IR 05000528/2022010
| ML23011A284 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/2023 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/EB1 |
| To: | Heflin A Arizona Public Service Co |
| References | |
| IR 2022010 | |
| Download: ML23011A284 (20) | |
Text
January 17, 2023
SUBJECT:
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2022010, 05000529/2022010 AND 05000530/2022010
Dear Adam C. Heflin:
On December 22, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. Horton, Senior Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Signed by Gaddy, Vincent on 01/17/23 Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000528, 05000529, 05000530 License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 05000528, 05000529 and 05000530 License Numbers: NPF-41, NPF-51 and NPF-74 Report Numbers: 05000528/2022010, 05000529/2022010 and 05000530/2022010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2022-010-0010 Licensee: Arizona Public Service Facility: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Location: Tonopah, AZ Inspection Dates: November 28, 2022, to December 22, 2022 Inspectors: C. Baron, Contractor S. Campbell, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer W. Cullum, Reactor Inspector R. Deese, Senior Reactor Analyst G. George, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Lee, Reactor Inspector G. Nicely, Contractor F. Thomas, Reactor Inspector Approved By: Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Conform with Regulatory Guide 1.106 for MOV Thermal Overload Protection Devices Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000528,05000529,05000530/202201 0-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a finding having very low significance and an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control." Specifically, the licensee failed to translate Regulatory Guide 1.106, Revision 1, requirements into the design for motor-operated valves motor starter thermal overload protection devices. Specifically, the design does not ensure that the thermal overload protection devices were bypassed under accident conditions, and the design did not consider the cumulative effect of heating caused by successive starts that could occur from additional repositioning.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000528,05000529,05 Failure to Appropriately 71111.21M Open 000530/2022010-02 Group MOVs in accordance with MOV Diagnostic Testing Program
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance (DBA) Inspection The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02) (5 Samples 1 Partial)
- (1) Unit 2 High Pressure Safety Injection Valve SIAUV-627 Component walkdown Maintenance history including completed work orders for routine and corrective maintenance Calculations for thrust and torque requirements and maximum expected differential pressure Design basis documentation including required safety functions and environmental conditions Corrective action program documentation Motor-operated valve setpoint documentation including assumed variables such as stem friction and valve factor Environmental qualification documents Calculations for voltage load flow, voltage drop, and thermal overload relay sizing Engineering change documentation for replacement of the Unit 3 high pressure safety injection valve from a magnesium rotor to an aluminum rotor
- (2) Unit 3 Low Pressure Safety Injection Valve SIBUV-625 Component walkdown Maintenance history including completed work orders for routine and corrective maintenance Calculations for thrust and torque requirements and maximum expected differential pressure Design basis documentation including required safety functions and environmental conditions Corrective action program documentation Motor-operated valve setpoint documentation including assumed variables such as stem friction and valve factor Environmental qualification documents Calculations for voltage load flow, voltage drop, and thermal overload relay sizing
- (3) Unit 1 Class 1E 125Vdc DC Control Center PKB-M42 and Distribution Panel PKB-D22 System health report Maintenance, inspection, and testing procedures Vendor operating and maintenance requirements Short circuit calculations, coordination studies, voltage drop calculations, and maintenance activities to ensure they were appropriate for the design of the Class 1E DC Control Center PKB-M42 and PKB-D22 Distribution Panel Operating voltage characteristics to verify the Class 1E DC Control Center PKB-M42 and downstream components can perform their design function through input voltage ranges Corrective action documents to ensure degraded or nonconforming conditions are identified and corrected
- (4) Units 1, 2, and 3 Emergency Diesel Generators and Fuel Oil Systems Design basis documents and calculations including loading and voltage load flow/voltage drop System design basis manual and applicable compliance with industry and NRC regulatory guides Engineering change documentation for replacements, including applicable post-modification testing requirements, of the voltage regulation systems Diesel fuel pump documentation to verify that injection pumps have been replaced with new or rebuilt pumps containing new Viton O-rings Calculations for diesel fuel storage and day tank sizing, and diesel fuel oil API gravity and heat values Maintenance and testing procedures and latest test results to verify integrity of diesel storage tanks and adequate testing of fuel oil Engineering change documentation for modifications intended to reduce leakage and improve maintenance including verification that changes were properly incorporated into applicable drawings and operating and maintenance procedures
- (5) Units 1, 2, and 3 Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Component walkdown, maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation Calculations for net positive suction head, and hydraulic performance Comprehensive pump test acceptance criteria, basis for acceptance criteria, and recent test results Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures Turbine overspeed trip setpoint and evaluation of pipe pressure Room heat up during station blackout due to steam leakage Time to restart auxiliary feedwater pump after control room evacuation due to fire
- (6) Evaluation of Operator Procedures and Actions From November 28, 2022, to December 15, 2022, the inspectors reviewed and observed the following selected time critical actions (TCA):
TCA-56 involving control room operator actions resulting from a design basis loss of power and a 50-gallon per minute low pressure safety injection (LPSI)pump seal leak during recirculation. The operators addressed the LPSI pump seal leak by manually closing the reactor water tank valve CHA-HV-531 and containment sump isolation valve SIA-UV-531 within 30 minutes upon alarm indication of room flooding. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the suitability of the emergency core cooling system room flood level switch to function in the postulated service conditions.
