IR 05000528/2021003
| ML21311A000 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 11/12/2021 |
| From: | Ami Agrawal NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D |
| To: | Lacal M Arizona Public Service Co |
| References | |
| IR 2021003 | |
| Download: ML21311A000 (22) | |
Text
November 12, 2021
SUBJECT:
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2021003, 05000529/2021003, AND 05000530/2021003
Dear Mrs. Lacal:
On September 30, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. On October 6, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. Horton, Senior Vice President, Site Operations and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Ami Agrawal, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000528, 05000529 and 05000530 License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, and NPF-74
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000528, 05000529 and 05000530
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000528/2021003, 05000529/2021003 and 05000530/2021003
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-003-0111
Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company
Facility:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
Location:
Tonopah, AZ
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2021 to September 30, 2021
Inspectors:
L. Merker, Senior Resident Inspector
E. Lantz, Resident Inspector
N. Cuevas, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Ami Agrawal, Acting Chief
Reactor Projects Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Scope a Matrix Test Module in the Maintenance Rule Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000528,05000529,05000530/202100 3-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65,
Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, for the licensees failure to include a nonsafety related component in the scope of their maintenance rule monitoring program. Specifically, the licensee failed to include the matrix test module of the engineered safety features actuation system, a nonsafety related component whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system. This resulted in a reactor scram concurrent with actuations of both trains of the containment isolation actuation signal, safety injection actuation signal, main steam isolation signal, and a loss of the main feedwater system.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000529/2021-002-00 LER 2021-002-00 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, Reactor Trip during Plant Protection System Surveillance Testing 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 entered the inspection period at full power. On July 19, 2021, the unit experienced a reactor cutback to 53 percent power due to a trip of main feedwater pump B. On July 20, 2021, the licensee further lowered power to 19 percent due to a fault in the control element drive mechanism control system. On July 24, 2021, the licensee returned Unit 1 to 100 percent power and remained at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 entered the inspection period at full power. On September 18, 2021, the unit began a coastdown for Refueling Outage 23 and ended the inspection period at approximately 89 percent power.
Unit 3 operated at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident and regional inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week, increasing the amount of time on site as local COVID-19 conditions permitted.
As part of their onsite activities, resident inspectors conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for monsoon thunderstorms, on August 18, 2021.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2, essential cooling water system A, on July 16, 2021
- (2) Unit 1, essential chilled water system A, on August 10, 2021
- (3) Unit 2, essential spray pond system B, on September 23, 2021
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 2, Zone 17, main control room, on September 21, 2021
- (2) Unit 2, Zone 5B, class switchgear room B, on September 22, 2021
- (3) Unit 2, Zone 10B, remote shutdown room B, on September 22, 2021
- (4) Unit 3, Zones 18, 19, and 20, upper cable spreading room, on September 29, 2021
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
- (1) Unit 2, water intrusion into the class switchgear room A, on August 14, 2021
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room during Unit 1 power ascension following the trip of main feedwater pump B, on July 24, 2021.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification simulator training activities, on July 28, 2021.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Units 1, 2, and 3, review of the 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) Periodic Evaluation, on September 30, 2021
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) Unit 2, emergency diesel generator A maintenance outage, on September 30, 2021
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1, emergent main feedwater pump B and control element drive mechanism control system troubleshooting and repairs, post main feedwater pump B trip, on July 22, 2021
- (2) Unit 2, emergent module replacements due to failure of the balance of plant engineered safety features actuation system B during testing, on July 23, 2021
- (3) Unit 1, emergent seismic monitoring system and emergency diesel generator A troubleshooting and repairs, on September 4, 2021
- (4) Unit 3, high risk for emergent main turbine control valve 3 maintenance, on September 24, 2021
