ML12132A279
| ML12132A279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 05/10/2012 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| EDATS: OEDO-2012-0147, G20120172, NRC-1559, TAC ME8189, 2.206, OEDO-2012-0147 | |
| Download: ML12132A279 (631) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR 2.206 Petition RE:
James E. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Plant
Title:
Docket Number:
(n/a)
Location:
(telephone conference)
Date:
Tuesday, April 17, 2012 NOTE Edited for Consistency and Accuracy with Audio Recording to the Best Recollection and Petitioners' Comments Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, Petition Manager May 10, 2012 Work Order No.:
NRC-1559 Pages 1-59 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20005 (202) 234-4433
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
.+.++.+
4 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 5 PUBLIC MEETING 6
RE:
7 JAMES A.
FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 8
+++++
9 TUESDAY 10 APRIL 17, 2012 1
+++++
12 The meeting took place in the 13 Commissioners' Conference Room, OIF16-01G16, One White 14 Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 15 Samson Lee, Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, 16 presiding.
17 PETITIONERS PRESENT:
18 JESSICA AZULAY CHASNOFF, Point of Contact for the 19 Joint Petitioners, Alliance for a Green 20 Economy 21 PAUL GUNTER, Director, Reactor Oversight Project, 22 Beyond Nuclear 23 LINDA A. DeSTEFANO, Energy Committee, Sierra Club 24 Atlantic Chapter, and Representative to the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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Alliance for a Green Economy*
2 TIM JUDSON, Citizens Awareness Network*
3 JEAN
- KESSNER, Councilor at
- Large, City of 4
Syracuse, New York*
5 BARBARA WARREN, Citizens Environmental 6
Coalition*
7 8
PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS:
9 SAMSON LEE, Chairperson 10 BHALCHANDRA VAIDYA, Petition Manager for 2.206 11 petition, NRR/DORL 12 ANDREA RUSSELL, 2.206 Petition Coordinator*
13 LEE BANIC, Backup 2.206 Petition Coordinator 14 CATHERINE SCOTT, Assistant General Counsel for 15 Materials Litigation and Enforcement, 16 Office of General Counsel 17 18 NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF PRESENT:
19 MICHELLE ALBERT, Office of General Counsel 20 JOHN MONNINGER, Associate Director, Japan Lessons 21 Learned Directorate 22 KIM MORGAN BUTLER, NRR/DPR 23 ANTHONY ULSES, NRR/Reactor Systems Branch 24 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 NRC REGION I STAFF PRESENT:
BRICE BICKETT, Senior Project Engineer*
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN, Engineering Branch Chief*
DIANE SCRENCI, Public Affairs Officer*
LICENSEE REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT:
DAVID
- MANNAI, Senior Licensing Manager for Nuclear Safety, FitzPatrick Plant/Entergy*
JOSEPH PECHACEK, Licensing Manager, FitzPatrick Plant/Entergy*
- Participating via telephone NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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2 3
T-A-B-L-E O-F C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S 4
Welcome and Introductions (Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, 5
Petition Manager)...................................
5 6
PRB Chairman's Introduction 7
(Samson Lee, PRB Chair) 12 8
Petitioner's Presentation 9
Jessica Azulay Chasnoff, Point of Contact for 10 the Joint Petitioners, Alliance for a Green 11 Economy....................................
25 12 Jean Kessner, Councilor at Large, City of 13 Syracuse, New York..........................
39 14 Tim Judson, Citizens Awareness Network......
42 15 Linda DeStefano, Energy Committee, Sierra Club 16 Atlantic Chapter, and Representative to the 17 Alliance for a Green Economy................
48 18 Paul Gunter, Director, Reactor Oversight 19 Project, Beyond Nuclear.....................
50 2
Clarifying Questions from the NRC staff and/or the 21 licensee...........................................
55 22 Questions from members of the public on the 10 CFR 2.206 23 petition process..................................
57 24 PRB Chairman's Closing Remarks (Samson Lee).......
59 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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2 PROCEEDINGS 3
12:34 p.m.
4 MR. VAIDYA:
Hello.
Let's start.
I would 5
like to thank everybody for attending this meeting.
6 My name is Bhalchandra Vaidya.
I am with the Office 7
of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating 8
Reactor Licensing.
9 We are here today to allow the petitioners, 10 Paul Gunter and others, called the joint petitioners, 11 to address the NRC Petition Review Board, PRB, regarding 12 the 10 CFR 2.206 petition dated March 9th, 2012, and 13 supplements dated March 13th and March 20th, 2012.
14 I am also the petition manager for the 15 petition.
The Petition Review Board Chairman is Samson 16 Lee, to my left.
17 In accordance with the management directive 18 MD 8.11, the petitioner may request that a reasonable 19 number of associates, people needed [be permitted] to 20 assist in addressing the PRB concerning the petition.
21 As a part of PRB's review of this petition, the joint 22 petitioners have requested this opportunity to address 23 the PRB through Ms.
Azulay --
I hope I'm pronouncing 24 the name right --
the point of contact for all the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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petitioners and co-petitioners that were notified about 2
this meeting today.
3 This meeting is scheduled for two hours, 4
originally from 12:30 to 2:30.
Hopefully, we'll finish 5
by 2:30 today.
6 The meeting is being recorded and 7
transcribed by the court reporter.
A transcript will 8
become a supplement to the petition.
A transcript will 9
also be mailed [made publicly available]
though the 1
Agency Wide Documents Access and Management System, 11 ADAMS.
12 The meeting will also be webcast.
13 For those at the NRC headquarters 14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:***12:36:40 I'm 15 getting a big echo now that wasn't there a minute ago.
16 MR.
VAIDYA:
A few administrative items.
17 Please fill out the attendance sheets so that we can 18 record your attendance.
They are either being 19 circulated or they were at the door.
Towards the end 20 of the meeting, we can eenneet [collect] them.
21 And we also have public meeting feedback 22 forms, same way, at the entrance, and we'll bring those 23 up to the table later on.
These forms are forwarded 24 to our internal communications specialist.
You may NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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either leave them here following the meeting, or mail 2
them back.
They are post-paid.
3 If you are participating by phone and would 4
like to leave an email feedback on this public meeting, 5
please forward your comments to me by email at the address 6
bhalchandra.vaidya@nrc.gov.
7 My address, I believe, was printed on the 8
public meeting notice.
Therefore, if you don't catch 9
my pronunciation, you can go to the meeting notice.
10 Please note that the meeting will start with 11 the telephone line for the public participants on mute, 12 that is listening mode, and the line for petitioners 13 and others open, so they can participate during the 14 meeting.
15 I would like to open this meeting with 16 introductions of the meeting participants.
I ask that 17 all the participants speak clearly, and state for the 18 record your name, your position, occupation, and your 19 organization.
20 For those here in the room, please speak 21 up or approach the microphone so that the persons on 22 the phone can hear clearly, and so that the court reporter 23 can accurately record your name.
24 I have already introduced myself.
Let us NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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start with the other NRC participants here in the room.
2 Sam?
3 CHAIRMANLEE:
I'mSamsonLee.
I'mthePRB 4
chairman.
5 MS.
SCOTT:
I'm Catherine Scott.
I'm the 6
Assistant General Counsel for materials litigation and 7
enforcement in OGC.
8 MS.
BANIC:
Lee Banic, backup petition 9
coordinator for NRR.
10 MR.
MONNINGER:
I'm John Monninger.
I'm 11 the associate director for the NRC's Japan Lessons 12 Learned Directorate in the Office of Nuclear Reactor 13 Regulation.
14 MR.
ULSES:
I'm Anthony Ulses, the Branch 15 Chief of the Reactor Systems Branch in the Office of 16 Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
17 MS.
BUTLER:
I'm Kim Morgan Butler, Acting 18 Branch Chief of the Generic Communications Branch in 19 the Division of Policy and Rulemaking in the Office of 20 Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
21 MS.
ALBERT:
I'm Michelle
- Albert, an 22 attorney in the Office of General Counsel.