TCA-60 involving a station blackout event and dispatching a control building operator from the Unit 1 Operations Support Building to the station blackout generators (SBOG), starting one SBOG in accordance with Procedure 40EP-9EO10-80, "ALIGN SBOG TO PBA-S03 (BO)," and powering one 4.16kV bus within 60 minutes.
TCA-109 involving a small break loss of coolant accident and the operators tripping both reactor coolant pumps within 5 minutes of subcooling margin dropping below 24 degrees Fahrenheit.
TCA-75 involving control room operator actions resulting from an anticipated transient without scram and initiating emergency boration within 10 minutes.
Internal Events and Internal Floods Human Reliability Worksheet I.4, 4NKNM45-2HLOP-HR, "AO Fails to Align Alternate Charger EF/E1(NKN-H21/H20) to NKN-M45, involved identifying and diagnosing (Tcog) the loss of a battery charger and aligning it to the alternate charger (Texe) during and following an initiating event and before battery depletion. The inspectors observed an Auxiliary Operator being dispatched from the vicinity of the control room and using Procedure 40OP-9NK01, 125 VDC Non-Class 1E Electrical System (NK), Section 6.5, to simulate aligning Alternate Battery Charger EF/E1 NKN-H20 to 125 VDC Charger E1 to Bus NKN-M45.
According to Worksheet I.4, the required time to execute (Texe) this action is 15 minutes. The AO completed it in 19 minutes. The inspectors observed crew performance of a scenario involving a Steam Generator Tube Rupture coincident with a complete loss of offsite power, a loss of Battery Charger E and with Auxiliary Feedwater Pump AFB-P01 out of service. According to Worksheet I.4, the required time to recognize and diagnose (Tcog) the loss of Battery Charger E is 35 minutes. The scenario was stopped after 45 minutes.
The licensee issued Condition Report 22-13311 to document exceeding Tcog and Texe.
Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) ===
- (1) Units 1, 2, and 3 Reactor Building Drain System Gate Valve RDB-V-024 Containment Isolation Valve Component walkdown Air-operated valve component setpoint documentation Interface between safety and non-safety related components Licensee responses to NRC Generic Letter 88-14 Design basis documentation including required safety functions Maintenance and testing documentation including completed work orders Calculations for maximum expected differential pressure and margin
Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (4 Samples)
- (1) Design Change AF-1701, "MOV Pressure Locking Modification for Auxiliary Feed Valves 1,2,3JAFCUV0036, 1,2,3JAFAUV0037 and 1,2,3JSGAUV0138"
- (2) Design Equivalency Change DEC-00337, "Roof Penetrations Seals for Auxiliary, Fuel, and Control Building Roofs for All Three Units"
- (3) Design Change DG-804, "Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Enhancements"
- (4) Design Change Package DF-1555, "Replace Underground Duct Banks and Associated Cabling from EDG Buildings to Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank"
Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (4 Samples)
- (1) NRC Information Notice 2017-06: Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a fault on the Direct Current Distribution System
- (2) NRC Information Notice 2012-06: Ineffective Use of Vendor Technical Recommendations
- (3) NRC Information Notice 1997-90: Use of Nonconservative Acceptance Criteria in Safety-Related Pump Surveillance Tests
- (4) NRC Information Notice 1990-45: Overspeed of the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and Over pressurization of the Associated Piping System
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Conform with Regulatory Guide 1.106 for MOV Thermal Overload Protection Devices Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000528,05000529,05000530/20220 10-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a finding having very low significance and an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control." Specifically, the licensee failed to translate Regulatory Guide 1.106, Revision 1, requirements into the design for motor-operated valves motor starter thermal overload protection devices. Specifically, the design does not ensure that the thermal overload protection devices were bypassed under accident conditions, and the design did not consider the cumulative effect of heating caused by successive starts that could occur from additional repositioning.
