IR 05000454/1987010

Insp Repts 50-454/87-10 & 50-455/87-09 on 870228-0331.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Lers, Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Operations Summary,Training,Complex Surveillance & Maint

ML20215G657
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	04/10/1987
From:	Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215G649	List: IR 05000454/1987010 ML20215G646
References
50-454-87-10, 50-455-87-09, 50-455-87-9, NUDOCS 8704170224
Download: ML20215G657 (12)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-454/87010(DRP); 50-455/87009(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 License Nos. NPF-37; NPF-66 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Byron Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Byron Station, Byron, Illinois Inspection Conducted: February 28 - March 31, 1987 Inspectors: J. M. Hinds, J P. G. Brochman Approved Byg C

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.N.(M'Iids},'Ur?Actingkhief Y/< o/r?

Reactor Projects Section 1A Date'

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Inspection Summary

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Inspection on February 28 - March 31, 1987 (Reports No. 50-454/87010(DRP);

50-455/87009(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident

inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings; LERs; operations summary; training; refueling activities; complex surveillance; surveillance; maintenance; operational safety and ESF walkdown; startup testing; spent fuel pool activities; special reports; region III requests; and event followu Results: No violations or deviations were identified nor were any items identified which could affect the public health and safety, i

9704170224 870410 PDR ADOCK 05000454

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company

• R. Querio, Station Manager

• R. Pleniewicz, Production Superintendent

• R. Ward, Services Superintendent

• Burkamper, Quality Assurance Superintendent L. Sues, Assistant Superintendent, Operating

• G. Schwartz, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance

• T. Joyce, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services D. St. Clair, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning W. Blythe, Operating Engineer, Unit 0 J. Schrock, Operating Engineer, Unit 1 0. Brindle, Operating Engineer, Unit 2 T. Didier, Operating Engineer, Rad-Waste M. Snow, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

• A. Chernick, Training Supervisor F. Hornbeak, Technical Staff Supervisor R. Flahive, Radiation / Chemistry Supervisor P. O'Neil, Quality Control Supervisor

• E. Zittle, Regulatory Assurance Staff

• C. Lawson, U-2 Startup Staff

• M. Whitemore, Acting Rad / Chem Supervisor

• Pirnat, Regulatory Assurance Staff

• J. Langon, Regulatory Assurance Staff

• D. Berg, Nuclear Safety Group

• A. Britton, Quality Assurance Inspector The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspectio * Denotes those present during the exit interview on March 31, 198 . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 & 92702) (0 pen) Violation (455/86046-01(DRP)): Failure to include four Residual Heat Removal valves on system drawings or valve lineup The inspector reviewed the lictasee's response which stated that the valves were not required to be shown on drawing M-2137, sheet 1, due to Note 34 on drawing M-819. The response stated that valves 2RH018C, 2RH018D, 2RH019C, and 2RH019D are operated by the instrument department and therefore are not covered by operating department procedures. The inspector acknowledges ti4 licensee's response; however, the establishment of procedures to

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verify the alignment of components in a safety related system is a matter affecting quality. 10 CFR 50; Appendix B, Criterion V, requires that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, cr drawings. Therefore,

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l written instructions or procedures are required to align the RH valves. In a supplemental letter to the response to the notice of violation, letter from K. A. Ainger to A. B. Davis, dated March 23, 1987, the licensee stated that applicable system valve lineup procedures will be revised to include all isolation valves not previously issued and this action will be completed by the

end of the Unit 1 refueling outage. Pending completion of these actions this item will remain ope (Closed) Open Item (454/87002-05(DRP); 455/87002-05(DRP)):

Inspector concern related to the training given to test engineers to define objective evidence used to determine valve positio The inspector reviewed the licensee's training on this matter and verified that all required personnel had received the training and that the training adequately discussed acceptable methods of objective evidence. Based on this review this item is considered close (Closed) Open Item (455/86040-02(DRP)): Carbon Dioxide fire suppression pipe in 2A Diesel Generator Day Tank Room not properly supported. During a walkdown of the Diesel Fuel Oil (D0) system the inspector identified that fire suppression system piping in the Day Tank Room for the 2A Diesel Generator was not adequately supported. The inspector examined the new hanger the licensee installed on the fire suppression piping and verified that it would restrain the piping during the discharge of carbon dioxid Based on this action, the inspector has no further concerns regarding this matter, and this item is considered close . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92700)

