Text

Integrated Inspection Report 05000498/2021002 and 05000499/2021002
	ML21216A093
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	08/04/2021
From:	Jeffrey Josey; NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A
To:	Gerry Powell; South Texas
References
	IR 2021002
	Download: ML21216A093 (35)
	v • d • e

SUBJECT:

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2021002 AND 05000499/2021002

Dear Mr. Powell:

On June 30, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 August 4, 2021 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000498 and 05000499 License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000498 and 05000499

License Numbers:

NPF-76 and NPF-80

Report Numbers:

05000498/2021002 and 05000499/2021002

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2021-002-0103

Licensee:

STP Nuclear Operating Company

Facility:

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

Location:

Wadsworth, TX 77483

Inspection Dates:

April 1, 2021 to June 30, 2021

Inspectors:

R. Alexander, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspect

B. Baca, Health Physicist

J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector

S. Hedger, Emergency Preparedness Inspector

G. Kolcum, Senior Resident Inspector

R. Kopriva, Senior Reactor Inspector

S. Lichvar, Project Engineer

D. Livermore, Nuclear Systems Engineer

G. Pick, Senior Reactor Inspector

J. Reynoso, Health Physicist

E. Simpson, Health Physicist

C. Stott, Resident Inspector

Approved By:

Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch A

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Inadequate Cold Weather Procedures Leads to Plant Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000498/2021002-01 Open/Closed

[H.1] -

Resources 71152 A self-revealed, Green finding was identified associated with the licensees failure to adequately implement a low net positive suction head (NPSH) protection design change (work package 003105) which required heat trace circuits and thermal insulation to protect freezing of steam generator feed pumps (SGFPs) NPSH sensing lines. Additionally, the licensee failed to implement procedural requirements in 0POP01-ZO-0004, Extreme Cold Weather Guidelines, and 0PGPO3-ZV-0004, Freezing Weather Plan, to verify adequate freeze protection which lead to NPSH sensing lines freezing and an inadvertent loss of feedwater and subsequent reactor trip of Unit 1 on February 15, 2021.

Failure to Maintain FLEX Equipment Consistent with NRC Order EA-12-049 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498,05000499/2021002-02 Open/Closed

[P.3] -

Resolution 71152 The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of NRC Order EA-12-049, Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design---Basis External Events, in that the licensee failed to maintain strategies to maintain, and restore core cooling, and containment cooling capabilities following a beyond--design--basis external event. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement a battery replacement strategy, and consequently, FLEX diesel generator 11 failed to start during a surveillance test. FLEX diesel generator 11 is a component dedicated to the licensee Diverse and Flexible Mitigation Capability, or FLEX strategy. The licensee FLEX strategy was implemented to meet the requirements of NRC Order EA-12-049.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000498/2021-001-00 Frozen Common Sensing Line Results in Loss of Two Main Feedwater Pumps Leading to Automatic Reactor Protection and 71153 Closed

Auxiliary Feedwater Systems Actuations due to Low Steam Generator Level

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and on June 22, 2021, lowered power level to 17 percent due to a failed moisture separator reheater relief valve. The unit was shut down on June 23, 2021 and remained in Mode 3 until repairs were completed. Unit 1 was restarted on June 26, 2021 and returned to full power on June 27, 2021.

Unit 2 began the inspection period in Mode 6 during refueling outage 2RE21. The main generator breaker was closed on April 19, 2021, ending the refueling outage. Unit 2 reached rated thermal power on April 22, 2021. On May 13, 2021, the unit was lowered to 90 percent power due to loss of a low-pressure heater pump when a condensate polisher valve failed open. Unit 2 was returned to full power later, on May 13,

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident and regional inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week, increasing the amount of time on site as local COVID-19 conditions permitted.

As part of their onsite activities, resident inspectors conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of summer heat conditions for the following systems:

emergency diesel generator

essential cooling water pond

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2, train A auxiliary feedwater on April 18, 2021

(2) Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater on April 19, 2021

(3) Unit 2, train A essential cooling water on April 19, 2021

(4) Unit 2, train C essential cooling water on April 19, 2021

(5) Unit 1, train C safety injection on May 18, 2021

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Essential cooling water intake structure on May 14, 2021

(2) Unit 1, train C safety injection on May 18, 2021

(3) Unit 2, control room on June 26, 2021

(4) Unit 1, control room on June 27, 2021

(5) Unit 1, turbine generator building on June 29, 2021

(6) Fire pump house on June 29, 2021

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) Units 1 and 2, mechanical auxiliary building the week of April 19, 2021

Cable Degradation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:

(1) Unit 1, train A safety-related electrical cable in underground vaults A0XYA-EKE-M50 and -M52 on May 5, 2021

71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)

Main article: IP 71111.08

(1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from March 26, to April 16, 2021:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.

liquid penetrant examination, pressurizer LT-0467 lower root valve, record no.

