect in the wet well water to prevent radiological 4 releases to the environment.
5 The Petitioners now note that the addition 6 of a one and a half year delay before full implementation 7 of the Phase I wet well hardened containment vent 8 totaling as an additional three years that Fitzpatrick 9 will operate with the vulnerable Mark I pressure 10 suppression containment system and the preexisting 11 partially hardened containment vent.
12 The Petitioners reassert that extending 13 the continued operation of Fitzpatrick with an 14 unreliable containment under accident conditions 15 represents an undue risk to public health and safety.
16 And, in the interim, and prompts the call 17 for the suspension of the Fitzpatrick operating 18 license.
19 Given the history of NRC regulation, the 20 extended delay is not likely to be the last. The 21 Petitioners have asked for the suspension of the 22 suspension of operations with the preexisting 23 containment vent certainly with that in mind.
24 The Petition Review Board has rejected a 25 review of the requested action in part stating the staff NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
20 1 explicitly recognized the wide variance in the 2 reliability of the hardened vent designs among Mark I 3 plants. The design at Fitzpatrick is one example of 4 that variance.
5 Therefore, the issue should be rejected 6 pursuant to criterion two for rejecting a Petition under 7 2.206 and to quote, meaning that the raised issue has 8 already been thoroughly reviewed by the NRC and is 9 resolved such that the solution is applicable to the 10 raised issue.
11 The Petitioners note that this same wide 12 variance in reliability of hardened vent designs 13 includes not only Fitzpatrick's half-measure of a 14 containment vent that if used under severe accident 15 conditions will likely explode inside the adjacent 16 building to the reactor building.
17 It also includes the demonstrated failed 18 vent design at Fukushima Daiichi's units one, two, three 19 and four.
20 Accordingly, the NRC's Orwellian-like 21 interpretation of variance reliability includes 22 unreliable performance.
23 Again, the Petitioners reassert that 24 Fitzpatrick operating license should be suspended.
25 The Petition Review Board accepts three of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
21 1 the Petitioners challenges for the suspension. Those 2 challenges are Fitzpatrick operators claim of, quote, 3 unlikely ignition points, unquote, in the preexisting 4 event line and release path that would otherwise cause 5 a detonation of hydrogen gas generated by a severe 6 accident.
7 Also, the NRC Inspection Report finding 8 that Fitzpatrick, quote, existing plant capabilities 9 and, quote, current procedures do not address hydrogen 10 considerations during primary venting.
11 And, Fitzpatrick's mitigation strategy and 12 current procedures do not address hydrogen 13 considerations during primary containment venting.
14 In each case, the Petition Review Board 15 references the NRC Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 16 5.1 to order licensees to include reliable hardened 17 containment vents on all Mark I and Mark II boiling water 18 reactors, namely, Enforcement Action 2013109 and Task 19 Force Recommendation 6 for a long term review by NRC to 20 identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation 21 inside containment or in other buildings as additional 22 information is revealed through further study of the 23 Fukushima Daiichi accident.
24 The Petitioners have a number of concerns 25 with the Petition Review Board's recommendation to hold NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
22 1 the requested enforcement action in abeyance while 2 Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant continues to operate 3 with a vulnerable containment structure and unaddressed 4 safety issues that involve the large amounts of 5 non-conensible explosive gasses that would be generated 6 under severe accident conditions and ignition sources 7 that can result in deflagration and detonation with 8 widespread and long lasting radiological consequences 9 that will affect large sectors of society, the economy 10 and the environment.
11 The matter of arriving at timely resolution 12 to these unaddressed issues ranks high among the 13 Petitioners concerns.
14 According to NRC presentations, the 15 current challenges to the hydrogen gas problem includes 16 very little reliable empirical data on hydrogen is being 17 used -- is being recorded since the Fukushima accident.