Description:
Motor-operated valves with thermal overload protection devices for the valve motors are used in safety systems and in their auxiliary supporting systems. Operating experience has shown that indiscriminate application of thermal overload protection devices to these valve motors could result in needless hindrance to successful completion of safety functions.
Thermal overload protection devices are designed primarily to protect continuous-duty motors while they are running rather than during starting. However, use of these overload devices to protect intermittent-duty motors may result in undesired actuation of the devices if the cumulative effect of heating caused by successive starts at short intervals is not considered in determining the overload trip setting. Undesired actuation of the protection devices would result in undesired loss of control of the valves, until the protective devices are manually reset or cool down.
To ensure that safety-related safety injection, and auxiliary feedwater motor-operated valves, equipped with thermal overload protection devices, would successfully complete their safety related function, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station designed the emergency safety features motor operated valve circuits to meet the acceptable Regulatory Position 1(b) of Regulatory Guide 1.106, Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves. Specifically, Regulatory Position 1(b) states,
1. Provided that the completion of the safety function is not jeopardized or that other safety
systems are not degraded,
- (b) those thermal overload protection devices that are normally in force during plant operation should be bypassed under accident conditions.
The bypass initiation system circuitry should conform to the criteria of Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.10, and 4.13 of IEEE Std 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," and should be periodically tested.
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Updated Safety Analysis Report, paragraph 8.3.1.1.3.13 discusses that the thermal overload relay contacts for motor-operated valves are bypassed, or deactivated, in the event of an initiating accident signal. The bypass remains in effect until the initiating signal is manually reset. To confirm the description, the inspectors reviewed drawings of the safety injection and auxiliary feedwater systems motor-operator starting circuits. These drawings illustrated that the bypassing of the thermal overload protection devices occur when a safety injection actuation signal or auxiliary feedwater actuation signal is present. The thermal overload protection devices are reactivated when these signals are manually reset in the control room.
Through review of the updated safety analysis report and emergency operations procedures, the inspectors identified motor-operated valves that initially open or close on an accident actuation signal; and these valves also provide a throttling safety function during specific accidents or events. The throttling safety function is necessary to depressurize the reactor coolant system and achieve cold shutdown. Specifically, auxiliary feedwater regulating valves are required to be throttled in a loss of feedwater event. High-pressure safety injection valves are required to be throttled to achieve post loss-of-coolant accident long term cooling.
Inspectors discussions with Palo Verde operators and review of design basis loss of feedwater emergency operating procedures indicated that operators throttle auxiliary feedwater flow to stabilize steam generator levels using the auxiliary feedwater regulating valves. Once steam generator water levels are stabilized, the emergency operating procedures direct the operators to reset the auxiliary feedwater actuation signal circuitry. Once the auxiliary feedwater actuation signal circuitry is reset, the thermal overload protection devices are reactivated and no longer bypassed. This would occur prior to entering cold shutdown to exit the event or accident conditions.
For the high-pressure safety injection motor operated valves that have a throttling accident safety function, operators discussed that the safety injection actuation signal would most likely still be active; therefore, the thermal overload protection devices would be bypassed.
However, there is no procedural guidance to ensure the safety injection signal circuitry would not be reset prior to throttling for long term recirculation.
Since the thermal overload protection devices would not be bypassed during the entire time accident conditions are present, the inspectors determined that Regulatory Position 1(b) of Regulatory Guide 1.106 was not met.
