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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML24024A0182024-01-24024 January 2024 LTR-23-0216-1 - (E-Mail) Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 and 4 - 10 CFR 2.206 Petition -Turkey Point and PWR RPV Embrittlement E-Mail Closure Letter to Petitioner, January 23, 2024 ML24023A0622024-01-10010 January 2024 10 CFR 2.206 Petition - LTR-23-0216-1 - Turkey Point and PWR RPV Embrittlement - E-mail Final Determination Status to Petitioner - 1-10-2024 - L-2023-CRS-0005 IR 05000250/20240102024-01-0505 January 2024 Focused Engineering Inspection 05000250/2024010 and 05000251/2024010 ML23347A0772023-12-13013 December 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4 - LAR to Transition to 24-Month Fuel Cycles (L-2023-LLA-00161) ML23341A0602023-12-0707 December 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4 - Exemption Request for Use of Axiom Fuel Cladding (L-2023-LLE-0036) ML23317A3752023-11-0808 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4 - LAR to Update SFP Criticality Analysis (L-2023-LLA-0142) ML23307A2382023-11-0303 November 2023 10 CFR 2.206 Petition - LTR-23-0216-1 - Initial Assessment; Turkey Point Subsequent License Renewal with Petitioner 11/3/2023 - L-2023-CRS-0005 ML23333A0092023-10-27027 October 2023 Attachment a - NRC Extension of Comment Period-1 ML23265A2692023-09-15015 September 2023 Turkey Point,_Rp Document Request 2023-004 ML23226A0752023-08-14014 August 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4 - Request for Additional Information - RCP LAR (L-2022-LLA-0128) ML23173A1522023-06-22022 June 2023 Request for Additional Information NextEra Fleet Emergency Plan Amendment Request ML23171B0532023-06-20020 June 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Change in Estimated Review Schedule for Turkey Point Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ITS) LAR (L-2022-LLI-0002) ML23198A0592023-05-22022 May 2023 FPL to Fws, Notification of Doa Crocodile in CCS on 5/22/23 ML23138A0212023-05-17017 May 2023 Telephone Record, Call with Florida Power and Light Regarding Decommissioning Funding Plan Update Dated March 30, 2021 ML23129A8322023-05-0505 May 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4 - Request for Additional Information - RCP LAR (L-2022-LLA-0128) ML23109A1862023-04-19019 April 2023 and Turkey Point Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Proposed Alternative to Asme Section XI Authorizing Implementation of Asme Code Case N-752-1 ML23117A2712023-04-11011 April 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Updated Data for Doa Turkey Point American Crocodile at 4/10/2023 ML23067A2812023-03-0808 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Non-causal American Croc Doa Turkey Point ML23038A1892023-02-0303 February 2023 RP RFI April 2023 ML23006A0262023-01-0505 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Audit Plan - Turkey Point Fire Protection Changes to Support RCP Seal Replacement LAR ML22311A4752022-11-0707 November 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4 - Request for Additional Information - ITS ML22293B6562022-10-18018 October 2022 Request for 45 Day Extension of Comment Period of Turkey Point Subsequent License Renewal Scoping Process, Docket Id NRC-2022-0172 by Natural Resources Defense Council, Miami Waterkeeper and Counsel for Friends of the Earth ML22265A1522022-09-21021 September 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4 - LAR to Revise Fire Protection Program (L-2022-LLA-0128) ML22258A1862022-09-15015 September 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Turkey Point Unit Nos. 3 and 4 - Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action License Amendment Requests to Replace Instrumentation with Digital Systems ML22181A0562022-06-30030 June 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Turkey Point U3 Sgtir (L-2022-LRO-0070) ML22178A1032022-06-25025 June 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Turkey Point Doa American Crocodile 6/25/22 ML22147A0672022-05-19019 May 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Turkey Point Doa Crocodile 05/19/2022 ML22095A0162022-04-0505 April 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Verbal Authorization of Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Unit 3 - Icw Relief Request No. 10-II ML22081A0292022-03-21021 March 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 - Request for Additional Information - Icw Alternative ML22018A0272022-01-18018 January 2022 2022 All RFI Responses - Exercise and Program Inspections - Revl ML21302A0052021-12-23023 December 2021 Email to Nextera/Fpl Re Discussion of Availability of Human Factor Validation Information to Support the Planned Turkey Point Digital I&C License Amendment Request ML21307A2882021-11-18018 November 2021 NRC to Fws, Request to Reinitiate Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation for Continued Operation of Turkey Point ML21298A0572021-10-25025 October 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Final: Tpn Request for Additional Information - Round 2 Concerning Relief Request 10 - Extension EPID: L-2021-LLR-0077 ML21291A1272021-10-14014 October 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Fifth Ten-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Relief Request No.10 - Extension (L-2021-LLR-0077) ML21270A1652021-09-27027 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Turkey Point Request for Additional Information Concerning Full Spectrum LOCA Methodology - EPID L-2021-LLA-0070 ML21266A2602021-09-22022 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Partial Sea Turtle Carcass at Turkey Point ML21252A2142021-09-0101 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Final: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 - Request for Additional Information Concerning Relief Requests 8 and 9 ML21207A1212021-06-30030 June 2021 Fws to NRC, Biological Opinion Notifications to Fws Law