ML13162A580
| ML13162A580 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/2012 |
| From: | NRC/OIS/IRSD/RFSB |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2013-0010, TAC ME8189, G20120172 | |
| Download: ML13162A580 (15) | |
Text
I ill. 1 10 CFR 2.206 PRB Closed Meetina Notes - 05129112
SUBJECT:
GUNTER ET AL. 2.206 REQUESTING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST JAMES A. FITZPATRICK PLANT (G20120172) (TAC ME8189)
PETITIONER: Paul Gunter, et al DATE: March 9, 2012, the supplements dated March 13, and March 20, 2012, and Petitioners' Presentations to the PRB in the Public Meeting on April 17, 2012.
PRB MEMBERS & ADVISORS Samson Lee (PRB Chair - Deputy Director, NRR, Division of Risk Assessment)
Bhalchandra Vaidya (Petition Manager - NRR, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing)
Anthony Ulses (Branch Chief - NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Reactor Systems Branch)
Robert Dennig (Branch Chief - NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Containment and Ventilation Branch)
Robert Fretz (Senior Project Manager- NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, Projects Management Branch)
John Monninger (Associate Director - NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate)
Andrea Russell (Agency 2.206 Coordinator - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking)
Kim MorganButler (Branch Chief(A) - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Generic Communications Branch)
Brice Bickett (Senior Project Manager - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)
Mathew Jennerich (Project Engineer - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)
Lawrence Doerflein (Branch Chief - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety)
Carrie Safford (Deputy Assistant General Counsel - Materials Litigation and Enforcement - Office of General Counsel)
Ryan Eul (Enforcement Specialist - Office of Enforcement)
Catherine Scott (Assistant General Counsel - Materials Litigation and Enforcement -
Office of General Counsel)
Mauri Lemoncelli (Senior Attorney - Materials Litigation and Enforcement - Office of General Counsel)
SUMMARY
OF REQUEST:
On March 9, 2012, as supplemented March 13 and March 20, 2012, Mr. Paul Gunter, et. al.,
submitted a joint petition to the NRC, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2.206, regarding James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick).
The joint petitioners request that t~e FitzPatrick operating license be immedi ly suspended as the result of the undue risk to 4e-public health and safety presented by the -pefetoerreliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's prv .!;! .uctv...containment vent system. The joint petitioners state that the risks and uncertainty presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and decisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, as associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to public health and safety. The joint petitioners request that the suspension of the operating license be in effect pending final resolution of a public challenge to the adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.
The joint petitioners do not seek or request that FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus Vent System (D'VS) as it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple failures to
mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at Fukushima Daiichi.
The joint petitioners request that the NRC take action to suspend the FitzPatrick operating license immediately until the following emergency enforcement actions are enacted, completed, reviewed, and approved by the NRC and informed by independent scientific analysis:
- 1) Entergy Nuclear Operations' FitzPatrick nuclear power plant shall be subject to public hearings with full hearing rights on the continued operation of the Mark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully hardened vent line as recommended by NRC Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick operator uniquely did not make containment modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise known as "the hardened vent," as requested by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other GE Mark I in the US;
- 2) Entergy Nuclear Operations shall publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system as previously identified as "an acceptable deviation" from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent System and as outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September 28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:
a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system and; b) "unlikely ignition points" as claimed in the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that would otherwise present increased risks and consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident.
In the March 20, 2012, supplement to the petition, the joint petitioners state that the Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the NRC inspection results in the "Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The joint petitioners draw attention to what is described at page 8 of the enclosure as an "apparentbeyond design and licensing basis vulnerability"involving the FitzPatrick operator's refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC in Generic Letter 89-16.
To summarize the supplement, the joint petitioners state that:
9 The Commission's March 12, 2012, Order states that "Current regulatory requirement and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the US. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensed activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety." The Order further states, "While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exist with regard to the reliability of the vents,"
- The NRC inspection report identifies that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" and "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" which is further identified as a "current licensing basis vulnerability." The joint petitioners further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" as assumed by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that "FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary 2
containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program."
" The Commission Order timeline setting December 31, 2016, for installing the reliable hardened vent does not address in a timely way the unique condition of FitzPatrick.
