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Safety Insp Rept 50-461/86-42 on 860602-06 & 09-13.No Violations,Deviations or Safety Significant Issues Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Actions on Previous Insp Findings, IE Bulletins & Circulars & Review of Allegations
	ML20199L865
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	06/30/1986
From:	Knop R, Scheibelhut C; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20199L844	List: IR 05000461/1986042; ML20199L840;
References
	RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.C.7, TASK-TM 50-461-86-42, I&B-78-14, I&C-81-11, IEB-78-14, IEC-81-11, NUDOCS 8607100035
	Download: ML20199L865 (13)
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.- U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .

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REGION'III

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Report No.'*50-46 086042(DRP) j s .. . ..

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Docket,No. 50-461 -

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.. License ,No. CPPR-137- t-

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.-Licensee: .: Illinois. Power Company ' *

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500 South 27th' Street N

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.,Decat'Ur, IL 62525 *

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Facility Name: 'Clinton Power Station

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Inspection At: Clinton Site', Clinton, IL .

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ne '-6 'and 9 13, 1986 '

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Inspection Condu ed: . .

Inspector: Sche ht . I '9h Approved By: ,R. h

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, , l . Reactor .Projedts Section 1B .. Date e.-

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. bnspection Sumrhary - . .

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' InspN:ti'on on June '2-6 and 9-13, '1986 '(Report Yo. 50-461/86042 (DRP)) , ,

Aress Inspected:, Routine safety inspectiqn by a Regional Inspecty of -

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applicant actions gn. previous.i.nspection findings, evaluation of applicant *-

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. action with regara to Three Mile Island action plan requ,trements, IE Bull,etins .

and Circulars,10CFR21 and 10CFR50.55(e) items, and review of. allegation ' .. ..

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Re'solts : Of the'five areas inspected,. no violations, deviations or safety *

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, significant issues were identifiee.?* g -

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8607100035'860702' '

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$DR ADOCK 05000461 . . l "'

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, DETAILh

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- Personnel Contacted .. .

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Illinois Power Company- (4P) - c

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K. A.* Baken; Supervisor, I and E Interface

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,- * N. Connell,. Manager, Quality Assurance

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"J. .H. Gr'eese, Manager, Stai tup 4 T e

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, ..* D. W. Hillyer, grector, Radiation Pqotection s ~

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E. W. Kant, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Station Eng*ineering Department

. "J. E..Loomis, Construction Manager . .

. " A. Miller, Assistant Manager, Startup a

D. R' Morris, Director, Nuclear Program Scheduling

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J'. S. Perry,6 Manager, Nui: lear Program Coordination

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. ' b. Weaver, Director, Lichnsing .

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"J. W. Wllson, Elant '.Aanirger *

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' Denotes thos*e attending.the exit meetin . .

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, The inspector also contacted others' of,the constrtictio,n project and

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2. .. Applicant Actions on Previously Identified Items' (427017

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.ra . (Closed) Safety Evaluation'Repott (SER)-Confirmation Item .,

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r (4.61/85005-33): " Verify that the automatic recirculation pump trip *

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is installed' and ATWS ,oper~atiry~g pro.cedures art in place."

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' .The applicar,t performed preoperational test' procedure PTP-RD-02,

" Alternate Rod Insertion /,ATWS Rec,ircula. tion Pump Trip", and the test

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results were approved April.10, 1986. The test'was performed to

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demonstrate that the Alternate Rod Insertion.and Anticipated #'

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. Transient *Without Scram Recirculation. Pump' Trip -System ( ARI/ATWS ,

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RPT) would perform as intended in both the automatic and manual

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, "I'he-SER section 15 2.1 stated that the procedure for mitigating ~

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ATWS, CPS No.- 4404'.01, '.' Reactivity Control - Emergency," would be reviewed under. the emergency operating procedure pr6 gram as

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described in Section 13.6.3 of the FSAR and that the results of the "

( review would be , reported ,in a supplement to the SE .,

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~A supplement was issued and gn open item was assigned to SSER'4,

- paragr'aph 13.6 3.,1. (open Item 85015-07). It required verification

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of revis1ons.to emergency procedures. guidelines (EPGs), upgrading of , .

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, , emergency off-normal procedures and. plant operator training prior to *

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fuel load. The NRC r.evieWed IP's response to this, issue and found th.e EPG, status of.EOP revisions, and operator training were . ..

acceptab'le with the, exception o*f the combustible gas dontrol EPG an "

. EOP which were. deferred to 57, power 'per 10CFR50 44(c)(3),(vii)(B) . .