18 And any verifiable information on the chain of events 19 at Fukushima may not be available for ten plus years.
20 In Supporters' Petition, the Petitioners 21 submit, for the record, Natural Resource Defense 22 Council's Technical Report preventing hydrogen 23 explosions in severe nuclear accidents, unresolved 24 safety issues involving hydrogen gas generation and 25 mitigation dated March 2014, with findings that the NRC NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
23 1 and the nuclear industry are far from resolution for 2 Recommendation 6.
3 Even after Fukushima Daiichi's three 4 devastating hydrogen explosions, the NRC has regulated 5 its investigation of severe accident hydrogen 6 generation safety issues to the lowest priority of its 7 post-Fukushima Daiichi Accident Response.
8 The NRDC report finds that beyond adding 9 reliable hardened containment vents to the Fukushima 10 cell reactors, it could take decades before the U.S.
11 nuclear industry implements further hydrogen gas 12 control measures.
13 A boiling water reactor like Fitzpatrick 14 has several times more mass of zirconium in their 15 reactor core than larger pressurized reactors like 16 Indian Point Unit 3.
17 A typical BWR core with 800 fuel assemblies 18 would actually have more than 76,000 kilograms of 19 zirconium cited by the IAEA as typically present in a 20 BWR core.
21 It is the interaction of this zirconium 22 fuel colliding with steam at high temperatures during 23 a severe accident that generates the explosive gas.
24 The NRC Technical Report further finds that 25 the NRC computer models under predict hydrogen gas NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
24 1 generation rates during severe accidents, citing 2 technical reports from Oak Ridge National Laboratory 3 and the International Atomic Energy Agency which 4 account for hydrogen gas generation during the 5 evolution of a severe accident and how computer safety 6 models under predict rates of hydrogen generation that 7 would occur during the re-flooding of an overheated 8 reactor core that can cause hydrogen gas rates to vary 9 by a large degree.
10 NRDC points out that, despite these 11 reports, the NRC Near-Term Task Force failed to discuss 12 NRC computer safety models like MELCOR that under 13 predict such hydrogen gas generation rates, thus, 14 undermining defense in depth with less conservative 15 computer models.
16 And, I quote, when hydrogen generation 17 rates are under predicted, hydrogen mitigation systems 18 are not likely to be designed so that they can handle 19 the generation rates that would occur in actual severe 20 accidents, unquote.
21 As such, contrary to NRC and industry 22 claims, the reliable hardened containment vent issue is 23 not yet resolved and very likely to prove troublesome 24 to NRC and industry on holding to current implementation 25 schedules and are no more reliable than the wide NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
25 1 variance of design of its predecessors.
2 The NRDC report calls particular attention 3 to the severe accident scenarios where there is a rapid 4 containment pressure increase and uncertainty for the 5 diameter and thickness of a reliable containment vent 6 line and more certainty for the lack of reliability of 7 as-built containment vent such as relied on at 8 Fitzpatrick for the next several years at least.
9 The NRDC report further illuminates that 10 current NRC enforcement action does not require that 11 hydrogen be mitigated in the BWR secondary containment, 12 also known as the reactor building, in several and 13 severe accidents, despite the multiple demonstrations 14 and devastating consequence at Fukushima Daiichi.
15 In line with the NRC defense in depth 16 philosophy, hydrogen gas leakage for more than 150 17 penetration in the Fitzpatrick Mark I primary 18 containment and/or hardened containment line needs to 19 be considered and mitigated.
20 Severe accident hydrogen explosions remain 21 an unresolved safety issue. The NRDC report points out 22 that during a severe accident, large volumes of water 23 will be pumped into the Fitzpatrick's reactor core 24 creating thousands of kilograms of steam.
25 While this large quantity of steam may NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
26 1 initially create an inerting effect that can suppress 2 and prevent hydrogen gas explosions, the steam will 3 eventually condense at some point in an accident either 4 naturally or by the use of containment systems for 5 hydrogen combustion causing hydrogen combustion and 6 which will occur only with a very small amount of energy 7 from an electrical spark or a static electric charge, 8 for example, that caused the Hindenburg disaster.