Enforcement ML21158A2332021-06-0707 June 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Fifth Ten-Year ISI Extension of ISI RPV Welds from 10 to 20 Years (L-2021-LLR-0038) ML21154A0872021-06-0202 June 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - 06/02/2021 Print a Logbook Entry: Turkey Point Endangered Species Report Regarding Injured American Crocodiles ML21154A0862021-05-25025 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review: Turkey Point - Update Listing of Approved LOCA Methodologies to Adopt Full Spectrum LOCA Methodology ML21140A0672021-05-13013 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Regarding Doa American Crocodile Report 5-13-21 ML21131A1362021-05-0404 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) 5/4/2021 Report Regarding Doa American Crocodile ML21097A1832021-03-30030 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Endangered Species Death Report from Turkey Point Regarding Incident on 03/30/2021 ML21084A1312021-03-18018 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Deceased American Crocodile Found Outside FPL Property Line ML21056A0002021-02-24024 February 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Endangered Species - 2/24/2021 Logbook Entry Regarding an American Crocodile ML21029A0172021-01-25025 January 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - 1/25/2021 Logbook Entry Regarding an American Crocodile Reported in the Owner Controlled Area ML21025A4152021-01-25025 January 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Dated January 10, 2021 - Open Phase Condition Implementation ML20346A1022020-12-0808 December 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Response: September 17, 2020 Submittal to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ML20218A5502020-08-0505 August 2020 Florida Power & Light Letter L-2020-127: FPL QAPD for 10 CFR 52 Licenses FPL-2 Revision Summary 2024-01-05
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARML23333A0172023-11-27027 November 2023 Attachment I - Chin - the Cooling Canal System at the FPL-Turkey-Point Power Station ML23333A0142023-11-27027 November 2023 Attachment F - Groundwater Tek Inc - Peer Review Study Final-1 ML24012A0422023-11-16016 November 2023 FAQ 23-03 Turkey Point IE01 Proposed NRC Response ML23265A5512023-09-22022 September 2023 Enclosure 3: WCAP-18830-NP, Turkey Point Fuel Storage Criticality Analysis for 24 Month Cycles L-2023-115, Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-1)2023-08-21021 August 2023 Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-1) L-2023-049, Correction to U4R33 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2023-03-30030 March 2023 Correction to U4R33 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report L-2023-028, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Reporting of Changes to, or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Models or Applications2023-03-27027 March 2023 and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Reporting of Changes to, or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Models or Applications L-2023-010, Supplemental Information Regarding License Amendment Request 274, Reactor Protection System, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, and Nuclear Instrumentation System Replacement Project - Submittal of RPS / ESFAS / Nis2023-02-10010 February 2023 Supplemental Information Regarding License Amendment Request 274, Reactor Protection System, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, and Nuclear Instrumentation System Replacement Project - Submittal of RPS / ESFAS / Nis L-2022-168, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - 10 CFR 50.46 - Emergency Core Cooling System LBLOCA 30-Day Report2022-10-26026 October 2022 and Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - 10 CFR 50.46 - Emergency Core Cooling System LBLOCA 30-Day Report L-2022-110, License Amendment Request 276, Revise Fire Protection Program in Support of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Replacement Project (Non-Proprietary)2022-08-26026 August 2022 License Amendment Request 276, Revise Fire Protection Program in Support of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Replacement Project (Non-Proprietary) L-2022-142, Revised Diversity and Defense-In-Depth Evaluation (D3), Framatome Document No. 51-9324096-0042022-08-19019 August 2022 Revised Diversity and Defense-In-Depth Evaluation (D3), Framatome Document No. 51-9324096-004 L-2022-038, Emergency Response Data System (Eros) Changes2022-05-17017 May 2022 Emergency Response Data System (Eros) Changes L-2022-073, Diversity and Defense-In-Depth Evaluation (D3), Framatome Document No. 51-9324096-0042022-05-0303 May 2022 Diversity and Defense-In-Depth Evaluation (D3), Framatome Document No. 51-9324096-004 L-2022-022, Updated Conditions of Certification Report2022-02-14014 February 2022 Updated Conditions of Certification Report L-2021-182, Summary of Commitment Revisions, Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Cleaning Inspection Commitment Revisions2021-09-16016 September 2021 Summary of Commitment Revisions, Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Cleaning Inspection Commitment Revisions L-2021-069, Commitment Revision Summary Report for Reactor Vessel Head Leakage Detection System (Rvhlds)2021-06-24024 June 2021 Commitment Revision Summary Report for Reactor Vessel Head Leakage Detection System (Rvhlds) IR 05000250/20200112020-07-23023 July 2020 NRC Inspection Report 05000250-2020011 and 05000251-2020011 and Investigation Report 2-2019-011; and Apparent Violation Final L-2020-073, Fifth Ten-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Revised Relief Request No. 6 and Supplemental Information for Train B CCW Return Piping2020-04-13013 April 2020 Fifth Ten-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Revised Relief Request No. 6 and Supplemental Information for Train B CCW Return Piping ML20098F3412020-04-0707 April 2020 