In accordance with Palo Verdes motor-operated valve testing and surveillance program (NRC Generic Letter 89-10 program), design basis reviews were completed to determine the conditions during which the valves were relied upon to open, to close, or to open or close at different times, to complete the specified safety function. In sizing and selecting the thermal overload protection devices, the devices should be set, assuming the cumulative effect of heating caused by successive starts, to allow the valve to perform its safety function and to reposition if inadvertently operated.
To understand the selection of thermal overload protection devices, the inspectors reviewed electrical calculations 13-EC-PH-0250, Overload Relay Heat Sizing Criteria, Revision 2, and 13-EC-PH-0254, MOV Thermal Protection, Revision 14. These calculations considered only the heat produced in the protection device by the movement of the valve in one direction and a reposition. However, the inspectors determined the calculations did not consider throttling valves, or valves that are required to open and close, during a design basis accident.
Therefore, the sizing and selection of the thermal overload protection devices did not consider the cumulative effect of heating caused by successive starts that could occur from additional repositioning.
The additional heat would have the potential to actuate the thermal overload protective devices before desired. If the devices actuate too soon, when they are not bypassed following actuation signal reset, operators would not have the ability to change position of the motor-operated valves until the protection device is reset at the motor starter. This condition may challenge the availability to throttle the valves necessary to exit the design basis accidents or events.
Corrective Actions: In response to this issue, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program to evaluate throttling effects on heat input to thermal overload protection device selection and if a suitable thermal overload protection testing is necessary.
This finding does not represent an immediate safety concern.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 22-13025, 22-12977, 22-13218, and 22-13493
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to bypass the thermal overload protection devices for the full duration of accident conditions, in accordance with Regulatory Position 1(b) of Regulatory Guide 1.106, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, there is a potential that safety-related motor-operated valves, that have a throttling design function, could inadvertently trip and adversely affect motor-operated valve operation during emergency operating procedure implementation.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding affected the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC and did not affect its operability or PRA functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," states, "Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in § 50.2and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions." Additionally, it states, "The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program."
Contrary to the above, prior to December 22, 2022, the licensee failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Additionally, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design in the performance of design reviews. Specifically, the licensee failed to correctly translate the requirements of RG 1.106 into the specifications and design of the thermal overload protection device bypass to remain in effect during accident conditions. Additionally, the sizing and selection of the thermal overload protection devices did not consider the cumulative effect of heating caused by successive starts that could occur from additional repositioning.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Unresolved Item Failure to Appropriately Group MOVs in accordance with 71111.21 (Open) MOV Diagnostic Testing Program M URI 05000528,05000529,05000530/2022010-02
Description:
The inspectors identified an unresolved item for the licensees failure to ensure motor-operated valve factors were established in accordance with licensee commitments to the grouping methods of NRC Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 6, "Information on Schedule and Grouping, and Staff Responses to Additional Public Questions," and methods of self imposed standard MPR-2524-A, JOG MOV Periodic Verification Program Summary.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's grouping of valves to establish valve factors which are used in assumptions to determine capability of safety-related motor operated globe valves. After reviewing the valve grouping, the inspectors identified the following issues:
The grouping evaluation did not consider differential pressure or flow as required by NRC Generic Letter 89-10 Supplement 6.
Group GL-2, did not have any documented differential pressure test data to establish a valve factor. In accordance with self-imposed standard, MPR-2524-A, JOG MOV Periodic Verification Program Summary, two or more valves are required to be tested in a group to properly establish a valve factor.
The MOV valve factors study, 13-MS-B075, " MOTOR OPERATED VALVE (MOV)
Valve Factors," Revision 0, did not discuss or analyze the effects of side loading on high flow globe valves.
While there was uncertainty applied to valve factors within groups, it is not clear that the uncertainty meets the two standard deviations criteria set by MPR-2524-A.
Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) requires, in part, that licensees must establish a program to ensure that motor operated valves continue to be capable of performing their design basis functions. However, the inspectors identified that the means of determining valve factors for globe valves was not conducted in accordance with approved methods used to meet the regulation.
Planned Closure Actions: To close the unresolved item, the inspectors need additional information to determine if the performance deficiencies are more-than-minor significance and a violation of NRC requirements exists, in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, "Issue Screening." The inspectors requested and will need to review the following information:
Number of valves affected by the issues documented above The current margin of each of the affected valves Impacts to operability or maintenance testing intervals Licensee Actions: As discussed in Condition Report 22-13437, Palo Verde Generating Station programs engineering staff will complete an evaluation to ensure that the grouping methods and uncertainty criteria of the motor operated valve program standards have been met.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report 22-13437
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On December 22, 2022, the inspectors presented the design bases assurance inspection results to T. Horton, Senior Vice President, Site Operations and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.21M Calculations 01-EC-MA-0221 AC Distribution 15
01-EC-PK-0207 DC Battery Sizing and Minimum Voltage 11
2-EC-MA-0221 AC Distribution 14
2-EC-PK-0207 DC Battery Sizing and Minimum Voltage 13
03-EC-MA-0221 AC Distribution 12
03-EC-PB-0200 AC Overcurrent Protection Class 1E 11
03-EC-PH-0255 120VAC Control Circuits 2
03-EC-PK-0207 DC Battery Sizing and Minimum Voltage 10
13-EC-PH-0250 Overload Relay Heater Sizing Criteria 2
13-EC-PH-0254 MOV Thermal Protection 14
13-EC-PK-0110 DC [Direct Current] Short Circuit Current: Class 1E 11
13-EC-PK-0209 125V DC Protection: Class 1E 002
13-JC-ZZ-0412 Motor Operated Valve Thrust and Torque Calculation for 2
13JSIBUV0615, 13JSIBUV0625, 13JSIAUV0635, and
13JSIAUV0645
13-JC-ZZ-0414 Motor Operated Valve Thrust and Torque Calculation for 1
13JSIAUV0617, 13JSIAUV0627, 13JSIAUV0637, and
13JSIAUV0647
13-MC-AF-0206 Auxiliary Feedwater System Design Pressures, Temperature 3
and Functions
13-MC-AF-0303 Pressure Rise in a Pipe due to Thermal Expansion of Water 4
13-MC-AF-0309 AF Hydraulic Calculation for Q-Trains 9
13-MC-AF-0310 AF Hydraulic Calculation for N-Train 5
13-MC-FP-0317 Fire Protection Change Regulatory Review 9
13-MC-HA-0052 Auxiliary Building Essential Cooling System Heat Load 9
Calculation (Appendix 'X')
13-MC-HA-0052 Auxiliary Building Essential Cooling System Heat Load 9
Calculation (Appendix 'Y')
13-MC-RD-0503 Radwaste Drain System, Auxiliary Building 10
13-MC-RD-0801 Maximum Differential Pressure Calculation for Radioactive 0
Waste Drain System Air-Operated Valve (AOV)
13JRDBUV0024
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
13-MC-ZZ-0219 Piston Style AOV Thrust and Actuator Sizing Calculation 7
13-MC-ZZ-0613 Overpressure of the Aux. Feedwater Pump Discharge Lines 0
13-MS-B075 Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Valve Factors 0
13-MS-C012 Pressure Locking Study 0
2-9268122-000 Framatome CE16HTP Fuel Vendor Qualification Program 01/18/2018
(VQP) SBLOCA Transient Analyses
TA-13-C00-2000- 10CFR50 Appendix R Fire Protection Analysis 3
004
Corrective Action Condition Report 15-11837, 18-14733, 18-15584, 19-04087, 19-02985, 19-
Documents (CR-) 02987, 19-03044, 19-14155, 20-03948, 20-04840, 20-13818,
21-00671
Condition Report 3470639, 3526207
Deficiency Report
(CRDR)
Palo Verde Action 3176091, 4160870
Request (PVAR-)
Corrective Action Condition Report 22-12363, 22-12685, 22-12689, 22-12691, 22-12693, 22-
Documents (CR-) 12694, 22-12696, 22-12700, 22-12710, 22-12711, 22-12733,
Resulting from 22-12768, 22-12791, 22-12814, 22-12901, 22-12922, 22-
Inspection 12967, 22-12972, 22-12977, 22-13019, 22-13025, 22-13051,
2-13072, 22-13139, 22-13140, 22-13141, 22-13142, 22-
13143, 22-13144, 22-13274, 22-13275, 22-13290, 22-13292,
2-13306, 22-13311, 22-13312, 22-13313, 22-13437, 22-
13493
Drawings 01-E-PKA-001 Main Single Line Diagram, 125V DC Class 1E and 120VAC 8
