IR 05000528/2022010
| ML23011A284 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/2023 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/EB1 |
| To: | Heflin A Arizona Public Service Co |
| References | |
| IR 2022010 | |
| Download: ML23011A284 (20) | |
Text
January 17, 2023
SUBJECT:
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2022010, 05000529/2022010 AND 05000530/2022010
Dear Adam C. Heflin:
On December 22, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. Horton, Senior Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000528, 05000529, 05000530 License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000528, 05000529 and 05000530
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000528/2022010, 05000529/2022010 and 05000530/2022010
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-010-0010
Licensee:
Arizona Public Service
Facility:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
Location:
Tonopah, AZ
Inspection Dates:
November 28, 2022, to December 22, 2022
Inspectors:
C. Baron, Contractor
S. Campbell, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer
W. Cullum, Reactor Inspector
R. Deese, Senior Reactor Analyst
G. George, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Lee, Reactor Inspector
G. Nicely, Contractor
F. Thomas, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Conform with Regulatory Guide 1.106 for MOV Thermal Overload Protection Devices Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000528,05000529,05000530/202201 0-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21M The inspectors identified a finding having very low significance and an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control." Specifically, the licensee failed to translate Regulatory Guide 1.106, Revision 1, requirements into the design for motor-operated valves motor starter thermal overload protection devices. Specifically, the design does not ensure that the thermal overload protection devices were bypassed under accident conditions, and the design did not consider the cumulative effect of heating caused by successive starts that could occur from additional repositioning.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000528,05000529,05 000530/2022010-02 Failure to Appropriately Group MOVs in accordance with MOV Diagnostic Testing Program 71111.21M Open
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance (DBA) Inspection The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02) (5 Samples 1 Partial)
- (1) Unit 2 High Pressure Safety Injection Valve SIAUV-627
Component walkdown
Maintenance history including completed work orders for routine and corrective maintenance
Calculations for thrust and torque requirements and maximum expected differential pressure
Design basis documentation including required safety functions and environmental conditions
Corrective action program documentation
Motor-operated valve setpoint documentation including assumed variables such as stem friction and valve factor
Environmental qualification documents
Calculations for voltage load flow, voltage drop, and thermal overload relay sizing
Engineering change documentation for replacement of the Unit 3 high pressure safety injection valve from a magnesium rotor to an aluminum rotor
- (2) Unit 3 Low Pressure Safety Injection Valve SIBUV-625
Component walkdown
Maintenance history including completed work orders for routine and corrective maintenance
Calculations for thrust and torque requirements and maximum expected differential pressure
Design basis documentation including required safety functions and environmental conditions Corrective action program documentation
Motor-operated valve setpoint documentation including assumed variables such as stem friction and valve factor
Environmental qualification documents
Calculations for voltage load flow, voltage drop, and thermal overload relay sizing
- (3) Unit 1 Class 1E 125Vdc DC Control Center PKB-M42 and Distribution Panel PKB-D22
System health report
Maintenance, inspection, and testing procedures
Vendor operating and maintenance requirements
Short circuit calculations, coordination studies, voltage drop calculations, and maintenance activities to ensure they were appropriate for the design of the Class 1E DC Control Center PKB-M42 and PKB-D22 Distribution Panel
Operating voltage characteristics to verify the Class 1E DC Control Center PKB-M42 and downstream components can perform their design function through input voltage ranges
