IR 05000336/2018011
| ML18313A007 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/2018 |
| From: | Daniel Schroeder Reactor Projects Branch 2 |
| To: | Stoddard D Dominion Energy |
| Schroeder D | |
| References | |
| IR 2018011 | |
| Download: ML18313A007 (15) | |
Text
ber 8, 2018
SUBJECT:
MILLSTONE POWER STATION - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2018011 AND 05000423/2018011
Dear Mr. Stoddard:
On September 27, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Millstone Power Station (Millstone), Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. John Daugherty, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations corrective action program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples selected for review, the team determined that the implementation of the corrective action program and overall performance related to evaluating and resolving problems was effective. In most cases, Dominion identified issues and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, prioritized and evaluated concerns appropriately, and implemented corrective actions to resolve problems in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues.
In addition to implementation of the corrective action program, the inspectors also reviewed Dominions use of operating experience, conduct of self-assessments, and safety conscious work environment at the station. Based on the samples selected for review, the inspectors concluded that the self-assessments reviewed were generally effective in identifying issues and improvement opportunities. The inspectors did determine there were deficiencies with Dominions use of industry operating experience at Millstone. Specifically, Millstone staff was not ensuring the industry operating experience was reviewed for applicability and evaluated, and corrective actions developed where necessary.
Finally, the inspectors found no evidence of significant challenges to Millstones safety conscious work environment. Based on the inspectors observations, Millstone staff are willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available. The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Daniel L. Schroeder, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Numbers: 50-336 and 50-423 License Numbers: DPR-65 and NPF-49
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000336/2018011 and 05000423/2018011
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 50-336 and 50-423 License Numbers: DPR-65 and NPF-49 Report Numbers: 05000336/2018011 and 05000423/2018011 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-011-0030 Licensee: Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Dominion)
Facility: Millstone Power Station (Milstone), Units 2 and 3 Location: P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 Inspection Dates: September 10 to September 27, 2018 Inspectors: A. Rosebrook, Senior Project Engineer, Team Leader A. Turilin, Project Engineer C. Highley, Millstone Resident Inspector D. Beacon, Project Engineer Approved By: Daniel L. Schroeder, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring Dominions performance at Millstone, Units 2 and 3 by conducting the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
Based on the samples selected for review, the team determined that the implementation of the corrective action program and overall performance related to evaluating and resolving problems was effective. In most cases, Dominion identified issues and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, prioritized and evaluated concerns appropriately, and implemented corrective actions to resolve problems in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues.
In addition to implementation of the corrective action program, the inspectors also reviewed Dominions use of operating experience, conduct of self-assessments, and safety conscious work environment at the station. Based on the samples selected for review, the inspectors concluded that the self-assessments reviewed were generally effective in identifying issues and improvement opportunities. The inspectors did determine there were deficiencies with Dominions use of industry operating experience at Millstone. Specifically, Millstone staff was not ensuring the industry operating experience was reviewed for applicability and evaluated, and corrective actions developed where necessary.
Finally, the inspectors found no evidence of significant challenges to Millstones safety conscious work environment. Based on the inspectors observations, Millstone staff are willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
No findings or more-than-minor violations were identified.
Additional Tracking Items Type Issue number Title Inspection Status Results Section URI 05000336 & Reviews of Incoming 71152B Open 05000423/2018-011-01 Industry Operation Experience Not Completed
INSPECTION SCOPES
This inspection was conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess Dominions performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection
The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the licensees corrective action program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment. The assessment is documented below.
- (1) Corrective Action Program Effectiveness - The inspection team evaluated Dominions effectiveness in identification, prioritization and evaluation, and correcting problems, and verified the station complied with NRC regulations and Dominions standards for corrective action programs. A five year look back was performed for the Unit 2 core spray and containment spray systems and the Unit 3 emergency diesel generator system.
- (2) Operating Experience - The team evaluated the stations effectiveness in its use of industry and NRC operating experience information and verified the station complied with Dominions standards for the use of operating experience.
- (3) Self-Assessments and Audits - The team evaluated the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments and verified the station complied with Dominions standards for the use of self-assessments and audits.
- (4) Safety Conscious Work Environment - The team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Evaluation of the Millstone Problem Identification and Resolution Program 71152B Based on the samples selected for review, the team determined that the implementation of the corrective action program and overall performance related to evaluating and resolving problems was effective. In most cases, Dominion identified issues and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, prioritized and evaluated concerns appropriately, and implemented corrective actions to resolve problems in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues. The inspectors did identify a potential vulnerability in the area of timely and effective corrective actions. Specifically, the team identified numerous examples of corrective action program products where the documented corrective actions did not fully address or correct the condition or identified cause.
