IR 05000528/2021003

Integrated Inspection Report 05000528/2021003, 05000529/2021003 and 05000530/2021003

ML21311A000
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	11/12/2021
From:	Ami Agrawal NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D
To:	Lacal M Arizona Public Service Co
References
IR 2021003
Download: ML21311A000 (22)

Text

November 12, 2021

SUBJECT:

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2021003, 05000529/2021003, AND 05000530/2021003

Dear Mrs. Lacal:

On September 30, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. On October 6, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. Horton, Senior Vice President, Site Operations and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Digitally signed by Ami Ami Agrawal AgrawalDate: 2021.11.11 09:53:34-06'00'

Ami Agrawal, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000528, 05000529 and 05000530 License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, and NPF-74

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000528, 05000529 and 05000530 License Numbers: NPF-41, NPF-51 and NPF-74 Report Numbers: 05000528/2021003, 05000529/2021003 and 05000530/2021003 Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-003-0111 Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company Facility: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Location: Tonopah, AZ Inspection Dates: July 1, 2021 to September 30, 2021 Inspectors: L. Merker, Senior Resident Inspector E. Lantz, Resident Inspector N. Cuevas, Resident Inspector Approved By: Ami Agrawal, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Scope a Matrix Test Module in the Maintenance Rule Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green None (NPP) 71153 NCV 05000528,05000529,05000530/202100 3-01 Open/Closed The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65,

Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, for the licensees failure to include a nonsafety related component in the scope of their maintenance rule monitoring program. Specifically, the licensee failed to include the matrix test module of the engineered safety features actuation system, a nonsafety related component whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system. This resulted in a reactor scram concurrent with actuations of both trains of the containment isolation actuation signal, safety injection actuation signal, main steam isolation signal, and a loss of the main feedwater system.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000529/2021-002-00 LER 2021-002-00 for Palo 71153 Closed Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, Reactor Trip during Plant Protection System Surveillance Testing

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 entered the inspection period at full power. On July 19, 2021, the unit experienced a reactor cutback to 53 percent power due to a trip of main feedwater pump B. On July 20, 2021, the licensee further lowered power to 19 percent due to a fault in the control element drive mechanism control system. On July 24, 2021, the licensee returned Unit 1 to 100 percent power and remained at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 entered the inspection period at full power. On September 18, 2021, the unit began a coastdown for Refueling Outage 23 and ended the inspection period at approximately 89 percent power.

Unit 3 operated at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident and regional inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week, increasing the amount of time on site as local COVID-19 conditions permitted.

As part of their onsite activities, resident inspectors conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for monsoon thunderstorms, on August 18, 2021.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2, essential cooling water system A, on July 16, 2021

(2) Unit 1, essential chilled water system A, on August 10, 2021

(3) Unit 2, essential spray pond system B, on September 23, 2021

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Unit 2, Zone 17, main control room, on September 21, 2021

(2) Unit 2, Zone 5B, class switchgear room B, on September 22, 2021

(3) Unit 2, Zone 10B, remote shutdown room B, on September 22, 2021

(4) Unit 3, Zones 18, 19, and 20, upper cable spreading room, on September 29, 2021

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) Unit 2, water intrusion into the class switchgear room A, on August 14, 2021

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room during Unit 1 power ascension following the trip of main feedwater pump B, on July 24, 2021.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification simulator training activities, on July 28, 2021.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Units 1, 2, and 3, review of the 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) Periodic Evaluation, on

September 30, 2021 Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:

(1) Unit 2, emergency diesel generator A maintenance outage, on September 30, 2021

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Unit 1, emergent main feedwater pump B and control element drive mechanism control system troubleshooting and repairs, post main feedwater pump B trip, on July 22, 2021

(2) Unit 2, emergent module replacements due to failure of the balance of plant engineered safety features actuation system B during testing, on July 23, 2021

(3) Unit 1, emergent seismic monitoring system and emergency diesel generator A troubleshooting and repairs, on September 4, 2021

(4) Unit 3, high risk for emergent main turbine control valve 3 maintenance, on September 24, 2021

(5) Unit 2, planned emergency diesel generator A maintenance outage, on September 30, 2021

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 1, emergency diesel generator A operability determination following a crankcase high pressure trip valve failure, on July 9, 2021

(2) Unit 3, letdown containment isolation valve CH-523 operability determination due to leaking air regulator, on July 18, 2021