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. This review was documented ,in Inspection Report 50-#61/85053. The

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applicant approved Revision 3 of CPS No. 4404.01, "ReactivJty

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, Cont,rol-Emergency",'dh February 22, 198 .

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The inspecbor reviewed the results of PTP-RD D2 and found.that the . //

. test did demonstrate proper operat' ion of'the 8I/ATWS RP,T. syste '

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The* inspector al'so revi,ewed the procedure No. 4401.01 and found it- - -

te be satisfactory and in accord with the EPG. Since the' remaining

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combustible gas control EPG and E0P, are being tracked under open item 461/85015-07, this item is cl-osed. ** .s

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, - i~ b . '(Open) Open Item (461/85039-01): "Demonstrat' ion of . capability to .

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augment the onsi,te staff to meet the 30- and 60-minute. goals of '

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table B-1 of NUREG-0654, Revision 1." ^ '

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In the. case of a s'ite emergency, key personr}el must respond to augment onsite personnel in the manning of the Technical Support Cehter (TSC), the, Operations . Support Center (OSC), an"d the*Emergen6y

,. Operations Facility (EOF). Table B-1 of NUREG-0654, Revision,1, delineates minimuni personnel and time response goals to. activate the

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facilifies. The item was left open beca'use. shift augmentation O capability had not bdert demonstrate .

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The applicant condup.ted an actua'l shift augmentation. drill

'(personnel called and' arrival at.the site logged) on Fdbruary 13,' +

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1986. Analysis of *the results of, the drill showed a weakness in the '

A notification scheme that led to an excessive number of late

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arrivals. 'To shorten the-n,otification time,' addit [onal pagers we're

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issued to reduce the. number of autodial c, alls and thereby reduce the

'* notification time. On April 4,1986, the applicant conductect

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another actual shift augm,entation dr.ill bu,t limited 1.t to groupt

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that hade shown excessive late' arrivals in the first drill. This

drill was judged successful by the applicant *.

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, To demonstrate their overall~ capability in this area, the applicant

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will conduct a' call-out dr'ill of all pertinent personnel. The item

"rethains open pending. andnspegtion of the results of the call-out' ~

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dril During discussions with the. applicant on this matter, it was

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discovered that the, applicant's program did not require drills of this na'ture on a per, iodic basis as required in NUREG-0654. This is., .

. considered an open item until a futtrre, inspection of the.' program

1. shows that the drills will be conducted *on a periodic basis ,

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1461/86042'-01). , .

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,. (0 pen) Deviation (461/86018-02):, " Failure to provide for periodic -

" testing of instrument air for par.ticulate contamination, fa13,ure to ~ ^

provide fo'r ' acceptance criteria concerning the size of particulates

presenti in the instrument ' air *, and failure to provide fo.r. testing "of '

instirument air. quality following repal.r or modification df the *

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. ' instrument air system." -

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The inspector contacted a'pplicant personnel to determfne the '

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progress made on the corrective actions taken and*the corrective

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, actions taken'to prevent recurrence. These actions were delineated

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applicant's r,esponse to the Notice of Deviation in'a letter .

to the,NRC dated May 25, 1986. The inspector ~ found the following: *

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. Vendors;of safety-related equipment have been contacted and the

.,. ~. maximum contaminant. particle size that the components can -

ace'ept- in the air ' stream and maintain operational reliability

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was determine .

. . The smallest of the above particle sizes has been set as the

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,new acceptance Amendment crTterion 38 to the. Final Safor,fety Analysis Report incorporates

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the criterion in section 9. The amendment was mailed to the NRC on June 20, 198 . . Testing of thq IA system to the new criteria has,not been accomplishe '

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4 '. - * The required procedure' changes have not rec'eived final .

approva

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Personne1 training in accordance with the revised procedures will follow procedure approva ,

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'. The inspector was also* told. tifat during a functional test of* the

' reactor Safety Relief Valves (SRVs)'the applicant found that some of

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. the control air solenoids did not completely close after use. While

- this failure did not prevent operation of.the system, the leaking-solenoid valves Sould haye ble*d the stored air in the accumulators if the instrument air system failed and thereby render the Automatic

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Depressurization System (ADS) inoperable. 'The applicant wrote

. Condition Report CR-1-8603-124 to investigate the problem and

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pgovideadispositio ,

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The agpticag disassembled the leaking solenoids and found that

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contamination with dirt was preventing prop'er closure. All of the control air s'olenoids were then disassembled and 14 of the 16 valves

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" found contamirjated with dirt. Corrective act' ion calls for a

cleaning of all ADS. air piping and a plant modification calls for

. _ the addi. tion of an air filter at the point' where the instrument ai,r

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system supplies the ADS air subsystem. The corrective action also*

. calls for inspection and cleaning of the Main Steam Isolation Valve .

