IR 05000423/1985053

Insp Rept 50-423/85-53 on 850819-23.No Noncompliance or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Safe Shutdown Ability in Event of Design Basis Fire & Insp of Emergency Lighting Sys for Safe Shutdown Purposes

ML20133H669
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	10/08/1985
From:	Anderson C, Krasopoulos A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133H656	List: IR 05000423/1985053 ML20133H653
References
50-423-85-53, NUDOCS 8510180061
Download: ML20133H669 (18)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /85-53 Docket N _

License N CPPR-113 Priority -

Category B

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Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Name: Millstone Unit 3 Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut Inspection Conducted: August 19-23, 1985 Inspectors: _ / WI 19 ( ff A. Krisopoulos, Reactof Engineer

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'date Also participating and contributing to the report were:

D. Kubicki, Chemical Engineering Branch, NRR H. Thomas, Electrical Systems Specialist, BNL R. Hodor, Mechanical S stems Specialist, BNL Approved by: p_

0 to 91 C. nderson, Chief date Plant Systems Section, DRS Inspection Summary:

Inspection on August 19-23, 1985 (Inspection Report No. 50-423/85-53)

Areas Inspected: Special announced team inspection to assess the applicant's capability to safely shut down the plant in the event of a design basis fire and inspection of the emergency lighting system provided for safe shutdown purposes. The team also inspected the oil collection system provided for the reactor coolant pump The inspection involved 132 inspector hours on-site and 40 inspector hours in-office by a team consisting of 4 inspector Results: No violations were identified, 10 items remained unresolved at the end of this inspectio G510100061 851011 PDR ADOCK 05000423 G PDR

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO)

• R. J. Asafaylo, Quality Service Supervisor

• R. Busch, Project Manager

• J. Chiloyan, Electrical Engineer

• R. Cikatz, Quality Control Engineer C. H. Clement, Maintenance Supeivisor i J. O. Crockett, Unit 3 Superintendent

• S. Fankhauser, Facilities Engineer J. J. Festa, Project Manager

• K. Gray, Staff Assistant, Quality Assurance

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• R. G. Joshi, Licensing T. B. Kazukynas, Fire Protection  ;

W. Lepper, Electrical Engineer

• Malchiodi, Training Instructor

• R. L. McGuinness, Licensing Supervisor

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D. B. Miller, Jr. , Start-up Manager

*0. Moore, Assistant Operations Supervisor j *G. Nadeau, Assistant Project Engineer j J. W. Naylor, Fire Protection

• M. Olsen, Electrical Engineer i *S. Orefice, Project Engineer j *G. Pitman, General Electrical Engineering, Manager

• J. J. Roncaioli, Supervisor, Fire Protection

• T. A. Shaffer, Manager, I&C Engineering

• G. Van Noordennen, Licensing Engineer j 1.2 Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) _

! *R. T. Foley, Support Electrical Engineer

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• K. Horelik, Control Systems

• J. E. Krechting, Assistant Project Engineer R. Mattei, Principal Electrical Engineer C. Nardella, Lead Electrical Engineer

• E. Sanders, Power Engineer

• M. R. Scanlon, Lead PWR Engineer

• P. Sheldon, PWR Engineer

• B. Woodsby, Power Engineer 1.3 Tenera Corporation

• R. Eberly, Fire Protection Engineer

• N. Fiorovante, Systems Engineer

• G. E. Setka, Manager, Electrical I&E

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1.4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

• E. Doolittle, Licensing Project Manager, NRR T. Rebelowski, Senior Resident inspector

• Denotes those present at the exit intervie i 2.0 Purpose This inspection was performed to verify the applicant's ability to safely i shut down the plant in the event of a fire, and to verify the adequacy of

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the plant's Emergency Lighting System and oil collection system provided for the reactor coolant pump .0 Background The applicant's fire protection program was reviewed by NRR's Chemical Engineering Branch, Fire Protection Section, for conformance with the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) Section 9.5-1, Fire Protection dated July 1981. This document contains, in Branch Technical Position (BTP)