(3) Unit 1, reactor coolant system operability determination due to reactor coolant pump 1A seal 2 degradation, on August 15, 2021

(4) Unit 1, emergency diesel generator A operability determination following diesel trip during startup, on August 31, 2021

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

(1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Unit 3, temporary modification 21-05679-002 to disable failed heated junction thermal couples 6B and 7B, on August 27, 2021

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) Unit 1, emergency diesel generator A crankcase high pressure trip valve following replacement, on July 10, 2021

(2) Unit 2, balance of plant engineered safety features actuation system B following emergent module replacements, on July 23, 2021

(3) Unit 1, main feedwater pump B following troubleshooting and repairs, on July 24, 2021

(4) Unit 3, letdown containment isolation valve following air regulator leakage repairs, on July 28, 2021

(5) Units 1, 2, and 3, seismic monitoring system following system becoming unresponsive, on September 10, 2021

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 2, emergency diesel fuel oil transfer pump A, on July 14, 2021

RCS Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2, 40ST-9RC02, emergency response facilities data acquisition and display system (preferred) calculation of reactor coolant system water inventory, on

September 24, 2021 FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Units 1, 2, and 3, 14MT-9BD85, FLEX 2X2 portable refueling pump inspections and tests, on September 28, 2021

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated an emergency preparedness training evolution, on August 17,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) ===

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

(3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (3 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

(3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (3 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

(3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (3 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

(3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (3 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

(3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Unit 1, fault in the control element drive mechanism control system preventing multiple control rods from moving in manual individual mode, on September 17, 2021

71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000529/2021-002-00, Unit 2 Reactor Trip During Plant Protection System Surveillance Testing (ADAMS accession: ML21197A196). The inspectors reviewed the LER submittal. The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct. A violation of NRC requirements was identified and documented in this report under Inspection Results.

Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the Unit 1 reactor cutback to 53 percent power due to a trip of main feedwater pump B, the downpower to 19 percent power due to a fault in the control element drive mechanism control system, and the licensees response, on July 23,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Scope a Matrix Test Module in the Maintenance Rule Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green None (NPP) 71153 NCV 05000528,05000529,05000530/20210 03-01 Open/Closed The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, for the licensees failure to include a nonsafety related component in the scope of their maintenance rule monitoring program. Specifically, the licensee failed to include the matrix test module of the engineered safety features actuation system, a nonsafety related component whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system. This resulted in a reactor scram concurrent with actuations of both trains of the containment isolation actuation signal, safety injection actuation signal, main steam isolation signal, and a loss of the main feedwater system.

Description:

The plant protection system consists of the reactor protection system and the engineered safety features actuation system. The reactor protection system consists of sensors, calculators, logic, and other equipment necessary to monitor selected nuclear steam supply system conditions and automatically initiates a reactor trip if the reactor approaches prescribed safety limits. The engineered safety features actuation system monitors selected plant parameters and provides the following actuation signals to each individual actuated component in the engineered safety features system if the plant parameters reach preselected setpoints: containment isolation actuation signal, containment spray actuation signal, main steam isolation signal, safety injection actuation signal, recirculation actuation signal, and auxiliary feedwater actuation signal. The reactor protection system and the engineered safety features actuation system functions are performed across four redundant protection trains: A, B, C, and D; actuation of the same signal from any two trains would result in the associated reactor scram or actuation of that engineered safety features actuation system signal (e.g., AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, or CD). Each of these six possible actuation combinations is independently actuated through a logic matrix.

The licensee conducts plant protection system functional testing of the reactor protection system logic and engineered safety features actuation system logic using matrix test modules. The logic test allows testing of each paralleled pair of coincidence logic relay contacts in every matrix. Each matrix test module tests one set of reactor protection system and engineered safety features actuation system function coincidence logic relay matrices (e.g., AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, or CD). Thus, the six matrices check all possible combinations. Testing is confined to a single reactor protection system parameter or engineered safety features actuation system function by the matrix test module switching arrangement. The system channel trip rotary switch is selected to the single reactor protection system parameter or engineered safety features actuation system function to be tested. The relay hold switch is placed to the hold position to apply a holding voltage to the test coil for all other relays that are not selected by the relay trip switch. This hold voltage on the energized test coils of the matrix relays prevents initiation of the selected reactor protection system parameter or engineered safety features actuation system function being tested.

