IR 05000461/1999008

Insp Rept 50-461/99-08 on 990309-12.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Performance During Exercise of Emergency Plan

ML20205P427
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	04/09/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205P396	List: IR 05000461/1999008 ML20205P392
References
50-461-99-08, 50-461-99-8, NUDOCS 9904200178
Download: ML20205P427 (16)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 Docket No: 50-461 License No: NPF-62

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Report No: 50-461/98027(DRS)

Licensee: Illinois Power Company Facility: Clinton Power Station Location: Route 54 West Clinton,IL 61727 Dates: March 9-12,1999 Inspectors: J. Foster, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Analyst T. Ploski, Sr. Emergency Response Coordinator D. Funk, Emergency Preparedness Analyst K. Stoedter, Resident inspector C. Brown, Resident inspector S. DuPont, Reactor Engineer Approved by: Gary L. Shear, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety

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'9904200178 990409 PDR ADOCK 05000461 '

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Clinton Nuclear Power Station NRC Inspection Report 50-461/99008 This inspection consisted of evaluating the licensee's performance during an exercise of the Emergency Plan. It was conducted by four re0 i onalinspectors and two resident inspector No violations of NRC requirements were identified. An Exercise Weakness was identified related to lack of knowledge of the status of inplant team ELapt Support e Overall licensee performance during the 1999 Emergency Plan exercise was adequate, and had improved considerably from the evaluated exercise, conducted November 18, 1998. An Exercise Weakness was identified relative to knowledge of the status of inplant repair teams. (Section P4.1.c).

• Performance in the Simulator Main Control Room was acceptable; no problems were noted in implementation of the Emergency Operating Procedures. During the rapidly moving scenario, control room shift personnel properly diagnosed reactor events at the Notification of Unusual Event, and Alert levels. Notifications were promptly made to offsite officials. (Section P4.1.c)

e The Technical Support Center staff's performance was effective; the facility activated efficiently, and use of priorities was very good. Plant event analysis, event classification, notifications, and briefings were competently perbrmed by the staf (Section P4.1.c)

e Overall performance of Operations Support Center (OSC) management and staff was mixed, with examples of both good and poor individual performance. Overall command and control of the facility was sufficient. An " urgent team" procedure aided team dispatch, and while a sense of urgency was exhibited when repair teams were briefed and dispatched from the OSC, dispatch times still need improvement. OSC management did not maintain good awareness of deployed teams' progress or result Communication difficulties resulted in inplant repair team status being lost, an Exercise Weakness. (Section P4.1.c)

e Performance in the Emergency Operations Facility was acceptabla. Status board maintenance and definition of what constitutes a release were identified as inspection followup items. (Section P4.1.c)

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e Communication was acceptable with some overall problems noted; licensee staff indicated they plan to perform a review of communications between facilities. (Section P4.1.c) -

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• Self-critiques following termination of the exercise were generally very good, being both self-critical and objective. The critiques included inputs from controllers and exercise participants. Licensee critique findings were consistent with the NRC evaluation team's findings. (Section P4.1.c)

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Report Details IV, Plant Support P3 Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation P Review of Exercise Oblectives and Scenario UP 82302)

The inspectors reviewed the 1999 exercise's objectives and scenario and determined ;

that the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the licensee's emergency plan. The scenario provided a challenging framework to support demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plan. The scenario included a -

radiological release and several equipment failure . P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness ,

. P Evaluated Biennial Emeroency Preparedness Exercise Insoection Scope UP 82301)

Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that power reactor licensees conduct biennial exercises that involve participation by offsite authorities. On November 18,1998, the licensee conducted a biennial exercise involving full participation by State of filinois and DeWitt county responders. This exercise was conducted to test major portions of the licensee's onsite and offsite emergency response capabilities. Onsite and offsite emergency response organizations and emergency response facilities were activate The March 10,1999 licensee-only emergency preparedness exercise evaluated during this inspection was conducted to demonstrate that weaknesses and deficiencies from the November 18,1998 exerciso had been corrected. This exercise was held with

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minor offsite participatio The inspectors evaluated performance in the following emergency response facilities:

e Simulator Main Control Room (SMCR)

e Technical Support Center (TSC)

e Operations Support Center (OSC)

e Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The inspectors assessed the licensee's recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations, command-and-control, the transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, and the overall implementation of