(Closed) LERs (455/87002-LL; 455/87003-LL): Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records the following LERs were reviewed to determine that the reportability requirements were fulfilled, imediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification /87002 Reactor Trips and Feedwater Isolations due to Operational Difficulties in Controlling Steam Generator Water Levels 455/87003 Redundant Trains of Safety Related Equipment Out-of-Service Simultaneously due to Personnel Errors A supplemental report will be issued for LER 455/87002, the inspector's review of this supplement to LER 455/87002 will be discussed in a subsequent report. The events discussed in LER 455/87003 are discussed in Inspection Reports 454/87011 and 455/8701 No violations or deviations were identified with respect to LER 455/8700 _ _ _ _

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t Summary of Operations Unit I remained shutdown in a refueling outage for the entire mont Unit 1 is scheduled to return to service on April 24, 198 Unit 2 continued in the startup testing program and operated at power levels up to 90% until 2010 on March 30, 1987, when a normal shutdown was commenced. At 0603 on March 31, 1987, during the shutdown, a reactor trip occurred (See Paragraph 15.g). The unit remained shutdown for a seven day scheduled outag . Training (41400 & 41701)

The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and nonlicensed personnel were reviewed by the inspectors during the witnessing of the licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and operational activities and during the review of the licensee's response to events which occurred during the month of January 1987. Personnel appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed, and nothing was observed which indicated any ineffectiveness of trainin No violations or deviations were identifie . Refueling Activities (60710)

Station refueling activities during the Unit 1, Cycle 1, fuel offloading activities were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and in compliance with the Technical Specification The following areas were considered / monitored during this review: The periodic testing and operability of refueling equipment and systems were performed per procedural requirements; fuel handling operations including fuel assembly removal, transfer, inspection, failed fuel rod detection, reconstitution and storage were performed in accordance with approved procedures and Technical Specifications; plant conditions were maintained as required to support refueling; good housekeeping, loose object control, appropriate cleanliness zones established and enforced and the required radiological controls and practices were established and observed; and the fuel handling activities were performed by qualified personne The inspectors verified by observation and direct interviews with fuel handling and control room personnel that refueling activities were being properly discussed and performed including: core monitoring during off loading operations; fuel accountability methods being established and enforced; refueling cavity and spent fuel pool levels maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications; boron concentrations established I

and verified as required; spent fuel assembly placement and control; Spent Fuel Pool bridge and hoist, fuel handling building (FHB) crane,

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spent fuel pool cooling, and FHB ventilation and radiation monitoring

! systems operation as required by Technical Specification !

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Refueling operations observed were verified to be in accordance with Technical Specifications,10 CFR, and Byron Administrative requirement No violations or deviations were identifie . Complex Surveillance Observation (61701)

The inspector reviewed activities for the surveillance testing of the diesel generator bus undervoltage circuits, emergency run mode protective trips, and the loss-of-coolant accident and safe shutdown load sequencer The following items were considered during this review: testing was accomplished in accordance with approved procedures; test instrumentation was within its calibration interval; testing was accomplished by qualified personnel; test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedural requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly documented, reviewed, and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspector reviewed the followinj is month surveillances procedures for the IB diesel generator to verify that test requirements were consistent with regulatory requireur.ts, Technical Specifications, licensee commitments, and administrative controls:

1BVS 8.1.1.2.f-14 1BVS 8.1.1.2.f-16 1BVS 8.1.1.2.f-20 The inspector reviewed the strip charts and data packages for IBVS 8.1.1.2.f-14 and 1BVS 8.1.1.2.f-16. The inspection activities in this area are an ongoing effort and their completion will be documented in a subsequent repor . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

Station surveillance activities of the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they

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were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while affected components or systems were removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the testing; testing was accomplished in accordance with approved procedures; test instrumentation was within its calibration

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interval; testing was accomplished by qualified personnel; test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedural requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly documented, reviewed, and resolved by appropriate management personne l L

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The following surveillance testing activities were observed / reviewed:

Steam Generator Snubber Testing 1B Containment Spray Pump ASME Test No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

Detensioning of reactor vessel head studs Inspection of auxiliary feedwater pump motor 1AF01PA No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707 & 71710)

The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of March 1987. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary, turbine, rad-waste, fuel handling, and Unit 1 containment buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc .

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The inspectors verified by observation and direct interviews that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with rad-waste shipments and barreling. During the month of March 1987, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 1 train 5 Residual Heat Removal systems to verify operabilit Facility operations observed were verified to be in accordar.ce with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Startup Test Witnessing and Observation (72302)

The inspectors witnessed performance of portions of the following Unit 2 startup test procedures in order to verify that testing was conducted in accordance with the operating license and procedural requirements, test data was properly recorded, and performance of licensee personnel conducting the tests demonstrated an understanding of assigned duties and responsibilitie .52.87 10% Load Swings 2.47.82D Thermal Power Measurement No violations or deviations were identifie . Spent Fuel Pool Activities (86700)

Unit 1, cycle 1, spent fuel handling and transfer operations occurring in the spent fuel pool were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were being conducted in accordance with approved procedures and in compliance with the Technical Specification The following areas were considered / monitored during this review: The spent fuel pool (SFP) water level was established and maintained above minimum required; SFP ventilation system maintained negative pressure in the FHB; SFP cooling and cleaning system maintained water temperatures clarity within acceptable limits; fuel handling personnel were properly trained, qualified and supervised; fuel handling activities were appropriately reviewed, briefed, scheduled and approved prior to performance; and accurate records of fuel assembly location changes were established and maintaine The inspectors verified by direct observation and interviews with licensee and contractor (Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) and Westinghouse Electric Corporation) personnel that the fuel assembly handling, transfer, failed fuel rod detection, and failed fuel rod reconstitution

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operations were being conducted in accordance with approved procedure The inspectors witnessed operation of the failed fuel rod detection equipment, the removal of the failed fuel rodlets from the fuel assembly, the replacement of the damaged rodlets with stainless steel inserts, and other related operations performed by contractors on the fuel assembly B34, which was the only cycle 1 fuel assembly, which is part of the cycle 2 reload. Two failed rodlets were detected and replaced in fuel assembly B3 Spent fuel operations and SFP activities observed were verified to be in accordance with the requirements established under the Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, contractor technical manuals, and the Byron Station Administrative Procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Special Reports (90713) The inspector reviewed a special report, letter from R. E. Querio to J. G. Keppler, dated March 6, 1987, of a diesel generator (DG)

failure to start. The report described an event on February 10, 1987, where the 1A DG on starting did not reach rated speed, voltage and frequency within the 10 seconds required by Technical

. Specification 4.8.1.1.2, but thok 15 seconds to reach the rated conditions. The licensee's incestigation determined that an inadequate prime on the fuel oil supply line was the intermediate cause of this event. The rootT cause of this event was the failure ofacheckvalvetoproperlysjat,therebyallowingthefueloilto drain back down to the DG fueleoil day tank. As corrective action the licensee installed a secor11, soft seat, check valve in series with the first valve to preven't draining of the fuel oil supply lin The inspector reviewed a preliminary report, letter from 4. A. Ainger to H. R. Denton, dated February 27, 1987, which ciscusses the licensee's compliance with the requirements of tegulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 3, " Instrumentation for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Access Plant and Environmental Conditions During and Following an Accident." This preliminary report was submitted in accordance with the requirements of Condition 2.C(9) of Unit 1 Operating License NPF-37 and Condition 2.C(4) of Unit 2 Operating License NPF-66. Both licenses required that a preliminary report be submitted by March 1, 1987. Pending review of this report and receipt of the final report by September 1,1987, these license conditions will remain ope * ,

1 Followtp of Regioq III Requests (92701)

The inspectors received a memorandum from C. E. Norelius, dated March 3, 1987, which requested information on the possible use of unqualified

" AMP" splices or terminal lugs in applications that require environmental qualification (EQ). The memo requested the inspectors obtain from the e

