IR 05000461/1989005
| ML20248K084 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1989 |
| From: | Danielson D, Ward K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248K082 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-89-05, 50-461-89-5, GL-88-01, GL-88-1, IEIN-88-003, IEIN-88-3, NUDOCS 8904170218 | |
| Download: ML20248K084 (7) | |
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L U.5;. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-
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U REGION'III.
Report No. 50-461/89005(DRS).
Docket.No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62
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l Licensee:. Illinois Power Company'
.,i 500. South 27th Street
-Decatur,.IL 62525
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Facility Name:.Clinton Power Station, Unit 1
' Inspection At:
Clinton Site, Clinton, IL 61727
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Inspection Conducted:
January 19-20, February 1-2, 8,-21-23, and-
'23,-1989
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Inspector:
K. 0. Ward ff
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Approved By:
..D.
H.~ Danielson, Chief 3O Materials and Processes Section Date
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Inspection'S.ummary Inspection on January 19-20, February 1-2, 8, 21-23,- and March 23, 1989 i
.(Report No. 50-461/89005(DRS))
' Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of inservice inspection (ISI) activities including review of programs.(73051), procedures-(73052),
observation of' work activities.(73753), and data review (73755); modification m
activities (37701); and licensee a~ction on.Information Notice 88-03 (92717).
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
Based on the results of the inspecti n, the inspector noted the following strengths:
The=first ISI program planning was adequate despite the delays dva to
.various reasons other than ISI.
The ISI activities generally stayed
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on schedule.
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The licensee's staffing of the ISI group was adequate, and the personnel
were very knowledgeable and conscientious.
Management involvement in the ISI was very evident.
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8904170218 890406 ADOCK0500g1 PDR Q
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DETAILS.
1.'
Persons Cont' acted B
Illinois Power' Company (IP)
- W. Gerstner,' Executive Vice President
- .D. Hall,'Vice President-
- J. Perry,~ Assistant Vice' President
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- R. Kerestes,' Director of Engineering Projects-
- F. Edler, Director, Maintenance and Technical Training.
- M. Hollon, Acting Director,'NPAG
- J. Mil _ler, Manager, Scheduling and Outage
- R Campbell, Manaaer QA
- J. Wilson, Manager, Clinton Power Station
- R. Freeman, Manager, Nuclear Station _ Engineering
- J.= Cook, Manager, Nuclear Planning ~and Support
'*D. Holtzscher, Acting Manager,' Licensing and-Safety
- S. Bell,~~ Supervisor ISI
- J. Brownell, Project Specialist J._ Wilder,ProjectSpecialist M. Balg, Project Engineer Soyland/WIPC0
- J. Greenwood, Manager Power Supply General Electric (GE)
S.LMeeker, Project Manager Kemper Group Insurance Company (KG)
-G. Brouette, ANII Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
P. Hiland, Senior Resident Inspector S. Ray, Resident Inspector L
The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employees.
- Denotes thore present at the exit interview February 23, 1989.
2.
License Action on Information Notice 88-03 (92717)
Information Notice 88-03, " Cracks in Shroud Support Access Hole Cover
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Welds."
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Background Jet Pump BWRs are designed with access holes in the shroud support plate,.
which is-located at the bottom of.the annulus between the core-shroud'and the reactor vessel wall.
Each reactor vessel has two such holes which are located-180 degrees apart..These holes are.used for access during construction-and are subsequently closed by welding a plate over the hole.
The covers and shroud support ledge are Inconel Alloy 600 t
material. :The connecting weld material also is Inconel 600 (Alloy 182
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l or 82).
l The high residual stresses resulting from welding, along with a possible crevice geometry of the weld, when combined with less than ideal water quality, present a condition conducive to-Intergranular Stess Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC).
This has been recognized by General Electric and, as a result, they have developed a remotely operated ultrasonic examining i
capability.for detecting cracks in the cover plate welds..This custom ultrasonic examining fixture was first used at Peach Bottom, Unit 3.
On January 21, 1988, at Peach Bottom, Unit 3, intermittent short cracks were found in the weld heat affected zone around the entire circumference of the covers.
