IR 05000461/1999017
| ML20209G526 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19002A263 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-99-17, NUDOCS 9907190188 | |
| Download: ML20209G526 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGIONlil
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Docket No:
50-461 License No:
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Report No:
50-461/99017(DRS)
Licensee:
Illinois Power Company l
Facility:
Clinton Power Station Location:
Route 54 West Clinton, IL 61727 Dates:
June 7-11,1999 Inspector:
James L. Belanger, Senior Physical Security inspector l
Approved by:
James R. Creed, Safeguards Team Leader i
Division of Reactor Safety l
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9907190188 990709
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PDR ADOCK 05000461 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Clinton Nuclear Power Station NRC Inspection Report 50-461/99017(DRS)
This inspection included a review of the access authorization program, communications, protected area access control of personnel, packages, material and vehicles, testing and maintenance, vehicle barrier system, response capabilities, security organization, administration, and previous issues. This was an announced inspection conducted by one regionalinspector.
Plant Support Implementation of the access authorization program was acceptable. Sufficient
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information was included in the process to allow clear determination of trustwoithiness and reliability. Developed derogatory information was reviewed timely and evaluations assured safety. (Section S1.1)
Personnel, vehicle and package searches conducted at entry points into the protected
area were professional and thorough. (Section S1.2)
Maintenance for security systems was timely and effective. The maintenance program
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effectively supported plant protection by ensuring that security equipment was operable and effective. (Section S2.1)
The vehicle barrier system was properly maintained and met security plan commitments.
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The barriers were well maintained and capable of performing their function.
(Section S2.2)
Communications within the security organization and among maintenance support
organizations was good. Observed meetings demonstrated the staff's open and informative expression of views. (Section 6.1)
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ReDort Details
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IV. Plant SuDDort
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Review of Access Authorization Proaram Imolementation
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Insnar*!on Scope (81700)
The licensee committed in their security plan to implement all elements of Regulatory-l
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Guide 5.66 to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56.
The inspector reviewed a sample of access authorization documentation to verify the adequacy of the licensee's program to verify true identity of the applicant and to develop information conceming employment, education, credit, and criminal histories, military service, and the character and reputation of an individual prior to granting them unescorted access to protected and vital areas. Additionally, access control records were reviewed to determine if the licensee was correctly reinstating, transferring, and granting temporary access authorizations.
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Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the active access authorization files of six licensee and contractor employees and four access authorization denials.
The documentation review showed that the scope and depth of the background investigations (Bis) satisfied NRC regulatory requirements and provided an adequate level of background information on which to base a determination for access
. authorization. Reviewed background files demonstrated a "best effort" to obtain and
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document required information to address an applicant's employment history, education history, credit history, criminal history, military service, and the applicant's character and reputation. The Bis covered the specified time period and the number of required
= contacts for each element previously referenced. The licensee verified identification by driver's license (photo identification) prior to granting unescorted access and issuing a badge, in,one instance where derogatory information had been developed, the licensee adequately and in a timely manner, reviewed and evaluated the derogatory information.
This included an interview with the employee conceming the adverse information.
The records of those individuals granted unascorted access under the reinstatement, transfer and temporary access provisions, showed that these provisions were being appropriately utilized by the licensee. The licensee's procedures and practices detailed in procedure, NT&S 1.19, Revision 12, " Security Screening," met program requirements.
Licensee actions conceming decisions to deny or revoke unescorted access met their program requirements. Of the four denials / revocations, none were appealed by the l
individuals concemed.
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Conclusions implementation of the access authorization program was acceptable. Sufficient information was included in the process to allow clear determination of trustworthiness and reliability. Developed derogatory information was reviewed timely and evaluations assured safety.
S1.2 Protected Area Access Control of Personnel /Packaaes and MaterialNehicles a.
Insoection Scooe (81700)
' 10 CFR 73.55 and the licensee's security plan require that all points of personnel and vehicle access into the protected area be controlled. Identification and search of all individuals must be made and authorization checked at these points. All hand-carried packages are required to be searched at these points. All packages and material for delivery into the protected area must be checked for proper identification and authorization and searched for devices such as firearms, incendiary devices, and explosives. All vehicles, except under emergency conditions, must be search for items which could be used for sabotage purposes, prior to entry into the protected area.
The inspector evaluated performance of search activities at the following protected area access points:
Operations Gatehouse
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Permanent Warehouse
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Main Vehicle Gate
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b.