In addition to implementation of the corrective action program, the inspectors also reviewed Dominions use of operating experience, conduct of self-assessments, and safety conscious work environment at the station. Based on the samples selected for review, the inspectors concluded that the self-assessments reviewed were generally effective in identifying issues and improvement opportunities. The inspectors did determine there were deficiencies with Dominions use of industry operating experience at Millstone. Specifically, Millstone staff was not ensuring the industry operating experience was reviewed for applicability and evaluated, and corrective actions developed where necessary.
Finally, the inspectors found no evidence of significant challenges to Millstones safety conscious work environment. Based on the inspectors observations, Millstone staff are willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
Unresolved Item Reviews of Incoming Industry Operation Experience 71152B (Open) (OPEX) Not Completed
Description:
The inspectors identified that Millstone could not demonstrate that incoming industry operational experience reports (ICES) since 2015 had been properly reviewed for applicability to Millstone and for those items that were applicable, were evaluated and corrective actions developed as necessary as required by program guidance. A population of over 1600 ICES reports were identified where it could not be determined if required reviews were complete. Because there are parallel processes which may have reviewed these items, additional review is necessary to determine whether this issue represents a performance deficiency that is of more than minor significance. Therefore, this item is characterized as an unresolved item (URI). The purpose of the operational experience program is to identify conditions adverse to quality (CAQs) found at other plants, evaluate whether the concern is applicable to either Millstone unit, and evaluate and develop corrective actions for those CAQs when necessary.
The inspectors noted that a performance improvement report (PIR) is automatically created for the Dominion fleet whenever an OPEX report is received (regardless of its source). Once the corporate PIR is generated, each site is required to check a box that it was received and also disposition it. The PIR remains opened until each site has completed this action. Prior to 2015, the corporate Operating Experience Coordinator would perform an applicability review and assign the remaining items to the site for further evaluation. When the corporate organization was reorganized, the headquarters review of OPEX became mostly administrative and the individual sites were expected to fully disposition the report. Since 2015, more than 1600 OPEX records were discovered that required disposition for Millstone.
These records were still open and no records exist to show whether reviews were completed.
Therefore it is uncertain if all applicable ICES reports were reviewed.
Planned Closure Actions: The NRC will conduct a problem identification and resolution annual sample using NRC IP 71152 once Dominion has notified the NRC that they have completed their review of the 1600 ICES reports.
Licensee Actions: Dominion wrote Condition Report (CR) 1105042 to capture the issue, conducted an investigation, and developed a plan to review the 1600 ICES reports which have no documented reviews. Dominion anticipates this review will be completed by the end of the first quarter of 2019.
Corrective Action Reference: CR 1105042 NRC Tracking Number: 05000336 & 05000423/2018-011-01 Observations 71152B Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: The team determined that the implementation of the corrective action program and overall performance related to evaluating and resolving problems was effective. In most cases, Dominion identified issues and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, prioritized and evaluated concerns appropriately, and implemented corrective actions to resolve problems in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues. However, some weaknesses were noted below.
Additionally, the inspectors identified a potential vulnerability in the area of timely and effective corrective actions.
1. Dominion failed to identify and evaluate a CAQ associated with the failure of the Unit 3 A emergency diesel generator annunciator panel on September 12, 2018.
Specifically, following replacement of the failed power supply, a second pre-tested safety-related power supply was installed and also failed in the same location, but this was only documented in the work order details. A total of three power supplies have now failed in this safety-related annunciator, which may indicate an application or design issue. Dominion agreed with this observation, wrote a CR, and initiated an evaluation. This observation is related to the assessment of the Corrective Action Program Area of Problem Identification. (CR 1105938)2. The team identified that Dominions program may have failed to ensure boric acid control inspectors had a valid eye exam to support their qualifications. Specifically, current eye examination information was not entered into the Learning Management System (LMS), which is used to verify qualification status. As a result, LMS incorrectly showed some boric acid control inspectors as not qualified due to expired eye exams.