Vital Inst [Instrument] Power System
01-E-PKA-005 Single Line Diagram 125V DC [Direct Current] Class 1E 15
Power System, DC Control Center 1E-PKB-M42
01-E-PKA-006 Single Line Diagram 125V DC Class 1E Power System, 12
Distribution Panel 1E-PKB-D22
01-M-AFP-001 P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System 45
01-M-IAP-003 P&I Diagram Instrument and Service Air System 102
01-M-SIP-001 P&I Diagram Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System 63
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
01-M-SIP-002 P&I Diagram Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System 44
01-M-SIP-003 P&I Diagram Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System 12
2-E-MAA-002 U2 Single Line Diagram 7
2-E-PHA-003 480V MCC 2E-PHA-003 28
2-M-AFP-001 P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System 35
03-E-PHA-006 480V MCC 3E-PHB-M36 19
03-M-AFP-001 P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System 32
13-E-MAA-001 Main Single Line Diagram 31
93-15198 3-150 Weld Ends Stainless Steel Gate Valve, 10" Air Cylinder, 15
2:1 Bevel Gear Operator, Fail Close
D131850-01 Installation Dimensions Flood Level Switch 09/03/1981
Engineering DEC-00337 Roof Penetration Seals for Auxiliary, Fuel, and Control 6
Changes Building Roofs for All Three Units
EDC 2017-00377 Update Calc 13-JC-ZZ-0414 to incorporate changes from calc 1
13ECMA0221
Engineering 15-11837-068 Engineering Evaluation 12/08/2022
Evaluations
2-13140-002 Level 3 Evaluation Report 12/16/2022
3567089 Engineering Evaluation 12/10/2010
ECE ZZ-0184 EQ List Reduction Study 12/02/1994
EQ-JM-481 Equipment Qualification Data File 09/23/1986
EQ-PM.R27 Equipment Qualification Program Manual 12/19/2019
VOL1
LEVEL 4 Determine whether RD Level Switch maintenance 03/22/2016
EVALUATION requirements of ERET 3319260 may be performed less often
REPORT 16- to allow the performance periodicities to better align, thus
2981-002 minimizing the number of times maintenance is performed.
PB-1655 Engineering Disposition ENG-DMWO #4544651 04/20/2020
Miscellaneous Equipment Template DCID List 08/17/2022
PVNGS-Palo Verde Unit 1 RD-Radioactive Waste Drains
Function Scoping
2-02493- APS Letter - 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, New and Revised 04/29/1993
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
WFC/JNI Deviations
15-11837-069 Item Identification 12/09/2022
15-11837-070 Item Identification 12/09/2022
18-F025 Licensing Document Change Request 10/05/2018
18-F026 Licensing Document Change Request 10/05/2018
1CHGPMP- I.4_Internal Events and Internal Floods Human Reliability 09/21/2022
STRT-2HR Worksheets: CR Operator Fails to Restart Chg Pmp
Following LOP
248689 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Preventive 12/01/2022
Maintenance Program
4NKNM45- I.4_Internal Events and Internal Floods Human Reliability 07/31/2019
2HLOP-HR Worksheets: AO Fails to Align Alternate Charger EF/E1(NKN-
H21/H20) to NKN-M45
262224/0 Surveillance Test Package Review Sheet 11/06/2021
AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System Design Basis Manual 26
AGT-FAILSTRT- I.4_Internal Events and Internal Floods Human Reliability 12/11/2020
2HR Worksheets: Operators Fail to Start SBOGs and Align Power
to AFN-P01
DF/DG/PE Design Diesel Generator, Class 1E Standby Generation, Fuel Oil 28
Basis Manual Storage and Transfer System
PK Design Basis Class 1E 125 VDC Power System 21
Manual
Q2-2022 HPSI System Health Report 09/01/2022
S-18-0061 10 CFR 50.59 Screening 1
SI Safety Injection System Design Basis Manual 41
TCA-109 Time Critical Action Validation Package for Following a loss of 02/12/2021
NPSH during a SBLOCA, secure all RCPs
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
TCA-56 Time Critical Action Validation Package to Isolate leak in SI 02/12/2021
Pump room
TCA-75 Time Critical Action Validation Package for Following a 03/07/2019
Reactor Trip and Control Rods failing to insert, initiate
boration.