Exigent License Amendment Request 272, One-Time Extension of TS 6.8.4 Steam Generator Inspection Program - Response to Request for Additional Information L-2019-204, Request for Use and Approval of Vapor Infusion Technology 90-Day Trial - Notification2019-11-25025 November 2019 Request for Use and Approval of Vapor Infusion Technology 90-Day Trial - Notification L-2019-151, 10 CFR 50.46 - Emergency Core Cooling System LBLOCA 30-Day Report2019-08-0606 August 2019 10 CFR 50.46 - Emergency Core Cooling System LBLOCA 30-Day Report L-2019-010, Proposed Alternative for the Use of Encoded Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination Techniques in Lieu of Radiography for Ferritic and Austenitic Welds2019-03-19019 March 2019 Proposed Alternative for the Use of Encoded Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination Techniques in Lieu of Radiography for Ferritic and Austenitic Welds L-2019-054, Baffle-Former Bolts Predictive Evaluations2019-03-13013 March 2019 Baffle-Former Bolts Predictive Evaluations ML19072A1622019-03-0505 March 2019 National Park Service, Southeast Regional Office, Comments Dated March 5, 2019, on Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4 Preliminary Draft SEIS Regarding Subsequent License Renewal ML18353A8352018-12-31031 December 2018 Biological Assessment for the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Proposed Subsequent License Renewal ML18299A1162018-10-15015 October 2018 Structural Integrity Associates Engineering Report No. 1700109.401P, Revision 7 - Redacted, Evaluation of Environmentally-Assisted Fatigue for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 for Subsequent License Renewal L-2018-174, Structural Integrity Associates Engineering Report No. 0901350.401, Revision 4, Leak-Before-Break Evaluation - Accumulator, Pressurizer Surge, and Residual Heat Removal Lines2018-10-12012 October 2018 Structural Integrity Associates Engineering Report No. 0901350.401, Revision 4, Leak-Before-Break Evaluation - Accumulator, Pressurizer Surge, and Residual Heat Removal Lines ML18299A1182018-10-12012 October 2018 Structural Integrity Associates Engineering Report No. 0901350.304, Revision 3, Fatigue Crack Growth Evaluation, October 12, 2018 L-2018-187, Subsequent License Renewal Application Revision to SLRA Section 3.5.2.2.2.6, Reduction of Strength and Mechanical, Properties of Concrete Due to Irradiation2018-10-0505 October 2018 Subsequent License Renewal Application Revision to SLRA Section 3.5.2.2.2.6, Reduction of Strength and Mechanical, Properties of Concrete Due to Irradiation L-2018-169, Responses to Requests for Additional Information for Subsequent License Renewal Application No. HC-7-a L-2018-169 Environmental Review2018-10-0505 October 2018 Responses to Requests for Additional Information for Subsequent License Renewal Application No. HC-7-a L-2018-169 Environmental Review L-2018-173, Notification of Request for Use and Approval of Polyacrylic Acid Pilot Program2018-09-21021 September 2018 Notification of Request for Use and Approval of Polyacrylic Acid Pilot Program ML18254A3412018-09-11011 September 2018 Fish and Wildlife Service'S List of Migratory Birds Near Turkey Point ML18227B5212018-08-15015 August 2018 Submit Attachment a, Annual Hourly Percent Frequency of Vertical and Horizontal Stability Categories by Wind Direction and Wind Speed ML18227A2902018-08-15015 August 2018 Submit Report Contains Official Summary of Startup Physics Tests, Unit 4 Cycle Iii. the Tests Were Conducted in Accordance with Operating Procedure 0204.5, Startup Sequence After Refueling L-2018-098, Annual Report for the AP1000 Standard Plant Design, 2017 Model Year 10 CFR 50.462018-04-18018 April 2018 Annual Report for the AP1000 Standard Plant Design, 2017 Model Year 10 CFR 50.46 L-2018-054, Attachment B: Process Control Program, 0-HPA-045, Revision 0A, Issued 2/16/172018-02-16016 February 2018 Attachment B: Process Control Program, 0-HPA-045, Revision 0A, Issued 2/16/17 L-2017-148, Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation2017-08-11011 August 2017 Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation L-2017-123, Special Report - Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps Inoperable2017-06-29029 June 2017 Special Report - Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps Inoperable L-2017-124, Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary2017-06-29029 June 2017 Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary L-2017-014, Florida Power & Light Company - 10 CPR 50.46 Annual Reporting of Changes to, or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Models or Applications for 20162017-04-17017 April 2017 Florida Power & Light Company - 10 CPR 50.46 Annual Reporting of Changes to, or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Models or Applications for 2016 L-2016-226, NEI 12-06, Revision 2, Appendix G, G.4.2 Mitigating Strategies Assessment Flex Strategies Report for the New Flood Hazard Information2016-12-20020 December 2016 NEI 12-06, Revision 2, Appendix G, G.4.2 Mitigating Strategies Assessment Flex Strategies Report for the New Flood Hazard Information L-2016-058, Licensee Qualification for Performing Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Analysis2016-03-23023 March 2016 Licensee Qualification for Performing Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Analysis ML16013A4722016-01-22022 January 2016 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f) Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task L-2015-313, Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation2015-12-18018 December 2015 Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation L-2015-137, Submittal of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments2015-04-22022 April 2015 Submittal of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments ML15054A0372015-02-23023 February 2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Record of Review Dispositions to Fire PRA Facts and Observations for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Stations, Units 3 and 4 ML14338A5542014-12-0404 December 2014 NRC-2013- TN2986-NRC 2014 St. Lucie ML14338A5552014-12-0404 December 2014 NRC-2013-TN3079-NRC 2014 St. Lucie License Renewal L-2014-233, Submittal of Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-I)2014-07-22022 July 2014 Submittal of Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-I) L-2014-085, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Re Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2014-03-27027 March 2014 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Re Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident 2023-09-22