- (5) Unit 2, planned emergency diesel generator A maintenance outage, on September 30, 2021
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1, emergency diesel generator A operability determination following a crankcase high pressure trip valve failure, on July 9, 2021
- (2) Unit 3, letdown containment isolation valve CH-523 operability determination due to leaking air regulator, on July 18, 2021
- (3) Unit 1, reactor coolant system operability determination due to reactor coolant pump 1A seal 2 degradation, on August 15, 2021
- (4) Unit 1, emergency diesel generator A operability determination following diesel trip during startup, on August 31, 2021
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Unit 3, temporary modification 21-05679-002 to disable failed heated junction thermal couples 6B and 7B, on August 27, 2021
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Unit 1, emergency diesel generator A crankcase high pressure trip valve following replacement, on July 10, 2021
- (2) Unit 2, balance of plant engineered safety features actuation system B following emergent module replacements, on July 23, 2021
- (3) Unit 1, main feedwater pump B following troubleshooting and repairs, on July 24, 2021
- (4) Unit 3, letdown containment isolation valve following air regulator leakage repairs, on July 28, 2021
- (5) Units 1, 2, and 3, seismic monitoring system following system becoming unresponsive, on September 10, 2021
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Unit 2, emergency diesel fuel oil transfer pump A, on July 14, 2021
RCS Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2, 40ST-9RC02, emergency response facilities data acquisition and display system (preferred) calculation of reactor coolant system water inventory, on September 24, 2021
FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Units 1, 2, and 3, 14MT-9BD85, FLEX 2X2 portable refueling pump inspections and tests, on September 28, 2021
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated an emergency preparedness training evolution, on August 17,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
- (3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
- (3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
- (3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
- (3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
- (3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Unit 1, fault in the control element drive mechanism control system preventing multiple control rods from moving in manual individual mode, on September 17, 2021
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000529/2021-002-00, Unit 2 Reactor Trip During Plant Protection System Surveillance Testing (ADAMS accession: ML21197A196). The inspectors reviewed the LER submittal. The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct. A violation of NRC requirements was identified and documented in this report under Inspection Results.
Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the Unit 1 reactor cutback to 53 percent power due to a trip of main feedwater pump B, the downpower to 19 percent power due to a fault in the control element drive mechanism control system, and the licensees response, on July 23,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Scope a Matrix Test Module in the Maintenance Rule Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green NCV 05000528,05000529,05000530/20210 03-01 Open/Closed
None (NPP)71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, for the licensees failure to include a nonsafety related component in the scope of their maintenance rule monitoring program. Specifically, the licensee failed to include the matrix test module of the engineered safety features actuation system, a nonsafety related component whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system. This resulted in a reactor scram concurrent with actuations of both trains of the containment isolation actuation signal, safety injection actuation signal, main steam isolation signal, and a loss of the main feedwater system.
Description:
The plant protection system consists of the reactor protection system and the engineered safety features actuation system. The reactor protection system consists of sensors, calculators, logic, and other equipment necessary to monitor selected nuclear steam supply system conditions and automatically initiates a reactor trip if the reactor approaches prescribed safety limits. The engineered safety features actuation system monitors selected plant parameters and provides the following actuation signals to each individual actuated component in the engineered safety features system if the plant parameters reach preselected setpoints: containment isolation actuation signal, containment spray actuation signal, main steam isolation signal, safety injection actuation signal, recirculation actuation signal, and auxiliary feedwater actuation signal. The reactor protection system and the engineered safety features actuation system functions are performed across four redundant protection trains: A, B, C, and D; actuation of the same signal from any two trains would result in the associated reactor scram or actuation of that engineered safety features actuation system signal (e.g., AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, or CD). Each of these six possible actuation combinations is independently actuated through a logic matrix.