9 But it is our concern that the attention 10 should be drawn to the widespread and unaccepting 11 consequences of allowing Fitzpatrick to continue to 12 operate with its substandard containment and only 13 partial measure that proves to be highly unreliable.
14 Thank you. That concludes my remarks.
15 MR. CHERESKIN: I believe Jessica has been 16 waiting.
17 CHAIR LEE: Jessica, you'd like to make 18 some remarks?
19 MS. AZULAY: Yes, thank you.
20 Thank you for the opportunity to address 21 you today. Thank you to my co-Petitioners who are there 22 in person.
23 My name is Jessica Azulay. I'm Program 24 Director for Alliance for a Green Economy, also known 25 as AGREE. And we are a New York State based coalition NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
27 1 of environmental and social justice organizations.
2 AGREE has served as the primary nuclear 3 watchdog organization in Central New York since the 4 beginning of the ongoing Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.
5 Since that catastrophe began to unfold, we 6 have sought to understand why the Mark I reactors at 7 Fukushima experience meltdowns and why their 8 containments were breached. And we have sought to 9 understand how the Mark I and their cousin, Mark II, 10 reactors in our region might be vulnerable to the same 11 kinds of meltdowns and massive radiological release.
12 Central New York is home to two Mark I 13 reactors, Fitzpatrick and Nine Mile Point 1 and one Mark 14 II reactor, Nine Mile Point 2.
15 I personally live in Syracuse, New York 16 which is about 36 miles from those reactors and I am one 17 of about a million people who live within 50 miles of 18 Fitzpatrick and Nine Mile 2.
19 Our way of life in Central New York is 20 heavily dependent on our clean water resources, our 21 farming and our forests and a clean environment is 22 essential to our health and well-being. It is 23 essential to the economy of the rest of the State of New 24 York as well.
25 A Fukushima-style accident could render a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
28 1 large part of my region uninhabitable. Those of us 2 lucky enough to evacuate would have our lives derailed 3 and the plant and animal life and those who are not 4 evacuated could have their lives destroyed.
5 The economic blow to our state would be 6 enormous and the radiological contamination of Lake 7 Ontario, one of the world's largest sources of fresh 8 water would be a tragedy beyond words.
9 I say all this because I want to remind you 10 that your decisions have real world consequences, real 11 world risks. Your decisions matter to me personally 12 and to every person, every living thing in Central New 13 York.
14 If you make risky decisions in this case, 15 you are putting our lives at risk.
16 So, I'm calling in today really just to 17 ask a simple question of you and your colleagues at NRC.
18 Do we in Central New York deserve to be protected from 19 radiation in the case of an accident at Fitzpatrick?
20 If the answer is yes, which I hope it is, 21 will the NRC commit to enforcing right now it's General 22 Design Criterion 16 which requires a reliable leak proof 23 containment to protect the public from radiation 24 exposure during an accident?
25 That's what this Petition is all about.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
29 1 It's about the fact that Fitzpatrick does not have a 2 containment system that will protect us from radiation 3 in the case of accident.
4 I say this as fact because I've reviewed 5 hundreds of pages dating back to the 1980s dealing with 6 this issue. And in not one of them have I found the NRC 7 or the plant operators claiming that Fitzpatrick has a 8 containment system that will prevent the release of 9 radiation in the case of a severe accident.
10 Sure, there's a lot in the documentation 11 about how unlikely an accident is. There's a lot of 12 calculation about how much an accident would cost in 13 lives and money and how events contribution to 14 preventing an accident is so small it supposedly wasn't 15 worth the $680,000.00 it would have taken back in the 16 early 1990s to install a hardened vent to the stack.
17 There is information about how this or that 18 vent design will help prevent a meltdown and how this 19 or that vent design will be easier or harder to operate.
20 But let's be real here, no one is saying 21 that in the case of an accident that radiation won't 22 escape and that we won't be contaminated.
