ML112901409

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CP-2011-06-Draft OP Test
ML112901409
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 06/06/2011
From: Brian Larson
Operations Branch IV
To:
References
Download: ML112901409 (335)


Text

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC RA1 Task #RO1310 K/A #2.1.43 4.1 / 4.3

Title:

Determine Reactivity Effects When Starting Positive Displacement Charging Pump Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is operating at approximately 3% power.
  • The Positive Displacement Charging Pump must be placed in service per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • CALCULATE a Reactivity Evaluation for starting the Positive Displacement Charging Pump per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Steps 5.3.1.C and 5.3.1.D.
  • REPORT findings to the Shift Manager.

Task Standard: Calculate the change in boron and resultant change in temperature when placing the Positive Displacement Pump in service per SOP-103A.

Required Materials: SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Rev. 17-23.

Reactivity Briefing Sheet for 1545 ppm Reactor Coolant System conditions.

Validation Time: 10 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA1 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

  • SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 5.3.1.
  • INITIALED up to Step 5.3.1.C.
  • 89.8 EFPD Reactivity Briefing Sheet.

Page 2 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA1 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-103A, Step 5.3.1.

Perform Step: 1 IF the RCS boron concentration has changed significantly since the 5.3.1.C 1st line + PDP was last operated, THEN determine the impact of water in the PDP calculation piping on reactivity as follows:

  • B = RCS Boron Concentration Difference Standard: CALCULATED B = RCS Boron Concentration Difference as follows:

B = ( 2400 ppm PDP - 1545 ppm RCS) x 0.00128 = 1.0944 ppm Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Rounding off of ITC and HFP Differential Boron Worth may occur.

Perform Step: 2 On the Reactivity Briefing Sheet get the following information:

5.3.1.C 2nd line + ITC _____ pcm/ºF HFP Differential Boron Worth _____ pcm/ppm calculation Standard: DETERMINED the following from the Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

ITC = - 1.1 +/- 0.1 pcm /ºF HFP Differential Boron Worth = - 6.9 +/- 0.1pcm / ppm Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Rounding off of ITC / HFP Differential Boron Worth may occur.

Perform Step: 3 On the Reactivity Briefing Sheet get the following information:

5.3.1.C 2nd line + ITC / HFP Differential Boron Worth = ppm / ºF calculation Standard: CALCULATED change in ppm / ºF:

- 1.1 pcm / ºF / - 6.9 pcm / ppm = 0.1594 +/- 0.02 ppm / ºF Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA1 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: Rounding off of TAVE may occur.

Perform Step: 4 On the Reactivity Briefing Sheet get the following information:

5.3.1.C 3rd line + TAVE = B / ppm / ºF calculation Standard: CALCULATED change in TAVE as follows:

TAVE = B / ppm / ºF = 1.0944 ppm / 0.1594 ppm / ºF = 6.87 +/- 1.0 ºF Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 IF TAVE calculated above is >1ºF, THEN notify Shift Operations 5.3.1.D Manager to discuss contingency actions.

Standard: DETERMINED TAVE calculated is greater than 1ºF and NOTIFIED Shift Manager.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 4 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA1 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is operating at approximately 3% power.
  • The Positive Displacement Charging Pump must be placed in service per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • CALCULATE a Reactivity Evaluation for starting the Positive Displacement Charging Pump per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Steps 5.3.1.C and 5.3.1.D.
  • REPORT findings to the Shift Manager.

Page 5 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA1 Rev d.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA1 Handout Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Stable Operation FOR SIMULATOR SIMULATOR USE on

- Created ONLY02/17/09 SIMULATOR USE ONLY Calculations based on core design values, and assume:

Burnup = 4001.3 MWD/MTU Burnup in the BOL range 89.82 EFPD Power = 0 RTP Boron = 1545 ppm NOTE: Re-create the Briefing Sheet B10 Conc = 0.1776696 w/o if current values significantly differ Control Bank D = 100 steps from assumed inputs.

Reactivity affects of Control Bank D HFP Diff Worth @ 100.0 steps = -4.3 pcm / step HFP Integral Rod Worth for CBD Step Positions:

Steps pcm Steps pcm Steps pcm Steps pcm 110 -269.0 103 -294.7 96 -325.2 85 -382.5 109 -272.4 102 -298.7 95 -329.9 80 -411.7 108 -275.9 101 -302.9 94 -334.8 75 -442.7 107 -279.4 100 -307.1 93 -339.8 70 -475.3 106 -283.1 99 -311.5 92 -344.8 65 -509.2 105 -286.9 98 -316.0 91 -350.0 60 -544.2 104 -290.7 97 -320.5 90 -355.2 55 -580.3 Reactivity affects of Boron HFP Diff Boron Worth @ 1545 ppm = -6.9 pcm / ppm 1-FK-110 Pot Setting for Blended Flow @ 1545 ppm = 6.34 (Assuming BAT concentration of 7492.0 ppm)

Reactivity affects of Power Power Coefficient of Reactivity = -13.1 pcm / % RTP Dilution to equal 1% Power Increase = 83.8 gallons RMUW Boration to equal 1% Power Decrease = 20.9 gallons boric acid Reactivity affects of RCS Temperature Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity (ITC) = -1.1 pcm / EF Boration to equal 1EF Temperature Decrease = 1.8 gallons boric acid Dilution to equal 1EF Temperature Increase = 7.3 gallons RMUW Load Reduction equal to 1EF Tave Increase = 1.0 MWe Page 1 of 1 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA1 Procedure COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL ELECTRONIC CONTROLLED COPY CHANGES ARE NOT INDICATED LATEST CHANGE NOTICE EFFECTIVE DATE PCN-1 0--200 1200

__________/________ Verify current status in the Document Control Database prior to use.

INITIAL & DATE QUALITY RELATED CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCEDURE NO. SOP-103A REVISION NO. 17 EFFECTIVE DATE: 03-05-2008 1200 PREPARED BY (Print): Brad Hancock Ext: 6769 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY (Print): Lisabeth Donley Ext: 6524 APPROVED BY: Alan Hall for Dave Goodwin Date: 02-19-2008 DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS Page 1 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA1 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 27 OF 131 5.3 Major Component Operation 5.3.1 Positive Displacement Pump Startup This section describes the steps to place the PDP in service.

CAUTION: PDP operation may result in high gaseous activity in the PDP Room due to packing leakage.

NOTE:  ! PDP run time should be minimized to conserve pump packing. Run PDP only when required (for example - Slave Relay Testing).

! Following loss of Instrument Air, control air to the PDP fluid drive must be reset. This is done by depressing the RESET pushbutton on the instrument air supply to the PDP fluid drive. This RESET is normally accomplished by ABN-301 restoration section 3.0.

! The reactivity impact for starting the PDP pump is typically very small due to diffusion effects between the PDP piping and the RCS. However, assuming no diffusion, the reactivity effects could potentially approach -15 pcm (and -1.5 °F temperature change) with very large

(>1000 ppm) boron concentration differences between the PDP piping and RCS. (EVAL 0944-04)

! Following several PDP starts, the PDP fluid drive oil may exceed the upper limit mark on the drive units sight glass due to priming) the pump (adding oil) over a period of time. The PROMPT Team should be contacted to drain th e e x c e s s o il.

(SMF-01-0600 and 4-03-149515-00)

! With the PDP stopped, oil level should be in the upper 1/4 of the MIN - MAX range, preferably near the MAX level mark. (SMF-05-2603)

Q A. Ensure the prerequisites in Section 2.5 are met.

B. IF the PDP has not operated for an extended period (month), THEN prime the PDP fluid drive by performing the following:

Q 1) IF pump hydraulic fluid level is at the maximum level of the sightglass, THEN instruct a PROMPT member to drain ~1/2 liter of oil into a clean container. (This oil will be added to the fluid drive at step 5.3.1.B. 3)

Q 2) Remove the pipe plugs from the two priming holes on top of the input end bell (motor side of the fluid drive).

Q 3) Pour oil (collected in step 5.3.1.B. 1) a) and/or from the approved lubrication list) into either hole until oil rises to the bottom of the other hole and remains there.

Q 4) Replace and tighten the pipe plugs.

Page 2 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA1 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 28 OF 131 5.3.1 NOTE: Steps C and D may be considered NA if in a MODE other than MODE 1 or 2.

Q C. IF the RCS boron concentration has changed significantly since the PDP was last operated, THEN determine the impact of water in the PDP piping on reactivity as follows:

NOTE: This formula was developed using data from Eval 2004-000944-04-00. It assumes 84 gallons for the PDP piping. All the factors that would not change were calculated to give a constant (0.00128) to simplify the formula(updated in EVAL-2009-000420-02). This formula does not take into account the diffusion effect. So, the boron concentration could be less than the PDP plaque indicates. The temperature change calculated below represents worst case. Operating experience has shown actual temperature change was less than results of the calculation below.

)B = RCS Boron Concentration Difference

)B = ( _______ ppm PDP - ________ ppm RCS ) x 0.00128

)B = _______ ppm On the Reactivity Briefing Sheet get the following information:

ITC pcm/°F HFP Differential Boron Worth pcm/ppm ITC = pcm/°F = ppm/°F HFP Differential Boron Worth pcm/ppm

)Tave = B = ppm = °F ppm/°F ppm/°F Q D. IF )Tave calculated above is >1°F, THEN notify Shift Operations Manager to discuss contingency actions.

NOTE: If the Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is overfilled, the PDP Charging Pump Room will become contaminated.

E. IF Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is low, THEN fill per the following steps:

Q 1) Slowly crack OPEN 1CS-0119, PD PMP 1-01 STUFFING BOX COOL TK MU ISOL VLV, until desired fill rate is achieved.

Q 2) When the desired tank level has been established, CLOSE 1CS-0119.

Q F. Ensure 1-8388-RO, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV RMT OPER, is OPEN.

G. OPEN the following valves:

Q! 1/1-8202A, VENT VLV (MCB)

Q! 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV (MCB)

Page 3 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA1 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 29 OF 131 5.3.1 Q H. Ensure 1APPD, POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT CHARGING PUMP 1-01 MOTOR BREAKER 1EB1/2B/BKR is racked to the CONNECT position.

Q I. Place 1-SK-459A, PDP SPD CTRL, in MANUAL with demand at 55%.

NOTE: The PDP will not start until 1-8109, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 RECIRC VLV, is open and handswitch 1/1-APPD, PDP, is in the START position. Two minutes after the PDP breaker is closed, 1-8109 will automatically close.

Q J. OPEN 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV.

NOTE: PDP speed may have to be raised rapidly when a CCP is also in operation to prevent the PDP from stalling on low oil pressure.

Q K. WHEN 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV is open, THEN start the PDP by placing handswitch 1/1-APPD PDP, to the START position.

Q L. Ensure 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV, is CLOSED.

NOTE: During PDP operation the following step may be performed to lower PDP suction stabilizer level.

M. IF 1/1-8204, H2/N2 SPLY VLV indicates OPEN (red light on), THEN perform the following to lower suction stabilizer level:

[C] Q! OPEN 1/1-8210A, H2/N2 SPLY VLV and 1/1-8210B, H2/N2 SPLY VLV for no more than 10 seconds to clear the high level, then close.

N. IF a CCP is in operation AND it is to be placed in standby, THEN perform the following:

Q 1) Ensure only ONE letdown orifice is in service per Section 5.2.3.

Q2 Alternately raise PDP speed using 1-SK-459A, PDP SPD CTRL, and lower CCP flow using 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL, until 1-FK-121 is at minimum.

Q 3) Shut down the running CCP per Section 5.3.4.

[IV] Q O. IF desired, THEN gradually adjust 1-SK-459A, PDP SPD CTRL, to achieve the required flow rate AND place in AUTO.

Q P. Adjust 1-LK-459, PRZR LVL CTRL, as necessary to maintain stable Pressurizer level.

COMMENTS Page 4 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA1 Answer Key CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 28 OF 131 5.3.1 NOTE: Steps C and D may be considered NA if in a MODE other than MODE 1 or 2.

Q C. IF the RCS boron concentration has changed significantly since the PDP was last operated, THEN determine the impact of water in the PDP piping on reactivity as follows:

NOTE: This formula was developed using data from Eval 2004-000944-04-00. It assumes 84 gallons for the PDP piping. All the factors that would not change were calculated to give a constant (0.00128) to simplify the formula(updated in EVAL-2009-000420-02). This formula does not take into account the diffusion effect. So, the boron concentration could be less than the PDP plaque indicates. The temperature change calculated below represents worst case. Operating experience has shown actual temperature change was less than results of the calculation below.

)B = RCS Boron Concentration Difference 2400 ppm PDP - ________

)B = ( _______ 1545 ppm RCS ) x 0.00128 1.0944 ppm

)B = _______

On the Reactivity Briefing Sheet get the following information:

ITC -1.1 +/- 0.1 pcm/°F HFP Differential Boron Worth - 6.9 +/- 0.1 pcm/ppm ITC = -1.1 +/- 0.1 pcm/°F = 0.1594 +/- 0.02 ppm/°F HFP Differential Boron Worth - 6.9 +/- 0.1 pcm/ppm

)Tave = B = 1.0944 ppm = 6.87 +/- 1.0 °F ppm/°F 0.1594 +/- 0.02 ppm/°F Q D. IF )Tave calculated above is >1°F, THEN notify Shift Operations Manager to discuss contingency actions.

NOTE: If the Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is overfilled, the PDP Charging Pump Room will become contaminated.

E. IF Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is low, THEN fill per the following steps:

Q 1) Slowly crack OPEN 1CS-0119, PD PMP 1-01 STUFFING BOX COOL TK MU ISOL VLV, until desired fill rate is achieved.

Q 2) When the desired tank level has been established, CLOSE 1CS-0119.

Q F. Ensure 1-8388-RO, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV RMT OPER, is OPEN.

G. OPEN the following valves:

Q! 1/1-8202A, VENT VLV (MCB)

Q! 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV (MCB)

Page 1 of 1 Rev d

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC RA2 Task #RO5115 K/A #2.1.25 3.9 / 4.2

Title:

Calculate Pressurizer and Steam Generator Level from Remote Shutdown Panel Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • The Unit 1 Control Room has been evacuated.
  • ABN-905A, Loss of Control Room Habitability, is in progress.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • CALCULATE Pressurizer indicated level to maintain Pressurizer actual level between 25% and 50% when at 467ºF.

Task Standard: Calculate actual Steam Generator and Pressurizer levels during a cooldown per ABN-905A, Attachments 16 and 17.

Required Materials: ABN-905A, Loss of Control Room Habitability, Rev. 9-6.

Validation Time: 10 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 4 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA2 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

  • ABN-905A, Loss of Control Room Habitability.
  • Attachment 16, SG Level Temperature Correction.
  • Attachment 17, PRZR Level Temperature Correction.

Page 2 of 4 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA2 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: Steam Generator Level Graph is from ABN-905A, Attachment 16.

Perform Step: 1 CALCULATE Steam Generator indicated wide range level to maintain Steam Generator actual level between 74% and 83% when at 400ºF.

Standard: CALCULATED Steam Generator indicated wide range level at 64% +/-1%

to maintain Steam Generator actual level at 74% when at 400ºF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 CALCULATE Steam Generator indicated wide range level to maintain Steam Generator actual level between 74% and 83% when at 400ºF.

Standard: CALCULATED Steam Generator indicated wide range level at 71% +/-1%

to maintain Steam Generator actual level at 83% when at 400ºF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Pressurizer Level Graph is from ABN-905A, Attachment 17.

Perform Step: 3 CALCULATE Pressurizer indicated level to maintain Pressurizer actual level between 25% and 50% when at 467ºF.

Standard: CALCULATED Pressurizer indicated level at 24% +/-1% to maintain Pressurizer actual level at 25% when at 467ºF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 CALCULATE Pressurizer indicated level to maintain Pressurizer actual level between 25% and 50% when at 467ºF.

Standard: CALCULATED Pressurizer indicated level at 57% +/-1% to maintain Pressurizer actual level at 50% when at 467ºF.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 3 of 4 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA2 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • The Unit 1 Control Room has been evacuated.
  • ABN-905A, Loss of Control Room Habitability, is in progress.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • CALCULATE Pressurizer indicated level to maintain Pressurizer actual level between 25% and 50% when at 467ºF.

Page 4 of 4 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA2 Rev d.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA2 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 ABN-905A LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REVISION NO. 9 PAGE 59 OF 74 ATTACHMENT 16 PAGE 1 OF 1 SG LEVEL TEMPERATURE CORRECTION NOTE: Normal SG level for Hot Standby and Cooldown (60 - 75% NR) is between 83% and 90%

actual wide range. Operating outside this range could cause uncovering AFW nozzle OR ESF actuation OR moisture carryover. Approximate critical levels (actual wide range) are:

! Lo-Lo (ESF actuation) Unit 1 - 74%

! AFW Nozzle Unit 1 - 83%

! Hi-Hi (moisture carryover) 92%

(L) 100.0 551 0 F 90.0 500 0 F 80.0 ACTUAL SG WIDE RANGE LEVEL (%)

350 0 F 0

400 F 70.0 70 0 F 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 INDICATED SG WIDE RANGE LEVEL (%)

Attachment 16 Page 1 of 2 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA2 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 ABN-905A LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REVISION NO. 9 PAGE 60 OF 74 ATTACHMENT 17 PAGE 1 OF 1 PRZR LEVEL TEMPERATURE CORRECTION PRESSURIZER LEVEL CHANNEL (Hot Calibrated)

(LI-459B, LI-460B) 100 2235 PSIG 653°F 1483 PSIG 90 486 PSIG 80 70 0 PSIG ACTUAL LEVEL (%)

60 596°F 50 70°F 40 467°F 30 20 10 0

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 INDICATED LEVEL (%)

Attachment 17 Page 2 of 2 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA2 Answer Key CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 ABN-905A LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REVISION NO. 9 PAGE 59 OF 74 ATTACHMENT 16 PAGE 1 OF 1 SG LEVEL TEMPERATURE CORRECTION NOTE: Normal SG level for Hot Standby and Cooldown (60 - 75% NR) is between 83% and 90%

actual wide range. Operating outside this range could cause uncovering AFW nozzle OR ESF actuation OR moisture carryover. Approximate critical levels (actual wide range) are:

! Lo-Lo (ESF actuation) Unit 1 - 74%

! AFW Nozzle Unit 1 - 83%

! Hi-Hi (moisture carryover) 92%

(L) 100.0 551 0 F 90.0 500 0 F 80.0 ACTUAL SG WIDE RANGE LEVEL (%)

350 0 F 0

400 F 70.0 70 0 F 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 INDICATED SG WIDE RANGE LEVEL (%)

Attachment 16 Page 1 of 2 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA2 Answer Key CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 ABN-905A LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REVISION NO. 9 PAGE 60 OF 74 ATTACHMENT 17 PAGE 1 OF 1 PRZR LEVEL TEMPERATURE CORRECTION PRESSURIZER LEVEL CHANNEL (Hot Calibrated)

(LI-459B, LI-460B) 100 2235 PSIG 653°F 1483 PSIG 90 486 PSIG 80 70 0 PSIG ACTUAL LEVEL (%)

60 596°F 50 70°F 40 467°F 30 20 10 0

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 INDICATED LEVEL (%)

Attachment 17 Page 2 of 2 Rev d

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC RA3 Task #RO1808 K/A #2.2.12 3.7 / 4.1

Title:

Perform Axial Flux Difference Surveillance Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is at 95% power.
  • The Axial Flux Difference (AFD) alarm was declared INOPERABLE over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago.
  • Power Range Nuclear Instrument AFD data was collected for several hours last shift.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • PERFORM OPT-403, Axial Flux Difference.
  • ENTER the Power Range Nuclear Instrument AFD data onto OPT-403-1, AFD Data Sheet.
  • RECORD findings in the Discrepancies/Comments Section of OPT-403-1.

TIME 1-NI-41C 1-NI-42C 1-NI-43C 1-NI-44C 0800 9% 10% 11% 9%

0830 9% 11% 12% 10%

0900 10% 11% 12% 11%

0930 11% 14% 12% 14%

1000 11% 13% 12% 13%

1030 12% 14% 13% 14%

Task Standard: Perform Axial Flux Difference surveillance per OPT-403 and record findings on OPT-403-1.

Required Materials: OPT-403, Axial Flux Difference, Rev. 11.

OPT-403-1, AFD Data Sheet, Rev. 10-1.

NUC-204-6, Axial Flux Difference As a Function of Rated Thermal Power, Unit 1 Cycle 15, Rev. 07/26/10.

Page 1 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 2 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

  • OPT-403, Axial Flux Difference.
  • OPT-403-1, AFD Data Sheet.
  • NUC-204-6, Axial Flux Difference As a Function of Rated Thermal Power.

Page 3 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from OPT-403, Section 8.0 and documented on Form OPT-403-1.

Perform Step: 1 Record the following data for the affected unit:

8.1 & 8.1.1

  • Unit 1 or 2 as applicable Standard: CIRCLED Unit 1 on OPT-403-1.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Record the following data for the affected unit:

8.1 & 8.1.2

  • Date Standard: ENTERED Date on OPT-403-1.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Record the following data:

8.2 & 8.2.1

  • Time Standard: ENTERED Time on OPT-403-1.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Record the following data:

8.2 & 8.2.2

  • PR FLUX for each operable excore detector Standard: RECORDED PR FLUX for each operable excore detector on OPT-403-1 from JPM Cue Sheet.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Record the following data:

8.2 & 8.2.3

  • Percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP)

Standard: RECORDED Percent Rated Thermal Power on OPT-403-1.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 6 Perform the following to determine PR FLUX status and record:

8.3 & 8.3.1

  • Verify at least 3 of 4 PR FLUX channels are within the Acceptable Operation region (Doghouse Region) of NUC-204-6 Axial Flux Difference as a Function of Rated Thermal Power.

Standard: DETERMINED PR FLUX status and RECORDED and INITIALED on OPT-403-1.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Perform the following to determine PR FLUX status and record:

8.3 & 8.3.2

  • Repeat Steps 8.2 and 8.3 at least once per thirty (30) minutes.

Standard: REPEATED Steps 8.2 and 8.3 at least once per thirty (30) minutes on OPT-403-1.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 Record findings in the Discrepancies/Comments Section of OPT-403-1.

Standard: RECORDED findings in the Discrepancies / Comments Section of OPT-403-1.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is at 95% power.
  • The Axial Flux Difference (AFD) alarm was declared INOPERABLE over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago.
  • Power Range Nuclear Instrument AFD data was collected for several hours last shift.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • PERFORM OPT-403, Axial Flux Difference.
  • ENTER the Power Range Nuclear Instrument AFD data onto OPT-403-1, AFD Data Sheet.
  • RECORD findings in the Discrepancies/Comments Section of OPT-403-1.

TIME 1-NI-41C 1-NI-42C 1-NI-43C 1-NI-44C 0800 9% 10% 11% 9%

0830 9% 11% 12% 10%

0900 10% 11% 12% 11%

0930 11% 14% 12% 14%

1000 11% 13% 12% 13%

1030 12% 14% 13% 14%

Page 6 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Rev d.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Handout 1 FOR SIMULATOR USE ONLY Axial Flux Difference as a Function of Rated Thermal Power Unit 1, Cycle 15 100 15.00 2.4 10.00 95 90 85 UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE 80 OPERATION OPERATION 75 70 65 Rated Thermal Power (%)

60 55 50 30.00 30.00 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

0

-40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Indicated Axial Flux Difference (%)

Prepared By: MOL IC18 Date:

Approved By: SIMULATOR USE ONLY Date:

Core Performance Engineering Supervisor NUC-204-6 Page 1 of 1 REFERENCE USE Rev. 2 Page 1 of 1 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Handout 2 AFD DATA SHEET 8.1.1 UNIT: (Circle one) 1 2 8.1.2 DATE NOTE: ! PR ) FLUX shall be considered outside the Acceptable Operations limits when two or more OPERABLE excore channels indicate ) FLUX to be outside the Acceptable Operations limits.

! PR ) FLUX logging frequency may be shortened at the discretion of the Shift Manager.

! Log PR ) FLUX data at least once per 30 minutes. The 30 minute frequency satisfies the following TRS 13.2.32.1 requirements:

- Once per hour for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> that the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable.

- Once per 30 minutes when the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable for > 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

PR FLUX 3 of 4 PR WITHIN TIME  % RTP INITIAL ACCEPTABLE u -NI-41C u -NI-42C u -NI-43C u -NI-44C OPERATION YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OPT-403-1 PAGE 1 OF 3 R-10 Page 1 of 3 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Handout 2 AFD DATA SHEET PR FLUX 3 of 4 PR WITHIN TIME  % RTP INITIAL ACCEPTABLE u -NI-41C u -NI-42C u -NI-43C u -NI-44C OPERATION YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO Additional copies of Page 2 of this data sheet may be used as required to document AFD status. Q Continued Next Page OPT-403-1 PAGE 2 OF 3 R-10 Page 2 of 3 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Handout 2 AFD DATA SHEET DISCREPANCIES / COMMENTS:

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

PERFORMED BY: DATE:

SIGNATURE REVIEWED BY: DATE:

OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT OPT-403-1 PAGE 3 OF 3 R-10 Page 3 of 3 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Procedure COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT COMMON OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL ELECTRONIC CONTROLLED COPY CHANGES ARE NOT INDICATED LATEST CHANGE NOTICE EFFECTIVE DATE

__________/________ Verify current status in the Document Control Database prior to use.

INITIAL & DATE QUALITY RELATED AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE PROCEDURE NO. OPT-403 REVISION NO. 11 EFFECTIVE DATE: 10/08/08 1200 PREPARED BY (Print): JIM BRAU Ext: 5443 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY (Print): ROB SLOUGH Ext: 5727 APPROVED BY: D.W. McGAUGHEY for Dave Goodwin Date: 09/19/08 DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS Page 1 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL UNIT COMMON OPT-403 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE REVISION NO. 11 PAGE 2 OF 4 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure satisfies Axial Flux Difference (AFD) monitoring when automated monitoring is NOT available. The requirements of TRS 13.2.32.1 is met by monitoring and logging indicated AFD for each OPERABLE excore channel. A frequency of 30 minutes for logging data is used to ensure the requirement is met if the AFD Monitor is inoperable for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

The actual TRS frequency requirements are as follows:

NOTE: The logged values of the indicated AFD shall be assumed to exist during the interval preceding each logging.

! Once per hour for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> that the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable. (TRS 13.2.32.1).

! Once per 30 minutes when the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable for >24 hours. (TRS 13.2.32.1).

2.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 2.1 At > 50% RTP the indicated AFD is within the Acceptable Operation limit of NUC-204-6 Axial Flux Difference as a Function of Rated Thermal Power.

3.0 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS 3.1 APLND - Analyzed Power Limit Nuclear Design 3.2 AFD - Axial Flux Difference 3.3 RTP - Rated Thermal Power 3.4 Validated Computer Program - A computer program verified consistent with current procedures and technical data used to calculate AFD and the associated penalty time.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Technical Specification 3.2.3, "AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) 4.2 Technical Requirement 13.2.32, "AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD)"

4.3 FSAR Section 4.3, Nuclear Design 4.4 COLR, Core Operating Limits Report 4.5 NUC-204, "Target Axial Flux Difference" 4.6 NUC-204-6, Axial Flux Difference as a Function of Rated Thermal Power 4.7 SOP-906, Plant Process Computer System Guidelines Page 2 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL UNIT COMMON OPT-403 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE REVISION NO. 11 PAGE 3 OF 4 5.0 PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND NOTES 5.1 Precautions None 5.2 Limitations 5.2.1 Core Performance Engineering shall be notified when any acceptance criteria not satisfied.

5.3 Notes None 6.0 PREREQUISITES Q 6.1 MODE 1 at > 50% RTP.

7.0 TEST EQUIPMENT None Page 3 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL UNIT COMMON OPT-403 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE REVISION NO. 11 PAGE 4 OF 4 8.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE: Record all data on Form OPT-403-1.

8.1 Record the following data for the affected unit:

Q 8.1.1 Unit 1 or 2 as applicable Q 8.1.2 Date 8.2 Record the following data:

Q 8.2.1 Time Q 8.2.2 PR ) FLUX for each operable excore detector Q 8.2.3 Percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP) 8.3 Perform the following to determine PR ) FLUX status and record:

Q A. Verify at least 3 of 4 PR ) FLUX channels are within the Acceptable Operation region (Doghouse Region) of NUC-204-6 Axial Flux Difference as a Function of Rated Thermal Power.

[C]

Q B. Repeat Steps 8.2 and 8.3 at least once per thirty (30) minutes.

9.0 RESTORATION/POST WORK ACTIVITIES None 10.0 ATTACHMENTS/FORMS 10.1 Attachments None 10.2 Forms 10.2.1 OPT-403-1, AFD Data Sheet Page 4 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Answer Key AFD DATA SHEET 8.1.1 UNIT: (Circle one) 1 2 8.1.2 DATE TODAY NOTE: ! PR ) FLUX shall be considered outside the Acceptable Operations limits when two or more OPERABLE excore channels indicate ) FLUX to be outside the Acceptable Operations limits.

! PR ) FLUX logging frequency may be shortened at the discretion of the Shift Manager.

! Log PR ) FLUX data at least once per 30 minutes. The 30 minute frequency satisfies the following TRS 13.2.32.1 requirements:

- Once per hour for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> that the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable.

- Once per 30 minutes when the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable for > 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

PR FLUX 3 of 4 PR WITHIN TIME  % RTP INITIAL ACCEPTABLE u -NI-41C u -NI-42C u -NI-43C u -NI-44C OPERATION YES NO 0800 9% 10% 11% 9% 95 LZ YES NO 0830 9% 11% 12% 10% 95 LZ YES NO 0900 10% 11% 12% 11% 95 LZ YES NO 0930 11% 14% 12% 14% 95 LZ YES NO 1000 11% 13% 12% 13% 95 LZ YES NO 1030 12% 14% 13% 14% 95 LZ YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OPT-403-1 PAGE 1 OF 3 R-10 Page 1 of 3 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Answer Key AFD DATA SHEET PR FLUX 3 of 4 PR WITHIN TIME  % RTP INITIAL ACCEPTABLE u -NI-41C u -NI-42C u -NI-43C u -NI-44C OPERATION YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO Additional copies of Page 2 of this data sheet may be used as required to document AFD status. Q Continued Next Page OPT-403-1 PAGE 2 OF 3 R-10 Page 2 of 3 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA3 Answer Key AFD DATA SHEET DISCREPANCIES / COMMENTS: Acceptance Criteria not met starting at 0930.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

PERFORMED BY: DATE:

SIGNATURE REVIEWED BY: DATE:

OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT OPT-403-1 PAGE 3 OF 3 R-10 Page 3 of 3 Rev d

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC RA4 Task #RWT029 K/A #2.3.12 3.2 / 3.7

Title:

Determine Radiation Levels During Maintenance and Administrative Exposure Limit Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

JPM Cue Sheet #1

  • A high dose maintenance activity is scheduled in the Fuel Building.
  • The general dose rate in the area is 100 mrem/hour but can be reduced to 25 mrem/hour if lead shielding is installed.
  • It will take Nuclear Equipment Operators (NEOs) Alpha & Bravo 30 minutes to install the shielding.
  • Independent of the shielding, it will take NEO Alpha two (2) hours or NEOs Alpha & Bravo one and a half (1.5) hours to perform the maintenance.

Initiating Cue: The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • CALCULATE the dose received when performing the maintenance for each of the following conditions:
  • NEO Alpha without shielding. __________ mrem.
  • NEOs Alpha & Bravo without shielding. __________ mrem.
  • NEO Alpha with shielding. __________ mrem.
  • NEOs Alpha & Bravo with shielding. __________ mrem Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

JPM Cue Sheet #2

  • It was determined that NEO Alpha received a Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) of 225 mrem while performing the maintenance task.
  • NEO Alphas year to date whole body exposure is 1785 mrem.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • IDENTIFY if any applicable CPNPP Administrative Exposure Levels have been exceeded.
  • REPORT findings to the Shift Manager.

Task Standard: Calculate the dose received when performing the maintenance and determine if an Administrative Exposure Level was exceeded per STA-655.

Page 1 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA4 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Required Materials: STA-655, Exposure Monitoring Program, Rev. 19.

Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 2 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA4 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee JPM Cue Sheet #1.

When JPM Cue Sheet #1 is completed, PROVIDE JPM Cue Sheet #2.

ENSURE examinee has a calculator.

ENSURE copy of STA-655, Exposure Monitoring Program is available.

Page 3 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA4 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Perform Step: 1 Determine total dose to NEO Alpha without shielding.

Standard: DETERMINED total dose to NEO Alpha without shielding as follows:

  • 100 mrem/hr x 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> = 200 mrem total dose.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Determine total combined dose to NEOs Alpha & Bravo without shielding.

Standard: DETERMINED total combined dose to NEOs Alpha & Bravo without shielding as follows:

  • 100 mrem/hr x 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />s/NEO x 2 NEOs = 300 mrem total dose.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Determine total dose to install shielding.

Standard: DETERMINED total dose to install shielding as follows:

  • 100 mrem/hr x 0.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />s/NEO x 2 NEOs = 100 mrem to install.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Determine total dose to NEO Alpha with shielding.

Standard: DETERMINED total dose to NEO Alpha with shielding as follows:

  • 25 mrem/hr x 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> + 100 mrem = 150 mrem total dose.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Determine total combined dose to NEOs Alpha & Bravo with shielding.

Standard: DETERMINED total combined dose to NEOs Alpha & Bravo with shielding as follows:

  • 25 mrem/hr x 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />s/NEO x 2 NEOs + 100 mrem = 175 mrem total dose.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA4 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: Provide the examinee with copy of JPM Cue Sheet #2.

Perform Step: 6 Determine if any applicable CPNPP Administrative Exposure Levels have been exceeded.

Standard: DETERMINED that the CPNPP TEDE Administrative Exposure Limit of 2000 mrem was exceeded per STA-655, Exposure Monitoring Program.

1785 mrem = 225 mrem = 2010 mrem.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Report findings to Shift Manager.

Standard: REPORTED to Shift Manager that the CPNPP TEDE Administrative Exposure Limit of 2000 mrem was exceeded.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA4 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET #1 Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • A high dose maintenance activity is scheduled in the Fuel Building.
  • The general dose rate in the area is 100 mrem/hour but can be reduced to 25 mrem/hour if lead shielding is installed.
  • It will take Nuclear Equipment Operators (NEOs) Alpha

& Bravo 30 minutes to install the shielding.

  • Independent of the shielding, it will take NEO Alpha two (2) hours or NEOs Alpha & Bravo one and a half (1.5) hours to perform the maintenance.

INITIATING CUE: The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • CALCULATE the dose received when performing the maintenance for each of the following conditions:
  • NEO Alpha without shielding. _____ mrem.
  • NEOs Alpha & Bravo without shielding. _____ mrem.
  • NEO Alpha with shielding. _____ mrem.
  • NEOs Alpha & Bravo with shielding. _____ mrem.

Page 6 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA4 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET #2 Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • It was determined that NEO Alpha received a Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) of 225 mrem while performing the maintenance task.
  • NEO Alphas year to date whole body exposure is 1785 mrem.

INITIATING CUE: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • IDENTIFY if any applicable CPNPP Administrative Exposure Levels have been exceeded.
  • REPORT findings to the Shift Manager.

Page 7 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA4 Rev d.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA4 Answer Key CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

STATION ADMINISTRATION STA-655 EXPOSURE MONITORING PROGRAM REVISION NO. 19 Page 23 of 29 ATTACHMENT 8.A PAGE 1 OF 2 ADMINISTRATIVE EXPOSURE LEVELS DEEP DOSE RADIATION WORKERS LEVEL PERIOD CALCULATION Annual TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equivalent) 2000 mrem TODE - (The SUM of Deep-Dose Annual Equivalent and Committed Dose Equivalent to any individual organ or tissue other than 20,000 mrem the lens of the eye).

PERIOD EVENT LEVEL Annual Planned Special Exposure (PSE) 4000 mrem NOT TO EXCEED:

Lifetime Planned Special Exposure (PSE) Five times the annual dose limit.

Page 1 of 2 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM RA4 Answer Key CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

STATION ADMINISTRATION STA-655 EXPOSURE MONITORING PROGRAM REVISION NO. 19 Page 24 of 29 ATTACHMENT 8.A PAGE 2 OF 2 ADMINISTRATIVE EXPOSURE LEVELS DEEP DOSE EMBRYO/FETUS OF DECLARED PREGNANT RADIATION WORKER PERIOD RECEPTOR LEVEL Gestation Declared Radiation Worker 200 mrem OR: (Not to exceed 50mrem/month)

Declared Escorted Radiation Worker NOTE: If the dose to the embryo/fetus is found to have exceeded 200 mrem by the time the woman declares pregnancy, then any additional dose should not exceed 50 mrem during the remainder of the pregnancy.

NOTE: Administrative Exposure Levels are based on Electronic Dosimeter estimates.

ESCORTED RADIATION WORKERS LEVEL PERIOD CALCULATION Monitoring Period DDE (Deep Dose Equivalent) (with OSL 100 mrem badge)

With appropriate authorization:

Annual DDE (Deep Dose Equivalent) (with OSL 2000 mrem badge)

MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC (VISTOR)

PERIOD CALCULATION LEVEL Quarter DDE (Deep Dose Equivalent) 20 mrem NOTE: A Visitor is not allowed into a contaminated or airborne area and therefore a committed dose equivalent should not be calculated.

NOTE: Administrative Exposure Levels are based on Electronic Dosimeter estimates.

Page 2 of 2 Rev d

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC SA1 Task #SO1017 K/A #2.1.43 4.1 / 4.3

Title:

Determine Reactivity Effects When Starting Positive Displacement Charging Pump Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is operating at approximately 3% power.
  • The Positive Displacement Charging Pump must be placed in service per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System.
  • Chemistry has just reported the Unit 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank boron concentration is 2700 ppm.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • CALCULATE a Reactivity Evaluation for starting the Positive Displacement Charging Pump per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Steps 5.3.1.C and 5.3.1.D.
  • REPORT your findings to the Shift Manager.
  • IDENTIFY any Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), Required Action, and Completion Time associated with the REPORT from Chemistry, if any.
  • LCO _______________
  • REQUIRED ACTION _______________
  • COMPLETION TIME _______________

Task Standard: Calculate the change in boron and resultant change in temperature when placing the Positive Displacement Pump in service per SOP-103A and identify any Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation, Required Action and Completion Time.

Required Materials: SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Rev. 17-23.

CPNPP Technical Specifications Units 1 and 2, Amendment 152.

Reactivity Briefing Sheet for 1545 ppm Reactor Coolant System conditions.

Page 1 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 2 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

  • SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 5.3.1.
  • INITIALED up to Step 5.3.1.C.
  • 89.8 EFPD Reactivity Briefing Sheet.
  • CPNPP Technical Specifications - Units 1 and 2.

Page 3 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-103A, Step 5.3.1.

Perform Step: 1 IF the RCS boron concentration has changed significantly since the 5.3.1.C 1st line + PDP was last operated, THEN determine the impact of water in the PDP calculation piping on reactivity as follows:

  • B = RCS Boron Concentration Difference Standard: CALCULATED B = RCS Boron Concentration Difference as follows:

B = ( 500 ppm PDP - 1545 ppm RCS) x 0.00128 = 1.0944 ppm Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Rounding off of ITC and HFP Differential Boron Worth may occur.

Perform Step: 2 On the Reactivity Briefing Sheet get the following information:

5.3.1.C 2nd line + ITC _____ pcm/ºF HFP Differential Boron Worth _____ pcm/ppm calculation Standard: DETERMINED the following from the Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

ITC = - 1.1 +/- 0.1 pcm /ºF HFP Differential Boron Worth = - 6.9 +/- 0.1 pcm / ppm Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Rounding off of ITC / HFP Differential Boron Worth may occur.

Perform Step: 3 On the Reactivity Briefing Sheet get the following information:

5.3.1.C 2nd line + ITC / HFP Differential Boron Worth = ppm / ºF calculation Standard: CALCULATED change in ppm / ºF:

- 1.1 pcm / ºF / - 6.9 pcm / ppm = 0.1594 +/- 0.02 ppm / ºF Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: Rounding off of TAVE may occur.

Perform Step: 4 On the Reactivity Briefing Sheet get the following information:

5.3.1.C 3rd line + TAVE = B / ppm / ºF calculation Standard: CALCULATED change in TAVE as follows:

TAVE = B / ppm / ºF = 1.0944 ppm / 0.1594 ppm / ºF = 6.87 +/- 1.0 ºF Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 IF TAVE calculated above is >1ºF, THEN notify Shift Operations 5.3.1.D Manager to discuss contingency actions.

Standard: DETERMINED TAVE calculated is greater than 1ºF and NOTIFIED Shift Operations Manager.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 Identify Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation.

Standard: RECOGNIZED RWST boron concentration greater than 2600 ppm and DETERMINED the following:

  • Technical Specification LCO 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank CONDITION A, RWST boron concentration not within limits.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Identify Technical Specification REQUIRED ACTION and COMPLETION TIME.

Standard: DETERMINED Technical Specification REQUIRED ACTION and COMPLETION TIME:

  • 3.5.4.A.1 - Restore RWST to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is operating at approximately 3% power.
  • The Positive Displacement Charging Pump must be placed in service per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System.
  • Chemistry has just reported the Unit 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank boron concentration is 2700 ppm.

INITIATING CUE: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • CALCULATE a Reactivity Evaluation for starting the Positive Displacement Charging Pump per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Steps 5.3.1.C and 5.3.1.D.
  • REPORT your findings to the Shift Manager.
  • IDENTIFY any Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), Required Action, and Completion Time associated with the REPORT from Chemistry, if any.
  • LCO _______________
  • REQUIRED ACTION _______________
  • COMPLETION TIME _______________

Page 6 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Rev d.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Handout Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Stable Operation FOR SIMULATOR SIMULATOR USE on

- Created ONLY02/17/09 SIMULATOR USE ONLY Calculations based on core design values, and assume:

Burnup = 4001.3 MWD/MTU Burnup in the BOL range 89.82 EFPD Power = 0 RTP Boron = 1545 ppm NOTE: Re-create the Briefing Sheet B10 Conc = 0.1776696 w/o if current values significantly differ Control Bank D = 100 steps from assumed inputs.