Corrective action documents to ensure degraded or nonconforming conditions are identified and corrected
- (4) Units 1, 2, and 3 Emergency Diesel Generators and Fuel Oil Systems
Design basis documents and calculations including loading and voltage load flow/voltage drop
System design basis manual and applicable compliance with industry and NRC regulatory guides
Engineering change documentation for replacements, including applicable post-modification testing requirements, of the voltage regulation systems
Diesel fuel pump documentation to verify that injection pumps have been replaced with new or rebuilt pumps containing new Viton O-rings
Calculations for diesel fuel storage and day tank sizing, and diesel fuel oil API gravity and heat values
Maintenance and testing procedures and latest test results to verify integrity of diesel storage tanks and adequate testing of fuel oil
Engineering change documentation for modifications intended to reduce leakage and improve maintenance including verification that changes were properly incorporated into applicable drawings and operating and maintenance procedures
- (5) Units 1, 2, and 3 Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
Component walkdown, maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
Calculations for net positive suction head, and hydraulic performance
Comprehensive pump test acceptance criteria, basis for acceptance criteria, and recent test results
Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
Turbine overspeed trip setpoint and evaluation of pipe pressure
Room heat up during station blackout due to steam leakage
Time to restart auxiliary feedwater pump after control room evacuation due to fire
- (6) Evaluation of Operator Procedures and Actions From November 28, 2022, to December 15, 2022, the inspectors reviewed and observed the following selected time critical actions (TCA):
TCA-56 involving control room operator actions resulting from a design basis loss of power and a 50-gallon per minute low pressure safety injection (LPSI)pump seal leak during recirculation. The operators addressed the LPSI pump seal leak by manually closing the reactor water tank valve CHA-HV-531 and containment sump isolation valve SIA-UV-531 within 30 minutes upon alarm indication of room flooding. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the suitability of the emergency core cooling system room flood level switch to function in the postulated service conditions.
TCA-60 involving a station blackout event and dispatching a control building operator from the Unit 1 Operations Support Building to the station blackout generators (SBOG), starting one SBOG in accordance with Procedure 40EP-9EO10-80, "ALIGN SBOG TO PBA-S03 (BO)," and powering one 4.16kV bus within 60 minutes.
TCA-109 involving a small break loss of coolant accident and the operators tripping both reactor coolant pumps within 5 minutes of subcooling margin dropping below 24 degrees Fahrenheit.
TCA-75 involving control room operator actions resulting from an anticipated transient without scram and initiating emergency boration within 10 minutes.
Internal Events and Internal Floods Human Reliability Worksheet I.4, 4NKNM45-2HLOP-HR, "AO Fails to Align Alternate Charger EF/E1(NKN-H21/H20) to NKN-M45, involved identifying and diagnosing (Tcog) the loss of a battery charger and aligning it to the alternate charger (Texe) during and following an initiating event and before battery depletion. The inspectors observed an Auxiliary Operator being dispatched from the vicinity of the control room and using Procedure 40OP-9NK01, 125 VDC Non-Class 1E Electrical System (NK), Section 6.5, to simulate aligning Alternate Battery Charger EF/E1 NKN-H20 to 125 VDC Charger E1 to Bus NKN-M45.
According to Worksheet I.4, the required time to execute (Texe) this action is 15 minutes. The AO completed it in 19 minutes. The inspectors observed crew performance of a scenario involving a Steam Generator Tube Rupture coincident with a complete loss of offsite power, a loss of Battery Charger E and with Auxiliary Feedwater Pump AFB-P01 out of service. According to Worksheet I.4, the required time to recognize and diagnose (Tcog) the loss of Battery Charger E is 35 minutes. The scenario was stopped after 45 minutes.
The licensee issued Condition Report 22-13311 to document exceeding Tcog and Texe.
Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02)===
- (1) Units 1, 2, and 3 Reactor Building Drain System Gate Valve RDB-V-024 Containment Isolation Valve
Component walkdown
Air-operated valve component setpoint documentation
Interface between safety and non-safety related components
Licensee responses to NRC Generic Letter 88-14
Design basis documentation including required safety functions
Maintenance and testing documentation including completed work orders
Calculations for maximum expected differential pressure and margin
Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (4 Samples)
- (1) Design Change AF-1701, "MOV Pressure Locking Modification for Auxiliary Feed Valves 1,2,3JAFCUV0036, 1,2,3JAFAUV0037 and 1,2,3JSGAUV0138"
- (2) Design Equivalency Change DEC-00337, "Roof Penetrations Seals for Auxiliary, Fuel, and Control Building Roofs for All Three Units"
- (3) Design Change DG-804, "Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Enhancements"
- (4) Design Change Package DF-1555, "Replace Underground Duct Banks and Associated Cabling from EDG Buildings to Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank"
Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (4 Samples)
- (1) NRC Information Notice 2017-06: Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a fault on the Direct Current Distribution System
- (2) NRC Information Notice 2012-06: Ineffective Use of Vendor Technical Recommendations
- (3) NRC Information Notice 1997-90: Use of Nonconservative Acceptance Criteria in Safety-Related Pump Surveillance Tests
- (4) NRC Information Notice 1990-45: Overspeed of the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and Over pressurization of the Associated Piping System
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Conform with Regulatory Guide 1.106 for MOV Thermal Overload Protection Devices Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000528,05000529,05000530/20220 10-01 None (NPP)71111.21M Open/Closed The inspectors identified a finding having very low significance and an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control." Specifically, the licensee failed to translate Regulatory Guide 1.106, Revision 1, requirements into the design for motor-operated valves motor starter thermal overload protection devices. Specifically, the design does not ensure that the thermal overload protection devices were bypassed under accident conditions, and the design did not consider the cumulative effect of heating caused by successive starts that could occur from additional repositioning.
Description:
Motor-operated valves with thermal overload protection devices for the valve motors are used in safety systems and in their auxiliary supporting systems. Operating experience has shown that indiscriminate application of thermal overload protection devices to these valve motors could result in needless hindrance to successful completion of safety functions.
Thermal overload protection devices are designed primarily to protect continuous-duty motors while they are running rather than during starting. However, use of these overload devices to protect intermittent-duty motors may result in undesired actuation of the devices if the cumulative effect of heating caused by successive starts at short intervals is not considered in determining the overload trip setting. Undesired actuation of the protection devices would result in undesired loss of control of the valves, until the protective devices are manually reset or cool down.
To ensure that safety-related safety injection, and auxiliary feedwater motor-operated valves, equipped with thermal overload protection devices, would successfully complete their safety related function, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station designed the emergency safety features motor operated valve circuits to meet the acceptable Regulatory Position 1(b) of Regulatory Guide 1.106, Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves. Specifically, Regulatory Position 1(b) states,
1. Provided that the completion of the safety function is not jeopardized or that other safety
systems are not degraded,
- (b) those thermal overload protection devices that are normally in force during plant operation should be bypassed under accident conditions.
The bypass initiation system circuitry should conform to the criteria of Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.10, and 4.13 of IEEE Std 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," and should be periodically tested.
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Updated Safety Analysis Report, paragraph 8.3.1.1.3.13 discusses that the thermal overload relay contacts for motor-operated valves are bypassed, or deactivated, in the event of an initiating accident signal. The bypass remains in effect until the initiating signal is manually reset. To confirm the description, the inspectors reviewed drawings of the safety injection and auxiliary feedwater systems motor-operator starting circuits. These drawings illustrated that the bypassing of the thermal overload protection devices occur when a safety injection actuation signal or auxiliary feedwater actuation signal is present. The thermal overload protection devices are reactivated when these signals are manually reset in the control room.
Through review of the updated safety analysis report and emergency operations procedures, the inspectors identified motor-operated valves that initially open or close on an accident actuation signal; and these valves also provide a throttling safety function during specific accidents or events. The throttling safety function is necessary to depressurize the reactor coolant system and achieve cold shutdown. Specifically, auxiliary feedwater regulating valves are required to be throttled in a loss of feedwater event. High-pressure safety injection valves are required to be throttled to achieve post loss-of-coolant accident long term cooling.
Inspectors discussions with Palo Verde operators and review of design basis loss of feedwater emergency operating procedures indicated that operators throttle auxiliary feedwater flow to stabilize steam generator levels using the auxiliary feedwater regulating valves. Once steam generator water levels are stabilized, the emergency operating procedures direct the operators to reset the auxiliary feedwater actuation signal circuitry. Once the auxiliary feedwater actuation signal circuitry is reset, the thermal overload protection devices are reactivated and no longer bypassed. This would occur prior to entering cold shutdown to exit the event or accident conditions.