Also, the inspectors did not verify their qualifications in LMS prior to performing inspections which would have led to the identification of the issue. The team verified that this error was administrative and all required inspections were performed by qualified personnel. Dominion agreed with this observation, wrote a CR, initiated an evaluation, verified all inspections were performed by qualified inspectors, and corrected LMS. This observation is related to the assessment of the Corrective Action Program Area of Problem Identification. (CR 1105794)
3. The team identified that Dominion failed to comply with Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) 26.165, Testing Split Specimens and Retesting Single Specimens, when Dominion failed to provide a sample to a third party laboratory within the required 1 working day after the donor had made the request. It was recognized the medical review officer was not familiar with Title 10 requirements such as 10 CFR 26.165 and 10 CFR 55.25 and was trained on timeliness or reporting requirements. The results of the second sample, when tested, matched the results of the first. This observation is related to the assessment of the Corrective Action Program Area of Problem Identification (CR 1046251)4. The team identified the root cause evaluation performed for non-cited violation (NCV)2017-004-01, Exceeding of Technical Specification Pressure-Temperature Curve Limits During Solid Plant Operations, did not identify a relevant contributing cause for this event. The portion of the Technical Specification Pressure Temperature Curve the plant was in at the time, the Technical Specification Low Temperature Overpressure System does not provide automatic pressure relief capability via power operated relief valves or residual heat removal system relief valves until the Pressure Temperature Curve limit has been exceeded. Thus operator action and configuration control are the only barriers in place to ensure the limits are not exceeded. Had plant staff been more aware of this fact, the risk perception likely would have resulted in challenges by operators and reviewers prior to the event. Dominion agreed with this observation, wrote a CR, and took prompt action to add a caution statement to the applicable procedure to raise awareness. This observation is related to the assessment of the Corrective Action Program Area of Problem Evaluation. (CR 1105194)5. The team identified that the review of two security NCVs had contributing causes of the corrective action program not being implemented properly:
- (1) NCV 50-336&50-423/2016403-02: In 2015, CR 576193 was developed to address a security equipment problem. A security staff member raised a concern about whether the action would be effective. However, the staff member only documented the concern in the notes for the corrective action assignment, stating that the action would not be effective. A new CR should have been written to ensure the concern received the appropriate level of management attention and review. The ineffective corrective action resulted in a subsequent Green NCV (NCV 50-336&50-423/2016403-03). In 2007, Millstone staff had conducted a root cause evaluation (CR-07-05432) and developed a corrective action to prevent recurrence (CAPR) for a security issue.
Between 2008 and 2016, this CAPR was effective. In 2016 some security shifts inappropriately discontinued the CAPR. After the practice established by the CAPR was stopped, the security issue recurred and Millstone received a Green NCV.
The team identified a potential vulnerability in the Corrective Action Program Area of Timely and Effective Corrective Actions where corrective actions were being closed without being able to demonstrate actions were actually taken to correct the identified condition or cause.
This was typically seen for issues where corrective actions were closed to work orders or other processes and those items were subsequently cancelled, changed, or deferred. Care must be taken to ensure when an item that a corrective action is closed to is completed or closed that the original condition or cause was actually addressed. The team identified numerous examples from all parts of the organization to support this observation. Dominion was able to demonstrate that those examples were administrative, therefore there was no violation of NRC requirements identified.
Each of the above items were evaluated using NRC IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and NRC IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, and determined to be of minor significance. Dominion has entered each of the observations discussed above in their corrective action program and documented corrective actions to be taken.
Observations 71152B Operating Experience and Part 21 Reviews: The inspectors determined there were deficiencies with Dominions use of industry operating experience at Millstone. Specifically, Millstone staff was not ensuring the industry and Part 21 operating experience was reviewed for applicability and evaluated, and corrective actions developed where necessary.
The inspectors noted that a PIR is automatically created for the Dominion fleet whenever an OPEX report is received (regardless of its source). Once the corporate PIR is generated, each site is required to check a box that it was received and also disposition it. The PIR remains opened until each site has completed this action. Prior to 2015, the corporate Operating Experience Coordinator would perform an applicability review and assign the remaining items to the site for further evaluation. When the corporate organization was reorganized, the headquarters review of OPEX became mostly administrative and the individual sites were expected to fully disposition the report. Following the reorganization, the Millstone Operational Experience coordinator set up Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Automailers for each system engineer in 2016 for OPEX. The coordinator believed that the applicable system engineers would take the first review of operating experience as it came out daily, and would complete the required PIR action and submit CRs if needed.
Therefore, the coordinator concluded that he did not need to take any actions regarding OPEX PIRs. While the system engineers do get an opportunity to review the operating experience that comes in their email, they had no role or assignment to take actions to review or document there review of the PIRs. While the system engineers do document through Engineering eSOMS logs once per month what operating experience was reviewed for their system, the system engineers do not have any responsibility for dispositioning the OPEX PIRs and none of the assignments were marked as complete. This programmatic weakness applied to both Part 21 and industry OPEX. URI 05000336 & 05000423/2018-011-01 is related to this observation.
