IR 05000498/2014010

IR 05000498/2014010; 05000499/2014010; 11/17/2014 - 12/18/2014; South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Report

ML15043A118
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	02/11/2015
From:	Geoffrey Miller Division of Reactor Safety IV
To:	Koehl D South Texas
H. Freeman
References
IR 2014010
Download: ML15043A118 (29)

Text

ruary 11, 2015

SUBJECT:

ERRATA FOR SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 and 2 - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2014010; 05000499/2014010

Dear Mr. Koehl:

Due to an error in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report 05000498/2014010 and 05000499/2014010, dated January 30, 2015, we are requesting you please replace that report with the entire enclosed document. The changes are necessary to properly identify the information that is publicly available.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, a copy of this letter, and its enclosure (with the exception stated below) will be available electronically for public inspection in the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Some of the material contained in the enclosed report therein contains Security-Related Information in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1) and its disclosure to unauthorized individuals could present a security vulnerability.

Attachment 1 to the Enclosure transmitted herewith contains SUNSI. When separated from Attachment 1 to the Enclosure, this transmittal document, the Enclosure, and Attachments 2 and 3, are decontrolled. Therefore, the material in Attachment 1 to the Enclosure will not be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the PARS component of NRC's ADAMS.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Geoffrey B. Miller, Chief Technical Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-498, 50-499 License No. NPF-76, NPF-80

Enclosure:

Errata UNITED STATES ary 30, 2015

SUBJECT:

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 and 2 - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2014010; 05000499/2014010

Dear Mr. Koehl:

On December 4, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed the onsite portion of the problem identification and resolution biennial inspection at the South Texas Project. On that day, the NRC inspection team discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. D. Rencurrel, Senior Vice President Operations, and other members of your staff. This discussion included a finding for which the NRC had not yet reached a significance determination. On December 18, 2014, the inspection team had completed its review and provided Mr. D. Rencurrel, and other members of your staff, the results of a detailed risk evaluation telephonically. The inspection team documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

Based on the inspection sample, the inspection team determined that South Texas Projects corrective action program, and your staffs implementation of it were adequate to support nuclear safety.

In reviewing your corrective action program, the team assessed how well your staff identified problems at a low threshold, your staffs implementation of the stations process for prioritizing and evaluating these problems, and the effectiveness of corrective actions taken by the station to resolve these problems. The team also evaluated other processes your staff used to identify issues for resolution. These included your use of audits and self-assessments to identify latent problems and your incorporation of lessons learned from industry operating experience into station programs, processes, and procedures. The team determined that your stations performance in each of these areas supported nuclear safety.

Attachment 1 to the Enclosure transmitted herewith contains SUNSI. When separated from Attachment 1 to the Enclosure, this transmittal document, the Enclosure, and Attachments 2 and 3, are decontrolled. -2-Finally, the team determined that your stations management maintained a safety-conscious work environment in which your employees were willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors documented one security finding of very low security significance (Green) in Enclosure 2. This finding involved a violation of Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is treating this violation as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. The deficiency was promptly addressed and the plant complied with applicable physical protection and security prior to the inspectors leaving the site. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area associated with complacency in that security force personnel did not implement appropriate error reduction tools due to the repetitive nature of the activities and the expectation of su

REGION IV==

Dockets: 05000498, 05000499 License: NPF-76, NPF-80 Report: 05000498/2014010; 05000499/2014010 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth, Texas Dates: November 17 through December 18, 2014 Team Lead: H. Freeman, Senior Reactor Inspector Inspectors: S. Alferink, Reactor Inspector B. Baca, Health Physics Inspector A. Sanchez, Senior Resident Inspector L. Willoughby, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By: Geoffrey B. Miller, Chief, Technical Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Attachment 1 to this Enclosure contains SUNSI. When separated from Attachment 1 to this Enclosure, this Enclosure, and Attachments 2 and 3, are decontrolled.

-1- Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000498/2014010; 05000499/2014010; 11/17/2014 - 12/18/2014; South Texas Project

Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Report The inspection activities described in this report were performed between November 17 and December 18, 2014, by four inspectors from the NRCs Region IV office and the senior resident inspector at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station. The report documents two findings of very low safety significance (Green). Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green,

White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,

Significance Determination Process. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.

Assessment of Problem Identification and Resolution Based on its inspection sample, the team concluded that the licensee maintained a corrective action program in which individuals generally identified issues at an appropriately low threshold.

Once entered into the corrective action program, the licensee generally evaluated and addressed these issues appropriately and timely, commensurate with their safety significance.

The licensees corrective actions were generally effective, addressing the causes and extents of condition of problems.