CMEB 9.5-1, the technical requirements of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, l hereinafter called BTP 9.5-1, and Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. The review of the applicant's Fire Protection Program (FPP) is documented in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated July 198 The applicant provided a comparison of Millstone 3 Fire Protection Program to the guidelines of both NUREG-0800 and Appendix R to 10 CFR 5 These

, comparisons are contained in Appendices B and C of the applicant's Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER) which is a part of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

l The applicant in the FPER committed to comply with the guidelines of NUREG-0800 (BTP 9.5-1) and Appendix R except where deviations from these guidelines have been identified by the applicant and technically

justified. These commitments, documented in the SER and FPER, were used by the team as the basis for this inspection, in particular, the commit-ments to provide safe shutdown capability in accordance with the guide-lines of BTP 9.5-1, Section C.S.B, Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown

Capability per BTP 9.5-1, Section C.5.C, an Emergency Lighting and Commu-nication System in accordance with BTP 9.5-1, Section C.S g. and an oil collection system for the reactor coolant pumps in accordance with BTP 9.5-1, Section C.7.a(1)(e). The requirements of the above-mentioned sections of BTP 9.5-1 are as follows:

Section C.S.B of BTP 9.5-1 requires that fire protection should be provided for structures, systems and components important to safe shutdown. These features should be capable of limiting fire damage so that:

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a) one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station (s) is free of fire damage; and

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b) systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control stations can be repaired within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> To meet the above guidelines, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage should be provided:

Separation by a fire barrier having a three hour rating

• Separation by a horizontal distance of at least 20 feet with no intervening combustibles and with fire detection and automatic fire suppression installed in the fire area

Enclosure of one train in a fire barrier having a one hour rating in addition to having fire detection and automatic suppression installed in the fire area If the protection required by Section C.5.b of BTP 9.5-1 is not provided or the systems of concern are subject to damage from fire suppression activities, Section C.S.c of BTP 9.5-1 requires that an alternate or dedicated shutdown capability be provided which is independent of the area of concer In addition, Section C.S.g of BTP 9.5-1 requires that an emergency lighting system and a two-way voice communication system is in place for areas vital to safe shutdown and emergency response in the event of a fir The emergency lighting should be fixed, self-contained units with individual 8-hour minimum battery power and should be installed in areas that must be manned during safe shutdown operations and for access / egress to and from all fire area Also, Section C.7.a(1)(e) of BTP 9.5-1 requires that the reactor coolant pumps be equipped with an oil collection system so designed that failure will not lead to fire during normal or design basis accident conottions and that the system will withstand a safe shutdown earthquak This collection system should be capable of collecting the lobe oil from possible leakage points and transporting this oil to a vented tank capable of holding the entire inventory of lobe oi .0 Correspondence All correspondence on the subject, between the applicant and the NRC and internal NRC documer.ts were reviewed by the inspection team in preparation for the site visit. Attachment 1 to this report is a listing of corre-spondence reviewe .0 Post Fire Safe Shutdown Capability The applicant's FPER in Section 6 describes the post-fire safe shutdown capability of Millstone #3, The document lists the systems required for

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safe shutdown :nd describes methods to achieve and maintain safe shutdown using these system .1 Systems Requiced for Safe Shutdown Systems and functions required for safe shutdown as listed in Section 6 of the applicant's FPER are as follows:

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Reactor coolant system decay heat removal via main steam / reactor coolant system instrumentation

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Reactor coolant system letdown

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Auxiliary feedwater injection I -

Auxiliary feedwater supply

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Auxiliary feedwater pump ventilation

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Reactor coolant system boration

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Reactor coolant system pressure control

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Residual heat removal system

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Component cooling water system

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Service water system j Additionally, a matrix included in this report as Attachment 2 describes which functions are available following a postulated fire in any plant area containing safe shutdown systems.