The licensee conducts plant protection system functional testing of the reactor protection system logic and engineered safety features actuation system logic using matrix test modules. The logic test allows testing of each paralleled pair of coincidence logic relay contacts in every matrix. Each matrix test module tests one set of reactor protection system and engineered safety features actuation system function coincidence logic relay matrices (e.g., AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, or CD). Thus, the six matrices check all possible combinations. Testing is confined to a single reactor protection system parameter or engineered safety features actuation system function by the matrix test module switching arrangement. The system channel trip rotary switch is selected to the single reactor protection system parameter or engineered safety features actuation system function to be tested. The relay hold switch is placed to the hold position to apply a holding voltage to the test coil for all other relays that are not selected by the relay trip switch. This hold voltage on the energized test coils of the matrix relays prevents initiation of the selected reactor protection system parameter or engineered safety features actuation system function being tested.
On May 19, 2021, the licensee performed a planned functional test of the plant protection system in Unit 2. While testing the containment isolation actuation signal, safety injection actuation signal, and main steam isolation signal functions of matrix test module AC, an inadvertent actuation of both trains of the containment isolation actuation signal, safety injection actuation signal, and main steam isolation signal occurred. The reactor scrammed because of the high pressurizer pressure due to the isolation of the main steam lines.
The licensee completed a cause evaluation and concluded the direct cause of the event was a momentary loss of hold power circuit continuity for critical engineered safety features trip paths through the relay hold switch and terminal block in the test circuitry. This power interruption momentarily removed the hold voltage to the matrix relay test coils that prevent transfer of the matrix relay contacts in the containment isolation actuation signal, safety injection actuation signal, and main steam isolation signal initiation logic circuits. The loss of the hold voltage allowed the trip signals to initiate the applicable plant response.
During their review, the inspectors noted the matrix test module was not scoped into the maintenance rule. After further discussions with the licensee, the inspectors determined the matrix test module was inappropriately excluded from the licensees maintenance rule program. The licensee reviewed the matrix test module scoping and concluded the matrix test module should be scoped into the maintenance rule program. On August 31, 2021, the licensee scoped the matrix test module into the maintenance rule program.
Corrective Actions: The licensees corrective actions included replacing the plant protection system components involved in the scram, completing an event investigation, and scoping the matrix test module into the maintenance rule program.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 21-06337, 21-06347, 21-08268, and 21-11094
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to include a nonsafety related component in the scope of the maintenance rule monitoring program whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to include the matrix test module of the engineered safety features actuation system, a nonsafety related component whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system. This resulted in a reactor scram concurrent with actuations of both trains of the containment isolation actuation signal, safety injection actuation signal, main steam isolation signal, and a loss of the main feedwater system.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding required a detailed risk evaluation because the finding caused a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition (e.g., loss of condenser, loss of feedwater).
The senior risk analyst noted that the Unit 2 reactor trip event on May 19, 2021, resulted in the same plant conditions analyzed for a Green finding for a previous reactor trip event on Palo Verde, Unit 2, on March 3, 2020, which was documented in Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 - Integrated Inspection Report 05000528/2020002, 05000529/2020002, and 05000530/2020002 (ADAMS accession number ML20212M129).
The analyst re-verified the quantitative and qualitative assumptions of the prior analysis and used Palo Verde SPAR model version PVNG-EQK-HWD-FLEX-LOMFW-DEESE, which contains modifications described in the previous 2020 inspection report to SPAR model version 8.61, run on SAPHIRE, software version 8.2.4, for the evaluation. The external events and large early release frequency analyses were also re-verified to be consistent by the analyst. Dominant core damage sequences were losses of main feedwater and losses of condenser heat sink sequences which were mitigated by the diverse steam generating feeding strategies available for operators. The analyst estimated the increase in core damage frequency of the finding to be 9.9E-7/year and of very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2) requires, in part, that the scope of the monitoring program specified in paragraph (a)(1) shall include nonsafety related components whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system.
