IR 05000498/2014003
| ML14218A811 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/2014 |
| From: | O'Keefe N NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B |
| To: | Koehl D South Texas |
| A. Sanchez | |
| References | |
| IR-14-003 | |
| Download: ML14218A811 (34) | |
Text
gust 6, 2014
SUBJECT:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2014003 AND 05000499/2014003
Dear Mr. Koehl:
On July 4, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facility. On July 10, 2014, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, D. Proulx/for /RA/
Neil OKeefe, Branch Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-498, 50-499 License Nos.: NPF-76, NPF-80
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000498/2014003 and 05000499/2014003 w/Attachment 1: Supplemental Information 2: Document Request for O
REGION IV==
Docket: 05000498, 05000499 License: NPF-76, NPF-80 Report: 05000498/2014003 and 05000499/2014003 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Dates: April 5 through July 4, 2014 Inspectors: A. Sanchez, Senior Resident Inspector N. Hernandez, Resident Inspector C. You, Reactor Inspector R. Kumana, Reactor Inspector P. Hernandez, Health Physicist L. Ricketson, P.E., Senior Health Physicist Approved Neil OKeefe By: Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000498/2014003, 05000499/2014003; 04/05/2014 - 07/04/2014; South Texas Project
Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report.
The inspection activities described in this report were performed between April 5 and July 4, 2014, by the resident inspectors at the South Texas Project and inspectors from the NRCs Region IV office. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Significance Determination Process. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.
No findings were identified.
PLANT STATUS
The South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Unit 1 began the inspection period shutdown for Refueling Outage 1RE18. On June 1, 2014, Unit 1 closed the main generator output breaker and ended the refueling outage. On June 5, 2014, Unit 1 reached 100 percent power. On June 19, 2014, Unit 1 reduced power to 84 percent to repair a leaking valve associated with main turbine governor valve 4. On June 20, 2014, the reactor was returned to 100 percent power and stayed there for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated throughout the inspection period at 100 percent power.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Summer Readiness for Offsite and Alternate AC Power Systems
a. Inspection Scope
On June 30, 2014, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations off-site and alternate-ac power systems. The inspectors inspected the material condition of these systems, including transformers and other switchyard equipment to verify that plant features and procedures were appropriate for operation and continued availability of off-site and alternate-ac power systems. The inspectors reviewed outstanding work orders for these systems. The inspectors walked down the switchyard to observe the material condition of equipment providing off-site power sources.
The inspectors verified that the licensees procedures included appropriate measures to monitor and maintain availability and reliability of the off-site and alternate-ac power systems.
These activities constituted one sample of summer readiness of off-site and alternate-ac power systems, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
On May 13, 2014, the inspectors attended a hurricane table top exercise to observe the licensee demonstrate personnel readiness for the upcoming hurricane season.
On June 30, 2014, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees adverse weather procedures for the 2014 hurricane season and evaluated the licensees implementation of these procedures. The inspectors verified that prior to the hurricane season the licensee had corrected weather-related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous hurricane season.
The inspectors selected three risk-significant systems that were required to be protected from hurricanes:
- Main switchyard
- Main and standby transformers
- Engineered safety feature transformers The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and design information to ensure the systems would remain functional when challenged by hurricane conditions. The inspectors verified that operator actions described in the licensees procedures were adequate to maintain readiness of these systems. The inspectors walked down portions of these systems to verify the physical condition of heavy rain and high winds.
