L-2015-313, Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

ML16014A096
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	12/18/2015
From:	Summers T Florida Power & Light Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-2015-313
Download: ML16014A096 (3)

Text

0 FPLo December 18, 2015 L-2015-31 3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-001 Re: Turkey Point Unit 3 Docket No. 50-250 Special Report - Accident Monitorinq Instrumentation In accordance with Technical Specifications 6.9.2 and 3.3.3.3, the attached Special Report is provided for your information.

Should there be any questions regarding this information, please contact Mitch Guth, Licensing Manager at (305) 246-6698.

Sincerely, Thma Sumers Vice President Turkey Point Nuclear Plant SM cc: Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant Florida Power & Li~qht Company

'-5 9760 S.W. 344* Street Homestead, FL 33035

L-2015-313 Page 2 of 3 SPECIAL REPORT

Purpose:

This special report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Turkey Point Unit 3 Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.3, Table 3.3-5, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Instrument 19.c, Action 34, part 2) due to the Condenser Air Ejector High Range-Noble Gas..........

Effluent Monitor (RAD-3-641 7) being inoperable for greater than 7 days.

Required Action 34 of TS 3.3.3.3, Table 3.3-5 states:

"With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter(s), within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and:

1) Either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or

2) Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 14 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status."

This Special Report is being transmitted in accordance with these requirements.

Event and Action Taken:

RAD-3-641 7 consists of three channels with the following ranges to cover the total range required (1.0 E-06 to 1.0 E05 pCi/cc):

High Range Channel 9: 1.0 E00 to 1.0 E+05 pCi/cc Mid Range Channel 7: 2.5 E-02 to 4.0 E+02 pCi/cc Low Range Channel 5: 1.0 E-07 to 6.0 E-02 pCi/cc On November 29, 2015, at 1820, Turkey Point Unit 3 entered Mode 3, returning to power from the Unit 3, Cycle 28 Refueling Outage. At that time, the Condenser Steam Jet Air Ejector Hogging Jets were in service maintaining condenser vacuum. With the Hogging Jets in service, plant conditions do not support the sample flow rate required to allow the High Range-Noble Gas Effluent Monitor (RAD-3-6417) to be in service, and as such, monitor RAD-3-6417 was rendered inoperable. The monitor was not returned to service until December 7, 2015 at 1235.

In accordance with TS 3.3.3.3, Table 3.3-5, Instrument I19.c, the Condenser Air Ejector High Range Noble Gas Effluent Monitor is required to be OPERABLE for Modes 1-3. Since RAD 6417 was not restored to service within 7 days (by December 6, 2015) as required by TS 3.3.3.3, Table 3.3-5, Action 34, this special report is prepared and submitted within the next 14 days to comply with the TS Action 34 requirements.

L-2015-313 Page 3 of 3 The pre-planned alternate method utilized was Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) compensatory sampling once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Compensatory sampling was initiated prior to entering Mode 3 on November 29, 2015 and was maintained throughout the period of inoperability.

Cause:

The sampling flow path was bypassed due to the plant line up required to maintain condenser vacuum by the hogging jet air ejector, instead of the Steam Jet Air Ejector, which resulted in declaring monitor RAD-3-6417 inoperable. On December 5, when plant line up permitted Operations to return monitor RAD-3-641 7 to service, it was discovered that RAD-3-641 7 was inoperable due to a failed microprocessor (CPU 3 board) and a failed portable terminal interlace card.

Schedule for Restoration:

The repairs of the monitor were completed promptly on December 7, 2015 and the monitor was declared operable on December 7, 2015 at 1235.

0 FPLo December 18, 2015 L-2015-31 3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-001 Re: Turkey Point Unit 3 Docket No. 50-250 Special Report - Accident Monitorinq Instrumentation In accordance with Technical Specifications 6.9.2 and 3.3.3.3, the attached Special Report is provided for your information.

Should there be any questions regarding this information, please contact Mitch Guth, Licensing Manager at (305) 246-6698.

Sincerely, Thma Sumers Vice President Turkey Point Nuclear Plant SM cc: Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant Florida Power & Li~qht Company

'-5 9760 S.W. 344* Street Homestead, FL 33035

L-2015-313 Page 2 of 3 SPECIAL REPORT

Purpose:

This special report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Turkey Point Unit 3 Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.3, Table 3.3-5, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Instrument 19.c, Action 34, part 2) due to the Condenser Air Ejector High Range-Noble Gas..........

Effluent Monitor (RAD-3-641 7) being inoperable for greater than 7 days.

Required Action 34 of TS 3.3.3.3, Table 3.3-5 states:

"With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter(s), within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and:

1) Either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or

2) Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 14 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status."

This Special Report is being transmitted in accordance with these requirements.

Event and Action Taken:

RAD-3-641 7 consists of three channels with the following ranges to cover the total range required (1.0 E-06 to 1.0 E05 pCi/cc):

High Range Channel 9: 1.0 E00 to 1.0 E+05 pCi/cc Mid Range Channel 7: 2.5 E-02 to 4.0 E+02 pCi/cc Low Range Channel 5: 1.0 E-07 to 6.0 E-02 pCi/cc On November 29, 2015, at 1820, Turkey Point Unit 3 entered Mode 3, returning to power from the Unit 3, Cycle 28 Refueling Outage. At that time, the Condenser Steam Jet Air Ejector Hogging Jets were in service maintaining condenser vacuum. With the Hogging Jets in service, plant conditions do not support the sample flow rate required to allow the High Range-Noble Gas Effluent Monitor (RAD-3-6417) to be in service, and as such, monitor RAD-3-6417 was rendered inoperable. The monitor was not returned to service until December 7, 2015 at 1235.

In accordance with TS 3.3.3.3, Table 3.3-5, Instrument I19.c, the Condenser Air Ejector High Range Noble Gas Effluent Monitor is required to be OPERABLE for Modes 1-3. Since RAD 6417 was not restored to service within 7 days (by December 6, 2015) as required by TS 3.3.3.3, Table 3.3-5, Action 34, this special report is prepared and submitted within the next 14 days to comply with the TS Action 34 requirements.

L-2015-313 Page 3 of 3 The pre-planned alternate method utilized was Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) compensatory sampling once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Compensatory sampling was initiated prior to entering Mode 3 on November 29, 2015 and was maintained throughout the period of inoperability.

Cause:

The sampling flow path was bypassed due to the plant line up required to maintain condenser vacuum by the hogging jet air ejector, instead of the Steam Jet Air Ejector, which resulted in declaring monitor RAD-3-6417 inoperable. On December 5, when plant line up permitted Operations to return monitor RAD-3-641 7 to service, it was discovered that RAD-3-641 7 was inoperable due to a failed microprocessor (CPU 3 board) and a failed portable terminal interlace card.

Schedule for Restoration:

The repairs of the monitor were completed promptly on December 7, 2015 and the monitor was declared operable on December 7, 2015 at 1235.