(MSIU), air subsystem and the installation of a fi,lter at the point where the instrument air system supplies the MSIV air subsyste ,,

The investigation found that the air subsystem that s0'pplies the

control rod drives had been flushed wrth e hot trisodium phosphate ,

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,'- solutios and provided with an entrance filter as part of the - -

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original desigr). .

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.. ,. After a review of these activities, the inspector concluded that when the corrective actior)s required by the condition report are completed, the Deviation.will no longer be considered a constraint

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on' fuel load. The Deviation will then be~ considered.a constraint on 5 a full power licenses .

d (Closed) SER Confirmation Item (461/85015-06)i " Verify Nuclear .-

Steam, Supply System vendor review of low power testing, power .

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- ascensi~on and ' emergency operating procedures is complete prior to fuel load."

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In Inspection Report 50-461/86010, the inspector determined that the NSSS vendor, General Electric, had reviewed the

low power and -

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' emergency ope' rating 3psocedure ,

The, inspector determined that all of the power. ascension pr'ocedure have been written with-all but two having final approval. ' The

.." inspector reviewed the applicant's records associated with these

. procedures and'found that all'had been reviewed by General E16ctric personnel. Th8 applicant's adtrii,nistrative controls also require'-

.. General Electr'ic review of any revision to the' procedures., ' *

Therefore, this item is close .,.

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No violations or deviations were identifi6d'. .

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-3 Evaluation of Anplicant Action with Regard to Three Mile _ Island (TMI)

, Action Plan Requ'irements (25401) .

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The NRC Office pf Inspection and Enforcement issued Temporary Instruction .

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(TI) 25.14/01, Revision.2', dated December- 15, 1980, to supplement the '

Inspection and Enforcement Manual'. The TI provides>TMI-related ir}spection requirements for operating licen:,e applicants during the phase #

between prelicensirig and licensing for fu.ll power operation. ~ The TI was

used as the, basis for* inspection of the following TMI items fonnd in' ' *

NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements."

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(Closed) Item I.C.7: "NSSS Vendor Review of Procedures." This l' tem is -

identical.to open item 4.61/85015-06. Since ,the opensitem has been closed

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(see paragrag 2.d above) this item ja also close e

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' Applicant Actions on 10CFR21 Items (92700) , . ,

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a. ..(Closed) 10CFR21'I' tem (461/83004-PP): " Design.of Control Rod Drive *

(CRD) housing band clamps." A construction pubcontractor informed , ,

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the applicant that the CRD band clamps supplied by General Electtic .

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III, subsection NF). The' applicant's evaluation determined that it was a reportable c.ondition and reported it to the NRC because' -

. calculations showed that clamp failure could lead to failure of , ,

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control rod hydraulic-insert and withdrawal lines. The situatio .

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arose because of misunders.tanding. General Electric considered the .

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clasps to.be shipping clainps. The-buyers considered the clamps'to

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be essential to.the piping desig '

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~In conjunction with another utility with the same problem, ASME code- #

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qualified clamps were designed and fabricated. The applicant

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removed the General Electric supplied shipping clamps and installed

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, the qualified clamp e

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The inspector reviewed the records and f*ound that the replacement ~

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clamps were desi n6

.. * III, subsection Nf'.ed and and fabr.icated 10CFR50 in accordance Appendix B requirements.with ASME Section The records

also indicated that the old clamps were r emoved and the new clamps

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. installed with proper quality ass 6rance controls. This item is

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(Closed) 10CFR21 Item '(461/85004-PP): "TEC.Model 914-1 acoustic' -

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valve flow monitor." The manufa,ctur,er of the equipment u's ed to monitor steam. flow through the main stea;n line Safety Relief Valves .

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(SRVs) informed ~the applicant that an electronic module (914-1)

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contained in their equipment may contain a defective component. The *

defect wo'uld result in failure of.the flow indicator to return to .

,, zero ifter flow through t' e h'SRV uent to zero, ~ a condition. known as '

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, bar graph " latch-Vp." * .