The licensee appropriately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility and entered applicable items in the corrective action program. The licensee incorporated industry and internal operating experience in its root cause and apparent cause evaluations.

The licensee performed effective and self-critical nuclear oversight audits and self-assessments.

The licensee maintained an effective process to ensure significant findings from these audits and self-assessments were addressed.

The licensee maintained a safety-conscious work environment in which personnel were willing to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation.

Cornerstone: Security

Green.

The inspectors documented one security finding of very low security significance that involved a violation of Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements. This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. The deficiency was promptly addressed and the plant is in compliance with applicable physical protection and security requirements. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area associated with complacency in that security force personnel did not implement appropriate error reduction tools due to the nature of the activities and the expectation of successful outcomes (H.12). This violation and associated corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Attachment 1, Security Supplement, to this report.

Licensee-Identified Violations

One violation of very low safety significance identified by the licensee was reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and associated corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

The team based the following conclusions on a sample of corrective action documents that were open during the assessment period, which ranged from October 7, 2012, to the end of the on-site portion of this inspection on December 4, 2014.

.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

1. Inspection Scope The team reviewed approximately 180 condition reports (CR), including associated root cause analyses and apparent cause evaluations, from approximately 32,000 that the licensee had initiated or closed. The majority of these (approximately 31,500) were lower-level condition reports that did not require cause evaluations. The licensee classifies condition reports as conditions not adverse to quality (CNAQ), conditions adverse to quality department or station (CAQ-D or CAQ-S), or significant conditions adverse to quality (SCAQ). Only conditions classified as CAQ-S and SCAQ require a cause evaluation as part of the resolution. The inspection sample focused on higher-significance condition reports for which the licensee evaluated and took actions to address the cause of the condition. In performing its review, the team evaluated whether the licensee had properly identified, characterized, and entered issues into the corrective action program, and whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated and resolved the issues in accordance with established programs, processes, and procedures. The team also reviewed these programs, processes, and procedures to determine if any issues existed that may impair their effectiveness.

The team reviewed a sample of performance metrics, system health reports, operability determinations, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the licensees corrective action program. The team evaluated the licensees efforts in determining the scope of problems by reviewing selected logs, work orders, self-assessment results, audits, system health reports, action plans, and results from surveillance tests, and preventive maintenance tasks. The team reviewed daily condition reports and attended the licensees condition report screening meetings to assess the reporting threshold and prioritization efforts, and to observe the corrective action programs interfaces with the operability assessment and work control processes.

The teams review included an evaluation of whether the licensee considered the full extent of cause and extent of condition for problems, as well as a review of how the licensee assessed generic implications and previous occurrences of issues. The team assessed the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions, completed or planned, and looked for additional examples of problems similar to those the licensee had previously addressed. The team conducted interviews with plant personnel to identify other processes that may exist where problems may be identified and addressed outside the corrective action program.

The team reviewed corrective action documents that addressed past NRC-identified violations to evaluate whether corrective actions addressed the issues described in the inspection reports. The team reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other corrective action documents to ensure that the ultimate corrective actions remained appropriate and timely.

The team considered risk insights from both the NRCs and South Texas Projects risk models to focus the sample selection and plant tours on risk-significant systems and components. The team focused a portion of its sample on the auxiliary feedwater, high and low head safety-injection, reactor protection, and quality display processing systems, which the team selected for a five-year in-depth review. The team conducted walk-downs of these systems and other plant areas to assess whether licensee personnel identified problems at a low threshold and entered them into the corrective action program.

2. Assessments

1. Effectiveness of Problem Identification During the 26-month inspection period, licensee staff generated approximately 32,000 condition reports. The team determined that most conditions that required generation of a condition report by Procedure 0PGP03-ZX-0002, Condition Reporting Process, Revision 49, had been appropriately entered into the corrective action program.

The team identified some examples where the licensee failed to promptly initiate condition reports upon discovery of conditions that warrant entry into the corrective action program. The main reason provided for the delays were licensees personnel investigating the issues to ensure that it needed to be placed into the corrective action program. The following are specific examples:

• Condition Report (CR) 11-8101 documented an instance where an auxiliary feedwater pump terry turbine failed to trip during overspeed testing. During their evaluation, the licensee disassembled the overspeed trip assembly and documented differences between the old trip weight and the new trip weight.

The team identified that the licensee evaluated the differences between the new trip weight and the old trip weight, but failed to evaluate why the new trip weight was not identical to the old trip weight. (CR 14-25242)

• Condition Report 14-22901 was written to address a specific issue where the resident inspector observed deficiencies in licensed operator requalification program that were placed into the corrective action program three weeks after being identified by the resident inspector.