Reactivity affects of Control Bank D HFP Diff Worth @ 100.0 steps = -4.3 pcm / step HFP Integral Rod Worth for CBD Step Positions:

Steps pcm Steps pcm Steps pcm Steps pcm 110 -269.0 103 -294.7 96 -325.2 85 -382.5 109 -272.4 102 -298.7 95 -329.9 80 -411.7 108 -275.9 101 -302.9 94 -334.8 75 -442.7 107 -279.4 100 -307.1 93 -339.8 70 -475.3 106 -283.1 99 -311.5 92 -344.8 65 -509.2 105 -286.9 98 -316.0 91 -350.0 60 -544.2 104 -290.7 97 -320.5 90 -355.2 55 -580.3 Reactivity affects of Boron HFP Diff Boron Worth @ 1545 ppm = -6.9 pcm / ppm 1-FK-110 Pot Setting for Blended Flow @ 1545 ppm = 6.34 (Assuming BAT concentration of 7492.0 ppm)

Reactivity affects of Power Power Coefficient of Reactivity = -13.1 pcm / % RTP Dilution to equal 1% Power Increase = 83.8 gallons RMUW Boration to equal 1% Power Decrease = 20.9 gallons boric acid Reactivity affects of RCS Temperature Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity (ITC) = -1.1 pcm / EF Boration to equal 1EF Temperature Decrease = 1.8 gallons boric acid Dilution to equal 1EF Temperature Increase = 7.3 gallons RMUW Load Reduction equal to 1EF Tave Increase = 1.0 MWe Page 1 of 1 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Procedure COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL ELECTRONIC CONTROLLED COPY CHANGES ARE NOT INDICATED LATEST CHANGE NOTICE EFFECTIVE DATE PCN-1 0--200 1200

__________/________ Verify current status in the Document Control Database prior to use.

INITIAL & DATE QUALITY RELATED CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCEDURE NO. SOP-103A REVISION NO. 17 EFFECTIVE DATE: 03-05-2008 1200 PREPARED BY (Print): Brad Hancock Ext: 6769 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY (Print): Lisabeth Donley Ext: 6524 APPROVED BY: Alan Hall for Dave Goodwin Date: 02-19-2008 DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS Page 1 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 27 OF 131 5.3 Major Component Operation 5.3.1 Positive Displacement Pump Startup This section describes the steps to place the PDP in service.

CAUTION: PDP operation may result in high gaseous activity in the PDP Room due to packing leakage.

NOTE:  ! PDP run time should be minimized to conserve pump packing. Run PDP only when required (for example - Slave Relay Testing).

! Following loss of Instrument Air, control air to the PDP fluid drive must be reset. This is done by depressing the RESET pushbutton on the instrument air supply to the PDP fluid drive. This RESET is normally accomplished by ABN-301 restoration section 3.0.

! The reactivity impact for starting the PDP pump is typically very small due to diffusion effects between the PDP piping and the RCS. However, assuming no diffusion, the reactivity effects could potentially approach -15 pcm (and -1.5 °F temperature change) with very large

(>1000 ppm) boron concentration differences between the PDP piping and RCS. (EVAL 0944-04)

! Following several PDP starts, the PDP fluid drive oil may exceed the upper limit mark on the drive units sight glass due to priming) the pump (adding oil) over a period of time. The PROMPT Team should be contacted to drain th e e x c e s s o il.

(SMF-01-0600 and 4-03-149515-00)

! With the PDP stopped, oil level should be in the upper 1/4 of the MIN - MAX range, preferably near the MAX level mark. (SMF-05-2603)

Q A. Ensure the prerequisites in Section 2.5 are met.

B. IF the PDP has not operated for an extended period (month), THEN prime the PDP fluid drive by performing the following:

Q 1) IF pump hydraulic fluid level is at the maximum level of the sightglass, THEN instruct a PROMPT member to drain ~1/2 liter of oil into a clean container. (This oil will be added to the fluid drive at step 5.3.1.B. 3)

Q 2) Remove the pipe plugs from the two priming holes on top of the input end bell (motor side of the fluid drive).

Q 3) Pour oil (collected in step 5.3.1.B. 1) a) and/or from the approved lubrication list) into either hole until oil rises to the bottom of the other hole and remains there.

Q 4) Replace and tighten the pipe plugs.

Page 2 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 28 OF 131 5.3.1 NOTE: Steps C and D may be considered NA if in a MODE other than MODE 1 or 2.

Q C. IF the RCS boron concentration has changed significantly since the PDP was last operated, THEN determine the impact of water in the PDP piping on reactivity as follows:

NOTE: This formula was developed using data from Eval 2004-000944-04-00. It assumes 84 gallons for the PDP piping. All the factors that would not change were calculated to give a constant (0.00128) to simplify the formula(updated in EVAL-2009-000420-02). This formula does not take into account the diffusion effect. So, the boron concentration could be less than the PDP plaque indicates. The temperature change calculated below represents worst case. Operating experience has shown actual temperature change was less than results of the calculation below.

)B = RCS Boron Concentration Difference

)B = ( _______ ppm PDP - ________ ppm RCS ) x 0.00128

)B = _______ ppm On the Reactivity Briefing Sheet get the following information:

ITC pcm/°F HFP Differential Boron Worth pcm/ppm ITC = pcm/°F = ppm/°F HFP Differential Boron Worth pcm/ppm

)Tave = B = ppm = °F ppm/°F ppm/°F Q D. IF )Tave calculated above is >1°F, THEN notify Shift Operations Manager to discuss contingency actions.

NOTE: If the Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is overfilled, the PDP Charging Pump Room will become contaminated.

E. IF Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is low, THEN fill per the following steps:

Q 1) Slowly crack OPEN 1CS-0119, PD PMP 1-01 STUFFING BOX COOL TK MU ISOL VLV, until desired fill rate is achieved.

Q 2) When the desired tank level has been established, CLOSE 1CS-0119.

Q F. Ensure 1-8388-RO, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV RMT OPER, is OPEN.

G. OPEN the following valves:

Q! 1/1-8202A, VENT VLV (MCB)

Q! 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV (MCB)

Page 3 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 29 OF 131 5.3.1 Q H. Ensure 1APPD, POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT CHARGING PUMP 1-01 MOTOR BREAKER 1EB1/2B/BKR is racked to the CONNECT position.

Q I. Place 1-SK-459A, PDP SPD CTRL, in MANUAL with demand at 55%.

NOTE: The PDP will not start until 1-8109, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 RECIRC VLV, is open and handswitch 1/1-APPD, PDP, is in the START position. Two minutes after the PDP breaker is closed, 1-8109 will automatically close.

Q J. OPEN 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV.

NOTE: PDP speed may have to be raised rapidly when a CCP is also in operation to prevent the PDP from stalling on low oil pressure.

Q K. WHEN 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV is open, THEN start the PDP by placing handswitch 1/1-APPD PDP, to the START position.

Q L. Ensure 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV, is CLOSED.

NOTE: During PDP operation the following step may be performed to lower PDP suction stabilizer level.

M. IF 1/1-8204, H2/N2 SPLY VLV indicates OPEN (red light on), THEN perform the following to lower suction stabilizer level:

[C] Q! OPEN 1/1-8210A, H2/N2 SPLY VLV and 1/1-8210B, H2/N2 SPLY VLV for no more than 10 seconds to clear the high level, then close.

N. IF a CCP is in operation AND it is to be placed in standby, THEN perform the following:

Q 1) Ensure only ONE letdown orifice is in service per Section 5.2.3.

Q2 Alternately raise PDP speed using 1-SK-459A, PDP SPD CTRL, and lower CCP flow using 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL, until 1-FK-121 is at minimum.

Q 3) Shut down the running CCP per Section 5.3.4.

[IV] Q O. IF desired, THEN gradually adjust 1-SK-459A, PDP SPD CTRL, to achieve the required flow rate AND place in AUTO.

Q P. Adjust 1-LK-459, PRZR LVL CTRL, as necessary to maintain stable Pressurizer level.

COMMENTS Page 4 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Answer Key 1 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 28 OF 131 5.3.1 NOTE: Steps C and D may be considered NA if in a MODE other than MODE 1 or 2.

Q C. IF the RCS boron concentration has changed significantly since the PDP was last operated, THEN determine the impact of water in the PDP piping on reactivity as follows:

NOTE: This formula was developed using data from Eval 2004-000944-04-00. It assumes 84 gallons for the PDP piping. All the factors that would not change were calculated to give a constant (0.00128) to simplify the formula(updated in EVAL-2009-000420-02). This formula does not take into account the diffusion effect. So, the boron concentration could be less than the PDP plaque indicates. The temperature change calculated below represents worst case. Operating experience has shown actual temperature change was less than results of the calculation below.

)B = RCS Boron Concentration Difference 2400 ppm PDP - ________

)B = ( _______ 1545 ppm RCS ) x 0.00128 1.0944 ppm

)B = _______

On the Reactivity Briefing Sheet get the following information:

ITC -1.1 +/- 0.1 pcm/°F HFP Differential Boron Worth - 6.9 +/- 0.1 pcm/ppm ITC = -1.1 +/- 0.1 pcm/°F = 0.1594 +/- 0.02 ppm/°F HFP Differential Boron Worth - 6.9 +/- 0.1 pcm/ppm

)Tave = B = 1.0944 ppm = 6.87 +/- 1.0 °F ppm/°F 0.1594 +/- 0.02 ppm/°F Q D. IF )Tave calculated above is >1°F, THEN notify Shift Operations Manager to discuss contingency actions.

NOTE: If the Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is overfilled, the PDP Charging Pump Room will become contaminated.

E. IF Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is low, THEN fill per the following steps:

Q 1) Slowly crack OPEN 1CS-0119, PD PMP 1-01 STUFFING BOX COOL TK MU ISOL VLV, until desired fill rate is achieved.

Q 2) When the desired tank level has been established, CLOSE 1CS-0119.

Q F. Ensure 1-8388-RO, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV RMT OPER, is OPEN.

G. OPEN the following valves:

Q! 1/1-8202A, VENT VLV (MCB)

Q! 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV (MCB)

Page 1 of 1 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Answer Key 2 RWST 3.5.4 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)

LCO 3.5.4 The RWST shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RWST boron concentration A.1 Restore RWST to OPERABLE 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> not within limits. status.

OR RWST borated water temperature not within limits.

B. RWST inoperable for B.1 Restore RWST to OPERABLE 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> reasons other than status.

Condition A.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3.5-8 Amendment No. 150 Page 1 of 2 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA1 Answer Key 2 RWST 3.5.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.4.1 -----------------------------------NOTE-----------------------------------

Only required to be performed when ambient air temperature is < 40°F or > 120°F.

Verify RWST borated water temperature is 40°F and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 120°F.

SR 3.5.4.2 Verify RWST borated water volume is 473,731 gallons. 7 days SR 3.5.4.3 Verify RWST boron concentration is 2400 ppm and 7 days 2600 ppm.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3.5-9 Amendment No. 150 Page 2 of 2 Rev d

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # SRO NRC SA2 Task #SO1005 K/A #2.1.1 3.8 / 4.2

Title:

Determine Technical Specification and Event Reportability Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • Both Units are at 100% power.
  • A prolonged heat wave has raised Station Service Water Intake temperature to 105ºF.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • IDENTIFY any Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), Required Action, and Completion Time, if any.
  • LCO _______________
  • REQUIRED ACTION _______________
  • COMPLETION TIME _______________
  • DETERMINE Oral and Written Reportability Requirements, if any.
  • Oral Reporting Requirement _______________
  • Written Reporting Requirement _______________

Task Standard: Determine Technical Specifications impacted and Reportability Requirements for an INOPERABLE Ultimate Heat Sink per STA-501 and Technical Specifications.

Required Materials: STA-501, Nonroutine Reporting, Rev. 14-5.

CPNPP Technical Specifications Units 1 and 2, Amendment 152.

Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA2 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

  • STA-501, Nonroutine Reporting.
  • CPNPP Technical Specifications - Units 1 and 2.

Page 2 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA2 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from CPNPP Technical Specifications, Amendment 152.

Perform Step: 1 Identify Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation.

Standard: RECOGNIZED Safe Shutdown Impoundment INOPERABLE due to Station Service Water temperatures greater than 102ºF and DETERMINED the following:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Identify Technical Specification REQUIRED ACTION and COMPLETION TIME.

Standard: DETERMINED Technical Specification REQUIRED ACTION and COMPLETION TIME:

  • 3.7.9.B.1 - Be in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, AND
  • 3.7.9.B.2 - Be in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The following steps are from STA-501, Attachment 8.D/13.

Perform Step: 3 Determine oral Reporting Requirements per STA-501. .D/13 Page 4 of 16 Standard: DETERMINED oral Reporting Requirements per STA-501:

The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications [Note: To Mode 3].

  • Oral Report within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per 10CFR50.72 (b) (2) (i).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA2 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 4 Determine written Reporting Requirements per STA-501. .D/13 Page 4 of 16 Standard: DETERMINED written Reporting Requirement per STA-501:

The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications [Note: To Mode 3].

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 4 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA2 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • Both Units are at 100% power.
  • A prolonged heat wave has raised Station Service Water Intake temperature to 105ºF.

INITIATING CUE: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • IDENTIFY any Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), Required Action, and Completion Time, if any.
  • LCO _______________
  • REQUIRED ACTION _______________
  • COMPLETION TIME _______________
  • DETERMINE Oral and Written Reportability Requirements, if any.
  • Oral Reporting Requirement _______________
  • Written Reporting Requirement _______________

Page 5 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA2 Rev d.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA2 Answer Key UHS 3.7.9 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

LCO 3.7.9 The Safe Shutdown Impoundment (SSI) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. SSI level less than A.1 Restore SSI level to within limits. 7 days required.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A not AND met.

B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> OR SSI inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.9.1 Verify water level of SSI is t770 ft mean sea level. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> SR 3.7.9.2 Verify station service water intake temperature is d 102qF. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3.7-22 Amendment No. 150 Page 1 of 2 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA2 Answer Key CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

STATION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL STA-501 NONROUTINE REPORTING REVISION NO. 14 PAGE 94 OF 168 ATTACHMENT 8.D/13 PAGE 4 OF 16 10CFR50.72 and 10CFR50.73 MATRIX 10CFR50.72 hrs 10CFR50.73 LER (a)(1)(i) Less There is no requirement in 10CFR50.73 to report the The declaration of any of the Emergency Classes than an declaration of an Emergency Class. However, an event specified in the Emergency Plan: (after notification of hour or condition that leads to declaration of an Emergency Class may meet one or more of the specific reporting state and local agencies). requirements that are in 10CFR50.73 (a)(1)(ii) There is usually a parallel reporting requirement in Those non-emergency events specified in paragraph (b) 10CFR50.73 that captures a non-emergency event that of this section that occurred within three years of the is reportable under 10CFR50.72. Exceptions are: a press release; notification to another government date of discovery. agency; transport of a contaminated person offsite; and loss of emergency preparedness capability.

(a)(2) There is no corresponding requirement in 10CFR50.73 If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative, the licensee shall make the required notifications via commercial telephone service, other dedicated telephone system, or any other method which will ensure that a report is made as soon as practical to the NRC Operations Center (a)(3) There is usually a parallel reporting requirement in The licensee shall notify the NRC immediately after 10CFR50.73 that captures a non-emergency event that notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and is reportable under 10CFR50.72. Exceptions are: a not later than one hour after the time the licensee press release; notification to another government declares one of the Emergency Classes. agency; transport of a contaminated person offsite; and loss of emergency preparedness capability.

(a)(4) There is usually a parallel reporting requirement in The licensee shall activate the Emergency Response 10CFR50.73 that captures a non-emergency event that Data System (ERDS) as soon as possible but not later is reportable under 10CFR50.72. Exceptions are: a than one hour after declaring an Emergency Class of press release; notification to another government alert, site area emergency, or general emergency. The agency; transport of a contaminated person offsite; and ERDS may also be activated by the licensee during loss of emergency preparedness capability.

emergency drills or exercises if the licensee's computer system has the capability to transmit the exercise data.

(b)(1) 1 (a)(2)(i)(C) 60 day Any deviation from the plant's Technical Specifications Any deviation from the plant's Technical LER authorized pursuant to 10CFR50.54(x). Specifications authorized pursuant to 10CFR50.54(x).

(b)(2)(i) 4 (a)(2)(i)(A) 60 day The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by The completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required LER the plant's Technical Specifications [Note: To Mode 3] by the plant's Technical Specifications NR-13 Page 2 of 2 Rev d

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC SA3 Task #SO1202 K/A #2.2.12 3.7 / 4.1

Title:

Perform Axial Flux Difference Surveillance Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is at 95% power.
  • The Axial Flux Difference (AFD) alarm was declared INOPERABLE over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago.
  • Power Range Nuclear Instrument AFD data was collected for several hours last shift.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • PERFORM OPT-403, Axial Flux Difference.
  • ENTER the Power Range Nuclear Instrument AFD data onto OPT-403-1, AFD Data Sheet.
  • IDENTIFY any Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), Required Action, and Completion Time, if any.
  • LCO _______________
  • REQUIRED ACTION _______________
  • COMPLETION TIME _______________
  • RECORD findings in the Discrepancies/Comments Section of OPT-403-1.

TIME 1-NI-41C 1-NI-42C 1-NI-43C 1-NI-44C 0800 9% 10% 11% 9%

0830 9% 11% 12% 10%

0900 10% 11% 12% 11%

0930 11% 14% 12% 14%

1000 11% 13% 12% 13%

1030 12% 14% 13% 14%

Page 1 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Task Standard: Perform Axial Flux Difference surveillance per OPT-403 and record findings on OPT-403-1 and identify any Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation, Required Action and Completion Time.

Required Materials: OPT-403, Axial Flux Difference, Rev. 11.

OPT-403-1, AFD Data Sheet, Rev. 10-1.

NUC-204-6, Axial Flux Difference As a Function of Rated Thermal Power, Unit 1 Cycle 15, Rev. 07/26/10.

CPNPP Technical Specifications Units 1 and 2, Amendment 152.

Validation Time: 20 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 2 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

  • OPT-403, Axial Flux Difference.
  • OPT-403-1, AFD Data Sheet.
  • NUC-204-6, Axial Flux Difference As a Function of Rated Thermal Power.
  • CPNPP Technical Specifications - Units 1 and 2.

Page 3 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from OPT-403, Section 8.0 and documented on Form OPT-403-1.

Perform Step: 1 Record the following data for the affected unit:

8.1 & 8.1.1

  • Unit 1 or 2 as applicable Standard: CIRCLED Unit 1 on OPT-403-1.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Record the following data for the affected unit:

8.1 & 8.1.2

  • Date Standard: ENTERED Date on OPT-403-1.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Record the following data:

8.2 & 8.2.1

  • Time Standard: ENTERED Time on OPT-403-1.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Record the following data:

8.2 & 8.2.2

  • PR FLUX for each operable excore detector Standard: RECORDED PR FLUX for each operable excore detector on OPT-403-1 from JPM Cue Sheet.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Record the following data:

8.2 & 8.2.3

  • Percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP)

Standard: RECORDED Percent Rated Thermal Power on OPT-403-1.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 6 Perform the following to determine PR FLUX status and record:

8.3 & 8.3.1

  • Verify at least 3 of 4 PR FLUX channels are within the Acceptable Operation region (Doghouse Region) of NUC-204-6 Axial Flux Difference as a Function of Rated Thermal Power.

Standard: DETERMINED PR FLUX status and RECORDED and INITIALED on OPT-403-1.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Perform the following to determine PR FLUX status and record:

8.3 & 8.3.2

  • Repeat Steps 8.2 and 8.3 at least once per thirty (30) minutes.

Standard: REPEATED Steps 8.2 and 8.3 at least once per thirty (30) minutes on OPT-403-1.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 Identify Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation.

Standard: DETERMINED Axial Flux Difference not within limits at 0930.

  • Technical Specification LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, CONDITION A, AFD not within limits.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 Identify Technical Specification REQUIRED ACTION and COMPLETION TIME.

Standard: DETERMINED Technical Specification REQUIRED ACTION and COMPLETION TIME:

  • 3.2.3.A.1 - Restore THERMAL POWER to < 50% RTP within 30 minutes.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 10 Record findings in the Discrepancies/Comments Section of OPT-403-1.

Standard: RECORDED findings in the Discrepancies / Comments Section of OPT-403-1.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is at 95% power.
  • The Axial Flux Difference (AFD) alarm was declared INOPERABLE over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago.
  • Power Range Nuclear Instrument AFD data was collected for several hours last shift.

INITIATING CUE: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • PERFORM OPT-403, Axial Flux Difference.
  • ENTER the Power Range Nuclear Instrument AFD data onto OPT-403-1, AFD Data Sheet.
  • IDENTIFY any Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), Required Action, and Completion Time, if any.
  • LCO _______________
  • REQUIRED ACTION _______________
  • COMPLETION TIME _______________
  • RECORD findings in the Discrepancies/Comments Section of OPT-403-1.

TIME 1-NI-41C 1-NI-42C 1-NI-43C 1-NI-44C 0800 9% 10% 11% 9%

0830 9% 11% 12% 10%

0900 10% 11% 12% 11%

0930 11% 14% 12% 14%

1000 11% 13% 12% 13%

1030 12% 14% 13% 14%

Page 6 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Rev d.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Handout FOR SIMULATOR USE ONLY Axial Flux Difference as a Function of Rated Thermal Power Unit 1, Cycle 15 100 15.00 2.4 10.00 95 90 85 UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE 80 OPERATION OPERATION 75 70 65 Rated Thermal Power (%)

60 55 50 30.00 30.00 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

0

-40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Indicated Axial Flux Difference (%)

Prepared By: MOL IC18 Date:

Approved By: SIMULATOR USE ONLY Date:

Core Performance Engineering Supervisor NUC-204-6 Page 1 of 1 REFERENCE USE Rev. 2 Page 1 of 1 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Procedure COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT COMMON OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL ELECTRONIC CONTROLLED COPY CHANGES ARE NOT INDICATED LATEST CHANGE NOTICE EFFECTIVE DATE

__________/________ Verify current status in the Document Control Database prior to use.

INITIAL & DATE QUALITY RELATED AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE PROCEDURE NO. OPT-403 REVISION NO. 11 EFFECTIVE DATE: 10/08/08 1200 PREPARED BY (Print): JIM BRAU Ext: 5443 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY (Print): ROB SLOUGH Ext: 5727 APPROVED BY: D.W. McGAUGHEY for Dave Goodwin Date: 09/19/08 DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS Page 1 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL UNIT COMMON OPT-403 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE REVISION NO. 11 PAGE 2 OF 4 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure satisfies Axial Flux Difference (AFD) monitoring when automated monitoring is NOT available. The requirements of TRS 13.2.32.1 is met by monitoring and logging indicated AFD for each OPERABLE excore channel. A frequency of 30 minutes for logging data is used to ensure the requirement is met if the AFD Monitor is inoperable for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

The actual TRS frequency requirements are as follows:

NOTE: The logged values of the indicated AFD shall be assumed to exist during the interval preceding each logging.

! Once per hour for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> that the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable. (TRS 13.2.32.1).

! Once per 30 minutes when the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable for >24 hours. (TRS 13.2.32.1).

2.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 2.1 At > 50% RTP the indicated AFD is within the Acceptable Operation limit of NUC-204-6 Axial Flux Difference as a Function of Rated Thermal Power.

3.0 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS 3.1 APLND - Analyzed Power Limit Nuclear Design 3.2 AFD - Axial Flux Difference 3.3 RTP - Rated Thermal Power 3.4 Validated Computer Program - A computer program verified consistent with current procedures and technical data used to calculate AFD and the associated penalty time.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Technical Specification 3.2.3, "AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) 4.2 Technical Requirement 13.2.32, "AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD)"

4.3 FSAR Section 4.3, Nuclear Design 4.4 COLR, Core Operating Limits Report 4.5 NUC-204, "Target Axial Flux Difference" 4.6 NUC-204-6, Axial Flux Difference as a Function of Rated Thermal Power 4.7 SOP-906, Plant Process Computer System Guidelines Page 2 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL UNIT COMMON OPT-403 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE REVISION NO. 11 PAGE 3 OF 4 5.0 PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND NOTES 5.1 Precautions None 5.2 Limitations 5.2.1 Core Performance Engineering shall be notified when any acceptance criteria not satisfied.

5.3 Notes None 6.0 PREREQUISITES Q 6.1 MODE 1 at > 50% RTP.

7.0 TEST EQUIPMENT None Page 3 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL UNIT COMMON OPT-403 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE REVISION NO. 11 PAGE 4 OF 4 8.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE: Record all data on Form OPT-403-1.

8.1 Record the following data for the affected unit:

Q 8.1.1 Unit 1 or 2 as applicable Q 8.1.2 Date 8.2 Record the following data:

Q 8.2.1 Time Q 8.2.2 PR ) FLUX for each operable excore detector Q 8.2.3 Percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP) 8.3 Perform the following to determine PR ) FLUX status and record:

Q A. Verify at least 3 of 4 PR ) FLUX channels are within the Acceptable Operation region (Doghouse Region) of NUC-204-6 Axial Flux Difference as a Function of Rated Thermal Power.

[C]

Q B. Repeat Steps 8.2 and 8.3 at least once per thirty (30) minutes.

9.0 RESTORATION/POST WORK ACTIVITIES None 10.0 ATTACHMENTS/FORMS 10.1 Attachments None 10.2 Forms 10.2.1 OPT-403-1, AFD Data Sheet Page 4 of 4 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Answer Key 1 AFD DATA SHEET 8.1.1 UNIT: (Circle one) 1 2 8.1.2 DATE TODAY NOTE: ! PR ) FLUX shall be considered outside the Acceptable Operations limits when two or more OPERABLE excore channels indicate ) FLUX to be outside the Acceptable Operations limits.

! PR ) FLUX logging frequency may be shortened at the discretion of the Shift Manager.

! Log PR ) FLUX data at least once per 30 minutes. The 30 minute frequency satisfies the following TRS 13.2.32.1 requirements:

- Once per hour for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> that the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable.

- Once per 30 minutes when the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable for > 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

PR FLUX 3 of 4 PR WITHIN TIME  % RTP INITIAL ACCEPTABLE u -NI-41C u -NI-42C u -NI-43C u -NI-44C OPERATION YES NO 0800 9% 10% 11% 9% 95 LZ YES NO 0830 9% 11% 12% 10% 95 LZ YES NO 0900 10% 11% 12% 11% 95 LZ YES NO 0930 11% 14% 12% 14% 95 LZ YES NO 1000 11% 13% 12% 13% 95 LZ YES NO 1030 12% 14% 13% 14% 95 LZ YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OPT-403-1 PAGE 1 OF 3 R-10 Page 1 of 3 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Answer Key 1 AFD DATA SHEET PR FLUX 3 of 4 PR WITHIN TIME  % RTP INITIAL ACCEPTABLE u -NI-41C u -NI-42C u -NI-43C u -NI-44C OPERATION YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO Additional copies of Page 2 of this data sheet may be used as required to document AFD status. Q Continued Next Page OPT-403-1 PAGE 2 OF 3 R-10 Page 2 of 3 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Answer Key 1 AFD DATA SHEET DISCREPANCIES / COMMENTS: Acceptance Criteria not met starting at 0930.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

PERFORMED BY: DATE:

SIGNATURE REVIEWED BY: DATE:

OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT OPT-403-1 PAGE 3 OF 3 R-10 Page 3 of 3 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA3 Answer Key 2 AFD (RAOC Methodology) 3.2.3 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.3 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) (Relaxed Axial Offset Control (RAOC) Methodology)

LCO 3.2.3 The AFD in % flux difference units shall be maintained within the limits specified in the COLR.


NOTE----------------------------------------------

The AFD shall be considered outside limits when two or more OPERABLE excore channels indicate AFD to be outside limits.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 50% RTP ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. AFD not within limits. A.1 Restore THERMAL POWER to 30 minutes

< 50% RTP.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.3.1 Verify AFD is within limits for each OPERABLE excore 7 days channel.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3.2-10 Amendment No. 150 Page 1 of 1 Rev d

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC SA4 Task #SO1112 K/A #2.3.12 3.2 / 3.7

Title:

Determine Radiation Levels and Reporting Requirements Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

JPM Cue Sheet #1

  • A high dose maintenance activity is scheduled in the Fuel Building.
  • The general dose rate in the area is 100 mrem/hour but can be reduced to 25 mrem/hour if lead shielding is installed.
  • It will take Nuclear Equipment Operators (NEOs) Alpha & Bravo 30 minutes to install the shielding.
  • Independent of the shielding, it will take NEO Alpha two (2) hours or NEOs Alpha & Bravo one and a half (1.5) hours to perform the maintenance.

Initiating Cue: The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • CALCULATE the dose received when performing the maintenance for each of the following conditions:
  • NEO Alpha without shielding. __________ mrem.
  • NEOs Alpha & Bravo without shielding. __________ mrem.
  • NEO Alpha with shielding. __________ mrem.
  • NEOs Alpha & Bravo with shielding. __________ mrem.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

JPM Cue Sheet #2

  • The Shift Manager was notified by Radiation Protection that an individual received 5.5 REM TEDE in a three (3) hour period.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • DETERMINE Oral and Written Reportability Requirements, if any.
  • Oral Reporting Requirement _______________
  • Written Reporting Requirement _______________

Task Standard: Calculate the dose received when performing the maintenance and determine oral and written Reporting Requirements for an overexposure event per STA-501.

Page 1 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA4 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Required Materials: STA-501, Nonroutine Reporting, Rev. 14-5.

Validation Time: 25 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 2 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA4 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee JPM Cue Sheet #1.

When JPM Cue Sheet #1 is completed, PROVIDE JPM Cue Sheet #2 and a copy of:

  • STA-501, Nonroutine Reporting.

ENSURE examinee has a calculator.

Page 3 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA4 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Perform Step: 1 Determine total dose to NEO Alpha without shielding.

Standard: DETERMINED total dose to NEO Alpha without shielding as follows:

  • 100 mrem/hr x 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> = 200 mrem total dose.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Determine total combined dose to NEOs Alpha & Bravo without shielding.

Standard: DETERMINED total combined dose to NEOs Alpha & Bravo without shielding as follows:

  • 100 mrem/hr x 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />s/NEO x 2 NEOs = 300 mrem total dose.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Determine total dose to install shielding.

Standard: DETERMINED total dose to install shielding as follows:

  • 100 mrem/hr x 0.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />s/NEO x 2 NEOs = 100 mrem to install.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Determine total dose to NEO Alpha with shielding.

Standard: DETERMINED total dose to NEO Alpha with shielding as follows:

  • 25 mrem/hr x 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> + 100 mrem = 150 mrem total dose.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Determine total combined dose to NEOs Alpha & Bravo with shielding.

Standard: DETERMINED total combined dose to NEOs Alpha & Bravo with shielding as follows:

  • 25 mrem/hr x 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />s/NEO x 2 NEOs + 100 mrem = 175 mrem total dose.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA4 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: Provide the examinee with copy of JPM Cue Sheet #2 and STA-501.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from STA-501, Attachment 8.D/4.

Perform Step: 6 Determine oral Reporting Requirements per STA-501. .D/4 Page 2 of 11 or 2 of 11 Standard: DETERMINED oral Reporting Requirements per STA-501:

An individual to receive, in a period of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s: TEDE 5 rems.

  • Oral Report within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> via the ENS per 10CFR20.2202 (b).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Determine written Reporting Requirements per STA-501. .D/4 Page 2 of 11 or 7 of 11 Standard: DETERMINED written Reporting Requirement per STA-501:

Any incident for which notification is required per 10CFR20.2202.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA4 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET #1 Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • A high dose maintenance activity is scheduled in the Fuel Building.
  • The general dose rate in the area is 100 mrem/hour but can be reduced to 25 mrem/hour if lead shielding is installed.
  • It will take Nuclear Equipment Operators (NEOs) Alpha

& Bravo 30 minutes to install the shielding.

  • Independent of the shielding, it will take NEO Alpha two (2) hours or NEOs Alpha & Bravo one and a half (1.5) hours to perform the maintenance.

INITIATING CUE: The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • CALCULATE the dose received when performing the maintenance for each of the following conditions:
  • NEO Alpha without shielding. _____ mrem.
  • NEOs Alpha & Bravo without shielding. _____ mrem.
  • NEO Alpha with shielding. _____ mrem.
  • NEOs Alpha & Bravo with shielding. _____ mrem.

Page 6 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA4 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET #2 Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • The Shift Manager was notified by Radiation Protection that an individual received 5.5 REM TEDE in a three (3) hour period.

INITIATING CUE: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • DETERMINE Oral and Written Reportability Requirements, if any.
  • Oral Reporting Requirement _______________
  • Written Reporting Requirement _______________

Page 7 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA4 Rev d.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA4 Answer Key CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

STATION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL STA-501 NONROUTINE REPORTING REVISION NO. 14 PAGE 63 OF 168 ATTACHMENT 8.D/4 PAGE 2 OF 11 From 10CFR20.2202(b)

Each Licensee shall within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery of the event, report any event involving licensed material possessed by the Licensee that may have caused or threatens to cause:

1) An individual to receive, in a period of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s:

a) TEDE > 5 rems b) DE > 15 rems (eye) c) SE > 50 rems (skin or extremity)

2) The release of radioactive material, inside or outside of a restricted area, so that, had an individual been present for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, could have received an intake in excess of one occupational annual limit on intake from 10CFR20, appendix B, Table 1, Column 2.

From 10CFR20.2203(a)(1)and(2)

Report in writing within 30 days of occurrence the following types of incidents:

1. Any incident for which notification is required by 10CFR20.2202.
2. Doses in excess of any of the following:

(i) The occupational dose limits for adults in 10CFR20.1201; or (ii) The occupational dose limits for a minor in 10CFR20.1207; or (iii) The limits for an embryo/fetus of a declared radiation worker in 10CFR20.1208; or NR-4 Page 1 of 2 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA4 Answer Key CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

STATION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL STA-501 NONROUTINE REPORTING REVISION NO. 14 PAGE 68 OF 168 ATTACHMENT 8.D/4 PAGE 7 OF 11 TABLE NR-4a:

SUMMARY

OF RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS CONDITION EXPOSURE SOURCE TYPE OF REPORT Occupational Dose Limits for The annual occupational dose limit for Requirement: 30 day LER (OL)

Minors minors is 10% of the annual dose limit 10CFR20.1207 specified for adult workers in Report:

10CFR20.1201 10CFR20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

Individual exposed to licensed (1) Annual Limit, whichever is more Requirement: 30 day LER (OL) material within a restricted area limiting: 10CFR20.1201(a) 5 rem TEDE Report:

or 10CFR20.2203(a)(2) (i) 50 rem CDE (organ or tissue)

(2) Annual Limit 15 rem (eye) 50 rem (skin or any one extremity (3) Individual's accumulated occupational dose is documented with licensee Any event involving licensed > 5 rem TEDE Requirement: 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> notification material possessed that may have >15 rem (eye) 10CFR20.2202 via ENS, AND caused or threatens to cause >50 rem (skin or any one extremity) Report: 30 day LER (OL) exposure to individual 10CFR20.2203 Event involving byproduct, > 25 rem TEDE Requirement: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> notification via source, or special nuclear material > 75 rem (eye) 10CFR20.2202 ENS, AND that may have caused or threatens >250 rad (skin or any one extremity) Report: 30 day LER (OL) to cause exposure to individual 10CFR20.2203 Limits for members of the public Annual Limit: Requirement: 30 day LER (OL) 100 mrem TEDE 10CFR20.1301 Unrestricted Area Dose: Report:

2 mrem in any one hour 10CFR20.2203 Limits for Embryo/Fetus of a Gestation Period Limit: Requirement: 30 day LER (OL) declared pregnant radiation 500 mrem TEDE 10CFR20.1208 worker (with a uniform monthly exposure rate) Report:

10CFR20.2203 NR-4 Page 2 of 2 Rev d

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC SA5 Task #SO1136 K/A #2.4.41 2.9 / 4.6

Title:

Classify an Emergency Plan Event Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • A Loss of All Offsite Power occurred on Unit 1 30 minutes ago.
  • Both Safeguards Buses are deenergized.
  • Pressurizer level is 0%.
  • Core Exit Thermocouple temperatures are 780ºF and rising.
  • Containment pressure is 30 PSIG and stable.
  • No Reactor Vessel Level Indication System lights are lit.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • DETERMINE the Emergency Action Level Group / Category, Subcategory, and Event Classification per EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation.

Task Standard: Determine the Event Category and Event Classification using the Emergency Action Level Hot & Cold Classification Charts per EPP-201.

Required Materials: EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation, Rev. 12.

CPNPP Emergency Action Level Hot & Cold Classification Charts, Rev. 0.

EOP Critical Safety Function Status Trees, Rev. 8.

Page 1 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Validation Time: 20 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 2 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

  • EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation.
  • CPNPP Emergency Action Level Hot & Cold Classification Charts.
  • EOP Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

Page 3 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from CPNPP Emergency Action Levels Hot.

Perform Step: 1 DETERMINE the Event Category.

Standard: REFERRED to CPNPP Emergency Action Levels Hot and Cold and DETERMINED the following chart is applicable:

  • CPNPP EAL Hot Conditions Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 MATCH plant conditions in the EAL Group / Category.

Standard: IDENTIFIED EAL Group / Category as System Malfunctions (S).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 MATCH plant conditions in the selected EAL Subcategory.

Standard: IDENTIFIED EAL Subcategory as Loss of AC Power (1).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Classify the event.

Standard: CLASSIFIED the event as a GENERAL EMERGENCY (SG1.1).

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 4 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Rev d.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • A Loss of All Offsite Power occurred on Unit 1 30 minutes ago.
  • Both Safeguards Buses are deenergized.
  • Pressurizer level is 0%.
  • Core Exit Thermocouple temperatures are 780ºF and rising.
  • Containment pressure is 30 PSIG and stable.
  • No Reactor Vessel Level Indication System lights are lit.

INITIATING CUE: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • DETERMINE the Emergency Action Level Group /

Category, Subcategory, and Event Classification per EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation.

Page 5 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Rev d.doc

Control Copy #: ________

Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Modes: 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Emergency Action Level Matrix Power Operation Startup Hot Standby Hot Shutdown Cold Shutdown Refueling Defueled Revision 12 Effective Date 11/04/2010 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Offsite dose resulting from an actual or imminent Offsite dose resulting from an actual or imminent release Any release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to Any release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to release of gaseous radioactivity greater than 1000 of gaseous radioactivity exceeds 100 mRem TEDE or the environment greater than 200 times the ODCM the environment greater than 2 times the ODCM mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem thyroid CDE for the actual 500 mRem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected for 15 minutes or longer for 60 minutes or longer or projected duration of the release using actual duration of the release meteorology 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it Rev d 1

is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time If dose assessment results are available, declaration should be based on dose assessment instead of radiation monitor values (see EAL RS1.2). Do not delay declaration awaiting dose assessment Offsite Rad Conditions Note 2: The Emergency Coordinator should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. In the absence of data to the contrary, assume that the release duration has exceeded the applicable time if an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown.

R Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has resulted or will result in the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel Unplanned rise in plant radiation levels 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Abnorm. Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE Rad Plant Vent Release PVG384 + PVG385 X-RE-5567 ---------- ---------- Ci/cc Ci/cc A+B

/ Rad Effluent 2 Gaseous Plant Vent (WRGM)

PVF684 + PVF685 X-RE-5570 A+B Ci/sec Ci/sec Ci/sec Ci/sec Onsite Rad Main Steam Conditions MSLu78 u-RE-2325

& MSLu79 u-RE-2326 Ci/cc Ci/cc 10 x high alarm 2 x high alarm Spent Fuel MSLu80 u-RE-2327 setpoint setpoint Events MSLu81 u-RE-2328 Liquid Waste LWE-076 X-RE-5253 -------- -------- 200 X high alarm 2 X high alarm setpoint* setpoint*

Liquid Service Water SSWu65 u-RE-4269 -------- -------- 200 X high alarm 2 X high alarm SSWu66 u-RE-4270 setpoint setpoint

  • With effluent discharge not isolated Rise in radiation levels within the facility that impedes operation of systems required to maintain plant safety functions 3 None None 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF None CR/CAS Rad Natural or destructive phenomena affecting Vital Areas Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the Note 8: Web address for National Earthquake Information Center is: Protected Area www.earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/quakes_all.php CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Handout 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HA1.1 (Bases Page 154) HU1.1 (Bases Page 143)

Seismic event > OBE as indicated by annunciator 2A-3.1, Seismic event identified by any two of the following:

OBE EXCEEDED, or yellow OBE light on Seismic Monitoring Annunciator 2A- 2.1, SEISMIC MONITORING system panel SYSTEM ACTIVATION, received AND Earthquake felt in plant Earthquake confirmed by any of the following: National Earthquake Information Center (Note 8)

Earthquake felt in plant National Earthquake Information Center (Note 8)

Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required for the safe shutdown of the plant HA1.2 (Bases Page 157) HU1.2 (Bases Page 145)

Tornado striking or sustained high winds > 80 mph resulting in Tornado striking within the Protected Area boundary Table H-1 Structures Containing EITHER: OR Systems Needed for Safe Shutdown Visible damage to any Table H-1 structures Sustained high winds > 80 mph Control Room indication of degraded performance of Page 1 of 3

- u-Containment systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown

- u-Safeguards Building HA1.3 (Bases Page 160) HU1.3 (Bases Page 147) 1 None

- X-Auxiliary Building

- X-Electrical & Control Building Internal flooding in the Safeguards Building or Turbine Building resulting in EITHER:

Internal flooding that has the potential to affect safety-related equipment required by Technical Specifications for the An electrical shock hazard that precludes access to current operating mode in the Safeguards Building or Natural or operate or monitor systems required to establish or Turbine Building

- X-Fuel Building Destructive maintain safe shutdown Phenomena - X-Service Water Intake Structure Control Room indication of degraded performance of

- u-Diesel Generator Building systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown

- u-Normal switchgear rooms HA1.4 (Bases Page 162) HU1.4 (Bases Page 149)

Turbine failure-generated projectiles resulting in EITHER: Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to

- u-CST Visible damage to or penetration of any Table H-1 turbine or generator seals

- u-RWST structures Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown HA1.5 (Bases Page 165) HU1.5 (Bases Page 151)

Safe Shutdown Impoundment level > 796.0 ft (lake) Safe Shutdown Impoundment level > 794.7 ft (lake)

OR OR Safe Shutdown Impoundment level < 761.5 ft (inside Safe Shutdown Impoundment level < 769.5 ft (inside traveling screens) traveling screens)

HA1.6 (Bases Page 167)

Vehicle crash resulting in EITHER:

Visible damage to any Table H-1 structures Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown Fire or explosion affecting the operability of plant safety Fire within the Protected Area not extinguished within 15 systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown min. of detection or explosion within the Protected Area 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 2 Note 9: Explosion is defined as a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or catastrophic failure of pressurized/energized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage HA2.1 (Bases Page 173) HU2.1 (Bases Page 169) permanent structures, systems, or components. A steam line Fire or explosion resulting in EITHER: Fire not extinguished within 15 min. of Control Room Fire or None break or steam explosion that damages surrounding permanent Visible damage to any Table H-1 structures notification or verification of a Control Room fire alarm in Explosion Control Room indication of degraded performance of structures or equipment would be classified under this EAL. any Table H-1 area (Note 4) systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown H

HU2.2 (Bases Page 171)

(Note 9)

Explosion of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the Protected Area (Note 9)

Access to a Vital Area is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable asphyxiant or flammable gases which jeopardize gases deemed detrimental to normal plant operations Hazards operation of operable equipment required to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the reactor 3 None Note 3: If the equipment in the stated area was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then EAL HA3.1 should not be declared as it 1 2 HA3.1 (Bases Page 178) 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 HU3.1 (Bases Page 175) 2 3 4 5 6 DEF will have no adverse impact on the ability of the plant Hazardous to safely operate or safely shutdown beyond that Access to a Vital Area is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, Toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases in amounts Gas already allowed by Technical Specifications at the time asphyxiant or flammable gases which jeopardize operation of that have or could adversely affect normal plant operations of the event. systems required to maintain safe operations or safely shut down the reactor (Note 3) HU3.2 (Bases Page 177)

Recommendation by local, county or state officials to evacuate or shelter site personnel based on offsite event Hostile action resulting in loss of physical control of the Hostile action within the Protected Area Hostile action within the Owner Controlled Area or Confirmed security condition or threat which indicates a facility airborne attack threat potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HG4.1 (Bases Page 186) HS4.1 (Bases Page 184) HA4.1 (Bases Page 182) HU4.1 (Bases Page 180)

A hostile action has occurred such that plant personnel are A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the Owner A security condition that does not involve a hostile action as 4 unable to operate equipment required to maintain any of the following safety functions:

Reactivity control Protected Area as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor Controlled Area as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor OR A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat reported by the Security Shift Supervisor OR A credible site-specific security threat notification Security RCS inventory within 30 min. of the site OR Secondary heat removal A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat HG4.2 (Bases Page 187)

A hostile action has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling systems AND Imminent fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool Control Room evacuation has been initiated and plant Control Room evacuation has been initiated control cannot be established 5 None 1 2 HS5.1 (Bases Page 189) 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 HA5.1 (Bases Page 188) 2 3 4 5 6 DEF None Control Control Room evacuation has been initiated Control Room evacuation has been initiated Room AND Evacuation Control of the plant cannot be established within 15 min.

Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of General Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of Site Area Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of an Alert Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a UE Emergency Emergency 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HG6.1 (Bases Page 197) HS6.1 (Bases Page 195) HA6.1 (Bases Page 193) HU6.1 (Bases Page 191)

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the 6 Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to Judgment of containment integrity or hostile action that results in an or hostile action that results in intentional damage or security event that involves probable life threatening risk to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be malicious acts; 1) toward site personnel or equipment that site personnel or damage to site equipment because of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action could lead to the likely failure of or; 2) that prevent effective hostile action. Any releases are expected to be limited to are expected unless further degradation of safety systems Guideline exposure levels (1 Rem TEDE and 5 Rem thyroid access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline occurs CDE) offsite for more than the immediate site area Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels exposure levels (1 Rem TEDE and 5 Rem thyroid CDE).

which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels (1 Rem TEDE and 5 Rem thyroid CDE) beyond the Exclusion Area Boundary Damage to a loaded cask Confinement Boundary E

ISFSI None None None 1 2 EU1.1 (Bases Page 248) 3 4 5 6 Damage to a loaded cask Confinement Boundary DEF Prepared for Luminant by: Operations Support Services, Inc. - www.ossi-net.com

HOT CONDITIONS (RCS Revision 12 Control Copy #: ________ Effective Date 11/04/2010 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to safeguard AC power capability to safeguard buses reduced to a Loss of all offsite AC power to safeguard buses safeguard buses buses for 15 min. single power source for 15 min. such that any for 15 min.

additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to safeguard buses 1

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 SG1.1 (Bases Page 211) SS1.1 (Bases Page 208) SA1.1 (Bases Page 205) SU1.1 (Bases Page 202)

Rev d Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to 6.9 KV Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to 6.9 KV safe- AC power capability to 6.9 KV safeguard buses uEA1 and Loss of all offsite AC power to 6.9 KV safeguard buses Loss of safeguard buses uEA1 and uEA2 uEA2 reduced to a single power source for 15 min. (Note 4) guard buses uEA1 and uEA2 for 15 min. (Note 4) uEA1 and uEA2 for 15 min. (Note 4)

AC AND EITHER: AND Power Restoration of at least one safeguard bus within Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is not likely all AC power to 6.9 KV safeguard buses uEA1 and uEA2 CSFST Core Cooling - RED or ORANGE path (Table S-3)

Loss of all vital DC power for 15 min.

2 1 2 3 4 None SS2.1 (Bases Page 216) None None Loss of DC < 105 VDC on all 125 VDC safeguard buses uED1, uED2, Power uED3 and uED4 for 15 min. (Note 4)

Automatic trip and all manual actions fail to shut down Automatic trip fails to shut down the reactor and manual Automatic trip fails to shut down the reactor and the Inadvertent criticality the reactor and indication of an extreme challenge to actions taken from the reactor control console are not manual actions taken from the reactor control console are the ability to cool the core exists successful in shutting down the reactor successful in shutting down the reactor 1 2 1 2 1 3 4 3 SG3.1 (Bases Page 226)

An automatic trip failed to shut down the reactor SS3.1 (Bases Page 224)

An automatic trip failed to shut down the reactor SA3.1 (Bases Page 220)

An automatic trip failed to shut down the reactor SU3.1 (Bases Page 219)

An unplanned sustained positive startup rate observed Criticality AND AND AND on nuclear instrumentation All manual actions do not shut down the reactor as Manual actions taken at the reactor control console (Note 6) Manual actions taken at the reactor control console (Note 6)

& do not shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor successfully shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor indicated by reactor power 5%

RPS AND EITHER: power 5% power < 5%

Failure CSFST Core Cooling - RED CSFST Heat Sink - RED Inability to reach required shutdown within Technical 4 Specification limits S

1 2 3 4 Inability to None None None Reach or SU4.1 (Bases Page 230)

Maintain Shutdown Plant is not brought to required operating mode within System Conditions Technical Specifications LCO action statement time Malfunct.

Inability to monitor a significant transient in progress Unplanned loss of safety system annunciation or Unplanned loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the Control Room with either (1) a significant indication in the Control Room for 15 min.

transient in progress, or (2) compensatory indicators are unavailable 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 None SS5.1 (Bases Page 235)

Loss of approximately 75% (or more) of annunciation or SA5.1 (Bases Page 233)

Unplanned loss of approximately 75% (or more) of SU5.1 (Bases Page 231)

Unplanned loss of approximately 75% (or more) of Instr. indication on CB-01 through CB-09 and CB-11 for 15 min. annunciation or indication on CB-01 through CB-09 and annunciation or indication associated with safety systems on (Note 4) CB-11 for 15 min. (Note 4) CB-01 through CB-09 and CB-11 for 15 min. (Note 4)

AND AND EITHER:

A significant transient is in progress, Table S-1 A significant transient is in progress, Table S-1 AND Compensatory indications are unavailable Compensatory indications are unavailable Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities 1 2 3 4 6 None None None SU6.1 (Bases Page 238)

Loss of all Table S-2 onsite (internal) communication methods affecting the ability to perform routine operations Comm. OR Loss of all Table S-2 offsite (external) communication methods affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Handout 1 Fuel clad degradation 1 2 3 4 SU7.1 (Bases Page 240) 7 None None None Reactor coolant Dose Equivalent I-131 specific activity Ci/gm Fuel Clad OR Degradation Reactor coolant Dose Equivalent XE-133 specific activity Ci/gm SU7.2 (Bases Page 242)

Gross Failed Fuel Monitor, FFLu60 (u-RE-0406), High Alarm (RED)

RCS leakage Page 2 of 3 8

RCS None None None 1

SU8.1 (Bases Page 244) 2 3 4 Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm (Note 7)

Leakage OR Identified leakage > 25 gpm F

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 FG1.1 (Bases Page 256) FS1.1 (Bases Page 254) FA1.1 (Bases Page 253) FU1.1 (Bases Page 252)

Loss of any two barriers Loss or potential loss of any two barriers (Table F-1) Any loss or any potential loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS Any loss or any potential loss of Containment (Table F-1)

Fission AND (Table F-1)

Product Loss or potential loss of third barrier (Table F-1)

Barriers Table F-1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Fuel Cladding Barrier Reactor Coolant System Barrier Containment Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss A. CSFST 1. CSFST Core Cooling-RED 1. CSFST Core Cooling- 1. CSFST RCS Integrity - RED 1. CSFST Containment - RED entry conditions met entry conditions met ORANGE entry conditions met None entry conditions met None (Bases Page 298)

(Bases Page 260) OR OR CSFST Heat Sink-RED entry CSFST Heat Sink - RED entry conditions met and heat sink conditions met and heat sink required (Bases Page 263) required (Bases Page 280)

2. Core exit TCs >

B.Core Exit 2. Core exit TCs > 2. Core exit TCs > AND T/Cs (Bases Page 266) (Bases Page 267) Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min.

(Bases Page 301)

None None None 3. All of the following:

Core exit TCs >

RVLIS 11 in. above plate light not lit Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min.

(Bases Page 303)

C.Radiation 3. Containment radiation > 1. Containment radiation > 5 R/hr 4. Containment radiation > 4,000 R/hr 400 R/hr CTEu16 Containment CTEu16 Containment HRRM CTEu16 Containment HRRM (u-RE-6290A), or (u-RE-6290A), or HRRM (u-RE-6290A), or CTWu17 Containment CTWu17 Containment HRRM CTWu17 Containment None HRRM (u-RE-6290B) None None (u-RE-6290B)

HRRM (u-RE-6290B) (Bases Page 285) (Bases Page 306)

(Bases Page 268)

4. Gross Failed Fuel Monitor, (FFLu60) u-RE-0406, radiation > 3.7E04 Ci/cc (Bases Page 270)

D.Inventory 3. RVLIS 11 in. above plate 2. RCS leak rate > available 2. RCS leak rate > the capacity of one 1. Containment pressure rise followed by a rapid 5. Containment pressure 50 psig and rising light not lit (Bases Page 274) makeup capacity as indicated charging pump in the normal unexplained drop in Containment pressure (Bases Page 315) by a loss of RCS subcooling charging mode with letdown isolated: (Bases Page 308)

(< Positive Displacement: 98 gpm 6. Containment hydrogen concentration > 4%

2. Containment pressure or sump level response not (Bases Page 316)

(Bases Page 288) Centrifugal: 150 gpm consistent with LOCA conditions (Bases Page 309)

None (Bases Page 291) 7. Containment pressure > 18 psig with neither

3. Ruptured SG results in an Containment Spray system train operating ECCS (SI) actuation 3. Ruptured SG is also faulted outside of Containment (Bases Page 311) (Bases Page 318)

(Bases Page 290)

4. Primary-to-secondary leakrate > 10 gpm AND Unisolable steam release from affected SG to the environment (Bases Page 313)

E.Other 5. Coolant activity 5. Failure of all valves in any one line to close Ci/cc I-131 Dose AND Equivalent None None None Direct downstream pathway to the environment None (Bases Page 275) exists after Containment isolation signal (Bases Page 320)

F. Judgment 6. Any condition in the 4. Any condition in the opinion 4. Any condition in the opinion 3. Any condition in the opinion of the 6. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency 8. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency opinion of the Emergency of the Emergency of the Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator that Coordinator that indicates loss of the Containment Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the Coordinator that indicates Coordinator that indicates that indicates loss of the RCS indicates potential loss of the RCS barrier (Bases Page 322) Containment barrier (Bases Page 323) loss of the Fuel Clad potential loss of the Fuel Clad barrier (Bases Page 295) barrier (Bases Page 296) barrier (Bases Page 277) barrier (Bases Page 278)

Note 4: The Emergency Coordinator should not wait until the Note 6: For manual trip, the MCB reactor trip switches and deenergizing uB3 and uB4 are applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the Note 5: Applicable on Cold Condition Chart only. Note 7: Use Category F EALs for escalation due to RCS leakage the only methods applicable to EALs SA3.1 and SS3.1 event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time Table S-1 Significant Transients Table S-2 Communications Systems Table S-3 AC Power Sources System Onsite Offsite Electrical load rejection > 25% full (internal) (external) Offsite:

electrical load 138 KV switchyard circuit Gai-Tronics Page/party system (Public Address System) X Reactor trip 345 KV switchyard circuit Plant Radio System X Runback > 25% reactor power Onsite:

PABX (Private Automatic Branch Exchange System) X X ECCS injection uEG1 Public Telephone System X X Reactor power oscillations > 10% uEG2 Federal Telephone System (FTS) X EAL Identifier XXX.X Category (R, H, E, S, F, C) Sequential number within subcategory/classification Emergency classification (G, S, A, U) Subcategory number (1 if no subcategory)

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Revision 12 COLD CONDITIONS (RCS Effective Date 11/04/2010 Control Copy #: ________

GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to safeguard AC power capability to safeguard buses reduced to a buses single power source for 15 min. such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC 1

power to safeguard buses 5 6 DEF 5 6 CA1.1 (Bases Page 88) CU1.1 (Bases Page 85)

Loss of None Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to 6.9 KV AC power capability to 6.9 KV safeguard buses uEA1 and Rev d AC None safeguard buses uEA1 and uEA2 for 15 min. (Note 4) uEA2 reduced to a single power source for 15 min. (Note 4)

Power AND Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to 6.9 KV safeguard buses uEA1 and uEA2 (Table C-5) 2 Loss of Loss of required DC power for 15 min.

5 6 None None None CU2.1 (Bases Page 91)

DC < 105 VDC on required 125 VDC safeguard buses (uED1, Power uED2, uED3, uED4) for 15 min. (Note 4)

Loss of RCS inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with Loss of RCS inventory affecting core decay heat Loss of RCS inventory RCS leakage Containment challenged removal capability 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 CG3.1 (Bases Page 118) CS3.1 (Bases Page 108) CA3.1 (Bases Page 104) CU3.1 (Bases Page 94)

RCS level < 0 in. above upper core plate (top) for 30 min. With Containment closure not established, RCS level RCS level < 33.25 in. above upper core plate (top) RCS leakage results in the inability to maintain or restore (Note 4) < 27.25 in. above upper core plate (top) OR EITHER of the following for 15 min. (Note 4):

AND RCS level cannot be monitored for 15 min. (Note 4) with a Pressurizer level > 17%

Any Containment challenge condition, Table C-4 CS3.2 (Bases Page 111) loss of RCS inventory as indicated by an unexplained level Above the low end of the target level control band With Containment closure established, RCS level < 0 in. rise in any Table C-1 sump / tank level (If pressurizer level was intentionally lowered < 17%)

above upper core plate (top)

CG3.2 (Bases Page 122) RCS leakage RCS level cannot be monitored for 30 min. (Note 4) with a CS3.3 (Bases Page 114) loss of RCS inventory indicated by any of the following: RCS level cannot be monitored for 30 min. (Note 4) with a 6

> 20,000 R/hr on any of the following: loss of RCS inventory indicated by any of the following:

- CTEu16, Containment HRRM > 20,000 R/hr on any of the following: CU3.2 (Bases Page 96)

(u-RE-6290A) - CTEu16, Containment HRRM Unplanned RCS level drop below EITHER of the following

- CTWu17, Containment HRRM (u-RE-6290A)

(u-RE-6290B) for 15 min. (Note 4):

- CTWu17, Containment HRRM Reactor Vessel flange (when the level band is Erratic source range monitor indication (u-RE-6290B)

Unexplained level rise in any Table C-1 sump / tank established above the flange)

Erratic source range monitor indication level Target band (when the level band is established Unexplained level rise in any Table C-1 sump / tank below the flange) level AND CU3.3 (Bases Page 100)

Any Containment challenge condition, Table C-4 RCS level cannot be monitored AND Loss of RCS inventory as indicated by an unexplained level rise in any Table C-1 sump / tank level Reactor Vessel Threshold Values C 3 Reactor Vessel Flange EWR Plant El. EAL(s)

CU3.2 RCS Cold SD/

Level Refueling System Bottom of Hotleg CA3.1 Malfunct.

6 in. < Bottom of Hotleg CS3.1 Top of Core Plate CS3.2 CG3.1 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Handout 1 Inability to maintain plant in cold shutdown Unplanned loss of decay heat removal capability with irradiated fuel in the Reactor Vessel 5 6 5 6 CA4.1 (Bases Page 134) CU4.1 (Bases Page 129) 4 None None An unplanned event results in EITHER:

RCS Unplanned event results in RCS CU4.2 (Bases Page 131)

Page 3 of 3 duration RCS Loss of all RCS temperature and RCS level indication Temp. RCS pressure rise > 10 psig due to a loss of RCS for 15 min. (Note 4) cooling (this condition is not applicable in solid plant conditions)

Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities 5 6 DEF CU5.1 (Bases Page 138) 5 None None None Loss of all Table C-2 onsite (internal) communication methods affecting the ability to perform routine operations OR Comm. Loss of all Table C-2 offsite (external) communication methods affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications Inadvertent criticality 6

Inadvertent None None None CU6.1 (Bases Page 140) 5 6 Criticality An unplanned sustained positive startup rate observed on nuclear instrumentation Note 4: The Emergency Coordinator should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the Note 5: Begin monitoring hot condition EALs concurrently event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time Table C-1 Sumps / Tanks Table C-2 Communications Systems Table C-3 RCS Reheat Duration Thresholds Onsite Offsite Containment Sump 1 System

  • If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature (internal) (external) is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable Containment Sump 2 Gai-Tronics Page/party system (Public Address System) X Containment Duration CCW Surge Tank A RCS Status Closure Status Plant Radio System X CCW Surge Tank B PABX (Private Automatic Branch Exchange System) X X Intact (but NOT reduced inventory) N/A 60 min.*

PRT Public Telephone System X X Established 20 min.*

RCDT Federal Telephone System (FTS) X Not intact OR reduced inventory NOT established 0 min.

Table C-4 Containment Challenge Conditions Table C-5 AC Power Sources Containment closure not established Offsite:

138 KV switchyard circuit Containment hydrogen concentration > 4%

345 KV switchyard circuit Unplanned pressure rise that can breach Onsite:

the Containment barrier uEG1 uEG2 EAL Identifier XXX.X Category (R, H, E, S, F, C) Sequential number within subcategory/classification Emergency classification (G, S, A, U) Subcategory number (1 if no subcategory)

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CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Handout 2 SUBCRITICALITY RED GO TO FRS-0.1A NEUTRON NO YELLOW FLUX WR LESS THAN GO TO 5% YES FRS-0.2A TIME FROM NO TRIP LESS THAN 15 MINUTES YES GREEN CSF NEUTRON NO SATISFIEDD FLUX SR ON SCALE YELLOW YES GO TO CONTAINMENT NO FRS-0.2A PRESSURE LESS THAN 5 PSIG YES NEUTRON NO FLUX SR DECREASING YES GREEN CSF SATISFIEDD RED GO TO FRS-0.1A POWER ORANGE NO RANGE GO TO LESS THAN FRS-0.1A 5% YES YELLOW GO TO FRS-0.2A INTERMEDIATE INTERMEDIATE NO NO RANGE SUR RANGE SUR ZERO OR MORE NEGATIVE YES NEGATIVE YES THAN -0.2 DPM GREEN CSF SOURCE SATISFIED RANGE NO ENERGIZED YELLOW YES GO TO FRS-0.2A SOURCE NO RANGE SUR ZERO OR NEGATIVE YES GREEN CSF SATISFIEDD Page 1 of 6 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Handout 2 CORE COOLING RED GO TO FRC-0.1A ORANGE CORE EXIT NO GO TO FRC-0.2A TC's LESS THAN 1200° F YES CORE EXIT NO TC's LESS THAN 750° F YES YELLOW RVLIS NO GO TO FRC-0.3A INDICATION 11 IN ABOVE YES PLATE LIGHT LIT YELLOW GO TO FRC-0.3A RCS NO SUBCOOLING GREATER THAN 25° F [55° F] YES GREEN CSF SATISFIED Page 2 of 6 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Handout 2 HEAT SINK RED GO TO FRH-0.1A

  • TOTAL FW FLOW TO SG's NO GREATER THAN 460 GPM YES NARROW RANGE LEVEL IN AT NO LEAST ONE SG GREATER THAN YELLOW 43% [50%] YES GO TO FRH-0.2A PRESSURE IN ALL SG's LESS NO THAN 1235 PSIG YES YELLOW GO TO FRH-0.3A NARROW RANGE NO LEVEL IN ALL SG's LESS THAN YES YELLOW 84%

GO TO FRH-0.4A

  • IF feed flow is throttled due PRESSURE IN ALL SG's LESS NO to operator action as instructed from either: THAN 1185 YELLOW PSIG YES GO TO FRH-0.5A
1) ECA-2.1A, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS, NARROW RANGE
2) FRS-0.1A, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR LEVEL IN ALL NO POWER GENERATION/ATWT, SG's GREATER THAN 43%
3) FRP-0.1A, RESPONSE TO [50%] YES IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION, or GREEN CSF SATISFIED
4) FRZ-0.1A, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE, THEN FRH-0.1A does not need to be implemented.

Page 3 of 6 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Handout 2 INTEGRITY

)

2500 RED A O Y

(

2000 GO TO FRP-0.1A T R E G R I A L R 1500 M E ALL RCS E N L 1000 I PRESSURE/COLD NO D L G O E LEG TEMP 500 E W N POINTS TO 0 RIGHT OF LIMIT A YES 0 166 198 250 280 557 ORANGE COLD LEG TEMPERATURE (°F) GO TO FRP-0.1A ALL RCS COLD LEG NO TEMPERATURES GREATER THAN 250° F YES YELLOW GO TO FRP-0.2A ALL RCS COLD LEG NO TEMPERATURES GREATER THAN 280° F YES TEMPERATURE GREEN DECREASE IN NO CSF SATISFIED ALL RCS COLD LEGS LESS THAN 100° F IN ORANGE LAST 60 YES GO TO FRP-0.1A MINUTE PERIOD ALL RCS COLD LEG NO TEMPERATURES GREATER THAN 250° F YES YELLOW GO TO FRP-0.2A RCS PRESSURE LESS THAN NO COLD OVERPRESSURE YES LIMIT GREEN CSF SATISFIED OLD OVER PRESSURE LIMIT RCS RCS RCS NO TEMPERATURE PRESSURE TEMPERATURE 70 389 GREATER THAN 150 389 350° F YES 200 447 220 447 GREEN 250 573 CSF SATISFIED 380 573 Page 4 of 6 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Handout 2 CONTAINMENT RED GO TO FRZ-0.1A CONTAINMENT PRESSURE NO LESS THAN 50 PSIG YES ORANGE GO TO FRZ-0.1A CONTAINMENT PRESSURE NO LESS THAN 18 PSIG YES ORANGE GO TO FRZ-0.2A CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL NO LESS THAN 816 FT YES YELLOW GO TO FRZ-0.3A CONTAINMENT RADIATION NO LESS THAN 20 R/HR YES GREEN CSF SATISFIED Page 5 of 6 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Handout 2 INVENTORY YELLOW GO TO FRI-0.3A RVLIS INDICATION NO 49 IN ABOVE FLANGE LIGHT YES LIT YELLOW GO TO FRI-0.1A PRESSURIZER NO LEVEL LESS THAN 92% YES YELLOW GO TO FRI-0.2A PRESSURIZER LEVEL NO YELLOW GREATER GO TO FRI-0.3A THAN 17% YES RVLIS INDICATION NO 49 IN ABOVE FLANGE LIGHT YES LIT GREEN CSF SATISFIED Page 6 of 6 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL LEVEL OF USE:

INFORMATION USE ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION PROCEDURE NO. EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 SORC Meeting No.: 10-018 Date: 10-14-2010 EFFECTIVE DATE: 11-04-2010 12:00 MAJOR REVISON ELECTRONIC CONTROLLED COPY CHANGES ARE NOT INDICATED LATEST CHANGE NOTICE EFFECTIVE DATE /

Verify current status in the Document Control Database prior to use PREPARED BY: (Print): Gary Wiechering EXT: 0180 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY (Print) Kelly Faver EXT: 5628 APPROVED BY: Steve Sewell DATE: 14-Oct-2010 PLANT MANAGER Page 1 of 16 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 2 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE 1.0 PURPOSE (C-01882)

This procedure provides guidance to the Shift Manager, TSC Manager, or EOF Manager to assist in the classification of an emergency as either an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency.

2.0 APPLICABILITY This procedure applies to the Shift Manager, TSC Manager, or EOF Manager in the event of an emergency situation at CPNPP.

3.0 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS 3.1 Alert - Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protection Action Guideline exposure levels. It is the lowest level of classification where near-site or offsite emergency response may be anticipated. For most Alert events, the plant would be brought to a safe condition, and radioactive releases, if any, would be minimal. [C-05703]

3.2 Emergency Action Levels (EALs) - A Pre-determined, Site-specific, observable threshold for a plant Initiating Condition that places the plant in a given emergency class. An EAL can be: an instrument reading; an equipment status indicator; a measurable parameter; a discrete, observable event; or another phenomenon which, if it occurs, indicates entry into a particular emergency class.

3.3 Emergency Classification - A classification system of emergency severity based on projected or confirmed initiating conditions/emergency action levels. The classes, from least to most severe, are: Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency.

3.4 Emergency Conditions - Situations which occur that can cause or may threaten to cause hazards affecting the health and safety of employees or the public, or which may result in damage to property.

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CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 3 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE 3.5 General Emergency - The General Emergency classification reflects accident situations involving actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with the potential for loss of containment integrity or the potential loss of reactor coolant system integrity.

Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. [C-05705]

3.6 Site Area Emergency - Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except within the site boundary. [C-05704]

3.7 Unusual Event - Unusual events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected for this classification unless further degradation of safety systems occur. [C-05702]

4.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4.1 General Instructions NOTE: For the purposes of this procedure, the title Emergency Coordinator is used generically to refer to the position with responsibility for emergency classifications, even though the Emergency Coordinator may not always have this responsibility.

4.1.1 In most cases the decision to declare, upgrade, or proceed to recovery/closeout of an emergency rests with the Emergency Coordinator.

When the EOF Manager is the Emergency Coordinator, he may elect to have the TSC Manager retain responsibility for assessing, classifying, and declaring an emergency condition.

4.1.2 The Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document and the Emergency Action Level Classification Matrix, cites specific conditions that denote whether the emergency is to be classified as an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. The Emergency Action Level Classification Matrix is provided as guidance to assist the Emergency Coordinator in making that decision. In many cases, a very general statement has been used to denote the emergency action level (EAL) on the Emergency Action Level Classification Matrix. This was done to allow the Emergency Coordinator flexibility to assess any undefinable parameters which may exist. [C-05327]

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CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 4 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE 4.1.3 Plant-specific operator actions required to mitigate the emergency condition are prescribed in the appropriate Abnormal Conditions Procedures or Emergency Operating Procedures (ABNs or EOPs) and are independent of any actions required by this Emergency Plan Procedure.

4.2 Use of the EAL Classification Matrix 4.2.1 The CPNPP EAL scheme includes the following features:

4.2.1.1 Division of the EAL set into three broad groups:

EALs applicable under all plant operating modes - This group would be reviewed by the EAL-user any time emergency classification is considered.

EALs applicable only under hot operating modes - This group would only be reviewed by the EAL-user when the plant is in Hot Shutdown, Hot Standby, Startup, or Power Operation mode.

EALs applicable only under cold operating modes - This group would only be reviewed by the EAL-user when the plant is in Cold Shutdown, Refueling or Defueled mode.

4.2.1.2 The purpose of the groups is to avoid review of hot condition EALs when the plant is in a cold condition and avoid review of cold condition EALs when the plant is in a hot condition. This approach significantly minimizes the total number of EALs that must be reviewed by the EAL-user for a given plant condition, reduces EAL-user reading burden and, thereby, speeds identification of the EAL that applies to the emergency.

4.2.1.3 Within each of the above three groups, assignment of EALs to categories/subcategories - Category and subcategory titles are selected to represent conditions that are operationally significant to the EAL-user.

4.2.1.4 Subcategories are used as necessary to further divide the EALs of a category into logical sets of possible emergency classification thresholds. The CPNPP EAL categories/subcategories are listed below.

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CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 5 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE EAL Groups, Categories and Subcategories EAL Group/Category EAL Subcategory Any Operating Mode:

R - Abnormal Rad Release / Rad Effluent 1 - Offsite Rad Conditions 2 - Onsite Rad Conditions & Spent Fuel Events 3 - CR/CAS Rad H - Hazards 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena 2 - Fire or Explosion 3 - Hazardous Gas 4 - Security 5 - Control Room Evacuation 6 - Judgment E - ISFSI None Hot Conditions:

S - System Malfunction 1 - Loss of AC Power 2 - Loss of DC Power 3 - Criticality & RPS Failure 4 - Inability to Reach or Maintain Shutdown Conditions 5 - Instrumentation 6 -Communications 7 - Fuel Clad Degradation 8 - RCS Leakage F - Fission Product Barrier Degradation None Cold Conditions:

C - Cold Shutdown / Refueling System 1 - Loss of AC Power Malfunction 2 - Loss of DC Power 3 - RCS Level 4 - RCS Temperature 5 - Communications 6 - Inadvertent Criticality Page 5 of 16 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 6 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE 4.2.1.5 The primary tool for determining the emergency classification level is the EAL Classification Matrix.

To help in determining the EAL Classification, color coded copies of the EAL Classification Matrix are maintained in the Control Room, the Technical Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility and selected other locations.

4.2.1.6 The user of the EAL Classification Matrix may consult the EAL Technical Bases Document in order to obtain additional information concerning the EALs under classification consideration.

4.2.2 Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix and Bases 4.2.2.1 If a cell in the Fission Product Barrier Matrix contains more than one numbered threshold, each of the numbered thresholds, if exceeded, signifies a Loss or Potential Loss of the barrier. It is not necessary to exceed all of the thresholds in a category before declaring a barrier Loss/Potential Loss.

4.2.2.2 Subdivision of the Fission Product Barrier Matrix by category facilitates association of plant conditions to the applicable fission product barrier Loss and Potential Loss thresholds. This structure promotes a systematic approach to assessing the classification status of the fission product barriers.

4.2.2.3 When equipped with knowledge of plant conditions related to the fission product barriers, the EAL-user first scans down the category column of the Fission Product Barrier Matrix, locates the likely category and then reads across the row of fission product barrier Loss and Potential Loss thresholds in that category to determine if any threshold has been exceeded. If a threshold has not been exceeded in that category row, the EAL-user proceeds to the next likely category and continues review of the row of thresholds in the new category 4.2.2.4 If the EAL-user determines that a Loss threshold has been exceeded, a check mark or circle may be placed in or around the threshold box for the Loss column. This signifies that the threshold barrier is lost.

Similarly, this is done for a Potential Loss threshold that has been exceeded.

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CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 7 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE 4.2.2.5 The EAL-user must examine each of the three fission product barriers to determine if other barrier thresholds in the category are lost or potentially lost. For example, if Containment radiation is sufficiently high (i.e., greater than 4,000 R/hr), a Loss of the Fuel Clad and RCS barriers and a Potential Loss of the Containment barrier exist. Barrier Losses and Potential Losses are then applied to the algorithms given in EALs FG1.1, FS1.1, FA1.1 and FU1.1 to determine the appropriate emergency classification.

4.2.3 Classifying Transient Events 4.2.3.1 The key consideration during a Transient Event is to determine whether or not further plant damage occurred while the corrective actions were being taken. In some situations, this can be readily determined, in other situations, further analyses may be necessary (e.g., coolant radiochemistry following an ATWT event, plant structural examination following an earthquake, etc.). Classify the event as indicated and terminate the emergency once assessment shows that there were no consequences from the event and other termination criteria are met.

4.2.3.2 Existing guidance for classifying transient events addresses the period of time of event recognition and classification (15 minutes).

However, in cases when EAL declaration criteria may be met momentarily during the normal expected response of the plant, declaration requirements should not be considered to be met when the conditions are a part of the designed plant response, or result from appropriate Operator actions.

4.2.3.3 There may be cases in which a plant condition that exceeded an EAL was not recognized at the time of occurrence but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review), and the condition no longer exists. In these cases, an emergency should not be declared. Reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 are applicable and the guidance of NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, should be applied.

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CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 8 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE 4.2.4 Multiple Events and Classification Upgrading/Downgrading 4.2.4.1 When multiple simultaneous events occur, the emergency classification level is based on the highest EAL reached.

For example, two Alerts remain in the Alert category. Or, an Alert and a Site Area Emergency is a Site Area Emergency. Emergency classification level upgrading for multi-unit stations such as CPNPP with shared safety-related systems and functions must also consider the effects of a loss of a common system on more than one unit (e.g.

potential for radioactive release from more than one core at the same site).

4.3 Emergency Classification Initial Actions [C-08621]

NOTE: Once indication of an abnormal condition is available, classification declaration must be made within 15 minutes. This time is available to ensure that the classification and subsequent actions associated with the classification, if warranted, are appropriate. It does not allow a delay of 15 minutes if the classification is recognized to be necessary.

It is meant to provide sufficient time to accurately assess the emergency conditions and then evaluate the need for an emergency classification based on the assessment performed. The decision to terminate the event or enter Recovery is NOT time independent.

NOTE: IF a higher classification is made prior to transmitting an event notification, THEN notification for the higher classification can supersede the event notification, provided that it can be performed within the 15-minute timeframe of the previous event. IF the notification of the higher classification cannot be performed within the 15-minute timeframe of the previous event classification, THEN the previous event notification is required within its 15-minute timeframe, and the subsequent event notification is required within its 15-minute timeframe.

CAUTION: Shutdown and outage conditions should be given special consideration since they will likely create abnormalities such as the loss of containment integrity or loss of the RCS pressure boundary (refueling, mid-loop operations, equipment hatch open, etc.). These types of boundary breaches combined with a plant transient (loss of AC power, etc.) may create a worse situation than would be expected if the Unit was at power.

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CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 9 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE 4.3.1 Upon recognition that an abnormal or emergency condition exists, the Shift Manager shall be immediately notified.

4.3.2 Operators shall refer to the appropriate ABNs or EOPs and take actions based upon the indicated symptoms.

4.3.3 The Shift Manager shall evaluate the conditions to determine the need for classifying into one of the four (4) Emergency Classification levels.

4.3.4 If the conditions do not fit any of the general descriptions on the EAL Classification Matrix, the Shift Manager should evaluate the conditions and, if appropriate, classify the emergency based upon professional judgment. If classification is not warranted, no further action is required except to continue monitoring the event.

4.3.5 If the on-duty Shift Manager determines that the conditions fit one or more of the Emergency Classifications shown on the matrix, the Shift Manager shall assume the role of Emergency Coordinator as prescribed in Procedure EPP-109, Duties and Responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator/Recovery Manger and consult his Position Assistant Document (PAD) for further actions. [C-05687, 01278]

4.3.6 When an abnormal or emergency condition is being evaluated, REFER to the EAL Classification Matrix and PERFORM the following:

IDENTIFY the Unit Mode for the state of the plant prior to the abnormal condition (Operating Modes are identified in respective EALs).

REVIEW the Initiating Conditions applicable to the operating mode as follows.

- Starting with the highest (General Emergency) classification level on the left side of the matrix and continue to the lowest (Unusual Event) classification level on the right side of the matrix.

- If more than one Initiating Conditions applies to the event, THEN SELECT the Initiating Conditions for the highest classification (from all of the Initiating Conditions that were determined to have been met).

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CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 10 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE REVIEW the EAL Threshold Values for the Initiating Conditions.

- If the EAL Threshold Values have been met or exceeded, THEN:

- NOTE the EAL number associated with the Initiating Conditions.

- DECLARE the event. For events affecting both Units, the highest classification on either Unit shall be declared.

4.4 Subsequent Actions [C-05701]

The Shift Manager or Emergency Coordinator shall continually monitor plant conditions and compare the current plant conditions to the EAL Classification Matrix to determine whether a change in emergency classification is warranted and whether to escalate the emergency classification or proceed to EPP-121, Reentry, Recovery and Closeout.

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CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 11 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE

5.0 REFERENCES

5.1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document 5.2 CPNPP Emergency Plan, Section 2.0 5.3 EPP-109, Duties and Responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator/Recovery Manager 5.4 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants 5.5 10CFR, Part 50.72, Notification of Significant Events 5.6 NEI 99-01 Rev. 5 5.7 CPSES FSAR Chapter 15 5.8 EPP-121, Reentry, Recovery and Closeout 6.0 ATTACHMENTS/FORMS 6.1 Attachments 6.1.1 Attachment 1, Initiating Condition Table 6.1.2 Attachment 2, EAL Classification Matrix 6.1.3 Attachment 3, EAL Technical Bases Document 6.2 Forms None Page 11 of 16 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 12 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE Attachment 1 Initiating Condition Table

[C-05327, 05701, 05702, 05703, 05704, 05705, 09308, 26728]

Page 1 of 2 Categories GE SAE Alert UE ALL Modes Offsite Rad Offsite Rad Offsite Rad Offsite Rad Abnormal Rad Conditions Conditions Conditions Conditions Release / Rad Onsite Rad Conditions Onsite Rad Conditions Effluent (R) & Spent Fuel Events & Spent Fuel Events CR/CAS Rad Natural or Destructive Natural or Destructive Phenomena Phenomena Fire or Explosion Fire or Explosion Hazardous Gas Hazardous Gas Hazards (H)

Security Security Security Security Control Room Control Room Evacuation Evacuation Judgment Judgment Judgment Judgment ISFSI ISFSI Categories GE SAE Alert UE HOT Conditions Loss of AC Loss of AC Loss of Loss of Power Power AC Power AC Power Loss of DC Power Criticality & Criticality & Criticality & Criticality &

RPS Failure RPS Failure RPS Failure RPS Failure System Inability to Reach or Malfunctions (S)

Maintain Shutdown Conditions Instrumentation Instrumentation Instrumentation Communication Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Leakage Fission Product Fission Fission Product Fission Product Fission Product Barriers (F) Product Barriers Barriers Barriers Barriers Page 12 of 16 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 13 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE Attachment 1 Initiating Condition Table

[C-05327, 05701, 05702, 05703, 05704, 05705, 09308, 26728]

Page 2 of 2 Categories GE SAE Alert UE COLD Conditions Loss of AC Power Loss of AC Power Loss of DC Power Cold SD / RCS Level RCS Level RCS Level RCS Level Refueling System RCS Temp. RCS Temp.

Malfunct. (C) Communication Inadvertent Criticality Page 13 of 16 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 14 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE Attachment 2 EAL Classification Matrix Page 1 of 2 The following EAL Classification Matrix is an example only. There are larger versions of EAL Classification Matrix, which are color coded to help in the determination of the classifications in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility and selected other locations.

EXAMPLE All Modes / Hot Conditions Page 14 of 16 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 15 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE Attachment 2 EAL Classification Matrix Page 2 of 2 EXAMPLE All Modes / Cold Conditions Page 15 of 16 Rev d

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM SA5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL EPP-201 REVISION NO. 12 ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 16 OF 16 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PLAN ACTIVATION INFORMATION USE Attachment 3 EAL Technical Bases Document Page 1 of 1 The EAL Technical Bases Document is a stand alone document that provides an explanation and rationale for each Emergency Action Level (EAL). Decision-makers responsible for implementation of EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification and Plan Activation, may use this document as a technical reference in support of EAL interpretation. This information may assist the Emergency Coordinator in making classifications, particularly those involving judgment or multiple events. Below is the Table of Contents for the EAL Technical Bases Document Section 1.0 PURPOSE 2.0 DISCUSSION

2.1 Background

2.2 Fission Product Barriers 2.3 Emergency Classification Based on Fission Product Barrier Degradation 2.4 EAL Relationship to ERGs 2.5 Symptom-Based vs. Event-Based Approach 2.6 EAL Organization 2.7 Technical Bases Information 2.8 Operating Mode Applicability 2.9 Validation of Indications, Reports and Conditions 2.10 Planned vs. Unplanned Events 2.11 Classifying Transient Events 2.12 Imminent EAL Thresholds 2.13 Multiple Events and Classification Upgrading/Downgrading 2.14 Unit Designation

3.0 REFERENCES

3.1 Developmental 3.2 Implementing 3.3 Commitments 4.0 DEFINITIONS 5.0 CPNPP-TO-NEI 99-01 EAL CROSSREFERENCE 6.0 ATTACHMENTS 6.1 Attachment 1 - Emergency Action Level Technical Bases 6.2 Attachment 2 - Fission Product Barrier Loss / Potential Loss Matrix and Bases Page 16 of 16 Rev d

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-1 Task #RO1014 K/A #001.A2.17 3.3 / 3.8 SF-1

Title:

Respond to a Dropped Control Rod Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: X Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is in MODE at 1 at 100% power.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • RESPOND to the dropped Control Rod per ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction.

Task Standard: Perform initial actions for a dropped Control Rod and trip the Reactor when a second Control Rod drops per ABN-712.

Required Materials: ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction, Rev. 10-2.

EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev. 8-5.

Validation Time: 4 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP BOOTH OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC-33 or any at 100% power Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

  • VERIFY Rod Control is in AUTO.
  • EXECUTE the following malfunctions:
  • RD03B06, Dropped Control Rod when Rod Control Bank Select Switch is taken to MANUAL.

BOOTH OPERATOR NOTE:

  • After each JPM:
  • VERIFY Rod Control is in AUTO.
  • RESET Rod Bank Update when Simulator is INITIALIZED.

EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of Procedure 1:

  • ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction.
  • Section 3.0, Dropped or Misaligned Rod in MODE 1 or 2.

Page 2 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from ABN-712, Step 3.3.

Perform Step: 1 Verify Number of Rods Misaligned from Step Counter by > 12 steps -

1 One.

Standard: DETERMINED only Control Rod B12 Rod bottom light is lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Check Reactor - CRITICAL AND Less than or equal to 100% on highest 2 reading NI AND No Reactor Startup in progress.

Standard: OBSERVED Nuclear Instruments on CB-07 and DETERMINED Reactor is critical and less than 100%.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: When Rod Control is placed in MANUAL, a 2nd Control Rod will drop.

Perform Step: 3 Ensure 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT - NOT IN AUTO.

3 Standard: PLACED 1/1-RBSS, Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 RESPOND to Multiple Rod Control System Alarms.

Standard: DETERMINED Control Rod B06 has dropped and REFERRED to Step 1 RNO.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The following steps represent the Alternate Path of this JPM.

Perform Step: 5 IF two or more rods dropped, THEN trip Reactor AND GO TO 1.a) RNO E0P-0.0A/B.

Standard: At CB-07, PLACED 1/1-RTC, RX TRIP Switch in TRIP and DETERMINED Reactor is NOT tripped.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 6 IF two or more rods dropped, THEN trip Reactor AND GO TO 1.a) RNO E0P-0.0A/B.

Standard: At CB-10, PLACED 1/1-RT, RX TRIP Switch in TRIP and DETERMINED Reactor is tripped.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The following steps are from EOP-0.0A.