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~ An investigation and evaluation by the applicant showed that the , ,

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- system provided an alarm i' unction only and was supplemented.by a

. diverse source of flow information in the form of thermocouples next'

. *to each acoustic sensor. Since modules that contained the defective -

part would still 'rovide the a'larm function, the applicant concluded

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, that the condition das not reportable.because the system was not necessary to assure . integrity of the reactor coolant boundary. or -

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capability to shut down the reactgr,,or capability to prevent or -

mitigate consequences of accidents. The manufacturer made availab'le'.

an. equivalent electronic module (914-2) that did not conta'in the '

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potentially defective part. The. applicant replaced the 9,14-1 , .

modules in the e,quipment with the 914 2 module .

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and evaluation and concurred in'the conclusion that the condition

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, (Closed) 10CFR21 Item (46,1/85008-PP): "Yarway CoFp.*Weldbond val.ves

. with potential internal voids iri 1/2 and 3/4 inch valve stems." The .

manufacture'r (Yarway Corp.) of certain 1/2 and 3/4. isnch Waldbond

. globe valves informed ,the appl.icant that the valves containing valve stems of a certain heat nuinber may have defective valv'e stem '

Valves conta,ining the. defective stems could leak through the stem ..

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, 'when the valve was in the open posiBion. Yarway identified the -

valves- shpplied to C,linton that may contain the defective stems. -

Yarway also offered to rep' lace the poten'tially defective ~ stems with

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stems without the potential defec ,

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The applicant determined that 15 of the valves were installed in ,

. . , safety-related systems at Clinto It was also determined that 14 of the valves were normally closed low point drain valves whic'h

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could have no impact on safety if the valve stems were defectiv ,

The remaining valve was an isolation valve for a pressure indicator in a noR-radioactive water syste'm and leakage would have,no impa'ct,

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on safety. The applicant concluded.that the condition was not

' reportable under the provisions of' The applicant replaced all of the potentially'defectfve va.10CFR2 lve stems w.ith replacement stems ~

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supplied by the vendo .

% The inspector reviewed .the results of the applicant's investigation an'd evaluation and concurred With the applicant',s conclusion that the' condition was not reportable. The inspector also reviewed the

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Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs) used to replace the stems and^found that the_ work was performed in accordance with trie quality assurance,se

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program for safety-related work. This~ item is close ,

. . . (Closed) 10CFR21 Item (461/86003-PP): ." Loose stem' clam l5 cdllars on '

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motior' operated valve stems." .During preoperational testing ,

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activities the applicant.'s start-up organization issued a. Condition

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Report (CR No. 1-85-02-075 dated 2/21/85) to document the stem clam ,

failure of two valves in safety-related systems. Stem clamp collars on valves of the type affected pr' event stem rotation when th'e motor

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operator is actuating'the valv If the stem clamp fails, the stem-

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, rotates and the valve will not actuate when required., The app-licant

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, considered the , condition reportable under the provisions ~of 10CFR21 .

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and reported the condition to the'NRC. The applicant wrote a Non-.

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conforming Material Report (NCMR No. 1-0686 dated 4/1/85.) to provide an engineering evaluation and ap, proved disposition. The engineerihg ,

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evaluation found the.following: Anchor Darling globe valves of the

, type used at Clinton were designed with a atem collar to. prevent the

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stem from rotating. The stem collar is held in place with a . .

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combination of valve gtem key way and set, screw. If for any reason

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(such as vib' ration) the set screw comes loosei the stem clamp' collar will slide down the stem and off the key way, resulting in the free rotation of the , stem, thereby rendering the valve inoperable. The

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. applicant determined that 36 Anchor Darling' valves utilizing this'

. design were installed in safety-related systems at Clinton. To

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preventirecurrence', the applicant developed a mechanical staking >

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procedure that prevents loosening of the~ set screws. The. applicant wrote MWRC13246 to stake the set screws on the 36 Anchor Darling -

valves. This activity was completet! 2/1/86. The applicant revised

. . pla'nt maintenance procedure CPS No. 8120.06 to include the staking .

. of'the set' screw after removal and re-installation of the stem clamp during maintenance or repair a'ctivities. Revision 2 o*f the -

procedure was issued.4/12/85. Anchor Darling Instruction Manual K-

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2866A was revised to add re-staking of the set screwp followl'ng' *-

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removal of.the stiem clamp. This revision was. completed .11/16/8 .* .