On May 19, 2021, the licensee performed a planned functional test of the plant protection system in Unit 2. While testing the containment isolation actuation signal, safety injection actuation signal, and main steam isolation signal functions of matrix test module AC, an inadvertent actuation of both trains of the containment isolation actuation signal, safety injection actuation signal, and main steam isolation signal occurred. The reactor scrammed because of the high pressurizer pressure due to the isolation of the main steam lines.

The licensee completed a cause evaluation and concluded the direct cause of the event was a momentary loss of hold power circuit continuity for critical engineered safety features trip paths through the relay hold switch and terminal block in the test circuitry. This power interruption momentarily removed the hold voltage to the matrix relay test coils that prevent transfer of the matrix relay contacts in the containment isolation actuation signal, safety injection actuation signal, and main steam isolation signal initiation logic circuits. The loss of the hold voltage allowed the trip signals to initiate the applicable plant response.

During their review, the inspectors noted the matrix test module was not scoped into the maintenance rule. After further discussions with the licensee, the inspectors determined the matrix test module was inappropriately excluded from the licensees maintenance rule program. The licensee reviewed the matrix test module scoping and concluded the matrix test module should be scoped into the maintenance rule program. On August 31, 2021, the licensee scoped the matrix test module into the maintenance rule program.

Corrective Actions: The licensees corrective actions included replacing the plant protection system components involved in the scram, completing an event investigation, and scoping the matrix test module into the maintenance rule program.

Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 21-06337, 21-06347, 21-08268, and 21-11094

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to include a nonsafety related component in the scope of the maintenance rule monitoring program whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to include the matrix test module of the engineered safety features actuation system, a nonsafety related component whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system. This resulted in a reactor scram concurrent with actuations of both trains of the containment isolation actuation signal, safety injection actuation signal, main steam isolation signal, and a loss of the main feedwater system.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding required a detailed risk evaluation because the finding caused a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition (e.g., loss of condenser, loss of feedwater).

The senior risk analyst noted that the Unit 2 reactor trip event on May 19, 2021, resulted in the same plant conditions analyzed for a Green finding for a previous reactor trip event on Palo Verde, Unit 2, on March 3, 2020, which was documented in Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 - Integrated Inspection Report 05000528/2020002, 05000529/2020002, and 05000530/2020002 (ADAMS accession number ML20212M129).

The analyst re-verified the quantitative and qualitative assumptions of the prior analysis and used Palo Verde SPAR model version PVNG-EQK-HWD-FLEX-LOMFW-DEESE, which contains modifications described in the previous 2020 inspection report to SPAR model version 8.61, run on SAPHIRE, software version 8.2.4, for the evaluation. The external events and large early release frequency analyses were also re-verified to be consistent by the analyst. Dominant core damage sequences were losses of main feedwater and losses of condenser heat sink sequences which were mitigated by the diverse steam generating feeding strategies available for operators. The analyst estimated the increase in core damage frequency of the finding to be 9.9E-7/year and of very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2) requires, in part, that the scope of the monitoring program specified in paragraph (a)(1) shall include nonsafety related components whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system.

Contrary to the above, prior to August 31, 2021, the scope of the licensees monitoring program specified in paragraph (a)(1) did not include the matrix test module of the emergency safety features actuation system, a nonsafety related component whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On October 6, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. T. Horton, Senior Vice President, Site Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.01 Corrective Action 21-09769

Documents

Procedures 40-OP-9CP01 Containment Purge System 28

40-OP-9CP01 Containment Purge System 28a

40AO-9ZZ21 Acts of Nature 39

71111.04 Corrective Action 21-00867, 18-13478, 18-15389

Documents

Drawings 01-M-ECP-001 P & I Diagram Essential Chilled Water System 36

01-M-EWP-001 P & I Diagram Essential Cooling Water System 33

Procedures 40OP-9EW01 Essential Cooling Water System (EW) Train A 34

40OP-9SP02 Essential Spray Pond (SP) B 57

41ST-1EC01 Essential Chilled Water Valve Verification 20

71111.05 Corrective Action 5373822

Documents

Drawings 02-M-HJP-001 P & I Diagram Control Building HVAC 21

13-A-ZYD-029 Fire Protection Control Building floor plan at elevation 140- 23

13-A-ZYD-029 Fire Protection Control Building floor plan at elevation 100- 23

Miscellaneous UFSAR, section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System 20C