[Table view] Category:Miscellaneous
MONTHYEARML24012A0422023-11-16016 November 2023 FAQ 23-03 Turkey Point IE01 Proposed NRC Response L-2023-115, Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-1)2023-08-21021 August 2023 Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-1) L-2023-028, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Reporting of Changes to, or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Models or Applications2023-03-27027 March 2023 and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Reporting of Changes to, or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Models or Applications L-2022-038, Emergency Response Data System (Eros) Changes2022-05-17017 May 2022 Emergency Response Data System (Eros) Changes L-2021-182, Summary of Commitment Revisions, Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Cleaning Inspection Commitment Revisions2021-09-16016 September 2021 Summary of Commitment Revisions, Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Cleaning Inspection Commitment Revisions L-2019-204, Request for Use and Approval of Vapor Infusion Technology 90-Day Trial - Notification2019-11-25025 November 2019 Request for Use and Approval of Vapor Infusion Technology 90-Day Trial - Notification L-2019-151, 10 CFR 50.46 - Emergency Core Cooling System LBLOCA 30-Day Report2019-08-0606 August 2019 10 CFR 50.46 - Emergency Core Cooling System LBLOCA 30-Day Report L-2018-173, Notification of Request for Use and Approval of Polyacrylic Acid Pilot Program2018-09-21021 September 2018 Notification of Request for Use and Approval of Polyacrylic Acid Pilot Program L-2017-148, Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation2017-08-11011 August 2017 Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation L-2017-123, Special Report - Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps Inoperable2017-06-29029 June 2017 Special Report - Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps Inoperable L-2017-124, Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary2017-06-29029 June 2017 Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary L-2016-226, NEI 12-06, Revision 2, Appendix G, G.4.2 Mitigating Strategies Assessment Flex Strategies Report for the New Flood Hazard Information2016-12-20020 December 2016 NEI 12-06, Revision 2, Appendix G, G.4.2 Mitigating Strategies Assessment Flex Strategies Report for the New Flood Hazard Information L-2016-058, Licensee Qualification for Performing Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Analysis2016-03-23023 March 2016 Licensee Qualification for Performing Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Analysis ML16013A4722016-01-22022 January 2016 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f) Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task L-2015-313, Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation2015-12-18018 December 2015 Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation L-2015-137, Submittal of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments2015-04-22022 April 2015 Submittal of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Summary Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments ML15054A0372015-02-23023 February 2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Record of Review Dispositions to Fire PRA Facts and Observations for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Stations, Units 3 and 4 ML14338A5552014-12-0404 December 2014 NRC-2013-TN3079-NRC 2014 St. Lucie License Renewal ML14338A5542014-12-0404 December 2014 NRC-2013- TN2986-NRC 2014 St. Lucie L-2014-233, Submittal of Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-I)2014-07-22022 July 2014 Submittal of Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-I) L-2013-246, Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2013-09-19019 September 2013 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report L-2013-258, 10 CFR 71.95 - Cask 8-120B - 60 Day Report2013-09-16016 September 2013 10 CFR 71.95 - Cask 8-120B - 60 Day Report L-2013-237, CFR 50.46, Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems in Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors - 30 Day Special Report2013-08-20020 August 2013 CFR 50.46, Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems in Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors - 30 Day Special Report L-2013-140, Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation2013-04-19019 April 2013 Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation ML12234A7512012-08-28028 August 2012 Closeout of Review of the One-Time Inspection of Class 1 Small Bore Piping Program Revised Commitment and Inspection Plan L-2012-090, Special Report - Containment Tendon Corrosion Protection Medium Volume Reduction2012-03-0505 March 2012 Special Report - Containment Tendon Corrosion Protection Medium Volume Reduction L-2011-498, Units, 3 & 4 - 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments for Period Covering 12/04/2009 Through 05/16/2011 and Updated Technical Specification Bases2011-11-16016 November 2011 Units, 3 & 4 - 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments for Period Covering 12/04/2009 Through 05/16/2011 and Updated Technical Specification Bases ML1122805012011-09-0909 