23 MR.
VAIDYA:
Looks like we have completed 24 the introductions at the NRC headquarters for the NRC NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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people.
At this time, are there any NRC participants 2
from headquarters on the phone?
3 MS.
RUSSELL:
Hi, this is Andrea Russell, 4
petition coordinator for Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
5 MS.
SCRENCI:
I'm Diane Scranci.
I'm the 6
Region I Public Affairs Officer.
7 MR.
DOERFLEIN:
Larry Doerflein, 8
Engineering Branch Chief, Region I.
9 MR.
BICKETT:
Brice Bickett, NRC Region I, 10 Senior Project Engineer.
11 MR.
VAIDYA:
Anybody else from the NRC on 12 the phone from headquarters?
In the region?
I think 13 we covered the regional office also here, before.
14 Are there any representatives from the 15 licensee on the phone?
I heard one person.
16 MR.
PECHACEK:
Bhalchandra, this is Joe 17 Pechacek from the Entergy Fitzpatrick Site, licensing 18 manager.
19 MR.
MANNAI:
David
- Mannai, Senior 20 Licensing Manager, Nuclear Safety.
21 MR.
VAIDYA:
We couldn't catch your name, 22 sir.
Can you repeat yourself?
23 MR. MANNAI:
Yes, it's DavidMannai, Senior 24 Management, Nuclear Safety and Licensing, Entergy.
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MR.
VAIDYA:
At this time, I would like to 2
have the petitioners who are here at NRC headquarters 3
introduce themselves.
I ask that all petitioners please 4
clearly state for the record your name and position and 5
organization.
6 Again, please speak up or use one of the 7
microphones at the table or at the podium located here 8
in the room.
9 Ms. Azulay, you can start.
Yes, press the 10 button.
11 MS.
AZULAY CHASNOFF:
I'm Jessica Azulay 12 Chasnoff.
I'm the Staff Organizer for the Alliance for 13 a Green Economy.
14 MR.
GUNTER:
And my name is Paul Gunter.
15 I'm Director of the Reactor Oversight Project for Beyond 16 Nuclear in Tacoma Park, Maryland.
17 MR. VAIDYA:
Thank you.
At this time, are 18 there any petitioners on the phone line?
19 MS.
DeSTEFANO:
Yes.
20 MR. VAIDYA:
Again, please speak up so that 21 the court reporter can accurately record your name.
22 Go ahead and introduce yourself.
23 MS. DeSTEFANO:
Okay.
Linda A. DeStefano.
24 I'm a member of the Energy Committee of the Atlantic NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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Chapter of the Sierra Club, which covers all of New York 2
State.
And I'm the representative from the Atlantic 3
Chapter to the Alliance for a Green Economy.
4 MS.
KESSNER:
I am on the phone as well, 5
calling from Syracuse.
My name is Jean Kessner.
I'm 6
a Councilor at Large for the City of Syracuse./
7 MR.
JUDSON:
And this is Tim Judson.
I'm 8
the President of the Citizens Awareness Network.
9 MS.
WARREN:
This is Barbara Warren.
I'm I
Executive Director of Citizens' Environmental 11 Coalition, a state-wide environmental group, and I'm 12 also a founding member of the Alliance for a Green 13 Economy.
14 MR.
VAIDYA:
Anybody else from the 15 petitioners on the phone at this time?
16 Okay.
It is not required for the members 17 of the public to introduce themselves for this meeting, 18 but we would like to record your participation.
Please 19 send this record of your participation to my email 20 address, again, bhalchandra.vaidya@nrc.gov.
21 During the public question period at the 22 end of the meeting, if you are asking a question, we 23 will ask you to introduce yourself and state your name.
24 For those members of the public who are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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dialing into the meeting and are not petitioners, I would 2
remind you that your lines will be on mute until the 3
public question period at the end of the meeting.
4 At this time, I just want to make sure that 5
at this time, the phone line for the general public is 6
changed to the listening mode.
It is confirmed --
to 7
minimize any background noise or distractions during 8
the petitioners' presentations, and will be reopened 9
for the comment period for the public.
10 I would like to reemphasize at this time 11 that we each need to speak clearly and loudly to make 12 sure that the court reporter can accurately transcribe 13 this meeting.
14
- Also, if you do have something that you 15 would like to say, please state your name for the record 16
- first, and then make your statement.
17 At this time, I will turn it over to PRB 18 Chairman Samson Lee.
19 CHAIRMAN LEE:
Welcome to this meeting on 20 the 2.206 petition submitted by Mr. Paul Gunter and the 21 joint petitioners.
22 I would like to first share some background 23 on our process.
Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code 24 of Federal Regulations describes the petition process, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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the timcely [primary] mechanism for the public to request 2
enforcement action by the NRC in a public process.
3 This process permits anyone to petition NRC 4
to take enforcement-style action related to NRC 5
licensees or licensed activities.
Depending on the 6
results of this evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend, 7
or revoke an NRC-issued license or take any other 8
appropriate enforcement action to resolve the problem.
9 The NRC's staff guidance for the 10 disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in management 11 directive 8.11, which is publicly available.
12 The purpose of today's meeting is to give 13 the petitioners an opportunity to provide any additional 14 explanation or support for the petition before the 15 Petition Review Board's initial consideration and 16 recommendation.
17 This meeting is not a hearing, nor is it 18 an opportunity for the petitioners to question or examine 19 the PRB on the merits or the issues presented in the 20 petition request.
No decisions regarding the merits 21 of this petition will be made at this meeting.
22 Following the meeting, the Petition Review 23 Board will conduct its internal deliberations.
The 24 outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed with NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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the petitioners.
2 The Petition Review Board typically 3
consists of a Chairman, usually a manager at the Senior 4
Executive Service level at the NRC.
It has a Petition 5
Manager and PRB Coordinator.
Other members of the Board 6
are determined by the NRC staff based on the content 7
of the information in the petition request.
8 At this time, I would like to introduce the 9
Board.
10 I am Samson Lee, the Petition Review Board 11 Chairman.
Bhalchandra Vaidya is the Petition Manager 12 for the petition under discussion.
Andrea Russell is 13 the office's PRB Coordinator, and she is on the phone 14 today.
And Merrilee Banic is the backup PRB Coordinator 15 today.
16 And our technical staff includes Anthony 17 Ulses from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, 18 Reactor Systems Branch; John Monniger from the Office 19 of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Japan Lessons Learned 2
Project Directorate; Brice Bickett, Matthew Jennerich, 21 and Lawrence Doerflein from Region I; and we also obtain 22 advice from our Office of the General
- Counsel, 23 represented by Catherine Scott.
24 As described in our process, the NRC staff NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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and the licensee may ask clarifying questions in order 2
to better understand the petitioner's presentation and 3
to reach a reasoned decision whether to accept or reject 4
the petitioner's request for review under the 2.206 5
process.
6 I would like to briefly summarize the scope 7
of the petition under consideration and the NRC 8
activities to date.
9 On March 9, 2012, as supplemented March 13 1
and March 20,
- 2012, Mr.
Paul
- Gunter, and other 11 petitioners, submitted a joint petition to the NRC under 12 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2.206, 13 regarding James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
14 In this petition
- request, the joint 15 petitioners are requesting the following actions:
they 16 request that the FitzPatrick operating license be 17 immediately suspended as the result of the undue risk 18 to the public health and safety presented by the 19 operator's reliance on non-conservative and wrong 2
assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability 21 of FitzPatrick' s pre-existing ductwork containment vent 22 system.
23 The joint petitioners state that the risks 24 and uncertainty presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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and decisions, in regard to NRC's Generic Letter 89-16, 2
as associated with the day-to-day operations of this 3
nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to 4
public health and safety.
5 The joint petitioners request that 6
suspension of the operating license be, in fact, pending 7
final resolution of the public challenge to the adequacy 8
of the preexisting vent line in light of the Fukushima 9
Daiichi nuclear accident.