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5.2 Alternative Safe Shutdown Capability

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The applicant committed, in Section 6 of the FPER, to provide alternative safe shutdown capability for a fire that would disable

! the Control Room, Cable Spreading Room and Instrument Rack Roo This alternative shutdown capability will be in accordance with the

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requirements of Sections IIIG.3 and IIIL of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, which parallel the guidelines of BTP 9.5-1, positions C.5.b.(3) and C.S.c respectivel .3 Remaining Plant Areas

, The applicant in the response to Section C.S.b of BTP 9.5-1 compart-son committed to providing safe shutdown capability throughout the plant except in fire areas AB-1(D) and RC-1. For these two areas,

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the applicant in the response to Section C.5.e(2) of BTP 9.5-1, has provided alternative methods of assuring safe shutdown capabilit . :

6.0 Inspection Methodology The inspection team examined the applicar,t's capabilities for separating and protecting equipment, cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot and cold shutdown conditions. The team inspected randomly selected fire areas which the applicant had identified as being in conformance with BTP 9.5- The following functional requirements were reviewed for achieving and maintaining hot and cold shutdown:

• Reactivity control

Pressure control

• Reactor coolant makeup

• Decay heat removal

• Support systems

Process monitoring The inspection team also examined the applicant's capability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown and the capability to bring the plant to cold shutdown condition in the event of a fire in areas where remote shutdown capability is provide The examination included a review of the drawings for the remote shutdown capability and review of the procedures for achieving the remote shutdown. Drawings were reviewed to verify electrical independence from the areas of concer Procedures were reviewed for general content and feasibilit Also inspected were fire detection and suppression systems and the degree of physical separation between redundant trains of Safe Shutdown Systems (SSSs). The team review included ar evaluation of the susceptibility of the SSSs for damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression system The inspection team examined the applicant's fire protection features provided to maintain one train of equipment needed for safe shutdown free of fire damage. Included in the scope of this effort were fire area boundaries, including walls, floors and ceilings, and fire pro-tection of openings such as fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seal Also, the team reviewed the applicant's emergency lighting system for areas of the plant required for safe shutdown and the reactor coolant pumps oil collection syste .0 Inspection of Protection Provided to Safe Shutdown Sys_tems 7.1 Protection in Various Fire Areas The plant is divided into fire areas which are described in Section 5 of the FPE __A

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The team inspected the following areas because these areas contain safe shutdown equipment:

Auxiliary Building, Fire Area AB-1 Auxiliary Building Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-9 Auxiliary Building Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-10 Supplementary Leak Collection Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-11 Supplementary Leak Collection Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-12 East MCC and Rod Control Area, Fire Area AB-5 West MCC and Rod Control Area, Fire Area AB-6A West MCC/ Rod Control ACU Room, Fire Area AB-6B East MCC/ Rod Control ACU Room, Fire Area AB-8 East Service Water Cubicle, Fire Area CWS-3 West Service Water Cubicle, Fire Area CWS-4 Containment Structure, Fire Area RC-1 West Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-1 East Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-2 Battery Room 1, Fire Area CB-3 Battery Room 2, Fire Area CB-4 Battery Room 3, Fire Area CB-5 Battery Room 4, Fire Area CB-6 Battery Room 5, Fire Area CB-7 Electrical Equipment Room, West Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-16 Electrical Equipment Room, East Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-17 Cable Spreading Area, Fire Area CB-B Control Room, Fire Area CB-9 Instrument Rack Room and Underfloor Area, Fire Area CB11A and B Chiller Room, Fire Area CB-13 Mechanical Equipment Room, Fire Area CB-14 East Fuel Oil Vault, Fire Area EG-1 West Fuel Oil Vault, Fire Area EG-2 North Emergency Generator Enclosure, Fire Area EG-3A and B South Emergency Generator Enclosure, Fire Area EG-4A and B South Containment Recirculation Cooler Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-1 North Containment Recirculation Cooler Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-2 North RHR Heat Exchanger Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-3 East Floor Area, Fire Area ESF-4 Southeast Floor Area / Auxiliary Feed Pump Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-5 South RHR Heat Exchanger Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-6 Refueling Water Recirculation Pumps Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-7 North Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-8 South Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-9 North A/C Unit / Safety Injection Surge Tank Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-10 South A/C Unit Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-11 Floor Areas, Fire Area MSV-1

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l North Cable Tunnel, Fira Area SB-2 t j South Cable Tunnel, Fire Area SB-3 r

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C.S.b and C.5.c of BTP 9.5-1 and to assess the adequacy of the fire .