Perform Step: 7 Verify Reactor Trip:

st 1, 1.a, & 1 bullet

  • Verify the following: Reactor trip breakers - AT LEAST ONE OPEN Standard: OBSERVED 1/1-RTBAL & 1/1-RTBBL, RX TRIP BKR green OPEN lights lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 Verify Reactor Trip:

1, 1.a, & 2nd bullet

  • Verify the following: Neutron flux - DECREASING Standard: OBSERVED 1-NI-35B, IR CURRENT CHAN I and 1-NI-36B, IR CURRENT CHAN II are lowering.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 Verify Reactor Trip:

1 & 1.b

  • All control rod position rod bottom lights - ON Standard: OBSERVED all Control Rods INSERTED on CTRL ROD POSN bezel.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 4 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is in MODE at 1 at 100% power.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • RESPOND to the dropped Control Rod per ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction.

Page 5 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-1 Rev e.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S1 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 9 OF 52 3.0 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED ROD IN MODE 1 OR 2 3.1 Symptoms

a. Annunciator Alarms

! PR CHAN DEV (6D-3.4)

! DRPI ROD DEV (6D-3.5)

! ANY ROD AT BOT (6D-3.7)

! $2 ROD AT BOT (6D-4.7)

! QUADRANT PWR TILT (6D-4.10)

b. Plant Indications

! Plant parameters changing abnormally during rod position changes NOTE:  ! A dropped rod will distort the symmetrical flux distribution of the reactor core. This distortion will be reflected as a deviation in the power range and N16 indications monitored by OPT-102A/B (SR 3.3.1.1.2.a; 3.3.1.1.2.b.;3.3.1.1.6; 3.3.1.1.7). The power range and N16 instrumentation need not be declared inoperable if indications were within the required deviation prior to the event and no other influence has occurred. (SMF-2007-003427)

! For the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifty surveillance while in the abnormal condition of a dropped rod, an assessment should be performed that the channels are indicating as expected for the condition of an asymmetrical flux pattern. Since the dropped rod may cause the channels to deviate beyond the normal Channel Check criteria, an assessment is required that the channels are as expected for the plant condition. If required, additional resources (e.g. Core Performance Engineering) may be consulted to assist with the assessment.

(SMF-2007-003427)

! NIS Power Range instruments power or AFD indications disagree

! DRPI Rod Bottom Light(s) lit for rods which should be withdrawn

! DRPIs in a bank disagree by greater than 12 steps

! DRPI disagrees with its group step counter by greater than 12 steps 3.2 Automatic Actions

! Possible Reactor trip

! Automatic control rod motion Section 3.0 Page 1 of 13 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S1 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 10 OF 52 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Q 1 Verify Number of Rods Misaligned from a) IF two or more rods dropped, THEN trip Step Counter by >12 steps - # ONE Reactor AND GO TO EOP-0.0A/B.

b) Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> verify SDM OR initiate boration to restore SDM.

c) Within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> place unit in HOT STANDBY per IPO-003A/B (TS 3.1.4).

Q 2 Check Reactor - CRITICAL Reduce load to less or equal to 1100 MW.

AND IF rod(s) misaligned greater than 12 steps during Reactor startup, THEN perform the Less than or equal to 100% on highest following:

reading NI

a. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, insert ALL Control Banks to AND Control Bank Offset Position.

No Reactor Startup in progress b. Log entry into MODE 3.

c. Initiate Tracking LCOAR, as necessary (TS 3.1.4).
d. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter, ensure adequate Shutdown Margin per TS 3.1.4:
1) Perform OPT-301.
2) Document per OPT-102A/B.
e. Initiate repair per STA-606.
f. WHEN all RCCAs are returned to operable status, THEN Perform the following:
1) Reference and position affected rod(s) per IPO-002A/B.
2) Document rod operability per OPT-106A/B.

Q 3 Ensure 1/u-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT - NOT IN AUTO.

Section 3.3 Page 2 of 13 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S1 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 11 OF 52 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Q 4 Verify Reactor - STABLE Control Tave AND Reactor Power by controlling the following, as necessary:

! Tave-Tref - WITHIN 1°F

! Turbine Power

! Reactor Power - STABLE

! Boration

! Dilution

! Steam dumps

! Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves Q 5 Verify AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) Restore )Flux to within limits or reduce power

- WITHIN LIMITS within 30 minutes. Refer to TS 3.2.3 Q 6 Verify "QUADRANT PWR TILT" Alarm IF Reactor Power is greater than 50% RTP, (6D-4.10) - DARK THEN perform OPT-302 (TS 3.2.4).

Q 7 Within ONE Hour, Determine Cause of Ensure TS 3.1.4 requirements implemented per Abnormal Rod Position. LCOAR.

Section 3.3 Page 3 of 13 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S1 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 12 OF 52 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Q 8 Check Plant Parameters Indicate IF DRPI malfunction indicated, THEN GO TO ACTUAL Dropped or Misaligned Rod: Section 4.0, this procedure.

! Tave

! AFD

! QPTR

! NIS

! Review Plant Computer CET map for any abnormal indications.

9 Perform the following:

Q! Initiate Repair per STA-606.

Q! Direct Chemistry to perform shiftly analysis for fuel defects until plant restored to stable conditions.

NOTE:  ! Either of two realignment methods may be used. The DRPI method is less accurate but may allow quicker realignment with less rod movement. The referencing method is more accurate but requires stepping affected rod full out and may have more adverse effect on flux shape.

! A rod may be recovered within the first 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of the event with no restrictions on rod recovery rate or plant operation (EVAL-2006-0003933-04).

Q 10 Contact Reactor and System Engineering and Plant Management prior to realigning

[C] Rods.

! Determine if any rod recovery restrictions apply.

! Determine recovery method.

Q 11 Within 1 Hour AND Once per 12 Hours Thereafter, Perform OPT-301 to Verify Shutdown Margin (TS 3.1.4).

Section 3.3 Page 4 of 13 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S1 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 13 OF 52 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Q 12 Reduce Turbine and Reactor Power to Level at which Control Banks are LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO Position Prior to Transient OR to Level Sufficient to Withdraw Affected Rod, as determined by Engineering.

CAUTION: The affected rod(s) shall be realigned to within +/-12 steps of group step counter demand position within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or requirements of Tech Spec 3.1.4 implemented (LCOAR).

Q 13 Verify DRPI Realignment Method GO TO step 16 for referencing realignment Chosen. method.

Q 14 Transfer 1/u-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT, as follows:

! Control Rod affected - MANUAL

! Shutdown Rod Affected - SELECT AFFECTED BANK Section 3.3 Page 5 of 13 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S1 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 14 OF 52 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION:  ! Affected rod withdrawal should only be performed after fuel conditioning requirements have been met unless approved by Engineering.

! Do NOT withdraw an RCCA that has been misaligned for greater than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> during power operation without Engineering guidance.

NOTE: The last movement of affected rod should be in the SAME direction as the last movement of affected group.

15 Restore Rod to OPERABLE Status by Ensure TS 3.1.4 requirements implemented per Realigning as follows within 1 Hour: LCOAR.

Q a. Move affected group to desired DRPI Light.

Q b. WHEN stable operating conditions have been established, THEN transfer 1/u-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT to affected bank.

CAUTION: Do NOT allow P/A Converter Auto-Manual selector switch to spring return to automatic until directed by this procedure.

Q c. Locally maintain P/A Converter Auto-Manual selector switch (SFGD 832 Rm u-096) - MANUAL "Step continued next page" Section 3.3 Page 6 of 13 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S1 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 15 OF 52 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION: Do NOT make any changes in plant operations during realignment of the affected rod that would require a change in bank position.

15 Q d. Record positions for affected rod:

Affected Rod (DRPI)

Bank (DRPI)

Group 1 step counter Group 2 step counter Q e. Place all lift coil disconnect switches for affected bank, groups 1 AND 2, EXCEPT for affected rod - ROD DISCONNECTED Section 3.3 Page 7 of 13 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S1 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 16 OF 52 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE:  ! When moving affected rod, a CONTROL ROD CTRL URGENT FAIL alarm will be received in control room and at power cabinet containing the other group of affected bank. This is normal and will prevent the other group's step counter from operating.

! At low RCS boron concentration, excessive boration may delay return to desired power level after rod recovery.

15 Q f. WHEN moving affected rod for realignment, THEN perform the following:

1) Maintain Tave within 2°F of Tref by controlling the following, as necessary:

! Turbine Power

! Steam Dumps

! Boration

! Dilution

2) Verify that only affected rod is moving.
3) Ensure last movement of affected rod is in same direction as last movement of affected group.

Q g. Slowly move affected rod until aligned with its group by DRPI indication.

Q h. Place all lift coil disconnect switches -

ROD CONNECTED Step continued next page Section 3.3 Page 8 of 13 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S1 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 17 OF 52 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 15 Q I. Reset affected bank demand step counter to value recorded in Step 15d.

Q j. Transfer bank selector switch to MANUAL.

Q k. Place P/A Converter Auto-Manual selector switch - AUTO Q l. GO TO Step 17.

CAUTION: Do NOT make any changes in plant operation during realignment that would require a change in bank position.

16 Perform Referencing Realignment Method as follows:

Q a. Transfer 1/u-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT to affected bank.

NOTE: Rod Groupings are listed on Attachment 1.

Q b. Record positions for affected rod:

Affected Rod (DRPI)

Bank (DRPI)

Group 1 step counter Group 2 step counter Step continued next page Section 3.3 Page 9 of 13 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S1 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 18 OF 52 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 16 Q c. Place all lift coil disconnect switches for affected bank, groups 1 AND 2, EXCEPT for affected rod - ROD DISCONNECTED

[C] Q d. WHILE performing the following steps, verify that ONLY affected rod moves.

Q e. Reset affected rod group demand step counter to zero steps.

NOTE: At low RCS boron concentration, excessive boration may delay return to desired power level after rod recovery.

Q f. Maintain Tave within 2°F of Tref by controlling the following, as necessary:

! Turbine Power

! Steam Dumps

! Boration

! Dilution Step continued next page Section 3.3 Page 10 of 13 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S1 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 19 OF 52 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE: When moving affected rod, a CONTROL ROD CTRL URGENT FAIL alarm will be received in control room and at power cabinet containing the other group of affected bank. This is normal and will prevent the other group' step counter from operating.

16 Q g. Reset P/A converter for affected bank

- ZERO per SOP-702A/B Q h. Over a 15 or 30 minute period OR as specified by Engineering, withdraw affected rod until operating step counter is at 232 steps.

Q I. Adjust affected step counter to 231 steps.

Q j. Insert rod to position recorded in Step 16b, affected Group Step Counter.

Q k. Verify P/A converter for affected bank k. Manually reset P/A converter per reads value recorded in Step 16b SOP-702A/B to value recorded in step 16b Group Step Counter. Group Step Counter.

Q l. Verify affected rod is at same position as its bank (DRPI).

Q m. Place all lift coil disconnect switches -

ROD CONNECTED Q n. Transfer 1/u-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT - MANUAL.

Section 3.3 Page 11 of 13 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S1 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 20 OF 52 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION: Resetting the Urgent Failure Alarm removes the reduced current applied to movable and stationary grippers. IF cause of alarm has NOT been corrected, THEN resetting alarm may result in dropping rod(s).

17 Clear the Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm as follows:

Q a. Ensure only lift reg white light on designated circuit card in affected cabinet (See ALB-6D 1.6 logic diagram) - LIT Q b. DEPRESS 1/u-RCAR, CONTROL ROD CTRL ALARM RESET Q c. Ensure ALL white lights on designated circuit card in affected cabinet (See ALB-6D 1.6 logic diagram) - DARK Q 18 Adjust Tave to within 1°F of Tref Q 19 Place 1/u-RBSS CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT - AUTO if desired NOTE: Verification of OPT-106A/B requirement may be satisfied by documenting rod motion during realignment, at discretion of Shift Manager.

Q 20 Verify Rod Restored to OPERABLE Initiate actions of TS 3.1.4B AND initiate status WITHIN 1 HOUR from Time Rod LCOAR.

Was Misaligned:

! Perform OPT-106A/B OR

! Document rod motion greater than or equal to 10 steps in one direction in Unit Log.

Section 3.3 Page 12 of 13 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S1 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 21 OF 52 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Q 21 Verify Rod Position Indicators - MATCH Consult Engineering as necessary to determine ACTUAL POSITIONS actual position(s) AND adjust affected indicators to agree (Refer to SOP-702A/B).

! DRPI

! Step Counters

! P/A Converter

! Bank Overlap Unit

! Plant Computer 22 Verify Rod Position Deviation Monitor - Initiate LCOAR (TS 3.1.4, 3.1.7, TR 13.1.37).

OPERABLE Q a. Check "DRPI ROD DEV" (6D-3.5) alarm matches actual conditions:

! ALL shutdown rods greater than 210 steps AND ALL DRPIs within

+/-12 steps of their group position -

WINDOW DARK

! Any shutdown rod less than or equal to 210 steps OR any DRPI greater than or equal to +/-12 steps from its group demand position -

WINDOW LIT Q b. Check "DRPI URGENT FAIL" (6D-3.6) alarm - DARK Q 23 Refer to EPP-201.

Q 24 Initiate a SMART Form per STA-421, as applicable.

END OF SECTION Section 3.3 Page 13 of 13 Rev e

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-2 Task #RO1310 K/A #004.A4.08 3.8 / 3.4 SF-2

Title:

Start the PDP and Secure the CCP Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions with Unit 1 in MODE 3:

  • Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) 1-01 is running.
  • A Plant Equipment Operator is at the Positive Displacement Pump (PDP) and has verified stuffing box level is satisfactory and fluid drive is primed.
  • Prerequisites of Section 2.5 are met and there has been no significant change in boron concentration since the PDP was last operated.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • START the PDP per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 5.3.1, Positive Displacement Pump Startup, START at Step 5.3.1.F.
  • SHUTDOWN the CCP per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 5.3.4, Centrifugal Charging Pump Shutdown.

Task Standard: Start the PDP and shutdown the running CCP per SOP-103A.

Required Materials: SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Rev. 17-19.

Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-2 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP BOOTH OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC-38 or any at power Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

  • VERIFY only one Letdown Orifice is in service.
  • ENSURE 1-8388-RO, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV RMT OPER, is OPEN.

EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of Procedure 1:

  • SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System.
  • Section 5.3.1, Positive Displacement Pump Startup.
  • Section 5.3.4, Centrifugal Charging Pump Shutdown.

Page 2 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-2 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-103A, Step 5.3.1.

Perform Step: 1 Ensure 1-8388-RO, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV RMT OPER, is 5.3.1.F OPEN.

Standard: CONTACTED the NEO and VERIFIED 1-8388-RO, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV RMT OPER, is OPEN.

Examiner Cue: The discharge valve is open.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 OPEN the following valves:

5.3.1.G & 1st bullet

  • 1/1-8202A, VENT VLV (MCB)

Standard: PLACED 1/1-8202A, VENT VLV in OPEN and OBSERVED red OPEN light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 OPEN the following valves:

nd 5.3.1.G & 2 bullet

  • 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV (MCB)

Standard: PLACED 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV in OPEN and OBSERVED red OPEN light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Ensure 1APPD, POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT CHARGING PUMP 1-01 5.3.1.H MOTOR BREAKER 1EB1/2B/BKR is racked to the CONNECT position.

Standard: OBSERVED 1APPD, Positive Displacement Charging Pump 1-01 lights and DETERMINED breaker is in the CONNECT position.

Examiner Cue: If asked, REPORT breaker in the CONNECT position.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 PLACE 1-SK-459A, PDP SPD CTRL, in MANUAL with demand at 55%.

5.3.1.I Standard: VERIFIED 1-SK-459A, PDP SPD CTRL, in MANUAL with demand at 55%.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-2 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 6 OPEN 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV.

5.3.1.J Standard: PLACED 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV in OPEN and OBSERVED red OPEN light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 WHEN 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV is open, THEN start the PDP by 5.3.1.K placing handswitch 1/1-APPD PDP, to the START position.

Standard: PLACED 1/1-APPD, PDP in START and OBSERVED red PUMP and FAN lights lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 Ensure 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV, is CLOSED.

5.3.1.L Standard: PLACED 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV in CLOSE and OBSERVED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 IF 1/1-8204, H2/N2 SPLY VLV indicates OPEN (red light on), THEN 5.3.1.M & bullet perform the following to lower suction stabilizer level:

  • OPEN 1/1-8210A, H2/N2 SPLY VLV and 1/1-8210B, H2/N2 SPLY VLV for no more than 10 seconds to clear the high level, then close.

Standard: OBSERVED 1/1-8204, H2/N2 SPLY VLV green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-2 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 10 IF a CCP is in operation AND it is to be placed in standby, THEN 5.3.1.N & 5.3.1.N.1) perform the following:

  • Ensure only ONE letdown orifice is in service per Section 5.2.3.

Standard: DETERMINED only one Letdown Orifice is in service.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 11 IF a CCP is in operation AND it is to be placed in standby, THEN 5.3.1.N & 5.3.1.N.2) perform the following:

  • Alternately raise PDP speed using 1-SK-459A, PDP SPD CTRL, and lower CCP flow using 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL, until 1-FK-121 is at minimum.

Standard: DEPRESSED 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL amber MAN pushbutton then alternately RAISED PDP speed using 1-SK-459A, PDP SPD CTRL, and LOWERED CCP flow using 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL, until 1-FK-121 is at minimum.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 12 IF a CCP is in operation AND it is to be placed in standby, THEN 5.3.1.N & 5.3.1.N.3) perform the following:

  • Shut down the running CCP per Section 5.3.4.

Standard: REFERRED to Section 5.3.4 to SECURE CCP 1-01.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-103A, Step 5.3.4.

Perform Step: 13 If only one CCP is in operation, place 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL 5.3.4.A in MANUAL AND slowly reduce to 0% demand.

Standard: VERIFIED 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL in MANUAL with 0%

demand and green output () light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 5 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-2 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 14 STOP the selected CCP.

5.3.4.B & 1st bullet

  • 1/1-APCH1, CCP 1 Standard: PLACED 1/1-APCH1, CCP 1 in STOP and OBSERVED green PUMP and red FAN lights lit.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 6 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-2 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions with Unit 1 in MODE 3:

  • Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) 1-01 is running.
  • A Plant Equipment Operator is at the Positive Displacement Pump (PDP) and has verified stuffing box level is satisfactory and fluid drive is primed.
  • Prerequisites of Section 2.5 are met and there has been no significant change in boron concentration since the PDP was last operated.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • START the PDP per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 5.3.1, Positive Displacement Pump Startup, START at Step 5.3.1.F.
  • SHUTDOWN the CCP per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 5.3.4, Centrifugal Charging Pump Shutdown.

Page 7 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-2 Rev e.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S2 Procedure COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL ELECTRONIC CONTROLLED COPY CHANGES ARE NOT INDICATED LATEST CHANGE NOTICE EFFECTIVE DATE PCN-1 0--200 1200

__________/________ Verify current status in the Document Control Database prior to use.

INITIAL & DATE QUALITY RELATED CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCEDURE NO. SOP-103A REVISION NO. 17 EFFECTIVE DATE: 03-05-2008 1200 PREPARED BY (Print): Brad Hancock Ext: 6769 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY (Print): Lisabeth Donley Ext: 6524 APPROVED BY: Alan Hall for Dave Goodwin Date: 02-19-2008 DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS Page 1 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S2 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 6 OF 131 2.5 PDP Startup Q  ! The CVCS is aligned for operation per Section 5.1.1.

Q  ! The PDP oil cooler has CCW flow.

Q  ! Demineralized Water is available to the PDP stuffing box coolant tank.

2.6 CCP Startup Q  ! The CVCS is aligned for operation per Section 5.1.1.

Q  ! The CCP Lube oil coolers have SSW flow.

2.7 Placing Demineralizers in service.

Q  ! Normal letdown AND charging are in service.

Q  ! The demineralizer to be placed in service has been filled with resin.

Q  ! The demineralizer is filled and vented.

Q  ! Notify Chemistry to determine sample requirements. Except for the Cation Demineralizer boron concentration is required prior to placing a demineralizer in service with results logged in the unit log (may be previously determined).

Q  ! No resin transfers or flush operations are in progress for the demineralizers selected.

2.8 Shutting Down CVCS For Outage Work.

Q  ! RCS level is stable at a level either above or below the RCP seal package

! Verify that the Number 1 Seal Leakoff Isolation Valve for any RCP NOT on its backseat is CLOSED.

Q 1/1-8141A, RCP 1 SEAL 1 LKOFF VLV Q 1/1-8141C, RCP 3 SEAL 1 LKOFF VLV Q 1/1-8141B, RCP 2 SEAL 1 LKOFF VLV Q 1/1-8141D, RCP 4 SEAL 1 LKOFF VLV Q  ! To prevent damage to the Reactor Cooling Pump seal packages while seal injection is secured, ensure that Standard Clearance 05450 has been hung.

Page 2 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S2 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 7 OF 131 3.0 PRECAUTIONS

! An explosive mixture of oxygen and hydrogen in the Volume Control Tank and/or PDP suction stabilizer should be avoided at all times. Oxygen content in the tank and stabilizer should not exceed 5% by volume when hydrogen is present.

! During normal operation Volume Control Tank pressure should be maintained high enough to provide a minimum back pressure of 15 psig on the Reactor Coolant Pump Seals. During degas operation, VCT pressure shall be maintained $10 psig to prevent reverse pressurization of the RCP number 2 seals. Reverse pressurization could result in RCP seal damage.

! After any significant change in letdown and charging flow, the reactor coolant pump seal injection flows should be checked and adjusted if necessary.

! To avoid thermal shock of the reactor coolant piping when operating at elevated temperature, charging flow should first be preheated in the regenerative heat exchanger. Letdown flow should not be stopped without also reducing charging flow to maintain RCP seal injection only when RCS cold leg temperature is > 350°F.

! Pressure downstream of the letdown orifices should be maintained greater than saturation pressure to preclude flashing of the letdown coolant before it enters the letdown heat exchanger.

! When placing a standby demineralizer in service, care should be taken to avoid the insertion of positive reactivity due to absorption of boron in the bed.

[C] ! Except as provided for in EVAL-2007-002946-01, RCP seal injection shall be maintained any time RCS level is above the seal package (84 inches above core plate 830'0") for any RCP not on its backseat.

! Demineralizer resins should be maintained wet per RWS-302.

! The CCP alternate miniflow piping must be filled and vented to ensure the relief valves are not damaged by water hammer in the event of an SI actuation.

! Operation of Demineralizers and associated flow paths has the potential to change RCS Boron Concentration which directly affects Reactivity. Prior to performing evolutions affecting Demineralizers and associated flow paths, ensure all potential effects of the evolution (including potential dilution or boration) are considered. Except for the Cation Demineralizer boron concentration is required prior to placing a demineralizer in service with results logged in the unit log (may be previously determined).

! When placing a Demineralizer in service, minor RCS temperature changes of approximately 0.5°F may be expected. Minor changes in temperature may occur even for a saturated demin which has recently been in service. This is due to the daily change in RCS boron concentration and the minor delta that develops to the demin piping boron.

! Charging pump suction should normally remain aligned to the VCT due to dissolved oxygen concerns when suction comes from the RWST. When entering a plant outage, suctions should NOT be rolled to the RWST prior to crud burst. When time allows, Chemistry should be notified prior to rolling suction to the RWST.

Page 3 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S2 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 8 OF 131 4.0 LIMITATIONS AND NOTES 4.1 Limitations

! During normal operation, maintain VCT pressure between 15 psig and 60 psig.

! During degas operation, maintain VCT at a minimum pressure of 10 psig to prevent damage to the RCP number 2 seals.

[C] ! Letdown temperature should not exceed 140°F to the demineralizers.

! Two boron injection subsystems shall be OPERABLE in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. (TR 13.1.31)

! One ECCS train shall be OPERABLE in Mode 4. (TS 3.5.3)

! At least one boron injection subsystem shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source in MODES 5 and 6. (TR 13.1.32)

! CCP Motor Starting Duty

1. Motor at ambient temperature: 2 consecutive starts.
2. Motor at operating temperature: 1 consecutive start.

! Minimum time between starts following conditions 1 or 2.

a. Motor running between starts - 15 minutes.
b. Motor standing between starts - 45 minutes.

[C] ! The PDP suction stabilizer gas supply and vent valves should be closed and the PDP should be stopped IF the charging pump suction is switched from the VCT to the RWST due to VCT low-low level or operator action. This is applicable when VCT pressure is greater than RWST pressure. Higher VCT pressure will disable the PDP stabilizer vent path and may cause gas binding of the CCPs if 1CS-8200, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 SUCT STAB VNT CHK VLV leaks.

[C] ! When the PDP is running and 1/1-8204, H2/N2 SPLY VLV indicates open (red light on), 1/1-8210A, H2/N2 SPLY VLV and 1/1-8210B, H2/N2 SPLY VLV may be opened no more than 10 seconds to clear the high level (1/1-8204 green light on). When 1-ALB-6A, 1.8 "PDP SUCT STAB LVL HI-HI" alarms, operator actions will provide steps to start a CCP and stop the PDP.

! Charging flow through the Regenerative Heat Exchanger is limited to 300 gpm. Due to indication (1-FI-121A), flow is limited to 270 gpm.

! The minimum charging flow from the CCPs with 1-FK-121 in AUTO is 55 gpm. Any charging flow less than 55 gpm will require placing 1-FK-121 in MANUAL.

! Seal injection to the RCP No. 1 seals should not exceed 130°F.

! Seal injection to any RCP No. 1 seal should not exceed 13 gpm.

[C] ! Seal injection to any RCP No. 1 seal shall not be less than 6 gpm.

! When RCS temp is > 500 degrees, letdown flow is limited to 140 gpm with the 45 gpm orifice and ONE 75 gpm orifice in service.

Page 4 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S2 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 9 OF 131 4.1 Limitations (continued)

! Letdown flow is limited to 170 gpm (when RCS temp is < 500 degrees) with 1 Mixed Bed Demineralizer in service. (Reference EVAL-2005-001409-01-00)

! Letdown flow is limited to 195 gpm (when RCS temp is < 500 degrees) when 2 demineralizers are in service. (Reference FDA-2007-001435-01-00)

[C] ! Seal injection to a coupled RCP may be secured if RCS level is above or below the seal package provided that the following actions are implemented to minimize the exposure to risk associated with this configuration:

- Seal injection should be in service any time RCS level is moving through the seal package.

- The #1 seal leak off isolation valves should be closed.

- No pump should be rotated while seal injection is secured; this will prevent cycling water through the shaft alley and seal package.

- The time with seal injection secured should be limited to the time required to perform maintenance on the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) and testing / surveillances that require seal injection to be secured.

- The RCP Oil Lift system should remain secured during the time that seal injection is isolated to prevent movement of the shaft and possibly cycling water through the shaft and seal package.

- The pumps shall be hand rotated with the RCS at Low Pressure and Seal Injection in service to assist in dislodging any debris/deposits, prior to pump operation.

- A flush of the seals at a higher seal injection flow rate may be used to purge any debris or unfiltered water from the seal package and shaft alley, if necessary.

Although additional risk is incurred by securing seal injection to a coupled pump, this added risk to the seals may be mitigated by implementing the above actions. (Reference EVAL-2007-002946-01-0)

! During certain conditions, it may be necessary to start the CCP before an operator can be dispatched to locally start the Aux Lube Oil Pump. The start of a CCP without starting the Aux Lube Oil Pump is classified as an emergency start and the following limitations apply:

- Any emergency start of a CCP should be recorded in the Unit Log.

- WHEN the Aux Lube Oil Pump has been operated within the last 30-day period THEN CCP bearings retain sufficient lubrication for a CCP start without prior start of the Aux Lube Oil Pump.

- ABNs and ERGs have been evaluated to determine which instructions for a CCP start are considered to be an emergency start of the CCP. WHEN ABN instructions reference that a CCP start be performed per SOP-103A, THEN the Aux Lube Oil Pump is expected to be started prior to starting the CCP. ABN instructions that initiate start of a CCP WITHOUT reference to SOP-103A can be performed as an emergency start. Any CCP start within the ERGs is considered an emergency start.

Page 5 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S2 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 10 OF 131 4.2 Notes

! Attachment 1 and 2 can be used to verify valve and control switch lineups with the system in normal operation.

! The symbol [R] has been located throughout this procedure where real or potential radiation hazards are positively identified. This identification technique should not preclude the worker from following good radiation work practices throughout the task to ensure his/her occupational exposure is maintained As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA).

! The symbol [IV] and [CV] have been located throughout this procedure to identify those steps requiring verification. Initial performance and verification (Independent Verification [IV] or Concurrent Verification

[CV]) of these steps shall be documented on the Verification Log Sheet (STA-694-1).

! Following boron saturation of a new demineralizer, RCS boron can be expected to drop. A reduction of RCS boron by 10 to 15 ppm is not unusual. This change is the result of boron being removed from the letdown stream during the saturation evolution and blended flow replacing the boron with boron-10.

! When stopping a CCP, lube oil pressure to the pump bearings will be reduced as the shaft-driven lube oil pump coasts down. When lube oil pressure reduces to < 13 psig, the Aux Lube Oil Pump automatically starts and will automatically stop as the lube oil pressure exceeds > 18 psig. The Aux Lube Oil Pump may cycle a few times (normally 3 to 5 times) before remaining on.

! Modifying notes in attachments appear on the bottom of the applicable page and again on the last page of the attachment.

! The interaction of controllers FK-121, LK-459, & SK-459A is complex. When alternating between PDP

& CCP operation, LK-459 must be adjusted to accomplish smooth operation. IF a CCP is operating, steady state demand on LK-459 will be ~1/3 the indicated flow of FI-121A. IF the PDP is operating, the demand of LK-459 will be ~matched to the output of SK-459A. These values assume previous steady state, automatic, 100% power operation, but can be used as guidance for manual adjustments.

[C] ! When Excess Letdown flow is aligned to the top of the VCT, the potential exists to bypass the VCT, supplying non-degassed coolant through the Charging Pump Suction Vent Line to the Charging Pump suctions. Therefore, the Charging Pump Suction Vent Line is isolated prior to aligning the Excess Letdown flow to the VCT. Additionally, since no constant vent path is available in this line-up, a LCOAR is entered and ultrasonic monitoring of the Charging Pump Suction Vent Line initiated. Excess Letdown flow is normally aligned to the suction of the charging pumps.

! Proper oil level for the PDP Fluid Drive Unit is as follows (SMF-05-2603):

- With the PDP stopped, oil level should be in the upper 1/4 of the MIN - MAX range, not to exceed the MAX oil level mark.

- With the PDP running, oil level should NOT drop below the MIN oil level mark.

Overfilling can cause unnecessary heating of the oil, and increased load on the motor

! After each PDP run, the PDP boron placard should be updated to ensure the next PDP run will have current boron concentration information.

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CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S2 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 27 OF 131 5.3 Major Component Operation 5.3.1 Positive Displacement Pump Startup This section describes the steps to place the PDP in service.

CAUTION: PDP operation may result in high gaseous activity in the PDP Room due to packing leakage.

NOTE:  ! PDP run time should be minimized to conserve pump packing. Run PDP only when required (for example - Slave Relay Testing).

! Following loss of Instrument Air, control air to the PDP fluid drive must be reset. This is done by depressing the RESET pushbutton on the instrument air supply to the PDP fluid drive. This RESET is normally accomplished by ABN-301 restoration section 3.0.

! The reactivity impact for starting the PDP pump is typically very small due to diffusion effects between the PDP piping and the RCS. However, assuming no diffusion, the reactivity effects could potentially approach -15 pcm (and -1.5 °F temperature change) with very large

(>1000 ppm) boron concentration differences between the PDP piping and RCS. (EVAL 0944-04)

! Following several PDP starts, the PDP fluid drive oil may exceed the upper limit mark on the drive units sight glass due to priming) the pump (adding oil) over a period of time. The PROMPT Team should be contacted to drain th e e x c e s s o il.

(SMF-01-0600 and 4-03-149515-00)

! With the PDP stopped, oil level should be in the upper 1/4 of the MIN - MAX range, preferably near the MAX level mark. (SMF-05-2603)

Q A. Ensure the prerequisites in Section 2.5 are met.

B. IF the PDP has not operated for an extended period (month), THEN prime the PDP fluid drive by performing the following:

Q 1) IF pump hydraulic fluid level is at the maximum level of the sightglass, THEN instruct a PROMPT member to drain ~1/2 liter of oil into a clean container. (This oil will be added to the fluid drive at step 5.3.1.B. 3)

Q 2) Remove the pipe plugs from the two priming holes on top of the input end bell (motor side of the fluid drive).

Q 3) Pour oil (collected in step 5.3.1.B. 1) a) and/or from the approved lubrication list) into either hole until oil rises to the bottom of the other hole and remains there.

Q 4) Replace and tighten the pipe plugs.

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CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S2 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 28 OF 131 5.3.1 NOTE: Steps C and D may be considered NA if in a MODE other than MODE 1 or 2.

Q C. IF the RCS boron concentration has changed significantly since the PDP was last operated, THEN determine the impact of water in the PDP piping on reactivity as follows:

NOTE: This formula was developed using data from Eval 2004-000944-04-00. It assumes 84 gallons for the PDP piping. All the factors that would not change were calculated to give a constant (0.00128) to simplify the formula(updated in EVAL-2009-000420-02). This formula does not take into account the diffusion effect. So, the boron concentration could be less than the PDP plaque indicates. The temperature change calculated below represents worst case. Operating experience has shown actual temperature change was less than results of the calculation below.

)B = RCS Boron Concentration Difference

)B = ( _______ ppm PDP - ________ ppm RCS ) x 0.00128

)B = _______ ppm On the Reactivity Briefing Sheet get the following information:

ITC pcm/°F HFP Differential Boron Worth pcm/ppm ITC = pcm/°F = ppm/°F HFP Differential Boron Worth pcm/ppm

)Tave = B = ppm = °F ppm/°F ppm/°F Q D. IF )Tave calculated above is >1°F, THEN notify Shift Operations Manager to discuss contingency actions.

NOTE: If the Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is overfilled, the PDP Charging Pump Room will become contaminated.

E. IF Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is low, THEN fill per the following steps:

Q 1) Slowly crack OPEN 1CS-0119, PD PMP 1-01 STUFFING BOX COOL TK MU ISOL VLV, until desired fill rate is achieved.

Q 2) When the desired tank level has been established, CLOSE 1CS-0119.

Q F. Ensure 1-8388-RO, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV RMT OPER, is OPEN.

G. OPEN the following valves:

Q! 1/1-8202A, VENT VLV (MCB)

Q! 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV (MCB)

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CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S2 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 29 OF 131 5.3.1 Q H. Ensure 1APPD, POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT CHARGING PUMP 1-01 MOTOR BREAKER 1EB1/2B/BKR is racked to the CONNECT position.

Q I. Place 1-SK-459A, PDP SPD CTRL, in MANUAL with demand at 55%.

NOTE: The PDP will not start until 1-8109, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 RECIRC VLV, is open and handswitch 1/1-APPD, PDP, is in the START position. Two minutes after the PDP breaker is closed, 1-8109 will automatically close.

Q J. OPEN 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV.

NOTE: PDP speed may have to be raised rapidly when a CCP is also in operation to prevent the PDP from stalling on low oil pressure.

Q K. WHEN 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV is open, THEN start the PDP by placing handswitch 1/1-APPD PDP, to the START position.

Q L. Ensure 1/1-8109, PDP RECIRC VLV, is CLOSED.

NOTE: During PDP operation the following step may be performed to lower PDP suction stabilizer level.

M. IF 1/1-8204, H2/N2 SPLY VLV indicates OPEN (red light on), THEN perform the following to lower suction stabilizer level:

[C] Q! OPEN 1/1-8210A, H2/N2 SPLY VLV and 1/1-8210B, H2/N2 SPLY VLV for no more than 10 seconds to clear the high level, then close.

N. IF a CCP is in operation AND it is to be placed in standby, THEN perform the following:

Q 1) Ensure only ONE letdown orifice is in service per Section 5.2.3.

Q2 Alternately raise PDP speed using 1-SK-459A, PDP SPD CTRL, and lower CCP flow using 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL, until 1-FK-121 is at minimum.

Q 3) Shut down the running CCP per Section 5.3.4.

[IV] Q O. IF desired, THEN gradually adjust 1-SK-459A, PDP SPD CTRL, to achieve the required flow rate AND place in AUTO.

Q P. Adjust 1-LK-459, PRZR LVL CTRL, as necessary to maintain stable Pressurizer level.

COMMENTS Page 9 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S2 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-103A CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 34 OF 131 5.3.4 Centrifugal Charging Pump Shutdown This section describes the steps to remove a CCP from service.

Q A. If only one CCP is in operation, place 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL in MANUAL AND slowly reduce to 0% demand.

B. STOP the selected CCP.

Q! 1/1-APCH1, CCP 1 Q! 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 C. After the CCP has stopped rotating, place the local handswitch for the Aux Lube Oil Pump for selected pump in STOP.

Q! 1/1 APCH1-LP, CCP 1-01 AUX LUBE OIL PUMP Q! 1/1 APCH2-LP, CCP 1-02 AUX LUBE OIL PUMP NOTE: 1-FK-121 is returned to AUTO in the next step to ensure RCP seal injection is maintained should an SI signal occur.

[IV] Q D. Ensure 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL is placed in AUTO.

CAUTION: A maximum of two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 350°F (TS 3.4.12)

[IV] E. IF the unit is in Mode 4 or in Mode 3 with any RCS cold leg temperature less than 350°F, THEN verify at least one CCP handswitch is in AUTO.

Q! 1/1-APCH1, CCP 1 Q! 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2

[IV] F. IF all RCS cold leg temperatures are > 350°F, THEN ensure both CCP handswitches are in AUTO.

Q! 1/1-APCH1, CCP 1 Q! 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 COMMENTS Page 10 of 10 Rev e

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-3 Task #RO5024 K/A #010.A4.03 4.0 / 3.8 SF-3

Title:

PORV Block Valve Operability Test Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: X Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is in MODE 1 at 100% power.
  • Surveillance on the PORV Block Valves is required.
  • All Prerequisites have been met.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • PERFORM the PORV Block Valve Operability Test per OPT-109A, PORV Block Valve Test for both Block Valves.
  • RECORD data on OPT-109A-1, PORV Block Valve Data Sheet Task Standard: Perform the PORV Block Valve Operability Test per OPT-109A and take action to isolate an open PORV per ALM-0053, 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4.

Required Materials: OPT-109A, PORV Block Valve Test, Rev. 10.

OPT-109A-1, PORV Block Valve Data Sheet, Rev. 12.

ALM-0053A, 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4 - PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE, Rev. 6-15.

Validation Time: 10 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-3 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP BOOTH OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC-18 or any at power Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

  • VERIFY both PRZR Block Valves are OPEN.
  • EXECUTE malfunction RX16B, PRZR PORV 456 fails 30% open when 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV Block Valve is reopened at Step 8.2.3.

EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of Form 1 and Procedure 1:

  • OPT-109A, PORV Block Valve Test.
  • OPT-109A-1, PORV Block Valve Data Sheet.

When referenced, PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of Procedure 2:

  • ALM-0053A, 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4 - PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE.

Page 2 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-3 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from OPT-109A, Step 8.0.

Perform Step: 1 Stroke test of 1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

8.1 & 8.1.1

  • ENSURE 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN.

Standard: DETERMINED 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Stroke test of 1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

8.1 & 8.1.2

  • CLOSE 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Standard: PLACED 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in CLOSE and OBSERVED green CLOSE light lit and RECORDED on Form OPT-109A-1 at Step

8.1.2. Comment

SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Stroke test of 1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

8.1 & 8.1.3

  • OPEN 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Standard: PLACED 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in OPEN and OBSERVED red OPEN light lit and RECORDED on Form OPT-109A-1 at Step 8.1.3.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Stroke test of 1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

8.2 & 8.2.1

  • ENSURE 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN.

Standard: DETERMINED 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Stroke test of 1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

8.2 & 8.2.2

  • CLOSE 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Standard: PLACED 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in CLOSE and OBSERVED green CLOSE light lit and RECORDED on Form OPT-109A-1 at Step

8.2.2. Comment

SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-3 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 6 Stroke test of 1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

8.2 & 8.2.3

  • OPEN 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Standard: PLACED 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in OPEN and OBSERVED red OPEN light lit and RECORDED on Form OPT-109A-1 at Step 8.2.3.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Booth Operator: When 1/1-8000B is reopened, EXECUTE malfunction RX16B at 30%.

Perform Step: 7 Acknowledge annunciator 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4 - PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE.

Standard: ACKNOWLEDGED annunciator 5C, Window 1.4 - PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE and RECOGNIZED PORV 456 is OPEN.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The following steps represent the Alternate Path of this JPM.

Examiner Note: When referenced, PROVIDE examinee with a copy of Procedure 2.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from ALM-0053A, 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4.

Perform Step: 8 Determine affected PORV.

1 Standard: DETERMINED affected PORV is 1/1-PCV-456.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 Monitor pressurizer pressure.

2 & 2.A

  • If one channel is indicating > 60 psig difference between the remaining operable channels, go to ABN-705.

Standard: DETERMINED all Pressurizer pressure indications are reading approximately the same value.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-3 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV will be stuck in mid-position.

Perform Step: 10 Monitor pressurizer pressure.

2, 2.B, & 2nd bullet

  • If reactor is in Mode 1, 2 or 3 with pressurizer pressure < 2335 psig, close affected PORV.
  • 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV Standard: PLACED 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV in CLOSE and OBSERVED red OPEN and green CLOSE lights lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 11 Verify pressurizer or RCS wide range pressure stabilizes.

nd 4, 4.A, & 2 bullet

  • If pressure continues to decrease due to PORV leakage, close both PORV block valves and determine affected PORV.
  • 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV Standard: PLACED 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in CLOSE and OBSERVED green CLOSE light lit.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-3 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is in MODE 1 at 100% power.
  • Surveillance on the PORV Block Valves is required.
  • All Prerequisites have been met.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • PERFORM the PORV Block Valve Operability Test per OPT-109A, PORV Block Valve Test for both Block Valves.

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S3 Procedure 1 COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL ELECTRONIC CONTROLLED COPY CHANGES ARE NOT INDICATED LATEST CHANGE NOTICE EFFECTIVE DATE

__________/________ Verify current status in the Document Control Database prior to use.

INITIAL & DATE LEVEL OF USE:

CONTINUOUS USE QUALITY RELATED PORV BLOCK VALVE TEST PROCEDURE NO. OPT-109A REVISION NO. 10 EFFECTIVE DATE: 7/15/10 1200 SURVEILLANCE TEST PREPARED BY: (Print) J.D. STONE EXT. 0564 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY: (Print) EDITORIAL REVISION EXT. NA APPROVED BY: Bart Smith for Steven Sewell DATE: 7/1/10 DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS Page 1 of 4 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S3 Procedure 1 CPNPP UNIT 1 PROCEDURE NO.

OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL OPT-109A REVISION NO. 10 PORV BLOCK VALVE TEST PAGE 2 OF 4 CONTINUOUS USE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure satisfies SR 3.4.11.1 and a portion of 5.5.8 requirements for PORV block valves by the performance of a stroke test.

Section 8.1: 1-8000A 1-8000B 2.0 ACCEPTANCE AND REVIEW CRITERIA 2.1 Acceptance Criteria 2.1.1 The acceptance criteria are listed on the data sheet.