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The inspector reviewed the engineering evaluation and co.ncurred With

- the findings. The inspector reviewed the maintenance pro'cedure and

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1.nstruc41on-manual and found that the staking procedure had been '

% s ipcorporated in both. The inspector reviewed the MWR and found'that the set screw stpking had.been done in accordance'with the quality ^

assurance program. This. item'is close , ,

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'No violations or deviations were identifie ,

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. . . Applicant Action on 10CFR50.55(e) Ittims (92700) ,

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(0 pen) ,10CF'R50.55(e) Item (461/85016-EE): "Namco.EA-170 and 180 limit' ,

switches not torqued: EQ implications." OnDec' ember 27,J985,the .

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applicant notified the NRC of a podentially reportable deficiency . .

concerning the torquing of cover plate screws .on certain Namco limi*,

- sw. itches. The condition.was documented in a Condition Report (CR1-85-1.2- ..

038) written by a construction q0ality assurance person who noted that

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while the Namco installation instruction EA189 9006 required 20 inch-

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pounds torque Tqr cover screws for EA170 and'EA180 limit switches ,

identifie'd in the Equipment Qualifica41on' Program, this was not being required qr perf.ormed during installation, terminations or'startup ~ - -

. testing. Further investigatio'n of the CR determined that for the EA-180 ' ~ -

s, witches that were used in' areas considered as a harsh envirgoment, improper torquing of the cover plate screws could negate the -

' environmental qualifi' cations.of the switches. Since the switches are "*~

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used in the control and alarm circuits cf safety-related systems, fgilure '

.would make the system inoperable. Therefore t;he coridition was considered

, reportable. The applicant pdrformed an investigatidn, of the deficiency , '

and found the following: * .

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. (1) 'I'he' torquing' requirement is containe#d in the equipment qualification '.~

package, EQ-CL008. Installation instr'uction drawings EA'189 90006,

'

C

EA189 90008, and EA189 90009 require twenty inch-pounds of torque be --

.

applied to the cover plate screws. * .

.

- . .

,,

"

. .

,

(2) The requirement was no't addr.essed in design, installatioq or testing

-

document , ,

,

-(3) ~ .The vendor's installation / operation / maintenance manuals did not .

contdin the torquing requirement > .

. *

. .. , .. .

-

, (4)- Temporary ad,hesive labels on the a'ffected swJtches gave the .

- . . requirements, but were removed on installatio . . . .

-

-(5). EA740, lim'it' switches were installed in areas of harsh env'irohment ,

and had no requirement to torque the covet plate screw .

. . .

, ,

.

'

. (6) A total of 145.EA180 and 2B EA740 limit switches were identified as

- - being deficien ,

.

~

. -

(7) To determine if the deficiency Was an isolated case, all pertinent 5 documents associated with ASCO, PYCO, GOULP, and VALCOR devices were -

reviewed. No similar d'eficiencies.were found and it was concluded .

. ' that the subject deficiency was an isolated case of non-15suance' of * I

,

-

-

engineering instruction .

.-

(8) The root cause was determined to be the vendor's method of issuing

~

.

,

torque requirements with the equipment (i.e. adhesive labels on the

switches) instead of the normal. Industry practice of issuing the$ ' *

requirements _in published installation / operation / maintenance .

manuals.

.

, The ap'plicant' initiated c'orrective action by having the Architect, Engineer, Sargent and Lundy, issue Field. Engineering Change Notices

. (FECNs) 13714 and 13715 to document engineering instructions concerning .

torque requirergents foi the cover plate screws. Based on the FECNs, 173

'

.

MW3s were written to torque the cover plate screws on the defic'ient *

' '* switches. The FECNs were also posted.against the installa, tion specification (k-2999) and the associated vendor manuals;

-

. .

.

The inspector reviewed the FECNs and a sampling of the closed HWRs and

-

.

-

concluded that all of the identified limit switches had their cov e plate ' ,

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'

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. screws properly torqued. -The inspector verified that..tpe FECNs were posted against the instalfation specification. However, the i'nspector

'

,

-

'did not verify that the FECNs were posted against the pertinent vendor

~ **'*_

manual.s an,d did not review the. applicant's pertinent maintenance

'

procedures to dettermine if the torque requirements were presen '

Therefor,e, this item remains open.pendity review during aefuture . .

inspectio ,-

. -.

No violations or deviations we're id'entifie ,

,

- Applican't Actions on' IE -Circu'lars 'and Bulletins Not ' Requiring a Response ~

(92701) . . ,

,

- - -

. ..