Contrary to the above, prior to August 31, 2021, the scope of the licensees monitoring program specified in paragraph (a)(1) did not include the matrix test module of the emergency safety features actuation system, a nonsafety related component whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 6, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. T. Horton, Senior Vice President, Site Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
21-09769
Procedures
40-OP-9CP01
Containment Purge System
40-OP-9CP01
Containment Purge System
28a
Acts of Nature
Corrective Action
Documents
21-00867, 18-13478, 18-15389
Drawings
01-M-ECP-001
P & I Diagram Essential Chilled Water System
01-M-EWP-001
P & I Diagram Essential Cooling Water System
Procedures
Essential Cooling Water System (EW) Train A
Essential Spray Pond (SP) B
Essential Chilled Water Valve Verification
Corrective Action
Documents
5373822
Drawings
2-M-HJP-001
P & I Diagram Control Building HVAC
13-A-ZYD-029
Fire Protection Control Building floor plan at elevation 140-
13-A-ZYD-029
Fire Protection Control Building floor plan at elevation 100-
Miscellaneous
UFSAR, section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System
20C
Design Basis Manual, Fire Protection System, Section
5.1.2.4
Design Basis Manual, Fire Protection System, Section
5.1.2.4
UFSAR, Appendix 9B, Fire Protection Evaluation Report
20C
Procedures
Unit 2 Firewatch Tour Log
09/21/2021
Pre-fire Strategies Manual
Pre-fire Strategies Manual
Fire System Impairments and Notifications
1910.39
PVNGS Fire Prevention Plan
Control Room Fire
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
21-09657
Miscellaneous
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
20C
13-MC-ZJ-0200
As Built Control Building Flooding Calculation
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
Unit 1 Operator logs
07/24/2021
NLR21S040202
Licensed Operator Continuing Training Simulator Scenario:
Station Blackout
07/07/2021
NLR21S040302
Licensed Operator Continuing Training Simulator Scenario:
LMFRP / Place SDC in Service / RCS Draindown
07/08/2021
Procedures
Conduct of Operations
Power Operations
151
Feedwater and Condensate
CEA Position Data Log
Corrective Action
Documents
19-02987, 20-07809, 20-07862, 21-02198, 21-10839, 21-
11040, 21-11058, 21-11226
Miscellaneous
Maintenance Rule (a)(3) Periodic Assessment for the Period
January 1, 2019, - June 30, 2020
Procedures
Foreign Materials Exclusion Controls
Installation and Removal of DG A Temporary Piping
Supports
Industry Operating Experience Review
Maintenance Rule
Maintenance Rule
Maintenance Rule
Work Orders
24848, 5254449, 5136175, 5254542, 5254569, 5254567
Corrective Action
Documents
21-08296, 21-08326, 21-08344, 21-08355, 21-08382, 21-
08427, 21-08478, 21-08604, 21-08605, 21-08712, 21-
08666, 21-10343, 21-10262, 21-10219, 21-10665, 21-
10954, 21-11082, 21-11087, 21-11088, 21-11089, 21-
11090, 21-11205
Miscellaneous
Work Week 2129 Schedule Risk Evaluation
07/20/2021
Unit 1 Protected Equipment Scheme for Main Feedwater
Pump A
07/21/2021
Unit 1 Protected Equipment Scheme for Class 1E AC
08/31/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
battery charger out of service
Unit 1 Protected Equipment Scheme for A diesel generator
out of service
08/31/2021
Work Week 2135 Schedule Risk Evaluation
08/30/2021
Risk Profile Unit 1 DG A
08/31/2021
Unit 1 control room operator logs
08/31/2021
Unit 1 control room operator logs
09/01/2021
Night Order: Unit 3 MT Control Valve #3 Issue
Phoenix Risk Monitor - PVGS Unit 3 Current Risk Summary
Report as of 9/23/2021
09/23/2021
Unit 3 Main Control Valve Jumper WO 5372130 Risk
Management and Readiness Plan
Ops Downpower Unit 3 CV-3 Risk Management and
Readiness Plan
