IR 05000454/1987009
| ML20213A394 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1987 |
| From: | Danielson D, Ward K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213A383 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-454-87-09, 50-454-87-9, 50-455-87-13, IEIN-86-099, IEIN-86-106, IEIN-86-99, NUDOCS 8704270535 | |
| Download: ML20213A394 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-454/87009(DRS); 50-455/87013(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. NPF-37; NPF-60 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Byron Site, Byron, Illinois Inspection Conducted:
February 26, March 4-6, 11, 18-20, 25-26,
-2, 7-8, and 14, 1987 Inspector:M.D. Ward IJe/7J
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Date Approved By:
D. H. Danielson, Chief 4/2'/F7 Materials and Processes Date Section Inspection Summary Inspection on February 26, March 4-6, 11, 18-20, 25-26, April 1-2, 7-8, and 14, 1987 (Reports No. 50-454/87009(DRS); No. 50-455/87013(DRS)
I Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection of inservice inspection (ISI) activities including review of program (73051), procedures (73052), observation of work and work activities (73753), and data review and evaluation (73755); shot peening of steam generator tubes (73051, 73052, 73753,73755); licensee action on a 50.55(e) item (92700) and IE Information Notices (92704); and various modifications (37701).
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
DOk$500$454 PDR
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DETAILS 1.
P_ersons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
- R. Ward, Services Superintendent
- J. Pausche, Asst. Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- W. Walter, Asst. Technical Staff Supervisor
- E. Zittle, Regulatory Assurance Staff
- D.
Flowers, ISI, Coordinator
- J. Snyder, QA Inspector R. Klingler, Project QC Supervisor R. Moravec, Project Mechanical Supervisor J. Porter, Construction Supervisor W. Witt, NDE Supervisor, Level III P. O'Neil, QC Supervisor J. Ewald, Technical Staff Engineer Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
J. Hinds, Jr., Senior Resident Inspector
- P. Brochman, Resident Inspector Hunter Corporation (HC)
S. Finch, Foreman The Babcock & Wilcox Company (B&W)
C. Meredith, Supervisor Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company (HSB)
P. Fisher, Assistant Regional Manager J. Hendricks, ANII The inspector also contracted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employees.
- Denotes those present at the final exit interview April 14, 1987.
2.
Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Items (Closed) 50.55(e) Item (455/86006-EE): Westinghouse Radiographs not retrievable per code. On October 30, 1986, a potential deficiency was reported to the Region III office pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e). The deficiency involved misplaced radiographs for equipment supplied by Westinghouse. Based on further review of this item, CECO concluded that
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this item does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) as
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referenced in an October 29,=1986,' letter from S. C. Hunsader to
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J. G. Keppler regarding CECO's corrective actions of.the misplaced ~
radiographs.
This item was reviewed in NRC Inspection Report-i No. 50-455/86038(DRS).
Therefore, this 50.55(e) item is considered closed.-
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3.
Licensee-Action on IE Information Notices
a.
-IE information' notice No. 86-99:
Degradation of-steel containments'.
This information notice was to provide licensees with.information of-a potentially significant safety problem regarding the degradation of '
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a steel containment resulting form corrosion.
Ceco determined that this IE-information notice.was not applicable to Byron.
CECO stated that the Byron station.is.a pressurized water-reactor (PWR) plant and does not have. voids'between the steel liner and the concrete, therefore no action is. planned at this time.
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b.
IE information notice No. 86-106:
Feedwater line break.
This information notice was to alert licensees of a' potentially generic -
problem with feedwater pipe thinning and other problems related to this event.
On December 9, 1986, both units at the.Surry Power Station were operating at full power when the 18" suction line to the main feedwater pump "A" for Unit 2 failed catastrophically. The event was initiated by the main steam isolation valve on steam generator-
"C"failingclosed.
Because of the' increased pressure in steam
generator C" that collapsed the voids in the water,-the reactor tripped on low-low level in that steam generator.
A two by.four foot section of the wall of the suction line to the "A" main feedwater pump was blown out and come.to rest in an overhead cable tray.
The break was located in an elbow in the 18".line about one
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i foot from the 24" header.
The lateral reactive force generated by i
escaping feedwater completely severed the suction line.
The free-
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end whipped and came to rest against the discharge-line for the
other pump.
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Surveillances IBVSXII-3 and IBVSXII-4 were performed by CECO personnel during this outage.
The purpose of these surveillances were to verify the structural integrity of selected secondary side piping systems by performance of ultrasonic pipe. thickness'
j measurements.
A selection of feedwater pump suction connections i
were included in the surveillance sample.
These surveillances are still in progress as of April 14, 1987.
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4.
Inservice Inspection (ISI), Unit 1
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a.
This is the first outage of the first period of the first ten year plan.
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Ceco contracted the Babcock and Wilcox. Company (B&W) to perform the eddy current examinations (ET) on the tubes in steam generators (SG) A, B, C, and D and ultrasonic examination (UT) of the reactor vessel.
Most of the remaining ISI was performed.from 3 p.m. - 11 with CECO and Westinghouse (W) performing the visual examinations.p.m.
The examinations were in accordance with ASME Section XI, led 0 Cdition, Winter 1981 Addenda.
The UT was performed by B&W using pulse-echo UT flaw detection instruments and various angles and MHZ transducers. The procedures used by B&W were reviewed and approved by a Ceco Level III who was trained and qualified by EPRI.
No intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) was identified during this outage.
b.
Review of Programs, Procedures, Material, Equipment and Personnel Certifications, Audits and Data The NRC inspector reviewed that ISI programs, procedures, specific relief requests and documents relating to the following:
Ultrasonic instruments, calibration blocks, transducers, and UT
couplant certifications.
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Eddy current equipment
Liquid penetrant materials
Magnetic particle materials and equipment
NDE personnel certifications in accordance with SNT-TC-IA,
including training and experience
Audits and surveillances ISI data reports
ET data reports on the following tubes that were plugged.
- STEAM GENERATORS IRC01BA IRC01BB IRC01BC IRC01BD Row Column Row Column Row Column Row Column
108
4
38
63
103
81
71
100
94
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c.
Ob'servation of Work Activities The NRC inspector observed work an'd had discussions with. personnel
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during the following-ISI' activities.
These observations-included calibration for pipe welds and the reactor vessel welds and performance of the NDE examinations.
The related documentation was also_ included as part-of this review.
Magnetic' particle examination'(MT) of weld IFW 87CA-6, C-19.
- Liquid penetrant examination.(PT) of weld ISI 09BA-10, J8.
and' weld 1FWO300-16, C2.
UT, MT and PT of reactor coolant pump fly wheels 1RC01PD-
and IRC01PB.
Immersion ultrasonic examinations being performed'from
the inside surface of the reactor vessel on the nozzle to shell welds and the nozzle ta safe and piping welds.
Ceco Level III training B&W personnel in UT of full
penetration butt welds in cast stainless steel components.
Eddy current examinations on tubes in the "A," "B,"'"C,"
and "D" stream generators.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Shot Peening of Steam Generator Tubes Extensive operating, experience with PWR steam generators (SGs) indicates that the roll transition area of the tubes are susceptible.to intergranular
stres's corrosion cracking (IGSCC).
IGSCC requires a combination of tensile stress, susceptible material, and an aggressive environment.
Elimination of any one of these conditions prevents IGSCC from occurring. The purpose
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of shot peening is to remove the tensile stress on-the ID surface'of the-
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tube and replace it with compressive stress.
Shop peening is a cold working process whereby an item is bombarded with round shot (in this case type 316 stainless steel) leaving the surface in a residual compressive state.
The system is an automated process thereby~
providing uniformity and repeatability.
The corrosion testing performed to quality this process demonstrates.that:
primary side IGSCC in the tube roll transition areas is effectively.
i eliminated for the design life of the SGs.
Individuals involved in shot peening were. trained on a mock-up on site prior to the actual shot peening of the SG tubes. -Written and oral examinations were given to individuals prior to performing shot peening.
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O Shot peering was performed on approximately 29" inside each tube including i.pproximately 2" above the tube sheets on the hot leg side of SGs A, B, C, and D.
CECO and B&W personnel walked the NRC inspecar through the shot peening process in detail including the mock-up and how it operated. The NRC inspector also observed by video the shot peening process in operation on the A, B, C, and D SGs and examined the following:
A completed peened tube.
- A new I-strip.
- An I-strip that had been used for intensity and coverage to verify the repeatability of the process.
- Documentation of an I-strip test in the computer.
The NRC inspector also reviewed procedures, personnel certifications, drawings and other related documentation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Modifications Modification M6-1-85-049: Replace high pressure nitro a.
accumulators with the low pressure instrument air (IA) gen accumulator.
This modification replaced the high pressure nitrogen accumulators at the pressurizer power operated relief values (PORVs) with low pressure IA accumulators. The low pressure IA air system is more compatible with the operation of the PORVs, thereby increasing the reliability of the PORVs.
All work for this modification was performed in accordance with ASME Section XI, Class C requirements. The NRC inspector observed cutting and fit-ups including marking a pipe for a proper fit-up to a 90 elbow. The NRC inspector also heat numbers on the pipe and fittings with the documentation.
Observed tacking and welding and reviewed drawings, procedures, work request and other related documentation.
No violation or deviations were identified, b.
Modification M6-1-85-0567: Addition of steam generator blow down control valves. This modification involved the addition of eight valves and was required to provide redundant isolation of the steam generator blcw down in the event of a high energy line break in the auxiliary building portion of the SD piping. These additional air operated valves will assume the control activities from the previous containment isolation valves. This will reduce isolation valve leakage caused by seat wear associated with the pressure drop across the control valve.
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All work-for this modification was performedLin accordance with ASME Section XI, Class B. requirements.
The NRC inspector observed welding, fit-ups, and cutting; also reviewed procedures, drawings, process sheets and other related documentation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Modification M6-1-86-0138:
Relocation of containment isolation valves.
The previous sample lines to the post accident hydrogen monitors had low point loop seals that could fill with water and became inoperable.- ~This modification pertained to the re-route'of-
' containment post accident hydrogen. monitoring sample piping..The
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new pipe routing from the hydrogen analyzers to the containment suction sample points contained no low points to eliminated potential condensate accumulation.
All work for this modification was performed in accordance with ASME Section XI, Class B requirements.
The NRC inspector observed welding and fit-ups; also reviewed procedures, drawings, process sheets and related documentation.
No violations or deviations'were identified.'
6.
Exit Interview The inspector met with site representatives (denoted in Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection noted in this report.
The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of.the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by thel inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
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