. the emergency plan.. In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques in each of the above facilities to evaluate the licensee's initial self-assessment of exercise performanc .. Emeroency Response Facility Observations and Findinas b.1 Simulator Main Con.trpfRoom (SMCR)

Overalllicensee performance in the SMCR was acceptable. During the scenario, SMCR personnel diagnosed reactor events at the Notification of Unusual Event and -

Alert classification levels. Event notification forms and verbal notifications to State of Illinois officials and the NRC were completed in a detailed and timely manne Communications within the SMCR were generally clear and concise. Three part communications and the phonetic alphabet were used throughout the event to aid in the transfer of information. The Control Room Supervisor and the Shift Manager held crew briefings and updates when needed to keep the operating crew informed of changing plant conditions and operating strategie Operations personnel utilized the appropriate procedures, including abnormal operating procedures, alarm response procedures, and emergency plan implementing procedures, to help diagnose each reactor event. No deficiencies were identified regarding the implementation of the emergency operating procedures; however, a questioning attitude was lacking at times. For example, the operations crew did not recognize that the instruments used to monitor containment pressure used different scales (pounds per square inch atmospheric versus pounds per square inch gauge).

As a result, the simulator crew did not question a change in containment pressure from 2 pounds to more than 17 pounds for approximately one hour, even though plant conditions did not support the increas Communications between communicators in the SMCR and the TSC were effectiv Transfer of command and control of emergency responsibilities frcm the Acting Site Emergency Director (Shift Manager) to the TSC's Site Emergency Director (SED) was orderly and timely, b.2 Technical Support Center (TSC)

Overall, the TSC staff's performance was effective. The 'TSC staff performed and interacted efficiently and professionally, and functioned w eli as a tea The material condition of the TSC improved since the last inspection. Eight desktop organizers had been added, reducing the amount of " clutter" on TSC tables. Two new Safety Parameter Display Systems terminals had also been added, replacing older units. The conduit tripping hazard previously noted still remains, and the Area Radiation / Process Radiation monitoring system also remained out of servic The facility was rapidly and efficiently activated following declaration of the Aler Minimum staffing was available within nine minutes of the emergency response organization pager activation. Activation checklists were observed in use, and an initial habitability survey was promptly performed. Subsequent habitability surveys were conducted on a periodic basis. A formal public address announcement was made when the SED assumed command authorit .

Excellent command and control was demonstrated by the SED, and facility briefings were held on a strict schedule, with short update briefings held as needed. - Facility staff were asked if they were ready for briefings, and halted other activities during briefing periods. At one point, a briefing was postponed when communications staff indicated that a briefing would delay a time-sensitive notification. Three-part communication was well utilized, and ensured correct communication on several occasion Classifications were properly made by the SED and his staff, essentially as predicted by the scenario writers. Protective Action Recommendations were made per procedure, and communicated within the required timeframe. The SED correctly declared a General Emergency and his staff developed a procedurally correct offsite Protective Action recommendation (PAR).

Priorities were appropriately reviewed by the SED and changed as plant conditions warranted. The procedure for determining priorities requires no duplication of prioritie For example, only one task could be designated as priority 1. Tasks not assigned a priority number are assumed to be relatively unimportant. The relative importance of items not assigned a priority ranking was sometimes difficult for OSC personnel to determine, hampering OSC management's correct allocation of resource Plant conditions were continuously monitored by TSC personnel when the scenario provided available instrumentation. Primary plant parameters were displayed on TSC status boards, wh!ch were generally well maintained. The status of some plant systems and equipment, notably Standby Liquid Control (SLC), was not always clearly indicated or discussed in briefing Communication with other response facilities was generally very good. However, some plant status information or discussion items were not well shared between facilitie The initiation of flow by the SLC system was not known in the EOF. Subsequently, SLC was lor,t due to loss of electrical busses and had little effect on plant activitie After regaining electrical power, the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)

autostarted due to high radiation levels in containment. This resulted in a noble gas release. The EOF staff was not informed of the activation of the SGT The Radiation Protection Manager Performed well, maintaining an awareness of plant radiation levels. A study which predicted Clinton inplant radiation levels to be expected following a core melt was well utilized when most radiation instrumentation was unavailable. Proper concem was expressed when core damage and rising radiation J levels began to threaten teams already performing tasks in the plan The uninterruptible power supply for the public address system functioned properly, )

allowing the system to function during the simulated loss of power to the TSC. An uninterruptible power supply connected to a facsimile machine supplied power for only approximately 40 minutes before failing The facsimile machine had not been utilized to send any facsimiles. This was no*' >y the licensee and will be reviewed for possible corrective actio l