~

(Closed) IE Circular 81-11 (461/8101'1-CC): " Inadequate Decay Heat-

^ .

^

Removal During Reactor Shutdown." Sever *al ' instances 8f loss of ~ ' -

-

decay heat removal capability were reported it. operating boiling .

water reactors during shutdown condition As a result, certain .

"

recommended actions were included in the Circular to strengthen

. - procedures and administrative' controls relating to decay heat removal during reactor shutdown. These recommended act. ions '

included: .

~

, ,. e *

,

(1) A review of procedures and administrative controls that relate to decay heat re,moval during reactor > shutdown. The review was

, to determiije"the. adequacy of monitoring and responding to -

' . 2- . .

events Jnvolving lost or deg:ade,d' decay heat remova (2) ~ A determina , ion that administrative controls provid.e that

"

.

. g, ,

(a) Redundant or diverse decay heat removal methods are ,

(

,

available dur'ing all modes of plant operatio However,

'- '

,

, only one power source needs to be operable in order to .,-

-

conside'r the decay heat removal system operable while.in modes 4 and . . .

,- ~

.

-( b) .In those cases where pingle failure or other actions -

,

. result in only one decay h9at rentoval train being

"

available, an alternate means of decay heat removal i , ,,

,. 'proVided or an expeditious means fo.r the restoration'g of

,

the lost trsin .is provide ,

+ .. . .

_ .

4 (c) The maximum coolant temperature remain's beJow the -

, saturation temperature during periods of low flow or no .

~

flow. Cdnsideration should be given to maintaining water level,in the reagtor vessel sufficiently high to enable

"

-

., ,

'

-

,

-

natural circulation at all time (d) . Ronitoring* of the reactor coolant t'emperature and pressure

'

, .

is done at a specified frequenc *

. ,

&

. In respons*e to the above recorrrnendations, the applicant took the followin'g actions: .

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, , (1)* The decay heat removal methot;is for Op,ergting Modes 3,.4, and 5 ~

-

were ou'tlined in Technical Specification' Sections 3.4.9.1,

" Residual Heat Removal - Ho't Shutdown", 3.4.9.2, " Residual Heat

, Removal - Cold Shutdown", 3.9.11.1, " Residual Heat Removal and

' *' ' Coolant. Circulation - High Water Level", and 3.9.11.2, .

, .,

" Residual Heat Removal *an,d. Coolant Circulation -' Low Water * - Level". The action stiatements of' Technical Specification '

Sections 3.4.9.1'.b and 3.4.9.2.b required that reactor coolant

~

-

tw $> temperature and pressure be monitored hourly ~when the minimume*

-

. number of R+1Rlumps and heat exchangers were not operable c The

'

action statements of Technical Specif.ication. Sections 3.9.1L1. band 3.911.2.brequired'thatreactorcoolant ** 9

, s temperature be fnonitored hourly when ,the" minimum number of RHR" .

- -

. pumps and heat 4exchangers were got operable. CPS Procedures

. ~3312.01*, " Residual Heat Remo~ val", and' 4403.01, "Cooldown -

~

.

-

g, Emergency", defi'hed the alternate methods for removing decay

- h'ea t . * * ~

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( 2.) (a) Normal and qiver*se methods of .removi,ng * *

decay heat' are .

identified in l tem (1). abov ,

.

-

(b) Alternat4 methods of,r'emoving decay heat are . identified ..

in Item (1) abov '

- -

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. .

.

._

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(c,d) CPS Procedure 9'00,0 06, "Pr'611minary Plant Temperature ..,

Log", Section.8,1, and the Heatup/Cooldow'n, Inservice t

Leak, and Hydrostatic Testing 30 min.ute Temperatur.e Log '.

required.the mdnitoring of the reactor coolant

,

. ,. '

' '

. ' tempergtur.e every . thirty minutes during a forced hea' tup or cooldown until 3 egnsecutive readings do not differ .

, by more than 10 degrees E.fr%E the first to the thir .

. . ,.

Sections' 81 and 8.3 of this' procedure required tihe ..

..

. o reactor coolant ' temperature be monitored eie.ry two hours'

-

*

' when the 30. minute temperature log is discontinued, '

until shutdown copl.ing is no longer in operation, ., '* -

< Natural circulation in .the core was assured 'by Aceping

'

the vespe.1 water le

,

Upset Rang,e Monitor, or +44 vel at, oronabovg inches the Shutdown +61 inthes Range on. the ,

'

Monitor. This water level was specJfied in Section <

'

.

