IR 05000461/1986002
| ML20151U508 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1986 |
| From: | Love R, Williams C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151U502 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-86-02, 50-461-86-2, IEB-84-02, IEB-84-2, NUDOCS 8602110035 | |
| Download: ML20151U508 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-461/86002(DRS)
Docket No. 50-461 License No. CPPR-137 Licensee:
Illinois Power Company 500 South 27th Street Decatur, IL 62525 Facility Name: Clinton Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Clinton Site, Clinton, IL Inspection Conductec : January 13-23, 1986
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-glCldh Inspector:
S. Love Date GV 1/r/e4
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. Approved By:
C. C. Williams', Chief Plant System Section Date Inspection Summary AreasInspectef:~Toutine,unannouncedinspectionofITcensee~)a)ctionon:
Inspection on January 13-23,198UR_eportNo.. 50-461/86002(DRS e
previous inspection findings; Part 21 reports; and 50.55(e) reports. This inspection involved a total of 68 inspection-hours by one NRC. inspector including 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> in office review. During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 52066, 92701, 92703, 92716 and 99020 were covered.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
8602110035 e60203
'PDR ADOCK 05000461
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Illinois Power Company (IP)
- W.
C. Gerstner, Executive Vice President
- D.
P. Hall, Vice President
- J. E. Loomis, Construction Manager
- J. Greenwood, Manager, Power Supply (Soyland/WIPCo)
~ *S. B. Fisher, Manager, NP&S
- H. E. Daniels, Jr., Project Manager
- F. A. Spangenberg, Manager, Licensing and Safety
- W. Connell, Manager, Quality Assurance
- J. G. Cook, Assistant Plant Manager
- J. S. Perry, Manager, Nuclear Programs Coordinator
- T. M. McKenrick, Supervisor, Assessment and Support N.T.
- J. A. Brownell, Licensing Specialist J. Voris, Quality Assurance Engineer G. Bousquet, Quality Assurance Engineer R. A. Derbort, Quality Assurance Engineer R. E. Campbell, Director, Quality Systems and Audits A. Sherwood, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer Baldwin Associates (BA)
- J. L. Thompson, Quality Engineering Manager The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during this inspection.
- Denotes those personnel attending the exit interview on January 16, 1986.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Open Item (461/84043-03): During a previous inspection, the inspector requested the licensee evaluate the 22 ASME Code interpretations, as perceived by BA, attached to BA letter CA-382-84, dated September 12, 1984.
IP has evaluated the BA ASME Code interpretations and revised guidelines were issued as an attachment to BA letter CA-1157-85, dated January 31, 1985.
This letter now included a caution to review the original interpretation to ensure that the interpretation fits the situation.
The revised letter (CA-1157-85), with attachment satisfies the inspectors concern.
b.
(Closed) Open Item (461/85022-01): During a previous inspection, it was observed that BA procedure BAP 2.6, " Instrumentation," allows for the issuance of unstatused drawings (not reviewed and approved by the A/E) to the field for construction.
The inspector requested the licensee to verify that procedure BAP 2.6 does not violate the IP Quality Assurance Program.
IP's review did not identify any violation,f IP Quality Assurance Program requirements.
This review also veri, ed that procedural controls are adequate to ensure final
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inspections are performed to an S&L Status 1 (approved) or-Status 2
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This.information satisfies the inspectors concerns.-
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(Closed) Open Item (461/85041-01): During a previous inspection, the
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qs inspector informed the licensee that there may be a problem with the
environmental qualifications of magnesium rotors utilized by Limitorque
'for Motor Operated Valves (MOV).
This same subject is addressed in LIE Information Notice No.-86-02: " Failure of Valve Operator Motor
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i During Environmental Qualification Testing." Investigation by the
licensee, Sargent and Lundy (S&L), and Limitorque Corporation indicated
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which contain magnesium rotors.
This resolves the inspectors concern and IE Information Notice 86-02.