" FitzPatrick uniquely does not have a fully hardened vent system on the vulnerable Mark I containment. As a result, FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with "a beyond design and licensing bases vulnerability, in that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program." Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the "licensing basis vulnerability" of its chosen pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension of operations pending closer scrutiny, public hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and capability in the event of a severe accident. The additional Identified "vulnerability" and the relatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy places the public health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day operations where "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" and will not for nearly five (5) more years.
BASIS FOR THE REQUEST:
As a basis for the request, the joint petitioners' state that in light of the multiple failures of the GE Mark I containment and hardened vent systems at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in the days following the March 11, 2011, station black out event, the joint petitions seek the prompt and immediate suspension of the FitzPatrick operations because:
" The GE Mark I BWR pressure suppression containment system is identified as inherently unreliable and likely to fail during a severe accident.
" The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved for severe accident mitigation is not a fully "hardened vent" system.
" The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved relies upon non-conservative and faulty assumptions.
" The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent system uniquely allows for a severe nuclear accident to be released at ground level.
" The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe dramatically and exponentially changes the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analyses.
" The continued day-to-day reliance upon the significantly flawed pre-existing containment vent system as would be relied upon to mitigate a severe accident at the FitzPatrick Mark I reactor presents an undue risk to the public health and safety.
- The identified containment vulnerability, the non-conservative if not false assumption of "no likely ignition sources" in the pre-existing vent line and the unacceptable consequences of failure of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent place both greater uncertainty and undue risk on public health and safety and are not reasonably justified by arbitrarily assigning a low probability of the occurrence of a severe accident.
IS THERE A NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: (If Yes, describe)
NO.
In its internal meeting on March 20, 2012, the PRB found that there is no immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public and therefore, denied the request for emergency enforcement action based on the following considerations:
- 1. The Near-Term Task Force (NTTF), established by the NRC in response to the Fukushima 3
Daiichi nuclear event, concludes in its report dated July 12, 2011, that continued nuclear reactor operation and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to the public health and safety and are not inimical to the common defense because of the low likelihood of an event beyond the design basis at a U.S. nuclear power plant and the current mitigation capabilities at those facilities; and,
- 2. On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark 11 containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-1 2-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012. The order stated that:
Current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety. However, the importance of reliable operation of hardened vents during emergency conditions was already well established and this understanding has been reinforced by the clear lessons of Fukushima. While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exists with regard to the reliability of the vents. Additionally, hardened vents are not required on plants with BWR Mark II containments although as discussed above, Mark II containments are only slightly larger than Mark I. Reliable hardened venting systems in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments are needed to ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is maintained.
The NRC staff was aware of the conclusions presented in its Safety Evaluation (SE) dated September 28, 1992, for Fitzpatrick with respect to GL 89-16, and considered this information in its overall assessment on whether or not BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments were safe to operate following the events at Fukushima. In addition, the NRC staff was cognizant of and reviewed the results of inspections performed under TI 183 at FitzPatrick (Report dated May 13, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML111330455) following the events at Fukushima. The regional staff has communicated with NTTF regarding the Vent system configuration at FitzPatrick, including the differences from GL 89-16 recommendations (Larry Doerflein e-mail). The petition for emergency enforcement action provided no new additional information relating to the existing containment venting capability of the Fitzpatrick plant.
DOES IT MEET CRITERIA FOR REVIEW?
Criteria for Reviewing Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:
- 1. The petition contains a request for enforcement-related action such as issuing an order modifying, suspending, or revoking a license, issuing a notice of violation, with or without a proposed civil penalty.
YES,
- 2. The facts that constitute the bases for taking the particular action are specified. The petitioner must provide some element of support beyond the bare essentials. The supporting facts must be credible and sufficient to warrant further inquiry.
YES.
- 3. There is no NRC proceeding available in which the petitioner is or could be party and through which the petitioner's concerns could be addressed.
4
YES.
Criteria for Rejecting Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:
- 1. The incoming correspondence does not ask for an enforcement-related action or fails to provide sufficient facts to support the petition, but simply alleges wrongdoing, violations of NRC regulations, or existence of safety concerns.
YES, in part.
- 2. The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.
YES, in part.
On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012.
Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and Recommendation 6.
Recommendation 5.1 orders licnsees
',rddened,to in'!id,.*eliable.