23 So, I just want to ask you that in your 24 deliberations about how to handle our Petition, you ask 25 yourselves whether Fitzpatrick is in compliance with NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
30 1 the General Design Criterion 16 or not?
2 If an accident occurs at this plant, I 3 assure that no one will excuse inaction based on the 4 precedent of inaction.
5 Now, I will turn to the specifics of the 6 Fitzpatrick case because I want to make sure you 7 understand that Fitzpatrick is a unique case because the 8 vent plan on the books doesn't really even make a 9 pretense of protection.
10 I'm going to reference a number of 11 documents that we received through the Freedom of 12 Information Act Request and I'll email these documents 13 to our Petition Manager so that you have them at your 14 fingertips to accompany your review of my statement.
15 The documents we received through the 16 Freedom of Information Act Request suggest that the vent 17 at Fitzpatrick will not work in a station blackout 18 scenario to help prevent a meltdown or the total loss 19 of containment.
20 One document dated September 28, 1992 with 21 the subject Hardened Wet Well Vent Capability at the 22 James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Plant describes in detail 23 how the vent would not be effective in a station blackout 24 situation because by the time the pressure is high 25 enough to be vented, it would be too late to use the vent NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
31 1 effectively.
2 So, it seems from this and other documents 3 that we are unprotected if there is a loss of offsite 4 power and something goes wrong with the backup power 5 sources, this Fitzpatrick vent will not help us.
6 But what about cases in which the vent can 7 supposedly be used?
8 Let me review what a successful venting at 9 Fitzpatrick looks like. Because Fitzpatrick is a Mark 10 I reactor and its containment is relatively small, it 11 is not designed to be able to withstand the build up of 12 pressure that would result from a severe accident.
13 So, if the operators at Fitzpatrick find 14 themselves in an accident scenario in which proves 15 pressure is building, they will want to relieve the 16 pressure building up at the reactor.
17 The plan is to open some valves and create 18 a pathway for steam, radiation and other materials to 19 exit the reactor building through a couple of pipes and 20 enter the ductwork in the adjacent standby gas treatment 21 building where it is expected that the ductwork will 22 fail and steam and radiation will be released into the 23 building.
24 Pressure will then build up in the standup 25 gas treatment building until the doors to outside blow NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
32 1 off, releasing the steam and radiation into the 2 environment at ground level. That's if things go 3 right.
4 Again, if things go right, the area around 5 the standby gas treatment building will be contaminated 6 with radioactive steam.
7 In the hundreds of NRC pages I've reviewed 8 on this plan, I have not found any discussion about how 9 this might affect workers on the site or how it might 10 hamper recovery efforts to get an accident under 11 control. I cannot believe this never discussed and 12 never studied.
13 But, as far as I can tell, the impact on 14 workers is unknown as is the extent to which releasing 15 radiation at the ground level could compromise access 16 to important parts of the Nine Mile Nuclear Complex 17 which houses Fitzpatrick and Nine Mile Point 1 and 2.
18 The potential for this vent plan to affect 19 the other nuclear plants at the site has been completely 20 ignored by NRC, to our knowledge.
21 What is known is that the impact on the 22 public will be greater because of the ground level 23 release at Fitzpatrick. And, if there were a hardened 24 vent path going to the stack like at the other Mark I 25 reactors in the U.S.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
33 1 A June 15, 1990 document titled Staff 2 Back-Fit Analysis for James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear 3 Plant Regarding Installation of a Hardened Wet Well Vent 4 is very clear on this point.
5 It states, quote, for venting sequences, 6 the hardened vent connected to the plant stack could 7 reduce dose consequences more effectively by 8 approximately a factor of two than venting through the 9 ductwork.
10 This reduction is due to a greater 11 effectiveness of atmospheric dispersion resulting from 12 controlled elevated relief compared to an uncontrolled 13 ground level release from ductwork, unquote.
14 So, we see that if the Fitzpatrick is used 15 as planned, the public will receive twice as much 16 radiation than if there were a vent to the stack.