• In the summer of 2013, the resident inspector observed and communicated an instance where the dedicated spotter for individuals moving a load onto a flatbed trailer became involved in the lift and was no longer ensuring their personnel safety. While this observation did not fall under NRC jurisdiction, it did meet managements expectations for entry into the corrective action program as a CNAQ.

Overall, the team concluded that the licensee generally maintained a low threshold for the formal identification of problems and entry into the corrective action program for evaluation. Licensee personnel initiated over 1,200 condition reports per month during the inspection period. Most of the personnel interviewed by the team understood the requirements for condition report initiation and most expressed a willingness to enter newly identified issues into the corrective action program at a very low threshold.

2. Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The sample of condition reports reviewed by the team focused primarily on issues screened by the licensee as having higher-level significance, including those that received cause evaluations, those classified as significant conditions adverse to quality, and those that required engineering evaluations. The team also reviewed a number of condition reports that included or should have included immediate operability determinations to assess the quality, timeliness, and prioritization of these determinations.

The team also attended several condition report screening committee meetings, interviewed several condition report screening committee members, and noted an improvement from the previous biennial inspection. The team had the following observations:

• The process for screening condition reports had been modified shortly before the inspection in order to reduce the number of screeners (department performance improvement coordinators) who can screen condition reports and to gain consistency in significance and trending.

• The licensee adopted the Utilities Service Alliance trend codes, but some of those using the codes lacked an understanding and use of these codes.

• Although the licensee structured and standardized the screening committee meeting to gain consistency, the meeting does not have a formalized meeting agenda.

The team concluded that, in general, root cause evaluations were appropriately evaluated and adequate corrective actions developed; however, there were several instances where Tier 1 and Tier 2 apparent cause evaluations lacked appropriate structure and the relationship between cause evaluation and the stated apparent cause was not clear. The team further concluded that in several instances, the management performance improvement committee (MPIC) might have inadvertently directed changes to the apparent cause during committee review, which may have led to some of these issues. The team had the following observations:

• Condition Reports 12-28186, 13-2611, and 14-7054 had issues where the WHY staircase were as short as two questions in nature, the answer to one question did not flow into the following question in the staircase, and the final answer in the staircase did not match the stated apparent case. These items were entered into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 14-22976, 22979, and 22980.

• There was often not enough detail in MPIC meeting minutes or in the condition report to clearly provide a basis for revising the original assessment in the root or apparent cause evaluations.

• There was some evidence that the MPIC meetings we perceived as interrogative, directive in nature, and appears intimidating to those individuals presenting evaluations.

• MPIC meetings often review root and apparent cause evaluations after they had been completed. The result of this is that MPIC made recommendations that lead to changing or re-performing the evaluation, which could result in changes to the corrective action, and delay timeliness of that corrective action. Furthermore, there were no timeliness requirements to incorporate the changes or to have MPIC review implementation of those changes for adequacy. The team identified several revisions that were issued months after the initial 30-day timeliness goal for cause evaluations.

The team also identified a security-related issue during review of this area, which is not being made publicly available (reference Attachment 1 of the enclosure to the transmittal letter).

Overall, the team determined that the licensees process for screening and prioritizing issues that had been entered into the corrective action program supported nuclear safety. The licensees operability determinations were consistent, accurately documented, and completed in accordance with procedures.

3. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

In general, the corrective actions identified by the licensee to address adverse conditions were effective. The team noted one instance in which corrective actions had been untimely or incompletely accomplished:

• Condition Report 11-10791 documented a minor violation of License Condition 2.E for the failure to test and demonstrate the 8-hour capacity of the emergency lights. In response to this issue, the licensee performed a one-time small sample discharge test of the emergency lights. The team reviewed the corrective actions and concluded that the licensees program still did not demonstrate the 8-hour capacity of the emergency lights and the violation of License Condition 2.E still existed. Based on the results of the one-time discharge test, the team concluded that the failure to comply with License Condition 2.E constituted a minor violation that was not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy (CR 14-16243).

Overall, the team concluded that the licensee generally identified effective corrective actions for the problems evaluated in the corrective action program. The licensee generally implemented these corrective actions in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance, and reviewed the effectiveness of the corrective actions appropriately.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The team examined the licensees program for reviewing industry operating experience, including reviewing the governing procedures. The team reviewed a sample of four industry operating experience communications and the associated site evaluations to assess whether the licensee had appropriately assessed the communications for relevance to the facility. The team also reviewed assigned actions to determine whether they were appropriate.

b. Assessment Overall, the team determined that the licensee appropriately evaluated industry-operating experience for its relevance to the facility. The team chose industry-operating experience deemed not relevant to the facility by the licensee along with the industry-operating experience that was relevant. The relevant industry-operating experience information was incorporated into plant procedures and processes as appropriate.