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(Closed) Open Item (461/85041-02): During a previous inspection, it~
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i was observed that Corrective Action Request (CAR) 248, dated June 17,
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j 1985,.was prepared to document storage and maintenance deficiencies, i ;
Due to the potential significance of this CAR, the inspector elected to verify proper closure of.the CAR by BA.
Open item 461/85041-03
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tracks IP's action on items identified by CAR 248 that have been turned over to IP.
The following corrective actions have been
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completed by BA:
i Thirteen hundred SMIR cards were reviewed for proper storage
level requirements.. Of these, 50 were found to require
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upgrading of their maintenance activities and evaluation for
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hardware deficiencies.
Forty-one were returned to their proper
. level of storage with no hardware deficiencies identified.
The-remaining nine items had btan turned over to IP prior to CAR-248.
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Four thousand " Bill of Material" items were. reviewed and 709 safety-related permanent plant components (instruments) with
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maintenance requirements were identified.. BA was directed to a
l incorporate these 709 instruments into the storage and maintenance program. This effort was not completed due to the accelerated
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turn-over ' schedule.
These 709 instruments were identified'to IP'
i on 10 CFR 50.55(e) referral 50PE51.
l Two thousand letters / memos containing direction / criteria for
the storage and maintenance program were reviewed.
This-review ide'ntified one area of concern (instrumentation) which was I
identified to IP on 10 CFR 50.55(e) referral 50PE51.
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By letter FCE-358-85, dated November 5, 1985, IP has assumed responsibility for all items that failed to receive the required
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storage and maintenance.
This letter states, in part,'"It was IP
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NSEDs contention that since the majority of safety-related, permanent I
plant equipment and components have been-turned over to IPC-, the
responsibility for assuring their acceptability is IPC's.... No further ' action by BA. is necessary."
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The above information resolves the inspector's concerns.
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L(Closed) Open Item (461/85054-01): During a previous-inspection, it e.
was observed that if the approved disposition on NCR 33,408 was implemented, it would negate the requirements for QC to inspect non safety-related installations in seismic. Category 1 areas.
This was documented in IPQA. Surveillance Finding C-85-158.
FECN 12965 was issued to correct this error, NCR 33,408 was identified.as being superseded by the FECN, and Survaillance Finding C-85-158 was closed on November'20, 1965.
The above actions resolve the inspector's concern.
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'(Closed) Unresolved Item (461/85042-05):
During a review of Independent Design Review (IDR) construction variance number 21, it was observed that the licensee's response ~to IE Bulletin 84-02 was
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not complete.
On Augu::t 28, 1985, IP provided a supplemental Jresponse to IE Bulletin 84-02.
This additional information was responsive to the Bulletin.
The inspector also questioned the adequacy of the licensee's
. evaluation (for.reportability) of the crazing / cracking of Lexan
. covers on Agastat relays.
The inspector was concerned that the licensee had not considered possible failure of the relay cover-during the evaluation.
During this inspectica, the inspector-reviewed Nonconformance Reports (NCR), Nonconforming Material Reports (NCMR), IP internal correspondence,. letters from Control Products Division (CPD)'of Amerace Corporation (Agastat' Relay manufacturer) and General Electric (Agastat relay suppli_er), and specifically FDDR No. LH1-2322 that was associated with the identification, evaluation, and replacement of the crazed / cracked Lexan covers on Agastat relays.
The following observations were made:
NCRs 10522-10525 were prepared by BA on August 4, 1983, to document the crazed / cracked covers.
- NCMRs 011-014 were prepared by IP on October 3, 1983, to document
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the crazed / cracked covers.
BA NCRs 10522-10525 were attached to the NCMRs.
On November 8, 1983, an evaluation / investigation was commenced
tn assess whether a potential Part 21 defect existed regarding crazed / cracked covers on safety-related Agastat relays.
CPD letter dated January 25, 1984, states, in part, "It is our
opinion that the relays with the cracked covers would not be a detriment with the operation of the relay.
A possible cause, other than a defect in the material, would be the stress encountered by the use of an Agastat locking spring, P/N CR0070."