PT-2021-045

liquid penetrant examination, pressurizer LT-0467 lower root valve, record no.

PT-2021-063

magnetic particle examination, pressurizer support skirt to bottom head weld, record no. MT-2021-012

ultrasonic examination, pressurizer spray nozzle to shell weld PRZ-2-N2, record no. UT-2021-023

ultrasonic examination, pressurizer spray nozzle to shell weld PRZ-2-N3, record no. UT-2021-024

ultrasonic examination, pressurizer elbow to pipe/ 3-RC-2015-NSS weld 7, record no. UT-2021-026

ultrasonic examination, pressurizer elbow to pipe/ 3-RC-2015-NSS weld 14, record no. UT-2021-027

ultrasonic examination, pressurizer elbow to pipe/ 3-RC-2015-NSS weld 15, record no. UT-2021-028

ultrasonic examination, pressurizer elbow to pipe/ 3-RC-2015-NSS weld 3, record no. UT-2021-029

ultrasonic examination, branch connection to pipe/4-RC-2323-BB1 weld 4, record no. UT-2021-22

visual examination, weld examination pressurizer LT-0467 lower root valve, record no. VTW-2021-074

visual examination, ridged restraint structural support - guide/RH-2205-HL5001, drawing no. RH-9205-HL5001, revision 2, record no. VTC-2021-026.

visual examination, ridged restraint structural support - RR/RH-2205-RR04, drawing no. RH-9205-RR04, revision.3, record no. VTC-2021-060

previously identified flaw: ultrasonic examination, pressurizer safety nozzle to shell weld PRZ-2-N4C, record no. UT-2021-025

welding: replacement of pressurizer LT-0467 lower root valve, work order 96022095, field weld FW0031

welding: replacement of pressurizer LT-0467 lower root valve, work order 96022095, field weld FW0032 03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities.

The inspector reviewed the following documents associated with boric acid leaks and evaluations for Unit 2:

bolted joint evaluation, 19-11395-1, residual heat removal heat exchanger 2C, condition report (CR) 2019-11395-1

bolted joint evaluation, 19-11396-3, residual heat removal heat exchanger 2A, CR 2019-11396

bolted joint evaluation, 19-11775-3, residual heat removal heat exchanger 2B, CR 2019-11775-2

bolted joint evaluation, 19-12634-3, RCP 2A seal housing, CR 2019-12634-3 boric acid evaluation, 20-1744-2, LHSI pump 1B, condition report CR 2020-1744

bolted joint evaluation, 20-3616-3, residual heat removal heat exchanger 1C, CR 2020-3616

bolted joint evaluation, 20-3661-3, residual heat removal heat exchanger 1B, CR 2020-3661

boric acid evaluation, 20-538-3, CV-0131A body to bonnet, CR 2020-538.

bolted joint evaluation, 20-6703-3, let down reheat heat exchanger 1A, CR 2020-6703

boric acid evaluation, 20-20-6740-2, pipe cap off 1-CV-0481, CR 2020-6740

boric acid evaluation, 20-1844-3, boric acid transfer pump 1B suction valve 1-CV-0347, CR 2020-1844

boric acid evaluation, 20-2108-3, fitting near PCV-4453D leaking, CR 2020-2108

boric acid evaluation, 20-2762-3, leak at yoke of 2-RC-0054d, CR 2020-2762 The inspector reviewed 27 condition reports associated with inservice and operating experience issues. No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 startup on April 18-19, 2021.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operators in startup training scenarios on April 15, 2021.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Unit 2, train A diesel generator water jacket gasket leak on April 1, 2021

(2) Unit 1, train A FLEX diesel generator after fail to start on March 16, 2021

(3) Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater steam leak on April 14, 2021

(4) Unit 2, NI 0046A extended range nuclear instrument maintenance on April 15, 2021

Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:

(1) Unit 2, NI 0046A extended range nuclear instrument channel check on March 20, 2021

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Unit 1, yellow risk for work on train A feedwater booster pump12 on May 3, 2021

(2) Unit 1, yellow risk for routine maintenance associated with train A battery bank E1A11 inoperable on May 6, 2021

(3) Unit 2, increase reactor coolant system activity due to potential failed fuel on May 18, 2021

(4) Unit 1, yellow risk for essential cooling water pump replacement during the week of June 7, 2021

(5) Unit 1, white risk for essential component cooling system pump maintenance during the week of June 14, 2021