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licensee information regarding the use of AMP splices or terminal lugs in EQ situations, a description of the installed configuration, whether this use was in an instrumentation circuit, and any justifications for continued operation (JCO) if unqualified splices were used and proposed corrective actions. The licensee's response to this request stated that AMP splices or terminal lugs were not used at Byron in applications where they are required to establish or maintain an EQ seal. AMP splices and terminal lugs are used on EQ equipment, however, these connections are covered, either with Okonite tape or RayChem heat shrink tubing, to establish the EQ seal. As AMP splices and terminal lugs are not used as the basis for EQ, the licensee believes that no configuration description or JCOs are necessary. AMP splices or terminal lugs are not used in instrumentation applications. The inspector forwarded this information to Region III and this item is considered close . Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactors (93702) General The inspector performed onsite followup activities for events which occurred during March 1987. This followup included reviews of operating logs, procedures, Deviation Reports, Licensee Event Reports (where available), and interviews with licensee personne For each event, the inspector developed a chronology, reviewed the functioning of safety systems required by plant conditions, reviewed licensee actions to verify consistency with procedures, license conditions, and the nature of the event. Additionally the inspector verified that the licensee investigation had identified root causes of equipment malfunctions and/or personnel error and had taken appropriate corrective actions prior to plant restart. Details of the events and licensee corrective actions developed through inspector followup are provided in Paragraphs b through g below.

' Unit 2 - Unusual Event Declared on March 4, 1987 At 0050 on March 4 1987, with reactor power at 48%, Unit 2

, experienced a drop in condenser vacuum due to increased air inleakage. This decreased the turbine efficiency enough to raise reactor power above 50%. Due to startup testing, greater than 60 penalty minutes of Axial Flux Difference (AFD) outside the target band had been accumulated within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> TS 3. requires that if power is greater than 50% with greater than 60 penalty minutes for AFD that power be reduced to less than 50% in the next 30 minutes and the power range nuclear instrument's trip setpoints be reduced from 108% to 55%, within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. At 0125 TS 3.0.3 was entered as pcwer had been greater than 50% for 30 minutes. By 0149 power had been reduced to less than 50% and TS 3.0.3 was exited. At 0305 reactor power again increased above 50%

and TS 3.0.3 was entered. By 0312 power had been reduced to less than 50% and TS 3.0.3 was exited. At 0455 TS 3.0.3 was again entered when the licensee had not completed the reduction of the trip setpoints to the fourth power range nuclear instrument. At

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0547 the licensee began to reduce reactor power and declared an unusual event. By 0720 the power range trip setpoints had been reset and the unusual event terminated. A subsequent review of this event by the licensee indicated that the limits of TS 3. had never been exceeded as a special test exception allows AFD to be outside the target band for a total of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> during testin Consequently the unusual event need not have been declare Unit 2 - Unusual Event Declared on March 6, 1987 At 0448 on March 6, 1987, with reactor power at 49% power, a low pressure alarm was received for the 2B safety injection accumulato Operators had recently overfilled the accumulator and were in the process of lowering level by transferring water to the 2C accumulator when the low pressure alarm (602 psig) was receive Operators stopped lowering level but pressure continued to decreas Licensee personnel entered containment and identified that the accumulator relief valve, 25I8855B, had lifted and failed to resea TS 3.5.1 requires that the accumulator be restored to an operable condition within one hour or place the unit in Hot Standby within the next six hours. At 0558 a power reduction was commenced and an unusual event was declared. Maintenance personnel in containment mechanically agitated the valve and were able to reseat i Operators commenced repressurization of the accumulator and by 0618 the low pressure alarm had been cleared. The load decrease was stopped and the unusual event was terminated. The unit was subsequently returned to 49% power. The licensee intends to replace t

valve 2SI8855B during the outage which started on March 31, 198 The licensee will inspect the valve once it is removed and the inspectors will review the results of that inspectio Fire in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) on March 19, 1987 At approximately 2140 on March 19, 1987, with Unit 2 at 73% and Unit I defueled, a fire was reported in a temporary flexible ventilation duct at the 411 foot elevation of the FHB. The temporary ventilation duct connected a HEPA filtration unit with a decontamination tent. Pipe whip restraints and jet deflector components which had been removed from the Unit 1 containment were being decontaminated in the tent using wire wheels and buffing pad A large amount of smoke was seen in the FHB and a radiation-chemistry (Rad-Chem) foreman at the control point for entry into

! the Unit 1 containment reported a fire to shift management. The station fire brigade responded to the scene by 2145 and fire was observed to be out and no offsite assistance was required from the Byron fire department. All non-essential personnel were evacuated from the FHB. Rad-Chem personnel began taking airborne samples and performing surveys. The FHB charcoal filter plenums were placed in service to filter any airborne radioactive contaminents.