In addition, Dominion identified a minor performance deficiency contrary to station procedures related to the review of 10 CFR Part 21 reports. A self-assessment identified that several applicability reviews for Part 21 reports were either inaccurate or incomplete. Examples included Part 21 reports 2017-01-00, 2017-01-01, and 2017-01-02 (Bellefonte Unit 2 Containment Vertical Tendon (V281) Failure 50.55(e) First, Second and Third Interim Reports). Millstones applicability review for these Part 21 reports stated Millstone does not have containment tendons and the Part 21 was not applicable. This is incorrect since Millstone Unit 2 has tendons. However, station engineering staff had previously evaluated this concern and as a result no corrective actions were needed thus no violation of NRC requirements occurred.
Observations 71152B Self-Assessments and Audits: The team determined that Dominions Audit and Self-Assessment programs at Millstone were effective at identifying issues and potential adverse trends and ensuring they were entered into the corrective action program and corrected.
The pre-problem identification and resolution inspection self-assessment identified two issues of note.
1. Dominion staff identified untimely corrective actions for the 2016 failures of the solenoid valves associated with Unit 3 air operated valve 194A, Train A reactor plant component cooling water non safety header return auto isolation valve. A corrective action was developed to replace the solenoids in service and to send the replaced solenoids to the vendor for analysis. Dominions self-assessment identified that, although the solenoids had been removed from the system in the Fall of 2017, they had had not been sent to the vendor for analysis. Dominion wrote a CR, and sent the solenoids to the vendor in September 2018. This observation is an example of an effective self-assessment and a weakness in the area of Corrective Action Program Effectiveness- Timely and Effective Corrective Actions.
2. Dominion staff also identified the Part 21 applicability review discussed in the Operating Experience and Part 21 section above.
Observations 71152B Safety Conscious Work Environment: The team found no evidence of challenges to Dominions organizational safety-conscious work environment. Site employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
Observations 71152B Review of Corrective Actions Related to Greater-than-Green Findings That Were Not Completed by the End of the Associated Supplemental Inspection: The team reviewed the long term corrective actions and effectiveness reviews associated with multiple failures of the Unit 3 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump open at the time of completion of the documented IP 95001 Supplemental Inspection Report 05000423/2014013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15015A078), dated January 15, 2015. The team verified these corrective actions had been completed as scheduled. The team did not identify any new performance deficiencies and did not document any additional observations. Note: The team did not review corrective actions for Green Notice of Violation, VIO 05000423/2016001-01, Repetitive Failures to Correct Unit 3 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Performance Issues.
This review will be completed and documented in a separate inspection report.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure.
On September 27, 2018, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Mr. John Daugherty, Site Vice President and other members of the Dominion staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Procedures
AP-2-18-01, Unit 2 Dry Fuel Storage (ISFSI) ALARA Plan
CM-AA-400, 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 - Changes, Tests, and Experiments, Rev. 11
CM-AA-DDC-201, Design Change, Revision 17
CM-AA-RSK-1001, Engineering Risk Assessment, Revision 14
DNES-AA-GN-1005, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Revision 3
ER-AA-MRL-100, Implementing Maintenance Rule, Revision 11
ER-MP-CRH-102, Millstone Unit 2 Control Room Habitability Program, Revision 3
MA-AA-105, Scaffolding, Rev. 17
MP-GARDMP-000-OP-AA-102-1001, Development of Technical Basis to Support Operability
MP-GARDMP-000-PI-AA-300-3000, Emergent Issue Response, Revision 6
MP-GARDMP-000-PI-AA-300-3001, Root Cause Evaluation, Revision 13
MP-GARDMP-000-PI-AA-300-3004, Cause Evaluation Methods, Revision 7
MP-GARDMP-000-PI-AA-300-3007, Level of Effort Evaluation, Revision 0
MP-PROC-000-NO-AA-102, Internal Auditing and Millstone Inspection, Revision 2
MP-PROC-000-NO-AA-IAP-101, Internal Audit Program, Revision 1
MP-PROC-000-OP-AA-102, Operability Determination, Revision 15
MP-PROC-000-PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Revision 34
MP-PROC-000-PI-AA-300, Cause Evaluation, Revision 16
MP-PROC-000-WM-AA-100, Work Management, Revision 31
MP-PROC-ENG-U2-24-FFS-BAP01-TB-Map, Revision 1
MP-PROCESS-000-WM-AA-10, Work Management, Revision 1
MS-AA-PTE-401 attachment 5, Commercial Grade Item Evaluation for Procurement Technical
Evaluation 10000054868
NF-AA-PRA-370, Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures and Methods: MRule (a)(4) Risk
Monitor Guidance, Revision 19
OP 2345A, A Emergency Diesel Generator sections 4.4 through 4.6, revision 034
OP-AA-1500, Operational Configuration Control, Revision 15
OP-M2-MOP-VEN-006, West 125 Volt DC Vital Switchgear Room Cooling (FEG 2315D00),
Revision 2
SP 2613A, Diesel Generator Operability Tests, Facility 1, Revision 25
SP 2613B, Diesel Generator Operability Tests, Facility 2, Revision 26
SP 3622.8-005, 3FWA*P2 Discharge Isolation Valves Stroke Time Test, Revision 000-06
SP 3622.8-012, TDAFW Pump Control Valves Stroke Time, Revision 02
SP 3626.14, RSS Heat Exchanger SW Supply Piping Flush, Revision 4
SP 3646A.1, Emergency Diesel Generator A Operability Test, Revision 20
SP 3646A.2, Emergency Diesel Generator B Operability Test, Revision 22
SP3646A.22-001, Emergency Diesel Generator B Operability Tests, Revision 026
SP3646A.22-002, Train B EDG Air System Check Valve Test, Revision 001-02
SP3646B.6-002, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank 1B to EDG A Day Tank Test, Revision 006
U2-24-FFS, Millstone Unit 2 Fire Fighting Strategies, Revision 0
U2-24-FFS-BAP01-CB-MAP Millstone Unit 2 Fire Fighting Strategies for 480 Volt Load Center
Rooms
U3-24-FFS-BAP01-ESF-MAP Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategies for Engineered Safety
Features Building
WM-AA-20, Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities, Revision 2
Condition Reports (*initiated in response to inspection)
CA3053744 CR1054280 CR1083725
CR1064323 CR1060588 CR1083739
CR1041301 CR1071314 CR1084171
CR1042287 CR1084142 CR1085107
CR1076005 CR1098088 CR1087072
CR1066291 CR592112 CR1087078
CR1041881 CR567120 CR1087212
CR1039762 CR549280 CR1088497
CR1058241 CR547559 CR1089572
CR1068069 CR547435 CR1089988
CR1080842 CR545970 CR1092202
CR1052697 CR545428 CR1092742
CR1054792 CR545314 CR1095019
CR1078348 CR545134 CR1095438
CR1092863 CR529392 CR1095752
CR1038873 CR1104252 CR1095757
CR1038919 CR1096791 CR1095822
CR1038948 CR1090662 CR1096085
CR1039851 CR1086623 CR1096125
CR1042037 CR1078830 CR1096287
CR1056042 CR1082596 CR1096300
CR1087536 CR1066793 CR1096359
CR1101571 CR1061966 CR1096362
CR1039144 CR1061135 CR1096363
CR1039312 CR1055104 CR1096430
CR1039993 CR1054285 CR1096791
CR1040001 CR1052491 CR1096885
CR1040449 CR1040578 CR1096886
CR1040994 CR1040452 CR1101853
CR1040996 CR1020277 CR1102932
CR1041950 CR1041881 CR1103813
CR1040775 CR1048799 CR1038921
CR1042270 CR1048876 CR1038978
CR1055657 CR1049057 CR1039153
CR1056216 CR1052431 CR1039554
CR1058064 CR1054643 CR1040963
CR1040069 CR1056068 CR1041171
CR1041081 CR1058155 CR1041968
CR1088507 CR1058934 CR1042748