I'd '!n nWR Mark, I and coMar*
iicontainments. This orddtIncluded Jp.ifmp'or1m6an ..bj ives for the design of hardened;'vent..to ensu're reliable ýo.p.erationi an d. ýseý.ofýUse (boti opening ahid .c!osing) during a'.pý61ongedSBO. Recommendation 6 rec f lsý,iaSipartf the; loongersterm review*i thhat t*e. NR*;id*ntifinsights;abut ýhyd roge: controland mitlg:ti r! side:
~otlmot ~i teuil~Js frnairireedtough r~iQ~il further
§tudytof tjhe Da.-chI 1ukuah0ma
- ahcient.
FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16.
With respect to Fukushima accident, the NTTF evaluation and the subsequent Commission Order have concluded that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety.
- 3. The request is to deny a license application or amendment. NO.
- 4. The request addresses deficiencies within existing NRC rules. NO.
5
'IS THERE A NEED FOR OE, 01, OIG. or OGC INVOLVEMENT:
The petition does not contain any allegations of licensee or NRC staff wrongdoing. However, the PRB includes representatives from OE and OGC.
RECOMMENDED APPROACH AND SCHEDULE (Next Steps):
Accept in part (see Table for explanation).
The next steps would be to:
- Ensure management agrees with the PRB initial recommendation.
- Inform the petitioners of the PRB's initial recommendation.
- Provide the second opportunity for the petitioners to address the PRB, and make the arrangements for an acceptable date and time.
6
Table (This table summarizes each issue for the following criteria).
issue Specific Issue Raised Does'this Recommendation No. meet criteriafor review under 2.206
_ __ _ _ _process? ,
11 FitzPatrick operating license'be immediately No. The NTTF and JLD in the Commission Order have suspended as the result of the undue risk to the concluded that there is no immediate safety concern public health and safety presented by the operator's to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the reliance on non-conservative and wrong -2 public, and therefore, the request for immediate assumDtions that went into the analysis of the action should be rejected. The Petitioners have not capability of FitzPatnck's pre-existing ductwork provided adequate basis for the their argument containment vent system. The risks and uncertainty regarding the operator's reliance on non-presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and conservative and wronq assumptions that went into decisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, as the analysis of the caDabilitv of FitzPatrick's ore-associated with the day-to-day operations of this existing ductwork containment vent system nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to public health and safety. The petitioner's concerns regarding this issue do not require immediate shutdown of FitzPatrick based on the conclusions reached by NTTF and the Commission Order regarding Reliable Hardened Vent for the US GE Mark I BWRs.
U. S. plants have implemented "beyond-design-basis" requirements such as ATWS, SBO, combustible gas control, aircraft impact assessment, mitigation of major fires or explosions, and extensive damage mitigation guidelines, thereby reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases.
A sequence of events like those occurrino in the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur at US GE Mark I BWRs.
The NRC NTTF report on July 12, 2011, based on review of insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi 7
Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteria for review under 2.206 process?
accident, made a recommendation to the Commission to include a reliable hardened vent system.
2 The suspension of the operating license be in effect No. This is merely a statement to support the petition in pending final resolution of a public challenge to the general. This is not an enforcement related action adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the and is outside the scope of the 2.206 process and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. therefore, this request should be rewected, pursuant to Criterion 1 for reecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.
3 The joint petitioners do not seek or request that No. This is merely a statement to support the petition in FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus general. This is not an enforcement related action Vent System (DTVS) Recommended by GL89-16, and is outside the scope of the 2.206 process and as it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple therefore, this request should be reiected, pursuant failures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at to Criterion 1 for reiecting a petition under 10 CFR Fukushima Daiichi. 2.206.
4 FitzPatrick be subject to public hearings with full No. The petitioner raises issues that have already been hearing rights on the continued operation of the the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either Mark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the hardened vent line as recommended by NRC issues have been resolved, and the resolution is Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated operator uniquely did not make containment September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16.
known as "the hardened vent,' as requested by NRC Therefore, this issue should be reiected, pursuant to Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other Criterion 2 for reiectinq a petition under 10 CFR GE Mark I in the US; 2.206.
5 FitzPatrick shall publicly document for independent The licensee's response to the Order will be publicly review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the available. Subsequent NRC documentation reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre- regarding additional efforts i.e., hydrogen control, existing containment vent system as previously would also be publicly available.