8.1.14 of CPS _ Procedure 3312.01, " Residual Heat * "

i * '

- , Removal"..

*

. The inspecton reviewed the referienced Technic [1. Specifications;and .

.

procedures. The review showed that the recommendations ~

of the*~

'

d Circular were' included in th'e Technical Specifications and ~

-

.

pr'oceduges.,Thi.s item is close , ,,

- -

.

, . . (Closed) IE Bulletin.78-14-(461/78014-EB): ", Deterioration of Buna-N ..

Components in ASCO Solenoids." Problems at several operatin * . boiling water reactors involving slow response times of control rod .

~

. . insertion following a scram were reported. Subse *'

< '

.

revealed that deterioration of Buna-N c.omponents*quent in the scram investigation pilot solenoid valves had. caused malfunction of the valves. The bulletin *

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' -

essential 1/~ required establishment of'a proeventive maintenance

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3_ program to rep' lace a'll Buna-tJ material in all CRD' scram' pilot '

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. valves,-backup scram valvbs, scram discharge' volume vent and drain pilot valves, and scram discharge volume test valvss a't periodic

-

'

.' ~

interval It was noted that the GE design specification for Buna-N '

,

mate ~ rial specified a ininimum design life of three. year .

~

'

. To comply with the Bulletin and reduce future maintenance expense- ,

'

,

't and ' time, the CRD scram pifot valves and' backup scram valves whre

' rebuilt using Viton parts excegt for the body gasket and diaphragin

~

- . assembly which remain Suna-N. Dur'ing the rebuilding pYocess, new ~

diaphragm assersblies and body gas.kets were installed. This change -

'

-

waf conc'rredu in by the Architect-Engineer, Sargent and Lundy,' and the v'alve manufacturer, ASCO. The scram discharge volume' vent and *

-

4 *

drain pilot valves were ?eplaced with W11cor solenoid valves. *This

' '

change was concurred in by the NSSS. supplier, General Electric. The ,

- *

,Valcor valves require replacement _of one "0" ring ' ev'ery five years to remain environmentally qualified for forty years. The,Clinton

.

f design does not utilize scram discharge volume test valves. .The

'

applicant had Sargent and Lundy perform an independent ^ review of the

~

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environmental qualification life of the rebu*ilt ASCO solenoid .

valves. .They. determined"thatthe"vajveswereenv,.ironmentally qualified for forty years of service provide 8 that the diaphragm ,

, assembly and bod.y gasket were replaced every three* years. This was

-

refl'ected in erJvironmental qualification package.MEQ CL-075 and was

'

.,

- +

b'eing scheduled for the serain pilot valyes by preventive maintenance

,

'

1tems EMRDM0-001S, 062S; 003S, and 004S using CPS No. '8523.01, s

+ " Scram Pilot Valve Mai,ntenance" and for the backup' scram valves by

-

, prevehtive maintenance item EMRDM0-008S using CPS No. 8523.03,

"Bap) cup Scram Pilot Valve A and B Maintenance." The preventive

'

.

mhintenance items were listed'in the applicant's computerized

- *

preventive (naintenan'ce geheduling. system, "SURVTRAC." '

, -

, . .. -

,,

'

The inspector reviewed a sampling of the Maintenance Work Requests - '

(MWRs)utilizedinthevalverebui'1dingprogramand'foundthatthey

,

4 ,

accomplished the stated replacements. The inspector rev *

,,

' '

SUffVTRAC scheduling s.ystem and found that the valves were(ewed schedu' led the

,

' ,

-

,.to have the Buna-N components replaced every three years'. The .

+

inspector concluded that the " app 1Icant has complied wit!h the intent '

te qf the Bulletin. This* item is close .

' '

. Noviolapionsordeviations,wereidentifie , ,

> . Applicant Actions on All'egations (99014)

"

s .

,

(Closed) All.egation (RIII-86-A-0055 (#185)): " Unqualified Nuclear-

,

. Station Engin'eering. Department Instrumentation and . Control Section .

' Supervisor." The NRC received,a signed letter from an indiv.idual '

),

(indi$ dual A) who was concerried thpt the acting, supervisor (individual

. . B) of the Control and Insb'0lnentation (C&I) section of the Nuclear -

Station Engineering Department -(NSED) may'be incompetent to function 8tn '

the positior Irtdividual. A also sent copies of* the letEer to the *

. * applicant's management *. ,

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NRC Review ,

,

. . o the-applicant's posit. ion description for the' position inc4uded the

'

, ,

requirements for a BS degree fq,the appropriate discipline plus 10 years

,

o,f experience in the supervision and direction of the activities of .