CR1100013 CR1064337 CR1042827
CR1102414 CR1065064 CR1043104
CR1040729 CR1071755 CR1043538
CR1046256 CR1073151 CR1043650
CR1047300 CR1074559 CR1043895
CR1061480 CR1075006 CR1044214
CR1066733 CR1075077 CR1044415
CR1068705 CR1075374 CR1044634
CR1080881 CR1075953 CR1044853
CR1089381 CR1076382 CR1044984
CR1046560 CR1076837 CR1045328
CR1045458 CR1050804 CR1097969
CR1046251 CR1054058 CR1076280
CR1042185 CR1054681 CR1054992
CR1082243 CR1066935 CR1105005*
CR1083716 CR1067384 CR1105042*
CR1092287 CR1069537 CR1105173*
CR1038846 CR1073335 CR1105194*
CR1038877 CR1075440 CR1105604*
CR1038943 CR1075530 CR1105612*
CR1039157 CR1077942 CR1105646*
CR1039278 CR1080824 CR1105766*
CR1039595 CR1083288 CR1105794*
CR1039637 CR1084165 CR1105795*
CR1040136 CR1086509 CR1105884*
CR1040143 CR1090171 CR1105887*
CR1040256 CR1090858 CR1105930*
CR1040304 CR1092726 CR1105938*
CR1040472 CR1092939 CR1105979*
CR1040727 CR1093443
CR1042273 CR1094937
CR1043240 CR1096840
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
WO53102971281 WO53103143959 WO 43102194931
WO53103015045 WO53103143960 WO 53102194929
WO53103028210 WO53103145376
WO53103042702 WO53203164218
Engineering Evaluations
50.59 screenings MPS3-SCRN-2018-0181-0 and MPS3-SCRN-2016-0195-0
ETE-MP-2015-1157, Revision 1, MP3 Reactor Coolant System Structural Integrity Evaluation
Following October 13, 2017 Overpressurization Event
Calculation M3-LOE-00281EM, Revision 5, Millstone 3: Pressure/Temperature Limits for 32
Drawings
212-26930 Sheet 2, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Feedwater System, Revision 49
212-30001, Main One Line Phasing Diagram Power Distribution System, Revision 26
212-26933, Sheet 1, Service Water System, Revision 44
212-26902, Sheet 3, Reactor Coolant System, Revision 26
212-26913, Sheet 1, PID High Pressure Safety Injection System, Revision 33
212-26913, Sheet 2, PID High Pressure Safety Injection System, Revision 42
212-26914, Safety Injection Pump Cooling System, Revision 18
Self-Assessment and Audits
PIR1050333 PIR1079909 PIR1011919
PIR1059882 PIR1044038 PIR1058977
PIR1062504 PIR1044036 PIR1089958
PIR1074474 PIR1011917 PIR1089989
PIR1089991 PIR1098156 PIR1089677
PIR1097498 PIR1097702 PIR1057404
PIR1098384 PIR1094309
50.59 Quality Review Team Quarterly Summaries 2016-Q4, 2017-Q4, and 2018-Q2
NRC NCVs Reviewed
NCV-2016-003-01 NCV-2016-403-04 NCV-2018-001-01
NCV-2016-003-02 NCV-2017-001-01 NCV-2018-001-02
NCV-2016-004-01 NCV-2017-001-02 NCV-2018-001-03
NCV-2016-004-02 NCV-2017-003-01 NCV-2018-010-01
NCV-2016-009-01 NCV-2017-004-01 NCV-2018-010-02
NCV-2016-009-02 NCV-2017-007-01 NCV-2018-010-03
NCV-2016-009-03 NCV-2017-403-01 NCV-2018-010-04
NCV-2016-403-01 NCV-2017-403-02 NCV-2018-410-01
NCV-2016-403-02 NCV-2017-403-03
NCV-2016-403-03 NCV-2017-403-04
Miscellaneous
50.59 Applicability and Screening Training Slideshows
ASME Paper: PVP-Vol. 481, RPV Integrity and Facture Mechanics, July 25-29, 2004, San
Diego, CA, PVP2004-2724, Probabilistic Assessment of Margins in Appendix G
Methodology, by
- K. K. Yoon, H. P. Gunawardane and S. Rosinksi.
CAP-002 Change Management detailed notice.
Dominion Nuclear Facility Quality Assurance Program Description Topical Report DOM-QA-1
Revision 27
Follow-up Documentation related to CA3093134 (Vendor Invoice)
List of Qualifications Required of Staff for 50.59 Applicability, Screens, and Evaluations
Millstone CAART Report for Thursday, September 13, 2018
Millstone CRT Report for Wednesday, September 12, 2018
MP-DC-000-MPG-18-00139, Resolution of Part 21 Impacting Foxboro Model N-2ARPS Series
Multinest Power Supplies 5/3/18
MPG-18-00139 Implementation Status Tracking Spreadsheet
Quarterly Surveillances for the Unit 3 C Charging Pump: 2017-04, 2017-08, 2017-11, 2018-01,
2018-02, 2018-05, and 2018-08
Scaffolding Tracking Spreadsheet/Database
Tech Spec 3/4.4.9 (including Figure 3.4-3). Reactor Coolant System Pressure/Temperature
Limits