10 The joint petitioners do not seek or request 11 that FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus 12 Vent System (DTVS) as it is demonstrated to have 13 experienced multiple failures to mitigate the severe 14 nuclear accidents at Fukushima Daiichi.
15 The joint petitioners request that the NRC 16 take action to suspend the FitzPatrick operating license 17 immediately until the following emergency enforcement 18 actions are enacted, completed, reviewed, and approved 19 by the NRC and informed by independent scientific 20 analysis:
21
- 1) EntergyNuclear Operations' FitzPatrick 22 nuclear power plant shall be subject to public hearings 23 with full hearing rights on the continued operation of 24 the Mark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully 2
hardened vent line as recommended by NRC Generic Letter 3
89-16.
4 As such, the FitzPatrick operator uniquely 5
did not make containment modifications and did not 6
install the DTVS, otherwise known as "the hardened vent,"
7 as requested by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed 8
on every other GE Mark I in the US; 9
- 2)
Entergy Nuclear Operations shall 10 publicly document for independent review its 11 post-Fukushima re-analyses for the reliability and 12 capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment 13 vent system as previously identified as "an acceptable 14 deviation" from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which 15 recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent 16 System and as outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation 17 Report dated September 28, 1992.
18 The publicly documented post-Fukushima 19 analysis shall include the reassessment of all 20 assumptions regarding the capability and reliability 21 of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically 22 address non-conservative assumptions regarding:
23 a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis 24 used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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system and; 2
b) "unlikely ignition points" as claimed 3
in the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that 4
would otherwise present increased risks and consequences 5
associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas generated 6
during a severe accident.
7 As a basis for the request, the joint 8
petitioners state that in light of the multiple failures 9
of the GE Mark I containment and hardened vent systems 10 at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in the 11 days following the March 11, 2011, station black out 12 event, the joint petitions seek the 13 prompt and immediate suspension of the FitzPatrick 14 operations because:
15 The GE Mark I BWR pressure suppression 16 containment system is identified as inherently 17 unreliable and likely to fail during a severe accident.
18 The capability of FitzPatrick's 19 pre-existing containment vent as approved for severe 20 accident mitigation is not a fully "hardened vent" 21 system.
22 The capability of FitzPatrick's 23 pre-existing containment vent as approved relies upon 24 non-conservative and faulty assumptions.
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The capability of FitzPatrick's 2
pre-existing containment vent system uniquely allows 3
for a severe nuclear accident to be released at ground 4
level.
5 The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe 6
dramatically and exponentially changes the FitzPatrick 7
cost-benefit analyses.
8 The continued day-to-day reliance upon the 9
significantly flawed pre-existing containment vent 10 system as would be relied upon to mitigate a severe 11 accident at the FitzPatrick Mark I reactor presents an 12 undue risk to the public health and safety.
13 The identified containment vulnerability, 14 the non-conservative if not false assumption of "no 15 likely ignition sources" in the pre-existing vent line, 16 and the unacceptable consequences of failure of the 17 FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent place both 18 greater uncertainty and undue risk on public health and 19 safety and are not reasonably justified by arbitrarily 20 assigning a low probability of the occurrence of a severe 21 accident.
22 In the March 20,
- 2012, supplement to the 23 petition, the joint petitioners state that the Temporary 24 Instruction 2515/183 provides the NRC inspection results NEALR. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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in the "Followup to the Fukushima 2
Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event."
3 The joint petitioners draw attention to 4
what is described on page 8 of the enclosure as an 5
"apparent beyond design and licensing basis 6
vulnerability" involving the FitzPatrick operator's 7
refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC in 8
9 To summarize the supplement, the joint 10 petitioners state that:
11 The Commission's March 12,
- 2012, Order 12 states that "Current regulatory requirement and existing 13 plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a 14 sequence of events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident 15 is unlikely to occur in the US.
Therefore, continued 16 operation and continued licensed activities do not pose 17 an imminent threat to public health and safety."
18 The Order further
- states, "While not 19 required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S.
20 plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but 21 a wide variance exist with regard to the reliability 22 of the vents."
23 The NRC inspection report identifies that 24 FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE,, N.W.
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"current procedures do not address hydrogen consequences 2
during primary containment venting" which is further 3
identified as a "current licensing basis vulnerability."
4 The joint petitioners further reiterate 5
that the NRC inspection finding that FitzPatrick's 6
"existing plant capabilities" as assumed by the Order 7
are in fact negated by the finding that "FitzPatrick's 8
current licensing basis did not require the plant to 9
have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent 10 system as part of their Mark I containment improvement 11 program."
12 The Commission Order timeline setting 13 December 31, 2016 for installation of the hardened vent 14 order does not address in a timely way the unique 15 condition of the FitzPatrick nuclear power plant.
16 The FitzPatrick nuclear power plant 17 uniquely does not have a fully hardened vent system on 18 the vulnerable Mark I containment.
19 As a
- result, FitzPatrick's current 20 capability is identified with "a beyond design and 21 licensing bases vulnerability, in that FitzPatrick's 22 current licensing basis did not require the plant to 23 have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent 24 system as part of their Mark I containment improvement NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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program."
2 Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully 3
refused to install the DTVS, the documented discovery 4
of the "licensing basis vulnerability" of its chosen 5
pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension 6
of operations pending closer scrutiny, public hearings, 7
and full disclosure for its adequacy and capability in 8
the event of a severe accident.
9 The additional identified "vulnerability" 10 and the relatively remote and uncertain mitigation 11 strategy places the public health and safety unduly and 12 unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day 13 operations where "current procedures do not address 14 hydrogen considerations during primary containment 15 venting" and will not for nearly five (5) more years.
16 Please allow me to discuss the NRC 17 activities to date.
18 On March 13,
- 2012, the petition manager 19 contacted Mr. Gunter via e-mail to discuss the 10 CFR 20 2.206 petition process that offered him an opportunity 21 to address the PRB by phone or in person.
22 On March 13, 2012, Mr. Gunter provided the 23 petition manager an acknowledgment via email and 24 indicated that Ms.
Jessica Azulay is the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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point-of-contact for the joint petitioners and submitted 2
a supplement to the March 9, 2012, petition.
3 On March 14,
- 2012, the petition manager 4
contacted the point-of-contact for the joint 5
petitioners, via e-mail, to describe the 10 CFR 2.206 6
petition process and offered her an opportunity to 7
address the PRB by phone or in person.
On March 16, 2012, the point-of-contact for 9
the joint petitioners provided the petition manager an I0 acknowledgment, via e-mail, and also requested the 11 public meeting and teleconference details to enable the 12 petitioners to address the PRB.
13 On March 20, 2012, the PRB met internally 14 to discuss the request for immediate action.
The PRB 15 denied the request for immediate action on the basis 16 that there was no immediate safety concern to the plant, 17 or to the health and safety of the public.
18 From March 22 through April 2,
- 2012, 19 additional petitioners contacted the petition manager, 20 via e-mail, to indicate that each of them wish to co-sign 21 the petition, they agree to the 10 CFR 2.206 process, 22 and that Ms. Jessica Azulay is their point-of-contact.
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the respective emails.
2 On March 27,
- 2012, the petition manager 3
contacted the point-of-contact for the joint petitioners 4
via email to inform her about the PRB decision for the 5
immediate action.
6 On March 27, 2012, the point-of-contact for 7
the joint petitioners confirmed the date of the public 8
meeting to address the PRB.
9 As a reminder for the phone participants, 10 please identify yourself if you want to make any remarks, 11 as this will help us in the preparation of the meeting 12 transcript that will be made publicly available.
13 Thank you very much.
14 MR.
VAIDYA:
- Well, at this stage, Ms.
15 Azulay as the point of contact for joint petitioners, 16 I'll turn it over to you to coordinate petitioner's 17 presentations to address the PRB and to provide any 18 additional information you and other petitioners believe 19 PRB should consider as a part of this petition.