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The Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) were entered and utilized.-

This was the first such full SAMG demonstration, during an exercise, evaluated by NRC Region Ill. In general, SAMG and related Technical Support Guideline rse appeared to be effectiv b.3 Operations Supoort Center (OSC) and Emeroency Response Teams The overall performance of OSC management and staff continued to be mixed, with examples of both strong and weak individual performance, similar to observations during the November 18,1998, evaluated exercis The OSC was staffed and operational in a timely manner following the Alert declaration. Personnel displayed good teamwork during setup. The initial sign-in process was effective and noise levels within the facility were acceptable; however, the inspectors noted that support personnel made no effort to stage any gear or equipment in preparation for being assigned to a repair tea Per the scenario, the OSC experienced a loss of power. OSC personnel effectively worked through the difficulties caused by the loss of lighting in the facility. A sufficient number of portable lights were operational throughout the simulated loss of powe Public Address (PA) announcements and TSC briefings were clearly heard in the OS These communications, in conjunction with the OSC Supervisor's frequent briefings via a portable PA system, were effective in keeping OSC personnel abreast of plant events and changing plant conditions. This was a distinct improvement over the performance observed during the November 1998 exercis The overall OSC Supervisor's " command and control" of the facility was improved over the previous evaluated exercise; however, timely dispatch and status of repair teams remained a problem are With 22 repair teams formed during the exercise, the inspectors observed actual dispatch times of 7 to 42 minutes from the time of the request by the TSC Site Emergency Director. Two emergency team coordinators were actively engaged in assembling and briefing repair teams. Team leaders were designated and radiation protection personnel were assigned as appropriate. The pre-dispatch briefings properly contained information on travel routes, current expected dose rates, and accumulated dose and dose-rate tum back limit A good decision was made by the OSC Supervisor to delay formation of team 11, a low priority team, to concentrate on dispatching team 12, an " urgent" priority tea However, emergency plan implementing procedure EC-12,, * Emergency Teams,"

Revision 6, was not completely followed. Section 4.2.1.7 of the procedure states that

"an urgent team should be dispatched with little or no briefing such that dispatch times are no more than 5 - 10 minutes." While team 12 was dispatched within 11 minutes of

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the request, this could have been further expedited if the guidance in the procedure had been followed and a limited dispatch briefing provided. A full pre-dispatch team

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briefing was given by the emergency team coordinator. This was an inspection Followup Item (50-461/99008-01).

Repair team 15's dispatch was untimely. Team dispatch was delayed due to the team dispatcher conferring on the telephone with the simulator main control room. The team was requested as a priority 1 team, but took 42 minutes to be dispatche ,

Debriefings for returning teams were disorganized and ineffective in attaining information for the OSC Supervisor. Team 12, an " urgent team" had retumed and was in the OSC for 22 minutes before being debriefed and their status being updated on the OSC Supervisor's status board. The emergency team coordinators were not informed that a team was retuming and the team leader usually had to ask a coordinator to accept his debriefing comment The OSC staff was ineffective in maintaining the status of repair teams. Information on Emergency Team Data Sheets was not always accurate and was often incomplet Team 1 remained in a standby condition outside the OSC for more than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> because their status was unknown by the OSC staff other than the communicato The OSC communicator was not effective in relaying repair team status to the OSC Supervisor, due partly to nearly continuous communications from the field teams. At one point, 20 repair teams were in the field and each had been instructed to report status and radiological conditions every 15 minutes. The communicator logged, but did not generally pass on, the information received from the repair teams. The OSC Supervisor's signature, indicating review of debriefing information from retuming repair teams, as required in procedure EC-12, was not accomplished. When asked why information on team 12, designated as an " urgent team," had not been communicated to the OSC Supervisor, the communicator replied that an attempt had been made but that the OSC Supervisor was too busy to receive the information. Knowledge of teams'

status became so outdated that the OSC Supervisor had to direct the staff to regain personnel accountability for all team members. This was an Exercise Weakness (50-461/99008-02).