3.0 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS None

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Performance 4.1.1 Technical Specification 3.4.11 "Pressure Operated Relief Valves" 4.1.2 Technical Specification 3.4.12 "Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System" 4.1.3 Technical Specification 5.5.8 "Inservice Testing Program" 4.2 Development 4.2.1 FSAR Section 5.4.13 "Safety & Relief Valves" 4.2.2 FSAR Section 15.6.1 "Inadvertent Opening of a Pressurizer Safety or Relief Valve" 4.2.3 M1-0250 "Flow Diagram Reactor Coolant System" 4.2.4 M1-0251 "Flow Diagram Reactor Coolant System" Page 2 of 4 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S3 Procedure 1 CPNPP UNIT 1 PROCEDURE NO.

OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL OPT-109A REVISION NO. 10 PORV BLOCK VALVE TEST PAGE 3 OF 4 CONTINUOUS USE 5.0 PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND NOTES 5.1 Precautions 5.1.1 Prior to positioning a valve for stroke testing, the potential consequences on the System or component OPERABILITY shall be evaluated with the valve in the abnormal position. IF the valve stroke impacts OPERABILITY of the System or component, THEN a LCOAR entry shall be made to track the condition.

5.2 Limitations 5.2.1 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2 and 3, per TS 3.4.11.

5.2.2 An LTOP system shall be OPERABLE per the requirements of TS 3.4.12 in MODES 4,5 and 6.

5.2.3 IF any acceptance criteria are not met, THEN immediately notify the Shift Manager to refer to the applicable TS.

5.3 Notes None 6.0 PREREQUISITES Q 6.1 This test may be performed in any MODE.

Q 6.2 The PORV block valve to be tested is NOT closed per Required Actions for Conditions A, B, or E in TS 3.4.11.

7.0 TEST EQUIPMENT None Page 3 of 4 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S3 Procedure 1 CPNPP UNIT 1 PROCEDURE NO.

OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL OPT-109A REVISION NO. 10 PORV BLOCK VALVE TEST PAGE 4 OF 4 CONTINUOUS USE 8.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE: Record all data on Form OPT-109A-1.

8.1 Stroke test of 1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

Q 8.1.1 ENSURE 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN.

Q 8.1.2 CLOSE 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Q 8.1.3 OPEN 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

8.2 Stroke test of 1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

Q 8.2.1 ENSURE 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN.

Q 8.2.2 CLOSE 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Q 8.2.3 OPEN 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

8.3 Independently VERIFY pressurizer PORV block valves are OPEN:

Q  ! 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV Q  ! 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV 9.0 RESTORATION None 10.0 ATTACHMENTS/FORMS 10.1 Attachments None 10.2 Forms 10.2.1 OPT-109A-1 "PORV Block Valve Data Sheet" Page 4 of 4 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S3 Procedure 2 CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ALARM PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 ALM-0053A ALARM PROCEDURE 1-ALB-5C REVISION NO. 6 PAGE 12 OF 61 ANNUNCIATOR NO.: 1.4 LOGIC:

PLANT COMPUTER:

P6480A PRZR PRESS CHAN I Y6469D PRZR PORV (1-PCV-455A)

P0481A PRZR PRESS CHAN II Y6780D PRZR PORV (1-PCV-456)

P0482A PRZR PRESS CHAN III P6498A HL 1 PRESS (WR)

P6483A PRZR PRESS CHAN IV P6499A HL 4 PRESS (WR)

LOCAL INSTRUMENTS:

None

REFERENCES:

M1-0251 E1-0064 Sh.11,12 E1-0018 Sh.D, F Page 1 of 3 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S3 Procedure 2 CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ALARM PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 ALM-0053A ALARM PROCEDURE 1-ALB-5C REVISION NO. 6 PAGE 13 OF 61 ANNUNCIATOR NOM./NO.: PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE 1.4 PROBABLE CAUSE:

High pressurizer pressure Instrument malfunction PORV malfunction Blown control power fuse AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None NOTE: 1/1-PCV-455A, PRZR PORV and 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV will relieve at approximately 2335 psig. 1/1-PCV-455A, PRZR PORV is interlocked with 1-PI-458 to close at 2185 psig. 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV is interlocked with 1-PI-457 to close at 2185 psig.

OPERATOR ACTIONS:

CAUTION: When a safety valve actuation has resulted in plant shutdown, subsequent Mode 4 operation shall not be commenced until affected safety valve has been inspected.

1. Determine affected PORV.
2. Monitor pressurizer pressure.

A. If one channel is indicating >60 psig difference between the remaining operable channels, go to ABN-705.

B. If reactor is in Mode 1, 2 or 3 with pressurizer pressure <2335 psig, close affected PORV.

! 1/1-PCV-455A, PRZR PORV  ! 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV

3. With reactor in Mode 4, 5 or 6, refer to TDM-301A to determine RCS pressure and temperature limits.

! 1-TR-413A/23A, HL 1 & 2 WR TEMP  ! 1-PI-403A, HL 4 PRESS (NR)

! 1-TR-413B/23B, HL 1 & 2 WR TEMP  ! 1-PI-403, HL 4 PRESS (NR)

! 1-TR-433B/23B, HL 3 & 4 WR TEMP  ! 1-PI-405, HL 1 PRESS (WR)

! 1-TR-433A/23A, HL 3 & 4 WR TEMP  ! 1-PR-437, HL 1 WR PRESS A. If RCS pressure is within the limits based on current RCS temperature, close affected PORV.

! 1/1-PCV-455A, PRZR PORV  ! 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV

4. Verify pressurizer or RCS wide range pressure stabilizes.

A. If pressure continues to decrease due to PORV leakage, close both PORV block valves and determine affected PORV.

! 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV

! 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV CONTINUED...

Page 2 of 3 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S3 Procedure 2 CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

ALARM PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 ALM-0053A ALARM PROCEDURE 1-ALB-5C REVISION NO. 6 PAGE 15 OF 61 ANNUNCIATOR NOM./NO.: PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE 1.4 OPERATOR ACTIONS: (Continued)

5. Monitor PRT pressure, temperature and level.

A. If PRT parameters do not stabilize, perform OPT-303 to determine leakage rate.

B. If excessive PORV seat leakage is indicated:

1) Ensure affected PORV block valve is closed.

! 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV

! 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV

2) Cycle affected PORV open and closed at least two times.

! 1/1-PCV-455A, PRZR PORV

! 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV NOTE: Operational experience has shown that the time required to re-establish a loop seal varies depending on the leak size. Experience indicates that times of 48 to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> are typical.

Consult System Engineering if additional guidance is desired.

3) Close affected PORV block valve to allow block valve loop seal to be reestablished and then reopen affected block valve.

! 1/1-8000A PRZR, PORV BLK VLV

! 1/1-8000B PRZR, PORV BLK VLV

4) Perform OPT-303 to verify PORV seat leakage has been terminated.

NOTE: A PRZR PORV is considered OPERABLE with known seat leakage when:

1. The PORV is capable of being manually cycled, and
2. With the PORV block valve open:

! The automatic control system can maintain PRZR pressure and level within assumed accident analysis limits (+ 30 psig of pressure setpoint and + 5% of level setpoint), and

! RCS identified leakage is less than LCO 3.4.13 limits.

6. Refer to TS 3.4.11, 3.4.13 and 3.4.12.
7. Correct the condition or initiate a work request per STA-606.

Page 3 of 3 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S3 Form PORV BLOCK VALVE DATA SHEET NOTE: PORV Block valve operated through one complete cycle of full valve travel satisfies SR 3.4.11.1 requirements.

ACCEPTANCE STEP OBSERVED CRITERIA INITIALS 6.0 PREREQUISITES MET N/A N/A 8.1.2 1/1-8000A CLOSED CLOSED/OPEN CLOSED 8.1.3 1/1-8000A OPEN OPEN/CLOSED OPEN 8.2.2 1/1-8000B CLOSED CLOSED/OPEN CLOSED 8.2.3 1/1-8000B OPEN OPEN/CLOSED OPEN 8.3 INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION

! 1/1-8000A OPEN N/A N/A

! 1/1-8000B OPEN N/A N/A COMMENTS/DISCREPANCIES:

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

PERFORMED BY: DATE:

SIGNATURE REVIEWED BY: DATE:

OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT CONTINUOUS USE OPT-109A-1 Page 1 of 1 R-12 Page 1 of 1 Rev e

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-4 Task #RO1507 K/A #011.EA1.11 4.2 / 4.2 SF-4P

Title:

Transfer Residual Heat Removal Pumps and Safety Injection Pumps to Hot Leg Recirculation Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: X Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • A Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident occurred on Unit 1 three (3) hours ago.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • TRANSFER Residual Heat Removal Pumps and Safety Injection Pumps from Cold Leg Recirculation to Hot Leg Recirculation per EOS-1.4A, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation.

Task Standard: Transfer Residual Heat Removal Pumps and Safety Injection Pumps from Cold Leg Recirculation to Hot Leg Recirculation per EOS-1.4A.

Required Materials: EOS-1.4A, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation, Rev. 8-1.

Validation Time: 12 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-4 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP BOOTH OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC-36 or any post-LOCA Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

  • EXECUTE malfunction RC08C2, Hot Leg Loop 3 Large Break LOCA.
  • EXECUTE override D1S18802A, CB-02 1/1-8802A, SI Pumps to RCS Hot Leg Valve OPEN Switch - CLS BOOTH OPERATOR NOTE:
  • After each JPM, REMOVE key T-112, RHR System from the following:
  • 1/1-8840, RHR to Hot Leg 2 and 3 Injection Isolation Valve.
  • 1/1-8809A, RHR to Cold Leg 1 & 2 Injection Isolation Valve.
  • 1/1-8809B, RHR to Cold Leg 3 & 4 Injection Isolation Valve.
  • 1/1-8802A, SI to Hot Leg 2 & 3 Injection Isolation Valve.

EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of Procedure 1:

  • EOS-1.4A, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation.

Page 2 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-4 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from EOS-1.4A.

Perform Step: 1 Perform the following to align Train A RHR to Hot Leg Recirculation:

1.a & 1.a.1)

  • Check RHR Train A Available.

Standard: DETERMINED RHR Train A available.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Perform the following to align Train A RHR to Hot Leg Recirculation:

1.a, 1.a.2), & bullet

  • Close RHR TO CL 1 & 2 INJ ISOL VLV: 1/1-8809A Standard: INSERTED key T-112, RHR System into 69/1-8809A POWER switch and TURNED to ON position then PLACED 1/1-8809A, RHR TO CL 1 &

2 INJ ISOL VLV in CLOSE and OBSERVED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Perform the following to align Train A RHR to Hot Leg Recirculation:

1.a, 1.a.3), & bullet

  • Open RHRP 1 XTIE VLV: 1/1-8716A Standard: PLACED 1/1-8716A, RHRP 1 XTIE VLV in OPEN and OBSERVED red OPEN light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Perform the following to align Train A RHR to Hot Leg Recirculation:

1.a, 1.a.4), & bullet

  • Ensure RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV is open: 1/1-8840 Standard: INSERTED key T-112, RHR System into 69/1-8840 POWER switch and TURNED to ON position then PLACED 1/1-8840, RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV in OPEN and OBSERVED red OPEN light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Perform the following to align Train A RHR to Hot Leg Recirculation:

1.a & 1.a.5)

  • Verify RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ FLO, 1-FI-988.

Standard: OBSERVED 1-FI-988, RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ FLO at ~ 3000 GPM.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-4 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 6 Perform the following to align Train B RHR to Hot Leg Recirculation:

1.b & 1.b.1)

  • Check RHR Train B available.

Standard: DETERMINED RHR Train B available.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Perform the following to align Train B RHR to Hot Leg Recirculation:

1.b, 1.b.2), & bullet

  • Close RHR TO CL 3 & 4 INJ ISOL VLV: 1/1-8809B Standard: INSERTED key T-112, RHR System into 69/1-8809B POWER switch and TURNED to ON position then PLACED 1/1-8809B, RHR TO CL 3 &

4 INJ ISOL VLV in CLOSE and OBSERVED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 Perform the following to align Train B RHR to Hot Leg Recirculation:

1.b, 1.b.3), & bullet

  • Open RHRP 2 XTIE VLV: 1/1-8716B Standard: PLACED 1/1-8716B, RHRP 2 XTIE VLV in OPEN and OBSERVED red OPEN light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 Perform the following to align Train B RHR to Hot Leg Recirculation:

1.b, 1.b.4), & bullet

  • Ensure RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV is open: 1/1-8840 Standard: DETERMINED 1/1-8840, RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV is OPEN.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 10 Perform the following to align Train A RHR to Hot Leg Recirculation:

1.b & 1.b.5)

  • Verify RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ FLO, 1-FI-988.

Standard: OBSERVED 1-FI-988, RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ FLO at ~ 4000 GPM.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 11 Align SI Pumps Flow Path For Hot Leg Recirculation:

2 & 2.a

  • Check SI Train A available.

Standard: OBSERVED SIP 1 red FAN and PUMP lights lit with 1-PI- 919, SIP 1 DISCH PRESS and 1-FI-918, DISCH FLO indications.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-4 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 12 Align SI Pumps Flow Path For Hot Leg Recirculation:

2 & 2.b

  • Stop SI pump 1.

Standard: PLACED 1/1-APSI1, SIP 1 handswitch in STOP and OBSERVED green PUMP and red FAN lights lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 13 Align SI Pumps Flow Path For Hot Leg Recirculation:

2, 2.c, & bullet

  • Close SIP 1 XTIE VLV: 1/1-8821A Standard: PLACED 1/1-8821A, SIP 1 XTIE VLV in CLOSE and OBSERVED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The following steps represent the Alternate Path of this JPM.

Perform Step: 14 Align SI Pumps Flow Path For Hot Leg Recirculation:

2, 2.d, & bullet

  • Open SI TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV: 1/1-8802A Standard: INSERTED key T-112, RHR System into 69/1-8802A POWER switch and TURNED to ON position then PLACED 1/1-8802A, SI TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV in OPEN and OBSERVED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 15 Go to Step 2f.

2.d RNO Standard: DETERMINED 1/1-8802A, SI TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV will NOT OPEN and TRANSITIONED to Step 2f per RNO column.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 16 Verify SI pump 1 discharge flow.

2.f Standard: OBSERVED 1-FI-918, SIP 1 DISCH FLO at 0 GPM and REFERRED to RNO column.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 5 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-4 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 17 Perform the following:

2.f & 2.f.1) RNO

  • Stop SI pump 1 Standard: DETERMINED SIP 1 STOPPED.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 18 Perform the following:

2.f, 2.f.2), &

  • Close SI TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV: 1/1-8802A bullet RNO Standard: OBSERVED 1/1-8802A, SI TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 19 Perform the following:

2.f, 2.f.3), &

  • Open SIP 1 XTIE VLV: 1/1-8821A bullet RNO Standard: PLACED 1/1-8821A, SIP 1 XTIE VLV in OPEN and OBSERVED red OPEN light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 20 Perform the following:

2.f & 2.f.4) RNO

  • Start SI pump 1 to re-establish Cold Leg Recirculation. Consult Plant Staff to evaluate long term core cooling.

Standard: PLACED 1/1-APSI1, SIP 1 handswitch in START and OBSERVED red PUMP and FAN lights lit with 1-PI- 919, SIP 1 DISCH PRESS and 1-FI-918, DISCH FLO indications.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 6 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-4 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • A Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident occurred on Unit 1 three (3) hours ago.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • TRANSFER Residual Heat Removal Pumps and Safety Injection Pumps from Cold Leg Recirculation to Hot Leg Recirculation per EOS-1.4A, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation.

Page 7 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-4 Rev e.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure ELECTRONIC CONTROLLED COPY CHANGES ARE NOT INDICATED LATEST CHANGE NOTICE EFFECTIVE DATE _________________

PCN 1 10/27/09_1200

____________/___________DMS CROSS VERIFICATION PERFORMED - WORKING COPY INITIAL & DATE EFFECTIVE DATE: 08-03-06 1200 PREPARED BY (Print): BART SMITH EXT: 8837 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY (Print): MIKE MANIS EXT: 5536 A. Hall for R. Smith APPROVED BY: DATE: 7/5/06 DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS Page 1 of 24 Rev e

MAJOR ACTION CATEGORIES OS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION A. ALIGN RHR FLOW PATH FOR EV. 8 HOT LEG RECIRCULATION B. ALIGN SI PUMPS FLOW PATH FOR HOT LEG RECIRCULATION A. 1. ALIGN RHR FLOW PATH FOR HOT LEG RECIRCULATION ONE TRAIN AT A TIME

2. ALIGN SI PUMPS FLOW PATH FOR HOT LEG RETURN TO PROCEDURE RECIRCULATION AND STEP IN EFFECT B.
3. + RETURN TO PROCEDURE AND STEP IN EFFECT

+ THE SWITCH BETWEEN HOT LEG AND COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SHOULD BE PERFORMED EVERY 24 HOURS AFTER THE INITIATION OF HOT LEG RECIRCULATION Page 2 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 2 OF 23 A. PURPOSE This procedure provides the necessary instructions for transferring the ECCS system to the hot leg recirculation mode.

B. APPLICABILITY This procedure is applicable for initiating events occurring in MODES 1, 2 and 3. This procedure assumes RHR is not in service in the shutdown cooling mode of operation. Using this procedure when not in these modes requires a step by step evaluation to determine if the required action is still applicable to current plant conditions.

C. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS This procedure is entered:

1) From EOP-1.0A, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT when 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> have elapsed.
2) When a decision is made, based upon recommendation of the Plant Staff, that transfer to hot leg recirculation is required. Transfer to hot-leg recirculation might be required eventually, after transferring to cold leg recirculation during the implementation of:

EOS-1.2A, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION ECA-3.1A, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, or ECA-3.2A, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SATURATED RECOVERY DESIRED.

Page 3 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 3 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1 Align RHR Flow Path For Hot Leg Recirculation One Train at a Time:

a. Perform the following to align Train A RHR to Hot Leg Recirculation:
1) Check RHR Train A 1) Go to Step 1b.

Available.

2) Close RHR TO CL 1 & 2 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8809A

3) Open RHRP 1 XTIE VLV:

1/1-8716A

4) Ensure RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV is open:

1/1-8840

-CONT 1-Page 4 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 4 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

5) Verify RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ 5) Perform the following:

FLO, 1-FI-988.

A) Close RHRP 1 XTIE VLV:

1/1-8716A B) Open RHR TO CL 1 & 2 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8809A C) Verify RHR TO CL 1 & 2 INJ FLO, 1-FI-618.

D) Consult with Plant Staff to evaluate long term core cooling.

E) IF RHR Train B available, THEN perform Step 1b and attempt to establish Hot Leg Recirculation via that train.

F) IF Hot Leg Recirculation from RHR can NOT be established, THEN close RHR TO HL 2

& 3 INJ ISOL VLV, 1/1-8840. Go to Step 2.

-CONT 1-Page 5 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 5 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

b. Perform the following to align Train B RHR to Hot Leg Recirculation:
1) Check RHR Train B 1) Go to Step 2.

available.

2) Close RHR TO CL 3 & 4 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8809B

3) Open RHRP 2 XTIE VLV:

1/1-8716B

4) Ensure RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV is open:

1/1-8840

5) Verify RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ 5) Perform the following:

FLO, 1-FI-988.

A) Close RHRP 2 XTIE VLV:

1/1-8716B B) Open RHR TO CL 3 & 4 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8809B C) Verify RHR TO CL 3 & 4 INJ FLO, 1-FI-619.

D) Consult with Plant Staff to evaluate long term core cooling.

E) IF RHR Train A available, THEN perform Step 1a and attempt to establish Hot Leg Recirculation via that train.

F) IF Hot Leg Recirculation from RHR can NOT be established, THEN close RHR TO HL 2

& 3 INJ ISOL VLV, 1/1-8840. Go to Step 2.

Page 6 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 6 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 2 Align SI Pumps Flow Path For Hot Leg Recirculation:

a. Check SI Train A available. a. Go to Step 2g.
b. Stop SI pump 1.

-CONT 2-Page 7 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 7 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

c. Close SIP 1 XTIE VLV c. IF 1/1-8821B is available, THEN perform 1).

1/1-8821A IF 1/1-8821B is NOT available, THEN perform 2).

1) IF 1/1-8821B is available, THEN perform the following:

A) Stop SI pump 2.

B) Close SIP 2 XTIE VLV:

1/1-8821B C) Open SI TO HL 1 & 4 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8802B D) Start SI pump 2.

E) Verify SI pump 2 discharge flow. IF NOT NOT,, THEN stop SI pump 2 AND close SI TO HL 1

& 4 INJ ISOL VLV, 1/1-8802B.

F) Close SI TO CL 1 4 INJ 1

ISOL VLV:

1/1-8835 G) Open SI TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8802A H) Start SI pump 1.

I) Verify SI pump 1 discharge flow. IF NOT NOT,, THEN stop SI pump 1 AND close SI TO HL 2

& 3 INJ ISOL VLV, 1/1-8802A.

-CONT 2-Page 8 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure

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Page 9 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 9 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

f. Verify SI pump 1 discharge f. Perform the following:

flow.

1) Stop SI pump 1.
2) Close SI TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8802A

3) Open SIP 1 XTIE VLV:

1/1-8821A

4) Start SI pump 1 to re-establish Cold Leg Recirculation. Consult Plant Staff to evaluate long term core cooling.
g. Check SI Train B available. g. Go to Step 2m.
h. Stop SI pump 2.

-CONT 2-Page 10 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 10 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

i. Close SIP 2 XTIE VLV: i. IF 1/1-8821A is available AND open, THEN perform 1).

1/1-8821B IF 1/1-8821A is closed, THEN perform 2).

IF 1/1-8821A is NOT available, THEN perform 3).

1) IF 1/1-8821A is available AND open, THEN perform the following:

A) Stop SI pump 1.

B) Close SIP 1 XTIE VLV:

1/1-8821A C) Open SI TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8802A D) Start SI pump 1.

E) Verify SI pump 1 discharge flow. IF NOT NOT,, THEN stop SI pump 1 AND close SI TO HL 2

& 3 INJ ISOL VLV, 1/1-8802A.

F) Close SI TO CL 1 4 INJ 1

ISOL VLV:

1/1-8835 G) Open SI TO HL 1 & 4 INJ ISOL VLV 1/1-8802B H) Start SI pump 2.

-CONT 2-Page 11 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 11 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I) Verify SI pump 2 discharge flow. IF NOT NOT,, THEN stop SI pump 2 AND close SI TO HL 1

& 4 INJ ISOL VLV, 1/1-8802B.

J) IF no SI pump running, THEN perform the following:

1. Open SI TO CL 1 4 1

INJ ISOL VLV, 1/1-8835.

2. Start SI pump 2 to re-establish Cold Leg Recirculation.
3. Open SIP 1 XTIE VLV, 1/1-8821A.
4. Start SI pump 1 to re-establish Cold Leg Recirculation.
5. Consult Plant Staff to evaluate long term core cooling.

K) Return to procedure and step in effect.

-CONT 2-Page 12 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 12 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2) IF 1/1-8821A is closed, THEN perform the following:

A) Ensure SI pump 2 stopped.

B) Close SI TO CL 114 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8835 C) Open SI TO HL 1 & 4 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8802B D) Start SI pump 2.

E) Verify SI pump 2 discharge flow. IF NOT NOT,, THEN stop SI pump 2 AND close SI TO HL 1

& 4 INJ ISOL VLV, 1/1-8802B.

F) IF SI pump 2 NOT running, THEN perform the following:

1. Open SI TO CL 1 4 1

INJ ISOL VLV, 1/1-8835.

2. Start SI pump 2 to re-establish Cold Leg Recirculation.
3. Consult Plant Staff to evaluate long term core cooling.

G) Return to procedure and step in effect.

-CONT 2-Page 13 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure

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Page 14 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 14 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

m. Check if SI TO CL 114 INJ ISOL VLV, 1/1-8835 should be closed:
1) Check that NO SI pump is 1) DO NOT close 1/1-8835. Go injecting into cold legs. to Step 3. OBSERVE NOTE PRIOR TO STEP 3.
2) Close SI to CL 1 14 INJ 2) IF 1/1-8835 can NOT be ISOL VLV, 1/1-8835. closed, THEN consult Plant Staff to evaluate SI alignment. Go to Step 3.

OBSERVE NOTE PRIOR TO STEP 3.

3) Open one SIP XTIE VLV:

1/1-8821A

-OR-1/1-8821B

>>¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥ NOTE NOTE:: After the initiation of hot leg recirculation, the action to switch between hot leg and cold leg recirculation should be performed every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per Attachment 2. Alternating recirculation paths is performed to prevent excessive boron concentration in the reactor during long term operation following a LOCA.

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-END-Page 15 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 15 OF 23 ATTACHMENT 1.A PAGE 1 OF 1 FOLDOUT FOR EOS-1.4A, TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION

1. SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA IF any SG pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner or has completely depressurized and has not been isolated, THEN go to EOP-2.0A, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1.
2. EOP-3.0A TRANSITION CRITERIA Manually start SI pumps as necessary and go to EOP-3.0A, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1, if any SG level increases in an uncontrolled manner or any SG has abnormal radiation.
3. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION IF CST level decreases to less than 10%, THEN switch to alternate AFW water supply per ABN-305, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.

Page 16 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 16 OF 23 ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 1 OF 5 TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION FROM HOT LEG RECIRCULATION

>>¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥ NOTE NOTE:

The transfer back to Hot Leg Recirculation is normally performed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after this attachment is complete. The Plant Staff may direct transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation at an interval less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> based on the possibility of core recriticality due to boron plateout.

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1. Align RHR Flow Path For Cold Leg Recirculation One Train At A Time
a. Perform the following to align Train A RHR to Cold Leg Recirculation:
1) Check RHR Train A in hot leg 1) Go to Step 1b.

recirculation.

2) Close RHRP 1 XTIE VLV:

1/1-8176A

3) Open RHR TO CL 1 & 2 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8809A

4) Verify RHR TO CL 1 & 2 INJ FLO, 4) Perform the following:

1-FI-618.

A) Close RHR TO CL 1 & 2 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8809A B) Open RHRP 1 XTIE VLV:

1/1-8716A C) Verify RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ FLO, 1-FI-988.

D) Consult with Plant Staff to evaluate long term core cooling.

-CONT 1-Page 17 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 17 OF 23 ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 2 OF 5 TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION FROM HOT LEG RECIRCULATION E) IF RHR Train B available, THEN perform Step 1b and attempt to establish Cold Leg Recirculation via that train.

F) IF Hot Leg Recirculation from RHR can NOT be established, THEN close RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV, 1/1-8840. Go to Step 2.

b. Perform the following to align Train B RHR to Cold Leg Recirculation:
1) Check RHR Train B in hot leg 1) Go to Step 1c.

recirculation.

2) Close RHRP 2 XTIE VLV:

1/1-8716B

3) Open RHR TO CL 3 & 4 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8809B

4) Verify RHR TO CL 3 & 4 INJ 4) Perform the following:

FLO, 1-FI-619.

A) Close RHR TO CL 3 & 4 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8809B B) Open RHRP 2 XTIE VLV:

1/1-8716B C) Verify RHR TO CL 3 & 4 INJ FLO, 1-FI-619.

D) Consult with Plant Staff to evaluate long term core cooling.

-CONT 1-Page 18 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 18 OF 23 ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 3 OF 5 TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION FROM HOT LEG RECIRCULATION

c. Check if RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV, 1/1-8840 should be closed:
1) Check that NO RHR pump is 1) DO NOT close 1/1-8840.

injecting into hot legs. Go to Step 2.

2) Close RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ 2) IF 1/1-8840 can NOT be ISOL VLV: closed, THEN consult Plant Staff to evaluate RHR 1/1-8840 alignment. Go to Step 2.
2. Align SI Pumps Flow Path For Cold Leg Recirculation:
a. Check SI Train A - ALIGNED IN a. Go to Step 2i.

HOT LEG RECIRCULATION

b. Check SIP 1 XTIE VLV - OPEN: b. IF SIP 2 XTIE VLV, 1/1-8821B is open AND SI pump 2 NOT 1/1-8821A aligned in Cold Leg Recirculation, THEN close 1/1-8821B.
c. Stop SI pump 1.
d. Close SI TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV.

1/1-8802A

e. Ensure SIP 1 XTIE VLV open:

1/1-8821A

f. Ensure SI TO CL 1 4 INJ ISOL 1

VLV open:

1/1-8835

g. Start SI pump 1.

-CONT 2-Page 19 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 19 OF 23 ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 4 OF 5 TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION FROM HOT LEG RECIRCULATION

h. Verify SI pump 1 discharge flow. h. Perform the following:
1) Stop SI pump 1.
2) Close SIP 1 XIE VLV:

1/1-8821A

3) Open SI TO HL2 &3 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8802A

4) Start SI pump 1 to re-establish Hot Leg Recirculation flow.

Consult Plant Staff to evaluate long term core cooling.

i. Check SI Train B - ALIGNED IN HOT LEG i. Go to Step 3.

RECIRCULATION

j. Stop SI pump 2.
k. Close SI TO HL 1 & 4 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8802B

l. Ensure SIP 2 XTIE VLV open:

1/1-8821B

m. Ensure SI TO CL 1 4 INJ ISOL VLV open:

1 1/1-8835

-CONT 2-Page 20 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 20 OF 23 ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 5 OF 5 TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION FROM HOT LEG RECIRCULATION

n. Start SI pump 2.
o. Verify SI pump 2 discharge flow. o. Perform the following:
1) Stop SI pump 2.
2) Close SIP 2 XTIE VLV; 1/1-8821B
3) Open SI TO HL 1 & 4 INJ ISOL VLV:

1/1-8802B

4) Start SI pump 2 to re-establish Hot Leg Recirculation flow.

Consult Plant Staff to evaluate long term core cooling.

3. Notify Plant Staff to evaluate possibility of core recriticality prior to transfer back to Hot Leg Recirculation.
4. Return To Procedure And Step In Effect.

Page 21 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 21 OF 23 ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 1 OF 3 BASES STEP 1 1:: This step aligns the RHR flow path for the hot leg recirculation mode.

Following the initiation of a LOCA, switchover to hot leg recirculation mode is performed due to boron precipitation concerns.

Establishing hot leg recirculation terminates boiling in the core and precludes boron precipitation from the boric acid solution which could potentially hinder core cooling.

Contingent actions are provided to realign RHR to cold leg recirculation if hot leg recirculation can not be established. RHR provides significant core cooling during the recirculation phase of ECCS operation; therefore, the operator is directed to re-establish RHR flow via cold leg recirculation in the event hot leg recirculation can not be established. Plant Staff is informed of the condition to allow consideration for increased possibility of boron plate out in the upper vessel regions and to investigate why hot leg recirculation can not be established. When the condition preventing Hot Leg Recirculation is corrected, the operator should attempt to establish Hot Leg Recirculation at that time.

STEP 2 2:: This step aligns the SI pumps for hot leg recirculation mode.

Following the initiation of a LOCA, switchover to hot leg recirculation mode is performed due to boron precipitation concerns.

Establishing hot leg recirculation terminates boiling in the core and precludes boron precipitation from the boric acid solution which could potentially hinder core cooling.

Contingent actions are provided to realign SI to cold leg recirculation if hot leg recirculation can not be established. Cold leg recirculation is re-established to maintain maximum core cooling capability. Plant Staff is informed of the condition to allow consideration for increased possibility of boron plate out in the upper vessel regions and to investigate why hot leg recirculation can not be established. When the condition preventing Hot Leg Recirculation is corrected, the operator should attempt to establish Hot Leg Recirculation at that time.

One SIP Cross-Tie Valve (8821A or 8821B) is reopened following alignment of the SI System to the hot leg recirculation mode to ensure the Cold Leg penetration isolation valve (8835) remains pressurized.

During hot leg recirculation, the cold leg penetration is not in service (valves closed) but remains pressurized by the safety injection pumps to a pressure in excess of containment design pressure, which ensures that a leakage path for containment atmosphere does not exist during a LOCA.

Page 22 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure

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Page 23 of 24 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S4 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 EOS-1.4A TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION REVISION NO. 8 PAGE 23 OF 23 ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 3 OF 3 BASES ATTACHMENT 2 Following the transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation performed by this procedure, the transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation will be performed again at approximately 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> intervals. Alternating between hot and cold leg injection is utilized to prevent excessive concentration in the reactor vessel during long-term operation following a LOCA. This attachment provides the actions to accomplish transfer back to Cold Leg Recirculation for Hot Leg Recirculation.

ATTACHMENT 3 The Bases attachment provides a discussion for the steps and attachments of this procedure. The information that forms the basis steps and attachments has been taken from the WOG ERG Background Information or from specific CPSES operating experience or information.

Page 24 of 24 Rev e

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-5 Task #RO3007 K/A #041.A4.08 3.0 / 3.1 SF-4S

Title:

Transfer Steam Dump System to Steam Pressure Mode Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is in HOT STANDBY.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • TRANSFER the Steam Dump System to the Steam Pressure Mode per IPO-009A, Plant Equipment Shutdown Following a Trip, Step 5.45, Transfer Steam Dump System to Steam Pressure Mode.
  • PLACE 1-PK-507, Steam Dump Controller in AUTO.

Task Standard: Transfer the Steam Dump System to the Steam Pressure Mode per IPO-009A.

Required Materials: IPO-009A, Plant Equipment Shutdown Following a Trip, Rev. 14-11.

Validation Time: 5 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-5 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP BOOTH OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC-38 or any shutdown Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

  • EXECUTE the following remote functions:

BOOTH OPERATOR NOTE:

EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of Procedure 1:

  • IPO-009A, Plant Equipment Shutdown Following a Trip.
  • Step 5.45, Transfer Steam Dump System to Steam Pressure Mode.

Page 2 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-5 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from IPO-009A, Step 5.45.

Perform Step: 1 Ensure 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL is in MANUAL.

5.45.A Standard: OBSERVED 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL amber MAN light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Match 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL demand to 1-UI-500, STM 5.45.B DMP demand.

Standard: ADJUSTED 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL RAISE () / LOWER

() pushbuttons to MATCH 1-UI-500, STM DMP DEMAND.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Verify 1-PCIP, 1.4, CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 is ON.

5.45.C Standard: OBSERVED 1-PCIP-1.4, CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 window lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Ensure BOTH STM DMP INTLK SELECT switches are ON.

5.45.D Standard: OBSERVED 43/1-SDA, STM DMP INTLK SELECT and 43/1-SDB, STM DMP INTLK SELECT in ON position.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Place 43/1-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in STM PRESS and verify 5.45.E proper response of steam dump valves.

Standard: PLACED 43/1-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in STM PRESS position and VERIFIED Steam Dump Valves maintain position.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-5 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 6 Ensure 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL set to 6.86.

5.45.F Standard: ADJUSTED 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL potentiometer to 6.86.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Place 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL in AUTO.

5.45.G Standard: DEPRESSED 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL white AUTO pushbutton and OBSERVED white AUTO light lit.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 4 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-5 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is in HOT STANDBY.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • TRANSFER the Steam Dump System to the Steam Pressure Mode per IPO-009A, Plant Equipment Shutdown Following a Trip, Step 5.45, Transfer Steam Dump System to Steam Pressure Mode.
  • PLACE 1-PK-507, Steam Dump Controller in AUTO.

Page 5 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-5 Rev e.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S5 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

INTEGRATED PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 IPO-009A PLANT EQUIPMENT SHUTDOWN FOLLOWING A TRIP REVISION NO. 14 PAGE 24 OF 36

[C] 5.44 B. IF RX $10% PWR bistable lights are ON, THEN refer to ABN-703. /

Initials Date C. Verify the following:

Q! 1-PCIP, 4.5, RX #48% PWR 3-LOOP FLO PERM P-8 is ON.

Q! 1-PCIP, 4.6, TURB #10% PWR P-13 is ON.

Q! 1-PCIP, 1.6, RX $10% PWR P-10 is OFF.

Q! 1-PCIP, 1.2, IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK is OFF.

Q! 1-PCIP, 2.2, IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK is OFF.

Q! 1-PCIP, 3.2, PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK is OFF.

Q! 1-PCIP, 4.2, PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK is OFF.

Q! 1-PCIP, 3.5, RX & TURB #10% PWR P-7 is ON.

Q! 1-PCIP, 2.4, LO TURB PWR ROD WITHDRWL BLK C-5 is ON.

Q! 1-ALB-6D, 1.1, SR HI VOLT FAIL is OFF. /

Initials Date D. Verify the following annunciators are OFF:

Q! 1-ALB-6C, 3.4, PR FLUX RATE HI Q! 1-ALB-6D, 3.3, 1 OF 4 PR FLUX RATE HI /

Initials Date NOTE: The following step may be marked N/A if performed during the implementation of EOS-0.1A.

5.45 IF not previously aligned to Steam Pressure Mode, THEN Transfer the Steam Dump System to the Steam Pressure mode as follows:

Q A. Ensure 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL is in MANUAL.

Q B. Match 1-PK-507, STM DUMP PRESS CTRL demand to 1-UI-500, STM DMP DEMAND.

Q C. Verify 1-PCIP, 1.4, CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 is ON.

Q D. Ensure BOTH STM DMP INTLK SELECT switches are ON.

Q E. Place 43/1-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in STM PRESS and verify proper response of steam dump valves.

Q F. Ensure 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL set to 6.86.

Q G. Place 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL in AUTO.

Q H. Verify 1-PI-507, MS HDR PRESS is approximately 1092 psig. /

Initials Date Page 1 of 1 Rev e

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-6 Task #RO1702 K/A #103.A2.03 3.5 / 3.8 SF-5

Title:

Verify Containment Spray Not Required Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: X Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 has just tripped from 100% power.
  • A Loss of Coolant Accident is in progress.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

Task Standard: Determine Containment Spray is required, initiate Containment Spray Phase B actuation, and manually align Containment Spray Phase B Valves per EOP-0.0 A, Attachment 6.

Required Materials: EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev. 8-5.

Validation Time: 10 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-6 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP BOOTH OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC-32 or any 100% power Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

  • INSERT Malfunction RP10A, Train A failure.
  • INSERT Malfunction RP10B, Train B failure.
  • INSERT Malfunction RP19C, Train A failure.
  • INSERT Malfunction RC09A2, Loss of Coolant Accident.

EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of Procedure 1:

Page 2 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-6 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from EOP-0.0A.

Perform Step: 1 Verify Containment Spray Not Required:

7 & 7.a

  • Containment pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 18.0 PSIG
  • 1-ALB-2B window 1-8, CS ACT - NOT ILLUMINATED

-AND-

  • 1-ALB-2B window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT - NOT ILLUMINATED Standard: DETERMINED Containment pressure greater than 18 PSIG with some windows illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Perform the following:

7.a & 7.a.1) RNO

  • Verify Containment Spray and Phase B Actuation initiated. IF NOT, THEN manually actuate.

Standard: DETERMINED Containment Spray is actuated with 1-ALB-2B, Window 1-8, CS ACT - ILLUMINATED.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Perform the following:

7.a & 7.a.1) RNO

  • Verify Containment Spray and Phase B Actuation initiated. IF NOT, THEN manually actuate.

Standard: DETERMINED Containment Phase B is NOT actuated with 1-ALB-2B, Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT - NOT ILLUMINATED.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-6 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: Examinee will attempt actuation of Phase B from C-02 and CB-07.

Perform Step: 4 Perform the following:

7.a, 7.a.1), &

  • Verify Containment Spray and Phase B Actuation initiated. IF 7.a.2) RNO NOT, THEN manually actuate.
  • Verify appropriate MLB indication for CNTMT SPRAY (BLUE WINDOWS) AND PHASE B (ORANGE WINDOWS).

Standard: PERFORMED the following to manually actuate Containment Phase B:

  • PLACED 1/1-CIPBA1A and 1/1-CIPBA2A, CS/CNTMT ISOL -

PHASE B MAN ACT switches at CB-02 to ACT position.

  • DETERMINED Containment Phase B did NOT actuate at CB-02.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Perform the following:

7.a, 7.a.1), &

  • Verify Containment Spray and Phase B Actuation initiated. IF 7.a.2) RNO NOT, THEN manually actuate.
  • Verify appropriate MLB indication for CNTMT SPRAY (BLUE WINDOWS) AND PHASE B (ORANGE WINDOWS).

Standard: PERFORMED the following to manually actuate Containment Phase B:

  • PLACED 1/1-CIPBA1B and 1/1-CIPBA2B, CS/CNTMT ISOL -

PHASE B MAN ACT switches at CB-07 to ACT position.

  • DETERMINED Containment Phase B did NOT actuate at CB-07.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The following steps represent the Alternate Path of this JPM.

Examiner Note: Examinee may verify valve position using either the indicating light at the valve or windows on 1-MLB-4A3 or 1-MLB-4B3.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from EOP-0.0A, Attachment 6.

Examiner Note: Close either or both Train A Valve 4526 or Train B Valve 4527.

Perform Step: 6 CB-03 1-HS-4526, NON-SFGD LOOP CCW SPLY VLV CLOSED Item #15 (Page 1 of 2)

Standard: PLACED 1-HS-4526, NON-SFGD LOOP CCW SPLY VLV in CLOSE position and VERIFIED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-6 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 7 CB-03 1-HS-4527, NON-SFGD LOOP CCW SPLY VLV CLOSED Item #13 (Page 1 of 2)

Standard: PLACED 1-HS-4527, NON-SFGD LOOP CCW SPLY VLV in CLOSE position and VERIFIED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Close either or both Train A Valve 4524 or Train B Valve 4525.

Perform Step: 8 CB-03 1-HS-4524, NON-SFGD LOOP CCW RET VLV CLOSED Item #16 (Page 1 of 2)

Standard: PLACED 1-HS-4524, NON-SFGD LOOP CCW RET VLV in CLOSE position and VERIFIED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 CB-03 1-HS-4525, NON-SFGD LOOP CCW RET VLV CLOSED Item #14 (Page 1 of 2)

Standard: PLACED 1-HS-4525, NON-SFGD LOOP CCW RET VLV in CLOSE position and VERIFIED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Close either or both Train A Valve 4701 or Train B Valve 4708.

Perform Step: 10 CB-03 1-HS-4701, RCP CLR CCW RET ISOL VLV CLOSED Item #5 (Page 2 of 2)

Standard: PLACED 1-HS-4701, RCP CLR CCW RET ISOL VLV in CLOSE position and VERIFIED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 11 CB-03 1-HS-4708, RCP CLR CCW RET ISOL VLV CLOSED Item #6 (Page 2 of 2)

Standard: PLACED 1-HS-4708, RCP CLR CCW RET ISOL VLV in CLOSE position and VERIFIED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 5 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-6 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: Close either or both Train A Valve 4699 or Train B Valve 4700.