These activities constituted one sample of readiness for seasonal adverse weather, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant systems:
- May 6, 2014, Unit 2, trains C and D auxiliary feedwater system while train A was out-of-service for maintenance
- May 14, 2014, Unit 1, train A chemical and volume control system while surveillance testing was delayed for corrective maintenance on a flow meter for charging pump 1A
- May 21, 2014, Unit 2, train B auxiliary feedwater system during normal operations
- May 22, 2014, Unit 2, train B control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system while train C operability was being reviewed
- May 25, 2014, Unit 1, main transformer and normal breaker lineups for the engineered safety feature transformers during reactor startup
- June 30, 2014, Units 1 and 2, switchyard during south bus outage The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the trains and systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
These activities constituted six partial system walk-down samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on seven plant areas important to safety:
- May 16, 2014, Unit 2, auxiliary shutdown area, Fire Area 7 and Fire Zone Z071
- May 19, 2014, Unit 1, electrical auxiliary building, Fire Area 1 and Fire Zone Z034
- May 21, 2014, Unit 2, train B auxiliary feedwater pump room, Fire Area 49 and Fire Zone Z402
- June 4, 2014, Unit 1, electrical auxiliary building train B cable area, Fire Area 33 and Fire Zone Z018
- June 4, 2014, Unit 2, electrical auxiliary building train B cable area, Fire Area 33 and Fire Zone Z018
- June 5, 2014, Unit 1, electrical auxiliary building train C cable area, Fire Area 4 and Fire Zone Z046
- June 5, 2014, Unit 2, corridor at elevation 10 feet, Fire Area 2 and Fire Zone Z016 For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.
These activities constituted seven quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On July 1, 2014, the inspectors observed simulator training for an operating crew. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during requalification activities.
These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
On May 25, 2014, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants Unit 1 main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity due to performing a reactor startup following Refueling Outage 1RE18. The inspectors observed the operators performance of the following activities:
- Reactor startup, including the pre-job brief In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures, including conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies.
These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed three instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs):
- March 11, 2014, Unit 1, train B emergency diesel generator Maintenance Rule functional failure due to a jacket water leak
- March 17, 2014, Unit 2, personnel airlock Maintenance Rule functional failure due to outer door seal failing to pressurize
- April 16, 2014, Unit 2, integrated computer system (plant computer) online maintenance was performed while the integrated computer system was placed in a maintenance state, which had to be evaluated for operability The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensees characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.
These activities constituted completion of three maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:
- June 17, 2014, planned maintenance on emergency diesel generator 13 went longer than planned, impacting maintenance scheduled for the next week
- June 28, 2014, planned maintenance relocating the switchyard south bus shunt reactor The inspectors verified that these risk assessments were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees risk assessments and work schedule changes associated with two emergent conditions that affected risk associated with ongoing work activities with the potential to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems:
- May 22, 2014, low grid voltage while transferring offsite power sources to a more restrictive alignment during repairs to the main transformer X1 bushing
- June 25 and 26, 2014, the severe weather occurred shortly before the planned start of the south bus outage in the Switchyard The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.
These activities constitute completion of four maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs:
- April 7, 2014, operability determination of Unit 1 control rod drive mechanism due to its inability to be successfully placed in a lockout condition
- April 23, 2014, operability determination of Unit 2 residual heat removal system due to the integrated computer system being placed in maintenance mode, which potentially removed three pressure transmitters from service
- April 30, 2014, operability determination of the Unit 1 containment emergency sumps following the identification of loose and damaged fiberglass insulation blankets
- May 8, 2014, operability determination of the Unit 1 pressurizer following exceeding the limits for cooldown and heatup
- May 17, 2014, operability determination of the Unit 2 control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system due to through-wall corrosion on the train C outside air supply ductwork
- June 27, 2014, operability determination of the Unit 2, train A emergency core cooling system due to leakage of the safety injection accumulator 2A into the discharge test header The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable, the inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded SSC.
These activities constitute completion of six operability and functionality review samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
On June 27, 2014, the inspectors reviewed a permanent modification to all six trains of essential cooling water. The modification was installed to resolve an issue with the pump discharge strainer becoming loose from the strainers motor.
The inspectors reviewed the design and implementation of the modification. The inspectors verified that work activities involved in implementing the modification did not adversely impact operator actions that may be required in response to an emergency or other unplanned event. The inspectors verified that post-modification testing was adequate to establish the operability of the SSC as modified.
These activities constitute completion of one sample of permanent modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed seven post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant SSCs:
- April 16, 2014, Unit 1, reactor vessel head vent and valve operability test
- May 2, 2014, Unit 2, qualified display parameter system following resistance temperature detector board replacement to resolve erratic wide range temperature element indications
- May 6, 2014, Unit 1, chemical and volume control system/charging pump 1A following maintenance
- May 7, 2014, Unit 1, nuclear instrumentation channel 31 (startup channel)following replacement of a drawer connector
- May 10, 2014, Unit 1, all three trains of control room emergency air clean-up system following weld repairs to ductwork in all three trains
- June 17, 2014, Unit 2, component cooling water system train C motor operated valve 199 following maintenance]
- June 27, 2014, Unit 1, M-43 supplementary containment purge supply local leak rate testing following maintenance The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.