20 Because we started late, you probably have 21 about 70 minutes to do the presentations.
If any 22 petitioners feel that they did not have an adequate 23 opportunity to address the PRB during this meeting, 24 because of time constraints, then we welcome any NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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supplemental information that they can provide in 2
writing to the PRB for consideration.
3 This supplemental information for the PRB's 4
consideration should be mailed to the Executive Director 5
of Operations,
- EDO, at NRC, by April 24th, which is 6
another week, so that it will be part [of the petition].
7 At this time -- well, you can go ahead now 8
and start the presentation.
9 MS.
AZULAY CHASNOFF:
Thank you.
I just 10 want to ask Jean, if you're on the line, if you want 11 to speak first, you can, if your schedule needs to.
12 MS.
KESSNER:
I am fine following your --
13 whoever's going first.
I don't want to go first, because 14 I'm not really laying out _
15 MS.
AZULAY CHASNOFF:
Okay.
16 MS.
KESSNER:
the issue, if that's your 17 so if I could speak (phonetic)***1:05:39 second --
18 MS.
AZULAY CHASNOFF:
Yes.
19 MS.
KESSNER:
that should work, okay?
20 MS.
AZULAY CHASNOFF:
Okay.
Great.
I 21 will start then.
22 MS.
KESSNER:
Thank you.
23 MS.
AZULAY CHASNOFF:
So my name again is 24 Jessica Azulay Chasnoff, and I'm here representing the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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Alliance for a
Green Economy.
We're a primary 2
petitioner in this petition.
3 We work for safe, affordable energy and the 4
development of a green economy in New York State.
Our 5
member organizations, which are also primary 6
petitioners, are CNY chapter of Citizens Awareness 7
Network, Syracuse Peace Council, Peace Action of Central 8
New York, Peace Action New York State, Center for Health, 9
Environment, and Justice, and Citizens' Environmental 10 Coalition.
11 On March 9, the Alliance for a Green Economy 12 and its member organizations, along with Beyond Nuclear, 13 filed a 2.206 petition with the NRC requesting an 14 emergency enforcement action to suspend power operations 15 at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Reactor in Scriba, 16 New York.
17 Many of the members of the Alliance for a 18 Green Economy and its member organizations live within 19 50 miles of the FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant, among 20 approximately 910,000 people.
21 We are calling on the NRC to protect our 22 communities' safety, health, and economy by suspending 23 operations at this dangerous plant.
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suspend operations at a major power source.
Our 2
concerns about the safety of the FitzPatrick plant are 3
not superficial.
We have identified serious flaws with 4
the FitzPatrick plant design that make it vulnerable 5
to containment failure and accident mitigation failure 6
in the case of a severe accident at the plant.
7 Severe nuclear accidents are rare, but they 8
do happen.
Unforseen circumstances, acts of nature, 9
equipment failure, operator error, these can lead to 10 an accident.
That is why nuclear power plants in the 11 US have a containment structure.
12 If there's an accident at a plant, the 13 containment structure is the last line of defense between 14 the nuclear reactor and the public.
A containment 15 failure at FitzPatrick would allow radiation to escape 16 into the surrounding environment, which includes Lake 17 Ontario, multiple population centers including Scriba, 18 Oswego, and Syracuse, and important agricultural areas.
19 Based on the documents that we submitted 20 with our petition, we are concerned about the containment 21 design at the FitzPatrick Nuclear Reactor.
22 Another threat during a nuclear accident is the 23 buildup of explosive hydrogen gas.
Proper management 24 of hydrogen is critical to prevent explosions that could NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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breach the containment structure.
2 Hydrogen explosions could also damage the 3
fuel pool at FitzPatrick, which contains many times more 4
radioactive material than the reactor core, and poses 5
a potentially larger threat to the surrounding public 6
and the environment.
7 Based on the documents we submitted with 8
our petition, we are concerned about the potential for 9
hydrogen explosions at FitzPatrick.
10 Containment failure at the FitzPatrick 11 plant or damage to the fuel pools in a severe accident 12 scenario could have catastrophic consequences for our 13 region.
The exact repercussions of the radiation 14 exposure from an accident at FitzPatrick are of course 15 unknowable, because they would depend on the amount of 16 radiation released, weather conditions, etcetera.
17 But large swaths of the surrounding land 18 could become unliveable and unfarmable, and the precious 19 fresh water of Lake Ontario could be forever ruined.
20 Thousands of cancer deaths and other 21 radiation-related illnesses could occur, and the cleanup 22 could cost taxpayers billions of dollars, not to mention 23 the cost to our local and state economy that could result 24 from an accident.
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It is not our intention to predict the exact 2
consequences of an accident at FitzPatrick, but it is 3
our intention to remind the NRC and the public that the 4
consequences could be extremely serious and 5
irreversible.
That is why we have brought this petition 6
to the NRC.
7 Based on the record of documentation on the 8
plant's design and the plant's emergency venting plan, 9
we are concerned that FitzPatrick does not have a 10 reliable containment structure, or a reliable mitigation 11
- plan, to protect workers or the public from the 12 consequences in the event of an accident at that plant.
13 FitzPatrick is a GE Mark I boiling water 14 reactor.
Internal NRC documents as early as the 1970s 15 show the agency's concern with the containment structure 16 with this type of reactor.
The containment structure 17 is relatively small, making it more vulnerable to 18 hydrogen explosions and containment breach during an 19 accident.
20 The vulnerabilities in the Mark I
21 containment design were further acknowledged when in 22
- 1989, the NRC requested that operators at all Mark 1 23 plants voluntarily make modifications, quote, "to both 24 prevent and mitigate the consequences of serious NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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accidents."
2 These modifications included the 3
installation of a reliable hardened vent system.
All 4
of the Mark I reactors in the US complied with this 5
request, save one, FitzPatrick.
6 As noted in our petition, the NRC allowed 7
the FitzPatrick operator to instead rely on a
8 pre-existing venting system, one not designed for the 9
purpose of venting during an accident.
10 The plant event (ph.netie)**.:llQ:9 [at]
11 the Hark ! reaetor3 to pro.te.t.
.ntainmf.ent The plan to 12 vent the Mark I reactors to protect containment integrity 13 poses a threat to the public, since the vent itself would 14 release untold amounts of radiation into the 15 environment.
16 This cannot be seen as true containment.
17 However, in theory, it could prevent a larger release 18 of radiation that could happen if containment was 19 breached through an explosion.
The FitzPatrick 20
[Fukushima] nuclear disaster illustrates what can happen 21 if a venting plan fails to protect containment integrity.
22 In that disaster, the venting plan did not 23 work to relieve the rising pressure within those Mark 24 I boiling water reactors, and as a result, containment NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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was breached, and dangerous levels of radiation escaped 2
the plants.
3 This is why the NRC in March ordered 4
operators of Mark I and Mark II reactors to install a 5
reliable hardened vent by 2016.
But what this means 6
is that for the next four years, FitzPatrick will operate 7
with its existing vent, unless the NRC accepts our 8
petition for suspension.
9 During the next four years, if there is an 1
unforseen accident at the plant, the proper functioning 11 and operation of this vent could make the difference 12 between life and death for workers at the plant and the 13 population surrounding the plant.
It could make the 14 difference between health and radiation-related 15 diseases and cancers.
16 It could make the difference between 17 whether Lake Ontario continues to be the crucial 18 freshwater resource it is today, or an unsafe body of 19 water carrying radioactive materials to lake communities 20 in the US and Canada.
21 It could make the difference between 22 whether the land around Scriba, New York, remains home 23 to those who live there, or becomes a no-go zone for 24 hundreds or thousands of years to come.
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Whether the FitzPatrick venting plan will 2
work is a critical question that could deeply affect 3
the lives of central New Yorkers.
There are several 4
reasons to doubt the reliability of the FitzPatrick vent.