(6) Unit 2, white risk for essential chiller maintenance during the week of June 14, 2021

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (10 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 2, containment polar crane brake on April 1, 2021

(2) Unit 2, train A diesel generator water jacket gasket leak on April 1, 2021

(3) Unit 2, containment refueling machine auxiliary hoist on April 1, 2021

(4) Unit 2, train A steam generator power operated relief valve indication on April 2, 2021

(5) Unit 2, NI 0046A extended range nuclear instrument channel check on April 2, 2021

(6) Unit 2, train A essential cooling water pump missing bolt on traveling screen guide support on April 5, 2021

(7) Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater steam leak on April 14, 2021

(8) Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater speed on April 17, 2021

(9) Unit 2, safety injection pumps comprehensive pump testing acceptance criteria changes on May 12, 2021

(10) Unit 1, auxiliary feedwater storage tank high water level on May 20, 2021

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Unit 2, temporary modification for extended range nuclear instrument NI 0046A on April 15, 2021

(2) Unit 1, temporary modification for net positive suction head trip circuit for steam feedwater pumps on May 14, 2021

(3) Unit 1, moisture separator reheater 12 north relief valve setpoint modification on June 24, 2021

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) Unit 2, NI 0046A extended range nuclear instrument maintenance on April 15, 2021

(2) Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater pump valve maintenance on April 17, 2021

(3) Unit 1, technical support center diesel generator maintenance on May 20, 2021

(4) Unit 1, train A essential cooling water pump on June 12, 2021

(5) Unit 1, train B high head safety injection pump on June16, 2021

(6) Unit 1, train B low head safety injection pump on June16, 2021

(7) Unit 2, train B essential chiller on June 28, 2021

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the closed-out sample for 2RE21 refueling outage and tied to the grid on April 28, 2021.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

Main article: IP 71111.22

(1) Unit 2, containment building integrated leakage rate test on March 23, 2021

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2, train A high head safety injection pump inservice test on April 8, 2021

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1)licensee's simulator-based licensed operator training evolution that involved a reactor coolant pump shaft shear, anticipated transient without scram, large break loss of coolant accident, and Alert and Site Area Emergency notifications on June 16, 2021

71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation Scenario Review

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preliminary exercise scenario that was submitted to the NRC on May 26, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21146A298) for the exercise scheduled to occur on July 28, 2021. The inspectors discussed the preliminary scenario with Mr. J. Enoch, Manager, Emergency Response Department, and other members of the emergency preparedness staff on June 24, 2021. The inspectors' review does not constitute NRC approval of the scenario.

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identified the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assessed radiological hazards.

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits (RWP)used to access high radiation areas.

(1) The inspectors reviewed the following:

Radiation Work Packages

RWP 2021-2-0108, Maintenance and Support Work in Room 307 - Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA), Revision 0

RWP 2021-2-0121, Reactor Head Lift Activities (LHRA) - High Radiological Risk, Revision 0

RWP 2021-2-0071, Radiation Protection Support - High Radiation Area (HRA), Revision 0 Electronic Alarming Dosimeter Alarms

One dose alarm, 2 millirem greater than set point, during insulation removal and boric acid inspection in work in Room 1 (CR-STP-2020-03214)

One dose rate alarm during replacement process filter, RC1B, (CR-S-TP-2020-04189)

One dose rate alarm during inspection of process sampling and instrumentation lines in the reactor containment building (CR-STP-2021-03188)

Pre-job Briefings

Westinghouse Delta Team HRA briefing for the upper internals move and entry on RWP-2021-2-0121, Reactor Head Lift Activities, Revision 0 and Work Activity Number 4504 Maintenance Crew HRA briefing for entry into the chemical volume and control system letdown locker, Unit-2 37 elevation, Room 307, on RWP-2021-2-108, Maintenance and Support Work in Room 307, Revision 0 and Work Activity Number 599830

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material/sources for the following:

(1) Observed licensee conduct surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area and observed workers exiting high contamination area in containment during the refueling outage

(2) Evaluated the licensee's physical and programmatic controls for highly activated and contaminated materials stored within the Unit 1 spent fuel pool

(3) Walked down the storage locations for several nonexempt radioactive sources listed in the licensee's Technical Specification Source Inventory:

J.L. Shepard model 142-10 (Cs-137)

BX3-2-2600 Irradiator (Cs-137)

NCS-0043, RT-11 (Cs-137)

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities, to include those with airborne radioactivity or the potential for airborne radioactivity, for the following:

(1) Removal and control of reactor vessel head movement under RWP 2021-2-0121, Reactor Head Lift Activities (LHRA) - High Radiological Risk, Revision 0