For the high-pressure safety injection motor operated valves that have a throttling accident safety function, operators discussed that the safety injection actuation signal would most likely still be active; therefore, the thermal overload protection devices would be bypassed.
However, there is no procedural guidance to ensure the safety injection signal circuitry would not be reset prior to throttling for long term recirculation.
Since the thermal overload protection devices would not be bypassed during the entire time accident conditions are present, the inspectors determined that Regulatory Position 1(b) of Regulatory Guide 1.106 was not met.
In accordance with Palo Verdes motor-operated valve testing and surveillance program (NRC Generic Letter 89-10 program), design basis reviews were completed to determine the conditions during which the valves were relied upon to open, to close, or to open or close at different times, to complete the specified safety function. In sizing and selecting the thermal overload protection devices, the devices should be set, assuming the cumulative effect of heating caused by successive starts, to allow the valve to perform its safety function and to reposition if inadvertently operated.
To understand the selection of thermal overload protection devices, the inspectors reviewed electrical calculations 13-EC-PH-0250, Overload Relay Heat Sizing Criteria, Revision 2, and 13-EC-PH-0254, MOV Thermal Protection, Revision 14. These calculations considered only the heat produced in the protection device by the movement of the valve in one direction and a reposition. However, the inspectors determined the calculations did not consider throttling valves, or valves that are required to open and close, during a design basis accident.
Therefore, the sizing and selection of the thermal overload protection devices did not consider the cumulative effect of heating caused by successive starts that could occur from additional repositioning.
The additional heat would have the potential to actuate the thermal overload protective devices before desired. If the devices actuate too soon, when they are not bypassed following actuation signal reset, operators would not have the ability to change position of the motor-operated valves until the protection device is reset at the motor starter. This condition may challenge the availability to throttle the valves necessary to exit the design basis accidents or events.
Corrective Actions: In response to this issue, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program to evaluate throttling effects on heat input to thermal overload protection device selection and if a suitable thermal overload protection testing is necessary.
This finding does not represent an immediate safety concern.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 22-13025, 22-12977, 22-13218, and 22-13493
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to bypass the thermal overload protection devices for the full duration of accident conditions, in accordance with Regulatory Position 1(b) of Regulatory Guide 1.106, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, there is a potential that safety-related motor-operated valves, that have a throttling design function, could inadvertently trip and adversely affect motor-operated valve operation during emergency operating procedure implementation.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding affected the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC and did not affect its operability or PRA functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," states, "Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in § 50.2and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions." Additionally, it states, "The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program."
Contrary to the above, prior to December 22, 2022, the licensee failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Additionally, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design in the performance of design reviews. Specifically, the licensee failed to correctly translate the requirements of RG 1.106 into the specifications and design of the thermal overload protection device bypass to remain in effect during accident conditions. Additionally, the sizing and selection of the thermal overload protection devices did not consider the cumulative effect of heating caused by successive starts that could occur from additional repositioning.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Unresolved Item Failure to Appropriately Group MOVs in accordance with 71111.21 (Open)
MOV Diagnostic Testing Program URI 05000528,05000529,05000530/2022010-02 M
Description:
The inspectors identified an unresolved item for the licensees failure to ensure motor-operated valve factors were established in accordance with licensee commitments to the grouping methods of NRC Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 6, "Information on Schedule and Grouping, and Staff Responses to Additional Public Questions," and methods of self imposed standard MPR-2524-A, JOG MOV Periodic Verification Program Summary.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's grouping of valves to establish valve factors which are used in assumptions to determine capability of safety-related motor operated globe valves. After reviewing the valve grouping, the inspectors identified the following issues:
The grouping evaluation did not consider differential pressure or flow as required by NRC Generic Letter 89-10 Supplement 6.