5 6
First, the vent was not designed to be used 7
in an accident scenario.
It has not been tested under 8
accident conditions.
9
- Second, the ductwork is not designed to 10 withstand the high pressures it would be under if it 11 was used during an accident scenario.
As described in 12 a 1992 NRC letter to the FitzPatrick operator at the 13 time, the New York Power Authority, the plan is to send 14 steam radiation and gas through ductwork into the standby 15 gas treatment system, which is located in a building 16 adjacent to the reactor building.
17 Once the gas and steam mixture reaches that 18
- building, the ductwork is expected to fail.
The 19 building is expected to fill with pressure until he doors 20 to the outside also fail.
21 It should be noted that the described plan 22 will mean the release of radiation, steam, and explosive 23 gases right into the environment at the ground level 24 near the reactor building.
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The 1992 letter does not indicate that the 2
operator or the NRC performed any assessment as to the 3
impact that that release may have on workers in the nearby 4
vicinity.
It also does not detail any assessment that 5
may have been done on increased radiation exposure to 6
the public that might be caused by releasing the steam 7
mixture at the ground level, rather than through the 8
300-foot-tall vent stack as indicated in the 9
recommendations by the NRC.
10 It does note in one
- line, quote, 11 "modifications to the piping configuration could reduce 12 the off-site dose, but would not decrease the core damage 13 frequency."
14 Third, the vent plan was approved by the 15 NRC using non-conservative assumptions about whether 16 there could be a hydrogen explosion in the vent.
In 17 approving the plan in
- 1992, the NRC accepted the 18 operator's assessment that combustion in the existing 19 vent path was quote, "not a significant risk."
20 The document notes that a hardened pipe 21 bypass that could prevent any deflagration within the 22 standby gas treatment system room could be built for 23
$680,000, but the NRC did not require one to be built.
24 Then, almost 20 years later, in an April NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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29, 2011 post-Fukushima inspection report, both Entergy 2
and the NRC seemingly acknowledged that hydrogen in the 3
event is a concern.
4 In the report, Entergy and the NRC note an 5
apparent beyond design and licensing basis vulnerability 6
in that current procedures do not address hydrogen 7
considerations during primary containment venting.
8 Since the venting system that is supposed 9
to prevent hydrogen explosions at the plant could itself 10 be vulnerable to hydrogen explosions, the vent cannot 11 be considered reliable.
12 Given this concern, has the NRC or Entergy 13 addressed the consequences of a hydrogen explosion 14 within this vent?
If they have, the public has not been 15 provided the details of this assessment.
16 This was one of the reasons we are calling 17 for a thorough and public post-Fukushima reassessment 18 of the Fitzpatrick vent system.
19 The April 29, 2011 report indicates that 20 Entergy was concerned enough about the potential for 21 a hydrogen explosion that it provided a quote, "caution 22 for operators to consider the presence of hydrogen."
23 This brings me to my fourth reason to doubt 24 the reliability of the FitzPatrick venting plan.
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Providing caution to operators to consider the presence 2
of hydrogen introduces uncertainty in the use of the 3
vent.
4 It could mean that in an accident scenario, 5
the vent may not be used properly or in time, leaving 6
the plant vulnerable to hydrogen buildup within the 7
primary containment structure, and increasing the 8
possibility of containment breach.
If operators are 9
cautious about using the vent, it cannot be considered 10 reliable.
11 we have been informed that on March 20, 12 2012, the Petition Review Board met internally to discuss 13 our request for an immediate suspension of power 14 operations at the plant.
15 We were told that the NRC would not take 16 immediate action, quote, "because there was no immediate 17 safety concern to FitzPatrick or to the health and safety 18 of the public."
19 When we asked for more information about 2
that decision, we were sent an April 3rd email from NRC 21 Petition Manager Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, which I am 22 submitting into the record.
23 The email states that a,
- quote, "report 24 dated July 12, 2011, issued by the Near-Term Task Force NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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established by the NRC in response to the Fukushima 2
Daiichi nuclear event concluded that continued nuclear 3
reactor operation and licensing activities do not pose 4
an imminent risk to the public health and safety and 5
are not inimical to the common defense because of the 6
low likelihood of an event beyond the design basis of 7
a US nuclear power plant and the current mitigation 8
capabilities at those facilities."
9 We disagree with this assessment.
First 10 of all, the July 12th, 2011 Near-Term Task Force report 11 erroneously states that, quote, "Eventually, all boiling 12 water reactor facilities with Mark I containment designs 13 voluntarily installed a hardened vent in response to 14 the 1989 recommendation that all Mark I boiling water 15 reactors be retrofitted with the installation of a 16 hardened wet-well vent."
17 Contrary to that statement, the NRC 18 documents we submitted with our petition show the 19 FitzPatrick plant was not installed with a truly hardened 20 vent.
Therefore, the Task Force's analysis of current 21 mitigation capabilities at Mark 1 boiling water reactors 22 cannot be applied to FitzPatrick.
23 The Task Force was mistaken in its survey 24 and/or representation of the Mark I venting systems.
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The FitzPatrick plant's unique mitigation capabilities 2
have not been thoroughly assessed in the post-Fukushima 3
context.
4
- Again, this is why we are calling for 5
suspension of operations until such an assessment is 6
done and made public.
7 The only FitzPatrick-specific document we 8
have seen that addresses the issue as illustrated by 9
the Fukushima nuclear disaster is the April 29, 2011 10 inspection report, which raises concerns about an 11 apparent beyond design and licensing basis 12 vulnerability.
This is not reassuring.
13 The April 3rd email from Mr. Vaidya also 14 states that the quote "low likelihood of an event beyond 15 the design basis of a US nuclear power plant, and 16 unlikelihood of a sequence of events such as the 17 Fukushima Daiichi accident in the US were used as reasons 18 for the NRC Petition Review Board to conclude that the 19 continued operation of FitzPatrick is not an imminent 20 threat."
21 How can the NRC use the unlikelihood of an 22 accident as justification for not immediately addressing 23 an unreliable accident mitigation plan?
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not happen before the danger posed by the containment 2
vulnerabilities and unreliable venting system have been 3
addressed, the NRC is gambling with public health and 4
safety.
5 The history of nuclear disasters and 6
near-disasters in the US and throughout the world 7
illustrates that accidents can have a variety of causes, 8
most of which are deemed unlikely, and many of which 9
are not as extreme as the earthquake and tsunami that 10 damaged the Fukushima reactors.
11 The Near-Term Task Force itself noted in 12 its report that the NRC has a policy that recognizes 13 that serious fuel damage accidents may not be completely 14 prevented.
That is why it requires containment 15 structures and safety features to prevent radioactive 16 releases.
17 Yet the NRC is so far allowing FitzPatrick 18 to operate with vulnerable containment and a vulnerable 19 vent.
20 Our communities need real protection from 21 the risks of nuclear power.
We need public 22 accountability and information about the design and 23 assessments of the FitzPatrick power plant.
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and safety warrant the suspension of operations at 2
FitzPatrick until these problems are addressed and NRC 3
conducts public hearings and publishes a transparent 4
analysis of the remedies needed to address these risks.
5 We are asking the NRC to enforce its 6
regulations, and not gamble with our lives, our health, 7
our homes, or our livelihood.
8 Thank you.
9 This is the email that I want to submit to 10 the record.
[E-mail is attached at the end of the 11 Transcript]
12 I'll now ask Jean Kessner to speak.
13 MS.
KESSNER:
Thank you very much.
I'm 14 Jean Kessner.
I'm a Councilor at Large for the City 15 of Syracuse.
16 Speaking for myself, and for Councilor at 17 Large Kathleen Joy, First District Councilor Jake 18 Barrett, and Fifth District Councilor Nader Maroun, the 19 FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant should have been 20 required to follow NRC regulations from 1989 that all 2
Mark I boiling water reactors install hardened vents.