Findinas and Observations The inspector observed personnel and package search activities in the operations gatehouse from 6:30 a.m. to 7:30 a.m. on three days of the inspection. Security officers issuing photo badges verified identity prior to giving an individual their badge. There were no mis-issued badges. Security officers completed adequate pat-down searches of personnel who alarmed ingress search detectors. Plant personnel were cooperative in reducing the amount of alarms by placing metal objects in trays that were placed on the x-ray belt. X-ray operators requested hands-on search for any indiscemible mass observed on the machine monitors. Security supervision provided adequate monitoring of ingress activities. The inspector noted that security management routinely provided oversight of search activities during periods of high traffic in the gatehouse search lanes.
On June 9,1999, the inspector observed one of two daily routine searches of materials received at the permanent warehouse prior to transfer to the protected area. Incoming
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material was placed inside a transfer cage with security trained and certified stores personnel.' The inspector observed that the stores personnel inspected sealed items to
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ensure that they b.d not been tampered with. Non-sealed packages were thoroughly searched. The ' -
the Protected Area barrier was not diminished during the
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process which 1 red by a security force member.
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On June 11,1999, the inspector observed a vehicle search at the main vehicle gate completed by three security force members. The search was complex because of extensive storage areas within the vehicle's cab. The vehicle search was professional, thorough and included the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area required by security plan and procedures, c.
Conclusions Personnel, vehicle and package searches conducted at entry points into the protected area were prcfessional and thorough.
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S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
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S2.1 Testina and Maintenance Proarams a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspector evaluated the licensee's programs for ensuring the reliability of security j
related equipment. Interviews were conducted with the Security Supervisor and his staff.
The inspector accompanied the security staff member on the monthly preventive maintenance surveillance of vital area doors. The inspector attended a bi-weekly j
" Security System Status Meeting." Security equipment tracking records relating to q
maintenance were reviewed, b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector observed the bi-week!y Security System Status meeting on June 10,1999, which covered the status of maintenance items, and issues involving the security system. Each department representative (Security, Nuclear Station Engineering Department and Calibration and Instrument staff) reported on the activities for which they had primary responsibility. The meeting provided a good overview of the status of active security related issues and projects.
T;te inspector accompanied a staff security specialist on the monthly security door surveillance. This surveillance identified several minor hardware problems associated with security doors which were communicated to the mechanical maintenance staff and fixed. Overall, the security doors and associated hardware were maintained in an effective condition.
The inspector's review of the security staff's tracking of maintenance requests (Security Equipment Problem Reports) showed prompt attention to identified problems by maintenance support organizations. The licensee identified some problems associated with some pan / tilt / zoom (PTZ) cameras which were beirg addressed through the j
maintenance system. (Note: The PTZ cameras were not required by security plan.)
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During tours of protected and vital areas and alarm stations, the inspector observed that security equipment identified in the approved security plan was operable and effective.
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Conclusions Maintenance for security systems was timely and effective. The maintenance program effectively supported plant protection by ensuring that security equipment was operable and effective.
S2.2 Vehicle Barrier System a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspector completed a walkdown of the vehicle barrier system (VBS) to verify that the system remained effective. Records documenting periodic inspections /surveillances were reviewed.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector completed a visual walkdown of the VBS to confirm that the vehicle barrier described in the security plan was maintained. The barriers appeared to be wel!
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maintained and capable of performing their intended functions. No significant deterioration or modifications were observed. The inspector found that the general characteristics of the barrier, such as height, spacing of the barrier, and number and spacing of cables were acceptable. No inconsistencies were identified.
The inspector reviewed documentation relating to the periodic inspections of the VBS and found that these inspections described the activities, included findings and descriptions of barrier condition, and when appropriate, corrective action. No discrepancies were noted.
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Conclusions The vehicle barrier system was properly maintained and met security plan commitments.
The barriers were well maintained and capable of performing their function.
S6 Security Organization and Administration S6.1 Manaaement Effectiveness: Communications / Awareness a.
Insoection Scooe (81700)
The inspector observed the security staff in meetings designed to promote communications within the security organization and with plant support staff. In addition to the Security System Status meeting (discussed in Paragraph S2.1), the inspector observed the security staff daily meeting on two occasions and attended one of the bi-monthly crew shift meetings.