Perform Step: 12 CB-03 1-HS-4699, RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ISOL VLV CLOSED Item #9 (Page 2 of 2)

Standard: PLACED 1-HS-4699, RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ISOL VLV in CLOSE position and VERIFIED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 13 CB-03 1-HS-4700, RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ISOL VLV CLOSED Item #7 (Page 2 of 2)

Standard: PLACED 1-HS-4700, RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ISOL VLV in CLOSE position and VERIFIED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Close either or both Train A Valve 4696 or Train B Valve 4709.

Perform Step: 14 CB-03 1-HS-4696, THBR CLR CCW RET ISO VLV CLOSED Item #10 (Page 2 of 2)

Standard: PLACED 1-HS-4696, THBR CLR CCW RET ISO VLV in CLOSE position and VERIFIED green CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 15 CB-03 1-HS-4709, THBR CLR CCW RET ISO VLV CLOSED Item #8 (Page 2 of 2)

Standard: PLACED 1-HS-4709, THBR CLR CCW RET ISO VLV in CLOSE position and VERIFIED green CLOSE light lit.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 6 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-6 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 has just tripped from 100% power.
  • A Loss of Coolant Accident is in progress.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

Page 7 of 7 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-6 Rev e.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S6 Procedure ELECTRONIC CONTROLLED COPY CHANGES ARE NOT INDICATED PCN 5 4-29-10 1200 LATEST CHANGE NOTICE EFFECTIVE DATE _________________

____________/___________DMS CROSS VERIFICATION PERFORMED - WORKING COPY INITIAL & DATE EFFECTIVE DATE: 08/03/06 1200 PREPARED BY (Print): BART SMITH EXT: 8837 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY (Print): MIKE MANIS EXT: 5536 APPROVED BY: DATE: 07/03/06 DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS Page 1 of 9 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S6 Procedure MAJOR ACTION CATEGORIES A. VERIFY AUTO ACTIONS B. IDENTIFY RECOVERY PROCEDURE EOP-0.0A REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION C. SHUTDOWN UNNECESSARY EQUIPMENT AND CONTINUE REV. 8 TRYING TO IDENTIFY APPROPRIATE RECOVERY PROCEDURE

1. VERIFY REACTOR TRIP FRS-0.1A, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWT
2. VERIFY TURBINE TRIP
3. VERIFY POWER TO AC SAFEGUARDS BUSSES ABN-601, RESPONSE TO A 138/345KV SYSTEM MALFUNCTION OR ABN-602
4. CHECK SI STATUS RESPONSE TO A 6900/480 VOLT SYSTEM MALFUNCTION A. 5. INITIATE PROPER SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT OPERATION PER ATTACHMENT 2
6. VERIFY AFW ALIGNMENT ECA-0.0A, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER
  • 8. CHECK IF MAIN STEAMLINES SHOULD BE ISOLATED EOS-0.1A, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE
10. CHECK PRZR VALVE STATUS SECONDARY COOLANT
11. CHECK IF RCPs SHOULD BE STOPPED EOP-2.0A, FAULTED STEAM
12. CHECK IF ANY SG IS FAULTED GENERATOR ISOLATION
13. CHECK IF SG TUBES ARE NOT RUPTURED EOP-3.0A, STEAM GENERATOR
14. CHECK IF RCS IS INTACT TUBE RUPTURE B. 15. CHECK IF ECCS FLOW SHOULD BE REDUCED EOP-1.0A, LOSS OF REACTOR OR
  • 16. INITIATE MONITORING OF CRITICAL SAFETY SECONDARY COOLANT FUNCTION STATUS TREES ON SPDS EOS-1.1A, SAFETY INJECTION
  • 17. CHECK SG LEVELS TERMINATION
18. CHECK SECONDARY RADIATION - NORMAL EOP-3.0A, STEAM GENERATOR
19. CHECK AUXILIARY AND SAFEGUARDS BUILDING TUBE RUPTURE RADIATION - NORMAL (GRID 4)
20. CHECK PRT CONDITIONS ECA-1.2A, LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT
21. IF THE DIESELS ARE RUNNING, THEN PLACE BOTH DG EMER STOP/START HANDSWITCHES IN START
22. RESET SI
23. RESET SI SEQUENCERS
24. RESET CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE A AND PHASE B C. 25. ESTABLISH INSTRUMENT AIR AND NITROGEN TO EOP-1.0A, LOSS OF REACTOR OR CONTAINMENT SECONDARY COOLANT
  • 26. CHECK IF RHR PUMPS SHOULD BE STOPPED ABN-601, RESPONSE TO A 138/345KV
  • 27. CHECK IF DIESEL GENERATORS SHOULD SYSTEM MALFUNCTION OR ABN-602 BE STOPPED RESPONSE TO A 6900/480 VOLT SYSTEM MALFUNCTION
28. RETURN TO STEP 9
  • CONTINUOUS ACTION STEP Page 2 of 9 Rev e

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Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-7 Task #RO4201 K/A #062.A4.07 3.1 / 3.1 SF-6

Title:

Shift Normal Bus 1A4 Between Unit Auxiliary Transformer and Startup Transformer Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: X Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% power.
  • Prerequisites for Normal Bus 1A4 have been met.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • SHIFT Normal Bus 1A4 between the Unit Auxiliary Transformer and the Startup Transformer per SOP-603A, 6900 V Switchgear, Step 5.3.2, Transferring a 6.9 KV Normal Bus from Unit 1 Auxiliary Transformer 1UT to Station Service Transformer 1ST.

Task Standard: Shift Normal Bus 1A4 between the Unit Auxiliary Transformer and the Startup Transformer and perform actions when Incoming Breaker 1A4-1 fails to trip during Bus transfer per SOP-603A.

Required Materials: SOP-603A, 6900 V Switchgear, Rev. 14-9.

ALM-0102A, 1-ALB-10B, Window 3.4 - 6.9 KV ANY NON-1E BUS PARALLELED, Rev. 11-4.

Validation Time: 10 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-7 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP BOOTH OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC-18 or any at power Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

  • When directed, EXECUTE malfunction ED20L, Breaker 1A4-1 interlock failure.

BOOTH OPERATOR NOTE:

  • After each JPM, PERFORM the following:
  • MOVE the Synchroscope Switch to an alternate 6900 V Bus position.
  • PLACE VS-1A, 6.9 KV BUS VOLT / FREQ SELECT switch in the 1A1 position.

EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of Procedure 1:

  • SOP-603A, 6900 V Switchgear.
  • Step 5.3.2, Transferring a 6.9 KV Normal Bus from Unit 1 Auxiliary Transformer 1UT to Station Service Transformer 1ST.

Page 2 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-7 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-603A, Step 5.3.2.

Perform Step: 1 Ensure the prerequisites in Section 2.3 are met for the selected bus.

th 5.3.2.A & 4 bullet

  • 6.9 KV SWITCHGEAR 1A4 Standard: DETERMINED Prerequisites have been met for 6900 V Switchgear 1A4 per the Initial Conditions.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Turn synchroscope ON for the selected Bus Feeder Breaker AND 5.3.2.B & 4th bullet ensure proper phasing and frequency.

  • SS-1A4-2, BKR 1A4-2 SYNCHROSCOPE Standard: PLACED synchroscope switch into SS-1A4-2, BKR 1A4-2 SYNCHROSCOPE position and TURNED to ON and OBSERVED proper phasing and frequency.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Close the incoming breaker from Station Service Transformer 1ST to the 5.3.2.C & 4th bullet desired bus.

  • CS-1A4-2, INCOMING BKR 1A4-2 Standard: PLACED CS-1A4-2, INCOMING BKR 1A4-2 in CLOSE and OBSERVED red CLOSE light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The following steps represent the Alternate Path of this JPM.

Perform Step: 4 Ensure the feeder breaker from Unit Auxiliary Transformer 1UT to the 5.3.2.D & 4th bullet bus being transferred trips open.

  • CS-1A4-1, INCOMING BKR 1A4-1 Standard: OBSERVED CS-1A4-1, INCOMING BKR 1A4-1 red CLOSE light lit and DETERMINED breaker did NOT OPEN.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-7 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: The following NOTE is from 1-ALB-10B, Window 3.4.

Perform Step: 5 Acknowledge annunciator alarm.

Standard: ACKNOWLEDGED annunciator alarm 1-ALB-10B, Window 3.4 - 6.9 KV ANY NON-1E BUS PARALLELED.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: This action is considered skill of the craft and, if referenced, is found in the Alarm Response Procedure.

Perform Step: 6 Ensure the feeder breaker from Unit Auxiliary Transformer 1UT to the th 5.3.2.D & 4 bullet bus being transferred trips open.

  • CS-1A4-1, INCOMING BKR 1A4-1 Standard: PLACED CS-1A4-1, INCOMING BKR 1A4-1 in TRIP and OBSERVED green TRIP light lit.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Check transferred bus voltage normal by performing the following:

5.3.2.E & 5.3.2.E.1)

  • Position VS-1A, 6.9 KV BUS VOLT/FREQ SELECT to the desired bus.

Standard: PLACED VS-1A, 6.9 KV BUS VOLT/FREQ SELECT to BUS 1A4 position.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 Check transferred bus voltage normal by performing the following:

5.3.2.E & 5.3.2.E.2)

  • Verify V-1A, 6.9 KV NON-SFGD BUS VOLT approximately 6900 VOLTS, for the selected bus (6450-7150 volts required).

Standard: OBSERVED V-1A, 6.9 KV NON-SFGD BUS VOLT approximately 6900 volts for BUS 1A4.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-7 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 9 Match handswitch target by placing the selected breaker, for the bus 5.3.2.F & 4th bullet transferred, in NEUTRAL-AFTER-TRIP.

  • CS-1A4-1, INCOMING BKR 1A4-1 Standard: DETERMINED CS-1A4-1, INCOMING BKR 1A4-1 is in NEUTRAL-AFTER-TRIP position with green FLAG indicating.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 10 Turn synchroscope OFF for the selected breaker.

5.3.2.G & 4th bullet

  • SS-1A4-2, BKR 1A4-2 SYNCHROSCOPE Standard: TURNED SS-1A4-2, BKR 1A4-2 SYNCHROSCOPE to OFF.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-7 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% power.
  • Prerequisites for Normal Bus 1A4 have been met.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • SHIFT Normal Bus 1A4 between the Unit Auxiliary Transformer and the Startup Transformer per SOP-603A, 6900 V Switchgear, Step 5.3.2, Transferring a 6.9 KV Normal Bus from Unit 1 Auxiliary Transformer 1UT to Station Service Transformer 1ST.

Page 6 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-7 Rev e.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S7 Procedure COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 1 SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL ELECTRONIC CONTROLLED COPY CHANGES ARE NOT INDICATED LATEST CHANGE NOTICE EFFECTIVE DATE PCN-9 11/15/10 1200

__________/________ Verify current status in the Document Control Database prior to use.

INITIAL & DATE QUALITY RELATED 6900 V SWITCHGEAR PROCEDURE NO. SOP-603A REVISION NO. 14 EFFECTIVE DATE: 3/22/05 1200 PREPARED BY (Print): Steven Lewis Ext: 6524 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY (Print): Allan Glass Ext: 5145 APPROVED BY: Alan Hall for R A Smith Date: 3/15/05 DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS Page 1 of 5 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S7 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-603A 6900 V SWITCHGEAR REVISION NO. 14 PAGE 4 OF 51 1.0 APPLICABILITY This procedure provides instructions for energizing, de-energizing and transferring the electrical line up of the 6.9 KV electrical switchgear.

2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Energizing a 6.9 KV Bus Q A. As applicable, Transformer XST1, XST2, XST1/2 (XST2A), 1UT, 1ST or 2ST energized.

B. Ensure the applicable control power lineup for the bus being energized has been completed:

Q  ! SOP-603A-EPA-E01, 6.9 KV Safeguards Bus Control Power Lineup Q  ! SOP-603A-EPA-E02, 6.9 KV Normal and Common Bus Control Power Lineup Q C. Ensure that the white supervisory light on the bus being energized is illuminated.

2.2 Deenergizing a 6.9 KV Bus Q  ! Prior to deenergizing the bus, ensure all loads necessary for plant operation have been transferred to an alternate source or the function is supplied by alternate equipment.

2.3 Normal Operation of a 6.9 KV Bus Q  ! Prior to transferring the bus to an alternate source, ensure the alternate source is energized and capable of handling the load of the associated bus.

3.0 PRECAUTIONS

! All electrical switching will be done under the direction of the Shift Manager or his designated representative.

! Observe all normal precautions pertaining to energized electrical gear.

! Open all load feeder breakers prior to energizing or deenergizing electrical buses.

! Check the bus voltage before and after a bus is energized.

! When energizing a dead 6.9 KV Normal Bus, the alternate feeder breaker (the -2, Incoming Breaker) will close automatically when the breaker handswitch is placed in the NEUTRAL position from the PULLOUT position, if the unit auxiliary/preferred power supply breaker is RACKED IN.

! The 6.9 KV safeguards bus tie breakers must be closed at all times for proper operation.

! All 6.9 KV breaker racking operations shall be performed in accordance with Attachment 1, Guidelines on Proper Operation of 6.9 KV Breakers.

Page 2 of 5 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S7 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-603A 6900 V SWITCHGEAR REVISION NO. 14 PAGE 5 OF 51 4.0 LIMITATIONS/NOTES 4.1 Limitations

! The Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start Instrumentation for each Function in TS Table 3.3.5-1, including the 6.9 KV Class 1E bus undervoltage and degraded voltage instrumentation, shall be OPERABLE in MODEs 1, 2, 3, & 4 per TS 3.3.5. The response times for this instrumentation shall be OPERABLE per TR 13.3.5.

! Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE in MODEs 1, 2, 3, and 4 per TS 3.8.9. (also reference Table B 3.8.9-1)

! The necessary portion of the Train A or Train B AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support one train of equipment required to be OPERABLE in MODEs 5 and 6 per TS 3.8.10. (also reference Table B 3.8.9-1) 4.2 Notes

! None Page 3 of 5 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S7 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-603A 6900 V SWITCHGEAR REVISION NO. 14 PAGE 30 OF 51 5.3.2 Transferring a 6.9 KV Normal Bus from Unit 1 Auxiliary Transformer 1UT to Station Service Transformer 1ST This section describes the steps required to transfer a 6.9 KV normal bus from Unit 1 Auxiliary Transformer 1UT to Station Service Transformer 1ST.

A. Ensure the prerequisites in Section 2.3 are met for the selected bus.

Q  ! 6.9 KV SWITCHGEAR 1A1 Q  ! 6.9 KV SWITCHGEAR 1A2 Q  ! 6.9 KV SWITCHGEAR 1A3 Q  ! 6.9 KV SWITCHGEAR 1A4 B. Turn synchroscope ON for the selected Bus Feeder Breaker AND ensure proper phasing and frequency.

Q  ! SS-1A1-2, BKR 1A1-2 SYNCHROSCOPE Q  ! SS-1A2-2, BKR 1A2-2 SYNCHROSCOPE Q  ! SS-1A3-2, BKR 1A3-2 SYNCHROSCOPE Q  ! SS-1A4-2, BKR 1A4-2 SYNCHROSCOPE NOTE: Closing an incoming feeder breaker will cause the other incoming breaker for the bus to automatically trip open.

C. Close the incoming breaker from Station Service Transformer 1ST to the desired bus.

Q  ! CS-1A1-2, INCOMING BKR 1A1-2 Q  ! CS-1A2-2, INCOMING BKR 1A2-2 Q  ! CS-1A3-2, INCOMING BKR 1A3-2 Q  ! CS-1A4-2, INCOMING BKR 1A4-2 D. Ensure the feeder breaker from Unit Auxiliary Transformer 1UT to the bus being transferred trips open.

Q  ! CS-1A1-1, INCOMING BKR 1A1-1 Q  ! CS-1A2-1, INCOMING BKR 1A2-1 Q  ! CS-1A3-1, INCOMING BKR 1A3-1 Q  ! CS-1A4-1, INCOMING BKR 1A4-1 Page 4 of 5 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S7 Procedure CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-603A 6900 V SWITCHGEAR REVISION NO. 14 PAGE 31 OF 51 5.3.2 E. Check transferred bus voltage normal by performing the following:

Q 1) Position VS-1A, 6.9 KV BUS VOLT/FREQ SELECT to the desired bus.

Q 2) Verify V-1A, 6.9 KV NON-SFGD BUS VOLT approximately 6900 VOLTS, for the selected bus (6450-7150 volts required).

F. Match handswitch target by placing the selected breaker, for the bus transferred, in NEUTRAL-AFTER-TRIP.

Q  ! CS-1A1-1, INCOMING BKR 1A1-1 Q  ! CS-1A2-1, INCOMING BKR 1A2-1 Q  ! CS-1A3-1, INCOMING BKR 1A3-1 Q  ! CS-1A4-1, INCOMING BKR 1A4-1 G. Turn synchroscope OFF for the selected breaker.

Q  ! SS-1A1-2, BKR 1A1-2 SYNCHROSCOPE Q  ! SS-1A2-2, BKR 1A2-2 SYNCHROSCOPE Q  ! SS-1A3-2, BKR 1A3-2 SYNCHROSCOPE Q  ! SS-1A4-2, BKR 1A4-2 SYNCHROSCOPE COMMENTS:

Page 5 of 5 Rev e

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-8 Task #RO3603 K/A #008.A4.10 3.1 / 3.1 SF-8

Title:

Remove Train A Component Cooling Water Safeguards Loop from Service Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: Plant:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% power with all controls in AUTOMATIC.
  • Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (CCW) is in service and Train B Component Cooling Water Loop is in Standby.
  • An operator is standing by at the Train B Component Cooling Water Pump.
  • Chemistry has been notified that CCW alignment changes are underway.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • REMOVE the Train A Component Cooling Water Safeguards Loop from service, LEAVE Train A Component Cooling Water Pump in operation, and PLACE Train B CCW Safeguards Loop in service per SOP-502A, Component Cooling Water System, Section 5.3.2, Removal/Restoration of Train A Safeguards Loop from Service, START at Step 5.3.2.1.C.

Task Standard: Start the Train B CCW Pump and remove the Train A CCW Safeguards Loop from service per SOP-502A.

Required Materials: SOP-502A, Component Cooling Water System, Rev. 18-11.

Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-8 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP BOOTH OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC-18 or any at power Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

  • ENSURE Train A Component Cooling Water Loop is in service.

EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of Procedure 1:

  • SOP-502A, Component Cooling Water System.

Page 2 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-8 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-502A, Step 5.3.2.

Perform Step: 1 IF Train B is to be placed in service, THEN Start Train B CCW Pump per 5.3.2.1.C Section 5.2.1.

Standard: STARTED Train B CCW Pump per Section 5.2.1.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-502A, Step 5.2.1.

Perform Step: 2 Ensure the Station Service Water Pump, associated with the CCW nd 5.2.1.1.A & 2 bullet Pump to be started is operating.

  • SSWP 2 Standard: DETERMINED Station Service Water Pump 1-02 is RUNNING.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Ensure the oil level in the bearing housings are normal.

5.2.1.1.B & 2nd bullet Standard: CONTACTED NEO to ENSURE the oil level in the bearing housings is normal.

Booth Operator: When contacted, REPORT oil level in bearing housing is normal.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Step may be performed on Train A; however, Train B is desired.

Perform Step: 4 IF CCW heat load is low, THEN additional CCW flow should be 5.2.1.1.C Train B & established through the CS HX or RHR HX prior to starting the second 1st bullet pump. Train B

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-8 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: Step may be performed on Train A; however, Train B is desired.

Perform Step: 5 IF CCW heat load is low, THEN additional CCW flow should be 5.2.1.1.C Train B & established through the CS HX or RHR HX prior to starting the second 2nd bullet pump. Train B

  • 1-HS-4573, RHR HX 2 CCW RET VLV Standard: OPENED 1-HS-4573, RHR HX 2 CCW RET VLV to establish flow through the RHR Heat Exchanger.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 Start the idle CCW Pump.

5.2.1.1.D & 2nd bullet

  • 1-HS-4519A, CCWP 2 Standard: PLACED 1-HS-4519A, CCWP 2 in START and OBSERVED:
  • Red FAN and PUMP lights lit.
  • 1-PI-4521, CCWP 2 DISCH PRESS rising.
  • 1-FI-4537A, CCW HX 2 OUT FLO rising.
  • 1-FI-4537B, CCW HX 2 RECIRC FLO rising.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The examinee may perform either or both of the following 2 steps.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-502A, Step 5.3.2.

Perform Step: 7 IF Train A CCW Pump is to continue operation with the loops isolated, 5.3.2.1.E.1) & 1st bullet THEN perform the following:

  • Throttle Open the return valve for the heat exchanger to establish a safeguards loop flowpath through the RHR or CS HX.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-8 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 8 IF Train A CCW Pump is to continue operation with the loops isolated, 5.3.2.1. E.1) & THEN perform the following:

2nd bullet

  • Throttle Open the return valve for the heat exchanger to establish a safeguards loop flowpath through the RHR or CS HX.
  • 1-HS-4574, CS HX 1 CCW RET VLV Standard: THROTTLED OPEN 1-HS-4574, CS HX 1 CCW RET VLV and OBSERVED flow on 1-FI-4560, CS HX 1 CCW RET FLO rising.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 Close the following to isolate Train A Safeguards Loop:

5.3.2.1.E.2) & 1st bullet

  • 1-HS-4514, SFGD LOOP CCW SPLY VLV Standard: PLACED 1-HS-4514, SFGD LOOP CCW SPLY VLV in CLOSE and OBSERVED green CLOSE light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 10 Close the following to isolate Train A Safeguards Loop:

5.3.2.1.E.2) &

  • 1-HS-4512, SFGD LOOP CCW RET VLV 2nd bullet Standard: PLACED 1-HS-4512, SFGD LOOP CCW RET VLV in CLOSE and OBSERVED green CLOSE light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 11 Verify proper operation of 1-HS-4536, CCWP 1 RECIRC VLV.

5.3.2.1.E.3)

Standard: VERIFIED 1-HS-4536, CCWP 1 RECIRC VLV is OPEN if CCW Heat Exchanger outlet flow drops below 8200 gpm.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-8 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% power with all controls in AUTOMATIC.
  • Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (CCW) is in service and Train B Component Cooling Water Loop is in Standby.
  • An operator is standing by at the Train B Component Cooling Water Pump.
  • Chemistry has been notified that CCW alignment changes are underway.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • REMOVE the Train A Component Cooling Water Safeguards Loop from service, LEAVE Train A Component Cooling Water Pump in operation, and PLACE Train B CCW Safeguards Loop in service per SOP-502A, Component Cooling Water System, Section 5.3.2, Removal/Restoration of Train A Safeguards Loop from Service, START at Step 5.3.2.1.C.

Page 6 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S-8 Rev e.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S8 Procedure COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 1 and COMMON SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL ELECTRONIC CONTROLLED COPY CHANGES ARE NOT INDICATED LATEST CHANGE NOTICE EFFECTIVE DATE PCN 11 9/29/10 1200

__________/________ Verify current status in the Document Control Database prior to use.

INITIAL & DATE QUALITY RELATED COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM PROCEDURE NO. SOP-502A REVISION NO. 18 EFFECTIVE DATE: 11/18/05 1200 PREPARED BY (Print): Juannelle Miller Ext: 5835 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY (Print): Steven Lewis Ext: 6524 APPROVED BY: Jim Brau for R.A. Smith Date: 11/14/05 DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS Page 1 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S8 Procedure CPSES UNIT 1 and PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL COMMON SOP-502A COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM REVISION NO. 18 PAGE 6 OF 176 2.3 Filling and Venting 2.3.1 Safeguards Loop Train A Q  ! The Demineralized Water System is available for CCW Surge Tank Makeup.

! CCW Drain Tank valves have been aligned per the following:

Q  ! SOP-502A-CC-V05, Valve Lineup - CCW Drains (part 1)

Q  ! SOP-502A-CC-V06, Valve Lineup - CCW Drains (part 2) 2.3.2 Safeguards Loop Train B Q  ! The Demineralized Water System is available for CCW Surge Tank Makeup.

! CCW Drain Tank valves have been aligned per the following:

Q  ! SOP-502A-CC-V05, Valve Lineup - CCW Drains (part 1)

Q  ! SOP-502A-CC-V06, Valve Lineup - CCW Drains (part 2) 2.3.3 Non-Safeguards Loop Outside the Containment Building Q  ! Sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, or 5.4.5 have been completed.

2.3.4 Non-Safeguards Loop Inside the Containment Building Q  ! Section 5.4.3 has been completed OR is in progress.

3.0 PRECAUTIONS

! The CCW System contains hydrazine. Protective clothing for the face and hands should be worn when working with this corrosion inhibitor.

! All releases from the CCW System should be coordinated with Chemistry and Environmental to ensure compliance with State and Federal regulatory requirements.

! The symbol [IV] has been located throughout this procedure to identify those steps requiring Verification. Initial performance and Verification of these steps shall be documented on the Verification Log Sheet (STA-694-1).

! The following Forms may be utilized to verify the valve, control switch and electrical lineups with the system in operation.

! SOP-502A-CC-V01  ! SOP-502A-CC-V06

! SOP-502A-CC-V02  ! SOP-502A-CC-C01

! SOP-502A-CC-V03  ! SOP-502A-CC-E01

! SOP-502A-CC-V04  ! SOP-502A-CC-E02

! SOP-502A-CC-V05 Page 2 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S8 Procedure CPSES UNIT 1 and PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL COMMON SOP-502A COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM REVISION NO. 18 PAGE 7 OF 176 3.0 PRECAUTIONS (continued)

! Demineralized water should be used as the source of makeup to the CCW Surge Tank when filling and venting the CCW System.

! All drainage from the CCW System should be directed to the CCW Drain System or to a sump which pumps directly to LVW.

! The CCW pumps will automatically start from the following signals, if the pump control switches are in AUTO:

Safety Injection sequence signal Blackout sequence signal Low CCW pressure at the opposite train CCW heat exchanger outlet An AUTO start of the associated train SSW pump on low pressure in the alternate SSW train.

! Starting a CCW pump will automatically start the following equipment, if their control switches are in AUTO:

Associated CCW pump room fan cooler Associated SSW pump Associated Safety Chilled Water recirc pump

! Air pockets can form in isolated portions during fill and vent operation. Caution should be exercised when filling the surge tank due to potential for CCW pump surge tank overflow when the CCW pump is stopped and the compressed air pockets expand.

! To prevent Chloride infusion if a tube leak exists, the CCW HX Shell side should be filled, vented and pressurized prior to operating SSW OR the CCW HX shell side should be isolated and drained with the drain valves open.

! Starting a second CCW pump or isolation of a large load may increase flow to the vent chillers causing 1-FV-4650A and 1-FV-4650B isolation, if flow remains high for 30 seconds.

! Isolating a large load or several smaller loads concurrently, while running both CCW pumps, may spike system pressure enough to cause lifting of relief valves in the affected loop.

! The Unit 1 and Unit 2 CCW supply and return isolation valves to all common equipment are required to be LOCKED CLOSED per OWI-103 and the valve lineups for this procedure. To provide cooling to a common piece of equipment the applicable Unit (1 OR 2) CCW isolation valves may be deviated with the Shift Manager's permission.

! Both units CCW Surge Tanks should be monitored during system draining.

Page 3 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S8 Procedure CPSES UNIT 1 and PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL COMMON SOP-502A COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM REVISION NO. 18 PAGE 8 OF 176 3.0 PRECAUTIONS (continued)

! The Reactor Coolant Pump Upper Bearing Lube Oil Coolers should be drained and dried when non-flowing water is expected to remain in the coolers for periods longer than two months, as this can be detrimental to the tubing material. Instructions to drain and dry the Reactor Coolant Pump Upper Bearing Lube Oil Coolers are contained in a subsection of Section 5.5, Draining.

! Containment penetrations MV-0003 and MV-0004 are used for CCW flow to the RCDT and Excess Letdown heat exchangers. Thermal relief protection of these penetrations is provided through locked open valves 1CC-0610, 1CC-0613, 1CC-0616, and 1CC-0619.

4.0 LIMITATIONS AND NOTES 4.1 Limitations

! CCW Pump bearing temperature exceeding 200°F requires the CCW Pump be stopped.

! Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 (TS 3.7.7)

! Flow rates on the CCW System of 17,500 gpm per CCW pump should not be exceeded.

! A CCW Pump Motor may have two (2) starting attempts from ambient temperature. At least a 45 minute standing period should be observed between any additional attempts.

! A CCW Pump motor may have one (1) immediate restart attempt from operating temperature. At least a 15 minute running period should be observed between any additional restart attempts.

! Normal flow rates for CCW supplied loads are listed in Attachment 1, Normal CCW Flows.

! CCW System relief valves are listed in Attachment 2, CCW Relief Valves.

! The maximum flow rate for CCW flow through the CCW Filter Demineralizer Skid is 80 gpm.

CCW flow through the skid is controlled at approximately 50 gpm in accordance with COP-502A, "Component Cooling Water."

! CCW supply should not be isolated to operating equipment.

! The RHR and Containment Spray Heat Exchanger supply manual butterfly valves (flow restricting orifices) are normally locked closed to provided acceptable CCW flow balancing for Design Basis Accidents to limit heat addition to CCW. These valves are not required to be opened to mitigate a Design Basis Accident (e.g. LOCA); however, they may be opened to accelerate cooldown after accident heat loads have sufficiently decayed if desired and if the valve locations are accessible. Therefore, 1CC-0109 and 1CC-0157, which are closed to provide a flow limiting function in MODES 1, 2 and 3, may be opened in MODE 3, at or below 400 °F, as needed to support RHR cooldown in MODE 4, 5 and 6. Manual Valves 1CC-0107 and 1CC-0158, which provide a flow limiting function in MODES 1, 2 and 3 may be open in MODE 4, 5, and 6.

4.2 Notes None Page 4 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S8 Procedure CPSES UNIT 1 and PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL COMMON SOP-502A COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM REVISION NO. 18 PAGE 14 OF 176 5.2 Normal Operation 5.2.1 Operating CCW Pumps This section describes the steps to start up a standby CCW Pump for alternating or dual pump operation and place a running CCW pump in standby as required.

5.2.1.1 Starting a Standby CCW Pump During Normal Operation.

NOTE: Starting a CCW Pump will automatically start the following equipment, if their control switches are in AUTO:

! Associated CCW Pump room fan cooler

! Associated SSW Pump

! Associated Safety Chilled Water Recirc Pump A. Ensure the Station Service Water Pump, associated with the CCW Pump to be started is operating.

Q  ! SSWP 1 Q  ! SSWP 2 B. Ensure the oil level in the bearing housings are normal.

Q  ! CCWP 1 Q  ! CCWP 2 Page 5 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S8 Procedure CPSES UNIT 1 and PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL COMMON SOP-502A COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM REVISION NO. 18 PAGE 15 OF 176 NOTE:  ! The following step may be required to limit CCW System pressure and prevent relief valve operation when two CCW Pumps are running.

! Low flow alarms are provided for both CT & RHR Heat Exchanger flow. These alarms may or may not occur as flow is started and stopped, dependent on time spent at or near the flow setpoint. This is a normal occurrence.

5.2.1.1 C. IF CCW heat load is low, THEN additional CCW flow should be established through the CS HX or RHR HX prior to starting the second pump.

TRAIN A Q  ! 1-HS-4574, CS HX 1 CCW RET VLV Q  ! 1-HS-4572, RHR HX 1 CCW RET VLV TRAIN B Q  ! 1-HS-4575, CS HX 2 CCW RET VLV Q  ! 1-HS-4573, RHR HX 2 CCW RET VLV NOTE: The following indications are available on the Plant computer.

ALARM T2740A CCWP 1 INBD RDL BRG TEMP 185°F T2741A CCWP 1 OUTBD RDL BRG TEMP 185°F T2742A CCWP 1 ACTIVE FACE THR BRG TEMP 185°F T2744A CCWP 1 MOT INBD BRG TEMP 185°F T2745A CCWP 1 MOT OUTBD BRG TEMP 185°F T2746A CCWP 1 MOT STAT PHASE A TEMP 236°F T2747A CCWP 1 MOT STAT PHASE B TEMP 236°F T2748A CCWP 1 MOT STAT PHASE C TEMP 236°F T2760A CCWP 2 INBD RDL BRG TEMP 185°F T2761A CCWP 2 OUTBD RDL BRG TEMP 185°F T2762A CCWP 2 ACTIVE FACE THR BRG TEMP 185°F T2764A CCWP 2 MOT INBD BRG TEMP 185°F T2765A CCWP 2 MOT OUTBD BRG TEMP 185°F T2766A CCWP 2 MOT STAT PHASE A TEMP 236°F T2767A CCWP 2 MOT STAT PHASE B TEMP 236°F T2768A CCWP 2 MOT STAT PHASE C TEMP 236°F D. Start the idle CCW Pump.

Q  ! 1-HS-4518A, CCWP 1 Q  ! 1-HS-4519A, CCWP 2 Page 6 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S8 Procedure CPSES UNIT 1 and PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL COMMON SOP-502A COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM REVISION NO. 18 PAGE 16 OF 176 NOTE: Low flow alarms are provided for both CT & RHR Heat Exchanger flow. These alarms may or may not occur as flow is started and stopped, dependent on time spent at or near the flow setpoint. This is a normal occurrence.

5.2.1.1 E. IF the CCW PUMPS are being alternated for their bi-weekly rotation per OWI-409 EQUIPMENT ROTATION PROGRAM, THEN momentarily initiate flow through each RHR and CS heat exchanger while BOTH pumps are in service.

TRAIN A Q  ! 1-HS-4574, CS HX 1 CCW RET VLV Q  ! 1-HS-4572, RHR HX 1 CCW RET VLV TRAIN B Q  ! 1-HS-4575, CS HX 2 CCW RET VLV Q  ! 1-HS-4573, RHR HX 2 CCW RET VLV COMMENTS:

Page 7 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S8 Procedure CPSES UNIT 1 and PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL COMMON SOP-502A COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM REVISION NO. 18 PAGE 33 OF 176 5.3.2 Removal / Restoration of Train A Safeguards Loop from Service These sections describe the steps to isolate Train A Safeguards Loop of CCW, AND to restore the Loop to service.

5.3.2.1 Removal of Train A Safeguards Loop from Service (Train A CCW Pump OPERATING OR SHUTDOWN)

This section describes the steps to isolate Train A Safeguards Loop of CCW. This section allows the loop to be isolated with the CCW Pump in operation, or with the CCW Pump shutdown.

Q A. Notify Chemistry that CCW system alignment changes may require adjustment to the CCW hydrazine injection rate per COP-502A.

B. IF Train A CCW Pump is to be stopped, THEN ensure the following equipment has been removed from service OR supplied by Unit 2 where applicable:

Q  ! RHR Pump 1-01 Q  ! CS Pump 1-01 Q  ! CS Pump 1-03 Q  ! Safety Chiller 1-05 Q  ! UPS A\C X-01 Q  ! Control Room A\C Unit X-01 Q  ! Control Room A\C Unit X-02 Q C. IF Train B is to be placed in service, THEN Start Train B CCW Pump per Section 5.2.1.

CAUTION: To prevent Chloride infusion if a tube leak exists, the CCW HX shell side should be filled, vented and pressurized OR the CCW HX should be isolated and drained within 30 minutes of depressurizing the safeguard loop. To meet the intent of this CAUTION, CCW pressure should be greater than SSW pressure to prevent lake water from leaking into CCW.

D. IF the Train A CCW Pump is to be stopped, THEN perform the following:

Q 1) Stop Train A CCW Pump 1-HS-4518A, CCWP 1, AND place the handswitch in PULL OUT.

Q 2) Isolate Service Water flow to the Train A CCW Heat Exchanger per SOP-501A, Station Service Water System OR prepare to isolate and drain the CCW shell side of the CCW heat exchanger.

Page 8 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S8 Procedure CPSES UNIT 1 and PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL COMMON SOP-502A COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM REVISION NO. 18 PAGE 34 OF 176 5.3.2.1 D 3) Close the following to isolate Train A Safeguards Loop:

Q! 1-HS-4514, SFGD LOOP CCW SPLY VLV Q! 1-HS-4512, SFGD LOOP CCW RET VLV Q! 1-HS-4536, CCWP 1 RECIRC VLV

4) IF the CCW heat exchanger is depressurized AND SSW flow is aligned to the heat exchanger, THEN perform the following:

Q! Isolate the CCW shell side of the heat exchanger, AND Open and Tag the CCW drain valve(s).

Q! Tag Train A CCW Pump 1-HS-4518A, CCWP 1, handswitch.

E. IF Train A CCW Pump is to continue operation with the loops isolated, THEN perform the following:

CAUTION: For continued operation with the safeguards loop isolated a flowpath through the RHR or CS Heat Exchangers should be established to provide adequate flow to the CCW heat exchanger for heat transfer and to provide for CCW Pump protection.

1) Throttle Open the return valve for the heat exchanger to establish a safeguards loop flowpath through the RHR or CS HX.

Q! 1-HS-4572, RHR HX 1 CCW RET VLV Q! 1-HS-4574, CS HX 1 CCW RET VLV

2) Close the following to isolate Train A Safeguards Loop:

Q! 1-HS-4514, SFGD LOOP CCW SPLY VLV Q! 1-HS-4512, SFGD LOOP CCW RET VLV NOTE: 1-HS-4536, CCWP 1 RECIRC VLV should open on low CCW heat exchanger outlet flow of approximately < 8,200 gpm with the CCW Pump breaker closed.

Q 3) Verify proper operation of 1-HS-4536, CCWP 1 RECIRC VLV.

Page 9 of 10 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM S8 Procedure CPSES UNIT 1 and PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL COMMON SOP-502A COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM REVISION NO. 18 PAGE 35 OF 176 NOTE: Isolating the Train A Safeguards Loop may cause an alarm at the PC-11 console for 1-RE-4509 (CCW167) due to OPERATE FAILURE - LOSS OF SAMPLE FLOW.

5.3.2.1 F. IF desired to remove 1-RE-4509, UNIT 1 COMPONENT COOLING WATER TRAIN A SFGD LOOP RADIATION DETECTOR from service, THEN perform the following:

Q 1) IF desired, initiate LCOAR for ODCM 3.3.3.4.

Q 2) At the PC-11 console, place CCW167 (1-RE-4509) in OFF.

COMMENTS:

Page 10 of 10 Rev e

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC P-1-U1 Task #AO3005 K/A #039.A2.01 3.1 / 3.2 SF-4S

Title:

Locally Control Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: X Classroom:

Actual Performance: Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant: X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • A Loss of Instrument Air has occurred on Unit 1.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • LOCALLY CONTROL the Unit 1 Atmospheric Relief Valve on Steam Generator 1-03 per ABN-301, Instrument Air Malfunction, Attachment 11, Local Control of SG Atmospheric Relief Valves.

Task Standard: Locally control the Atmospheric Relief Valve on a Steam Generator during Loss of Instrument Air per ABN-301.

Required Materials: ABN-301, Instrument Air Malfunction, Rev. 11-7.

Validation Time: 10 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-1-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 PLANT SETUP EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

  • ABN-301, Instrument Air Malfunction, Attachment 11, Local Control of SG Atmospheric Relief Valves, OR
  • Posted Job Aid PLR 2008-0040 for Local Control of SG Atmospheric Relief Valves.

EXAMINER NOTE:

  • This JPM MUST be performed on Unit 1.

Page 2 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-1-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: Remind examinee to simulate all actions.

Examiner Note: The Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve is located in the Safeguards Building 881 Room 1-109. Job Aid is posted on wall.

Examiner Note: Unit 1 handwheels are blue.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from ABN-301, Attachment 11.

Perform Step: 1 Locally close selected Steam Generator Relief Valve upstream rd

1) & 3 bullet isolations:
  • uMS-0098-R0, SG u-03 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV RMT OPER Standard: CLOSED 1MS-0098-R0, SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV RMT OPER by TURNING handwheel in the CLOCKWISE direction.

Examiner Cue: The valve is CLOSED.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Perform the following to manually control selected ARV.

2) & 2)a
  • Open actuator cylinder bypass valve.

Standard: OPENED black handled Actuator Cylinder Bypass Valve located on right-hand side of Actuator.

Examiner Cue: The valve turned 90°.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Perform the following to manually control selected ARV.

2) & 2)b
  • Place Bailey positioner by-pass valve in MANUAL (push in to turn).

Standard: PUSHED IN and TURNED Bailey Positioner Bypass Valve to PLACE in MANUAL.

Examiner Cue: The valve is pushed in and turned to position.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-1-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 4 Perform the following to manually control selected ARV.

2) & 2)c
  • Unscrew coupling (located on top of screw shaft) to access upper stem.

Standard: UNSCREWED coupling on top of screw shaft to access upper stem.

Examiner Cue: The coupling is UNSCREWED.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Perform the following to manually control selected ARV.

2) & 2)d
  • Rotate handwheel in closed direction to lower screw shaft until upper stem exposed sufficient to engage coupling (CCW to close UNIT 1 ONLY ) (CW to close UNIT 2 ONLY).

Standard: ROTATED the blue handwheel COUNTERCLOCKWISE to lower screw shaft until upper stem exposed sufficient to engage coupling.

Examiner Cue: The stem is EXPOSED.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 Perform the following to manually control selected ARV.

2) & 2)e
  • Completely insert fork of coupling into groove to secure positive control.

Standard: INSERTED fork of coupling into groove to secure positive control.

Examiner Cue: The fork is INSERTED in the coupling.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Perform the following to manually control selected ARV.

2) & 2)f
  • Open valve approximately 50% OR as directed by Shift Manager or Unit Supervisor.

Standard: CONTACTED the Control Room to DETERMINE required valve position.

Examiner Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to OPEN the valve 50%.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-1-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 8 Perform the following to manually control selected ARV.

2) & 2)f
  • Open valve approximately 50% OR as directed by Shift Manager or Unit Supervisor.

Standard: ROTATED the blue handwheel on top of the ARV until the valve position indicator on the stem reads ~50% OPEN.

Examiner Cue: The valve is 50% OPEN. Open the isolation valve 5%.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The examinee may refer to a posted Job Aid.

Perform Step: 9 Locally slowly throttle open selected Steam Generator Relief Valve rd

3) & 3 bullet upstream isolations:
  • uMS-0098-R0, SG u-03 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV RMT OPER Standard: Slowly THROTTLED OPEN 1MS-0098-R0, SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV RMT OPER in CLOCKWISE direction to 5% OPEN position.

Terminating Cue: The valve is 5% OPEN. This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-1-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • A Loss of Instrument Air has occurred on Unit 1.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • LOCALLY CONTROL the Unit 1 Atmospheric Relief Valve on Steam Generator 1-03 per ABN-301, Instrument Air Malfunction, Attachment 11, Local Control of SG Atmospheric Relief Valves.

Page 6 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-1-U1 Rev e.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P1 Unit 1 & 2 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-301 INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 11 PAGE 115 OF 118

[L] ATTACHMENT 11 PAGE 1 OF 1 LOCAL CONTROL OF SG ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES CAUTION: When locally operating SG ARVs, observe the following safety precautions:

! Eye protection - REQUIRED (preferably goggles)

! Hearing protection - REQUIRED

! Valve position changes shall be performed slowly to limit steam flow into room.