b.4 Emeroency Operations Facility (EOF)

Overall performance of the EOF staff was acceptable. Per procedures, the EOF was

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partially staffed by some of the technical staff and several administrative support staff following the Alert declaratio Four Offsite Monitoring Teams (OMT) were formed following the Alert declaration. The teams efficiently checked their equipment and instruments prior to receiving good initial briefings on current plant and environmental conditions, as well as their reasonable deployment strategy. The teams completed predeployment activities and left the EOF within an acceptable time. The OMTs were logically deployed downwind of the plant to detect a releas The Emergency Manager (EM) announced his arrival following the Site Area Emergency declaration and directed available staff to listen to the TSC SED's briefings,

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which were transmitted to the EOF by a public address system, and to otherwise prepare themselves to perform their dutie Transfer of command and control of the licensee's event response from the SED to the EM was acceptably delayed while the SED and his staff completed assessments of further plant equipment degrades. The Emergency Action Level / Protective Action Advisor and the EM soon satisfied themselves that the General Emergency declaration and Protective Action Recommendation generated from the TSC were procedurally correct.' The EM formally announced to the EOF staff that he had just assumed command and control of the event respons Different EOF technical staff were responsible for providing information to be posted on specific status boards by administrative support staff. The timeliness of updating status boards varied by up to 30 minutes. As a result, at times different status boards contained information that was either inconsistent or unclear when compared to information posted on other status boards. Examples of problems with status boards'

information included:

• A status board indicated that it displayed the highest radiation measurements reported by the OMTs. However, these readings usually did not include the six highest radiological measurements recently reporte e A " Problem Board" was used to post an unprioritized listing of current equipment ,

problems and, occasionally, a completed corrective action. No time of l occurrence was posted next to each listed proble e Some information on the * key events" status board was either uncle &r or incomplete. For example, there was no indication that injection was underway using SLC, although this was the sole means of injection to the reactor coolant system at the time and a hardcopy log available to the technical staff indicated that the SLC was operating. This status board also listed two times that were roughly one hour apart as the time that accountability of onsite personnel was complete o On other occasions, the key parameters status board included containment temperature values that exceeded the design temperature limit. However, .

neither the engineering stsff nor the EM questioned the reasonableness of j these value :

Another, more significant example of status board problems was that one critical

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parameter, containment pressure, rapidly increased above the noted design limi Containment pressure increased from an indicated 17 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) to 30 psig (design limit is 15 psig). Later, the pressure rapidly dropped from 30

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psig to 17.4 psig. Neither the rapid increase nor the decrease was initially questioned or challenged. The pressure remained at above 15 psig a total of 45 minutes before EOF staff questioned the TSC on the validity of the indication. Subsequently, it was discovered that the indication was in absolute pressure instead of the assumed gauge

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pressure. After the parameter was corrected to gauge pressure, the containment pressure was indicated as 2 psi In general, the use of status boards was marginally acceph with respect to timeliness of updating information posted, and the consistency and completeness of posted information. In general, there was a lack of a questioning attitude by EOF technical staff when inconsistent information appeared on one or several status boards.'

As a result, the value of information on the status boards to the EOF technical staff was limited and had little apparent impact on decision making. The EM apparently placed much greater reliance on information he received during briefings and conversations with the SED than on information posted on the status boards. The quality of status -

board usage within the EOF was an inspection Follow up Item (50-461/99008-03).

Protective measures staff identified a wind direction shift of sufficient magnitude to warrant a procedurally correct change to the affected sectors. An associated Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) message Form, Number 5, was transmitted to State officials within an acceptable time after the wind direction shift was recognize However, inconsistent information on the status of an ab.1ormal release was evident prior to power restoration to the Standby Gas Treatment System. This inconsistent information should have resulted in discussions among key licensee, State, and NRC responders. Examples of the inconsistent release status information included the following: NARS Form Number 5; release information on an EOF status board; and information presented during meetings of key EOF responder The NARS Form Number 5, approved at 10:57 a.m., indicated no release to the environment. Minutes later, the Radiation Protection Supervisor informed the EM that all the OMTs' reports of abnormal radiation levels close to the plant were due to shin However, another status board indicated that a release having a six hour duration had begun at 10:20 a.m. At the time, there were no apparent indications of a containment failure and the reported containment radiation level was less than 2 Rem per hou When the EM was later briefed on a worst case" dose projection, which included an assumed loss of containment integrity, the EM was told that the OMTs had reported no q indications of an abnormal release to the environment. The inconsistencies in i describing release status on EOF status boards, NARS Form Number 5, and during key staff briefings prior to tha restoration of power to the SGTS was an Inspection Follow I

up item (50-461/99008-04).