September 2011 Request to Initiate Informal Section 7 Consultation for the Proposed Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and 4 Extended Power Uprate (ME4907 and ME4908) Encl ML1122802922011-09-0909 September 2011 Request to Initiate Informal Section 7 Consultation for the Proposed Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and 4 Extended Power Uprate L-2011-213, Cycle 26 Startup Report2011-07-28028 July 2011 Cycle 26 Startup Report ML1119305872011-03-0404 March 2011 Initial Exam Retake 2011-301 Final Administrative JPMs L-2010-115, 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report Changes, Tests, and Experiments Implemented as Allowed by 10 CFR 50.59 for the Period Covering May 11, 2008 Through December 4, 20092010-06-0404 June 2010 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report Changes, Tests, and Experiments Implemented as Allowed by 10 CFR 50.59 for the Period Covering May 11, 2008 Through December 4, 2009 ML1019304172010-05-0606 May 2010 Tritium Database Report ML1012704392010-05-0505 May 2010 Y020100187 - List of Historical Leaks and Spills at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants ML15142A6502009-06-19019 June 2009 Florida Department of Environmental Protection Conditions of Certification - PA 03-45D on Turkey Point Units 3, 4, and 5 L-2008-160, Updated Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors.2008-08-11011 August 2008 Updated Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors. L-2007-129, Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) Maintenance2007-08-20020 August 2007 Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) Maintenance L-2007-095, CFR 50.59 Summary Report, Changes, Tests, and Experiments Implemented as Allowed by 10 CFR 50.59 for the Period Covering June 13, 2005 Through December 9, 20062007-06-0808 June 2007 CFR 50.59 Summary Report, Changes, Tests, and Experiments Implemented as Allowed by 10 CFR 50.59 for the Period Covering June 13, 2005 Through December 9, 2006 L-2006-247, Core Operating Limits Report2006-11-27027 November 2006 Core Operating Limits Report L-2006-241, Significance Determination Regarding a Loss of Power to Operating Residual Heat Removal Pump - Additional Information Regarding Gothic Analysis2006-10-17017 October 2006 Significance Determination Regarding a Loss of Power to Operating Residual Heat Removal Pump - Additional Information Regarding Gothic Analysis L-2006-180, Sation; St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2 and Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4 - Groundwater Questionnaire2006-07-31031 July 2006 Sation; St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2 and Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4 - Groundwater Questionnaire L-2006-131, Wastewater Permit Number FL0001562, Request for Minor Revision Notification2006-05-22022 May 2006 Wastewater Permit Number FL0001562, Request for Minor Revision Notification ML0614301742006-05-0505 May 2006 Biological Opinion Regarding the American Crocodile at Turkey Point L-2006-088, Core Operating Limits Report2006-03-29029 March 2006 Core Operating Limits Report ML0727008492005-01-31031 January 2005 Caldon Experience in Nuclear Feedwater Flow Measurement ML0503803942004-03-0505 March 2004 E-mail from P. Fillion to C. Payne - Turkey Point Report Input ML0503803832004-02-0606 February 2004 E-mail from P. Fillion to C. Payne, K. O'Donohue - Evaluation of Valves - Revision ML0503803752004-02-0404 February 2004 E-mail from P. Fillion to C. Payne, K. O'Donohue - Analysis of Two Valves ML0504703632003-09-0909 September 2003 9/9/03 Turkey Point Condition Report 03-1330-1 L-2003-068, Order (EA-03-009) Relaxation Request, Examination Coverage of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles - Supplemental Data2003-03-14014 March 2003 Order (EA-03-009) Relaxation Request, Examination Coverage of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles - Supplemental Data 2023-08-21
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rharlie Payne - Turkey Point Report Input Page II From: Paul Fillion)
To: Charlie Payne Date: 3/5/04 3:27PM
Subject:
Turkey Point Report Input
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Subject:
Turkey Point Report Input Creation Date: 3/5/04 3:27PM From: Paul Fillion Created By: PJF(nrc.lov Recipients ATL PO.ATL DO DCP (Charlie Payne)
Post Office Route ATL PO.ATLDO Files Size Date & Time tpTFP407pjf.wpd 22855 03/05/04 03:25PM Options Expiration Date: None Priority: Standard Reply Requested: No Return Notification: None Concealed
Subject:
No Security: Standard
iCharlie Payne - tDTFP407Dif.wrpd Pagie I 1Charlie Payne tDTFP4O7Dif.wDd
- Pane II INPUT FOR TURKEY POINT 2004 TFPI REPORT 04-07 by Paul J. Fillion
.01 Systems Reguired to Achieve and Maintain Post-fire Safe Shutdown
- a. Inspection Scope Focusing on the chemical and volume control system (CVCS), the team evaluated whether the safe shutdown analysis (SSA) properly identified and categorized components in terms of safe shutdown function. In addition, a sample of Instrumentation known to be necessary for safe shutdown, eg. pressurizer and pressure and level indication, was checked in the safe shutdown analysis.
The team considered the capability to safely shutdown given a fire in the selected Fire Area would cause a loss of normal power source to the safety-related buses.
Specifically the control circuit for emergency diesel generator 4A was reviewed in terms of the potential for permissives and interlocks being affected by a fire In Fire Area U, the Unit 4 Train B 4160 V switchgear room. The team checked that the 4160 V Train B normal power supply circuit breaker would not be disabled by a control room fire. This is important because the Train B emergency diesel generator breaker could not be closed if the normal power supply breaker remained closed and Train B Is the source of power for auxiliary shutdown operation.
- b. Findings No findings of significance were Identified.