22 Those regulations were promulgated in the 23 belief that a hardened vent would relieve pressure and 24 help prevent core meltdown during an accident.
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FitzPatrick was the only US nuclear plant that did not 2
make that change.
3 The FitzPatrick venting solution, which 4
would vent dangerous hydrogen and radiation through 5
ductwork into an auxiliary building, making the vent 6
the doorway to the outside, shows poor judgement at a 7
minimum, and a disregard for life and property around 8
Nine Mile Point.
9 The NRC should not have accepted 10 FitzPatrick's rationale for refusing to install the 11 vent.
It is disturbing that such a non-conservative 12 and flawed decision was allowed to proceed on the basis 13 of saving less than $1 million when so much is at stake.
14 Fukushima then showed us that in three out 15 of four cases, the hardened vent failed.
Three reactors 16 melted down, and many nearby residents can never go home 17 again.
18 Syracuse is just 36 miles from the 19 FitzPatrick Reactor.
As a political representative of 20 the people of Syracuse, we have strong and vested 21 interest in the safe operations of the atomic reactors 22 at Nine Mile Point [complex], and we ask the NRC to share 23 that interest.
24 I agree with the petitioners, having signed NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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the petition myself, that the FitzPatrick nuclear power 2
plant's license to operate should be suspended until 3
a way is found to mitigate the potential danger.
4 I agree that there should be public hearings 5
on the safety of the plant, and I join in the call for 6
a public release of a post-Fukushima reassessment.
7 Following Fukushima, the NRC listed 12 8
actions that must be taken at Mark I BWRs in the United 9
States.
All of those must be implemented at FitzPatrick 10 before the plant can restart.
11 According to Dave Lochbaum of the Union of 12 Concerned Scientists, you recently notified reactor 13 operators to design and install a reliable vent system.
14 15 I
know that my next comment is not 16 necessarily germane to this petition, but as part of 17 the full picture, I ask you to require two qualifications 18 to reliable vent systems: first, that the vents are 19 capable of being opened when needed, even during a 20 station blackout when normal pneumatic pressure is 21 unavailable; and secondly, that gases flow through real 22 filters, not merely the water in the torus, before being 23 discharged to the atmosphere.
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harm to human health.
Iodine is dangerous for three 2
months, but krypton has a half-life of ten years and 3
presents a danger over generations.
4 These should never, never be vented at 5
ground level, or through a reliable vent system without 6
filtration (pheneti*.
)*÷*25.:2.
Filters are provided 7
on these vents at European reactors, and the people of 8
New York, and in particular, Syracuse, New York, deserve 9
equal protection.
I0 Thank you.
11 MS.
AZULAY CHASNOFF:
I'll now ask Tim 12 Judson to speak.
13 MR.
JUDSON:
Hi.
My name is Tim Judson, 14 and I'm the President of Citizens Awareness Network.
15 CAN is a grassroots organization based in New York and 16 New England with over 6,000 members.
We represent 17 people living near at least four Mark I boiling water 18 reactors, the Pilgrim reactor in Massachusetts, Vermont 19 Yankee in southern Vermont, and Nine Mile Point Unit 20 1, and (ph.n.tic)**. :26.9 FitzPatrick in Oswego 21 County, New York.
22 The flaws in the Mark I containment design 23 are of great and immediate concern to us.
However, of 24 these reactors, it is clear that FitzPatrick is a unique NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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case unaccounted for in the NRC's current approach to 2
dealing with the post-Fukushima Mark I containment 3
issues, and completely outside of NRC's requirements 4
for licensed reactors to operate.
5 Had FitzPatrick' s vulnerability been known 6
before it was licensed, it would have never been allowed 7
to start up in the first place.
The NRC assures the 8
public that their safety is protected by what the agency 9
calls, quote, "defense in depth" approach to nuclear 10 safety regulations and reactor designs.
11 Safety systems are supposed to be backed 12 up by yet more safety systems, all to protect the reactor 13 core from being uncovered with water, to prevent the 14 fuel from overheating, burning, melting, and breaching 15 the reactor vessel, and to protect the public and the 16 environment from the massive amounts of radioactive 17 material escaping the reactor and being released into 18 the environment.
19 All of these systems failed in the Fukushima 20 nuclear accident.
And why is that?
I mean, because, 21 for all of this, this is an engineering problem.
22 The reactor safety systems had to be 23 designed to handle certain kinds of accidents happening 24 within certain estimated parameters, what NRC calls, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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- quote, "design basis accidents, " that is, types of 2
accidents that fall within the range of things the 3
reactor was designed to handle.
4 All of this is supposed to be undergirded 5
by one last, final, absolute barrier of protection, in 6
case everything else goes wrong, a containment system 7
built to withstand the incredible forces and pressures 8
of a nuclear accident to make sure that even if the 9
reactor fails, the radiation is contained within the 10 plant and does not escape to harm the public.
11 NRC has acknowledged flaws in the Mark I 12 containment, which ultimately boil down to the fact that 13 the containment is simply too small to withstand the 14 force of a nuclear accident.
15 NRC has decided that is it is within its 16 regulations to deliberately vent steam and radioactive 17 material during an accident at a Mark I reactor to prevent 18 the whole containment 'system from rupturing and losing 19 all ability to contain a release of radiation.
20 What makes that compromise feasible is the 21 ability to vent the radiation in a way that doesn't 22 directly threaten the safety of workers and the 23 habitability of the reactor site, so that they can 24 continue to work to mitigate the accident and shut the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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plant down safely.
2 But the NRC's original recommendation was 3
to install a hardened vent strong enough to handle the 4
high pressure of an accident, to bypass containment and 5
vent steam, hydrogen gas, and radioactive material out 6
through the reactor's 300-foot-tall off-gas 7
(Ph.n.tie)***1.28:31 stack, a giant filtered chimney 8
normally used to release relatively small amounts of 9
radioactive gases that build up in the cooling system 10 during routine operation of the reactor.
11 The design of those vents has proven 12 tragically flawed by the accidents at Fukushima Daiichi.
13 However, as the evidence the petitioners has submitted 14 shows, FitzPatrick never even installed such a vent to 15 protect the containment from rupturing, and instead 16 relies upon a venting scheme that inspectors --
NRC 17 inspectors noted last year as quote "outside the design 18 basis," meaning that it is untested and unproven and 19 outside of NRC regulations.
20 Entergy's plan in case of an accident at 21 FitzPatrick, if it can even be called a plan, is to vent 22 the containment through an unhardened pipe, which is 23 expected to rupture under pressure, releasing the steam, 24 hydrogen gas, and radioactivity into a building next NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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to the reactor building.
2 The containment would then be quote 3
"vented" as the pressure rises in that building.
The 4
doors to the outside are eventually blown off, and this 5
whole plan rests on the critical assumption that there 6
will be nothing to ignite the hydrogen and cause the 7
kind of massive explosion that ripped apart the reactors 8
at Fukushima and which has complicated all of the 9
mitigation and recovery efforts since.
10 FitzPatrick was the only Mark I reactor in 11 the country, and who knows, possibly, the world, that 12 did not even install a hardened vent.
And why was that?
13 According to the explanation provided by the reactor's 14 owner at the time, the New York Power Authority, to save 15 an estimated $680,000.
16 Entergy bought this decision along with the 17 rest of the plant over ten years ago when it purchased 18 FitzPatrick from NYPA.
That $680,000 now is less than 19
$1.2 million in today's money.
That's a savings of $1.2 20 million when Entergy has earned upwards of $500 million 21 per year from operating FitzPatrick over the last ten 22 years --
$500 million per year over the last ten years.
23 24 CAN was an intervenor in the transfer of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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the operating license from NYPA to Entergy at 2
FitzPatrick, and we had an opportunity to review the 3
licensee's financial qualifications to operate the 4
reactor.
5 And what we can say is that the -- that the 6
action that we're requesting by NRC to have the reactor 7
shut down until it can be brought within compliance with 8
the regulations is well within the financial 9
qualifications that Entergy demonstrated in the course 10 of the license transfer.