GE letter dated April 4, 1984, states, in part, "The conclusion
-drawn by' GE on the basis of an engineering review of the Agastat cracked cover' situation is that it is of a ' cosmetic' nature only and does not impair the safety function of.the relay."
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Throughout the documents reviewed, the terms " crazed" and
" cracked" are used-interchangeably.
After reading the GE-letter, it would appear that the correct term should be crazed.
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ie IP letter. number Y-72737, dated August l1,1984, states, in part:
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"The relay manufacturer, the Amerace Corporation and the safety-related equipment supplier, the General Electric Company
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were contacted to evaluate the safety impact of Agastat GP relays with cracked covers.
The evaluation by both component suppliers. indicates that the cracked relay covers would not impair the operation or safety function of the Agastat GP relays..Upon review of..the evaluations results by the equipment suppliers, NSED concludes that the cracked covers on Agastat GO series relays are not reportable conditions under 10 CFR 21.
The following information is in accordance with the requirements of Section 4.6 of QAP-11 6.5:
iv) Nature of the defect or-failure to comply and the safety hazard which is or could be created by the defect or failure to comply.
The CPS does not have any defects which have led to component.
failures.
The potential defect or potential failure would be the possible cracking or crazing of the relay cover to the extent that the effectiveness of the relay's external locking spring, P/N CR0070 would be compromised.
The relay's locking spring insures that the relay remains in its' plug-in socket under DBA conditions.
A relay inspection at the CPS has revealed that we do not have any relay covers cracked or crazed to the extent that the locking spring has been compromised.
Further communications with the equipment suppliers indicate that no relays have failed due to crazing of the relay cover."
Based on the above information, the licensee's evaluation for reportability on this issue was found to_be adequate.
3.
Licensee Action on 10 CFR 21 Reports a.
(Closed) Part 21 Report (461/82015-PP): On February 23, 1982, General Electric Company (GE) notified IF of a potential " slip
' contact" malfunction with Series 20K switches supplied to GE by Electroswitch Corporation.
The " slip contacts" are those contacts which are closed when the switch handle is rotated and remain closed when the switch handle returns to the center (normal) position.
A total'of 80 (62 non-NSSS and 18 NSSS) safety-related Series 20K switches are installed at Clinton Power Station.
The Electroswitch Corporation has redesigned thcir Series 20K switch to eliminate the possibility of " slip contacts" failing to perform their intended function.
All of the affected safety-related switches were replaced with the redesigned Series 20K switches.
During this inspection,
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the inspector reviewed the FDDRs, ECNs, Maintenance Work Requests and Construction Work Requests that documented the replacement of these switches.
b.
(Closed) Part 21 Report (461/84002-PP): On January 17, 1984,_ Pacific Air Products Company (PAPCo) notified-the NRC of a'potentially reportable defect with PAPC0 linear converters in that they were experiencing excessive wear.
The PAPCo linear converters are supplied in conjunction with ITT Electro-Hydraulic actuators for use on HVAC system isolation / modulation dampers in the CPS.
The linear co~nverters transform linear actuation motion to rotary motion to operate the dampers.
PAPCo had received a linear converter unit from a non-nuclear generating plant with indications of excessive wear of the brass shaft guides on the input and output shafts.
PAPCo's onsite investigation indicates that the cause of the abnormal wear is and was actuator " hunting." The PAPCo investigation indicated that the ITT actuator does hunt when it is at the end of the power stroke.
An additional cause of actuator oscillation (hunting) is caused by the location and type of sensing elements that control the actuator.
PAPCo's recommended corrective actions was to correct the abnormalities causing the hunting and establish an effective maintenance program.
The licensee has established a maintenance program in accordance with the program recommended by PAPCo.
There are four safety-related systems in which linear converters are used at CPS (control room HVAC, diesel generator ventilation, switchgear heat removal, and standby gas treatment).
In all four systems, redundancy of the affected dampers are present.