The PARS issued by TSC staff and correctly revised by EOF staff were accurately posted on an EOF status board. The protective actions chosen for implementation by offsite officials were also posted. ' The EM was kept adequately informed of potential changes that could warrant funner revision to the PAR or activation of the backup EO As the amount of radioactivity within the containment greatly increased, proper concem was voiced by radiation protection personnel for limiting onsite emergency worker exposures associated with inplant repair teams' missions and a planned shift chang l

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b.5 ' Scenario and Exercise Control The inspectors assessed how chailenging the scenario was to the licensee and evaluated the licensee's control of the exercise. The scenario was challenging and exercised the majority of the licensee's emergency response capabilitie Licensee Self-Critiaues The inspectors attended the licensee's self-critiques in the SMCR, TSC, OSC, and EOF which occurred immediately after the exercise. Exercise controllers solicited verbal and written inputs from the participants in addition to providing the participants with the controllers' initial assessments of personnel performance. In addition to facility-related critique items, overall communication issues were noted; licensee staff indicated they plan to perform a review of communications between facilities. - The inspectors concluded that these initial self-critiques were thorough and in close agreement with the majority of the inspectors' observation Summary of Conclusions Evaluation of the license's exercise performance was as follows:

e Overall licensee performance during the 1999 exercise performance was adequate, and had improved considerably from the last evaluated exercise, conducted November 18,1998. An Exercise Weakness was identified relative to knowledge of the status of inplant repair teams, o Performance in the Simulator Main Control Room was acceptable; no problems were noted in implementation of the Emergency Operating Procedures. During the rapidly moving scenario, control room shift personnel property diagnosed reactor events at the Notification of Unusual Event, and Alert levels.

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Notifications were promptly made to offsite official * The Technical Support Center staff's performance was effective; the facility activated efficiently, and use of priorities was very good. Plant event analysis, event classification, notifications, and briefings were competently performed by the staf o Overall performance of OSC management and staff was r.ned, with examples of both good and poor individual performance. Overall command and control of ,

the facility was sufficient. An " urgent team" procedure aided team dispatch, and while a sense of urgency was exhibited when repair teams were briefed and dispatched from the OSC, dispatch times still need improvement. OSC management did not maintain good awareness of deployed teams' progress or results Communication difficulties resulted in inplant repair team statusnot being maintained, an Exercise Weaknes )

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e Performance in the Emergency Operatons Facility was acceptable, with status board maintenance and definition of what constitutes a release identified as inspection followup item e Interfacility communication was acceptable with some overall problems noted; licensee staff indicated they plan to perform a review of communications between facilitie e Self-critiques following termination of the exercise were generally very Good, being both self-critical and objective. The critiques included inputs from controllers and exercise participants. Licensee critique findings'were consistent with the NRC evaluation team's finding P8 Miscellcneous EP issues P (Closed) Inspection Followuo item No. 50-461/98003-16: Activation and response of the autodialer system. Discussion with the EP staff indicated that the new autodialer system had been successfully installed and tested. During the exercise, the system worked well, providing alphanumeric information as to emergency ciassification and numbers for response personnel to call. This item is close P.8.2 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item No. 50-461/98027-01: The transfer of command authority to the TSC's senior responder was slow due to a flawed procedure. The licensee had deleted both the procedural step and status board requirement to wait for field monitoring teams to be in place. The transfer of command and control was efficient and timely in the current exercise. This item is closed P.8.3 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item No. 50-461/98027-02: Exercise Weakness involving TSC staff not appropriately setting priorities of inplant teams and a lack of a sense of urgency in briefing and dispatching teams. The procedural direction for setting priorities had been revised to prohibit utilizing a priority (number) more than once (there could only be a single priority 1 at a time). Priorities were well determined, and reassessed as scenario conditions changed. There was a sense of urgency observed in the briefing and dispatching of inplant teams. This item is close P.8.4 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item No. 50-461/98027-03: Exercise Weakness involving Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) formulation and transmission by TSC and EOF staffs. During the current exercise, PARS were procedurally correct, and transmitted within expected timeframes. This item is close P.S.5 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item No. 50-461/98027-04: Failure of the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) in the TSC caused lack of Public Address (PA) system capability in TSC and adjacent OSC in tl:e previous evaluated exercise. The PA system in the TSC was supplied by an UPS of sufficient size to power the system during the entire period the TSC was to have lost power during the exercise scenario. The UPS appeared to have sufficient reserve power to have energized the equipment for a much longer period, if necessary. This item is close .