Procedures 01DP-0AP12 Condition Reporting Process 41
01DP-0RS01 Surveillance Frequency Control Program 1
30DP-9MP08 Preventive Maintenance Program 30
2MT-9ZZ82 Time Delay Relay Test 24
2MT-9ZZ94 Inspection/Cleaning of 1E and Non 1E 125 Vdc Motor Control 18
Centers
40AL-9RK1A Panel B01A Alarm Responses 10
40AL-9RK1C Panel B01C Alarm Responses 9
40AL-9RK2C Panel B02C Alarm Responses 7
40AL-9RK2D Panel B02D Alarm Responses 7
40AL-9RK3A Panel B03A Alarm Responses 30
40AO-9ZZ14 Loss of Non-Class Instrument or Control Power 07/26/2018
40AO-9ZZ19 Control Room Fire 42
40DP-90P18 MOV Operating Guidelines 24
40DP-9AP22 Emergency Operating Procedures Deviation Document 08/15/2022
40DP-9OP15 Equipment Deficiency Tracking 08/12/2021
40DP-9OP19 Locked Valve, Breaker, and Component Tracking 143
40DP-9OP26 Operations Condition Reporting Process and Operability 47
Determination/Functional Assessment
40DP-9ZZ04 Time Critical Action (TCA) Program 16
40DP-9ZZ04 TCA Program 04/21/2020
40DP-9ZZ04 Time Critical Action (TCA) Program Rev. 16
40EP-9EO01 Standard Post Trip Actions 23
40EP-9EO07 Loss Of Off Site Power / Loss Of Forced Circulation 31
40EP-9EO08 Blackout 07/09/2021
40EP-9EO08 Blackout 27
40EP-9EO10 Standard Appendices 107
40EP-9EO10-010 Appendix 10: Charging Pump Alternate Suction to the RWT / 0
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Restoration
40EP-9EO10-011 Appendix 11: Charging Pump Alternate Suction to the SFP / Rev. 0
Restoration
40EP-9EO10-080 Appendix 80: Align SBOG To PBA-S03 (BO) 0
40EP-9EO10-103 Appendix 103: RCS Makeup / Emergency Boration 2
40OP-9AF01 Essential Auxiliary Feedwater System 70
40OP-9NK01 125 VDC Non-Class 1E Electrical System (NK) 30
40OP9DG01 Emergency Diesel Generator A 81B
65DP-0QQ01 Industry Operating Experience 44
73DP-9XI01 Pump and Valve Inservice Testing Program 41
73DP-9ZZ12 Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Program 21
73ST-9AF02 Auxiliary Feedwater A - Inservice Test 61
73ST-9AF04 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A - Comprehensive Pump Test 30
73ST-9XI07 GA, GR and RD Valves - Quarterly - Inservice Test 23
73ST-9ZZ20 IST Program Off-Line Set Pressure Verification 46
74ST9DF02 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Receipt Surveillance Test 12
81DP-0EE10 Design Change Process 52
87DP-0CC08 Control of Vendor Engineering Documents 32
Work Orders Work Orders 2826785, 2827226, 2859190, 2981510-03, 3020922,
20924, 3319260, 3582027, 3895391, 4051663, 4326942,
4557848, 4557849, 4557851, 4612836, 4650768, 4747944,
4849954, 4906594, 4962724, 4962787, 4962791, 4962792,
27327, 5086711, 5145377, 5147776, 5151522, 5182687,
206837, 5257874, 5278965, 5305506, 5305507, 5307398,
5307408, 5307478, 5334546, 4848663, 5035279, 5230891,
4743537, 5029438, 5029439, 5029440
17