This was verified by a review of the app'icable M05 series draw.ngs. Based on the above information, it was determined that the issue with PAPCo linear converters is not reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 21.
c.
(Closed) Part 21 Report (461/85002-PP): On Septamber 10, 1984, Rosemount Inc. notified Baldwin Associates of a potential lesk path in the threads between the sensor module and the electronics housing of Rosemount Series B. Model 1153 transmitters manufactured between January and August 1984.
IP identified 74 of the potentially defective in use at CPS.
These transmitters were returned to Rosemount for rework and recertification and were subsequently returned to CPS for reinstallation.
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed work requests for the removal and reinstallation of the transmitters; Rosemount Repair Action Certificate of Compliance; Calibration Data Sheet; Receiving Inspection Reports; and Installation Travelers used to install and inspect the transmitters.
4.
Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports a.
(Closed) 50.55(e) Report (461/84006-EE): On March 28, 1984, IP notified NRC Region III of a potentially reportable deficiency concerning damage to electrical cable penetrations.
The IP investigation / inspection identified damage to termination blocks; terminal block cages; feedthrough power conductors; termination
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enclosures; wire terminations; integration valve; and material.
corrosion.
This damage was documented on 118 Nonconformance Reports.
During this inspection, the inspector verified that these 118 NCRs were properly closed.
b.
(Closed) 50.55(e) Report (461/84016-EE): On July. 29, 1984, IP notified NRC Region III of a potentially reportable deficiency concerning the general workmanship discrepancies in the wiring of the control panels for the HPCS diesel generator.
These panels were manufactured by Stewart and Stevenson Services and supplied by General Electric (GE).
The following types of discrepancies were identified: wires pulled out of the terminal lugs; improper grip of the insulation in the terminal lug ferrule; broken and missing wire strands; insufficient insertion of the conductor into the lug; broken wires; and unidentified loose wires.
These deficiencies were documented on NCRs 14165, 16984 and 28043; Nonconforming Material Reports (NCMR) 1-0510, 1-0590, and 1-0529; and Field Deviation Disposition Requests (FDDR) LH1-2255, LH1-2312, LH1-2585, and LH1-2642.
During this inspection, the inspector verified that the above listed NCRs, NCMRs, FDDRs were properly closed.
In order to determine the extent of similar deficiencies on other equipment manufactured by Stewart and Stevenson, the licensee inspected the' control panels for the Division I and II Emergency Diesel Generator Units.
It was determined that the internal wiring in these panels were in a condition similar to that found in the control panels for the HPCS diesel generator.
These deficiencies were identified on NCRs 10012, 27303, 27626, 27733, 27753 and 27809.
During this inspection, the inspector verified that these NCRs were properly closed.
c.
(Closed) 50.55(e) Report (461/84017-EE): On July 23, 1984, IP notified NRC Region III of a potentially reportable deficiency concerning work performed on General Electric (GE) components by Baldwin Associates (BA). GE has qualified their electrical equipment based on workmanship as outlined in NC & ID Procedures II GA-024 and 026.
GE requires aesurance that these qualifications are evident in their equipment.
'ission by BA to directly utilize the NC & ID Procedures in their work travelers resulted in equipment being modified that may not meet GE's requirements for equipment qualifications.
The IP investigation of this potentially reportable deficiency has determined that the existing means of verifying the quality requirements for work associated with GE change documents cre satisfactory.
Per GE letter GSI-1493-84, dated September 5, 1984, GE QA reviewed the BA Inspection Program for 80P (Non PGCC) FDI/FDDR work activities and found the program to be adequate.
The PGCC work / inspection activities are controlled by Control Room Assembly Procedures (CRAPS).
These procedures are reviewed and approved by GE and contained only minor differences when compared with NC & ID
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Procedures. Based'on:the.above information, it was determined that
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_this issue does not represent a reportable deficiency under the l
provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
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(Closed) 50.'55(e) Report (461/85002-EE): On February 21, 1985, IP notified NRC Region III of a_potentially reportable deficiency with installed cable tray in that the' tray was not in contact with the horizontal member of the hanger for detail DV-8A connections.' Sargent and-Lundy (S&L) selected a sample of 53' installed hangers where the.
tray was. skewed with respect to the hanger for evaluation. All 53 examples were determined to have no design significance relative to the operation of the CPS.