11 Entergy submitted evidence that it has 12 lines of credit from its parent corporation, and you 13 know, and in fact, the operations at the reactor have 14 exceeded all of the performance projections that were 15 anticipated to which undergirded its financial 16 qualifications at the time.
17 So there are certainly no excuses for the 18 NRC not to follow the actions that are requested here, 19 and certainly there's no reason to think that this --
20 that the impact on the licensee of its finances should 21 be considered.
22 Thanks.
23 MS.
AZULAY CHASNOFF:
I'll now ask Linda 24 DeStefano to speak.
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MS.
DeSTEFANO:
I'm the representative 2
from the Atlantic Chapter of the Sierra Club to the 3
4 The Atlantic Chapter covers New York State 5
and has 37,500 members. Chapter is phen* *
- 13144 6
part of the National Sierra Club.
The National Sierra 7
Club has a long history of speaking out about the problems 8
with nuclear energy.
9 These problems include the intractable one 10 of nuclear waste, the record of serious accidents, both 11 in the US and other countries, the possibility of a 12 terrorist attack on a nuclear facility, the prohibitive 13 cost of nuclear energy that is subsidized with our taxes 14 while renewable forms of energy receive relatively 15 little government assistance.
16 The nuclear power plant in question before 17 us today, FitzPatrick, has all these problems, plus 18 additional ones.
It is a GE Mark I boiling water 19 reactor, the same as those which failed at Fukushima 20 with disastrous consequences.
21 There are several other such facilities in 22 the US, but FitzPatrick has the additional drawback of 23 being the only one which has not followed the 24 longstanding advice of the NRC to install a hardened NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
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vent.
The existing venting system is woefully 2
inadequate.
3 In an accident, its so-called solution is 4
to release radioactivity at ground level into the 5
environment.
FitzPatrick should not be put into the 6
same category as the other Mark I reactors in terms of 7
license renewal until 2016, as it is the only one without 8
the hardened vent.
9 More than 900,000 people live within 50 10 miles of FitzPatrick.
Syracuse is only 36 miles away 11 from FitzPatrick.
As someone who lives just outside 12 Syracuse, I feel personally threatened, and I worry for 13 all living things that would be faced with dangerous 14 doses of radioactivity.
15 Our area has farmland and beautiful natural 16 areas.
We have Lake Ontario, one of the largest bodies 17 of freshwater in the US.
18 I don't understand how Entergy's interest 19 in saving a relatively small amount of money by refusing 20 to install a hardened vent can be weighed against the 21 economic health and environmental disaster that a 22 serious accident or terrorist attack would entail.
23 The Atlantic Chapter of the Sierra Club asks 24 that the NRC regard our safety as more important than NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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Entergy's bottom line.
2 Thank you.
3 MS.
AZULAY CHASNOFF:
I'll now have Paul 4
Gunter speak.
5 MR. GUNTER:
Thank you.
Again, my name is 6
Paul Gunter.
I'm Director of the Reactor Oversight 7
Project for Beyond Nuclear.
We're out of Tacoma Park, 8
9 And my colleagues and I have basically 10 presented you with a clear contradiction of the -- which 11 regards public health and safety and the continued 12 operation of the FitzPatrick nuclear power plant.
13 As has been pointed out, and I
think 14 reiterated appropriately, this plant was allowed to 15 continue operation following the issuance of Generic 16 Letter 8916 and the request for a severe accident 17 mitigation strategy.
18 They proceeded on what was identified as 19 an acceptable deviation from Generic Letter 8916, and 20 the Boiling Water Reactor Owner Group criteria that was 21 set out.
22 So, I think it's important for this Board 23 to recognize, first of all, that to date, there's been 24 no distinction made from what the Near-Term Task Force NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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has represented that all Mark Is eventually install a 2
reliable hardened vent system.
And reliable hardened 3
vent is the words that are used in Generic Letter 8916.
4 5
So this is not --
reliability has always 6
been an issue.
This is not something that's new that's 7
come out of the Fukushima disaster and the demonstration 8
of the unreliable containment and the unreliable vents 9
that were subsequently installed.
10 But what we're here to impress upon you and 11 reiterate is that FitzPatrick is an outlier, even from 12 the Near-Term Task Force's own representation.
13 And as such, it being an outlier, it does represent 14 this contradiction that they were given the approval 15 on this acceptable deviation in September 28, 1992, and 16 then in a subsequent inspection on May l1th, 2011, it 17 was identified that they basically are operating on a 18 they have been all along, and continue to operate 19 on a vulnerability within their licensing basis.
20
- Now, basically, what that contradiction 21 does is that it puts your integrity on the line.
This 22 Board has a responsibility now to address what is clearly 23 identified as an outlier from the Near-Term Task Force 24 and the day-to-day operations of the FitzPatrick plant.
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And the public looks to you, it looks to 2
this agency, for its safety.
And so, you've got this 3
contradiction now before you.
4 And, you know, it's really -- you're sort 5
of the last line of defense for an unreliable containment 6
in a plant that never even bothered to put a vent, a 7
8 And you're also it's also the 9
responsibility of this Board to consider that as the 10 current scenario plays out for the Near-Term Task Force 11 and the orders that have been issued, is that we ' re going 12 to wait another four, five years before, you know, we 13 see, you know, an order take effect --
and maybe not 14 even then.
15 It's not really clear right now that this 16 is a hard and fast date to us, that we've seen orders 17 come and go without any enforcement action.
And I mean, 18 that's been an issue that I brought up before the 19 Commission, and it's been an issue that we've been 20 dealing with through previous 2.206 petitions.
21 So even this December 31st, 2016 date, when 22 the criteria is supposed to take effect and these new 23 reliable hardened vents are supposed to be in place, 24 you know, that's not a reliable chronology, as far as NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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we're concerned.
2 So, the task before you is is that, you know, 3
we know now that this plant was provided an opportunity 4
to continue operation on deviations from your 5
recommendations, on deviations even from the Boiling 6
Water Reactor Owner Group, and their criteria that was 7
established.
8 And now, we understand that even that 9
approval for an acceptable deviation basically provided 10 that the -- you know, the NRC inspection of May 11th, 11
- 2011, said that the current licensing basis did not 12 require the plant to have a primary containment torus 13 air space or air space hardened vent system.
14 So, you
- know, we're puzzled by the 15 willy-nilly-ness that public safety is being tossed 16 around between.,
And the fact that you don't -- you know, 17 I mean, obviously, nobody thinks that a tsunami is going 18 to come out of Lake Ontario.
But the fact is is that 19 station blackout, the prolonged station blackout, that's 20 what the issue is, and fire protection is an issue that 21 can lead to that.
22 There are any number of scenarios that could 23 lead to a prolonged station blackout, and we believe 24 that it's not just about, you know, having some sense NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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of guarantee or some sense of reliability that your 2
number won't come up on the wheel of misfortune, as we've 3
seen in Japan, but that in fact there are reliable 4
mitigation strategies that have been approved and put 5
in place.
And that's simply not the case.
6 So I think that what we're expecting from 7
this Petition Review Board is an explanation on how this 8
plant basically provides no guarantees, and still 9
continues to operate.
No reasonable assurance, I think 10 is a key term here, if you can't provide for the fact 11 that there is no reasonable assurance because there is 12 no reasonable mitigation strategy in place now for either 13 a beyond design basis or the licensing basis, we think 14 that you should take action as we've requested, and 15 suspend this operation until you can make that request.
16 But again, you know, our plea to you is that 17 this Board has the responsibility now to use its steady 18 judgement, and in that process, we believe that you put 19 your integrity on line, so --
and the whole agency.
20 So the agency has an opportunity now to 21 build public confidence, to address an outlier, or, we 22 can all be strung along again, and that could have 23 consequences.
24 So,
- now, we would like to take this NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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opportunity also to request a second Petition Review 2
Board meeting after you've addressed the -- what me and 3
my colleagues have said today.
