IR 05000250/2020011
| ML20205L316 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/2020 |
| From: | Mark Miller Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Moul D Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| EA-20-043 2-2019-011, IR 2020011 | |
| Download: ML20205L316 (11) | |
Text
July 23, 2020
SUBJECT:
TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000250/2020011 and 05000251/2020011, AND INVESTIGATION REPORT 2-2019-011; AND APPARENT VIOLATION
Dear Mr. Moul:
This letter refers to the investigation completed on March 10, 2020, by the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) at the Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station. The purpose of the investigation was to determine if three mechanics at Turkey Point deliberately falsified information in a work order package associated with required inspection and maintenance of a safety-related check valve.
Enclosure 1 to this report presents the results of this investigation. A Factual Summary of the OI Investigation is provided as Enclosure 2.
Based on the results of this investigation, an apparent violation (AV) was identified and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The AV is more fully discussed in Enclosure 1.
The AV being considered for escalated enforcement involves the recording of inaccurate/incomplete information associated with maintenance and inspection of a safety-related valve, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR § 50.9(a), Completeness and Accuracy of Information. Specifically, on January 23, 2019, mechanics assigned to work on auxiliary feedwater check valve AFWU-3-017 recorded inaccurate information in work order 40542353.
The NRC concluded that the actions of the mechanics were apparently deliberate as discussed in the enclosed Factual Summary and caused FPL to be in apparent violation of 10 CFR § 50.9(a).
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to (1)
respond to the apparent violation addressed in this inspection report within 30 days of the date of this letter, (2) request a Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference (PEC), or (3) request Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). If a PEC is held, the NRC may issue a press release to announce the time and date of the conference; however, the PEC will be closed to public observation since information related to an Office of Investigations report will be discussed and the report has not been made public. Additionally, a PEC will be transcribed. If you decide to participate in a PEC or pursue ADR, please contact Randy Musser at 404-997-4603 within 10 days of the date of this letter. A PEC should be held within 30 days and an ADR session within 45 days of the date of this letter.
If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000250,251/2020-011; EA-20-043 and should include for the apparent violation: (1) the reason for the apparent violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the apparent violations.
Additionally, your response should be sent to the NRCs Document Control Center, with a copy mailed to Mark Miller, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II, 245 Peachtree Center Avenue NE, Atlanta, GA 30303, within 30 days of the date of this letter. If a response is not received within the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a PEC.
If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your perspective on these matters and any other information that you believe the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a predecisional enforcement conference does not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation has occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during the conference may include information to determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken or planned.
In lieu of a PEC, you may also request Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue. ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts using a neutral third party. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation. Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral (the mediator) works with parties to help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR, they select a mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no power to make decisions. Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the issues. Additional information concerning the NRC's program can be obtained at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral third party. Please contact ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR.
In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violations described in the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice and Procedure," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Randy Musser of my staff at 404-997-4603.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Mark S. Miller, Director
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 05000250, 05000251 License Nos.: DPR-31, DPR-41
Enclosures:
1. Inspection Report 05000250/2020011 and 05000251/2020011 2. Factual Summary
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000250 and 05000251
License Number:
Report Number:
05000250/2020011 and 05000251/2020011
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-011-0043
Licensee:
Florida Power & Light Company
Facility:
Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station
Location:
Homestead, FL 33035
Approved By:
Randall A. Musser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance of the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor
Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the
safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Incomplete and Inaccurate Information Associated with Auxiliary Feedwater Maintenance
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Not Applicable
Apparent Violation
Open
Not
Applicable
Not
Applicable
An apparent violation of 10 CFR § 50.9(a) was identified for not maintaining a complete and
accurate record of inspections of safety-related equipment. Specifically, mechanics assigned
to work on auxiliary feedwater check valve AFWU-3-017 recorded inaccurate information in
work order (WO) 40542353.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Incomplete and Inaccurate Information Associated with Auxiliary Feedwater Maintenance
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report Section
Not Applicable
Apparent Violation
Open
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
An apparent violation of 10 CFR § 50.9(a) was identified for not maintaining a complete and
accurate record of inspections of safety-related equipment. Specifically, mechanics assigned
to work on auxiliary feedwater check valve AFWU-3-017 recorded inaccurate information in
work order (WO) 40542353.