Group GL-2, did not have any documented differential pressure test data to establish a valve factor. In accordance with self-imposed standard, MPR-2524-A, JOG MOV Periodic Verification Program Summary, two or more valves are required to be tested in a group to properly establish a valve factor.
The MOV valve factors study, 13-MS-B075, " MOTOR OPERATED VALVE (MOV)
Valve Factors," Revision 0, did not discuss or analyze the effects of side loading on high flow globe valves.
While there was uncertainty applied to valve factors within groups, it is not clear that the uncertainty meets the two standard deviations criteria set by MPR-2524-A.
Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) requires, in part, that licensees must establish a program to ensure that motor operated valves continue to be capable of performing their design basis functions. However, the inspectors identified that the means of determining valve factors for globe valves was not conducted in accordance with approved methods used to meet the regulation.
Planned Closure Actions: To close the unresolved item, the inspectors need additional information to determine if the performance deficiencies are more-than-minor significance and a violation of NRC requirements exists, in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, "Issue Screening." The inspectors requested and will need to review the following information:
Number of valves affected by the issues documented above
The current margin of each of the affected valves
Impacts to operability or maintenance testing intervals Licensee Actions: As discussed in Condition Report 22-13437, Palo Verde Generating Station programs engineering staff will complete an evaluation to ensure that the grouping methods and uncertainty criteria of the motor operated valve program standards have been met.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report 22-13437
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On December 22, 2022, the inspectors presented the design bases assurance inspection results to T. Horton, Senior Vice President, Site Operations and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
01-EC-MA-0221
AC Distribution
01-EC-PK-0207
DC Battery Sizing and Minimum Voltage
2-EC-MA-0221
AC Distribution
2-EC-PK-0207
DC Battery Sizing and Minimum Voltage
03-EC-MA-0221
AC Distribution
03-EC-PB-0200
AC Overcurrent Protection Class 1E
03-EC-PH-0255
20VAC Control Circuits
03-EC-PK-0207
DC Battery Sizing and Minimum Voltage
13-EC-PH-0250
Overload Relay Heater Sizing Criteria
13-EC-PH-0254
MOV Thermal Protection
13-EC-PK-0110
DC [Direct Current] Short Circuit Current: Class 1E
13-EC-PK-0209
25V DC Protection: Class 1E
2
13-JC-ZZ-0412
Motor Operated Valve Thrust and Torque Calculation for
13JSIBUV0615, 13JSIBUV0625, 13JSIAUV0635, and
13JSIAUV0645
13-JC-ZZ-0414
Motor Operated Valve Thrust and Torque Calculation for
13JSIAUV0617, 13JSIAUV0627, 13JSIAUV0637, and
13JSIAUV0647
13-MC-AF-0206
Auxiliary Feedwater System Design Pressures, Temperature
and Functions
13-MC-AF-0303
Pressure Rise in a Pipe due to Thermal Expansion of Water
13-MC-AF-0309
AF Hydraulic Calculation for Q-Trains
13-MC-AF-0310
AF Hydraulic Calculation for N-Train
13-MC-FP-0317
Fire Protection Change Regulatory Review
13-MC-HA-0052
Auxiliary Building Essential Cooling System Heat Load
Calculation (Appendix 'X')
13-MC-HA-0052