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protection in these areas.

i I No unacceptable conditions were identified except as follows: [

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The applicant in the FPER committed to abide by the guidelines set I i forth in BTP 9.5- ,

i The team identified two areas that these guidelines were not followed !

and requests to deviate from these guidelines were not submitted or planned and an analysis to show the adequacy of the Fire Protection Systems in these areas was not performe The areas in question and the deviations from the FPER are as

follows:

i 3 BTP 9.5-1, Section C 6 a. stipulates that fire detection systems be !

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provided for all areas that contain or present a fire exposure hazard i l to safety-related equipment. Such systems should be installed in

I accordance with NFPA Standard No. 72 The team observed that several locations in the plant containing safety-related equipment I were not provided with fire detectio Examples include the cubicle i on elevation 38 ft. 6 inches of the Hydrogen Recombiner Area and l several floor levels of the Main Steam Valve Enclosure. The appli- j

! cant has committed to either install additional fire detectors to i

satisfy the BTP 9.5-1 guidelines or to provide NRR with an analysis -

] which justifies the absence of fire detection in such areas. Also -

1 BTP 9.5-1 Section C.5.b(2)(a) stipulates that structural steel i members forming a part of a fire wall should be fireproofe ;

i l In lieu of fireproofing the structural steel, NRC has issued guidance I

to licensees stating that an engineering analysis may be performed to

show that a postulated fire within the fire area will not degrade the j fire barriers. The team observed that structural steel members forming a part of the ESF building fire walls were not fireproofed

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, and an analysis to justify the lack of fireproofing was'neither

performed nor planned, f

i The applicant committed to perform an analysis of the fire loading

within t..ase fire areas (ESF Building) and fireproof the steel j membert if the analysis indicates a need for fireproofing.

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! The above are collectively identified as an unresolved item.

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! Fire Barrier Adequacy Concerns Section C.S.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 stipulates that walls, floors and ceilings which separate fire areas should have a minimum fire resis-j tance rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, with all openings protected by fire doors, fire dampers or penetration seals having a fire rating equivalent to

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that of the barrier. The team observed several conditions in the

plant that appear to conflict with this guideline. Specifically

i Fire doors have been modified to accommodate security hardware; The configuration of spare conduit sleeves in fire barriers

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thicker than 8 inches thick have not been fire tested; and l

i Fire dampers have not been functionally tested under plant operating condition The applicant has responded to the team's concerns by committing to:

a j Submit a report to NRR which justifies the modifications to the fire doors; lI

! Provide confirmation to NRR that the configuration of spare conduit sleeves in fire barriers more than 8 inches thick have j a fire rating commensurate with the rating of the barrier; and i Provide the results of a functional test of fire dampers under l plant operating conditions to NRR,  ;

! Pending receipt and evaluation of these data by NRR, this item will 1 remain unresolve (50-423/85-53-02)

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I Fire protection of Safe Shutdown Eq~uipment in l Auxiliary BiiiTding and Reactor ContaTnment

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i The applicant in the safe shutdown analysis stated that the Auxiliary !

Butiding and Reactor Containment fire areas do not meet the guide-lines of BTP 9.5-1, Section C.S b. and an alternative shutdown

capability was not provided as required by BTP 9.5-1, Section C.S.c.

j The appitcant, however, stated that alternative fire protection capability is being provided, such as water curtains or other methods which do not meet the rule, and that a deviation request from the above requirements is being prepared for submittal to NRR for review - and approval. The safe shutdown capability in these areas could not

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l l be assessed at the time of the inspection, and it is unresolved, j pending an evaluation of the proposed deviation request by NRR and resulting alternative fire protection capability is installed and ,

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made operationa (50-423/85-53-03)  !