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Observations and Findinas The daily staff meetings and the bi-monthly crew shift meetings involved principal staff of both the licensee and contractor security personnel. The meetings were professional and informative. Staff and security force members openly expressed their views and comments to management.
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,Qonclusions Security communications was effective within the security organization and among maintenance support organizations. Observed meetings demonstrated the staff's open and informative expression of views.
S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues S8.1 (Closed) Non-Cited Violation 50-461/99007-01-Failure of an individual to report the use of a medication that could impact their ability to safely perform assigned duties. This issue was identified during an investigation conducted by the Employee Concerns Program, but which was not communicated to the fitness-for-duty staff for evaluation.
The apparent cause was a lack of program integration between the Employee Concern Program and the Fitness-for-Duty Program. A review of CNP 3.09," Employee Concern l
Program," showed that the procedure did not include a requirement that issues found during investigations conducted through the Employee Concern Program that could affect personnel trustworthiness or fitness-for-duty be forwarded to Personnel Processing to determine suitability for continued or future unescorted access. The licensee placed the violation in their corrective action program as Condition Report No. 1-99-03-080.
l The inspector reviewed the " Apparent Cause/ Trend Data Report" related to the referenced Condition Report. This report showed that the PADS system administrator
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was notified on March 5,1999, so that PADS could be updated to reflect that Clinton Power Station has additionalinformation regarding the employee that should be considered when making unescorted access decisions. The licensee also revised their Employee Concern Program procedure to indicate that any issues revealed during an investigation that could affect personnel trustworthiness or fitness-for-duty will be provided to Personnel Processing to determine suitability for continued or future unescorted access. This Non-Cited Violation is closed.
S8.2 (Closed) Non-Cited Violation 50-461/99007-02: Failure of an individual to report an arrest that could impact upon their trustworthiness and reliability. This violation involved the same individual and associated investigation conducted by the Employee Concern Program noted in paragraph S8.1. The Condition Report corrective actions noted in S8.1 were also applicable to this violation. The individual's site access was revoked.
This Non-Cited Violation is closed.
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S8.3 (Ocen) Follow-Uo item 50-461/99007-03: The licensee identified an ongoing problem
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with some security door equipment that was computer related. The specific details are i
safeguards information. The inspector was to review the effectiveness of licensee's
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' actions to resolve the problem.
The inspector discussed this issue with the Security Supervisor who stated that they had achieved some progress through the replacement of some parts; however, they had not totally resolved the issue. The Security Supervisor stated that their evaluation determined that the problem appeared to be associated with a portion of the security computer system which is responsible for the transmission of commands and data among other components. The corrective actions for Condition Report CR 1-99-02-275
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was concentrating on upgrading multiplexor PM's to meet vendor recommendations and industry practices. This issue will continue to be evaluated during the next security inspection.
V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on June 11,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee G. Armstrong, Corrective Actions Manager G. Birk, Security Administrator M. Hiter, Personnel Processing Supervisor s
K. Johnson, Manager, Nuclear Support M. McNamer, Burns Security Site Manager J. Sipek, Director, Licensing D. Smith, Director, Security and Emergency Planning M. Stuckey, Licensing Representative C. Williamson, Security Supervisor NRC T. Pruett, Senior Resident inspector K. Stoedter, Resident inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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IP 81700:
Physical Security Program at Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None-
Closed i
50-461/99007-01 NCV Failure to report use of medication that could affect job performance
50-461/99007-02 NCV Failure to report arrest under access authorization program Discussed 50-461/99007-03 IFl Follow up on corrective actions to address computer problem affecting security doors
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED Bl Background Investigation l
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
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C8.1 '
Calibration and Instrumentation CNP Clinton Nuclear Procedure CR Condition Report DRS Division of Reactor Safety IFl inspection Follow Up item NCV Non Cited Violation NSED Nuclear Station Engineering Department PADS Personnel Access Data System PTZ Pan / Tile / Zoom
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Quality Assurance Audit Report Q38-99-04
. Condition Reports (Security Related) March 1,1999 to June 11,1999 Security System Status Report dated May 26,1999 Clinton Procedures:
CPS 1701.62, " Compensatory Measures for.VBS"
HT&s 1.19, " Security Screening"
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CPS 1032.03, " incoming Package and Material Control"
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CPS 1701.52, " Security system Operational Tests, inspection and Maintenance
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Procedure"
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