These activities constitute completion of seven post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the stations Unit 1 refueling outage that concluded on June 5, 2014, the inspectors evaluated the licensees outage activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee considered risk in developing and implementing the outage plan, appropriately managed personnel fatigue, and developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions. This verification included the following:
- Review of the licensees outage plan prior and during the outage
- Verification that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth during outage activities
- Observation and review of fuel handling activities
- Monitoring of heat-up and start-up activities These activities constitute completion of one refueling outage sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed eight risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:
In-service tests:
- May 10, 2014, Unit 1, train A centrifugal charging pump
- June 16, 2014, Unit 2, train C component cooling water valve MOV-199
- June 27, 2014, Unit 1, train C low head safety injection pump comprehensive pump test Containment isolation valve surveillance tests:
- March 17, 2014, Unit 1, containment isolation valve M-43 supplementary containment purge supply valve local leak rate test Other surveillance tests:
- April 8, 2014, Unit 1, inspection of all emergency containment recirculation sump trains
- April 19, 2014, Unit 1, train C emergency diesel generator
- May 29, 2014, Unit 2, off-site power verification while the 345 kV south bus was out-of-service in the switchyard
- July 3, 2014, Unit 1, primary coolant effluent sample The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the tests satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.
These activities constitute completion of eight surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on June 18, 2014, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensees assessment of drill performance. The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario; observed the drill from the simulator, technical support center, and operational support center; and attended the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
These activities constitute completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstones: Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees performance in assessing the radiological hazards in the workplace associated with licensed activities. The inspectors assessed the licensees implementation of appropriate radiation monitoring and exposure control measures for both individual and collective exposures. The inspectors walked down various portions of the plant and performed independent radiation dose rate measurements. The inspectors interviewed the radiation protection manager, radiation protection supervisors, and radiation workers. The inspectors reviewed licensee performance in the following areas:
- The hazard assessment program, including a review of the licensees evaluations of changes in plant operations and radiological surveys to detect dose rates; airborne radioactivity; and surface contamination levels
- Instructions and notices to workers, including labeling or marking containers of radioactive material; radiation work permits; actions for electronic dosimeter alarms; and changes to radiological conditions
- Programs and processes for control of sealed sources and release of potentially contaminated material from the radiologically controlled area, including survey performance; instrument sensitivity; release criteria; procedural guidance; and sealed source accountability
- Radiological hazards control and work coverage, including the adequacy of surveys; radiation protection job coverage and contamination controls; the use of electronic dosimeters in high noise areas; dosimetry placement; airborne radioactivity monitoring; controls for highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored within spent fuel and other storage pools; and posting and physical controls for high radiation areas and very high radiation areas
- Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance with respect to radiation protection work requirements
- Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to radiological hazard assessment and exposure controls since the last inspection These activities constitute completion of one sample of radiological hazard assessment and exposure controls, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed licensee performance with respect to maintaining occupational individual and collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed licensee performance in the following areas:
- Site-specific ALARA procedures and collective exposure history, including the current 3-year rolling average; site-specific trends in collective exposures; and source-term measurements
- ALARA work activity evaluations/post-job reviews, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation requirements
- The methodology for estimating work activity exposures, the intended dose outcome, the accuracy of dose rate and man-hour estimates, and intended versus actual work activity doses and the reasons for any inconsistencies
- Records detailing the historical trends and current status of tracked plant source terms, and contingency plans for expected changes in the source term due to changes in plant fuel performance issues or changes in plant primary chemistry
- Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during work activities in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas
- Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to ALARA planning and controls since the last inspection These activities constitute completion of one sample of occupational ALARA planning and controls, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.02.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Safety System Functional Failures (MS05)
a. Inspection Scope