Design Basis Manual, Fire Protection System, Section 15

5.1.2.4

Design Basis Manual, Fire Protection System, Section 15

5.1.2.4

UFSAR, Appendix 9B, Fire Protection Evaluation Report 20C

Procedures Unit 2 Firewatch Tour Log 09/21/2021

Pre-fire Strategies Manual 29

Pre-fire Strategies Manual 29

14DP-0FP02 Fire System Impairments and Notifications 27

1910.39 PVNGS Fire Prevention Plan 0

40AO-9ZZ19 Control Room Fire 42

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.06 Corrective Action 21-09657

Documents

Miscellaneous Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 20C

13-MC-ZJ-0200 As Built Control Building Flooding Calculation 8

71111.11Q Miscellaneous Unit 1 Operator logs 07/24/2021

NLR21S040202 Licensed Operator Continuing Training Simulator Scenario: 07/07/2021

Station Blackout

NLR21S040302 Licensed Operator Continuing Training Simulator Scenario: 07/08/2021

LMFRP / Place SDC in Service / RCS Draindown

Procedures 40DP-9OP02 Conduct of Operations 75

40OP-9ZZ05 Power Operations 151

40OP-9ZZ14 Feedwater and Condensate 81

40ST-9ZZ23 CEA Position Data Log 36

71111.12 Corrective Action 19-02987, 20-07809, 20-07862, 21-02198, 21-10839, 21-

Documents 11040, 21-11058, 21-11226

Miscellaneous Maintenance Rule (a)(3) Periodic Assessment for the Period 1

January 1, 2019, - June 30, 2020

Procedures 30DP-9MP23 Foreign Materials Exclusion Controls 9

31MT-9DG05 Installation and Removal of DG A Temporary Piping 6

Supports

65DP-0QQ01 Industry Operating Experience Review 43

70DP-0MR01 Maintenance Rule 44

70DP-0MR01 Maintenance Rule 45

70DP-0MR01 Maintenance Rule 46

Work Orders 5224848, 5254449, 5136175, 5254542, 5254569, 5254567

71111.13 Corrective Action 21-08296, 21-08326, 21-08344, 21-08355, 21-08382, 21-

Documents 08427, 21-08478, 21-08604, 21-08605, 21-08712, 21-

08666, 21-10343, 21-10262, 21-10219, 21-10665, 21-

10954, 21-11082, 21-11087, 21-11088, 21-11089, 21-

11090, 21-11205

Miscellaneous Work Week 2129 Schedule Risk Evaluation 07/20/2021

Unit 1 Protected Equipment Scheme for Main Feedwater 07/21/2021

Pump A

Unit 1 Protected Equipment Scheme for Class 1E AC 08/31/2021

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

battery charger out of service

Unit 1 Protected Equipment Scheme for A diesel generator 08/31/2021

out of service

Work Week 2135 Schedule Risk Evaluation 08/30/2021

Risk Profile Unit 1 DG A 08/31/2021

Unit 1 control room operator logs 08/31/2021

Unit 1 control room operator logs 09/01/2021

Night Order: Unit 3 MT Control Valve #3 Issue 1

Phoenix Risk Monitor - PVGS Unit 3 Current Risk Summary 09/23/2021

Report as of 9/23/2021

Unit 3 Main Control Valve Jumper WO 5372130 Risk 0

Management and Readiness Plan

Ops Downpower Unit 3 CV-3 Risk Management and 0

Readiness Plan

Protected Equipment Scheme for DG A Being 09/26/2021

INOPERABLE (DG B Protected)