Description: Safety related check valve AFWU-3-017 on Unit 3 provides a flow path for
cooling from the auxiliary feedwater pump lube oil cooler to the condensate storage tank. This
valve is located within the auxiliary feedwater system cage (auxfeed cage) which has only
one entrance/exit and requires badge access. The valve is disassembled and inspected on a
three-year frequency per the Check Valve Monitoring program which was required by the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code.
In 1986 the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) issued SOER 86-03, Check Valve
Failures or Degradation, which utilities responded to by developing programs to verify that
check valves are monitored for degradation. Inspection and maintenance of AFWU-3-017
was scheduled per WO 40542353 on January 23, 2019. The work required completion of
three documents: a Work Order Task Description (WOTD), an SOER 86-03 Check Valve
Data Sheet (CVDS), and a Journeyman Work Report (JWR).
The inspectors went to the auxfeed cage several times on January 23, 2019, to witness the
work on AFWU-3-017 and inspect the work activities. Based on visual observations, it
appeared that valve was never disassembled despite that each step of the work order,
including final completion, being signed as completed.
Based on questioning by the inspectors, the licensee investigated the activities associated
with WO 40542353. The licensees investigation indicated that the subject valve was
disassembled and some of the steps were completed. However, a significant time
discrepancy was discovered between (i) the Badge Access Transaction Report (BATR) for
badge swipes at the only entrance/exit from the auxfeed cage on January 23, 2019 and (ii)
the Measuring & Testing Equipment (M&TE) Issues & Returns by User ID log on January 23,
2019 (M&TE Log) used to track precision tool usage during work processes. The M&TE Log
indicated that three (3) of four (4) required precision tools were not checked out until after the
individuals, who were assigned to perform the work, exited from the auxfeed cage for the final
time on January 23. This time discrepancy clearly indicated that those precision tools could
not have been used to conduct the precision measurements required by the CVDS.
According to Step 4.6 of the WO, the mechanics were to PERFORM SOER 86-03 check
valve inspection using attached SOER 86-03 check valve data sheet (Type: LIFT CHECK).
The CVDS provides space for the mechanic to record three measurements: disc diameter,
disc weight, and body bore diameter.
This step was marked as completed, however, the three mechanics admitted they did not
have the CVDS with them while the valve was disassembled for inspection despite knowing
that the procedure required them to perform the work with the CVDS. Therefore, the
information in the WO indicating the step had been completed was inaccurate.
Step 4.11 of the WO required the mechanics to RECORD findings in the JWR and attached
SOER 86-03 data sheet. The CVDS requires the mechanic to record three
measurements: disc diameter, disc weight, and body bore diameter. Due to the nature of
this inspection these measurements must be taken using precision measuring tools in order
to obtain the recordings which require a high degree of accuracy. However, as noted above,
three of the four required precision tools were not checked out on the M&TE log until after the
mechanics had made their final entry into the auxfeed cage on January 23. Therefore, these
tools could not have been used to take measurements required by the CVDS. Despite this
discrepancy, the mechanics logged in the JWR that precision tools had been used to inspect
the valve. Therefore, the information in the JWR regarding precision tool use was inaccurate.
Additionally, the measurement values recorded in the CVDS were identical to measurements
that had been recorded in 2015, which brought into question the accuracy of the values in the
CVDS.
Corrective Actions: The licensee completed an internal investigation into the matter. The site
issued disciplinary corrective actions to the individual mechanics involved in the issue,
including denial of site access and termination of employment. Corrective actions, in the form
of site communications, were implemented to address the importance of a strong nuclear
safety culture and requirement for complete and accurate work and truthfulness. Additionally,
the site implemented a semi-annual random audit of a portion of work orders at Turkey Point
to determine whether personnel completed assigned duties by comparing work to the BATR
and other validating information, such as M&TE Logs.
Corrective Action References: AR 2299601
Performance Assessment: The inspectors determined this apparent violation was associated
with a minor performance deficiency when addressed in the NRCs rector oversight process
(ROP).
Enforcement:
Violation: The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider
willfulness in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address
this violation which involves apparent willfulness using traditional enforcement to adequately
deter noncompliance.