1) Locally close selected Steam Generator Relief Valve upstream isolations (SFGD 881' Rm u-109):

! uMS-0026-R0, SG u-01 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV RMT OPER

! uMS-0063-R0, SG u-02 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV RMT OPER

! uMS-0098-R0, SG u-03 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV RMT OPER

! uMS-0134-R0, SG u-04 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV RMT OPER

2) Perform the following to manually control selected ARV.
a. Open actuator cylinder bypass valve.
b. Place Bailey positioner by-pass valve in MANUAL (push in to turn).
c. Unscrew coupling (located on top of screw shaft) to access upper stem.
d. Rotate handwheel in closed direction to lower screw shaft until upper stem exposed sufficient to engage coupling (CCW to close UNIT 1 ONLY ) ( CW to close UNIT 2 ONLY).
e. Completely insert fork of coupling into groove to secure positive control.
f. Open valve approximately 50% OR as directed by Shift Manager or Unit Supervisor.
3) Locally slowly throttle open selected Steam Generator Relief Valve upstream isolations:

! uMS-0026-R0, SG u-01 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV RMT OPER

! uMS-0063-R0, SG u-02 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV RMT OPER

! uMS-0098-R0, SG u-03 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV RMT OPER

! uMS-0134-R0, SG u-04 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV RMT OPER Attachment 11 Page 1 of 1 Rev e

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC P-2-U1 Task #RO1120 K/A #037.AA1.04 3.6 / 3.9 SF-7

Title:

Restore Condenser Off Gas Radiation Detector Dryer Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: X Classroom:

Actual Performance: Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant: X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is in MODE 1.
  • 1-HS-2959, Condenser Off-Gas Monitor Vacuum Sample Pump Control handswitch is in OFF.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • RESTORE the Unit 1 Condenser Off Gas Radiation Detector Dryer per SOP-309A, Condenser Vacuum and Water Box Priming System, Section 5.3.4, Bypassing/Restoring Condenser Off Gas Radiation Detector 2959 Dryer.

Task Standard: Restore the Condenser Off Gas Radiation Detector 2959 Dryer to service per SOP-309A.

Required Materials: SOP-309A, Condenser Vacuum and Water Box Priming System, Rev. 20-2.

Validation Time: 6 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-2-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 PLANT SETUP EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

  • SOP-309A, Condenser Vacuum and Water Box Priming System for Unit 1.
  • Section 5.3.4, Bypassing/Restoring Condenser Off Gas Radiation Detector 2959 Dryer.

EXAMINER NOTE:

  • This JPM MUST be performed on Unit 1.

Page 2 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-2-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: Remind examinee to simulate all actions.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-309A, Step 5.3.4.

Perform Step: 1 Restore the Air Dryer by OPENING the following valves:

5.3.4.B.1) & 1st bullet

  • 1CV-0275, U1 CNDSR OFF GAS RAD DET 2959 DRYER INLET VLV.

Standard: ROTATED 1CV-0275, U1 CNDSR Off Gas Rad Det 2959 Dryer Inlet VLV 90° COUNTERCLOCKWISE to OPEN position.

Examiner Cue: Valve is rotated 90° counterclockwise.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Restore the Air Dryer by OPENING the following valves:

5.3.4.B.1) & 2nd bullet

  • 1CV-0276, U1 CNDSR OFF GAS RAD DET 2959 DRYER OUTLET VLV.

Standard: ROTATED 1CV-0276, U1 CNDSR Off Gas Rad Det 2959 Dryer Outlet VLV 90° COUNTERCLOCKWISE to OPEN position.

Examiner Cue: Valve is rotated 90° counterclockwise.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 CLOSE the following valves:

5.3.4.B.2) & 1st bullet

  • 1CV-0277, U1 CNDSR OFF GAS RAD DET 2959 DRYER BY-PASS VLV.

Standard: ROTATED 1CV-0277, U1 CNDSR Off Gas Rad Det 2959 Dryer By-Pass VLV 90° CLOCKWISE to CLOSE position.

Examiner Cue: Valve is rotated 90° clockwise.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 CLOSE the following valves:

5.3.4.B.2) & 2nd bullet

  • 1CV-0279, U1 CNDSR OFF GAS DRYER BY-PASS FLOAT DRAIN VALVE ISOLATION VALVE Standard: ROTATED 1CV-0279, U1 CNDSR Off Gas Dryer By-Pass Float Drain Valve Isolation Valve 90° CLOCKWISE to CLOSE position.

Examiner Cue: Valve is rotated 90° clockwise.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-2-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 5 Ensure 1-HS-2959, CONDENSER OFF-GAS MONITOR VACUUM 5.3.4.B.3) SAMPLE PUMP CONTROL HAND SWITCH, is in AUTO.

Standard: ROTATED 1-HS-2959, Condenser Off-Gas Monitor Vacuum Sample Pump Control handswitch to AUTO position.

Examiner Cue: Handswitch is in AUTO.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 Verify COG182 at PC-11 is indicating AND green.

5.3.4.B.4)

Standard: CONTACTED the Control Room to VERIFY that COG182 at PC-11 is indicating and green.

Terminating Cue: COG182 at PC-11 is indicating and green. This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 4 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-2-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is in MODE 1.
  • 1-HS-2959, Condenser Off-Gas Monitor Vacuum Sample Pump Control handswitch is in OFF.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • RESTORE the Unit 1 Condenser Off Gas Radiation Detector Dryer per SOP-309A, Condenser Vacuum and Water Box Priming System, Section 5.3.4, Bypassing/Restoring Condenser Off Gas Radiation Detector 2959 Dryer.

Page 5 of 5 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-2-U1 Rev e.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P2 Unit 1 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-309A CONDENSER VACUUM AND WATERBOX PRIMING SYSTEM REVISION NO. 20 PAGE 27 OF 41 5.3.4 Bypassing/Restoring Condenser Off Gas Radiation Detector 2959 Dryer This section describes the steps to by-pass and restore CP1-CVDYRE-01, Condenser Off Gas Radiation Detector 2959 Dryer. The sample may be routed through the by-pass until the dryer is back in service. The by-pass line and associated valves, coalescing filter and drain system will provide an alternate route in the case where the dryer is unavailable.

NOTE:  ! This bypass system will provide some moisture removal but is not expected to serve the radiation monitor with the driest air possible; therefore, when this system is placed in service, Operations and Chemistry personnel must be aware of the limitations of the monitor since it may not be operating at its highest efficiency.

! 1-RE-2959, UNIT 1 CONDENSER OFF GAS RADIATION DETECTOR is designed to detect primary-to-secondary leakage continuously at rates of 30 gpd or less and is identified in ODA-308 as a component subject to the Systems Important to Safety Log (SISL).

! STA-732 requires Chemistry to collect grab samples to support leakage detection when ANY Steam Generator Leak Rate Monitor AND the Condenser Off-Gas Monitor are determined to be unavailable for detecting primary-to-secondary leak rates less than or equal to 30 gpd.

! When CP1-CVDYRE-01, CONDENSER OFF GAS RADIATION DETECTOR 2959 VACUUM PUMP AIR DRYER 1-01 is bypassed, moisture condensation may accumulate and affect the ability of 1-RE-2959 to accurately detect primary-to-secondary leak rates less than or equal to 30 gpd.

! Several of the following steps require an Equipment Operator to be dispatched to CP1-CVDYRE-01, U1 TB 803 MEZZANINE FLOOR.

A. Bypassing CP1-CVDYRE-01 WHEN it is desired to bypass CP1-CVDYRE-01, THEN perform the following:

1) OPEN the following valves:

Q  ! 1CV-0277, U1 CNDSR OFF GAS RAD DET 2959 DRYER BY-PASS VLV Q  ! 1CV-0279, U1 CNDSR OFF GAS DRYER BY-PASS FLOAT DRAIN VALVE ISOLATION VALVE

2) Isolate the Air Dryer by CLOSING the following valves:

Q  ! 1CV-0275, U1 CNDSR OFF GAS RAD DET 2959 DRYER INLET VLV Q  ! 1CV-0276, U1 CNDSR OFF GAS RAD DET 2959 DRYER OUTLET VLV Page 1 of 2 Rev e

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P2 Unit 1 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-309A CONDENSER VACUUM AND WATERBOX PRIMING SYSTEM REVISION NO. 20 PAGE 28 OF 41 5.3.4 A.

NOTE: In the next step, placing 1-HS-2959 in OFF will make 1-RE-2959 incapable of detecting primary-to-secondary leak rates less than or equal to 30 gpd . Refer to ODA-308-31.

Q 3) IF desired, THEN place 1-HS-2959, CONDENSER OFF-GAS MONITOR VACUUM SAMPLE PUMP CONTROL HAND SWITCH in OFF.

B. Restoring CP1-CVDYRE-01 to Service NOTE: Moisture accumulation may impede monitor sample flow. IF necessary, contact PROMPT Team to drain the system including the suction and discharge side of the Monitor Vacuum Pump, and the coalescing filter bypass rack.

WHEN it is desired to restore CP1-CVDYRE-01 from bypass, THEN perform the following:

1) Restore the Air Dryer by OPENING the following valves:

Q  ! 1CV-0275, U1 CNDSR OFF GAS RAD DET 2959 DRYER INLET VLV.

Q  ! 1CV-0276, U1 CNDSR OFF GAS RAD DET 2959 DRYER OUTLET VLV.

2) CLOSE the following valves:

Q  ! 1CV-0277, U1 CNDSR OFF GAS RAD DET 2959 DRYER BY-PASS VLV.

Q  ! 1CV-0279, U1 CNDSR OFF GAS DRYER BY-PASS FLOAT DRAIN VALVE ISOLATION VALVE.

Q 3) Ensure 1-HS-2959, CONDENSER OFF-GAS MONITOR VACUUM SAMPLE PUMP CONTROL HAND SWITCH, is in AUTO.

Q 4) Verify COG182 at PC-11 is indicating AND green.

COMMENTS:

Page 2 of 2 Rev e

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC P-3-U1 Task #RO4405 K/A #086.A1.05 2.9 / 3.1 SF-8

Title:

Respond to Fire in Service Water Intake Structure Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: X Classroom:

Actual Performance: Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant: X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is in MODE 5.
  • A fire in the Unit 1 Service Water Intake Structure is in progress.

Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • ALIGN the alternate power supply to the Unit 1 Train B Residual Heat Removal Pump Hot Leg Recirculation Isolation Valve per ABN-808A, Response to Fire in Service Water Intake Structure, Attachment 2, Alternate Power Supply Hookup for 1-8701B.

Task Standard: Align the alternate power supply to the Train B Residual Heat Removal Pump Hot Leg Recirculation Isolation Valve per ABN-808A.

Required Materials: ABN-808A, Response to Fire in Service Water Intake Structure, Rev. 5.

Validation Time: 14 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-3-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 PLANT SETUP EXAMINER:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

  • ABN-808A, Response to Fire in Service Water Intake Structure for Unit 1.
  • Attachment 2, Alternate Power Supply Hookup for 1-8701B.

EXAMINER NOTE:

  • This JPM MUST be performed on Unit 1.

Page 2 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-3-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: Remind examinee to simulate all actions.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from ABN-808A, Attachment 2.

Examiner Note: Breakers are located in Safeguards Building 852', Room 1-103 on Motor Control Center 1-EB4.

Perform Step: 1 Open the following breakers:

st 1 & 1 bullet

  • 1EB4-2/1M/BKR-1 & 2, RHR PUMP 1-02 HOT LEG 1-04 RECIRC PMP ISOL VLV 8701B ALT MOT BKR-1 & 2 (SFGD 852 Rm 1-103)

Standard: TURNED both breakers 1EB4-2/1M/BKR-1 and 1EB4-2/1M/BKR-2 to OFF position.

Examiner Cue: Breakers are in OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Breakers are located in Safeguards Building 810', Room 1-083 on Motor Control Center 1-EB3.

Perform Step: 2 Open the following breakers:

nd 1 & 2 bullet

  • 1EB3-2/9M/BKR-1 &2, RHR PMP 1-02 HL 1-04 RECIRC OMB ISOL VLV 1-8701B PREF MOTOR BREAKER-1 & 2 (SFGD 810 Rm 1-083)

Standard: TURNED both breakers 1EB3-2/9M/BKR-1 and 1EB3-2/9M/BKR-2 to OFF position.

Examiner Cue: Breakers are in OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Cable box is located in Safeguards Building 810', Room 1-083 on the outer Containment wall.

Perform Step: 3 Disconnect the following control cables from their connectors in JB1S-2 & 1st bullet 12290 (SFGD 810 Rm 1-083 on the outer containment wall):

  • Cable EO122920A from connector C-1-8701B-CN Standard: UNSCREWED Cable EO122920A from connector C-1-8701B-CN.

Examiner Cue: Cable is unscrewed.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-3-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 4 Disconnect the following control cables from their connectors in JB1S-2 & 2nd bullet 12290 (SFGD 810 Rm 1-083 on the outer containment wall):

  • Cable EO100806A from connector C-1-8701B-PN Standard: UNSCREWED Cable EO100806A from connector C-1-8701B-PN.

Examiner Cue: Cable is unscrewed.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Cables are routed through the connector box then plugged in.

Perform Step: 5 Route cables to JB1S-1230G via JB1S-12280.

3 Standard: ROUTED cables to JB1S-1230G via JB1S-12280.

Examiner Cue: Cables are routed through the connector box.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 Plug cables into their respective connectors at JB1S-1230G:

4 & 1st bullet

  • EO122920A into connector C-1-8701B-CA Standard: PLUGGED cable EO122920A into connector C-1-8701B-CA.

Examiner Cue: Cable is plugged in.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Plug cables into their respective connectors at JB1S-1230G:

4 & 2nd bullet

  • EO100806A into connector C-1-8701B-PA Standard: PLUGGED cable EO100806A into connector C-1-8701B-PA.

Examiner Cue: Cable is plugged in.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-3-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 8 Close 1EB4-2/1M/BKR-1 & 2.

5 Standard: TURNED both breakers 1EB4-2/1M/BKR-1 and 1EB4-2/1M/BKR-2 to ON position and OBSERVED green CLOSE light lit.

Terminating Cue: Breakers are ON and green CLOSE light is lit. This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-3-U1 Rev e.doc

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

  • Unit 1 is in MODE 5.
  • A fire in the Unit 1 Service Water Intake Structure is in progress.

INITIATING CUE: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

  • ALIGN the alternate power supply to the Unit 1 Train B Residual Heat Removal Pump Hot Leg Recirculation Isolation Valve per ABN-808A, Response to Fire in Service Water Intake Structure, Attachment 2, Alternate Power Supply Hookup for 1-8701B.

Page 6 of 6 CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P-3-U1 Rev e.doc

CPNPP NRC 2011 JPM P3 Unit 1 Procedure CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 ABN-808A RESPONSE TO FIRE IN SERVICE WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE REVISION NO. 5 PAGE 14 OF 15 ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 1 OF 1 ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY HOOKUP FOR 1-8701B

1. Open the following breakers:

Q  ! 1EB4-2/1M/BKR-1 & 2, RHR PUMP 1-02 HOT LEG 1-04 RECIRC PMP ISOL VLV 8701B ALT MOT BKR-1 & 2 (SFGD 852 Rm 1-103)

Q  ! 1EB3-2/9M/BKR-1 &2, RHR PMP 1-02 HL 1-04 RECIRC OMB ISOL VLV 1-8701B PREF MOTOR BREAKER-1 & 2 (SFGD 810 Rm 1-083)

Q 2. Disconnect the following control cables from their connectors in JB1S-12290/ (SFGD 810 Rm 1-083 on the outer containment wall):

! Cable EO122920A from connector C-1-8701B-CN

! Cable EO100806A from connector C-1-8701B-PN Q 3. Route cables to JB1S-1230G via JB1S-1228 0\

Q 4. Plug cables into their respective connectors at JB1S-1230G:

! EO122920A into connector C-1-8701B-CA

! EO100806A into connector C-1-8701B-PA CAUTION: All RHR suction valve interlocks are bypassed when the valve is operated from the MCC or locally. Proper operating sequence of RHR suction valves is critical to prevent aligning RHR to the RCS without isolating the RWST.

Q 5. Close 1EB4-2/1M/BKR-1 & 2.

Q 6. Operate 1-8701B as required from 1EB4-2/1M/BKR. Valve position indication and handswitch are located on Breaker.

Attachment 2 Page 1 of 1 Rev e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: June 2011 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

  • 100% power MOL - RCS Boron is 908 ppm (by sample).

Turnover: Maintain steady-state power conditions.

Critical Tasks:

  • Manually Initiate Safety Injection due to Failure to Automatically Actuate Prior to Exiting EOP-0.0A.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 RP05B I (RO, SRO) Reactor Coolant System Loop 2 TCOLD Instrument (TI-421A) Fails

+10 min TS (SRO) High.

2 ED07B C (RO, BOP, SRO) Loss of Protection Bus IV1PC2.

+30 min TS (SRO) 3 TU04 R (RO) Main Turbine Bearing Vibration at 10.5 mils (180 second ramp).

+50 min N (BOP, SRO) Power Reduction to Lower Main Turbine Vibration.

4 MS02 M (RO, BOP, SRO) Main Steam Header Leak Outside Containment (300 second ramp).

+55 min 5 RP07A I (RO) Safety Injection Trains A and B Fail to Automatically Actuate.

+55 min RP07B 6 RP08B I (BOP) Manual Safety Injection Train B Failure at CB-07.

+55 min 7 MS08C C (RO) Steam Generator (1-03) Main Steam Isolation Valve (HV-2335A)

+55 min Fails to Close.

8 RH01C C (BOP) Residual Heat Removal Pump (1-01) Auto Start Failure on Safety

+60 min Injection Signal.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 8 Total malfunctions (5-8) 4 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #1 The crew will assume the watch at 100% power with no scheduled activities per IPO-003A, Power Operations.

The first event it is a high failure of TCOLD Temperature Instrument, TI-421A. Operator actions are per ABN-704, TC/N-16 Instrumentation Malfunction, and require stopping Control Rod motion and stabilizing Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature and Pressurizer level. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

The next event is a Loss of Protection Bus IV1PC2. Crew actions are per ABN-603, Loss of a Protection or Instrument Bus, and include stabilizing the plant, restoring an alternate power source, and verification of instrument restoration. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

The next event is initiated with Main Turbine high vibration. The crew enters ABN-401, Main Turbine Malfunction, which will require reducing load to 900 MWe. When the crew commences reducing load, Main Turbine vibration will improve over a 10 minute period.

When Main Turbine vibration is restored to normal, a Main Steam header leak will ramp in over 300 seconds. The crew should recognize the requirement to manually trip the Reactor. The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. While performing the actions of EOP-0.0A, the RO will attempt to manually initiate both Trains of Safety Injection at CB-07; however, this task will be completed by the BOP at CB-02.

While performing actions in EOP-0.0A, the crew should recognize lowering Main Steam pressure with an associated Main Steam Isolation Signal. Steam Generator 1-03 Main Steam Isolation Valve HV-2335A will fail to automatically or manually close. The crew will transition from EOP-0.0A to EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator. When the Faulted Steam Generator (1-03) has been isolated, entry into EOS-1.1A, Terminate Safety Injection, is performed.

The scenario is includes a Residual Heat Removal Pump that fails to start upon initiation of the Safety Injection Sequencer. This scenario is terminated when the Faulted Steam Generator is isolated and the crew secures High Head Safety Injection.

Risk Significance:

  • Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Loss of Inverter IV1PC2
  • Risk significant operator actions: Restore Power to Protection Bus 1PC2 Manually Initiate Safety Injection Manually Start RHR Pump Isolate Faulted Steam Generator CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #18 and Event File for NRC Scenario #1.

EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATING VALUE PARAMETER SETUP RP07A/B Safety Injection Train A/B actuation failure OFF K0 RP08B Manual SI Train B actuation failure at CB-07 OFF K0 MS08C SG (1-03) MSIV (HV-2335A) fails to close OPEN K0 RH01C RHR Pump (1-01) auto start failure on SI signal - K0 CS02E CS Pump (1-01) auto start failure on SI signal - K0 1 RP05B Loop 2 Tcold NR Instrument (TE-421A) failure 630ºF K1 2 ED07B Loss of Inverter IV1PC2 TRIP K2 2 EDR02 Restore Inverter IV1PC2 power ALT K10 3 TU04 Main Turbine bearing vibration at 10.5 mils 10.5 mils K3 Power reduction (NOTE 1) total (180 sec. ramp)

NOTE 1: When load reduction is initiated, RAMP TU04 to 4 mils over 600 seconds.

4 MS02 Main Steam header leak 4E7 lbm/hr K4 (300 sec. ramp) 5 RP07A/B Safety Injection Train A/B actuation failure OFF K0 6 RP08B Manual SI Train B actuation failure at CB-07 OFF K0 7 MS08C SG (1-03) MSIV (HV-2335A) fails to close OPEN K0 (NOTE 2)

NOTE 2: When directed to locally close valve, DELETE malfunction MS08C.

8 RH01C RHR Pump (1-01) auto start failure on SI signal - K0 CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #18 and NRC Scenario #1 SETUP file.

ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.

ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.

ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD.

ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:

- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.

ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps.

Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 5 of 22 Event

Description:

Loop 2 TCOLD Temperature Instrument Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1.

- RP05B, Loop #2 Tcold NR temperature instrument (TI-421A) fails high.

Indications Available:

5C-1.5 - ANY N16 DEV HI / LO 5C-2.5 - 1 OF 4 OT N16 HI 5C-2.6 - 1 OF 4 OP N16 HI (comes in then clears) 5C-3.5 - ANY TAVE DEV HI / LO 6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE TREF DEV 6D-2.10 - AVE TAVE HI 6D-2.13 - 1 OF 4 OP N16 ROD STOP & TURB RUNBACK 6D-3.14 - 1 OF 4 OT N16 ROD STOP & TURB RUNBACK 1-TI-421A, CL 2 TEMP (NR) CHAN II indication fails high

+1 min RO/BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO RECOGNIZE Control Rods inserting due to TCOLD failed high.

DIRECT performance of ABN-704, Tc / N-16 Instrumentation Malfunction, US Section 2.0.

RO PLACE 1/1-RBSS Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.

RO SELECT LOOP 2 on 1-TS-412T, TAVE Channel Defeat.

RO/BOP VERIFY Steam Dump System is NOT actuated and NOT armed.

Examiner Note: Crew will withdraw rods to 215 steps in 5 step increments to restore TAVE.

RO RESTORE TAVE to within 1ºF of TREF.

RO SELECT LOOP 2 on 1/1-JS-411E, N16 Power Channel Defeat.

ENSURE a valid N16 channel supplying recorder on 1/1-TS-411E, 1-TR-411 RO CHAN SELECT.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 6 of 22 Event

Description:

Loop 2 TCOLD Temperature Instrument Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY Steam Dump System is NOT armed by OBSERVING PCIP-3.4 RO/BOP alarm - DARK.

US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

+10 min US INITIATE a work request per STA-606.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 7 of 22 Event

Description:

Loss of Protection Bus IV1PC2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2.

- ED07B, Loss of Protection Bus IV1PC2.

Indications Available:

10B-2.16 - 118V CHAN II INV TRBL 5A-1.3 - RC LOOP 1 1 OF 3 FLO LO 5A-2.3 - RC LOOP 2 1 OF 3 FLO LO 5A-3.3 - RC LOOP 3 1 OF 3 FLO LO 5A-4.3 - RC LOOP 4 1 OF 3 FLO LO Channel 2 Windows on TSLB 1 through 7 and 9 Numerous Other Loss of Protection Bus 1PC2 Alarms

+30 sec RO/BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO/BOP RECOGNIZE loss of Protection Bus 1PC2.

DIRECT performance of ABN-603, Loss of Protection or Instrument Bus, US Section 2.0.

Booth Operator: If contacted, REPORT Inverter failure on 1PC2 with acrid odor in room.

RO/BOP VERIFY Reactor did NOT trip.

US DETERMINE Unit in MODE 1.

RO ENSURE 1/1-RBSS, Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.

Manually CONTROL Steam Generator levels and Main Feed Pumps as BOP necessary to maintain level.

RO Manually CONTROL Charging to maintain Pressurizer level as required.

  • DETERMINE Letdown is isolated.
  • ADJUST 1-HCV-182, Seal Injection Flow as necessary.

RO VERIFY RCP seal injection within normal operating range.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 8 of 22 Event

Description:

Loss of Protection Bus IV1PC2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO VERIFY Pressurizer level control between 25% and 70%.

RO DETERMINE Pressurizer pressure within normal operating range.

DETERMINE Steam Generator levels NOT being controlled between 60%

BOP and 70%.

BOP As necessary, PLACE 1-SK-509A, MFW Pump Master Controller in MANUAL.

PLACE 1-FK-520 and 1-FK-530, SG 1-02 and SG 1-03 Feedwater BOP Regulating Valves in MANUAL and CONTROL Steam Generator level.

RO DETERMINE Loop 2 selected on 1-TS-412T, TAVE CHAN DEFEAT Switch.

RO/BOP DISPATCH an operator to REENERGIZE Protection Bus 1PC2.

Booth Operator: When contacted to reenergize 1PC2, WAIT 2 minutes then PERFORM remote function EDR02 to transfer to the alternate power supply.

BOP RESET C-7, Steam Dump Arming Signal Interlock.

  • PLACE 43/1-SD, Steam Dump Mode Select switch to RESET.

DETERMINE 1-TS-412T, Tave CHAN DEFEAT Switch should remain in US/RO Loop 2 position.

US/RO DETERMINE Control Rod Bank Select Switch should remain in MANUAL.

PLACE 1-FK-520 and 1-FK-530, SG 1-02 and SG 1-03 Feedwater BOP Regulating Valves in AUTO and MONITOR Steam Generator level.

BOP As necessary, PLACE 1-SK-509A, MFW Pump Master Controller in AUTO.

RESET Power Range Flux Rate Mode Selector on Drawer N-42A and RO VERIFY Positive Rate Mode alarm light off.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 9 of 22 Event

Description:

Loss of Protection Bus IV1PC2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO ADJUST 1-HC-182, Seal Flow Control Valve to CONTROL RCP seal flow.

RO ENSURE 1/1-8105 and 1/1-8106, Charging Isolation Valves are OPEN.

RO RESTORE Letdown flow per Control Board Job Aid.

  • OPEN or VERIFY OPEN both Letdown Isolation Valves.
  • ENSURE 1-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL in MANUAL and 30%

(75 gpm) or 50% (120 gpm) DEMAND.

  • ENSURE 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL in MANUAL and 50%

DEMAND.

  • ADJUST Charging to desired flow and MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 and 13 gpm.
  • OPEN the desired Orifice Isolation Valves.
  • ADJUST 1-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL to ~310 psig on 1-PI-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS then PLACE in AUTO.
  • ADJUST 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL to obtain ~95ºF on 1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP, then place in AUTOMATIC.

+20 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • ACTION A.1 - Restore inverter to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Examiner Note: LCO 3.8.9B would be entered if power was NOT restored to Bus IV1PC2. It MAY or MAY NOT be reported due to its short duration.

  • ACTION B.1 - Restore AC vital bus subsystem to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 10 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Bearing Vibration and Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3.

- TU04, Main Turbine bearing vibration at 10.5 mils on 180 second ramp.

Indications Available:

Main Turbine Digital Alarm Summary Display in alarm

+3 min BOP RESPOND to Main Turbine Digital Alarm Summary.

US DIRECT performance of ABN-401, Main Turbine Malfunction, Section 2.0.

OBSERVE Turbine Vibration and Generator Vibration Displays to determine BOP alarm validity.

DETERMINE Turbine Vibration and Generator Vibration Displays all readings BOP either yellow or green.

DETERMINE Turbine Vibration and Generator Vibration Displays has yellow BOP readings (LP2 Turbine rear shaft bearing).

Examiner Note: The crew may initially execute a 50 MWe power reduction (Runback) in an attempt to reduce Turbine vibration. Rods may or may not be placed in AUTO.

US NOTIFY Generation Controller of imminent load reduction.

BOP/US DETERMINE Turbine shaft vibration greater than 10 mils.

NOTIFY Plant Management of the need to reduce load and CONTACT US System Engineering.

Booth Operator: When Plant Management is notified, REPORT as Shift Manager to ramp the Unit to 900 MWe in 30 minutes per the Reactivity Briefing Sheet.

DIRECT load reduction to 900 MWe per IPO-003A, Power Operations, US Section 5.6, Reducing Turbine Power from 100% to MODE 3.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 11 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Bearing Vibration and Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior INITIATE RCS boration per SOP-104A, Reactor Make-up and Chemical RO Control System.

SET Turbine Load Rate Setpoint Controller as desired and Load Target to BOP 900 MWe.

Examiner Note: Crew may or may not borate for the power change. If boration is desired, the amount would be determined per the Reactivity Briefing Sheet.

RO If desired, PERFORM the following to COMMENCE RCS boration:

  • ENSURE 1/1-MU, RCS Makeup Manual Actuation is in STOP.
  • PLACE 43/1-MU, RCS Makeup Mode Select in BORATE.
  • SET 1-FK-110, BA Blender Flow Control to desired flowrate.
  • SET 1-FY-110B, BA Batch Flow counter for the desired number of gallons.
  • ENSURE 1/1-FCV-110A, Boric Acid Blender Flow Control Valve is in AUTO.
  • PLACE 1/1-MU, RCS Makeup Manual Actuation in START.
  • VERIFY 1/1-APBA1, Boric Acid Transfer Pump starts.
  • VERIFY 1/1-FCV-110A, Boric Acid Blender Flow Control Valve throttles to the preset flow rate.
  • VERIFY 1/1-FCV-110B, RCS Makeup to Charging Pump Suction Isolation Valve OPEN.
  • VERIFY 1-FR-110, Boric Acid Flow to Blender RED pen operating properly.
  • VERIFY 1-FY-110B, Batch Flow counter operating properly.
  • When desired amount of boric acid is added, PLACE 1/1-MU, RCS Makeup Manual Actuation in STOP.
  • FLUSH the blender with approximately 50 gallons makeup water when boration is complete.

Booth Operator: When Turbine load reduction is commenced, RAMP malfunction TU04 to 4 mils over 10 minutes.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 12 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Bearing Vibration and Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP PERFORM the following to LOWER Turbine Load:

  • CHANGE Turbine Load Rate to ~12 MWe/min.
  • OPEN Load Target OSD.
  • SELECT blue bar and ENTER 900 MWe.
  • DEPRESS Accept then VERIFY value in blue bar is desired Load Target (magnitude and direction).
  • DEPRESS Execute then VERIFY Load Target changes to desired load.
  • CLOSE Load Target OSD.

+20 min CREW MONITOR load change.

When power is reduced 3% to 5% and Turbine vibration is lowering, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Events 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 13 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Steam Header Leak / Automatic And Manual Safety Injection Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure / RHR Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

- MS02, Main Steam header leak @ 4E7 lbm/hr.

- RP07A/B, Safety Injection Trains A and B fail to auto actuate.

- RP08B, Manual Safety Injection Train B failure at CB-07.

- MS08C, HV-2335A, SG 1-03 Main Steam Isolation Valve fails to close.

- RH01C, Residual Heat Removal Pumps start failure on SI Sequencer.

Indications Available:

6A-3.4 - CHRG FLO HI / LO 5C-3.3 - PRZR PRESS LO BACKUP HTRS ON

+30 sec RO/BOP RECOGNIZE lowering RCS temperature and pressure.

Booth Operator: If asked, REPORT steam in the Turbine Building.

RO/BOP DETERMINE Reactor Trip required and manually TRIP Reactor.

US DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

  • DETERMINE Neutron flux - DECREASING.

RO DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON.

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

  • DETERMINE all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:

  • DETERMINE both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED.

RO DETERMINE SI required but NOT actuated.

CRITICAL TASK Manually Initiate Safety Injection due to Failure to Automatically Actuate Prior STATEMENT to Exiting EOP-0.0A.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 14 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Steam Header Leak / Automatic And Manual Safety Injection Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure / RHR Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK RO Manually INITIATE both Trains of Safety Injection.

RO

  • PLACE 1/1-SIA2, SI MAN ACT Switch to ACT position at CB-07.

BOP

  • PLACE 1/1-SIA1, SI MAN ACT Switch to ACT position at CB-02.

Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps performed by BOP are identified later in the scenario. The RCPs may be tripped if subcooling is observed to be < 25ºF.

This condition is only temporary and subcooling will recover by the time EOP-0.0A, Step 11, Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped, is performed.

US/BOP INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.

RO VERIFY AFW Alignment:

  • DETERMINE both MDAFW Pumps - RUNNING.
  • PLACE Turbine Driven AFW Pump in PULLOUT per Foldout Page.
  • CONTROL AFW Flow as follows:
  • CONTROL AFW flow as necessary to maintain narrow range level >

43% in any SG or total AFW flow > 460 gpm per Foldout Page.

  • STOP AFW flow to Faulted SG 1-03 per Foldout Page.
  • MAINTAIN proper AFW valve alignment.

RO VERIFY Containment Spray Not Required:

  • VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 1-8, CS ACT NOT illuminated.
  • VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT NOT illuminated.
  • VERIFY Containment pressure < 18.0 PSIG.

Booth Operator: When contacted, WAIT 2 minutes then CLOSE MSIV 1-03.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 15 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Steam Header Leak / Automatic And Manual Safety Injection Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure / RHR Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO DETERMINE Main Steam lines should be ISOLATED:

RO * [RNO] MANUALLY or LOCALLY CLOSE MSIV 1-03.

  • VERIFY Main Steam Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
  • VERIFY Before MSIV Drip Pot Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

RO CHECK RCS Temperature:

  • DETERMINE RCS Average Temperature less than 557ºF.

RO VERIFY NOT dumping steam.

RO REDUCE total AFW flow to minimize the cooldown:

  • MAINTAIN a minimum of 460 gpm UNTIL narrow range level greater than 50% in at least one SG.
  • STOP Turbine Driven AFW Pump.

RO CHECK PRZR Valve Status:

  • VERIFY PRZR Safeties - CLOSED.
  • VERIFY Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.
  • VERIFY Power to at least one Block Valve - AVAILABLE.
  • VERIFY Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RO CHECK if RCPs Should Be Stopped:

  • DETERMINE all ECCS Pumps - RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25ºF.

RO/BOP CHECK if Any Steam Generator Is Faulted:

  • DETERMINE SG 1-03 completely DEPRESSURIZED.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 16 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Steam Header Leak / Automatic And Manual Safety Injection Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure / RHR Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US TRANSITION to EOP 2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1.

Examiner Note: EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, steps begin here.

+15 min US/RO CHECK Main Steam line Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

  • VERIFY MSIV 1 LOCALLY CLOSED.

US/RO CHECK at Least One Steam Generator Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.

US/RO IDENTIFY Faulted Steam Generator 1-03.

CRITICAL TASK Perform Actions to Identify and Isolate Faulted Steam Generator Prior to STATEMENT exiting EOP-2.0A.

CRITICAL TASK RO/BOP ISOLATE Faulted Steam Generator 1-03.

RO CHECK CST Level - GREATER THAN 10%.

Examiner Note: EOP-2.0A, Attachment 2 actions are performed outside of the Control Room.

US/BOP VERIFY Faulted Steam Generator 1-03 Break Outside Containment.

  • DIRECT performance of EOP-2.0A, Attachment 2.

US/RO CHECK Secondary Radiation:

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 17 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Steam Header Leak / Automatic And Manual Safety Injection Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure / RHR Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • CHECK available Secondary Radiation Monitors - NORMAL.

US/RO CHECK if ECCS Flow to Should Be Reduced:

  • VERIFY Secondary heat sink:
  • DETERMINE Total AFW Flow to intact SGs > 460 GPM.
  • DETERMINE Narrow Range Level in SGs 1-01, 1-02, & 1-04 > 43%.
  • VERIFY RCS subcooling > 25ºF.
  • VERIFY RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
  • VERIFY PRZR level > 13%.

+20 min US DETERMINE ECCS flow should be reduced and TRANSITION to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, Step 1.

Examiner Note: EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, steps begin here.

Examiner Note: The following six (6) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.D.

BOP [1.D] PLACE both Diesel EMER START/STOP Handswitches in START.

BOP [1.D] RESET SI.

BOP [1.D] RESET SI Sequencers.

BOP [1.D] RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and B.

BOP [1.D] RESET Containment Spray Signal.

BOP/RO [1.D] ESTABLISH Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment.

  • OPEN 1-HS-3487, Containment Instrument Air Isolation Valve.

RO STOP Train B CCP and PLACE in Standby.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 18 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Steam Header Leak / Automatic And Manual Safety Injection Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure / RHR Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US/RO CHECK RCS Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.

Examiner Note: The following two (2) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.J.

RO [1.J] ISOLATE CCP Injection Line Flow Path:

  • VERIFY CCP - SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST.
  • ALIGN CCP Miniflow Valves:
  • OPEN 1/1-8110 and 1/1-8111, CCP Miniflow Valves.
  • CLOSE 1/1-8511A and 1/1-8511B, CCP Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves.
  • PLACE Charging Flow Control Valve in MANUAL and 35% demand.
  • CLOSE 1/1-8801A and 1/1-8801B, CCP Injection Line Isolation Valves.

+30 min RO [1.J] ESTABLISH Charging Flow Path:

  • OPEN 1/1-8105 and 1/1-8106, Charging Line Isolation Valves.
  • ADJUST Charging Flow Control Valve to establish Charging flow.
  • ADJUST RCP seal flow to maintain between 6 gpm and 13 gpm.

When EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, Attachment 1.J is complete, TERMINATE the scenario.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 19 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Steam Header Leak / Automatic And Manual Safety Injection Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure / RHR Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP per EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2.

BOP VERIFY SSW Alignment:

  • VERIFY SSW Pumps - RUNNING.
  • VERIFY Diesel Generator Cooler SSW return flow.

BOP VERIFY Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A.

BOP VERIFY Phase A Actuation.

BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation.

BOP VERIFY CCW Pumps - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY RHR Pumps - RUNNING.

BOP

  • DETERMINE RHR Pump 1-01 failed to start and MANUALLY START RHR Pump 1-01.

BOP VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment:

  • VERIFY both CCPs - RUNNING.
  • VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve isolation:
  • DETERMINE Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
  • DETERMINE Letdown Isolation Valves1/1-LCV-459 & 1/1-LCV-460

- CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY ECCS flow:

  • VERIFY CCP SI flow indicator.
  • VERIFY SI Pumps discharge flow indicator.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 20 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Steam Header Leak / Automatic And Manual Safety Injection Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure / RHR Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

BOP VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete:

  • VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves CLOSED.
  • VERIFY Feedwater Bypass Control Valves CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY both Diesel Generators - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY Monitor Lights For SI Load Shedding - LIT.

BOP VERIFY Proper SI alignment per MLB light indication.

BOP VERIFY Components Properly Aligned per Table 1.

Location Equipment Description Condition CB-03 X-HS-5534 H2 PRG SPLY FN 4 STOPPED CB-03 X-HS-5532 H2 PRG SPLY FN 3 STOPPED CB-04 1/1-8716A RHRP 1 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-04 1/1-8716B RHRP 2 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-06 1/1-8153 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-06 1/1-8154 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-07 1/1-RTBAL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-RTBBL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-BBAL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07 1/1-BBBL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-08 1-HS-2397A SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2398A SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2399A SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2400A SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2111C FWPT A TRIP TRIPPED CB-08 1-HS-2112C FWPT B TRIP TRIPPED CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 21 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Steam Header Leak / Automatic And Manual Safety Injection Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure / RHR Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CB-09 1-HS-2490 CNDS XFER PUMP STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI)

CV-01 X-HS-6181 PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6188 PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6195 PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6202 PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6209 PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6216 PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6223 PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6230 PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-3631 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 & STARTED BSTR FN 42 CV-01 X-HS-3632 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 & STARTED BSTR FN 43 CV-01 1-HS-5600 ELEC AREA EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5601 ELEC AREA EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5602 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 3 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5603 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 4 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5618 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 17 CV-01 1-HS-5620 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 18 CV-03 X-HS-5855 CR EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5856 CR EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5731 SFP EXH FN 33 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5733 SFP EXH FN 34 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5727 SFP EXH FN 35 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5729 SFP EXH FN 36 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 22 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Steam Header Leak / Automatic And Manual Safety Injection Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure / RHR Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.

CB-03 2-HS-5538 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5539 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5537 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5536 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete and to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #1 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: June 2011 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

  • 72% power MOL - RCS Boron is 975 ppm by Chemistry sample.

Turnover: Maintaining 72% power per Load Controller direction. Rod Control in AUTO.

Critical Tasks:

  • Identify Excess Reactor Coolant System Leakage and Manually Trip Reactor Prior to Reaching 0% Pressurizer Level.
  • Identify and Isolate Flow from the Ruptured Steam Generator Prior to Commencing an Operator Induced Cooldown.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N (BOP, SRO) Recirculate RWST using Containment Spray Pump (1-01).

+5 min 2 CV16A I (RO, SRO) Volume Control Tank Level Transmitter (LT-112) Failure low.

+10 min 3 MS13D I (BOP, SRO) Atmospheric Relief Valve (1-04) Fails Open due to Steam Pressure

+15 min Transmitter (PT-2328) Failure.

4 CV01B C (RO, SRO) Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) Trip.

+25 min TS (SRO) 5 SG01D R (RO) Steam Generator (1-04) Tube Leak at 2.5 GPM (180 second ramp).

+45 min N (BOP, SRO) Rapid Down Power Required.

TS (SRO) 6 SG01D M (RO, BOP, SRO) Steam Generator (1-04) Tube Rupture at 500 GPM (180 second

+48 min ramp).

7 RP01 I (RO) Automatic Reactor Trip Failure.

+50 min 8 RP09A C (BOP) Containment Isolation Phase A Train A and Train B Auto Actuation

+55 min RP09B Failure.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 7 Total malfunctions (5-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 3 Critical tasks (2-3)

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #2 The crew will assume the watch at 72% power per IPO-003A, Power Operations. The Grid Controller has requested that power remain at this level due to transmission line overload until further notice.

The scenario begins with a recirculation of the Refueling Water Storage Tank per SOP-204A, Containment Spray System, following makeup to restore tank level. The Containment Spray Pump will remain operating during the scenario.

The next event is a low failure of the Volume Control Tank Level Transmitter. The crew will reference annunciator ALM-0061A-4.5, VCT LEVEL LO, and ABN-105, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, and establish an Alternate Operating Mode for the Reactor Makeup System.

When conditions are stable, the Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV) on Steam Generator 1-04 will fail open. This event is recognized by a Reactor power increase, ARV Controller indicating 100% demand, and a Plant Computer System alarm. The BOP will place the affected Controller in MANUAL and close the ARV. ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure Instrument Malfunction, may be referenced.