Phoenix Risk Monitor - PVGS Unit 2 Current Risk Summary 09/27/2021

Report As of 9/27/2021 00:00

Phoenix Risk Monitor - PVGS Unit 2 Current Risk Summary 09/27/2021

Report As of 9/28/2021 02:20

Phoenix Risk Monitor - PVGS Unit 2 Current Risk Summary 09/27/2021

Report As of 9/28/2021 14:00

2DP-0RS01-01 Risk Challenge Meetings 0

RICT-U2-2021-01 U2 PHOENIX RICT July 12, 2021 What If? Risk at 1544 07/12/2021

RICT-U2-2021-01 U2 PHOENIX RICT July 12, 2021 Operator Screen Risk at 07/12/2021

1743

RICT-U2-2021-01 U2 PHOENIX RICT July 13, 2021 Operator Screen Risk at 07/13/2021

0634

Procedures 02DP-0RS01 Online Integrated Risk 9

2DP-9RS01 Configuration Risk Management and Risk-Informed 4

Completion Time Programs

31MT-9DG05 Installation and Removal of DG A Temporary Piping 6

Supports

40DP-9AP21 Protected Equipment 7

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

40DP-9AP21 Protected Equipment 7

40DP-9RS01 Operations Department Online Nuclear Risk Determination 7

Modes 1 and 2

40DP-9RS03 Risk Management Actions 1

40DP-9RS04 RICT PRA Functionality Determination 1

40DP-9RS05 Calculation of RMAT and RICT 0

40DP-9SR03 Risk Management Actions 1

40OP-9SA02 De-Energization of BOP ESFAS 25

77OP-9RJ07 Plant Computer Users Manual 2

Work Orders 5357846, 5357847, 5359440, 5359445, 5360225, 5372130

71111.15 Corrective Action 21-08106, 21-08566, 21-09152, 21-10219, 17-00032, 16-

Documents 15628, 21-09687, 21-06194

Miscellaneous PVNGS Design Basis Manual, Chemical And Volume 26

Control System

Technical Specification Bases 72

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 20C

Unit 1 Control Room Logs 08/31/2021

DBM, RC System 32

21-08106-001 Evaluation

PVNGS DBM Diesel Generator, Class 1E Standby Generation, Fuel Oil 28

Storage and Transfer System

Procedures Design Basis Manual, Diesel Generator, Class 1E Standby 26

generation, Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System

(DF/DG/PE)

40AO-9ZZ04 Reactor Coolant Pump Emergencies 33

40ST-9DG01 Diesel Generator A Test 51

Work Orders 5362834

71111.18 Corrective Action 21-05679, 21-05937

Documents

Miscellaneous S-08-0355 10 CFR 50.59 Screening 1

Procedures 93DP-0LC07-01 10 CFR 50.59 and 72.48 Administrative Guideline 6

IP-ENG-001 Standard Design Process 2

Work Orders 5340360

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.19 Corrective Action 21-08296, 21-08326, 21-08344, 21-08355, 21-08382, 21-

Documents 08427, 21-08478, 21-08664, 21-08715, 21-08566, 21-

08973, 21-08978, 21-10262

Drawings 03-M-DGP-001 P & I Diagram starting air diesel generator system 63

Procedures 32MT-9FT01 Adjustment of Feedwater Pump Turbine (FWPT) MDT-20 16

Governor Settings

36ST-1SM01 Seismic Monitoring System Functional Test Procedure 21

40OP-9FT02 Feedwater Pump Turbine B 56

40OP-9FT04 Feedwater Pump Turbine B Over-Speed Testing 14

40OP-9SA01 BOP ESFAS Module Operation 33

40OP-9SA02 De-Energization of BOP ESFAS 25

40ST-9DG01 Diesel Generator A Test 51

41ST-1SM01 Seismic Instrumentation Channel Checks 14

73DP-9ZZ20 Air Operated Valve Program 14

73ST-9XI22 CH Valves - Inservice Test 23

Work Orders 5357846, 5357847, 5355141, 5359445, 5360225, 5359249,

5368765, 5249757

71111.22 Calculations 13-JC-SB-200 PPS Bistable Drift Analysis 1

Corrective Action 21-09651, 21-11152, 21-11153, 21-10660, 21-10710, 21-

Documents 10803

Miscellaneous Unit 2 West Containment Sump and RCS Unidentified 09/08/2021

Leakage Trends

Unit 2 West Containment Sump and RCS Unidentified 09/23/2021

Leakage Trends

Multi-Unit RDT In Leakage Trends 09/07/2021

Unit 2 Containment Sump In Leakage MRM Slide 07/27/2021

Unit 2 Containment Sump In-Leakage 6/02/2021 - 0

9/07/2021 Data

Procedures 14DP-0BD02 PVNGS FLEX Equipment Status Control 4

14MT-9BD85 FLEX 2X2 Portable Refueling Pump Inspections and Tests 2

36ST-9RC02 Containment Building Sump Instrumentation Calibration 29

40OP-9RC03 RCS Leakage Source Determination 6

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

40ST-9RC02 ERFDADS (Preferred) Calculation of RCS Water Inventory 54

73ST-9DF01 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps - Inservice Test 37