10 CFR § 50.9(a) states, in part, that information required by the Commissions regulations,
orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate
in all material respects.
Contrary to the above, on January 23, 2019, the licensee maintained information recorded in
steps 4.6 and 4.11 of WO 40542353, which was not complete and accurate in all material
respects. Specifically, step 4.6 was marked complete, yet the work was not performed using
the CVDS.
Additionally, for step 4.11, inaccurate information was recorded regarding the tools used in
the JWR and inaccurate measurement values were recorded in the CVDS. Records of
inspections of safety-related equipment are material to the NRC because they indicate
whether the licensee is performing quality, safety-related activities in accordance with its
operating procedures and NRC regulations.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an apparent violation pending a final
significance (enforcement) determination.
Enclosure 2
FACTUAL SUMMARY
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 2-2019-011
On March 10, 2020, the NRCs Office of Investigations completed an investigation into the
circumstances of a potentially falsified work order package associated with required inspection
and maintenance of a safety-related check valve at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Unit 3.
On January 23, 2019, two mechanics were assigned to perform a required inspection and
maintenance on Valve AFWU-3-017, a safety-related check valve at Turkey Point Unit 3. A
third licensee employee was assigned as a temporary General Maintenance Leader (GML) for
this inspection. The responsibilities of the GML included assigning the work, conducting a
tailboard (briefing), performing required visual inspections while the work was being done, and
reviewing and closing out the work package. The valve is located in the Auxiliary Feedwater
System Cage (AuxFeed Cage), which has only one entrance/exit point and requires badge
access.
The inspection was conducted using Work Order (WO) 40542353, which required completion of
three documents: a Work Order Task Description (WOTD), an SOER 86-03, Check Valve
Data Sheet (CVDS), and a Journeyman Work Report (JWR). According to Step 4.6 of the
WOTD, the mechanics were to PERFORM SOER 86-03 check valve inspection using attached
SOER 86-03 check valve data sheet (Type: LIFT CHECK). The SOER data sheet provides
space for the mechanic to record three measurements: disc diameter, disc weight, and body
bore diameter. Step 4.11 of the WOTD required the mechanics to RECORD findings in the
JWR and attached SOER 86-03 data sheet. All three individuals (the two mechanics and the
temporary GML) signed the last page of the WOTD indicating they had completed the valve
inspection work using the SOER data sheet.
Per Step 4.6 of the WOTD, the mechanics were required to perform an SOER 86-03 check
valve inspection using attached SOER 86-03 check valve data sheet. One of the mechanics
marked that step with a circle and slash indicating that it had been performed on the morning of
January 23, 2019, while he and the second mechanic were in the AuxFeed Cage. However,
evidence obtained by NRC OI indicated that all three workers (the two mechanics and the
temporary GML) admitted that they did not have the SOER data sheet with them while the valve
was disassembled for inspection.
The JWR indicated that the work was performed [in accordance with the] task description and
procedure and that four precision tools were used during the inspection. Turkey Point tracks
usage of precision tools at the plant in a log of Measuring and Testing Equipment (MTE) Issues
and Returns (MTE Log). The MTE Log for January 23, 2019 indicated that one mechanic
checked out a torque wrench at 11:10 a.m. and returned it at 11:28 a.m. The MTE Log also
indicates that the mechanic checked out a micrometer, a scale, and a Starrett Gage at 1:30
p.m. and returned those items at 1:55 p.m. According to badge access records for the AuxFeed
Cage entry/exit, the mechanics and the temporary GML did not enter the AuxFeed Cage after
12:00 p.m.
The mechanic who recorded the measurements on the SOER data sheet on January 23, 2019,
stated that he used a standard measuring tape and a scale located in another building to
perform the required measurements. The measurements he recorded were identical to
measurements that had been recorded in 2015.
The preponderance of evidence gathered during the investigation appears to indicate that the
employees willfully falsified the measurements recorded in the CVDS. By falsifying information
associated with WO 40542353 for the check valve inspection, this appears to have caused FPL
to be in violation of 10 CFR § 50.9(a).
Records of inspections of safety-related equipment are material to the NRC because they
indicate whether the licensee is performing quality, safety-related activities in accordance with
its operating procedures and NRC regulations.