(2) Removal and control of reactor vessel upper internals movement under RWP 2021-2-0121, Reactor Head Lift Activities (LHRA) - High Radiological Risk, Revision 0

(3) Polish/deburr reactor thimble tubes in Room 3 under RWP 2021-2-0125, Disconnect/Re-connect Seal Table (LHRA), Revision 0

(4) Observed radiological support/verification survey of the Chemical Volume and Control System Letdown Orifice Header Isolation Valve work in room 307 for HRA Work Activity Number 599830 High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following HRA and Very High Radiation Areas:

(1) Unit 2 Mechanical Auxiliary Building 41' elevation, chemical and volume control system volume control tank

(2) Unit 2 Reactor Containment Building (RCB) 37 elevation, regenerative health exchanger

(3) Unit 2 RCB 2 elevation, access into room 3

(4) Unit 2 RCB 11 elevation, access into room 3 (half door)

(5) Unit 2 RCB 19 elevation, pressurizer surge line, room 205 Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.

71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:

(1) Unit 1 control room emergency ventilation system (train A-3VIIVXV001, train B-3VIIVXV002, train C-3VIIVXV003)

(2) Unit 1 Technical Support Center ventilation system (9V111VXV001)

Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation system:

(1) Reactor head high efficiency particulate air filtration

Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices.

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses.

71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:

(1) Unit 2 main steam line C radiation monitor calibration, RA-RT-8048

71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, &

Transportation

Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04)

Main article: IP 71124.08

(1) On March 31, 2021, the inspectors observed shipment number STP-2-21-016, containing radioactive material (Low Specific Activity LSA-II), was prepared according to requirements.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 03.04)===

Main article: IP 71151

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)

BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 03.10) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 03.11) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)

OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 03.15) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)

Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)

PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 03.16) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)

Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in solid state protection power supply failures that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (7 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Effectiveness of corrective actions related to the full implementation of the cyber security inspection findings

(2) Unit 1, trip on February 15, 2021

(3) Unit 1, FLEX diesel generator 11 failure to start on March 16, 2021

(4) Unit 2, main steam to deaerator valves failed open at 98 percent power on March 19, 2021

(5) Unit 2, upper internals assembly lifting and rigging activity on March 31, 2021

(6) Unit 2, train C residual heat removal outlet temperature control valve partial closure after instrument air restored on April 5, 2021

(7) Unit 2, misalignment of fuel bundle PP57 placement on April 4, 2021 and misalignment of fuel bundle PR73 on April 5, 2021

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow-up (IP Section 03.01)

Main article: IP 71153

(1) The inspectors evaluated the Unit 1 unplanned complicated trip and licensees response on February 15, 2021.

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000498/2021-001-00, Unit 1, Frozen Common Sensing Line Results in Loss of Two Main Feedwater Pumps Leading to Automatic Reactor Protection and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems Actuations Due to Low Steam Generator Level (ADAMS Accession No. ML21105A850). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section

INSPECTION RESULTS

Inadequate Cold Weather Procedures Leads to Plant Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000498/2021002-01 Open/Closed

[H.1] -

Resources 71152 A self-revealed, Green finding was identified associated with the licensees failure to adequately implement a low net positive suction head (NPSH) protection design change (work package 003105) which required heat trace circuits and thermal insulation to protect freezing of steam generator feed pumps (SGFPs) NPSH sensing lines. Additionally, the licensee failed to implement procedural requirements in 0POP01-ZO-0004, Extreme Cold Weather Guidelines, and 0PGPO3-ZV-0004, Freezing Weather Plan, to verify adequate freeze protection which lead to NPSH sensing lines freezing and an inadvertent loss of feedwater and subsequent reactor trip of Unit 1 on February 15, 2021.

Description:

On November 1, 2020, the licensee had completed plant walkdowns preparing for freezing weather and concurred that all winter readiness action was complete, and the plant was ready for winter.

On February 15, 2021, the plant operators were involved with severe winter conditions when two of three SGFPs tripped from low NPSH. Unit 1 reactor tripped when the 'C' steam generator water level reached low-level setpoints.

Following the reactor trip, a walk down by operators discovered a 5-foot section of an uninsulated common NPSH sensing line. The water in the NPSH line had frozen, resulting in the loss of a two of three Unit 1 SGFPs and an automatic reactor scram from low steam generator water levels.

The licensee evaluation determined the loss of feed pumps was due to an erroneous NPSH sensing line trip signal caused when ice formed in the common sensing line.

The root cause evaluation identified the root cause was inadequate freeze protection of a common NPSH sensing line. The common NPSH sensing line was part of a design modification to help prevent SGFPs overspeed. The common NPSH sensing line was installed in 1988 under work package 003105 and required components outside of the turbine building have heat tracing and insulation.