Work Orders 5234129, 5255961, 5252607

71114.06 Miscellaneous LOCT Emergency Plan Data Form for SES-0-03-Q-11 08/17/2021

DEP Classification Form for SES-0-03-Q-11 08/27/2021

DEP Notification Form for SES-0-03-Q-11 08/27/2021

EP-0902 Notifications 17

SES-0-03-Q-11 SGN-FT-1011 F.L./RCS Leak/MFP Trip/LOCA/HPSI and 11

CSAS Fail

Procedures 40AO-9ZZ02 Excessive RCS Leakrate 21

71151 Corrective Action 20-08932, 20-14947, 21-00314, 21-00506, 21-06710, 21-

Documents 06844, 21-10660, 21-10710, 21-10803

Miscellaneous Units 1, 2, and 3 MSPI Run Demands Failures Report 07/08/2021

4/1/2020 - 6/30/2021

Units 1, 2, and 3 MSPI Component Failures Report 4/1/2020 07/08/2021

- 6/30/2021

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI Unavailability Report 4/1/2020 - 07/08/2021

6/30/2021

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI EDG System July 2021 UAI 09/01/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI EDG System July 2021 URI 09/01/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI EDG System July 2021 PLE 09/01/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI RHR CS Systems July 2021 UAI 09/02/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI RHR CS Systems July 2021 URI 09/02/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI RHR CS Systems July 2021 PLE 09/02/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI EW SP Systems July 2021 UAI 09/02/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI EW SP Systems July 2021 URI 09/02/2021

Derivation Reports

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI EW SP Systems July 2021 PLE 09/02/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI HPSI System July 2021 UAI 09/02/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI HPSI System July 2021 URI 09/02/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI HPSI System July 2021 PLE 09/02/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI AFW System July 2021 UAI 09/02/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI AFW System July 2021 URI 09/02/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, MSPI AFW System July 2021 PLE 09/02/2021

Derivation Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, All Systems July 2021 MSPI Margin 09/01/2021

Reports

Units 1, 2, and 3, Control Room Operator Logs 4/1/2020 - 09/25/2021

6/30/2021

13-NS-C075 MSPI Bases Document 9

13-NS-C075 MSPI Bases Document 10

13-NS-C075 MSPI Bases Document 11

13-NS-C075 MSPI Bases Document 12

Procedures 70DP-0MR01 Maintenance Rule 46

70DP-0PI01 Performance Index Data Mitigating Systems Cornerstone 9

93DP-0LC09 NRC ROP PI Data Collection, Verification and Submittal 12

71152 Corrective Action 21-08605, 21-08666, 21-08979, 21-08980, 21-08981, 21-

Documents 09934

Miscellaneous NRC Update - CEDMCS Reliability Presentation 08/19/2021

Operational Decision-Making Instruction: Unit 1 Select 0

Control Element Assemblies Will Not Move in Manual

Individual (MI)

Night Order: Unit 1 CEDMC Differences 1

Procedures 40AO-9ZZ11 CEA Malfunctions 28

77OP-9RJ07 Plant Computer Users Manual 2

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Work Orders 5359440

71153 Corrective Action 21-06337, 21-06347, 21-08029, 21-08041, 21-08268, 21-

Documents 11094

21-08604, 21-08605

Miscellaneous Unit 1 Operator logs: July 19 - 20, 2021 07/20/2021

MREP Approval Form - SB Scoping MTM Component 09/02/2021

Addition

Palo Verde Simulator Observation - Main Feed Restoration 08/26/2021

Timeline

Operability 40AO-9ZZ09 Reactor Power Cutback (Loss of Feedpump) 31

Evaluations

Procedures 32MT-9FT01 Adjustment of Feedwater Pump Turbine (FWPT) MDT-20 16

Governor Settings

40DP-9OP02 Conduct of Operations 75

40OP-9FT02 Feedwater Pump Turbine B 56

40OP-9FT04 Feedwater Pump Turbine B Over-Speed Testing 14

40OP-9ZZ05 Power Operations 151

70DP-0MR01 Maintenance Rule 46

77OP-9RJ07 Plant Computer Users Manual

Work Orders 5359440, 5359445, 5360225

19