8
Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteriafor review under2.206
,__process?
identified as "an acceptable deviation" from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent System and as outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September .28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:
No. FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was also a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to reviewed and approved by the NRC in September justify not installing a fully hardened vent 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's system and; processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16.
With respect to Fukushima accident, the NTTF evaluation and the subsequent Commission Order have concluded that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety.
Yes. Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and Recommendation 6.
9
Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteriafor review under2.206 process?
b) "unlikely ignition points" as claimed in the Recommendation 5.1 orders-;,
FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that reliable!`hardened vent in" would otherwise present increased risks and containments. This ordersiii consequences associated with the detonation 16e1i -`ies for the designo of hydrogen gas generated during a severe ensubre .-.
re iiable operaion endk accident. ind closing) dun 1 R im6idation 6 reimii lodgter.1eM review, thatlh a . uI...irbgibn conitrol and i cýOitaDmet or in other~bu~ifi infoinbation is revealed th5o' F~~b~$iDai-chizaccient:
6 The Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the No. The petitioner raises issues that have already been NRC inspection results in the "Follow-up to the the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic Event." The joint petitioners draw attention to what basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the is described at page 8 of the inspection report as an issues have been resolved, and the resolution is "apparentbeyond design and licensing basis applicable to the facility in question. The Order on vulnerability"involving the FitzPatrick operator's hardened containment vents (EA-12-050) has a refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC timeline of December 31, 2016, for installing the in Generic Letter 89-16. reliable hardened containment vent. Therefore, this issue should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for rejecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.
7 The NRC inspection report [per TI-2515/183] Yes. Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 identifies that FitzPatrick's "existing plant and Recommendation 6.
capabilities" and "current procedures do not address Recom-endation 5.1 orders licePsees.to include a hydrogen considerations during primary containment reliable hardened vent in-- RMark iand-Mark 11 venting" which is further identified as a "current containments, This order included.performance licensing basis vulnerability." The joint petitioners objectives for the design of hardenbedvents to 10
Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteriafor review under 2.206 process?
further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that ensure reliable. operationland:ease of-uset(both FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" as assumed ope. ng and dosing) d -n pFr*longQdSBO.
by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that Remmendation 6 rebm--ends,:as .partof theý "FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require lronger erm review, thatitheNRC identify insights.:
the plant to have a primary containment torus air *out'hjdrogen cont*rol
- itig-4on inside space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containient or in otheriidirgs as additional containment improvement program."'rtn is reveale*.iih further studypthe 0 [ima Dai-ichifa` . .
8 The Commission Order timeline setting December No. The petitioner raises issues that have already been 31, 2016, for installing the hardened vent Order does the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either not address, in a timely way, the unique condition of on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic the FitzPatrick nuclear power plant. basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16.
Therefore, this issue should be rejected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for rejecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.
9- The FitzPatrick nuclear power plant uniquely does No. The petitioner raises issues that have already been not have a fully hardened vent system on the the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either vulnerable Mark I containment. As a result, on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with "a basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the beyond design and licensing bases vulnerability, in issues have been resolved, and the resolution is that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated require the plant to have a primary containment September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the torus air space hardened vent system as part of their BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16.
Mark I containment improvement program." Therefore, this issue should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for rejecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.
11
Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteria for review under 2.206
______process? .. ..
10 Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to No. G.L 89-1.6 urged th.e liceinsees to Voluntatlylinstall..
install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the harden7ed _cpabiieieat theirMark* I "licensing basis vulnerability" of its chosen pre- conitainmente ifice seeschose not to nstal the existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension hiardenedj0,; buin, the NRC staffi-reqise of operations pending closer scrutiny, public the liceset'vd plnts rbi eii eýtinates hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and of cost-s btqnst_ aation of hardened ventcaPabilities.
capability in the event of a severe accident. The licehnS~teie'w fairmed that the NRC.2sfiff woul usq4br ,arto ~ pefAAA ~ p~f basc :a i. 0o determine. if.hardnedl .ynt instlt0~co~1Fdidosed. as baclkfin, accod.h..t.. _50.109.
in resp 6
,A6t**
- 1 itzPati k i*Mhdahatit i.
had dec dt..n.0* it to istall:ledf capat lto ý MRO.J'aff performed a1l'a'cl ana!yssis Jthere
- -,f addlitmonatiocreas*o.~tection to 15lif:lth-and safe.yt [.:d- et:pabilt- is i:imnea**lt Fitz WiW alY i eth 1_Tf6backfit'W &s Ys letter _ 6t*at*-Ch 299 -trgsf FI.99t0d!o iegoat:*e eesits decisiopn:.