Protected Equipment Scheme for DG A Being
INOPERABLE (DG B Protected)
09/26/2021
Phoenix Risk Monitor - PVGS Unit 2 Current Risk Summary
Report As of 9/27/2021 00:00
09/27/2021
Phoenix Risk Monitor - PVGS Unit 2 Current Risk Summary
Report As of 9/28/2021 02:20
09/27/2021
Phoenix Risk Monitor - PVGS Unit 2 Current Risk Summary
Report As of 9/28/2021 14:00
09/27/2021
Risk Challenge Meetings
RICT-U2-2021-01
U2 PHOENIX RICT July 12, 2021 What If? Risk at 1544
07/12/2021
RICT-U2-2021-01
U2 PHOENIX RICT July 12, 2021 Operator Screen Risk at
1743
07/12/2021
RICT-U2-2021-01
U2 PHOENIX RICT July 13, 2021 Operator Screen Risk at
0634
07/13/2021
Procedures
Online Integrated Risk
Configuration Risk Management and Risk-Informed
Completion Time Programs
Installation and Removal of DG A Temporary Piping
Supports
Protected Equipment
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Protected Equipment
Operations Department Online Nuclear Risk Determination
Modes 1 and 2
Risk Management Actions
RICT PRA Functionality Determination
Risk Management Actions
Plant Computer Users Manual
Work Orders
5357846, 5357847, 5359440, 5359445, 5360225, 5372130
Corrective Action
Documents
21-08106, 21-08566, 21-09152, 21-10219, 17-00032, 16-
15628, 21-09687, 21-06194
Miscellaneous
PVNGS Design Basis Manual, Chemical And Volume
Control System
Technical Specification Bases
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
20C
Unit 1 Control Room Logs
08/31/2021
DBM, RC System
21-08106-001
Evaluation
PVNGS DBM
Diesel Generator, Class 1E Standby Generation, Fuel Oil
Storage and Transfer System
Procedures
Design Basis Manual, Diesel Generator, Class 1E Standby
generation, Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System
(DF/DG/PE)
Reactor Coolant Pump Emergencies
Diesel Generator A Test
Work Orders
5362834
Corrective Action
Documents
21-05679, 21-05937
Miscellaneous
S-08-0355
CFR 50.59 Screening
Procedures
CFR 50.59 and 72.48 Administrative Guideline
IP-ENG-001
Standard Design Process
Work Orders
5340360
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
21-08296, 21-08326, 21-08344, 21-08355, 21-08382, 21-
08427, 21-08478, 21-08664, 21-08715, 21-08566, 21-
08973, 21-08978, 21-10262
Drawings
03-M-DGP-001
P & I Diagram starting air diesel generator system
Procedures
Adjustment of Feedwater Pump Turbine (FWPT) MDT-20
Governor Settings
Seismic Monitoring System Functional Test Procedure
Feedwater Pump Turbine B
Feedwater Pump Turbine B Over-Speed Testing
Diesel Generator A Test
Seismic Instrumentation Channel Checks
Air Operated Valve Program
CH Valves - Inservice Test
Work Orders
5357846, 5357847, 5355141, 5359445, 5360225, 5359249,
5368765, 5249757
Calculations
13-JC-SB-200
PPS Bistable Drift Analysis
Corrective Action
Documents
21-09651, 21-11152, 21-11153, 21-10660, 21-10710, 21-
10803
Miscellaneous
Unit 2 West Containment Sump and RCS Unidentified
Leakage Trends
09/08/2021
Unit 2 West Containment Sump and RCS Unidentified
Leakage Trends
09/23/2021
Multi-Unit RDT In Leakage Trends
09/07/2021
Unit 2 Containment Sump In Leakage MRM Slide
07/27/2021
Unit 2 Containment Sump In-Leakage 6/02/2021 -
9/07/2021 Data
Procedures
PVNGS FLEX Equipment Status Control
FLEX 2X2 Portable Refueling Pump Inspections and Tests
Containment Building Sump Instrumentation Calibration
RCS Leakage Source Determination
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
ERFDADS (Preferred) Calculation of RCS Water Inventory
Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps - Inservice Test
Work Orders
234129, 5255961, 5252607
Miscellaneous
LOCT Emergency Plan Data Form for SES-0-03-Q-11
08/17/2021
DEP Classification Form for SES-0-03-Q-11
08/27/2021
DEP Notification Form for SES-0-03-Q-11
08/27/2021