Following installation of the NPSH modification, the licensee performed annual plant walkdowns for freezing weather readiness using station procedures, 0POP01-ZO-0004, Extreme Cold Weather Guidelines, and 0PGP03-ZV-0004, Freezing Weather Plan. These procedures had inadequate guidance for the freeze protection in Unit 1 NPSH sensing line (i.e.... missing insulation).

Corrective Action References: Condition Report 2021-1460

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to adequately implement procedural requirements in work package 003105, and procedures, 0POP01-ZO-0004, Extreme Cold Weather Guidelines, and 0PGPO3-ZV-0004, Freezing Weather Plan, to ensure proper installation of the required heat trace circuits and thermal insulation to protect freezing of SGFPs NPSH sensing lines was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the inadequate implementation resulted in NPSH sensing lines freezing and an inadvertent loss of feedwater and subsequent reactor trip.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, inspectors determined the finding caused both a reactor trip and a loss of feedwater relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a trip to a stable shutdown condition, therefore, a detailed Risk Evaluation was required.

The analyst utilized the guidance in the Risk Assessment of Operational Events Handbook, Volume 1, Internal Events, Revision 2.02, dated December 2017 to assess the significance of the subject performance deficiency. Section 8.0, Initiating Events Analysis, defines an initiating event and mutually inclusive unavailability of a system, structure or component as, A [performance deficiency] causes an initiating event with subsequent reactor trip and the same PD causes an observed unavailability of a structure, system or component that is mutually inclusive of the initiating event. The analyst determined that the subject performance deficiency resulted in a severe cold weather initiating event and also caused the unavailability of main feedwater pumps 11 and 13 (which represent components in structures, systems or components).

In accordance with Section 8.4, Case 3 - Initiating Event and Mutually Inclusive SSC Unavailability, the analyst calculated the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) for the combined initiating event and unavailability of the two main feedwater pumps. The analyst used the South Texas Project 1 and 2 SPAR model, Version 8.55 to quantify the CCDP. The best fit initiating event was a partial loss of main feedwater. The analyst utilized the Events and Conditions Assessment workspace in the SAPHIRE code to model the initiating event and set basic events MFW-TDP-FR-P21, Failure of MFW TDP 21 to Run, and MFW-TDP-FR-P21, Failure of MFW TDP 21 to Run, to the house event TRUE, indicating that the pumps tripped and that there was a potential for the other pumps to trip from common cause. The analyst noted and verified that these basic events were the appropriate surrogates for the failures of pumps 11 and 13. Neither of the motor-driven startup feedwater pumps (pumps 14 or 24) were modeled in the SPAR. The failure mode of main feedwater in the dominant sequences was operator action to recover main feedwater following a partial loss. This failure had a demand probability of 0.25. As such, the operator recovery was large enough that the failure rate of Pump 12 was inconsequential, regardless of the availability or unavailability of pump 14. The CCDP for the event was 5.62E-07.

Section 8.4 also suggests quantifying the incremental conditional core damage probability for just the unavailability of the pumps over an appropriate exposure period. The main feedwater pumps were unavailable for approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months until the sense line was thawed and the pumps could have been used to feed the steam generators. The analyst utilized the Events and Conditions Assessment workspace in the SAPHIRE code to model the loss of both pumps and the potential for the other pumps to trip from common cause. The resulting change in core damage probability was 9.7E13/hour which resulted in an incremental conditional core damage probability of 2.3E-11 over the 24-hour exposure period.

Finally, as recommended by Section 8.4, the analyst chose the highest value between the CCDP and the incremental conditional core damage probability. Given that both calculations include the risk contribution of the pump unavailability; only the highest result should be recorded as the final significance determination process result. This value, 5.6E-07, indicates a finding of very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.

Specifically, the inadequate procedure implementation resulted in the water in the NPSH sensing lines freezing and an inadvertent loss of feedwater and subsequent reactor trip.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding because no safety-related equipment was affected, although, the plants shutdown occurred during a time when demand for power during the Texas freeze was very high.

Failure to Maintain FLEX Equipment Consistent with NRC Order EA-12-049 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498,05000499/2021002-02 Open/Closed P.3-Resolution 71152 The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of NRC Order EA-12-049, Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design--Basis External Events, in that the licensee failed to maintain strategies to maintain, and restore core cooling, and containment cooling capabilities following a beyond--design--basis external event. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement a battery replacement strategy, and consequently, FLEX diesel generator 11 failed to start during a surveillance test. FLEX diesel generator 11 is a component dedicated to the licensee Diverse and Flexible Mitigation Capability, or FLEX strategy. The licensee FLEX strategy was implemented to meet the requirements of NRC Order EA-12-049.

