IR 05000454/1987029

Insp Repts 50-454/87-29 & 50-455/87-27 on 870708-14. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Allegations Received by Region III Re Improper Background Screening,Drug Use & Excessive Overtime Causing Inattentiveness

ML20236D955
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	07/27/1987
From:	Creed J, Kniceley J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236D913	List: IR 05000454/1987029 ML20236D910
References
50-454-87-29, 50-455-87-27, NUDOCS 8707310146
Download: ML20236D955 (6)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  !

REGION III

Reports No. 50-454/87029(DRSS); 50-455/87027(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. NPF-37; NPF-66 l Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 j Inspection Conducted: July 8-14,1987 Type of Inspection: Allegation Review

Inspector: w,/ 7Ih h / 7[27/f7 J.Kfniceley D&te '

Physical Security Inspector Approved By: h 7 7/87

{JamesR. Creed, Chief Date Safeguards Section Inspection Summary Inspection on July 8-14, 1987 (Reports No. 50-454/87029(DRSS); 50-455/87027(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Included a review of allegations received by Region III l concerning improper background screening, drug use and excessive overtime {

causing inattentivenes Results: One violation of security plan criteria was identified dealing with background screening. This violation meets the criteria as licensee ~

l identified therefore, a Notice of Violation will not be forwarde ,

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8707310146 870728 PDR ADOCK 05000454 9 PDR Y _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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DETAILS Key Persons Contacted In addition to the key members of the licensee's staff listed below, the inspector interviewed other members of the security organizatio The asterisk (*) denotes those present at the exit intervie *R. Querio, Station Manage _

• R. Ward, Services Superintendent

• Klingler, Senior QA Engineer

• Lucas, Security Administrator 4

• H. Kri.st, Assistant Security Administrator {

• D. Goble, Assistant Security Administrator

• R. McNeill, Acting Project Manager, The Wackenhut Corporation (TWC)

• G. Wood, Operations Coordinator, TWC

• R. Witherby, CAS/SAS Coordinator, TWC G. Toleski, Nuclear Security Administrator, Corporate R. Roulo, Nuclear Security Staff, Corporate 1 Entrance and Exit Interviews (IP 30703) At the beginning of the inspection, Mr. R. Querto, Station Manager, of the licensee staff was informed of the-purpose of this visit and the functional areas to be examine The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in Sectirn 1 at the conclusion of the onsite inspectio No written material pertaining to the inspection was left with the licensee or contractor representatives. A general description of the scope of the inspection'was provided. Briefly listed below are the findings discussed during the exit intervie ;

i (1) The inspector stated that one violation of security plan {

criteria was identified. The violation meets the criteria '

of licensee identified and therefore a Notice of Violation will not be cited (Section Sa).

(2) The inspector concluded and the licensee agreed that the allegation involving improper background screening by a ]

contractor was substantiated. This led to a violation of security plan criteria. The licensee's review and corrective actions were adequate and appropriate  ;

(Section 3a). 1 (3) The inspector stated that the allegation of' drug use at the Byron Station was not substantiated. Due to a lack of specific information, the inspector verified that commitments identified in the physical security plan are being met and the licensee's ;

fitness for duty program has been implemented (Section 3b).  ;

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(4) The inspector stated that the allegation of guards sleeping on duty due to excessive overtime hours could not be substantiated (Section 3c).