I i Testing of Gaseous Suppression Systems l

! The team observed that several plant areas are protected by gaseous ,

l fire protection systems, either Halon or carbon dioxide (CO2 ). The  :

i team raised the concern that in the areas protected by CO2 systems, i the seals installed to protect the fire barrier penetrations could '

fail upon system actuation from the resultant increase in room

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pressure. The team also was concerned that the design concentrations ;

of the Halon and CO 2 systems would not be achievable and maintain-J{ able.

i To resolve this issue, the applicant committed to submit to NRR the results of the acceptance tests on those systems to confirm that f penetration seal integrity was maintained and that design concentra- !

{ tions were achieved and maintained. Pending receipt and evaluation

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! of these tests, by NRR this item remains unresolve '

(50-423/85-53-04)

i i 7.2 Safe Shutdown Procedures i

} 7. Procedure Review ,

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j The team reviewed the following safe shutdown procedures:

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Procedure E0P 3503, Shutdown Outside Control Room,

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Revision 1, dated 8/21/85 l

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Procedure E0P 3504, Cooldown Outside Control Room,

Revision 1, dated 8/17/85 i

l The purpose of the review was to verify the adequacy of the l procedures to achieve the Safe Shutdown goals established for l both hot standby and cold shutdown. Procedures E0P 3503 and i j 3504 were developed to place the plant in hot standby and cold

, shutdown respectively following a design basis fire in either l the Control Room Instrument Rack Room or Cable Spreading Room

, with the available equipment and instrumentation indication, j

{ The team also " walked-down" the procedures to assess their l feasibility,

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No unacceptable conditions were identified except as follows: )-

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i Safe Shutdown Equipment Modification Work and Related Procedures

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The team observed that the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP) is

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I being modified. As a result of these modifications, the function designations on the panel for actuating valves, !

de energizing circuits, etc. were either missing or not clear.

lI The applicant addressed this concern in the Control Room design review to NUREG 0737, Supplement 1, which also includes the ASP.

1 An Engineering and Design Control Request (E and DCR) No.

I TC-06776 dated August 8, 1985 was initiated to complete this t

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Also, the applicant is in the process of incorporating into the !

station operating procedures the changes dictated by the Fire '

1 Protection Evaluation Shutdown Systems Availability Analysi ; This analysis examines the effects on shutdown capability of a j postulated fire in each fire area. Since the work is in pro- :

cess, a review could not be performed to determine the adequacy 1 of the revised procedures. Pending an NRC review of the com- .

1 l pleted work, and procedures, the above are collectively defined

as an unresolved item. (50-423/85-53-05)

j Repairs for Cold Shutdown

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The team observed that a fire in the Auxiliary Building Fire l Area AB-10 could damage all three component cooling pump l

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l These pumps provide cooling water to the RHR heat exchangers to i

remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System. The applicant explained that this function is required for cold

shutdown and if the pumps are damaged, the rule allows for

repairs. The applicant further stated that if a fire was to occur in this area, repairs are planned and an identical spare i

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pump motor will be available onsite for repair purposes. Also, installation procedures, tools, cable and other hardware and

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i time table that would allow cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> '

after a fire. Because the hardware and repair procedures were

not available for review, this is an unresolved item, j (50-423/85-53-06)

} Operator Actions for Manual Diesel Start i

l Ouring the walkdown of the safe shutdown procedures, a team 1 member observed that the emergency diesel generator shaf t is

exposed. This could present a hazard to an operator attempting i

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to manually start the emergency diesels by standing near the ..

shaft. An injury to the operator may interfere with the diesel

4 start and subsequent generator line up and synchronizatio The applicant committed to evaluate and correct this conditio !