Description:

In March 16, 2021, the licensee declared FLEX diesel generator 11 non-functional following a failure to start per station procedure 0POP07-FR-0006, FLEX Diesel Generator Performance Test, Rev. 13, to support work authorization number (WAN)613281. The alternate FLEX diesel generator 12 was started and was validated as functional.

The licensee entered the issue for FLEX diesel generator 11 into its corrective action program under Condition Report (CR) 21-2839.

As part of the licensee's strategies in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049, the licensee is committed to the guidance described in NEI 12-06, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, Revision 0, and employs different diesel engines as primary and backup (N+1) elements for their FLEX strategies. The licensee generally describes its strategies to meet NRC Order EA-12-049 in STPNOC Overall Integrated Plan, dated February 28, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML13070A011) and maintains the program and strategies in procedure 0PGP03-ZO-0056, FLEX Equipment Functionality Program.

Procedure 0PGP03-ZO-0056 includes the following: At all times Each Unit shall have two FLEX Diesel Generators functional. (FLEX diesel generator 11(21), FLEX diesel generator 12(22))

As authorized by NEI 12-06, Section 11.1, Quality Attributes, the equipment associated with these FLEX strategies is procured as commercial grade equipment with design, storage, maintenance, testing, and configuration controlled as outlined in various sections of the NEI 12-06 document. As such, the equipment associated with FLEX strategies is generally not required to be procured, tested, or otherwise maintained in accordance with the quality requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 (e.g., Appendix B, Section 50.65, Maintenance Rule, etc.).

NRC inspectors questioned the management of the FLEX diesel generator batteries and found the batteries did not have a replacement frequency. The licensee failed to manage the FLEX diesel generator batteries consistent with other site battery programs which did have replacement frequencies. Also of note is that the FLEX diesel generator batteries have a manufacturers recommended life of approximately 3 years.

Corrective Actions: Note that prior to the performance of WAN 613281, the licensee wrote 12 previous condition reports relating to the FLEX diesel generator batteries which included corrosion issues, and one failure to start.

CR FLEX DG Issue 16-2563 11 & 12 Corrosion found on battery tops, support brackets, and terminals 16-5067 Corrosion on northernmost battery 16-5068 Corrosion on southernmost battery 16-5203 Small pool of acid found on top of northern battery bank 16-15096 Corrosion found on top of battery 19-261 Corrosion found on north and south battery banks19-262 Corrosion found on north and south battery banks 19-9708 DG failed to start during performance of PMT 20-91 Corrosion of north battery support bracket 20-9404 Corrosion of battery support brackets found 20-10112 Corrosion of battery support brackets found 21-145 Corrosion of battery support brackets found 21-2839 DG failed to start during performance of PM on FLEX pump Corrective Action References: Condition Report 21-2839

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors identified that the licensee failed to maintain guidance and strategies to maintain and restore core cooling and containment cooling capabilities following a beyond-design-basis external event as required by NRC Order EA-12-049. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement a battery replacement strategy, and consequently, FLEX diesel generator 11 failed to start during a surveillance test.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement a battery replacement strategy, and consequently, FLEX diesel generator 11 failed to start during a surveillance test.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using the Mitigating Systems Exhibit 2, Section E, the inspectors determined that the issue involved a failure, unavailability, or degradation of equipment credited for use in satisfying the requirements of NRC Order EA-12-049. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement a battery replacement strategy, and consequently, FLEX diesel generator 11 failed to start during a surveillance test. This is contrary to the requirements of NEI 12-06, Revision 0, Section 11.5.2, to which the licensee is committed.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.3 - Resolution. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0310, Aspects Within Cross-Cutting Areas, determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, because the licensee failed to take effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance.

Specifically, the licensee failed to implement the manufacturers battery replacement strategy even after a similar battery failure occurred on FLEX diesel generator 12 in 2019.

Enforcement:

Violation: NRC Order EA-12-049, Attachment 2, states, in part, licensees shall develop, implement, and maintain guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities following a beyond-design-basis external event.

The licensee generally describes its strategies to meet NRC Order EA-12-049 in STPNOC Overall Integrated Plan, dated February 28, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML13070A011)and maintains the program and strategies in 0PGP03-ZO-0056, FLEX Equipment Functionality Program. 0PGP03-ZO-0056 requires At all times Each Unit shall have two FLEX Diesel Generators functional. Contrary to the above, since 2015, the licensee failed to establish a FLEX diesel generator battery replacement strategy to ensure each unit had two FLEX Diesel Generators functional.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On April 5, 2021, the inspectors presented the occupational radiation safety, and two public radiation safety cornerstone objectives, inspection results to G. T. Powell, President and Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.