The licensee made no specific comments to the above statement . Investigation - Allegation Review (IP 99014)

The following information provided in the form of allegations, was reviewed by the inspector as specifically noted below: Background: (Closed) Allegation No. RIII-87-A-0056: The NRC Region III received information from an individual alleging that a contractor (Nutech/ Diversified Technical Services, Inc.) issued Commonwealth Edison a certification of trustworthiness letter which is required for access. The letter for the named individual was based on three years of continuous employment, when in fact the individual had been employed for only four months. This was done to avoid the cost of a background investigatio Review: The inspector interviewed the Pvron Station Corporate Security Administrator who stated that tney also had received the allegation. Due to the allegation, the Byron Station Quality Assurance personnel audited the security screening program for both Nutech and Diversified Technical Services, Inc. (DTS), a subcontractor of Nutech. The inspector reviewed the Audit Report (No. 06-87-54) conducted April 24 through May 4, 1987, which identified that both Nutech and DTS had Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) approved screening programs. Their review showed that Nutech employees were being screened in accordance with procedures. However, DTS screening records were found inadequate. Dates verifying when some information was gathered were missing as well as the other records being incomplete and in some cases required records were missing entirely. Because of these record inadequacies, the licensee could not verify that some psychological, character, or employment verifications were performed prior to granting unescorted access. The audit showed that the DTS screening program was poorly administered with incomplete records to verify that screening was done prior to granting unescorted access to the Byron Plant. The conclusion of the audit was that DTS did not implement their screening program in accordance with th ir approved screening procedure, which had been approved by CECO, and personnel employed by DTS should not be allowed to work for Commonwealth Edison until proper implementation of the screening program can be verifie i On April 28, 1987, the licensee withdrew all unescorted access to their nuclear facilities for DTS employees. These individuals were subsequently rescreened by Nutech and granted unescorted access tc CECO facilities. The licensee now has DTS provide backup documentation (i.e. , psychological tests and background references)

to CECO for their review. Corporate Security will review each DTS employee's psychological and background data for accuracy and

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completeness prior to granting unescorted access to CECO Nuclear l Stations. The licensee determined that due to DTS being new to the i Nuclear Industry, they did not fully understand the importance of '

accuracy and complete documentation which must be completed prior to requesting unescorted access. It is the licensee's position,  ;

based on their audit, that DTS did not deliberately intend to violate l any procedures, but that the program was poorly administered with no intent to deceive. The DTS office manager was terminated for failure to adequately administer the progra ,

l Conclusion: The failure of DTS to perform the required screening l is a violation of Section 4.4.3 of the licensee's security plan which requires screening prior to granting unescorted access to-their facilities. The violation meets the criteria of 10 CFR 2, 4

Appendix C,Section V.A. for licensee identified violations and t l therefore, a Notice of Violation has not been cited.

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When the licensee became aware of the allegation, an audit was performed which identified' inadequate screening. Corrective actions were immediately taken and long term corrective actions taken should prevent recurrence. The licensee's actions in this matter were timely and adequat The inspector determined through record review and interviews that the Byron Station adequately implemented their portion of the security screening program. The screening program for DTS was poorly administered with incomplete records to substantiate that screening had been done prior to granting unescorted access. The ,

allegation was substantiated and is considered closed, j i b. Backaround: (Closed) Allegation No. RIII-87-A-0036: On March 27, l 1987, NRC Headquarters received a telephone call from a unknown unidentified individual who simply stated that " drugs are being sold at the Byron Plant." The individual then hung up without providing any further informatio Review: Due to the lack of specific iriformation, the inspector was only able to review the licensee's policies and actions taken I

when an allegation or information is provided about drug related matters. The licensee has a Substance Abuse Policy and a Fitness For Duty Program which has been implemented at all the Commonwealth Edison Nuclear Facilities. Whenever information is received or identified relating to violations of these policies, a investigation l is conducted. When necessary, the licensee requires drug screening

tests and/or the use of a drug detection do The licensee's last routine dog drug search at the Byron Station j was on May 26, 1987. The results of the search was that there

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was no indication of controlled substances onsite. In 1986, the licensee conducted four dog assisted searches at Byro As a result of these searches, there were no controlled substances located on the facility.

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The licensee's security plan requires that personnel be searched prior to entering the facility. The inspector verified that security plan criteria are being met. Record review showed that the security force has identified contraband when it was attempted to be brought into the station. When identified, the appropriate corrective measures were taken, which include contacting local law enforcement 3 authorities when contraband is identifie '

Conclusion: Based on the lack of specific information, this allegation could not be substantiated. The licensee's actions taken in identified drug related incidences was found to be !

adequate. This allegation is considered close '

c. Background: (Closed) Allegation No. RIII-87-A-0089: On June 10, 1987, a letter was left in the Byron Resident Inspector mailbo The letter stated that the security force (Wackenhut) is working i their employees excessive overtime which causes employees to be i tired so that they cannot adequately perform their job. They are afraid that, due_to the excessive hours something.is going to go i wrong which could endanger our lives and the safety of the plan l They also felt that the Wackenhut management is keeping this information from the NR On June 15, 1987, an individual called the Region III office and stated that excessive overtime is being worked by the Wackenhut security which causes many officers to fall asleep on post and that two recent suicides were due to the overtime and job stres i l Review: The inspector interviewed the site security administrator l and the Wackenhut site management regarding excessive overtime and

! the attentiveness of security force personnel. The inspector requested and received Wackenhut payroll records and securit incident reports for January through July 1987. These interviews and records showed that due to the recent outage, which lasted

, from February 17 through June 21, 1987, overtime for the security force' was necessary to man required posts and n.eet work related

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needs. Security force personnel were required to work overtime either on a volunteer or mandated basis as needed- The records

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showed that the majority of officers and supervisors worked between 45 and 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> per week during the outage. Soine personnel were l required to work a double shift (16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />).

The inspector did an analysis to determine how often 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> shifts were worke Between December 1986 and July 4, 1987, 40 individuals-were required to work a double shift. The majority of this time occurred on Sunday, June 7, when eight individuals worked 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> and Saturday, June 20, when 22 individuals worked 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. In both of these incidences, the officers either volunteered or were mandated to work because the oncoming shift would not answer their telephones so they could be called in earlie __- .

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Excluding these two weekend days there were only ten times in an I eight month period that personnel.were required to work a 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> shif Records did show that occasionally, on a volunteer basis, i some personnel did work a 70 hour8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br /> week. The review of hours worked-

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showed that excessive overtime was not worked and that' manning levels are adequate. The security' administrator suggested that Wackenhut management. develop and implement an overtime procedure which follows NRC guidelines, which is (a) an individual shall not be permitted-to work more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> straight; (b) an. individual shall not be permitted to work more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period, nor more .

than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in any 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period, nor more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any seven day period; (c) a break of at least eight hours should be j allowed between work periods, and (d) the use of overtime should be i considered on an individual basis and not for the entire staff on a i shift. This guidance is identified in NRC Policy Statement " Nuclear j Power Stations Staff Working Hours," dated February 18, 1982, and IE l Circular 80-02 and IE Inspection Procedure 8102 j i

Based on interviews and record review, it was not confirmed that an j security personnel were sleeping on post or inattentive on dut There were two incidences where Firewatch Personnel, who are assigned no security related duties, were observed asleep ~or inattentive and .)

disciplinary action was taken in each incident. All guard. force supervisory personnel were asked if they were aware of any incidences-of sleeping or inattentive officers while on . post, that has not been reported. All stated and signed a statement that they are not aware of any incidences which should have been reported, but were not. The inspector randomly interviewed security officers who also stated that they were not aware of any security personnel asleep or inattentive on post. They did not feel that they were less effective or under additional. stress due to the overtime. The inspector confirmed .

through interviews that there have been no recent suicides or deaths 1 attributed to job stress or overtime. One officer did commit suicide !

two years ago, which was attributed to financial and marital problems i and one officer died of natural causes approximately a year ag .

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Conclusion: The allegation of excessive overtime and sleeping I or inattentive guards on post was not substantiated. Overtime was l worked, but it is not considered to be excessive because the amount q of hours worked fell within NRC guidelines. This allegation is j considered close J i

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