For the period of January 2013 through March 2014, the inspectors reviewed licensee event reports, maintenance rule evaluations, and other records that could indicate whether safety system functional failures had occurred. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, and NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines: 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, Revision 3, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the safety system functional failures performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity (BI01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees reactor coolant system chemistry sample analyses for the period of January 2013 through March 2014 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors observed a chemistry technician obtain and analyze a reactor coolant system sample on July 3, 2014. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the reactor coolant system specific activity performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Reactor Coolant System Identified Leakage (BI02)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees records of reactor coolant system identified leakage for the period of January 2013 through March 2014 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the reactor coolant system leakage performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (OR01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that there were no unplanned exposures or losses of radiological control over locked high radiation areas and very high radiation areas during the period of October 1 to December 31, 2013. The inspectors reviewed a sample of radiologically controlled area exit transactions showing exposures greater than 100 mrem and selected corrective action program records. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the occupational exposure control effectiveness performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.5 Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS)/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
(ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences (PR01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed corrective action program records for liquid or gaseous effluent releases that occurred between October 1 and December 31, 2013, and were reported to the NRC to verify the performance indicator data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the radiological effluent technical specifications (RETS)/offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM) radiological effluent occurrences performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review
a. Inspection Scope
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected one issue for an in-depth follow-up:
- On November 13, 2013, while at 100 percent power, a body-to-bonnet leak was identified on pressurizer spray valve CV-655B. This valve had experienced three such leaks since 2005 and was most recently reworked in April 2013.
The inspectors assessed the licensees problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition.
These activities constitute completion of one annual follow-up sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
.1 Unit 1 Notification of Unusual Event on January 18, 2014
On January 18, 2014, Unit 1 operators declared a Notification of Unusual Event due to a fire inside the protected area that affected normal plant operation. A fire alarm for the plant computer room was received in the control room at 3:45 a.m. The stations fire brigade responded to the plant computer power supply room when a Halon system actuation occurred. The shift manager declared a Notification of Unusual Event at 4:01 a.m. Upon investigation, there was no fire present; however, two transformers in the inverter cabinet had overheated and generated smoke that filled the room. The inspectors responded to the site and performed a thorough and complete control room walk-down, reviewed plant data, procedures, and technical specifications to ensure proper plant and operations personnel response. The inspectors also toured the affected areas of the plant. The unit remained at 100 percent power with no perturbations. The inspectors also reviewed the initial licensee notification to verify it met the requirements specified in NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines, Revision 3. Since the Halon system actuation impacted the ventilation system alignment and reduced the remaining capability of those systems, the inspectors reviewed the licensees compensatory measures.
These activities constitute completion of one event follow-up sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On April 4, 2014, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to Mr. L. Peter, Plant General Manager, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
On July 10, 2014, the inspectors presented the resident inspection results to Mr. D. Koehl, President and CEO, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- D. Koehl, President and Chief Executive Officer.
- R. Aguilera, Manager, Health Physics
- L. Archer, Plant Health Physicist, Health Physics
- J. Benevidez, Specialist, Health Physics
- M. Berg, Manager, Design Engineering/Testing and Programs
- C. Bowman, General Manager, Engineering
- R. Dunn Jr., Manager, Nuclear Fuel and Analysis
- T. Farrand, ALARA/Planning/Dosimetry Supervisor, Health Physics
- T. Frawley, Manager, Strategic Business Projects
- R. Gibbs, Acting Manager, Generation Support
- J. Hartley, Manager, Mechanical Maintenance
- M. Hayes, General Supervisor Technical, Health Physics
- G. Hildebrandt, Manager, Operations
- G. Janak, Operations Training Manager
- H. Le, Engineer Licensing Consultant, Licensing
- J. Lovejoy, Manager, I&C Maintenance
- R. McNeil, Manager, Maintenance Engineering
- J. Milliff, Manager, Security
- M. Murray, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- L. Peter, Plant General Manager
- J. Pierce, Manager, Unit 1 Operations
- G. Powell, Site Vice President
- M. Ruvalcaba, Manager, Strategic Projects
- R. Savage, Engineer, Licensing Staff Specialist
- B. Scarborough, Manager, Quality Assurance
- M. Schaefer, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
- R. Stastny, Maintenance Manager
- L. Sterling, Acting Supervisor, Licensing
- K. Wallis, Acting Manager, Systems Engineering
- D. Zink, Supervising Engineering Specialist