On May 13, 2021, the inspectors presented the Inservice inspection results to M. Schaefer, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On June 17, 2021, the inspectors presented the cyber security problem identification &

resolution findings effectiveness evaluation inspection results to Dennis Rawlings, Manager Information Technology and Cyber Security and other members of the licensee staff.

On June 24, 2021, the inspectors presented the emergency exercise preliminary scenario review inspection results to J. Enoch, Manager, Emergency Response Department, and other members of the licensee staff.

On July 15, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to G. T. Powell, President and Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

0POP02-EW-0001

Essential Cooling Water Operations

5Q159MB1023

Standby Diesel Generator System

71111.01

Procedures

5R289MB01006

Essential Cooling Water System

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-YYYY-NNNN

21-5792

0POP02-SI-0002

Safety Injection System Initial Lineup

71111.04

Procedures

0POP02-SI-0004

Safety Injection System Operations

0EAB01-FP-0034

Fire Preplan Electrical Auxiliary Building Main Control Room

0FHB35-FP-0303

Fire Preplan - Fuel Handling Building HVAC Equipment

0FHB35-FP-0305

Fire Preplan - Fuel Handling Building Train C SI/CSS

Cubicle

0FHP59-FP-0800

Fire Preplan for Lube Oil Skid-Turbine Oil Storage Area

0FHP59-FP-0900

Fire Preplan for Fire Pump House

0PGP03-ZA-0514

Barrier Impairment

71111.05

Procedures

2ECW56-FP-0603

Fire Preplan Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure Pump

Room Train C

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-YYYY-NNNN

21-5217

Procedures

0PMP05-MH-0001

Manhole Controls Procedure

71111.06

Work Orders

Work

Authorization

Numbers

23052, 623067

71111.08P

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-YYYY-NNNN

2019-11395, 2019-11396, 2019-11775, 2019-12634,

2019-12933-3, 2019-14149-4, 2019-7950-5, 2020-0538,

20-12391, 2020-1744, 2020-2212-3, 2020-2275-3,

20-2349-4, 2020-2356-2, 2020-2357-2, 2020-2568-2,

20-2598-2, 2020-2606-2, 2020-2607-2, 2020-3616,

20-3661, 2020-5575-2, 2020-5587-4, 2020-5589-4,

20-5590-3, 2020-5591-2, 2020-5592-4, 2020-6540-2,

20-6541-2, 2020-6703, 2020-6740, 2020-8748-2,

20-8749-2, 2020-8750-2, 2021-2762, 2021-3469,

21-3470, 2021-3514, 2021-3533

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Inservice Inspection Program Plan for the South Texas

Project Electric Generating Station Units 1 AND 2, STP Ten-

Year ISI Plan,

For the Fourth ISI Ten-Year Interval September 25, 2020 to

September 8, 2029

For the Fourth CISI Ten-Year Interval September 9, 2019 to

September 8, 2029

09/25/2020

EPRI 1000975

EPRI Boric Acid Corrosion Guidebook, Managing Boric Acid

Corrosion Issues at PWR Power Stations.

NOC-AE-

00000868

Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code Section XI Requirements for Containment Tendon

Examination and Inspection

07/10/2000

NOC-AE-

00000921

Amended Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and

Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Requirements for

Containment Tendon Examination and Inspection

09/14/2000

NOC-AE-

19003684

South Texas Project Unit 1 and 2

Docket No. STN 50-498 and STN 50-499

Proposed Alternative to ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel

Code Section Xl Requirements for

Repair/Replacement of Essential Cooling Water (ECW)

System Class 3 Buried Piping in

accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)

(Relief Request RR-ENG-3-24)

09/26/2019

NOC-AE-

19003696

South Texas Project Units 1 & 2

Docket No. STN 50-498, STN 50-499

Supplemental Information for Proposed Alternative to ASME

Code Requirements for the

Repair/Replacement of Essential Cooling Water System

Class 3 Buried Piping

(Relief Request RR-ENG-3-24) (EPID: L 2019-LLR-0096)

11/26/2019

SG-SGMP-17-31

South Texas 2RE19 Steam Generator Degradation

Assessment

2/2018

Miscellaneous

ST-AE-NOC-

01000790

South Texas Project, Units and 2 - Request for Relief from

American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section

03/15/ 2001

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

XI, Containment In-Service Inspection (ISI) Requirements

(TAC NOS. MA9508 AND MA9509)