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P 8.6 (Closed) Case Specific Checklist Restart item Vll.1. "Develoo and Implement .

Emeroency Preoggdness Imorovement Initiatives." Based upon the performance demonstrated during this exercise, and the closure of other followup items related to emergency preparedness, the evaluation team concluded that this restart item merited closur Manaaement Meetinos Exit Meetina Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 12,1999. The inspection team leader stated that, although the licensee's overall exercise performance was adequate, several performance issues were identified. The licensee acknowledged the preliminary findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie .

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED L_ ice _psee

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H. Anagnostopoulos, Director, Plant Radiation & Chemistry G. Baker, Manager - Quality Assurance ,

K. Evans, Emergency Planning J. Goldman, Manager - Work Management J. Gruber, Director- Corrective Action G. Hunger, Manager Clinton Power Station K. Johnson, Manager, Nuclear Support C. Kelly, Supervisor, Work Management M. Lyon, Supervisor, Operations Training J. McElwain, Chief Nuclear Officer W. Maguire, Director- Operations R. Phares, Manager - Nuclear Safety and Performance improvement W. Romberg, Manager- Nuclear Station Engineering Department  :

l J. Sipek, D rector - Licensing D. Smith, Director, Security and Emergency Planning  ;

D. Waddel, Manager, Recovery

'N. Yarosz, Emergency Planning NRC T. Pruett, Senior Resident inspector K. Stoedter, Resident inspector C. Brown, Resident inspector lilinois Department of Nuclear Safety D. Zemel, Resident Engineer INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301 Evaluation of dxercises for Power Reactors IP 82302 Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors

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l . ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-461/99008-01 IFl inplant team dispatch timeliness needs improvtmen S1/99000-02 IFl Exercise Weakness, inplant team status not know /99008-03 IFl Status board maintenance in the EOF was poo /99008-04 IFl Need to clearly define when a release is occurring, and when a potential release situation exist Closed 50-461/98003-16 IFl Activation and response of the autodialer syste /98027-01 IFl The transfer of command authority to the TSC's senior responder was slow due to a flawed procedur /98027-02 IFl Exercise Weakness involving PAR formulation and transmission by TSC and EOF staff I 50-461/98027-03 IFl Exercice Weakness involving TSC staff not appropriately setting priorities of inplant teams and a lack of a sense of urgency in briefing and dispatching team /98027-04 IFl UPS failure in the TSC causes lack of PA system capability in TSC and adjacent OS Discussed Non l

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED l CFR Code of Federal Regulations DR Division of Reactor Projects DRS~ Division of Reactor Safety EAL Emergency Action Level l EM Emergency Manager EOF Emergency Operations Facility EOP Emergency Operating Procedure EP Emergency Preparedness EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERDS Emergency Response Data System FEMA. Federal Emergency Management Agency IDNS lilinois Dep;rtment of Nuclear Safety IFl Inspectic;1 Follow up Item IP inspect;on Procedure NARS Nuclear Accident Reporting System .

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NPF Nuclear Power Facility NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation OMT Offsite Monitoring Team OSC Operations Support Center PA Public Address l PAR Protective Action Recommendation j PDR NRC Public Document Room . )

PRR Public Reading Room PSIA Pounds per Square Inch, Atmospheric-PSIG Pounds per Square Inch, Gauge RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel SAMG Severe Accident Management Guidelines SED Static. Emergency Director SGTS Standby Gas Treatment System SLC Standby Liquid Control SM Shift Manager SMCR Simulator Main Control Room SRI Senior Resident inspector TSC Technical Support Center  !

UPS Uninterruptible Power System j

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