It is estimated that cracking exists over 50 to 60 percent
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of the circumference with cusps as deep as 70 percent through the wall.
It-is believed that the cover' plate welds had not been inspected previously
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on any other BWR.
It is possible that the cracking is general and may,
therefore, affect all BWRs with jet pumps.
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Licensee Action-
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Clinton Power ~ Station, Unit 1, was put in service in 1987, compared to Peach Bottom, Unit 3, which has been in operation since 1974.
GE Service
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Information Letter (SIL) No. 462 addresses access hole covers with
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Alloy 600 material.
IP has an alternate design which eliminates the
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Alloy 600 crevice geometry but still has one access hole cover which contains a stainless steel 316L crevice geometry.
GE is currently
evaluating access hole covers with stainless steel 316L crevices.
IP
Design Engineering is currently investigating the improvement of water-
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quality by injecting hydrogen into the Feedwater System.
IP will reevaluate this problem after Unit I has been in service for two to three years, during the third refueling outage (1991).
The NRC will review the
. documentation at that time.
3.
Inservice Inspection (ISI Unit 1)
a.
Review of Program (73051)
The NRC inspector verified that the licensee's ISI program was complete and conformed to regulatory requirements and to the licensee's commitments.
The program was in accordance with ASME
Section XI, 1980 Edition, Winter 1981 Addenda.
There was sufficient
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organizational staff to ensure that acceptable ISI work was performed.
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The sampling inspection plan for addressing IGSCC concerns was in accordance with Generic Letter 88-01 and all welds were found to l
be acceptable.
Where ASME requirements were determined to be
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impractical, specific relief from NRR was requested in writing.
The NRC inspector reviewed specific relief requests and related documentation.
The NRC inspector also reviewed audits / surveillance of ISI activities condt :ted by qualified personnel to verify compliance with the ISI crogram.
b.
Review of Procedures (73052)
The NRC inspector ascertained that the licensee's ISI procedures adequately covered all required aspects Of the approved ISI j
program.
All ISI procedures were approved by the ANII and reviewed
by the NRC inspector.
The methods of ultrasonics (UT), magnetic particle (MT), liquid penetrant (PT), and visual (VT) examinations and techniqws were adequately described and in conformance to the requirements and guidance of ASME Section V, 1980 Edition, Winter 1981 Addenda, c.
Data Review and Evaluation'(73755)
The NRC inspector ascertained that the reported data covered the scope of the examinations required during this inspectin period as described in the ASME Code, Technical Specifications,.1d the ISI program.
This review included examination of documents related to j
UT, MT, PT, and VT equipment data and evaluations.
1he examination
data was within the acceptable criteria as outlined in the applicable NDE procedures and Code requirements, d.
Observation of Work and Work Activities (73753)
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The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's ISI plans and schedules and verified that the following ISI was performed in accordance with the Technical Specifications, licensee procedures, and the l
applicable ASME Codes:
(1) GE Personnel performing ultrasonic calibrations and examinations on pipe welds 1-RR-AB1-LU, 1-RR-ABI-CD,
1-RH-21-5-7, and 1-RH-23-1A.
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(2) GE personnel performing liquid penetrant examination,s on pipe welds 2-RR-ABI-LU and 1-RR-ABI-CD.
(3) GE personnel performing magnetic particle examinations on four
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welded attachments on line 1-RH-12004R-WA and pipe welds
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1-RH-21-5-7 and 1-RH-23-1A.
(4) GE personnel performing visual examinations using an ETV-1250 Westinghouse miniature underwater TV camera in conjunction with the use of v deo tape recorders recording the examinations from i
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a3 inside the reactor vessel.
The tapes were reviewed.by.the NRC
'T inspector, GE and IP personnel.
The following indications'were
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identified.,.-resolved by_GE and' accepted by IP:
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(a) An.eight inchicrack was found in a weld attaching one of
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the drain channels to the steam dryer skirt.
The crack extends _ vertically from the bottom of.the channel.
The cracking predominately occurs in a straight line through the throat of the fillet weld.
-GE's evaluation / determined that'it-is highly _unlikely that-the crack will increase, in'the next fuel cycle,.to the
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point of component: failure.
The crack is thought to be due to high cycle fatigue.
IP is planning to repair the
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s crack ~at the next outage.
The steam dryer is not _ safety related and, therefore, it
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does-not perf.orm any function in the SAR accident analyses.
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(b) Six of.the twenty-eight shroud head stud assembly retainers-i have been found to have slight (10-30%) wear of~the locking
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splines.
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'GE's evaluation determined that the wear was' caused-by.
' flow induced vibration of the bolt caused by the flow from the feedwater'sparger nozzles.
IP is planning to operate with the worn shroud head stud assembly bolts until the next outage when they will be examined again.
The< shroud head assembly is a noncode, nonsafety-related-component and, therefore,'does not perform any function in the SAR accident analyses.
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k (c) There appeared to be a fiberous material in the standpipe
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on a ledge four to five feet from the top of the steam
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The separator was removed from its location and then the foreign object was remo9ed from the separator prior to reinstallation of the separator.
It was determined that there was'_no evidence of damage.to the separator so-operability of the reactor was not impaired.
(d) The following debris _was observed on the iet pump' support plate in the vicinity of jet pumps.
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Near jet pump 9:
Numerous metal chi c, maximum size 3/16 in. wide by 1 4 in. long, j
Four pieces of light gage wire,
about 1/16 in diameter with
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varying lengths: 0.9 in., 1.5 in.,
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0.9 in., and 0.7 in.
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Near jet pump 12:
Numerous metal chips, maximum size 1/8 in. wide by 1/3 in. long,
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One welding rod, about 1/16 in.
i diameter by 0.9 in. long.
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Near jet pump 19:
Numerous metal chips, maximum size
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1/3 in, wide by 1/4 in. long.
l One welding rod, about 1/16 in, diameter by 10 in, long.
One unidentified object, approximately 3/15 in, long by 1/8 in wide by 1/8 in. high.
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Near jet pump 20:
One weld splatter, hemispherical
shape about 0.8 in, long by 0.5 in, wide by 0.4 in high.
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One light gage wire, about 1/32 in.
'j diameter by 1 in long.
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- The GE evaluation-determined that safe reactor operation is not compromised by the presence of the debris and foreign objects inside the reactor vessel.
It was concluded that there is no concern for fuel bundle blockage, interference with control rod operation, or potential for chemical reaction; therefore, the above would remain in the reactor vessel.
f The NRC inspector reviewed the qualifications and
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certifications of all inspection personnel on site to c
ensure conformance.with SNT-TC-1A.
Level II and III
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personnel performing UT for detection and discrimination
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of IGSCC were qualified by EPRI.
No violations or deviations w e identified
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4.
Modification:
Thirty-Three Valves Did Not Meet Specification (37701)
The original supplied valves did not meet
.,e GE design specification and did not pass the Miium test requirement'
The 33 valves were replaced in the Off Gas (00) System with 1/2"-600 lb. and 1500 lb., 3/4"-600 lb.,
l and 1500 lb. and 1"-600 lb. Kerotest par.kless metal diaphragm valv,, that have graphoil packing and meet the design and ALARA concerns.
The i
fabrication, ercction, and examinations were performed at various locations throughout the site.
This modification was performed in accordance with ANSI-831.1, 1973 Edition, Summer 1974 Addendum.
The NRC inspectoc reviewed drawings, an Engineering Change Notice, Design Change Notico, and NDE and welding related documentation.
The NRC inspector observed an IP QC inspector performing his dutier, a liquid penetrant examination, fit-ups, welding, h
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f and selected portiens of the installation. -The NRC inspector also-hu
. tvisually examined numerous' completed welds..
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-No! violations or deviations'were identified.
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5.
' Exit Interview (30703)
The inspector met with site representatives.(denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion offthe inspection.
The inspector summarized the scope and.
findings of the inspection noted in this. report.
The inspector also:
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discussed the likely'. informational content of the inspection report with
' regard to documents or processes rev4'
i by the inspector during the inspection. <The licensee did not idt.,fy any such documents / processes as proprietary.
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