17 Now, all of this was a discussion of what 18 would happen if things go according to plan. But the 19 record shows that NRC now has serious doubts about 20 whether things would go according to plan.
21 For one, it was assumed all this time that 22 there would not be an explosion in the standby gas 23 treatment building if this plan were followed, or 24 rather, I think it's more accurate to say that because 25 NRC staff was uncertain about whether there would be an NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
34 1 explosion, they let the New York power authority to 2 convince them to accept an inferior vent plan.
3 In so, with potential ignition sources in 4 the standby gas treatment building, this is clear from 5 the September 28, 1992 letter. And that the way to 6 prevent the possibility of a deflagration was to bypass 7 that building and vent to the stack.
8 But, because there was, quote, uncertainty 9 about whether the materials being vented would be 10 combustible, they allowed the inferior vent plan to 11 stand despite their reservations.
12 Quoting again from that September 28, 1992 13 document, a hardened pipe bypass around the standby gas 14 treatment system could prevent any hydrogen 15 deflagration within the SGPS room.
16 The licensee estimated the cost of this 17 modification at $680,000.00. The licensee concluded 18 that combustion in the existing vent path is not 19 significant and does not plan to modify the vent design.
20 Based on the uncertainty as to whether a 21 combustible mixture could develop, the prevention 22 potential of steam and nitrogen to suppress a hydrogen 23 deflagration, the mitigation potential of the concrete 24 wall between the SGPS room and the safety related 25 equipment and the costs associated with modifications, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
35 1 the NRC staff concludes that the existing design is 2 acceptable and the intent of the criterion has been met, 3 close quote.
4 After Fukushima, some NRC staff thought 5 this decision should be revisited, at least it seemed 6 that way from the emails and other documents we obtained 7 through the FOIA Request.
8 For instance, a summary of TI 183 9 inspections we received states, quote, the inspectors 10 identified that the current licensing basis does not 11 require the licensee to have a hardened wet well vent 12 installed as part of their Mark I containment program 13 improvements.
14 While the decision to not install the 15 hardened vent received regulatory approval, it may be 16 appropriate to reevaluate the adequacy of the existing 17 wet well vent strategy and configuration, close quote.
18 A March 2013 email from John Rain to other 19 NRC staff reviewing the history of the Fitzpatrick vent 20 expresses skepticism as to whether the vent could be 21 manually opened by hand when power is unavailable, 22 remarking with a little dark humor, as our Japanese 23 colleagues would likely say, good luck with that.
24 And yet, you have allowed this plant to 25 continue operating knowing all of this. It seems the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
36 1 only action taken to date was to issue guidance to the 2 plant operators that they should use caution when 3 considering using the vent because of the potential for 4 a hydrogen explosion.
5 According to an April 17, 2012 email from 6 Ed Knutson, the senior resident inspector at 7 Fitzpatrick which we obtained through the FOIA, the 8 guidance for primary containment venting without AC 9 power was changed to include in the consideration, 10 quote, venting primary containment to secondary 11 containment is likely to be an irreversible action since 12 it will result in discharge of steam and non-condensible 13 gas potentially causing fission products and hydrogen 14 to the reactor building creating an environment with 15 severe thermal radiological and combustible/explosive 16 conditions, close quote.
17 Doesn't urging caution make it less likely 18 that the vent would be used to prevent a serious accident 19 which, in turn, makes a serious accident more likely?
20 How does the NRC response to this situation reflect the 21 lessons learned from Fukushima?
22 It seems the lessons have helped identify 23 a festering problem, but has not spurred adequate action 24 to protect the public.
25 As a resident of Central New York, I'm NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
37 1 desperate to know that after Fukushima, the U.S.
2 regulators are taking the lessons learned seriously and 3 are addressing any known issues they find at our local 4 nuclear reactors. And, it seems clear to me that you 5 have fallen down on the job.