Auxiliary Building Essential Cooling System Heat Load
Calculation (Appendix 'Y')
13-MC-RD-0503
Radwaste Drain System, Auxiliary Building
Calculations
13-MC-RD-0801
Maximum Differential Pressure Calculation for Radioactive
Waste Drain System Air-Operated Valve (AOV)
13JRDBUV0024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
13-MC-ZZ-0219
Piston Style AOV Thrust and Actuator Sizing Calculation
13-MC-ZZ-0613
Overpressure of the Aux. Feedwater Pump Discharge Lines
13-MS-B075
Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Valve Factors
13-MS-C012
Pressure Locking Study
2-9268122-000
Framatome CE16HTP Fuel Vendor Qualification Program
(VQP) SBLOCA Transient Analyses
01/18/2018
TA-13-C00-2000-
004
10CFR50 Appendix R Fire Protection Analysis
Condition Report
(CR-)
15-11837, 18-14733, 18-15584, 19-04087, 19-02985, 19-
2987, 19-03044, 19-14155, 20-03948, 20-04840, 20-13818,
21-00671
Condition Report
Deficiency Report
(CRDR)
3470639, 3526207
Corrective Action
Documents
Palo Verde Action
Request (PVAR-)
3176091, 4160870
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Report
(CR-)
2-12363, 22-12685, 22-12689, 22-12691, 22-12693, 22-
2694, 22-12696, 22-12700, 22-12710, 22-12711, 22-12733,
2-12768, 22-12791, 22-12814, 22-12901, 22-12922, 22-
2967, 22-12972, 22-12977, 22-13019, 22-13025, 22-13051,
2-13072, 22-13139, 22-13140, 22-13141, 22-13142, 22-
13143, 22-13144, 22-13274, 22-13275, 22-13290, 22-13292,
2-13306, 22-13311, 22-13312, 22-13313, 22-13437, 22-
13493
01-E-PKA-001
Main Single Line Diagram, 125V DC Class 1E and 120VAC
Vital Inst [Instrument] Power System
01-E-PKA-005
Single Line Diagram 125V DC [Direct Current] Class 1E
Power System, DC Control Center 1E-PKB-M42
01-E-PKA-006
Single Line Diagram 125V DC Class 1E Power System,
Distribution Panel 1E-PKB-D22
01-M-AFP-001
P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System
01-M-IAP-003
P&I Diagram Instrument and Service Air System
2
Drawings
01-M-SIP-001
P&I Diagram Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
01-M-SIP-002
P&I Diagram Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System
01-M-SIP-003
P&I Diagram Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System
2-E-MAA-002
U2 Single Line Diagram
2-E-PHA-003
480V MCC 2E-PHA-003
2-M-AFP-001
P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System
03-E-PHA-006
480V MCC 3E-PHB-M36
03-M-AFP-001
P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System
13-E-MAA-001
Main Single Line Diagram
93-15198
3-150 Weld Ends Stainless Steel Gate Valve, 10" Air Cylinder,
2:1 Bevel Gear Operator, Fail Close
D131850-01
Installation Dimensions Flood Level Switch
09/03/1981
DEC-00337
Roof Penetration Seals for Auxiliary, Fuel, and Control
Building Roofs for All Three Units
Engineering
Changes
EDC 2017-00377
Update Calc 13-JC-ZZ-0414 to incorporate changes from calc
13ECMA0221
15-11837-068
Engineering Evaluation
2/08/2022
2-13140-002
Level 3 Evaluation Report
2/16/2022
3567089
Engineering Evaluation
2/10/2010
ECE ZZ-0184
EQ List Reduction Study
2/02/1994
EQ-JM-481
Equipment Qualification Data File
09/23/1986
EQ-PM.R27
VOL1
Equipment Qualification Program Manual
2/19/2019
LEVEL 4
EVALUATION
REPORT 16-
2981-002
Determine whether RD Level Switch maintenance
requirements of ERET 3319260 may be performed less often
to allow the performance periodicities to better align, thus
minimizing the number of times maintenance is performed.