,

' engineer It also called forethe providing of technical guidance to the C41 staff. On receipt of the letter, the applicant' conducted an 1 -

investigation of the coricern. The applicant found that individual B had a BS degree in mar.agement; had been a qualifiest reactor oper;ator in the C

nuclear navy; and had spent 1.6 years, 12 years.in supervisory p,'ositions,

-

in-nucleac construction activities.at three reactor sites in the areas of

~

'

electrical and I&C construgtiorJ. The department of, human resources , ,

_ confirmed individual B's resume by letters and considered him N, -

. qualified. A review by th'e manager of NSED concluded that he was

'

. qualified. The concernee kas interviewed by IP Quality Assurance and the NSED Manager. In both interviews, the concernee stated that he knew of

. no quality or hardware probl nis that existed in the plant. The CPS'

Safeteam, which is an independent IP* organization, intervi,ewed some af*

individual * A's coworkers.- These interviews tended to corroborate the concernee's

concern. However, none gf the persons. interviewed knew of '

~

. any quality or hardware problems in the plant. The applicant wrote- .

lettets to the. conc, erne,e and the NRC concluding that individ_ual B was .

-

qualifie Individual B , terminated his empl6ym'ent and) eft the site on May 30, 198 '

, . .

- The inspector reviewed the applicant's filesand found they suppor.ted th'e # *

,

information given above in all. instances. The inspector interviewed .

individual'A. ,,The interview showed that he still had his.originst #

concerns despite the applicant's 1,nv,estigation and conclusion. He was concernedthattheapplicantstillgould6cnsiderindividualB coinpetent . Indivi, dual A knew of no new quality or gardware problems that

.

,

may have come about since he wrote his original letter. The; inspector interviewed four of' individual A's coworkers. .Two of the four had been e

,

~~. interviewed 'previously by the Safeteam. In all' instances the persons

- interviewe'd shared' individual A's concer.ns abou't individual'B's technical competence. Thby consider'ed'individua-could tu~rn to for technical help or gu,1idance,. B as a manager In no casebutdidnottheyone they know

'

,

of any. quality or hardware problems in the plant. They attributed this to the technical cortpetence of his staf ,

-s

-

Results .

. .

9 .

~

Neither' individual A nor other personne1' interviewed by the inspector '

and/or the CPS Safeteam identified any goncern or evidence of hardware or

"

quality * problems b'ought r about-by individpal D's. employment. Based ori

,

the inspector fs review of individual B's qualification records and the results of personnel interviews by the inspector and the CPS Safetearfi,

, , the inspector concluded that individual B did not fully meet the position description provided by the applicant. Nevertheless, the applicant had -

evaluated individual.B's capabilit,y and had. concluded that he was qualified for the positio , '

,' ,

-

, .

-

Since -individual, B terminated employment and since there was no concern

or evidence 6f quality or hardwar.e problems resulting from his .

- . . .

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employment, the inspection did not include a review of individual B's -

'

' work. The apg icant's quali,ty assurange program was in accordance with

10CFR50,. Appendix B, which requires that all safe.ty-rela,te8 tests, design . c changes, procureinents and*other similar activities be performed sin accordance with written. documents that provide for independent review and veriff, cation of the wBrk. That review process, greatly reduces the '

possibility of quality or hardware problems being caused by a single *

-

individual. Therefore, the inspector considers the allegation to be-

,, close ..

~%

, No violations or deviations were identifie '

.

'

'-

,

- '

.

, . .s Open Items - -

.

.

. -Open items are matters 'which have been discussed *

with the applidant, . , . . .

which will be revised furt.her by the inspector, and which involve some *

action on the part of the NRC or appli. cant or both. One'open item O disclosed during this inspection. is.discu'ssed in paragraph 2.b. , '

,

'*

. , ,

9 Exit Meeting .

'

, ,.

The inspector met,with.,the resident inspector and applicant 4-representatives -(denoted in paragraph 1.) at the. conclusion of the inspection dn June. 13, 1986. The resident inspector summarized t,he stupe ,

and findings of the inspection. The dpplicant acknowledged the -

inspector's finidings. The applicant did not indicate that any of the

/

information disclosed during*the inspection could be considere ~

,

proprietary in natur .. ,

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IR 05000461/1986042

Text

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