When plant parameters are stable, a loss of the running Centrifugal Charging Pump will occur. The crew will enter ABN-105, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, and perform actions to immediately restore Charging flow. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

The next event is a Steam Generator tube leak of ~2.5 GPM. Crew actions are per ABN-106, High Secondary Activity. Given the size of the leak, a rapid power reduction will be performed. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

When Technical Specifications are referenced and power has been reduced from 3% to 5%, a Steam Generator Tube Rupture occurs and leakage rises to 500 GPM. Pressurizer pressure and level will lower uncontrollably and require a manual Reactor trip, initiation of Safety Injection, and entry into EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. At Step 13, a transition to EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, will occur to isolate the ruptured Steam Generator. The event is complicated by a failure of Train A and B Containment Isolation Phase A.

The scenario is terminated when the ruptured Steam Generator is isolated, feedwater flow is properly aligned, and a Reactor Coolant System cooldown is initiated.

Risk Significance:

  • Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip
  • Risk significant operator actions: Manually Trip Reactor Identify and Isolate Ruptured SG Manually Initiate Containment Isolation Cooldown and Depressurize the RCS CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #35 and Event File for NRC Scenario #2.

EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATING VALUE PARAMETER SETUP RP01 Automatic Reactor Trip failure - K0 RP09A/B Containment Isolation Train A/B actuation failure - K0 NOTE: Ensure Rod Control is in AUTO 1 N/A Recirculate the RWST - K0 2 CV16A VCT Level Transmitter (LT-112) failure 0% K2 2 CV16A VCT Level Transmitter (LT-112) vented by I&C DELETE K2 3 MS13D ARV (1-04) fails open due to PT-2328 failure 1300 psia K3 4 CV01B Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) trip - K4 CVR05 CCP (1-01) Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump OFF K10 CVR06 CCP (1-02) Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump AUTO K10 5 SG01D Steam Generator #1 Tube Leak 2.5 gpm K5 (180 sec. ramp) 6 SG01D Steam Generator #1 Tube Rupture 500 gpm MODIFY K5 (180 sec. ramp) 7 RP01 Automatic Reactor Trip failure - K0 8 RP09A/B Containment Isolation Train A/B actuation failure - K0 CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #35 and NRC Scenario #2 SETUP file.

ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.

ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.

ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD.

RE-SCALE Main Control Board CRT on CB-07 for 72% power.

ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:

- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.

ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 178 steps.

Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 5 of 23 Event

Description:

Recirculate the Refueling Water Storage Tank Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: ENSURE Simulator in RUN when crew is ready to assume the watch.

DIRECT performance of SOP-204A, Containment Spray System, Section

+1 min US 5.1.3, Recirculation Through the Recirculation Header.

BOP ENSURE the system is in STANDBY per Section 5.1.1.

BOP VERIFY Train A Chemical Additive Tank Discharge Valve is CLOSED.

  • 1-HS-4754, CHEM ADD TK DISCH VLV, Train A.

BOP INITIATE a trend of CSP 1-01 parameters on the Plant Computer.

BOP VERIFY CSP 1-01 Recirculation Valve is OPEN.

  • 1-HS-4772-1, CSP 1 RECIRC VLV.

BOP START Containment Spray Pump 1-01.

  • 1-HS-4764, CSP 1.

+5 min BOP MONITOR Containment Spray Pump parameters.

When recirculation has been started, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 6 of 23 Event

Description:

Volume Control Tank Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2.

- CV16A, Volume Control Tank (LT-112) fails low.

Indications Available:

6A-3.5 - VCT LVL LO 6A-4.5 - VCT LVL LO-LO 1-LI-112A - VCT LVL level indication fails low

+1 min RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO RECOGNIZE VCT level transmitter (LT-112) failed low.

DIRECT performance of ALM-0061A, 1-ALB-6A, Window 4.5 - VCT LVL LO-US LO.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from 1-ALB-6A, Window 5.5 - VCT LVL LO-LO.

RO MONITOR VCT level on 1-LI-112A, VCT LVL and 1-LI-185, VCT LVL.

RO VERIFY 1-PI-115, VCT PRESS is approximately 30 psig.

RO CHECK 1-LT-112, CVCS VCT Level Transmitter for malfunction.

RO STOP Auto Makeup; PLACE 1/1-MU, RCS MU MAN ACT in STOP.

RO REDUCE VCT level to between 46% and 56%.

  • If necessary, PLACE 1/1-LCV-112A, VCT LVL CTRL VLV in HUT.

RO ENSURE 1-LI-185, VCT LVL and 1-PI-115, VCT PRESS are both lowering.

DIRECT performance of ABN-105, Chemical and Volume Control System US Malfunction, Section 6.0.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 7 of 23 Event

Description:

Volume Control Tank Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When maintenance is contacted, DELETE malfunction CV16A and REPORT I&C vented the transmitter and it appears to be operating normally.

RO PLACE 1/1-MU, RCS MU MAN ACT in AUTO.

VERIFY Automatic Operating Mode in service per SOP-104A, Reactor

+5 min RO Makeup and Chemical Control System.

When the VCT level control is restored, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 8 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Pressure Control Channel Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3.

-MS13D, SG 1-04 Steam Pressure Channel (PT-2328) fails high.

Indications Available:

1-PI-2328, MSL 4 PRESS failed high 1-ZL-2328 SG 4 ATMOS RLF VLV read OPEN light lit Y6704D Plant Computer alarm

+1 min BOP RESPOND to Dynamic Alarm Display (DAD) Alarm.

RECOGNIZE Steam Generator 1-04 Steam Pressure Transmitter (PT-2328)

BOP failed high.

DIRECT performance of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header US Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 2.0.

BOP DETERMINE Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve - OPEN.

US DIRECT closing of Steam Generator 1-04, Atmospheric Relief Valve.

PLACE 1-PK-2328, SG 4 ATMOS RLF VLV CTRL in MANUAL and 0%

BOP DEMAND to CLOSE Valve.

+5 min US NOTIFY Chemistry that a release has occurred.

When the Atmospheric Relief Valve is closed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 9 of 23 Event

Description:

Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4.

- CV01B, Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-01 trip.

Indications Available:

5A-1.6 - ANY RCP SEAL WTR INJ FLO LO 6A-1.7 - ANY CHG PMP OVRLOAD / TRIP 6A-3.4 - CHG FLO HI / LO CCP 1 amber MISMATCH and white TRIP lights lit

+1 min RO RESPOND to Annunciator Procedure Alarms.

RO RECOGNIZE Charging Pump 1-01 trip.

Examiner Note: The next step is an Initial Operator Action.

RO START Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-02.

US DIRECT performance of ABN-105, CVCS Malfunction, Section 3.0.

RO VERIFY one Centrifugal Charging Pump running.

RO VERIFY Seal Injection Flow to each RCP between 6 gpm and 13 gpm.

RO/BOP VERIFY RCP parameters in normal operating range.

RO VERIFY PRZR level > 17% and rising.

Booth Operator: When contacted about status of Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-01, REPORT Phase B 50/51 over current relays are tripped and an acrid odor is present.

Booth Operator: When contacted, EXECUTE remote functions CVR05 and CVR06 for the Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01 & 1-02) Auxiliary Lube Oil Pumps.

RO VERIFY RCS leakage normal.

  • DETERMINE PRZR level stable at or trending to program.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 10 of 23 Event

Description:

Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • DETERMINE Charging flow < 15 gpm above Letdown flow.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 11 of 23 Event

Description:

Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • CONDITION A - One train inoperable because of the inoperability of a centrifugal charging pump.
  • ACTION A.1 - Restore pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

+10 min US INITIATE a work request per STA-606.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 5.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 12 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak and Power Descension Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5.

- SG01D, Steam Generator 1-04 Tube Leak at ~2.5 gpm.

Indications Available:

PC MSL-181 (1-RE-2328) is RED PC N16-177 MSL #4 (1-RE-2328A) is RED PC 182 COG (1-RE-2959) is RED (Condenser Off Gas is delayed)

+1 min RO/BOP RESPOND to Digital Radiation Monitoring System alarms.

RO/BOP RECOGNIZE radiation monitor alarms associated with Steam Generator 1-04.

US DIRECT performance of ABN-106, High Secondary Activity, Section 3.0.

DETERMINE Main Steam Line 1-04 radiation alarm 1-RE-2328 is RED on RO/BOP PC-11.

RO/BOP CORRELATE monitor readings to leak rate and rate of change as necessary.

Examiner Note: Crew may implement the Reactivity Briefing Sheet for a Rapid Plant Shutdown within one (1) hour. This guidance includes a boration of ~ 700 gallons and a Main Turbine load reduction to 250 MWe at 10 MWe/min.

REDUCE power to 50% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND be in MODE 3 in the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> US and GO TO Step 5b.

RO DETERMINE PRZR level is stable.

ADJUST Steam Generator 1-04 Atmospheric Relief Controller setpoint to BOP 1160 PSIG per TDM-501A/B.

PLACE 1-HV-2452-1, TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve from SG 1-04 in BOP PULLOUT.

Examiner Note: Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13 is NOT addressed in ABN-106 and has been identified as a Procedure Enhancement.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 13 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak and Power Descension Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

+10 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • CONDITION A - One steam supply valve to turbine driven AFW pump inoperable.
  • ACTION A.1 - Restore steam supply to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
  • CONDITION B - Primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limits.
  • ACTION B.1 - Be in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
  • ACTION B.2 - Be in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

DIRECT load reduction to 250 MWe per IPO-003A, Power Operations, US Section 5.6, Reducing Turbine Power from 100% to MODE 3.

INITIATE RCS boration per SOP-104A, Reactor Make-up and Chemical RO Control System.

SET Turbine Load Rate Setpoint Controller as desired and Load Target to BOP 250 MWe.

Examiner Note: Boration amount is determined per the Reactivity Briefing Sheet.

RO PERFORM the following to COMMENCE RCS boration:

  • ENSURE 1/1-MU, RCS Makeup Manual Actuation is in STOP.
  • PLACE 43/1-MU, RCS Makeup Mode Select in BORATE.
  • SET 1-FK-110, BA Blender Flow Control to desired flowrate.
  • SET 1-FY-110B, BA Batch Flow counter for the desired number of gallons.
  • ENSURE 1/1-FCV-110A, Boric Acid Blender Flow Control Valve is in AUTO.
  • PLACE 1/1-MU, RCS Makeup Manual Actuation in START.
  • VERIFY 1/1-APBA1, Boric Acid Transfer Pump starts.
  • VERIFY 1/1-FCV-110A, Boric Acid Blender Flow Control Valve throttles to the preset flow rate.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 14 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak and Power Descension Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • VERIFY 1/1-FCV-110B, RCS Makeup to Charging Pump Suction Isolation Valve OPEN.
  • VERIFY 1-FR-110, Boric Acid Flow to Blender RED pen operating properly.
  • VERIFY 1-FY-110B, Batch Flow counter operating properly.
  • When desired amount of boric acid is added, PLACE 1/1-MU, RCS Makeup Manual Actuation in STOP.
  • FLUSH the blender with approximately 50 gallons makeup water when boration is complete.

BOP PERFORM the following to LOWER Turbine Load:

  • CHANGE Turbine Load Rate to ~10 MWe/min.
  • OPEN Load Target OSD.
  • SELECT blue bar and ENTER 250 MWe.
  • DEPRESS Accept then VERIFY value in blue bar is desired Load Target (magnitude and direction).
  • DEPRESS Execute then VERIFY Load Target changes to desired load.

+20 min CREW MONITOR load change.

When power has been reduced 3% to 5%, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Events 6, 7, and 8.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 15 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure / Train A & B Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 6, 7, and 8.

- SG01D, SG 1-04 Tube Rupture @ 500 gpm on 180 second ramp.

- RP01, Automatic Reactor Trip failure.

- RP09A/B, Containment Isolation Phase A Train A/B fails to auto actuate.

Indications Available:

6A-3.4 - CHRG FLO HI / LO 5C-1.2 - PRZR LVL DEV LO 5C-3.3 - PRZR PRESS LO BACKUP HTRS ON PC 178 MSL #4 (1-RE-2328) is RED Main Steam Line Radiation level rising Pressurizer pressure lowering RECOGNIZE Pressurizer level and pressure decreasing at an increasing

+2 min RO/BOP rate.

RECOGNIZE PRZR pressure decreasing with Steam Line Radiation RO/BOP Monitors in alarm and steam / feed mismatch.

CRITICAL TASK Identify Excess Reactor Coolant System Leakage and Manually Trip Reactor STATEMENT Prior to Reaching 0% Pressurizer Level.

CRITICAL RO Manually INITIATE a Reactor Trip.

TASK US DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

  • DETERMINE Neutron flux - DECREASING.

RO DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON.

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

  • DETERMINE all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 16 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure / Train A & B Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • DETERMINE both AC Safeguards Buses -ENERGIZED.

RO Manually INITIATE both Trains of Safety Injection.

Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps performed by the BOP are identified later in the scenario. Ensure CRITICAL TASK listed is performed during Attachment 2.

US/BOP INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.

RO VERIFY AFW Alignment:

  • DETERMINE both MDAFW Pumps - RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE Turbine Driven AFW Pump - NOT RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE AFW total flow - GREATER THAN 460 GPM.
  • DETERMINE AFW valve alignment - PROPER ALIGNMENT.

RO DETERMINE Containment Spray NOT Required:

  • VERIFY 1-ALB-2B window 1-8, CS ACT NOT ILLUMINATED.
  • VERIFY 1-ALB-2B window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT NOT ILLUMINATED.
  • VERIFY Containment pressure < 18.0 PSIG.

RO CHECK If Main Steam lines should be Isolated:

  • DETERMINE Containment pressure 0 PSIG and stable.

RO CHECK RCS Temperature:

  • DETERMINE RCS TAVE - STABLE at OR trending to 557ºF.

RO CHECK PRZR Valve Status:

  • DETERMINE PRZR Safeties - CLOSED.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 17 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure / Train A & B Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • DETERMINE Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.
  • DETERMINE PORVs - CLOSED.
  • DETERMINE Power to both Block Valves - AVAILABLE.
  • VERIFY both PORV Block Valves - OPEN.

RO CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

  • DETERMINE ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE CCP Pump 1-02 and SI Pumps - RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25ºF.

US/RO DETERMINE RCPs should remain running.

US/RO CHECK if any SG is Faulted:

  • DETERMINE pressure in all SGs - NORMAL.

US/RO CHECK if SG Tubes are Ruptured:

Examiner Note: EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture steps begin here.

+15 min US/RO CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

  • OBSERVE ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.
  • OBSERVE CCP 1-02 and both SI Pumps - RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25ºF.

US/RO DETERMINE RCPs should remain RUNNING.

US/BOP DETERMINE Steam Generator 1-04 is ruptured.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 18 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure / Train A & B Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK Identify and Isolate Flow from the Ruptured Steam Generator Prior to STATEMENT Commencing an Operator Induced Cooldown.

CRITICAL TASK RO/BOP ISOLATE Flow From Ruptured Steam Generator 1-04:

  • VERIFY SG 1-04 Atmospheric Controller Setpoint in MANUAL & CLOSE.
  • CHECK SG 1-04 Atmospheric Relief Valve - CLOSED.
  • CLOSE SG 1-04 Drip Pot Isolation Valves.
  • VERIFY SG 1-04 TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve - CLOSED.
  • CLOSE SG 1-04 Blowdown Valves.

RO/BOP CHECK Ruptured SG 1-04 Level:

  • VERIFY narrow range level > 43%.
  • ISOLATE AFW flow to SG 1-04.

RO/BOP VERIFY SG 1-04 Pressure > 420 PSIG.

EOP-3.0A Caution: If RCPs are NOT running, the following steps may cause a false INTEGRITY STATUS TREE (FRP) indication for the ruptured loop. Disregard ruptured loop Cold Leg Wide Range Temperature indication until after performing Step 32.

CRITICAL TASK Initiate Cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System Prior to Exiting EOP-3.0A.

STATEMENT CRITICAL TASK RO/BOP INITIATE RCS Cooldown using Steam Dump System.

When PRZR pressure decreases to less than 1960 psig, BLOCK the Low RO/BOP Steam Line Pressure SI Signal.

  • PLACE 1/1-SLS-1RBA and 1/1-SLS-1RBB, Main Steam Line Isolation Safety Injection Reset / Block in BLOCK position.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 19 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure / Train A & B Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DETERMINE required Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) temperature from US Table 1.

  • TARGET Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) temperature = _____ ºF DUMP steam to Condenser from intact SG(s) at maximum rate using the BOP Steam Dump Valves.

BOP TRANSFER the Steam Dump Valves to STEAM PRESSURE Mode.

BOP ENSURE 1-PK-507, Steam Dump Pressure Controller in MANUAL and INCREASE demand.

US/RO DETERMINE required CET temperature is met.

BOP STOP RCS cooldown.

RO/BOP MAINTAIN required CET temperature.

+30 min RO/BOP CHECK Intact SG Levels:

  • VERIFY Narrow Range Level > 43%.
  • CONTROL AFW flow to maintain level between 50% and 60%.

When the Steam Generator is isolated and required CET temperature is met, TERMINATE the scenario.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 20 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure / Train A & B Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP as required per EOP-0.0A, Attachment

2. EOP-3.0A steps are identified later in the scenario.

BOP VERIFY SSW Alignment:

  • VERIFY SSW Pumps - RUNNING.
  • VERIFY Diesel Generator Cooler SSW return flow.

BOP VERIFY Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.

CRITICAL TASK Manually Initiate Containment Isolation Phase A due to Failure to STATEMENT Automatically Actuate Prior to Exiting EOP-0.0.

CRITICAL TASK BOP Manually INITIATE both Trains of Containment Isolation Phase A.

  • PLACE 1/1-CIPAA1 CNTMT ISOL - PHASE A / CNTMT VENT ISOL Switch in ACT position.

BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A.

BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation.

BOP VERIFY CCW Pumps - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY RHR Pumps - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment:

  • VERIFY CCP 1 RUNNING.
  • VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve isolation:
  • DETERMINE Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
  • DETERMINE Letdown Isolation Valves 1/1-LCV-459 & 1/1-LCV-460

- CLOSED.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 21 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure / Train A & B Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY ECCS flow:

  • VERIFY CCP SI flow indicator.
  • VERIFY SI Pumps discharge flow indicator.

BOP VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete:

  • VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves CLOSED.
  • VERIFY Feedwater Bypass Control Valves CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY both Diesel Generators - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY Monitor Lights For SI Load Shedding - LIT.

BOP VERIFY Proper SI alignment per MLB light indication.

BOP VERIFY Components Properly Aligned per Table 1.

Location Equipment Description Condition CB-03 X-HS-5534 H2 PRG SPLY FN 4 STOPPED CB-03 X-HS-5532 H2 PRG SPLY FN 3 STOPPED CB-04 1/1-8716A RHRP 1 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-04 1/1-8716B RHRP 2 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-06 1/1-8153 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-06 1/1-8154 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-07 1/1-RTBAL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-RTBBL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-BBAL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07 1/1-BBBL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-08 1-HS-2397A SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 22 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure / Train A & B Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CB-08 1-HS-2398A SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2399A SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2400A SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2111C FWPT A TRIP TRIPPED CB-08 1-HS-2112C FWPT B TRIP TRIPPED CB-09 1-HS-2490 CNDS XFER PUMP STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI)

CV-01 X-HS-6181 PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6188 PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6195 PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6202 PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6209 PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6216 PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6223 PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6230 PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-3631 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 & STARTED BSTR FN 42 CV-01 X-HS-3632 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 & STARTED BSTR FN 43 CV-01 1-HS-5600 ELEC AREA EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5601 ELEC AREA EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5602 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 3 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5603 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 4 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5618 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 17 CV-01 1-HS-5620 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 18 CV-03 X-HS-5855 CR EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5856 CR EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 23 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure / Train A & B Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CV-03 X-HS-5731 SFP EXH FN 33 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5733 SFP EXH FN 34 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5727 SFP EXH FN 35 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5729 SFP EXH FN 36 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.

CB-03 2-HS-5538 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5539 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5537 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5536 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete and to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #2 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: June 2011 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: * ~3% power BOL - RCS Boron is 1659 ppm by Chemistry sample.

  • Steam Dump System in service for RCS Temperature Control.

Turnover: Raise Reactor Power from 3% to 8% in preparation for Turbine Startup.

Critical Tasks:

  • Manually Trip the Reactor Upon Failure of Reactor to Trip Prior to Exiting FRS-0.1A.
  • Emergency Borate due to Anticipated Transient Without Trip Prior to Exiting FRS-0.1A.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N (BOP, SRO) Transfer from Auxiliary Feedwater System to Main Feedwater

+15 min System and Place Feedwater Bypass Control Valves in AUTO.

2 R (RO) Raise power to 8% in preparation for synchronizing the Main

+30 min N (BOP, SRO) Generator to the electrical grid.

3 RX08A I (RO, SRO) Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter (PT-455) fails low.

+40 min TS (SRO) 4 RX04D I (BOP, SRO) Steam Generator (1-04) Level Transmitter (LT-554) Fails Low.

+50 min TS (SRO) 5 RC07A M (RO, BOP, SRO) Reactor Coolant Pump (1-01) Trip.

+51 min 6 RP13C I (RO) Manual Reactor Trip Failure (both).

+52 min Commence Inserting Control Rods at 48 steps/minute.

7 OVRDE C (BOP) Bus Breaker CS-1B4-1 Fails to Open.

+52 min Initiate Emergency Boration.

8 CV01B C (RO) Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) Trip after Transition Brief to

+62 min EOS-0.1A.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 6 Total malfunctions (5-8) 3 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #3 The crew will assume the watch with power at approximately 3% per IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby. The crew will transfer Feedwater flow from the Auxiliary Feedwater System to the Main Feedwater System in preparation for raising power to 8%. This is followed by entry into SOP-304A, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Section 5.2, Shutdown and Standby of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

When transfer of Feedwater has been completed, the crew will enter IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.1, Warmup and Synchronization of the Turbine Generator and perform a power ascension using the Rod Control and Steam Dump Systems.

When power has been raised 3% to 5%, a Pressurizer Pressure Channel will fail low. Response is per ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, Section 2.0, to ensure Pressurizer Heaters are controlled and Power Operated Relief Valves remain closed. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

The next event is a Steam Generator Level Transmitter failure. Actions are per ABN-710, Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Malfunction. The BOP will be required to take manual control of the Feedwater Bypass Control Valve and then select an alternate controlling channel to return the Feedwater System to automatic control. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, a Reactor Coolant Pump will trip. Entry into ABN-101, Reactor Coolant Pump Trip / Malfunction, may be performed. Although an automatic Reactor trip is not generated, the RO should recognize the requirement to manually trip the Reactor. An attempt will be made to manually trip the Reactor via the normal Trip Switches and by deenergizing both buses supplying the Control Element Drive Mechanism Motor Generators. Once it is determined that neither of these methods have been successful, the crew will transition from EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to FRS-0.1A, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT.

When FRS-0.1A is entered, Control Rods are manually inserted, emergency boration is initiated, and operators are dispatched to locally trip the Reactor. The crew then transitions from FRS-0.1A to EOP-0.0A. After it is determined that Safety Injection is not required the crew will enter EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response and perform actions to restore Charging and Letdown flow. When in EOS-0.1A, a Centrifugal Charging Pump will trip and must be restarted to continue emergency boration.

The scenario is terminated when IPO-009A, Plant Equipment Shutdown Following a Trip, is referenced while in EOS-0.1A.

Risk Significance:

  • Risk significant operator actions: Manually Trip Reactor Due to RCP Trip Manually Insert Control Rods During ATWT Emergency Borate Due to ATWT Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #34 and Event File for NRC Scenario #3.

EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATING VALUE PARAMETER SETUP RP13C Manual Reactor trip failure FAIL K0 OVRDE Bus Breaker CS-1B4-1 Fails to Open OPEN K0 1 - Transfer from AFW to Main Feedwater System - N/A 1 FWR106 PV-2242 FWP SUCT HDR PRESS override NORMAL -

2 - Raise power to 8% - N/A 2 MSR04 1MS-451 & 1MS-454 MSR A & B Auxiliary Steam - K10 Isolation Valve 3 RX08A Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter (PT-455) failure 1700 psig K3 4 RX04D SG (1-04) Level Transmitter (LT-554) failure 0% K4 5 RC07A Reactor Coolant Pump (1-01) trip TRIP K5 6 RP13C Manual Reactor trip failure FAIL K0 7 OVRDE Bus Breaker CS-1B4-1 failure CLOSE K0 7 RPR112 Reactor Trip Breaker Train A OPEN K7 7 RPR113 Reactor Trip Breaker Train B OPEN K7 8 CV01B Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) trip (NOTE: 1) TRIP K8 NOTE 1: CCP 1-01 is tripped after transition brief in EOS-0.1 AND Pressurizer level > 10%.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #34 and NRC Scenario #3 SETUP file.

ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.

ENSURE Control Rods are in MANUAL with Control Rod Bank C @ 228 steps and Bank D @ 115 steps.

ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

REMOVE N-16 detectors from POLL on PC-11.

ENSURE 1-HS-2484 & 1-HS-2485, Condensate Storage Tank Isolation Valves are OPEN.

SET Plant Computer screen for MODE 2.

ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

PLACE Plant Computer, right hand RO and US Computer screens for MODE 2.

PLACE Group Display LPTDIFF on the BOP Desktop Computer.

ENSURE all PRZR Heaters energized.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:

- COPY of IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, INITIALED to Step 5.4.8.

- COPY of SOP-304A, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Section 5.2, with N/As as required in preparation for placing the AFW System in Standby.

- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.1, Warmup and Synchronization of the Turbine Generator, INITIALED as appropriate.

Significant Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.3 - AMSAC BLK TURB < 40% PWR C-20 PCIP-1.4 - CNDNSR AVAIL STM DUMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.7 - RX 50% PWR TURB TRIP PERM P-9 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WTHDRWL BLK C-5 PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.5 - RX & TURB 10% PWR P-7 PCIP-4.5 - RX 48% PWR 3-LOOP FLO PERM P-8 PCIP-4.6 - TURB 10% PWR P-13 6D-1.1 - SR HI VOLT FAIL 7B-4.8 - FWP A/B RECIRC VLV NOT CLOSED 8A-1.3 - FWPT B TRIP 8A-1.10 - 1 OF 4 TURB STOP VLV CLOSE Numerous 9A Feedwater alarms CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 5 of 20 Event

Description:

Transfer from the Auxiliary Feedwater System to the Main Feedwater System / Shutdown AFW System Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: ENSURE Simulator in RUN when crew is ready to assume the watch.

+1 min DIRECT performance of IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Step US 5.4.10.

ENSURE all Steam Generator Feedwater Flow Control Valve Controllers are BOP in MANUAL and the valves are CLOSED.

ENSURE all Steam Generator Feedwater Bypass Control Valve Controllers BOP are in MANUAL and 0% demand.

ENSURE the Steam Generator Feedwater Bypass Control Valve BOP handswitches are in AUTO and the valves are CLOSED:

BOP RESET the Feedwater Isolation signal by DEPRESSING pushbuttons:

  • 1/1-FWIRA, FW ISOL RESET.
  • 1/1-FWIRB, FW ISOL RESET.

BOP VERIFY alarm 1-ALB-8A, 1.13, LO TAVE & RX TRIP FW ISOL ACT is OFF.

IPO-002A Note: When the Feedwater Bypass Control Valves are open, the SG will be fed by two sources, which will require the operator to manipulate Auxiliary Feedwater flow to prevent SG level oscillations. The following three steps should be performed simultaneously in order to maintain proper SG level.

BOP Throttle OPEN Feedwater Bypass Control Valve Controllers in MANUAL:

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 6 of 20 Event

Description:

Transfer from the Auxiliary Feedwater System to the Main Feedwater System / Shutdown AFW System Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

BOP VERIFY flow to each Steam Generator through the Main Feed line:

  • 1- FI-510A, SG 1 FW FLO.
  • 1- FI-511A, SG 1 FW FLO.
  • 1- FI-520A, SG 2 FW FLO.
  • 1- FI-521A, SG 2 FW FLO.
  • 1- FI-530A, SG 3 FW FLO.
  • 1- FI-531A, SG 3 FW FLO.
  • 1- FI-540A, SG 4 FW FLO.
  • 1- FI-541A, SG 4 FW FLO.

BOP Throttle CLOSED the Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Control Valve Controllers:

IPO-002A Note: The SG level control system is selected to the preferred channels to preserve the 2/3 coincidence on high level Turbine Trip in the event the alternate level control channel fails.

ENSURE Steam Generator Level Control Switches are in the following BOP positions:

  • 1- LS-519C, SG 1 LVL CHAN SELECT - LQY-551.
  • 1- LS-529C, SG 2 LVL CHAN SELECT - LQY-552.
  • 1- LS-539C, SG 3 LVL CHAN SELECT - LQY-553.
  • 1- LS-549C, SG 4 LVL CHAN SELECT - LQY-554.

VERIFY Main Feedwater flow is sufficient to maintain Steam Generator level BOP and TERMINATE AFW flow in PLACE in STANDBY per SOP-304A.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 7 of 20 Event

Description:

Transfer from the Auxiliary Feedwater System to the Main Feedwater System / Shutdown AFW System Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CONTACT Radwaste Operations to PLACE the Condensate Polishing US/BOP Control System FWP Suction Header Pressure Low Trip Override Enabled Circuit to NORMAL per RWS-109A.

Booth Operator: When contacted, EXECUTE remote function FWR106, PV-2242 FWP SUCT HDR PRESS OVERRIDE.

BOP PLACE Feedwater Bypass Control Valve Controllers in AUTO:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-304A, Auxiliary Feedwater System.

US DIRECT performance of SOP-304A, Auxiliary Feedwater System.

BOP ENSURE both Motor Driven AFW Pump handswitches in AUTO after STOP.

  • 1-HS-2450A, MD AFWP 1.
  • 1-HS-2451A, MD AFWP 2.

BOP PLACE AFW Flow Control Valve Controllers at 100% output and MANUAL:

US/BOP VERIFY proper Flow Control and Isolation Valve position per OPT-206A.

Floor Cue: If requested, REPORT another operator will perform the actions of OPT-206A, AFW System.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 8 of 20 Event

Description:

Transfer from the Auxiliary Feedwater System to the Main Feedwater System / Shutdown AFW System Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior MONITOR the temperature of the Auxiliary Feedwater System for

+15 min US/BOP approximately 30 minutes to detect any Steam Generator back leakage.

When the AFW System alignment is complete, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 9 of 20 Event

Description:

Raise Reactor Power / Prepare Turbine for Operation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: MONITOR Simulator parameters while the crew transitions to IPO-003A.

DIRECT performance of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.1, Warmup

+1 min US and Synchronization of the Turbine Generator STARTING at Step 5.1.3.

BOP OPEN Turbine Drain Valves.

  • 1-HS-2419, TURB SIDE XOVER DRN VLV.

DETERMINE OPT-410A has been completed within the previous 31 days US (already initialed).

DETERMINE Moisture Separator Reheater pre-warming is complete per US SOP-301A (already initialed).

NOTIFY Chemistry and Radiation Protection if Reactor power will be US increased greater than 15% in a one hour period (already initialed).

Prior to increasing Reactor power above 10%, PERFORM Flow Control and US Isolation Valve Position verification per OPT-206A to ensure each AFW flow control valve and isolation valve is fully open (already initialed).

BOP OPEN 1-HS-2611/12, FW HTR 5A & 6A/5B & 6B BYP VLV.

US VERIFY the following annunciators are OFF (already initialed):

  • 1-ALB-9B, 3.9, EHC FLUID TEMP HI.
  • 1-ALB-9B, 5.6, TURB L/O TEMP HI.

DETERMINE lube oil temperature is >95°F on TURB BRG TEMP RCDR 1 US (already initialed).

BOP OPEN 1-HS-2417, HP CTRL VLV 1 4 BEF SEAT DRN VLV.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 10 of 20 Event

Description:

Raise Reactor Power / Prepare Turbine for Operation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP ENSURE controllers on GEN TEMP/LEAK WATER Display in AUTO:

  • PLACE 1-TV-3097, Primary Water TEMP Controller in AUTO.
  • PLACE 1-TV-3118, Hydrogen TEMP Controller in AUTO.

ENSURE the Turbine controls ready for Start-up by PERFORMING the BOP following:

  • ENSURE the Load Control Subloop Controller is OFF.
  • ENSURE the Load Target Setpoint Controller SET at 30 MWe.
  • ENSURE Load Rate Setpoint Controller SET at 10 MWe/MIN.
  • ENSURE Turbine in Speed Control by VERIFYING SPEED bar is red.

BOP VERIFY the Turbine Trip is RESET and OBSERVE Turbine Trip bar is white.

BOP VERIFY the following Turbine parameters:

  • DETERMINE 1-PI-6559, TURB L/O PRESS > 25 psig.
  • DETERMINE 1-PI-6561, EHC FLUID PRESS at least 114 psig.
  • DETERMINE 1-PI-6566, HP EHC FLUID PRESS ~455 psig.

BOP If desired, ENSURE Feedwater Bypass Control Valve Controllers in AUTO.

DETERMINE Attachment 1 was COMPLETED & REVIEWED by the Shift US Manager per Turnover Sheet prior to exceeding 5% power.

Direct WITHDRAWAL of Control Rods in no more than five (5) step US increments to raise power.

WITHDRAW Control Rods in no more than five (5) step increments while RO monitoring Reactor power level.

RO VERIFY Power Range Channels respond appropriately as power level rises.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 11 of 20 Event

Description:

Raise Reactor Power / Prepare Turbine for Operation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior As Reactor power increases, VERIFY Steam Dump System continues to BOP maintain Main Steam pressure at approximately 1092 psig.

US When reactor power is greater than 5%, LOG entry into MODE 1.

US PERFORM OPT-102A for MODE 1 Surveillances.

Floor Cue: If requested, REPORT OPT-102A, Operations Shiftly Routine Tests was completed last shift.

+15 min RO Slowly RAISE Reactor power to between 6% and 8%.

When power level is stabilized at 6% to 8%, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 12 of 20 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3.

- RX08A, Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-455) fails low.

Indications Available:

5B-3.4 - PRZR 1 OF 4 PRESS LO 5B-4.4 - PRZR 1 OF 4 SI PRESS LO 5C-3.3 - PRZR PRESS LO BACKUP HTRS ON

+1 min RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO RECOGNIZE PRZR pressure rising with PRZR heaters ON.

DIRECT performance of ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, US Section 2.0.

Examiner Note: The next three (3) steps are Initial Operator Actions.

RO VERIFY PORV closed.

RO PLACE 1-PK-455A, PRZR Master Pressure Control in MANUAL.

RO ADJUST 1-PK-455A for current RCS pressure.

TRANSFER to an alternate controlling channel, 1/1-PS-455F, PRZR Press RO Control Channel Select.

RO PLACE 1-PK-455A in AUTO.

RO VERIFY automatic control restoring Pressurizer pressure to 2235 psig.

ENSURE a valid channel selected to recorder 1/1-PS-455G, 1-PR-455 PRZR RO Pressure Select.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 13 of 20 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, VERIFY PCIP window 2.6, PRZR PRESS SI BLK PERM P-11 US in required state for current pressure (DARK).

US/RO VERIFY other instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL.

  • DETERMINE LT-459, LT-459F, and PT-455F readings are NORMAL.

+10 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
  • ACTION L.1- Verify interlock in required state for existing condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
  • ACTION D.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 14 of 20 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4.

- RX04D, Steam Generator 1-04 Level Transmitter (LT-554) fails low.

Indications Available:

8A-4.6 - SG 4 LVL LO 8A-4.8 - SG 4 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (power level dependent) 8A-4.12 - SG 4 LVL DEV (power level dependent) 8A-4.14 - SG 4 1 OF 4 LVL LO-LO 1-LI-554, SG 4 LVL (NR) CHAN I indication failed low

+1 min BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE Steam Generator 1-04 Level Transmitter (LT-554) failed low.

DIRECT performance of ABN-710, Steam Generator Level Instrumentation US Malfunction, Section 2.0.

BOP DETERMINE controlling level channel has failed.

Manually CONTROL 1-LK-580, SG 4 BYP CTRL as necessary to maintain BOP Steam Generator 1-04 at programmed level.

BOP VERIFY instruments on common instrument line indicate NORMAL.

  • VERIFY Loop 3 Instruments FT-542, LT-549, and FT-543 responding normally per Attachment 1.

ABN-710 Caution: Turbine Trip AND Feedwater Isolation will occur if 2 or more of the 3 HI-HI level bistables for the SAME Steam Generator are TRIPPED.

DETERMINE all HI-HI level bistable windows on TSLB-3 for Steam BOP Generator 1-04 are DARK.

BOP VERIFY automatic SG level control available:

  • OBSERVE alternate level control channel 1-LI-549A indication NORMAL.
  • DETERMINE automatic level control desired by Unit Supervisor.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 15 of 20 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PLACE 1-LS-549C, Steam Generator 4 Level Channel Select to the LY-549 BOP position.

BOP PLACE 1-FK-580, SG 4 BYP CTRL in AUTO and MONITOR operation.

+10 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • CONDITION E - One channel inoperable (Channel 4 LO-LO).
  • ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
  • CONDITION D - One channel inoperable (Channel 4 LO-LO).
  • ACTION D.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
  • CONDITION I - One channel inoperable (Channel 4 HI-HI).
  • ACTION I.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Events 5, 6, and 7.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 16 of 20 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump Trip / Manual Reactor Trip Failure / Anticipated Transient Without Trip /

Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 5, 6, and 7.

- RC07A, Reactor Coolant Pump trip.

- RP13C, Manual Reactor Trip failure.

- CONDITIONAL, Bus Breaker CS-1B4-1 Fails to Open.

Indications Available:

5B-1.1 - ANY RCP TRIP 5B-1.2 - 1 of 4 RCP UNDRVOLT 5A-1.3 - RC LOOP 1 1 OF 3 FLO LO Examiner Note: The crew may enter ABN-101, Reactor Coolant Pump Trip / Malfunction, if it is not immediately determined that a Reactor Trip is required.

RECOGNIZE Reactor Coolant Pump trip and INFORM US Reactor trip is

+30 sec RO required.

DIRECT a Reactor Trip and performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or US Safety Injection.

Examiner Note: The Reactor fails to trip when the breaker supplying a CEDM Motor Generator Set remains closed. Opening then closing these breakers would normally trip the CEDM MG set.

CRITICAL TASK Manually Trip Reactor upon Failure of Reactor to Trip Prior to Exiting STATEMENT FRS-0.1A.

CRITICAL RO Manually INITIATE a Reactor Trip.

TASK

  • PLACE 1/1-RTC, RX TRIP Switch in TRIP.
  • PLACE 1/1-RT, RX TRIP Switch in TRIP.
  • DETERMINE Reactor is NOT tripped.
  • [RNO] OPEN CS-1B3-1, INCOMING BKR 1B3-1 and OBSERVE green TRIP light lit.
  • [RNO] RECLOSE CS-1B3-1, INCOMING BKR 1B3-1 and OBSERVE red CLOSE light lit.
  • [RNO] OPEN CS-1B4-1, INCOMING BKR 1B4-1 and OBSERVE red CLOSE light lit.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 17 of 20 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump Trip / Manual Reactor Trip Failure / Anticipated Transient Without Trip /

Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • [RNO] RECLOSE CS-1B4-1, INCOMING BKR 1B4-1.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

  • DETERMINE Neutron flux - NOT DECREASING.

RO DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - OFF.

TRANSITION to FRS-0.1A, Response To Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT,

+2 min US Step 1.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from FRS-0.1A, Response To Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

  • DETERMINE Neutron flux - NOT DECREASING.
  • DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - OFF.

RO * [RNO] INSERT Control Rods 48 steps/minute.

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

  • DETERMINE all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY Total AFW Flow - GREATER THEN 860 GPM:

RO INITIATE Emergency Boration.

CRITICAL TASK Initiate Emergency Boration During Anticipated Transient Without Trip Prior to STATEMENT Exiting FRS-0.1A.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 18 of 20 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump Trip / Manual Reactor Trip Failure / Anticipated Transient Without Trip /

Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK RO INITIATE Emergency Boration of Reactor Coolant System.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from FRS-0.1A, Response To Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, Attachment 1.F, Initiate Emergency Boration.

  • [1.F] ENSURE a Centrifugal Charging Pump - RUNNING.
  • [1.F] VERIFY Charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM.
  • [1.F] PLACE 1/1-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 1 in START.
  • [1.F] PLACE 1/1-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 2 in START.
  • [1.F] PLACE 1/1-8104, EMER BORATE VLV in OPEN.
  • [1.F] VERIFY flow on 1-FI-183A, EMER BORATE FLO.

Booth Operator: Two minutes after being contacted to locally trip the Reactor and once emergency boration is initiated, EXECUTE remote functions RPR112 and RPR 113 to locally trip Reactor.

US/RO CHECK Pressurizer pressure - LESS THAN 2335 psig.

US/RO CHECK If The Following Trips Have Occurred:

  • VERIFY Reactor - TRIPPED.

RO * [RNO] DISPATCH operator to locally trip Reactor.

  • DETERMINE Turbine - TRIPPED.

RO/BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT INDICATION.

US/RO CHECK If Reactor Is Subcritical:

  • DETERMINE Power Range indication - LESS THAN 5%.
  • DETERMINE Intermediate Range Channels - NEGATIVE STARTUP RATE.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 19 of 20 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump Trip / Manual Reactor Trip Failure / Anticipated Transient Without Trip /

Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • GO to Step 18.

US/RO DETERMINE RCPs Should NOT Be Stopped.

US/RO RETURN to Procedure and Step in Effect.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

  • DETERMINE Neutron flux - DECREASING.

RO DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - LIT.

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

  • DETERMINE all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:

  • DETERMINE both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED.

US/RO DETERMINE Safety Injection - NOT REQUIRED.

  • [RNO] If SI is NOT required, GO to EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, Step 1.

Examiner Note: EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, steps begin here.

RO CHECK RCS Temperature:

  • DETERMINE RCS average temperature stable at or trending to 557ºF.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 20 of 20 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump Trip / Manual Reactor Trip Failure / Anticipated Transient Without Trip /

Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP CHECK FW Status:

  • CHECK RCS average temperatures < 564ºF.
  • VERIFY Feedwater Isolation - ISOLATION COMPLETE.

DETERMINE total AFW flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 460 GPM or BOP MAINTAIN any SG narrow range level greater than 43%.

Examiner Note: Pressurizer level is low due to greater than 860 GPM of Auxiliary Feedwater flow during FRS-0.1A entry and minimal core decay heat.

Booth Operator: When Pressurizer level is verified greater than 10%, EXECUTE malfunction CV01B, Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-01 trip.

RO DETERMINE Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-01 has tripped.

  • Manually START Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-02.

RO CHECK PRZR Level Control:

  • DETERMINE PRZR Level - LESS THAN 17%.
  • [RNO] CLOSE Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves.
  • [RNO] CLOSE Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves.
  • [RNO] CLOSE Excess Letdown Isolation Valves.
  • [RNO] VERIFY Pressurizer Heaters - OFF.
  • VERIFY Charging - IN SERVICE.

When actions to restore Pressurizer level are in progress, TERMINATE the scenario.

CPNPP NRC 2011 Sim Scenario #3 Rev f.doc