IR 05000461/1986043
| ML20203C992 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1986 |
| From: | Keating D, Knop R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203C983 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-86-43, NUDOCS 8607210115 | |
| Download: ML20203C992 (6) | |
Text
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-461/86043(DRP)
Docket No. 50-461 License No. CPPR-137 Licensee:
Illinois Power Company 500 South 27th Street Decatur, IL 62525 Facility Name: Clinton Power Station Inspection At: Clinton Site, Clinton, IL Inspection Conducted: May 27 through July 7, 1986 60'
IA fG J
Inspector:
D. E.
eating
/ /gg Date'
7//f/[d Approved By:
p C e
.
Projects Section IB Fate'
Inspection Summary Inspection on May 27 through July 7, 1986 (Report No. 50-461/86043(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine safety inspection by the resident inspector of construction completion activities including; site surveillance tours; installation of control rod drive hydraulic control units; mainsteam isolation valve springs; and sealing of containment penetrations.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
The applicant's activities and corrective actions were adequate.
bb5$00llf,,
um L
___
.
.
.
.
..
....
..
..
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Illinois Power Company (IP)
!
- D. Hall, Vice President, Nuclear
- J. Loomis, Construction Manager
- H. Daniels, Project Manager
- G. Bell, Special Assistant - Manager Scheduling and Outage
- F. Spangenberg, Manager, Licensing and Safety
- J. Perry, Manager, Nuclear Program Coordination
- J. Wilson, Plant Manager
- W. Connell, Manager, Quality Assurance
- J. Greene, Manager, Nuclear Station Engineering Department
- R. Campbell, Director, Quality Systems and Audits
- J. Weaver, Director, Licensing and Safety
- G. Miller, Director, Fiscal Management
}
- R. Schaller, Director, Nuclear Training
- J. Brownell, Licensing and Safety R. Lebkuecher, Specialist, Licensing and Safety R. Cannon, Specialist, Licensing and Safety T. Parrent, Construction Quality Assurance C. Clark, Quality Control J. Suthar, Nuclear Station Engineering P. Walberg, Nuclear Station Engineering Department General Electric Company (G.E.)
F. Smith, Resident Engineer J. Logan, Site Manager
- Denotes those attending the monthly exit meeting. Other licensee personnel were routinely contacted during the course of the inspection.
2.
Review of Installation of Control Rod Drive (CRD) Mechanism Hydraulic Control Units (HCU) (50063C)
On May 4,1986, startup test personnel in Unit 1 at Perry Nuclear Power Plant noted a missing holddown bolt on HCU 34-27 and loose holddown bolts on four additional HCUs.
Investigation by Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) and General Electric Company (GE) determined that quantified torque values had been established by G. E. as necessary to support seismic qualification of the HCUs.
Installation of the HCU holddown bolting at Perry; however, was accomplished without the qualified torque values being specified in the site specification.
Work procedures had called for bolts to be " snug tight".
I.
I
L
.
..
.
.
This condition was presented to Illinois Power (IP) for investigation -
into the applicability to Clinton Power Station (CPS).
The inspector monitored the applicant's investigation which included review of the following installation records to determine the torque requirements and conditions identified at the time of installation:
a.
FieldChangeRequest(FCR)17063
,
b.
Nonconformance Report (NCR) 5720 c.
FCR 11732 d.
NCR 29225 e.
Travelers C11-002 through C11-025 f.-
Inspection Report M85-2336 g.
Field Deviation Disposition Request (FDDR) LH1-175-81 h.
G.E. drawing 10504988, Hydraulic Control Unit G.E. drawing 767E800, Hydraulic Control Unit 1.
Sargent and Lundy (S&L) drawing, M04-1120, Equipment Foundations Key Plan Containment Building, elevation 755'-0 j.
S&L calculation CQD-03012, Justification of Torque Values by G.E.
The referenced FCRs, FDDR, and NCRs were written to document the differences in torque values that were identified. The travelers referenced above specified the torque values as required and as referenced on the G.E. drawings that were reviewed. NCR 5720 was dispositioned "Use-as-is" per G.E. letter (D. Wolf to M. Tindill) dated May 17, 1982. FCR 17063 was written requesting a torque range of 18 to
'
20 ft.-lbs.'on the HCU mounting bolts. This range was dispositioned as
>
acceptable per letter from G.E. in reply to IP request for a change in torque values to clarify the conflict in torque values on FCR 11732 and NCR 5720. A review of S&L calculation CQD-03012 justified the torque range of 18-28 ft.-lbs. which was used for the HCU mounting bolts. S&L and G.E. have both recommended that in the event of'a Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) or greater..then a 100% reinspection of the HCU be performed and both retorqued as required.
Based on the review of the above referenced documents and that no loose or missing bolts were identified, no further activity is planned by the
inspector.