6 The NRC has known for years that the Mark 7 Is simply do not provide a leak proof containment and 8 that the vent plan at Fitzpatrick carries with it 9 certain risks to the public, more risks because of the 10 potential for ground level contamination than any other 11 reactor of its type.
12 And now, the NRC knows that, based on the 13 lessons of Fukushima, that the consequences of loss of 14 power or other severe scenarios at Mark Is can be 15 catastrophic and irreversible. Yet, the only 16 assurance we get, the only rationale for inaction is 17 that an accident is unlikely.
18 This is not a satisfactory answer. We 19 deserve a real accounting of the risks at Fitzpatrick.
20 In your original preliminary recommendation, the 21 Petition Review Board told us you were planning to 22 accept portions of our Petition but to hold them in 23 abeyance because of the rulemaking happening around 24 Mark I vents.
25 But, I urge you to accept this Petition NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
38 1 without delay. Fitzpatrick poses an unacceptable risk 2 and it is not in compliance with the most basic of NRC 3 regulations requiring leak proof containment.
4 The existence of an inferior vent plan that 5 could lead to an explosion and/or ground level release 6 of radiation makes an accident more likely because 7 operators are told to be cautious about venting.
8 The cost of inaction or delay could be a 9 meltdown and the irreversible destruction of Central 10 New York.
11 If you are unwilling to shutdown the 12 reactor, I urge you to at least immediately grant the 13 public hearings we seek. Bring the situation into the 14 light of day and require Entergy to answer our questions 15 in a public forum. Entergy should be required to 16 publically document for independent review its 17 post-Fukushima reanalysis for the reliability and 18 capability of the Fitzpatrick vent.
19 Thank you very much for your time today.
20 MR. JUDSON: So, my name is Tim Judson.
21 I'm the Executive Director at the Nuclear Information 22 and Resource Service and I appreciate the Petition 23 Review Board's extension of this opportunity to address 24 you regarding the Fitzpatrick 2.206 Petition on 25 Fitzpatrick.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
39 1 You know, I want to address some of the 2 overarching concerns that the Petitioners have 3 developed over the course of this process regarding the 4 justifications that NRC has offered for what we see as 5 really inaction on our Petition, you know, the holding 6 of our Petition in abeyance.
7 And we're very concerned that the NRC is, 8 you know, is failing to act on these issues essentially 9 the way of protecting out of compliance reactors from 10 the expense of, you know, of having to restore 11 compliance at the expense of the worker and public 12 health and safety.
13 And, you know, I think what we've seen in 14 the documents that Jessica has described is that there's 15 an acknowledgment that, you know, in this particular 16 case with Fitzpatrick, that there would be a, you know, 17 double the dose consequence to the public from, you 18 know, from the utilization of Entergy's venting 19 strategy at Fitzpatrick. And there would be the NRC 20 required compliance with the installation of a hardened 21 vent.
22 And what we're very cognizant of is that the 23 NRC is not saying that Fitzpatrick is not going to have 24 to install a hardened vent at some point, it's just that 25 you're not going to require it now even though we know, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
40 1 based on the documentation that is now on the record, 2 that there's a known greater consequence to the worker 3 and public health and safety from deferring, you know, 4 the requirements that Fitzpatrick comply with the 5 regulations.
6 And so, and we've seen this happen -- this 7 is actually the third 2.206 Petition that many of the 8 Petitioners have been party to, you know, since 9 Fukushima at this particular reactor.
10 And I want to sort of run through the record 11 that sort of documents our concern that the NRC is acting 12 in a way to essentially lower safety regulations and 13 safety requirements in order to protect the industry 14 from financial expenses.
15 And, you know, we filed a year after this 16 Petition, we filed a 2.206 Petition alleging that 17 Fitzpatrick was in violation of financial 18 qualifications regulations and that proceeding has been 19 going on for over two years as well.
20 We submitted a vast amount of documentation 21 that Fitzpatrick is being operating at a financial loss, 22 is being under financial strain. In fact, Entergy 23 continuously acknowledges that this particular reactor 24 is operating under financial strain.
