IR 05000461/1989022

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Insp Rept 50-461/89-22 on 890619-0721.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Startup Testing Activities Subsequent to Initial Refueling Outage,Areas of Core Performance & Nuclear Engineering
ML20247N738
Person / Time
Site: Clinton Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/27/1989
From: Phillips M, Rescheske P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247N722 List:
References
50-461-89-22, NUDOCS 8908030135
Download: ML20247N738 (6)


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i U.S. NULLEAR REGULATORY C0!911SSION -

REGION'III- ]

Report No. 50-461/89022(DRS)

Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62-Licensee:. Illinois-Power Company.-

500 South 27th Street Decatur, IL> 62525 , 4 Facility Name: Clinton Power Station I Inspection At: Clinton, IL' 61727 Inspection Con cted: June 19 through July 21, 1989 Inspector: gg s O'4 -

Date'

5 L Approved By: Mo . Phillips, Chief 9(UL OMcDV h' ' l'

Operational Programs.Sectibh Date.- '

Inspection Summary Inspection on June 19 through July 21, 1989 (Report No. 50-461/89022(DRS))~

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced, safety inspection of startup testing activities subsequent to the initial refuel outage, specifically in the area of core performance and nuclear engineering (IP 61702, 61705, 61706 -61707, 72700). Also included in this inspection was.the review of previous inspection items (IP 92702).

Results: No violations or deviations were identified during this inspectio In general, the quality of the written procedures and.their implementation was considered good. The following items were closed: five (5) violations and a two (2) LERs from Inspection Report No. 89002 (refueling), and an Unresolved I Item No. 89017-01 (modifications).

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i DETAILS l

1. Persons Contacted l

J. S. Perry, Assistant Vice President j J. A. Brownell, Project Specialist E. R. Bush, Director,liuclear Program Scheduling F. C. Edler, Director, Plant Support Services B.. Gill, Acting Manag , NSED K. R. Graf, Director, Ops Monitoring S. P. Hall, Director, NPAG D. L. Holtzscher, Acting Manager, Licensing and Safety j J. H. Hansker, Director, Planning and Programs E. Schweitzer, Supervisor, Nuclear J. D. Weaver, Director, Licensing R. E. Wyatt, Manager, NTD { i U. S. NRC i P. G. Brochman, Senior Resident Inspector, Clinton Plant S. P. Ray, Resident Inspector, Clinton Plant Other persons were contacted during the course of the inspection, including r.. ambers of the licensee's operations and nuclear engineerin staf l All the above persons attended the exit meeting held on June 29, 198 J l

2. Action on Previous Items

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1 Based on the inspecter's review of licensee corrective actions i completed and/or scheduled, the (refueling) items listed below are 'l considered to be close (1) (Closed) Violation (50-461/89002-01(DRS)): CPS No. 8117.05, .

" Steam Dryer / Separator and Shroud Head Removal," was j inadequate, and PMS0-041, " Override of Interlocks," was

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not adhered to (area radiation monitor (ARM) was improperly overriden). Corrective actions taken included: revision

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of and training on Procedure No. 8117.05, personnel briefings on PMS0-041, and additional licensee management presence during refueling activitie In addition, the licensee committed to revise the USAR by October 31, 1989, to note the existence of the ARM interlock on the polar uan (2) (Closed) Violation (50-461/89002-02(DRS)): Technical- i Specifications (15) 3.9.10.1 and 3.9.1 were violated  :

(one-rod-out interlock was defeated during control rod drive '

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l removal / repair work). LER 461/89004 documented tDis even Corrective actions taken included: briefings with operations ;

staff; and revision of Procedure Nos. 8820.02, 9093.01, and 9090.01, to clarify, and add precautions and guidance. In addition, the licensee comitted to develop a training program by June 30,-198 l (3) (Closed) Violation (50-461/89002-03(DRS)); CPS No. 1019.04,

" Tool and Material Control for the Refuel Floor and Fuel Handling Floor During Refuel Outages," was not being implemented or maintained. Corrective actions included:

personnel briefings regarding material control responsibilities and duties, and revision of Procedure No. 1019.04 to clarify 1 the requirements and rr possibilitie l (4) (Closed) Violation (50-461/89002-04(DRS)): TS 3.9.2.b was .1 violated ( insufficient number of' operable SRMs during core l alterations). LER 461/89007 documented this event. Corrective '

actions included: briefings with operations staff, issuing a Night Order, and revision of Procedure No. 1014.01 to clarify .

instrument tagging requirement '

In addition, the licensee committed to provide training on this event during operator l requalification and operator refueling training (to be a completed by December 31, 1989).

l (5) (Closed) Violation (50-461/89002-05(DRS)): Examples of j refueling activities in which training was either lacking, inadequate, or ineffective. The corrective actions taken by the licensee are. included in Paragraphs (1) and (3) abov (6) (Closed) LER 461/89004: Licensed operators error of withdrawing a control rod and simulating a rod-full-in signal for the sarae control rod results in defeating the one-rod-out interlock. See Paragraph (2) ebov ('7) (Closed) LER 461/89007: Incorrect operability determination due to insufficient review of source range monitor (SRM) status results in core alterations without the required two operable SRMs. See Paragraph (4) abov The inspector noted that the license's response to the Notice of Violation for Inspection Report No. 89002 was approximately one week I late (without an extension granted). Further, a corrective action for inspection item No. 89002-02 (and LER No. 89004) was not completed by June 30, 1969, as comitted to by the licensee. In discussions with the licensee on July 24, 1989, via teleconference, the licensee committed to complete the item (development of a training program)

by July 27, 1989. The issue of timeliness will be discussed in subsequent meetings between the licensee and NRC managemen _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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4 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-461/89017-01(DRS)): Licensee action and response addressing a potential 10 CFR 21 defect concerning a motor operated. gate valve with an incorrectly sized stem nut. The license's response, dated June 20, 1989,- discussed their review of this item, and provided a copy of the 10 CFR 21 report submitted on June 13, 198 . Startup Tescing and Surveillance The inspection activities focused on specific startup tests and surveillance conducted by the licensee subsequent to the initial refuel outage. The inspector verified through review and discussions that licensee procedures, their implementation, and completed tests, satisfied TS Sections 3/4.1, 3/4.2, and 3/4.3. These TS sections dealt with the requirements for reactivity control systems, power distribution limits, and nuclear instrumentation. The following tests and surveillance were reviewed by the inspecter, and determined to be adequately performed and satisfy the acceptance criteria (except as noted in Paragraph g). In general, the written procedures were considered to be of good qualit CPS No. 9811.01, " Shutdown Margin Determination," provided a method for determining the shutdown margin (SDM) to satisfy TS surveillance requirement 4.1.1. The licensee performed the SDM demonstration on May 22, 1989, in Mode 4, during the approach to initial criticality. The SDM was calculated using data from the Cycle Management Report provided by the fuel vendor, General Electric Company (GE). CPS No. 2202.04, " Estimated Critical Position Determination,"

provided instructions for calculating an estimated critical position (ECP) prior to reactor startups. Information from the GE Cycle Management Report and the licensec's Nuclear Station Engineering Department (NSED) was used for the calculations. The inspector reviewed the !0Ps performed for the startups on May 22 and 27, and June 19, 198 CPS No. 9812.01, " Reactivity Anomaly," provided a methed to check for possible reactivity anomalies as the core reactivity changes with exposure. In accordance with TS 4.1.2, the licensee performed the procedure during the first startup on May 22, 1989. Subsequent i surveillance are performed every 31 effective full power days using l the reactivity anomaly curve provided by G CPS No. 9813.01, " Control Rod Scram Time Testing," was used to determine that the scram times of all control rods satisfied the requirements of TS 4.1.3.2. Utilizing computer generated records of reactor scram data and individual rod scram timing, the licensee l completed the testing in May 198 l l

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. CPS No. 9820.01, " Power Distribution Limits," provided the method- i and documentation to satisfy the surveillance requirements of l TS'4.2.1, 4.2.3,.and 4.2.4. ~ Utilizing the process: computer, the-

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l licensee monitors the following thermal limits: Minimum Critical {

Power Ratio (MCPR)r Linear Heat Generation Rate. (UlGR), and Average, i Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR). The surveillance j were performed every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when core thermal power:(CTP) was l

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greater than 25%, and within_12_ hours after:a power increase of 15%. The inspector reviewed the' surveillance completed by the'

licensee on June 22-25, 198 CPS No. 9831.01, "LPRM Calibration," was used to determine z calibration' currents to calibrate the Local Power Range Monitors 1 (LPRMs) and satisfy TS Table 4.3.1.1-1 (Note f). Utilizing the v process computer and the TIP system (traversing in-core probe). the licensee completed the initial LPRM calibration on May 31,'198 .

Subsequent calibrations are performed every 1000 effective' full 'j power horrs during power operation.-

' CPS No. 9?31.60, " Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Gain Adjustment and Setpoict Verification," Section 8.1, was used to adjust th APRMs to within 2% of the CTP and satisfy TS Table 4.3.1.1 _1.(Note d).

The inspector reviewed the-completed surveillance performed by the licensee on May 31 and June 121-26, 198 Sections 8.2-6.4 of the procedure provided instructions for k performing setpoint verifications on the'APRMs.- On June 26, 1989,. l the licensee determined that these sections had not been performed =!

. prior to entry into Mode 1 as required by TS. The inspector attended the critique meeting held on Ju.ne 27, 1989. The'cause of the missed surveillance appeared to be confusion in the TS notations j and inadequate procedure triggers. The licensee planned to document j this event in LER'461/89025. Additional information regarding this ;

event can be found'in NRC Resident Inspection Report 461/89018.and j subsequent report l

CPS No. 2208.01, " Core Thermal Power Determination," provided methods for calculating CTP from a reactor heat' balance. Different ,

sources for data were available which included two sets of computer ,

points and instrument readings. On June 22, 1989, the inspector '

performed a heat balance calculation using the available instrument _

readings and the licensee's procedure. The result (55.2% CTP) was !

in good agreement (within 2%) with the APRM readings and the process-l computer. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's completed heat i balances performed on May 29-31, 198 >

' CPS No. 2200.01, " Station huclear Engineer Routines," was used by -

the nuclear engineering staff to monitor and trend reactor ,

parameter The inspector reviewed the~ nuclear engineer logs ;

completed on June 26 and June 27 -1989. The inspector also reviewed '

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e portions of.the process computer and BUCLE verif.ications performed ~

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subsequent to the core reloa No violations or deviations were. identifie . Exit Meeting The inspector met with the licensee. representatives (denoted in-Paragraph'1) on June'29, 1989. -The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection, and the licensee. acknowledged the statements made by the' inspector. The inspector also discussed the.likelyL

informational content of the inspection report with regard to. document or processes reviewed by the. inspector during the. inspection. :Th licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as propr.ietar A second exit meeting was held on July 21, 1989, via teleconference, to discuss the closure of previous inspection. items-(discussed in. Paragraph 2).

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