.02 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Ca6ability
- a. Inspection Scope To address the issue of separation of redundant electric circuits located in the same fire area, the team determined which unprotected cables penetrated the wall between the Unit 4 Train A and Train B 4160 V switchgear rooms. The function of each of these cables was researched by the team to ascertain whether a fire In one switchgear room could affect the capability of equipment in the other room to achieve safe shutdown.
- b. Findings No findings of significance were Identified.
.03 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis
- a. Inspection Scope The team made a detailed review of a number of valves, instruments and other equipment relative to a postulated fire in each of the three Fire Areas chosen. This
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review included examination of the licensee's essential equipment list, power supply, essential cable list with routing information, resolution of potential problem cables, elementary control diagram and special fire response procedures. The potential for spurious valve operation or malfunction was considered in the period immediately following a fire and in the period after operator realignment to hot standby mode but before fire extinguishing. In the case of control room fire, alternate shutdown was considered. The applicable criterion was that a fire would not degrade the ability to shutdown. The components reviewed in this portion of the inspection were:
Volume control tank outlet valve (MOV), LCV-3(4)-115C RWST to charging pump valve (AOV), LCV-3(4)-115B RCP 3B #1 seal leakoff control valve (AOV), CV-3(4)-303B Boric acid injection stop valve, MOV-3(4)-350 Charging flow control valve (AOV), HCV-3(4Y121 RCP thermal barrier component cooling water supply isolation valve, MOV-3(4)-716B RCP thermal barrier component cooling water return isolation valve, MOV-3(4)-626 RCS pressure indicator (at auxiliary shutdown panel), P1-3-406-1 RCS pressurizer level (at auxiliary shutdown panel), Ll-3-462-1 Excore neutron flux detector (at auxiliary shutdown panel), NI-4-6649B-3 Air handling unit 4E243B Air handling unit 4E244A EDG 4B voltmeter and wattmeter (at auxiliary shutdown panel)
Unit 3 components Iited above were reviewed'inrielationhtoith-cntroI -room-and Flre Area T, and the Unit 4 components were reviewed in relation to Fire Area U.
Coordination of AC power and DC control protective devices was considered in terms of fire induced short circuits resulting in loss of safe shutdown capability. Control circuits reviewed were LCV-3-115B and component cooling water pump 4B breaker.
- b. Findings
Introduction:
A Green NCV was identified for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G.2, involving failure to protect a control cable for valve LCV-4-115B and a control cable for valve MOV-4-626 both in Fire Area U. Lack of protection for the LCV-4-115B cable could have lead to the water source for charging pump suction being
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- Paae3I shut off thus damaging the charging pump. Lack of protection for the MOV-4-626 cable could have lead to loss of RCP thermal barrier cooling. Both of these problems together with existing shutdown procedures could have led to RCP seal damage. The licensee resolved this concern by modifying their shutdown procedure.
Description:
Valve LVC-4-11 5B Is In a flow path between the reserve water storage tank (RWST) and the charging pumps suction header. It is an air powered, solenoid controlled, valve. Electric power Is 125 VDC, and the logic is 'energize to open." The valve can be controlled from the main control room and the auxiliary shutdown panel.
The problem identified by the team Involves the following scenario or sequence of events. There is a fire in Fire Area U. It Is postulated the fire would be extinguished In approximately one hour. Immediately after the start of the fire, operators secure the 4A charging pump if running. Valve LCV-4-1 I 5B is opened from the control room to establish the reserve water storage tank (RWST) as the source for charging pumps.
Procedures direct starting (or re-starting) the 4A charging pump within one hour. After the 4A charging pump is started, valve LCV-4-1 15B spuriously closes due to a fire induced short-circuit in the un-protected control cable which terminates at the auxiliary shutdown panel in Fire Area U. Closure of the suction valve leads to pump damage.
Two other charging pumps are installed but they would not be available In this scenario.
The 4B pump may not have power by virtue of the fact that it is powered via the 4160 V bus which is in Fire Area U. The 4C pump, a Train A/B swing pump, would not be available because it is locked out by procedure due to diesel generator loading considerations.
Valve MOV-4-626 is a motor operated valve in the RCP thermal barrier component cooling water return header pipe, I.e. it controls cooling water flow from all three pumps.
It is powered from motor control center 4B. The valve can be controlled from the control room and the auxiliary shutdown panel. Because a control cable for this valve terminates at the auxiliary shutdown panel In Fire Area U and the cable is un-protected, a short-circuit between two wires could cause the valve to spuriously close. Closure of the valve stops RCP thermal barrier cooling. If this event happens concurrent with the loss of charging flow as described above due to closure of LCV-4-115B, all RCP cooling is lost, and a RCP seal LOCA could result. Procedures were written such that credit cannot be given for recognition and recovery from the spurious valve closures in time to prevent the seal LOCA. This problem resulted from lack of protection for cables of