25 And we're concerned that the NRC has NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
41 1 essentially declined to enforce regulations in order to 2 prevent reactors like this from closing and -- because 3 I've reviewed the record on this.
4 You know, we know from -- there have been 5 industry analyses of this reactor and others that 6 document potentially over $130 million in financial 7 losses projected within a five year period. Now, the 8 five year period is significant in terms NRC regulations 9 because the NRC standard review plan on financial 10 qualifications for licensees establishes a requirement 11 that reactor operators present five years of cost and 12 revenue projections in order to show -- in order to 13 demonstrate that they're able to operate the reactor 14 profitably, that they're able to operate the reactor 15 safely.
16 Now, NRC has -- the NRR has issued a draft 17 decision on that Petition that projects it. But this 18 is after, you know, over two years of review and the 19 decision itself seems to be based entirely upon 20 information that was voluntarily submitted by Entergy 21 that is, as we've documented in a response to it, 22 inaccurate, irrelevant and incomplete, rather than any 23 review of the information that we've submitted that 24 documented financial problems facing this reactor 25 specifically.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
42 1 Now, in one of the documents that we've 2 submitted in relation to that was a report by the 3 investment firm, UBS, which was the initial source of 4 a lot of the documentation of the financial problems 5 facing Fitzpatrick.
6 And, in one of those reports, UBS had 7 actually visited the NRC to discuss with staff the 8 possibility that NRC was going to require the 9 installation of filtered hardened vents on Mark I and 10 II BWRs two years ago. And the UBS, based on the 11 discussion that they had had with NRC staff, expressed 12 confidence that the NRC was going to, in fact, decide 13 not to require filters on Mark I and II vents out of 14 concern for the industry's financial, you know, 15 financial considerations.
16 And this is quoting from their report 17 specifically. We look for a decision from the NRC next 18 week on proposals to require the installation of 19 hardened filtered vents on all Mark I and II units.
20 We increasingly believe the NRC may not 21 require these added precautions given the added stress 22 this places on the incumbent portfolio, with NRC staff 23 initially estimating these retrofits to cost $15 24 million.
25 However, multiple other sources estimate NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
43 1 that the true cost of such installation costs could be 2 up to $40 million per unit.
3 Now, I would like to note that a cost in the 4 range of $15 to $40 million per unit is not an exorbitant 5 cost, it's not an exorbitant capital expense for nuclear 6 reactors in the United States. That, in fact, since 7 this decision was made, Fitzpatrick installed a $15 8 million condenser replacement at the reactor.
9 And this has all been because one of the 10 other Petitions that we filed was an enforcing Petition 11 to get the NRC to require Fitzpatrick to replace the 12 condenser because it was in violation of the unplanned 13 power changes cornerstone in the reactor oversight 14 program.
15 And, what happened in that case was that 16 Entergy should have known in 2012 that it needed to 17 replace the condenser and decided not to, probably for 18 these financial considerations. And NRC continued to 19 let Fitzpatrick operate in violation of a safety 20 cornerstone until their next refueling outage in the 21 fall of 2014, essentially because the question of 22 whether Entergy was going to be willing to invest $50 23 million in the future operations of this reactor was 24 going to, you know, was going to be made.
25 And, as we now know, Entergy decided that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
44 1 the investments in the, you know, in the new condenser 2 was worth the expense and what we now see as the 3 Petitioners is, essentially, that the NRC have deferred 4 enforcing regulations that have increased the risk of, 5 you know, safety incidents at Fitzpatrick out of 6 financial considerations that Entergy has expressed.
7 And the, you know, but the fact remains 8 that, you know, the filtered vent issue at Fitzpatrick 9 presents a direct threat to the public health and safety 10 and we know, if fact, that it would, you know, have a 11 higher consequence in an accident scenario than what the 12 current plan is.
13 There's a write up that the installation of 14 a hardened vent would reduce the consequences of an 15 accident at Fitzpatrick.