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This is an unresolved item pending review of the applicant's actions in this area. (50-423/85-53-07)

7.3 Protection for Associated Circuits BTP 9.5-1, Section C.S.b, requires that pt otection be provided for associated circuits that could prevent operation or cause malopera-tion of redundant trains of systems neces',ary for safe shutdown. The circuits of concern are generally associated with safe shutdown circuits in one of three ways:

Common bus concern

• Spurious signals concern

Common enclosure concern The associated circuits were evaluated by the team for common bus, spurious signal, and common enclosure con: erns. Power, control, and instrumentation circuits were examined fo potential problem . Common Bus Concern The common bus concern may be found in circuits, either safety related or non-safety related, where there is a common power source with shutdown equipment and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concer ,

The team examined, on a sampling basis, 4160V, 480V, 120 V AC and 125V DC bus protective relay coordiration. The team also examined, on a sampling basis, the protection for specific instrumentation, controls, and power circuits, including the coordination of fuses and circuit breakers. The licensee plans to perform relay setting at approximately 12-month interval No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Spurious Signal Concern The spurious signal concern is made up of 2 items

False motor control, and instrument indications can occur such as those encountered during 1975 Browns Ferry fir These could be caused by fire initiated grounds, short or open circuit _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

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• Spurious operation of safety related or nonsafety-related components can occur that would adversely affect shutdown capability (e.g., RHR/RCS isolation valves).

The team examined, on a sampling basis, the following areas to ascertain that no spurious signal concern exists:

• Current transformer secondaries

• High/ low pressure interfaces

• General fire instigated spurious signals No unacceptable conditions were identified except as follows:

Installation of Redundant Fuses The team observed that a fire in the Control Room may disable the operation of the plant's alternate shutdown systems by damaging the transfer circuits between the main control panel and the auxiliary shutdown panels. The applicant stated that redundant fusing will protect the circuits involved and it will also eliminate the necessity to replace fuses during hot standb The applicant in Engineering and Design Coordination Report No. T-C-05936, dated July 19, 1985, indicated that circuit modifications will be implemented to provide redundant fusin The circuits involved are start-stop, speed control and metering circuits for the " orange" emergency diesel generator as well as the RWST and VCT suction valve Pending completion of the modification in this area, this item is unresolved. (50-423/85-53-08)

T Cold Instrumentation Work Incomplete The licensee is required to provide sufficient instrumentation to monitor the following parameters during alternative safe shutdow These parameters are as follows:

T Hot T Cold Steam Generator Pressure Steam Generator Level Pressurizer Pressure Pressurizer Level Source Range Tank Levels of all water sources required for shutdown

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The audit team determined that instrumentation for all of the above parameters has been provided at the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel except for T Cold. The applicant stated that Engineering and Design Coordination Report No. TC-05685 addresses this concern and calls for the T Cold instrumentation to be provided for Alternative Safe Shutdown. This is an open item pending completion and review of the proposed modifications.

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(50-423/85-53-09)

7. Common Enclosure Concern The common enclosure concern may be found when redundant circuits are routed together in a raceway or enclosure and they are not electrically protected or when fire can destroy both circuits due to inadequate fire barrier penetration A number of circuits, selected on a sampling basis, were examined for this concer '

No unacceptable conditions were identifie !

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7.4 General Fire protection Features The team examined the general fire protection features in the plant

! provided to maintain one train of safe shutdown equipment free of fire damage. Included in the scope of this effort were fire area

boundaries, including walls, floors and ceilings, and fire protection i

of openings such as fire doors, fire dampers, penetration seals, fire

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protection systems, and other fire protection feature No unacceptable conditions were identified except as indicated in

Section 7.1 of this repor .0 Emergency Lighting i

BTP 9.5-1, Section C.5.g. requires that emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply shall be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto. The applicant committed to provide such lighting in the FPER

Apacndix B response to BTP 9.5-1, Section C.5.g. The teen. observed that the emergency lighting installation has not progressed to the point that the system can be inspected to determine its adequac This is an unresolved item pending the installation of all emergency lighting systems by the applicant and a review of the systems by NR (50-423/85-53-10)

9.0 011 Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pumps

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BTP 9.5-1, Section C.7.a. Paragraph (1)(e), requires that the reactor