__ -__ required-valVes-and failure-of thesafe-shutdown-analysis-to-ldentify-the-above-scenario.
Analysis: The problem is a performance deficiency because it Is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, In that one train of safe shutdown equipment was not protected from fire damage. The performance deficiency is greater than minor because It affected the reactor safety cornerstone objective of Initiating events, I.e. fire. The fire protection risk significance phase 1 screening methodology was applied. The step I criteria were met in that fire barriers were degraded. Fire barriers were considered degraded because one train of shutdown equipment was not free of fire damage. Also detection capability in the fire area under consideration was also degraded as described In Section xxxxx. In applying the step 2 screening, the licensee's safe shutdown analysis paradigm is two trains of shutdown equipment in one fire area with no remaining capability outside the fire area. Having two trains in one fire area is a consequence of
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- d the fact that the actual mechanical flow paths are not entirely redundant making the valves in question important to both trains of shutdown equipment. In general, the safe shutdown analysis addressed this situation with preemptive operator actions, some of which take place outside the control room. The finding was essentially that this approach was not entirely successful, and therefore need for a phase 2 analysis Is indicated by the screening methodology. All the sequences on the small break LOCA worksheet and sequences 5 and 6 on the loss of offsite power worksheet were evaluated. The small break LOCA worksheet was relevant because of the foregoing discussion. The loss of offsite power worksheet was relevant because a fire In the 4160 V switchgear room can cause a short-circuit on the incoming feeder from the Unit 4 startup transformer, which In turn means that the Unit 4 startup transformer must be automatically isolated and cannot be re-energized until repairs are made. If the fire then caused a short-circuit on the incoming feeder from the Unit 4 auxiliary transformer, this would cause a unit trip and a loss of power on both the 4A and 4B buses. Power could later be recovered at the 4A bus via the Unit 3 startup transformer.
The most important sequences are within the small break LOCA worksheet: sequences six and seven. Sequence six involves operator action to stop the RHR pump and long-term RCS makeup via the operator aligning to the reserve water storage tank.
Sequence seven involves early Inventory high pressure injection. None of these functions are degraded. In addition, the initiating event likelihood was adjusted by a factor of ten to account for the fact that two spurious operations had to occur to cause the RCP seal LOCA.
The fire mitigation frequency was calculated to be -3.2, and the problem existed for greater than 30 days. Standard fire analysis techniques indicated there was a credible fire starting in the switchgear that could damage the control cables at the nearby auxiliary shutdown panel.
Enforcement The finding is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, lIl.G.2, and It was of very low safety significance. It met the criteria of Section VIA.1 of the Enforcement Policy and Is therefore being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV). It was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 04-0610 (MOV-4-626) and CR 04-0683
-(L-CV-1115B). Theviolation probably-o-cc-urred dre-to-inadvertent-errorsln-safe-shutdown analysis. It was identified by the NRC during this inspection, and probably existed since Appendix R became a requirement. This NCV will be tracked as NCV 0500025112004007-xx, Failure to Protect One Train of Safe Shutdown Equipment Needed for RCP Seal Protection In Fire Area U.
.04 Alternative Shutdown Canability The team inspected the safe shutdown analysis and plant configuration In relation to the requirement that hot and cold shutdown from outside the control room (alternate shutdown panel) could be achieved and maintained with or without offsite power available.
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The team reviewed a sample of control circuits and fuse coordination applications from the viewpoint that transfer of controls from the main control room to the alternate shutdown panel should not be affected by fire in the control room.
.05 Operational Implementation of Alternative Shutdown Capability
- a. Inspection Scope The team made sufficient review of surveillance procedures to determine whether or not the licensee was performing functional testing of the transfer/isolation switches, instrumentation and control switches at the auxiliary shutdown panel.
- b. Findinas No findings of significance were Identified.
.08 Cold Shutdown Repairs
- a. Inspection Scope
- a. The team reviewed Fire Response Procedure 3-GOP-305, Hot Shutdown to Cold Standby, to establish whether or not the licensee had materials identified to accomplish repairs of components required to achieve cold shutdown conditions in cases where the analysis predicted repairs may be necessary. The criteria for this review was that the list of materials was complete and that the types of repairs envisioned could be completed within a time frame consistent with reaching cold shutdown in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
- b. Findings No findings of significance were identified
- 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4A02 Identification and Resolution of Problems
- a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a sample of licensee audits, self-assessments and CRs to verify that items related to the Turkey Point fire protection plan, and the capability to successfully achieve and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition following a plant fire, were appropriately entered into the licensee's corrective action program In accordance with the Turkey Point quality assurance program and procedural requirements. The items selected were reviewed for classification and appropriateness of the corrective actions taken, or initiated, to resolve the issues. In addition, the team reviewed the licensee's evaluations of and corrective actions for selected industry experience issues related to the fire protection area. The operating experience reports were reviewed to verify that the licensee's review and actions were appropriate.