16 And, what the NRC has essentially done is 17 allow Fitzpatrick to decide to replace the condenser and 18 continue running this reactor in this degraded state 19 rather than to address the basic safety problem that 20 would have been able to do at essentially the same cost 21 level.
22 And so, this raises a very serious concern 23 for us that the NRC is essentially allowing Entergy to 24 dictate the terms of regulatory enforcement based on its 25 assertions about its own financial considerations NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
45 1 rather than the NRC actually taking the reins as the 2 regulator and doing its own cost benefit analyses.
3 And I think what you would find in this case 4 is that the cost benefit analysis for enforcing the 5 regulations on Fitzpatrick regarding the hardened vents 6 are, actually, more of a time value of money than the 7 actual expense. Because if Fitzpatrick is going to 8 continue to operate, Entergy is going to make this 9 expense. The difference is whether it makes it now or 10 whether it makes it in four years.
11 And, this is -- and so, and the NRC 12 conducting a cost benefit analysis of the enforcement 13 of the regulation, I believe that this is the way that 14 it needs to be looked at is that there's the time value 15 cost of money which is actually going to be -- which will 16 actually benefit Entergy in the long run because it will 17 be able to amortize the expense of, you know, of 18 installing a hardened event over a longer period of time 19 before the end of the life so that, in fact, this would 20 actually be a benefit to Fitzpatrick to enforce the 21 requirement if they're going to continue to operate the 22 reactor.
23 And if the reality is that if Entergy is not 24 going to be willing to make this expense in order to 25 continue operating the reactor, then better to have them NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
46 1 pose it sooner rather than later because, as we know, 2 the consequence of an accident is almost certain, I 3 mean, you know, the result of an accident is almost 4 certain, you know, given, you know, given the venting 5 strategy that's being used at Fitzpatrick.
6 So, with that, I'll conclude.
7 CHAIR LEE: I'm going to make the closing 8 remarks.
9 At this time, does the NRC staff at 10 headquarters have any questions for the Petitioners?
11 How about the Region?
12 MR. SETZER: No, thank you.
13 CHAIR LEE: Does the licensee have any 14 questions?
15 MR. NAPPI: No, we do not.
16 CHAIR LEE: I'm not sure if there's any 17 member of the public, but before I conclude the meeting, 18 members of the public might provide comments regarding 19 the Petition and ask questions about the 2.206 Petition 20 process.
21 However, as stated at the opening, the 22 purpose of this meeting is not to provide an opportunity 23 for the Petitioner or the public to question or examine 24 the PRB regarding the merits of the Petition Request.
25 Is there any member of the public want to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
47 1 make any comment or statement?
2 MR. LEWIS: Yes, I do, Marvin Lewis, member 3 of the public.
4 CHAIR LEE: Okay, Mr. Lewis, go ahead.
5 MR. LEWIS: Yes, back in '79 I had a 6 contention before the Three Mile Island Number 1 restart 7 hearing, namely concerning hardened filtered vents.
8 Thankfully, the licensee agreed with me and 9 made my contention moot after two years of whatever.
10 My problem is this, I agree with you. We 11 have to stick to procedure and that is important. But, 12 I respectfully point out that the charter of the NRC 13 specifically states protect the health and safety of the 14 public, nine times.
15 And I respectfully suggest that the NRC and 16 the Hearing Board look to the charter and see if that 17 protection of the health and safety of the public has 18 some precedence over some step, procedural step, that 19 the licensee or the NRC wants to involve itself therein.
20 Thank you.
21 CHAIR LEE: Thank you.
22 Is any other members of public want to make 23 a statement?
24 I would like to thank the Petitioners for 25 taking time to provide the NRC staff the clarifying NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
48 1 information on the Petition you have submitted.
2 And, before we conclude the meeting, does 3 the Court Reporter need any additional information for 4 the meeting transcript?
5 With that, this meeting is concluded and 6 I'm terminating the phone connection.
7 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 8 off the record at 1:29 p.m.)
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433