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! coolant pumps shall be equipped with an oil collection system if the

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containment is not inerted during normal operation. The applicant has  ;

installed an oil collection system for the reactor coolant pumps. The l

team's review did not identify any unacceptable condition ,

l 10.0 Unresolved Items

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Unresolved items are matters for which more information is required in

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order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, violations, or deviations, j Unresolved items are discussed in Sections 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and .0 Conclusions

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j j The significant findings of this inspection are summarized as follows:

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i One unresolved item stemming from a deviation from the FPER to design

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fire detection systems in accordance with NFPA Standard No. 72E and also provide fireproofing on structural steel members that form a

part of a fire barrier.

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Nine other items also remained unresolved at the end of the

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t Except at noted in this report, no other unacceptable conditions were i identified.

The applicant committed to resolve all of the findings contained in this i

report and complete all necessary modifications prior to fuel loa Further, the applicant committed to inform NRC Region I when this work is j complete so that it can be inspected in a timely manner.

] 12.0 Exit Interview j

The inspection team met with the licensee representatives, denoted in Paragraph 1, at the conclusion of the inspection on August 23, 1985. The j team leader summarized the scope and findings of the inspection at that time, i

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The team leader also discussed with the licensee the contents of the l! inspection report and ascertained that it would not contain any proprietary j

information. The licensee agreed that the inspection report may be placed in the Public Document Room without prior licensee review for proprietary i j information (10 CFR 2.790).

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At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the j licensee by the tea !

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ATTACHMENT 1 LIST OF CORRESPONDENCE REVIEWED MILLSTONE UNIT 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN 4/13/83 NRC - Chem, to Lic. Branch - Fire Protection 12/1/83 NRC - Chem. to Lic. Branch - Fire Protection Draft SER 3/9/84 NU to NRC (Lic.) - Results of Meeting to discuss draft SER open items (CMEB)

3/23/84 NU to NRC (Lic.) - Results of Meeting to discuss draf t SER open items (CMEB)

5/14/84 NU to NRC (Lic.) - Results of meeting to discuss draft SER open items (CMEB)

5/15/84 NU to NRC (Lic.) - Results of meeting to discuss draf t SER open items (ASB)

5/18/84 NRC - Chem. to Lic. Branch - Transmits Fire Protection SER 6/17/84 NRC - ASB - SER (not sent to Licensee)

10/9/84 Nu to NRC (Lic.) - Results of meeting to discuss Cable Spreading Room Protection CO 2 vs. Water Suppression 11/9/84 NU To NRC (Lic.) - Correction to PRA - fire in cable spreading room 1/25/85 NRC - Chem. to Lic. Branch - Fire Protection Supplemental SER 4/2/85 NU to NRC (Lic.) - Response to SER open items 4/30/85 NU to NRC (Lic.) - Transmits revised FPER 7/1/85 NU to NRC (Lic.) - Response to NRC question 410.32 - 1s0 Transfer Switches on Post Fire Shutdown Capability 7/25/85 NU to NRC (Lic.) - Results of June 4 and July 11, 1985 meetings with NRC to discuss deviations from BTP CMEB Guidelines

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ATTACHMENT 2 SYSTEM FUNCTION AVAILABILITY MATRIX FIRE AREA l

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ATTACHMENT 3 Section

Finding N Title Reference 50-423/85-53-01 Deviations from FPER 7.1

50-423/85-53-02 Fire Barrier Adequacy Concerns /85-53-03 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment in Auxiliary Building and Reactor Containment 50-423/85-53-04 Testing of Gaseous Suppression Systems /85-53-05 Safe Shutdown Equipment Modification Work and Related Procedures Not Completed 50-423/85-53-06 Repairs for Cold Shutdown /08-53-07 Operator Safety from Industrial Hazards /85-53-08 Installation of Redundant Fuses 7.3

. 50-423/85-53-09 T Cold Instrumentation Work Incomplete /85-53-10 Emergency Lighting Work Incomplete 8.0

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