FECN 8013 was issued to clarify the-
= installation requirements for tray attachments.
Based on the above-information, it was determined that this issue does not_ represent a
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reportable deficiency under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
5.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins (Closed) IE Bulletin-(461/84002-88):
IEB'84002 was issued on March 12, 1984.
This bulletin described-failures of General Electric Type HFA relays with Lexan coil assemblies.
In response to this bulletin, drawing
'and specifications were reviewed to determine the location of all GE HFA c
relays..In all, 528 HFA relays were found to have Lexan coil assemblies.
IP committed to replace these 132 relays with " Century Series" relays prior to initial' fuel load.
The remaining safety-related HFA relays were
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found to be the Century Series relays and were acceptable.
There were also non safety-related HFA relays found with Lexan coils.
The use of Lexan coils in non safety-related relays requires. controls on spare parts to prevent the inadvertent use of Lexan coils in safety-related relays.
This is being accomplished by existing procedure CPS 0AP1008.01N.
This procedure requires all safety-related spare or replacement parts to be identified and controlled.
During this. inspection, the inspector verified that the Lexan relay coils had been rep. laced with Century Series relays as follows:
90 HFA relays were replaced in MCR panels by FDI No. SKIM.
- Completion-date, August 21, 1985.
24 HFA relays were replaced in the Division III (HPCS) diesel
generator system by CWR 18190. _ Reference document FDDR No.
LH1-3311.
Conpletion date, January 10, 1986.
3 HFA relays were replaced in the HVAC system by CWR 18680.
- Reference document FECN 12826.
Completion date, December 14, 1985.
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f enclosures;. wire terminations; integration valve; and material ~
corrosion.'.This damage was documented on 118 Nonconformance Reports.
During this inspection, the inspector verified that these.
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118 NCRs were properly closed. No violation or deviations were identified.
15 HFA relays were replaced in the HVAC system by CWR 19,498.
- Reference documents FECN 11,930 and FECN 12,826.
Completion
.date January 14, 1986.
The licensee's corrective actions-in. response to IE Bulletin 84002 were-found to be adequate.
6.
Licensee Action on IE Circulars (Closed) IE Circular (461/79002-CC):
This circular describes the failure of 120 Volt Vital AC Power Supplies when all four of the Solidstate Controls, Inc. (SCI) inverter static switches automatically transferred
'to the alternate power supply.
No single failure could be identified; however, the circular provided a list of four items that should be reviewed by the licensees.
Investigation by IP and General Electric (GE)
revealed the following:
CPS does not use SCI (Solidstate Controls, Inc.) inverters in their
NSPS circuit design.
The inverters used in the CPS design use a 125V DC battery with a
battery charger as their primary power source.
They do not utilize any external. time delayed trips in the breaker circuits.' Any transient occurring on the AC bus feeding the charger would be dampened and limited at the inverter input.
The charger output is coordinated with the maximum input voltage of the inverter by the design.
The Static Transfer Switch is designed to transfer to the alternate
. source if a malfunction occurs in the inverter. This transfer is coordinated so as not to transfer on' load transients capable of
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.being handled by the inverter.
Determined that the procedures at CPS assure the operability of the
safety-related inverters after they have been subjected to maintenance and testing.
7.
Exit Interview The Region III inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted under Paragraph 1) at the' conclusion of the onsite portion of.the inspection on January 16, 1986.
The inoffice portion of the inspection was discussed with Mr. J. Brownell, IP Licensing Specialist, on Januar 23, 1986..The
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inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspe ', ion.
The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report ~
with regard to documents or processes reviewed during the inspection.
The licensee acknowledged this information and did not identify any such
' documents or processes as proprietary.
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