ST-WN-NOC-18-

STP Nuclear Operating Company, South Texas Project

Electric Generating Station Unit 2, Transmittal of South

Texas Project Unit 2 - Steam Generator Cycle 19 Condition

Monitoring and Cycles 20, 21, and 22 Preliminary

Operational Assessment

04/18/2018

ULV - 2021 - 1

Ultrasonic Instrument Linearity Verification, INSTRUMENT

VERIFIED

01TJR6

04/05/2021

MT-2021-012

Magnetic Particle, PRZ-2-SK / PZR Support Skirt to Bottom

Head Weld

03/31/2021

PT-2021-045

Penetrant Examination, PZR LT-0467 Lower Root Valve /

FW0032

04/01/2021

PT-2021-045

Liquid Penetrant Examination, PZR LT-0467 Lower Root

Valve

04/01/2021

PT-2021-063

Penetrant Examination, PRESSURIZER LT-0467 LOWER

ROOT VALVE

04/09/2021

UT-2021-022

Ultrasonic Examination, BRANCH CONNECTION TO PIPE /

4-RC-2323-BB1 WELD 4

04/02/2021

UT-2021-023

Ultrasonic Examination, SPRAY NOZZLE TO SHELL / PRZ-

2-N2

04/02/2021

UT-2021-024

Ultrasonic Examination, SAFETY NOZZLE TO SHELL /

PRZ-2-N3

04/02/2021

UT-2021-024

Ultrasonic Examination, SAFETY NOZZLE TO SHELL /

PRZ-2-N3

04/02/2021

UT-2021-025

Ultrasonic Examination, SAFETY NOZZLE TO SHELL /

PRZ-2-N4C

04/02/2021

UT-2021-026

Ultrasonic Examination, ELBOW TO PIPE / 3-RC-2015-NSS

WELD 7

04/02/2021

UT-2021-027

Ultrasonic Examination, PIPE TO ELBOW / 3-RC-2015-NSS

WELD 14

04/02/2021

NDE Reports

UT-2021-028

Ultrasonic Examination, ELBOW TO PIPE / 3-RC-2015-NSS

WELD 15

04/02/2021

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

UT-2021-029

Ultrasonic Examination, ELBOW TO PIPE / 3-RC-2015-NSS

WELD 3

04/03/2021

VT1/3-2021-001

Visual Examination, CC SURG TANK / CCST2

04/06/2021

VTC-2021-026

Visual Examination, Structural Guide / RH-2205-HL5001.

Drawing Number RH-9205-HL5001 Rev.2

04/05/2021

VTC-2021-060

Visual Examination, Ridged Restraint RR / RH-2205-RR04,

Design Drawing Number

RH-9205-RR0004 Rev.3

04/05/2021

VTW-2021-074

Visual Examination, PZR LT-0467 Lower Root Valve

04/01/2021

0PEP10-ZA-0004

General Ultrasonic Examination

0PEP10-ZA-0010

Liquid Penetrant Examination (Color Contrast Solvent

Removable)

0PEP10-ZA-0017

Magnetic Particle Examination (Dry Powder Yoke Method)

0PEP10-ZA-0017

Magnetic Particle Examination (Dry Powder Yoke Method)

0PEP10-ZA-0023

Visual Examination of Component Supports for ASME

Section XI Inservice Inspection

0PEP10-ZA-0023

Visual Examination of Component Supports for ASME

Section XI Inservice Inspection

0PEP10-ZA-0024

ASME XI Examination for VT-1 and VT-3

0PEP10-ZA-0024

ASME XI Examination for VT-1 and VT-3

0PGP03-ZE-0033

RCS Pressure Boundary Inspection for Boric Acid Leaks

0PGP03-ZE-0133

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program

0PMP02-ZW-0001

General Welding Requirements

0PMP02-ZW-

0001A

ASME Repair/Replacement Welding Requirements

0PMP02-ZW-

0001B

ASME/ANSI B31.1 Welding Requirements

0PMP02-ZW-

0001C

AWS/HVAC Welding Requirements

0PMP02-ZW-

0001D

Welding Documentation Requirements

0PMP02-ZW-0002

Welding Procedure Specification Preparation and

Qualification

Procedures

0PMP02-ZW-0003

Welder Qualification and Certification

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

0PMP02-ZW-0004

Control of Filler Materials

0PMP02-ZW-0005

Control of Postweld Heat Treatment

0PMP02-ZW-0006

Arc Wire Thermal Spray Coatings

OPSP15-EW-

0001

Essential Cooling Water System Pressure Test

PDI-UT-1

PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of

Ferritic Pipe Welds

09/20/2017

PDI-UT-2

PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of

Austenitic Pipe Welds

03/11/2020

PDI-UT-2

PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of

Austenitic Pipe Welds

03/11/2020

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