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Analysis of the air samples indicated the presence of Co-60 and CS-137, though both were less than the maximum permissible concentrations (MPC) of 10 CFR 20. Radiation surveys did not indicate any abnormal dose fields. By approximately 0100 on March 20, 1987, conditions had returned to normal and personnel were allowed to return to work. Any personnel suspected of injesting radioactive material were given a whole-body-coun No uptake of radioactive material was indicated for those persons who received a whole-body-coun The licensee's investigation determined that the cause of the fire was a spark from a grinding machine in the decontamination ten This spark entered the ventilation trunk and ignited paint dust which had collected at a low point in the ventilation duct. The paint dust ignited in a flash fire which consumed approximately 10 feet of the (25 foot long) 8 inch diameter ventilation duct almost immediately. The personnel inside the tent, reported that the fire seemed to self-extinguis As corrective action the licensee: relocated the ventilation suction to higher in the tent; installed a spark arrester at the entrance to the duct; rerouted the duct to minimize dust traps; required the duct to be inspected and cleaned on a shiftly basis; cleaned the inside of the tent to reduce the amount of dust present; established a checklist to document these actions; and discussed this event with decontamination personne At 2320 on April 7, 1987, with Unit 1 conducting refueling operations and Unit 2 in Mode 4, a second, identical, fire occurred in the ventilation duct at the decontamination tent. Pending further investigation, the licensee has suspended all activities in the decontamination tent. The inspectors will review these events further in a subsequent inspection repor e. Unit 2 - Unusual Event Declared on March 21, 1987 At 0300 On March 21, 1987, with reactor power at 75%, the measured Reactor Coolant System (RCS) unidentified leakage rate was calculated to be 1.3 gpm. Technical Specification 3.4.6.2 requires that with greater than 1 gpm of unidentified RCS leakage the leakage be reduced to less than 1 gpm within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in Mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in Mode 5 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. At 0600 power was reduced to 40% to allow personnel access inside the containment biological shield. Licensee personnel identified the leak as coming from the area of valve 2RC8039D, RCS Cold Leg Drain Valv At 0840 licensee personnel began reducing power to place the unit in Mode 3 and declared an unusual event. An unusual event was declared as required by EALS (Emergency Action Levels) 14 And 16 (Shutdown required by Technical Specifications and excessive RCS leakage).

Power was reduced to 20% and by 1140 the licensee had identified

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the leak as coming from a 3/8 inch " Parker" Compression Fitting downstream of Process Sample Valve, 2PS93580, which is downstream of 2RC8039D. Licensee personnel shut valves 2RC8039D and 2PS9379D controlling the leak. By 1212 the calculated RCS unidentified leak-age rate was less than 1 gpm and the unusual event was terminate The licensee utilized the services of a contractor, "Furmanite," to place a box around the leaking fitting to contain the remaining leakage. This action was completed by 1825 on March 22, 1987. The licensee intends to replace the leaking fitting during the outage which started March 31, 198 Auto-Start of SX Makeup Pump on Low Level in the SX Cooling Tower on March 22, 1987 At 1802 on March 22, 1987, with Unit 2 at 21% and Unit 1 defueled, the 0A essential service water (SX) makeup pump auto started on low water level in the SX cooling tower. The SX cooling tower is the ultimate heat sink at Byron and services both units. The licensee's investig-ation determined that scheduled maintenance work on non-vital, 4.16 KV electrical bus 143 inadvertantly deenergized the normal circulating water and deep well makeup control valves to the SX cooling towe The deenergizing of the makeup valves was not anticipated by licensee personnel when the planning for the bus 143 outage was done. The licensee investigation into this event is continuing, Unit 2 - Reactor Trip due to a Turbine / Generator Trip on March 31, 1987 At 0603 on March 31, 1987, with reactor power at 17%, the reactor tripped due to a turbine / generator trip. The licensee was decreasing power to take the unit offline for a scheduled outage when the reactor trip occurred. The first-out annunciator was Turbine Motoring Generator Trip. The turbine motoring trip protects the turbine when the power made by the turbine is less than the power made by the generator, as this can damage the turbine. This condition is sensed by low differential pressure between the first stage and exhaust stage of the high pressure turbine. Detection of this condition causes an immediate generator trip. Following the trip all systems functioned normally. The licensee continued with the outage. The licensee's investigation of this event had not been completed by the end of this report perio The inspectors will review these events in a subsequent report when LERs are issue . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on March 31, 1987. The inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the finding The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar _ _