IR 05000461/1997024
| ML20198G834 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 01/02/1998 |
| From: | Grobe J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198G820 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-97-24, NUDOCS 9801130128 | |
| Download: ML20198G834 (2) | |
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I U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lil
Docket No:
50-461 License No:
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Report No:
50-461/97024(DRS)
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Licensee:
lilinois Power Company Facility:
Clinton Power Station
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Location:
Clinton, Illinois
Dates:
December 15,1997
Inspector:
Terry J. Madeda, Physical Security inspector
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Approved by:
James R. Creed, Chief Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety i
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EXECUTfVE SUMMARY t
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Clinton Nuclear Power Station
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NRC Inspection Report 50-461/g7024 l
This inspection included a review of plant support activities relating to the physical protection of
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the facility. The inspector reviewed and evaluated selective elements of the access
authorization program, security communication system, control of packages, testing and
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maintenance programs, search equiprnent effectiveness, response and staffing capabilities, and follow-up on previous inspection findings. The inspection ses conducted from December
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1 5,1997.
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A licensee-identified violation occurred when an in-processing employee improperly
characterized a fitness for duty allegation as an anonymous allegation when it should
have been characterized as a credible allegation. The actions of the employee were
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attributed to poor judgement when he was advised of the allegation. The significance of the failure was reduced because a fitness for duty test was administered. (Section S1.1)
The inspectar identified a safety / security vulnerability regarding the untimely closing of
an active vehicle barrier gate. The barrier was normally left in the open position after vehicle traffic passed through the barrier. Barrier effectiveness was reduced when the barrier was left In the open position. (Section S.2.1)
The security organization was knowledgeable of security requirements and implemented
the physical security program in an effective manner. Security management showed appropriate attention to detall and program ownership, which contributed to effective implementation of security requirements and reduction of security errors. Effective maintenance support activities contributed to the reliable performance of security
equipment. (Section S6.1 and 2)
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Report Details S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Eitness For Duty imolementation Failure a,
lnsoection Scopo (81502)
The inspector reviewed documrentation and interviewed cognizant licensee access authorization personnel to evaluate implementation of fitness for duty requirements regarding chemical and alcohol testing.
b.
Observations and Findings The inspector's review of a licensee investigation report showed that an employee violated fitness for duty (FFD) procedures by improperly characterizing an allegation as anonymous.
On June 2,1997, the supervisor of personnel processing received information directly from a plant employee that he smelled alcohol on the breath of another plant employee.
The personnel processing supervisor then characterized the aliegation as anonymous end requested that the plant employee voluntarily submit to alcohol and drug testing.
Test results indicated that the individual tested positive for alcohol. The individual's site access was immediately suspended.
Nuclear Support Services (NSS) Procedure 1.17 addressed the process for handling FFD allegations. NSS 1.17 defined credible information cs first hand information presented by an individual identified by name who presents the facts and remains available for further questioning concerning the facts presented. Licensee review concluded that all those elements were present when the allegation was presented and that the personnel processing supervisor's action was in violation of NSS 1.17.
Licensee procedure NSS 1.0 addressed the process of testing for cause. NSS 1.6 required immediate testing for cause after receiving credible information that an individual abused drugs or alcohol. Licensee review concluded that the personnel processing supervisor violated NSS 1.6 by requesting that the individual suspected of alcohol abuse voluntarily agree to take a breath ak:ohol and drug test instead of requiring a test. (Note: The individual agreed and the test was conducted within a timely 50 minutes.)
The inspec5r's interview of the personnel processing supervisor showed that he acknowledged his awareness and understanding of the procedure's requirements. The supervisoi explalaed that he characterized the allegation as anonymous because of the high rank of the individualin the company and the associated sensitivity of the
allegation. The supervisor further stated that, In his opinion, had the individual not I
voluntarily submitted to the test it was probable that the individual may not have been tested. The inspector's review of the licensee's investigation report and on site
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Interviews of cognizant personnel developed no evidence to support that the supervisor's actions were a deliberate attempt to violate the procedures and/or to cover
up the allegations. The inspector's review showed that, immediately after being notified of the event, the supervisor notified a variety of senior licensee managers about the event.
When identified by the licensee, the supervisor was counseled on his responsibility to properly (nterpret end implement FFD procedures regarding allegations.
On June 2,1997, a licensee personnel processing supervisor violated a Clinton Power Station FFD procedure when the supervisor characterized a FFD allegation as an anonymous allegation when the allegation should have been characterized as a credible allegation. This non-repetitive, licensee-ldentified, and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50-461/97024-01(DRS)).
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Conclusions The inspector verified that a licensee personnel processing supervisor exercised poor judgement in the characterization and handling of a FFD allegation. The failure was licensee identi'ied and non-repetitive. Adequate corrective action was implemented to prevent reoccurrence.
S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2.1 Vehicle Barrier Effectiveness Reouction a.
Insoection Scoce f 81052)
The inspector randomly reviewed the effectiveness of the licensee's installed vehicle barrier protection system. The inspector's evaluation consisted of observation of the barrier, review of applicable records, and personnelinterviews.
b.
Observatiens and Findinas The inspector identified a safety / security vulnerability regarding a reduction in the effectiveness of an active vehicle barrier. The inspector observed that an active vehicle berrier gate was left in the open position for several minutes after a vehicle was allowed though the barrier. In discussion with several security officers, the inspector determined that it was routine for the vehicle barrier gate to remain open after a vehicle passed through the opened gate. Review of gate alarm records for a seven day period showed that, on a routine basis, the barrier gate was left in the open position for one to two minutes after a vehicle had passed through the barrier. On several occasions during that seven risy period, the gate was opened for periods of six to eight minutes to facilitate vehicle traffic or material transfer through the barrier.
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Discussion with the licensee's security supervisor determined that the practice observed by the inspector had been in effect for many years. (Note: The licensee's enhanced vehicle barrier system was implemented on February 29,1996.) The security supervisor acknowledged that he was not aware that the vehicle barrier gate was left open after vehicle transit through the barrier. The security supervisor implemented immediate action to ensure that the vehicle barrier gate would be promptly closed after each vehicle transit through the barrier. Further corrective measures were being evaluated and considered.
The inspector's finding represented the exis ;w mf a potentially exploitable condition such that the design basis vehicle could take Rettage of the time the barrier was open to compromise the vehicle barrier, This finding is an inspection Follow up Item (IFl 50-461/97024-02).
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Conclusions The inspector Identified a vulnerability that reduced the effectiveness of a vehicle barrier gate. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's finding and implemented immediate action to reduce the vulnerability.
S6 Security Organization and Administration S6.1 Proaram Pfectiveness a.
insoection Scoce (81020 and 81022)
The inspector evaluated the effectiveness of licensee and security management relative
'o the administrative and operational aspects of the security program. The inspector also conducted an evaluation of selected security equipment related to performance and maintenance support. The evaluation included observation, review of records, and Interviews of cognizant personnel, b.
Observations and Findinas Security management and supervisory positions were appropriately staffed by knowledgeable personnel. Those personnel demonstrated effective program ownership and teamwork that facilitated effective implementation of security requirements by operational security personnel. Effective teamwork and oversight activities by security and maintenance personnel contributed to maintaining an effective level of performance and reliability of security equipment.
Security management was in the process of establishing a site procedure to address tampering of site equipment. Security took the lead in this project when it was identified by the licensee and NRC that no formal program or approach to the identification and resolution of tempering events existed.
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Conclusions Teamwork and program ownership have been positive factors in the licensee's effective implementation of the security program.
S6.2 Reduction Of Security Errors a.
Insoection Scoce (81700)
The inspector reviewed security logs and other records pertaining to security program performance.
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Observations and Findings Review of security loggable events between January and November 1997 identified a significant increase (approximately 30%) in personnel errors between July and October.
Most errors were committed by newly badged plant personnel. Those errors involved non-security personnel failing to maintain proper badge control and failing to secure vital area doors. The ir.spector determined that the site security supervisor vias aware of the increased errors, and that actions to address those types of problems were underway. Those actions included the generation of two adverse trend reports to heighten senior licensee management awareness to the problems, conducting one-on-one training between security and the offender, and review of applicable procedural guidan% to validate its effectiveness. Review of loggable events in November showed that personnel errors by non-security r'ersonnel, regan.:ng badge control and securing vital area doors, were reduced.
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Conclusions Licensee actions to identify and reduce security related personnel errors were generally effective. The licensee continued to evaluate its improvement action plan to further reduce personnel errors. Increased training and management involvement have resulted in improved performance and a reduction in personnel errors.
S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues S8.1 (Closed) Violation (50-461/96016-01): Factory-sealed material delivered into the protected area was not properly controlled inspector review showed that factory-sealed packages were either properly controlled within the protected area or were searched prior to protected area access. This item is closed.
S8.2 { Closed) Violation (50-461/96016-02): The licensee failed to provide appropriate personnel access authorization to a vital area. Inspector review showed that procedural changes were implemented to clarify that vital area authorization is based on a work-related need. Cognizant supervisory personnel were briefed on the changes. Inspector review of vital area personnel access authorization records identified no problems. This item is closed.
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S8.3 (Closed) IFl (50-461/96016-04): A vehicle barrier gate that was not properly installed could be compromised, inspector observation showed that the vulnerability was adequately corrected. This item is closed.
S8.4 (Cbsed) Violation (50-481/97015-08): - Some illumination levels in the protected 6rea
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were inadequate, inspector observation determined that illumination levels in the
_ protected areas were adequate to meet assessment, monitoring, and detr ction -
requirements, inspector interviews with officers and cecurity supervisors determined their awareness of required illumination levels. This item is closed.
V. Management Meeting XI The Itupector presented the inspection results to licensee management at the -
conclusion of the onsite inspectio;i on December 5,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. Actions agresd to by the licensee to address the inspection
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findings were'also discussed. The licensee indicated that none of the information presented and dscussed at the exit treeting was considered to be Safeguards information.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee n
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G. Baker, Manager, Quality Assurance E. Bedford, Assistant Plant Manager - Operations W. Bousqust, Director, Plant Support J. Grueber, Director, Corrective Action J. Palchak, Manager, Nuclear Training and Support R. Phares, Manager, Nuc; ear Safety and Performance improvement W. Romberg, Assistant Vice President J. Siper, Director Licensing D. Smith, Security Supervisor M. Stickney, Supervisor - Licensing and Regional Regulatory interface NRC T. Pruett, Senior Resident inspector K. Stoedter, Resident inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP fo 700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors IP 65 020 Management Effectiveness IP 8 022 Security Organization IP 81052 Physical Barrier-Protected Area IP 81502 Fitness For Duty ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50-461/97024-01 NCV Failure to follow a fitness-for-duty procedure.
50-461/97024-02 IFl Vulnerability regarding a vehicle barrier gate.
Closed 50-461/96016-01 VIO Failure to properly control factory-sealed packages.
50-461/96016-02 VIO Failure to provide adequate personnel access aut;.orization to a vital area.
50-461/96016-04 IFl Vulnerability regarding the adequacy of a active vehicle barrier.
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50461/97015-08 - MlO -- Some illumination levels in the protected area were inadequate.-
50-461/97024-01
- NCV - Failure to follow a fitness for duty procedure.
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