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- b. Findings In reviewing CR-xxx, which dealt with the clarity and organization of time-critical manual actions in the fire response procedures, the team observed the CR appeared to be prematurely closed. When this subject was breached with cognizant operations personnel, they agreed with that the procedures needed enhancement relative to manual actions. A new CR was generated to address the issue. This will be a documented minor violation. [Section will be completed by Necota]
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Drawings 5610-E-144, Tray, Conduit & Grounding Miscellaneous Details, Rev. 31 5610-J-539P, Instrument Loop Diagram RCS Pressure Indication Alternate Shutdown, Rev. 4 5610-M-430-204, Instrument Loop Diagram, Charging Pump Pressure Discharge Flow & CVCS Hand Controls, Rev. 3 5610-E-27, Sheet 3Y, Elementary Diagram, Mechanical Auxiliaries Fire Pump Control Breaker 30305, Rev. 4 5610-E-27, Sheet 3Y1, Elementary Diagram, Mechanical Auxiliaries Fire Pump Motor P39, Rev. I 5610-E-1, Sheet 1, Main Single Line Unit 3, Rev. 33 5610-E-1, Sheet 2, Main Single Line Unit 4, Rev. 8 5610-T-E-1 592, Sheet 1, 125V D.C. & 120V A.C. Electrical Distribution, Rev. 39 5613-M-3047, Sheet 1, Unit 3, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Chemical and Volume Control System Charging and Letdown, Rev. 17 5613-M-3047, Sheet 2, Unit 3 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Chemical and Volume Control System Charging and Letdown, Rev. 38 5613-M-3047, Sheet 3, Unit 3, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Chemical and Volume Control System Charging and Letdown, Rev. 20 5613-M-3030, Sheet 5, Unit 3, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Component Cooling Water System, Rev. 16 5613-E-28, Sheet 36B, Elementary Diagram, Electrical Auxiliaries Diesel Generator 3A Relaying & Metering, Rev. 2 5613-E-25, Sheet 65B, Unit 3, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Auxiliaries Refueling Water Inlet Stop Valve into Charging Header - 115B, Rev. 2 5613-E-25, She~et33A7Uii37,Elementary Diagram, Rea-cto-rAuxiliaries-RCPThermal Barrler C.C.W. Isolation MOV, MOV-3-626, Rev. 2 5613-E-25, Sheet 27C, Unit 3, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Auxiliaries Boric Acid Injection Stop Valve MOV-3-350, Rev. 2 5613-E-25, Sheet 32H, Unit 3, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Auxiliaries RCP Bearing Oil CCW Supply Isolation Valve MOV-3-716B 5613-E-25, Sheet 34A, Unit 3, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Auxiliaries Volume Control Tank Low Level Isolation LCV-3-115C, Rev. 6 5613-E-25, Sheet 67B, Unit 3, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Auxiliaries RCP 'B" Seal Water Disch Isolation Valve CV-3-303B, Rev. 2 5613-E-25, Sheet 98A, Unit 3, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Auxiliaries Charging System Control Valve HCV-3-121, Rev. 0 5613-E-25, Sheet 5B, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Auxiliaries Charging Pump 3P201B
I[Char-lie Payne - tDTFP407rpif.wpd Page Pae7 71 I Carle ayn nTP4Onj.w 5614-E-25, Sheet 33A, Unit 4, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Auxiliaries RCP Thermal Barrier C.C.W. Isolation MOV, MOV-4-626, Rev. 4 5614-E-25, Sheet 8B, Unit 4, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Auxiliaries Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 4B Breaker 40408, Rev. 3 5614-E-25, Sheet 32H, Unit 4, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Auxiliaries RCP Bearing Oil CCW Supply Isolation Valve MOV-4-716B 5614-E-25, Sheet 32G, Unit 4, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Auxiliaries RCP Bearing Oil CCW Supply Isolation Valve MOV-4-716A 5614-E-28, Sheet 8A, Elementary Diagram, Electrical Auxiliaries Diesel Generator Breaker 4AA20, Rev. 5 5614-E-28, Sheet 14A, Elementary Diagram, Electrical Auxiliaries 4160V Switchgear Bus 4A Lock Out Relay, Rev. 2 5614-E-28, Sheet 1B, Elementary Diagram, Electrical Auxiliaries Auxiliary Transformer Breaker 4AB02. Rev. 8 5614-E-25, Sheet 2B, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Auxiliaries Component Cooling Water PP 4B Breaker 4AB13, Rev.5 5614-J-806, Sheet 2B, Instrument Loop Diagram Pressurizer Pressure and Level, Rev. 0 Calculations and Analysis 561 0-M-722, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis (Pages relevant to the selected fire areas) 5610-E-2000, Appendix R Essential Cable List (Parts relevant to the components selected for review) 5610-M-723, Appendix R Essential Equipment List (Portions relevant to the systems reviewed) 5177-265-EG-22, Breaker Fuse Coordination (Portions relevant to Inspection scope)
JPN-PTN-SEEP-93-01 1, Safety Evaluation for Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire, Rev.0 Procedures 3-OSP-300.1, Alternate Shutdown Panel 30264 Operability Test, dated 9129/03 3-OSP-300.2, Pre-Staging Equipment and Alternate Shutdown Panel 3C64 Switch and Instrumentation Alignment Check, dated 1112/01 CRs Reviewed 02-1268-1&2, Feasibility of performing manual actions with respect to normalized criteria 04-0580, Evaluate an alternate method to define time-lines that could enhance manual action sequences and interactions 04-0292, Operations practices not fully reflected In Pre-fire Plans procedural format 04-0124, Manual action required to trip RCP breakers when trip from main control room not available 03-4126, Procedure enhancement recommended to assign groups of fire zone manual actions to designated operators 04-0033, Credited valves MOV-3/4-860A&B and 861A&B in path from containment sump to RHR suction could be affected by fire 03-1330&1330-1, RCP seal protection circuit analysis issues