of ard rAmnt the o .r dvn._tE atn byJanuay moda.y. 99 t-O ntiten dt impose.th6 baddit 2neO~J5A9 By leýtt'e'rs daitd.dJanUar-y 24,:2991, the.6-NRC .staff approved the. icensee's:request datedJl 5 190,6 to integratelh .h resu lts of its IPE..proga ito its decision: regarding:,making any m.o'difications to existinci -vent.svstem tbim~lement GL89-16 12
ific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteria for review under 2.206 process? ....
hardened vent dsgn Cr te .itzPat*c*.
- provided By, letters-.dated Decemb'er 6, 1-991.,ard!August 14, 1992, F.i*tzPaa*c provided itsfiral,!pitiodn .regarding implementetion of:thoadndv tWeign -criteria, use oPflp .4.66e-xmine.th yehting .rpcures-and trainin.g ofoperators .ins 0 f6ro perfo-miing the IPE prgam fidtetau of inves~aI~ strategies
'noacdntfaigner ass6t sevreaccid,*
By lefttedaed Septeme2.8,_ -don the resta bt$ored tthep.dcu* t rimcke
-- t aiid-S 'W ~ thJeMP-NW~. U Fi~a~kj?~Nened. W lte'n~ NRC Iu .e.....T.. .. n t meetst
- _--t*"v" effecttve]j.jse
.. RlYP~atr
... ...ic""-K**'
';*ea U....* .,en÷*":'t.
capabil*.iflieeore, ttheP C rUi iudedlthat thee.tw*eli[v~ert ca.. b.l~ity*afj* ztrckiis adeqUa" Temporary Instruction 2515/183.
"beyond design and licensing basis vulnerabilityffor beyond design basis accidents]"was not a consideration during GL 89-16 inspections.
The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic
_______ J 'I 13
Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No. meet criteriafor review under 2.206 process?
basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16.
Therefore, this issue should be reqected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for relectinq a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.
11 The additional identified 'vulnerability" and the Yes. Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 relatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy and Recommendation 6.
places the public health and safety unduly and R4Mnmendadton 5.1 e1to n!ude..a unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day rlible'hardened vent i 1 .andMar.il operations where "current procedures do not co.cNta..I.ments
. This is Oinments. d ddu.'S n dr§ma6..e a.e address hydrogen considerations during primary o0jectives for the desig**l ed vrits t0 containment venting" and will not for nearly five (5) " Pse eliable ope*6 s -rofuse"(both' more years. neg and c.alosing).150 torg'6d SBO.
Reommendation '6 c As~i part-of e nger~ term review, hydrogen thVte gahoii's co.tlo en-6tlf nihts."
Is athisr4i'rther study of the
___________________________________ D a cciidi 14
SUMMARY
(1) The petition and the supplements do not include any new or additional information or facts that were not known to the NRC staff with respect to FitzPatrick's Containment Vent System.
(2) FitzPatrick response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16.
(3) Recommendatio166S-A: orders iCn*eý
. it ]Includ eaxIiiable ihardened vent in BWR Mark i:and Mark i. Thl. ord*j i'cuOded .pe.ormqp'W0bjectives for:the design of tc:ntainments:
hardened ven'ts .toens k' 0i00p0 pL,* *"?ing ann.clsing) during a p*o!*j rjendaton.q d'ld!.Si*'
-paetofffheion er term idntify Ig riohR b ,yrogen cont iide containment or in other buildings* asa ditionalrinformation is revealed through'further study of theFukushima: Dai-ichi accident.
(4) After the issuance of the Facility Operating License, the NRC has conducted its regular and necessary inspections and assessments of the licensee's performance. The Commission has not found it necessary to issue any generic communications, based on the industry operating experience, or the plant specific communications, based on the licensee's performance, to require any changes to the design and operating requirements of the Containment Vent System. The plant continues to meet all the requirements with respect to the regulations and the licensing bases, including those with respect to the design basis accidents and natural phenomena. Fukushima events have been characterized as "Beyond Design Basis Accidents." The design and operating requirements for "Beyond Design Basis Accidents" for Containment Vent System are being addressed through the Commission-Issued Order.