Notifications
SES-0-03-Q-11
SGN-FT-1011 F.L./RCS Leak/MFP Trip/LOCA/HPSI and
CSAS Fail
Procedures
Excessive RCS Leakrate
71151
Corrective Action
Documents
20-08932, 20-14947, 21-00314, 21-00506, 21-06710, 21-
06844, 21-10660, 21-10710, 21-10803
Miscellaneous
Units 1, 2, and 3 MSPI Run Demands Failures Report
4/1/2020 - 6/30/2021
07/08/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3 MSPI Component Failures Report 4/1/2020
- 6/30/2021
07/08/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI Unavailability Report 4/1/2020 -
6/30/2021
07/08/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI EDG System July 2021 UAI
Derivation Reports
09/01/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI EDG System July 2021 URI
Derivation Reports
09/01/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI EDG System July 2021 PLE
Derivation Reports
09/01/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI RHR CS Systems July 2021 UAI
Derivation Reports
09/02/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI RHR CS Systems July 2021 URI
Derivation Reports
09/02/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI RHR CS Systems July 2021 PLE
Derivation Reports
09/02/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI EW SP Systems July 2021 UAI
Derivation Reports
09/02/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI EW SP Systems July 2021 URI
Derivation Reports
09/02/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI EW SP Systems July 2021 PLE
Derivation Reports
09/02/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI HPSI System July 2021 UAI
Derivation Reports
09/02/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI HPSI System July 2021 URI
Derivation Reports
09/02/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI HPSI System July 2021 PLE
Derivation Reports
09/02/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI AFW System July 2021 UAI
Derivation Reports
09/02/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI AFW System July 2021 URI
Derivation Reports
09/02/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI AFW System July 2021 PLE
Derivation Reports
09/02/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, All Systems July 2021 MSPI Margin
Reports
09/01/2021
Units 1, 2, and 3, Control Room Operator Logs 4/1/2020 -
6/30/2021
09/25/2021
13-NS-C075
MSPI Bases Document
13-NS-C075
MSPI Bases Document
13-NS-C075
MSPI Bases Document
13-NS-C075
MSPI Bases Document
Procedures
Maintenance Rule
Performance Index Data Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
NRC ROP PI Data Collection, Verification and Submittal
Corrective Action
Documents
21-08605, 21-08666, 21-08979, 21-08980, 21-08981, 21-
09934
Miscellaneous
NRC Update - CEDMCS Reliability Presentation
08/19/2021
Operational Decision-Making Instruction: Unit 1 Select
Control Element Assemblies Will Not Move in Manual
Individual (MI)
Night Order: Unit 1 CEDMC Differences
Procedures
CEA Malfunctions
Plant Computer Users Manual
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work Orders
5359440
Corrective Action
Documents
21-06337, 21-06347, 21-08029, 21-08041, 21-08268, 21-
11094
21-08604, 21-08605
Miscellaneous
Unit 1 Operator logs: July 19 - 20, 2021
07/20/2021
MREP Approval Form - SB Scoping MTM Component
Addition
09/02/2021
Palo Verde Simulator Observation - Main Feed Restoration
Timeline
08/26/2021
Operability
Evaluations
Reactor Power Cutback (Loss of Feedpump)
Procedures
Adjustment of Feedwater Pump Turbine (FWPT) MDT-20
Governor Settings
Conduct of Operations
Feedwater Pump Turbine B
Feedwater Pump Turbine B Over-Speed Testing
Power Operations
151
Maintenance Rule
Plant Computer Users Manual
Work Orders
5359440, 5359445, 5360225