The team further determined that the licensee appropriately evaluated industry-operating experience when performing root cause analysis and apparent cause evaluations. The licensee appropriately incorporated both internal and external operating experience into lessons learned for training and pre-job briefs.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments and audits to assess whether the licensee was regularly identifying performance trends and effectively addressing them. The team also reviewed audit reports to assess the effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. The specific self-assessment documents and audits reviewed are listed in Attachment 2.

b. Assessment Overall, the team concluded that the licensee had an effective self-assessment and audit process. The team determined that self-assessments were self-critical and thorough enough to identify deficiencies. The team noted that a couple of self-assessments had identified long-standing issues within the area of emergency preparedness and noted that while many of these issues continued to exist, the licensee had made progress in addressing those issues.

.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

The team interviewed 100 individuals in 10 focus groups. The purpose of these interviews was

(1) to evaluate the willingness of licensee staff to raise nuclear safety issues, either by initiating a condition report or by another method,

(2) to evaluate the perceived effectiveness of the corrective action program at resolving identified problems, and

(3) to evaluate the licensees safety-conscious work environment (SCWE). The focus group participants included personnel from operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry, radiation protection, decontamination, administrative, data specialist, nuclear purchasing, material management, security, and contractors. At the teams request, the licensees regulatory affairs staff provided participants from the work groups based on availability. The team selected the participants blindly from the provided participants.

To supplement these focus group discussions, the team interviewed the Employee Concerns Program Manager to assess her perception of the site employees willingness to raise nuclear safety concerns. The team reviewed the Employee Concerns Program case log and select case files. The team also reviewed the minutes from the licensees most recent safety culture monitoring panel meetings.

b. Assessment 1. Willingness to Raise Nuclear Safety Issues All individuals interviewed indicated that they would raise nuclear safety concerns.

All felt that their management was receptive to nuclear safety concerns and was willing to address them promptly. All of the interviewees further stated that if they were not satisfied with the response from their immediate supervisor, they had the ability to escalate the concern to a higher organizational level. Most expressed positive experiences after raising issues to their supervisors. All expressed positive experiences documenting most issues in condition reports. One concern that was discussed was the ability to submit an anonymous condition report. The licensees program did not allow submitting an anonymous condition report and not all personnel had access to submit a condition report unless they go through a supervisor.

2. Employee Concerns Program All interviewees were aware of the Employee Concerns Program. Most explained that they had heard about the program through various means, such as posters, training, presentations, and discussion by supervisors or management at meetings.

All interviewees stated that they would use Employee Concerns if they felt it was necessary. All expressed confidence that their confidentiality would be maintained if they brought issues to Employee Concerns. Additionally, the licensee required long term contractors, contractors on site for greater than 180 days, to have an Employee Concerns Program. The programs we monitored by the licensee, but not by the Employee Concerns Manager unless assigned.

3. Preventing or Mitigating Perceptions of Retaliation When asked if there have been any instances where individuals experienced retaliation or other negative reaction for raising issues, all individuals interviewed stated that they had neither experienced nor heard of an instance of retaliation, harassment, intimidation, or discrimination at the site. The team determined that processes in place to mitigate these issues were being successfully implemented.

.5 Findings

The inspectors documented one security finding of very low security significance (Green)in Attachment 1 to the enclosed report. This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The deficiency was promptly corrected or compensated, and the plant was in compliance with the applicable physical protection, and security requirements before the inspection team left the site.

4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000499/2014-001-00, Standby Diesel Generator 23

Essential Cooling Water Leak Through the Wall of Aluminum-Bronze Pipe Nipple On December 31, 2013, a 3 gallon-per-minute essential cooling water leak was discovered on standby diesel generator 23 at a one-half inch aluminum-bronze threaded connection. The leak was initially identified as a 60 drop-per-minute leak on November 6, 2013. A subsequent reportability review determined that the standby diesel generator had been inoperable since the leak was initially discovered, resulting in safety system inoperability for approximately 55 days, which exceeded technical specification allowed outage time of 14 days. The aluminum-bronze nipple and tee assembly were replaced with an approved stainless-steel nipple and tee assembly. The licensee determined the cause of the failure to be a result of erosion of the aluminum-bronze nipple and tee assembly that led to a through-wall essential cooling water leak on standby diesel generator 23. The licensee subsequently ensured that all other aluminum-bronze nipples and tee assemblies on the remaining standby diesel generators were replaced. This event was placed into the corrective action program as Condition Report 13-15904; a licensee event report was submitted to the NRC on March 17, 2014; and Tier 1 apparent cause evaluation was performed.