,
No violations or deviations were identified.
-
-
.
-
- - - - - - - -
- -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
.
.
3.
10 CFR Part 21 Investigation of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)
Springs (92700/50073C)
On June 24, 1986, the applicant started a Part 21 investigation to determine if IP had the same conditions as those identified at Fermi Unit 2.
This investigation was prompted by receipt of a letter from Atwood and Morrill (A&M) Co., Inc. dated June 13, 1986. A&M is the supplier of the MSIVs at both Fermi Unit 2 and Clinton Unit 1.
This letter advised IP that four external closing assist springs on A&M MSIVs at Fermi Unit 2 had failed. The broken springs were the inner springs of a spring-in-spring set that fit around the yoke rods joining the air cylinder to the valve cover.
It has been determined that the failure of these springs was caused by brittle fracture triggered by quench cracks which developed during the manufacturing process. These springs were manufactured by Duer Spring and Manufacturing Company and supplied to A&M for their valves at Fermi and CPS. The MSIVs at CPS were supplied with the nuclear steam supply system by General Electric Company (G.E.).
The inspector accompanied representatives of IP and G.E. during a visual inspection of the four outboard MSIVs and the four inboard MSIVs. No cracked or broken springs were identified. The investigation committee and G.E. were asked to furnish an engineering justification of why some form of additional nondestructive examination (NDE) should not be performed in addition to the visual examination.
The inspector also contacted the resident inspector at Fermi to be apprised of the licensee's actions. Also contacted was a regional specialist who was following Detroit Edison's activities concerning this event. The heat treatment lot number that the Fermi Springs were furnished under was No. 8067703. This number was passed on to IP to determine if the springs furnished to CPS were part of this lot number.
IP has determined that this heat treatment lot number does not apply to the springs at CPS. The heat numbers of the springs for CPS are known; A&M is sensitive to the condition and the heat numbers involved at both Fermi and CPS. The applicant's position is that if there is a problem at another site involving the heat numbers of springs used at CPS, IP would respond immediately to the situation.
The quarterly technical specification surveillance of these MSIVs is done remotely because of the high radiation levels encountered during operation. Therefore, a visual examination of the springs is planned during the first fuel outage and will be monitored by the Centralized Commitment Tracking (CCT) system.
The inspector also reviewed Document Transmittal Form (DTF) JK1119 and the response by G.E. to DTF1115 requesting justification and clarification of G.E.'s position on visual examination only of the MSIV springs.
G.E.'s position is that since Fermi's failure was identified
as brittle fracture and not fatigue failure, this type of failure would occur during the first few cyclings and further into testing and
1 L
-
_
-
_-
,
\\
.
operation.
It is estimated that since the MSIVs were assembled at CPS, they have been cycled at least a dozen times. These valves will be cycled additionally as part of the startup process and cycled once a quarter as the plant goes into power production; therefore, G.E. has recommended to IP to visually inspect the springs at the end of the fuel outage. The applicant has accepted G.E.'s recommendation.
This position and the fact that quarterly technical specification surveillances will be performed is a reasonable approach; therefore, no further action on this item is planned by the inspector.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected a.
Containment Penetration Sealing (53053C)
The inspector reviewed Wyle Laboratories Test Report No. 46462-1, revision B, page II-3, Installation Instructions For Brand Industrial Services Co. (BISCO) LOCA Seal. The inspector also reviewed the following seal control records for containment:
(1) CC-755-01-3098, Detail 138, System 5840 (2) CC-755-01-3103, Detail 104, System 5840 (3) CC-755-01-31099, Detail 138, System 5840 (4) LOCA Seal, System 005, specified depth, full depth of 12.in.
(5) LOCA Seal, System 004, specified depth, full depth of 9 in.
Documentation identifying penetrations listed as exceptions to the walkdowns, and BISCO quality control inspection reports issued at the time the work was completed was also reviewed.
Results of the NRC review indi:ated that the installations and inspections were performed in accordance with BISCO and site procedures and all findings were properly resolved.
This is an in process activity which will be reviewed further in a future inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Site Surveillance Tours (42051C)
The inspector toured selected areas of the site at periodic intervals during the report period. Those tours assessed the general cleanliness of the site; storage and maintenance conditions of equipment and material being used in site construction; and potential for fire or other hazards.
L
_ _,
__
. -.
.-.
-
-
.-..
...-
!
s
,
.
)
Improvement has been noticed in plant cleanliness. However, the n
drywell wier wallpool and suppression pool were observed to have-
scum and trash in the water. The applicant has taken action to remedy this situation.
'
i No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Exit Meetings (30703)
The inspector met with applicant representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on July 7, 1986. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The applicant did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
i The applicant acknowledged the inspection findings.
I
,
i
I
\\
i
)
i
,
i
!
i
!
'