4 But your responsibility is heavy, and we 5
again put our trust in you, and in a formal process, 6
that this undue risk that's been identified by your own 7
documents be addressed through the suspension of the 8
operation of this plant, until there is some reasonable 9
assurance.
10 Thank you.
11 MS.
AZULAY CHASNOFF:
I think that's all 12 the speakers we have today.
13 MR.
VAIDYA:
Thank you.
14 At this time, does the NRC staff here at 15 headquarters have any questions for Ms. Azulay and others 16 from those who are present in the room, either through 17 PRB Board or NRC staff or PRB Board members?
18 Well, if none, how about the Region, those 19 who were on the phone from the Region, NRC staff?
Does 20 anybody have any questions for the joint petitioners 21 at this time?
22 MR.
DOERFLEIN:
This is Larry Doerflein.
23 I don't.
24 MR.
VAIDYA:
Okay.
Thank you.
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AS I previously stated, the licensees are 2
not part of the PRB' s decision-making process.
- However, 3
does the licensee have any clarifying questions for the 4
NRC's PRB or for the petitioners at this time?
5 MR.
MANNAI:
- Yes, this is Dave Mannai.
6 Entergy has no questions.
7 MR. VAIDYA:
Okay.
Well, we go to the next 8
phase.
Before I conclude the meeting, members of the 9
public may ask questions about the 2.206 process at this 10 time.
11 However, as we stated at the opening, the 12 purpose of this meeting does not include the opportunity 13 for the petitioner or the public to question or examine 14 the PRB regarding the merits of the petition request.
15 As a reminder, if members of the public 16 believe they did not have the opportunity to ask their 17 questions about the 2.206 petition at the end of the 18 question session because of time limitations, then they 19 can submit their questions in writing to me, the Petition 20
- Manager, Bhalchandra
- Vaidya, at my email address, 21 bhalchandra.vaidya@nrc.gov.
22 We will now change the public line from the 23 listening mode to the open mode.
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on the line or not, but at this time, I'm looking at 2
the control room to see whether they can switch the public 3
line to the open mode, please.
4 Is there anybody on the public line?
5 MS.
WARREN:
This is Barbara Warren with 6
Citizens' Environmental Coalition.
I would appreciate 7
it if, as you suggested, that you could review the next 8
steps that you will be taking on this petition?
You 9
know, the process?
10 MS.
BANIC:
This is Lee
- Banic, the 11 coordinator.
Next will be getting the transcript and 12 reviewing it and sending it out to the Board for review, 13 and then the Board will have a closed meeting to make 14 an initial recommendation considering the supplemental 15 information in the petition.
16 After that, we'll inform the petitioners 17 of our initial recommendation.
You'll get a second 18 chance to address the Board, as similarly as today.
19 And another transcript will be made and reviewed, and 20 then the Board will meet again for its final 21 recommendation, and you will be informed of that 22 recommendation.
23 The transcript should arrive here -- this 24 transcript, within a week, and we'll have another week NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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to review it probably, and then maybe the third week, 2
have our internal meeting to make a recommendation. So, 3
within a
- month, I would say you'd get our initial 4
recommendation.
5 MR.
VAIDYA:
Okay.
Mr.
Gunter had 6
indicated that he had a couple of questions, so.
7 MR. GUNTER:
Yes.
Thank you.
I guess my 8
question has to do with the internal deliberations of 9
the PRB and if they are --
it's my understanding they're 10 not transcribed, but we have some concerns and questions 11 about the transparency that we would request that the 12 deliberations --
is there a process by which we can make 13 the deliberations of this Petition Review Board a matter 14 of public record, so perhaps a question more directly 15 to the Office of General Counsel, are the deliberations, 16 the internal deliberations of the Petition Review Board 17 a matter of availability through the Freedom of 18 Information Act?
19 MS.
SCOTT:
The deliberations themselves 20 are not made public, as part of the Management Directive 21 8.11.
- However, if there are documents that are 22 generated by that, then if there is a Freedom of 23 Information Act request, then we would look through that 24 to see if they could be provided.
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MR.
VAIDYA:
Any other questions from the 2
public at this time?
I guess not.
So, well, at this 3
time, I'll turn it over back to the Chairman.
4 CHAIRMAN LEE:
Yes, I'll make some closing 5
remarks.
6 Ms.
Azulay and Mr.
Paul Gunter and 7
participating petitioners, thank you for taking the time 8
out to provide the NRC staff with clarifying information 9
on the petition you've submitted.
10 And before we close, does the court reporter 11 need any additional information?
12 COURT REPORTER:
I'll have a few questions 13 after the meeting.
14 CHAIRMAN LEE:
Okay.
We'll handle that 15 after the meeting.
16 Okay, with that, this meeting is concluded, 17 and we will be terminating the telephone connection.
18 Thank you.
19 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter was 20 concluded at 1:51 p.m.)
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c s
1ic 11 12 1E ATTACHMENT E-MAIL RESPONSE FROM BHALCHANDRA VAIDYA, PETITION MANAGER TO JESSICA AZULAY, THE POINT-OF-CONTACT FOR THE PETITIONERS NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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RE: PRB Decision on Request for Immediate Action Re: FitzPatric...
Subject:
RE: PRB Decision on Request for Immediate Action Re: FitzPatrick Emergency Enforcement Petition, March 9, 2012, (TAC No. ME8189)
From: "Vaidya, Bhalchandra" <Bhalchandra.Vaidya@nrc.gov>
Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2012 10:19:44 -0400 To: Jessica Azulay <jessica@allianceforagreeneconomy.org>
Ms. Jessica Azulay, In response to your request, I am providing, for your information, the following summary of discussions with respect the petitioners' request for emergency enforcement action:
The report dated July 12, 2011, issued by the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF), established by the NRC in response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear event concluded that continued nuclear reactor operation and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to the public health and safety and are not inimical to the common defense because of the low likelihood of an event beyond the design basis of a U.S. nuclear power plant and the current mitigation capabilities at those facilities. The Order issued on March 12, 2012, (EA-12-050), "Order Modifying Licenses With Regard To Reliable Hardened Containment Vents," also concluded that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident is unlikely to occur the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent.
The NRC staff was aware of the conclusions presented in its Safety Evaluation dated September 28, 1992, for Fitzpatrick with respect to GL 89-16, and considered this information in its overall assessment on whether or not BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments represented an imminent hazard and concluded they were not.
Thank you, Bhalchandra K. Vaidya Licensing Project Manager NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL1-1 (301)-415-3308 (0) bhalchandra.vaidya@nrc.gov From: Jessica Azulay [1]
Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2012 4:35 PM To: Vaidya, Bhalchandra
Subject:
Re: PRB Decision on Request for Immediate Action Re: FitzPatrick Emergency Enforcement Petition, March 9, 2012, (TAC No. ME8189)
Bhalchandra Vaidya, 1 have received your notice about the PRB's decision. Can you please provide us with official documentation of that internal meeting and the decision that was made? We would like to know the basis for the PRB decision that there is no immediate health and safety threat to the public.
- Thankyou, Jessica Azulay On 3/27/2012 2:55 PM, Vaidya, Bhalchandra wrote:
Ms. Jessica Azulay, On March 20, 2012, the Petition Review Board (PRB) met intemally to discuss the request for immediate action. The PRB denied the request for immediate action to take emergency enforcement action to suspend the operating license for FitzPatrick because there was no immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public.
4/16/2012 12:53 PM
RE: PRB Decision on Request for Immediate Action Re: FitzPatric...
In response to your request to address the PRB, the PRB is in the process of finalizing the date and time for the Public Meeting.
Thanks.
Bhalchandra K. Vaidya Licensing Project Manager NRC/NRR/DORLJLPL-1 (301)-415-3308 (0) bhalchandra.vaidyaanrc.gov 2 of 2 4/16/2012 12:53 PM