The team reviewed the licensee event report and the apparent cause evaluation and interviewed licensee personnel involved in the issue. The team determined that the licensee took appropriate actions required by technical specifications upon discovery of the condition. A licensee identified violation of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in Section 4OA7 of this report.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On December 4, 2014, the inspectors presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. D. Rencurrel, Senior Vice President Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.

This discussion included a finding for which the NRC had not yet reached a significance determination. On December 18, 2014, the inspection team had completed its review and provided Mr. Rencurrel, and other members of your staff, the results of a detailed risk evaluation telephonically. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary or sensitive information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements, which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation.

• Criterion XVI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, states, in part, Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, November 6 through December 31, 2014, the licensee identified a condition adverse to quality, but failed to take prompt corrective action for the condition. Specifically, the licensee identified a 60 drop-per-minute essential cooling water system leak on standby emergency diesel generator 23 on November 6, 2013. On December 31, 2013, during a surveillance test, the essential cooling water leak had grown to 3 gallons per minute, which rendered the diesel generator inoperable and would not have been able to meet its designed mission time of 30 days. The licensee determined that the diesel was inoperable since the initial discovery on November 6, 2013, (55 days) and as such exceeded the technical specification allowed outage time of 30 days.

The failure to promptly correct the essential cooling water system leak on standby diesel generator 23, which rendered the diesel incapable of meeting its mission time, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and is therefore a finding. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated July 1, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding required a detailed risk evaluation. A senior reactor analyst performed the detailed risk evaluation and determined that the change to core damage frequency was much less than 1E-6/year. Therefore, the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The dominant core damage sequences included seismic initiated loss of offsite power; failure of the essential cooling water train; failure of the train A and B standby emergency diesel generators; failure to recover offsite power and an emergency diesel generator in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; and an event-initiated reactor coolant pump seal loss of coolant accident. Remaining mitigation equipment that helped to limit the significance included the remaining functional essential cooling water trains, standby emergency diesel generators, and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

D. Abell, Performance Improvement Specialist

R. Aguilera, Manager, Health Physics

J. Atkins, Manager, Systems Engineering

R. Barr, Supervisor, Corrective Action Program

M. Berg, Manager, Design Engineering/Test & Programs

C. T. Bowman, General Manager, Nuclear Oversight

D. Caraballo, System Engineer

J. Crain, Manager, Emergency Response Plant Protection Department Support

M. Crutcher, System Engineer

R. Dunn Jr, Manager, Nuclear Fuel & Analysis

M. Farmer, Security System Engineer

T. Frawley, Manager, Plant Protection/Emergency Response

C. Gann, Manager, Employee Concerns Program

M. Gandt, Engineer, Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

R. Gubbs, Manager, Operations Division-Production Support

A. Hasan, System Engineer

J. Heil, Program Engineer

L. Huerta, Supervisor, Security Training

G. Hildebrandt, Manager, Operations

B. Jenewein, Manager, Performance Improvement

L. Knox, Security Compliance Specialist

R. Lonazo, System Engineer

L. Meier, Project Manager, Regulated Security Solutions

A. McGalliard, Manager, Corporate Staff Support & Owner Liaison

J. Milliff, Manager, Security

M. Murray, Manager, Regulatory Affairs/Licensing

G. Powell, Site Vice President

D. Rencurrel, Senior Vice President Operations

P. Rodgers, System Engineer

R. Savage, Licensing Engineering Specialist

R. Scarborough, Manager, Quality Assurance

M. Schaefer, Plant General Manager

R. Stastny, Manager, Maintenance

L. Sterling, Supervisor, Licensing

T. Upton, Technical Supervisor, Maintenance

M. Uribe, Manager, Work Control

T. Vajdos, System Engineer

D. Whiddon, Supervisor, Quality

J. Winters, Lead Investigator

D. Zink, Supervisor, Engineering Specialist

to the Enclosure contains SUNSI. When separated from Attachment 1 to the

Enclosure, the Enclosure and Attachments 2 and 3, are decontrolled.

Attachment 2

NRC Personnel

N. Hernandez, Resident Inspector

G. Miller, Chief, Technical Support Branch

G. Replogle, Senior Reactor Analyst

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000498/2014010-01 NCV Failure to Follow Security Procedure

05000499/2014010-01

Closed

05000499/2014-001-00 LER Standby Diesel Generator 23 Essential Cooling Water Leak Through the Wall of Aluminum-Bronze Pipe Nipple