03/22/2016
Engineering
Evaluations
PB-1655
Engineering Disposition ENG-DMWO #4544651
04/20/2020
Equipment Template DCID List
08/17/2022
PVNGS-Palo Verde Unit 1 RD-Radioactive Waste Drains
Function Scoping
Miscellaneous
2-02493-
APS Letter - 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, New and Revised
04/29/1993
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
WFC/JNI
Deviations
15-11837-069
Item Identification
2/09/2022
15-11837-070
Item Identification
2/09/2022
18-F025
Licensing Document Change Request
10/05/2018
18-F026
Licensing Document Change Request
10/05/2018
1CHGPMP-
STRT-2HR
I.4_Internal Events and Internal Floods Human Reliability
Worksheets: CR Operator Fails to Restart Chg Pmp
Following LOP
09/21/2022
248689
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Preventive
Maintenance Program
2/01/2022
4NKNM45-
I.4_Internal Events and Internal Floods Human Reliability
Worksheets: AO Fails to Align Alternate Charger EF/E1(NKN-
H21/H20) to NKN-M45
07/31/2019
262224/0
Surveillance Test Package Review Sheet
11/06/2021
Auxiliary Feedwater System Design Basis Manual
AGT-FAILSTRT-
2HR
I.4_Internal Events and Internal Floods Human Reliability
Worksheets: Operators Fail to Start SBOGs and Align Power
to AFN-P01
2/11/2020
DF/DG/PE Design
Basis Manual
Diesel Generator, Class 1E Standby Generation, Fuel Oil
Storage and Transfer System
PK Design Basis
Manual
Class 1E 125 VDC Power System
Q2-2022
HPSI System Health Report
09/01/2022
S-18-0061
CFR 50.59 Screening
Safety Injection System Design Basis Manual
TCA-109
Time Critical Action Validation Package for Following a loss of
NPSH during a SBLOCA, secure all RCPs
2/12/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
TCA-56
Time Critical Action Validation Package to Isolate leak in SI
Pump room
2/12/2021
TCA-75
Time Critical Action Validation Package for Following a
Reactor Trip and Control Rods failing to insert, initiate
boration.
03/07/2019
Condition Reporting Process
Surveillance Frequency Control Program
Preventive Maintenance Program
Time Delay Relay Test
Inspection/Cleaning of 1E and Non 1E 125 Vdc Motor Control
Centers
Panel B01A Alarm Responses
Panel B01C Alarm Responses
Panel B02C Alarm Responses
Panel B02D Alarm Responses
Panel B03A Alarm Responses
Loss of Non-Class Instrument or Control Power
07/26/2018
Control Room Fire
MOV Operating Guidelines
Emergency Operating Procedures Deviation Document
08/15/2022
Equipment Deficiency Tracking
08/12/2021
Locked Valve, Breaker, and Component Tracking
143
Operations Condition Reporting Process and Operability
Determination/Functional Assessment
Time Critical Action (TCA) Program
TCA Program
04/21/2020
Time Critical Action (TCA) Program
Rev. 16
Standard Post Trip Actions
Loss Of Off Site Power / Loss Of Forced Circulation
Blackout
07/09/2021
Blackout
Standard Appendices
107
Procedures
Appendix 10: Charging Pump Alternate Suction to the RWT /
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Restoration
Appendix 11: Charging Pump Alternate Suction to the SFP /
Restoration
Rev. 0
Appendix 80: Align SBOG To PBA-S03 (BO)
Appendix 103: RCS Makeup / Emergency Boration
Essential Auxiliary Feedwater System
25 VDC Non-Class 1E Electrical System (NK)
40OP9DG01
81B
Industry Operating Experience
Pump and Valve Inservice Testing Program
Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Program
Auxiliary Feedwater A - Inservice Test
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A - Comprehensive Pump Test
GA, GR and RD Valves - Quarterly - Inservice Test
IST Program Off-Line Set Pressure Verification
74ST9DF02
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Receipt Surveillance Test
Design Change Process
Control of Vendor Engineering Documents
Work Orders
Work Orders
26785, 2827226, 2859190, 2981510-03, 3020922,
20924, 3319260, 3582027, 3895391, 4051663, 4326942,
4557848, 4557849, 4557851, 4612836, 4650768, 4747944,
4849954, 4906594, 4962724, 4962787, 4962791, 4962792,
27327, 5086711, 5145377, 5147776, 5151522, 5182687,
206837, 5257874, 5278965, 5305506, 5305507, 5307398,
5307408, 5307478, 5334546, 4848663, 5035279, 5230891,
4743537, 5029438, 5029439, 5029440