IR 05000245/1985098

SALP Rept 50-245/85-98 for Mar 1985 - May 1986

ML20214X185
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	12/04/1986
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207B611	List: IR 05000245/1985098 IR 05000336/1985098 ML20207B605
References
50-245-85-98, NUDOCS 8612110003
Download: ML20214X185 (57)

Text

. .

ENCLOSURE 4 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION

REGION I

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE REPORT NO. 50-245/85-98 NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 ASSESSMENT PERIOD: MARCH 1, 1985 - MAY 31, 1986 BOARD MEETING DATE: JULY 28, 1986

,

}

8612110003 861204 ","

,,

PDR ADOCK 05000245 O PDR

. . _ _ _ _ , - - - _ _ _ _.__ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _____ _ _ _ .

. *

SUMMARY OF RESULTS Facility Performance CATEGORY CATEGORY LAST PERIOD THIS PERIOD RECENT FUNCTIONAL AREA (9/83-2/85) (3/85-5/86) TREND Plant Operations 1 1 Consistent Radiological Controls 2 3 Consistent Maintenance & Modifications 1 2 Consistent Surveillance 1 1 Consistent Emergency Preparedness 1 1 Consistent Security & Safeguards 1 1 Consistent Refueling /0utage Management 2 1 Consistent Assurance of Quality # 1 Consistent Training and Qualification # 2 Consistent fffectiveness 1 Licensing Activities 1 1 Consistent

1. Not previously addressed as a separate are Overall Facility Evaluation With the exception of one area, Radiological Controls, the facility per-formance during this SALP period was consistently goo Safe and con-servative plant operation has been evident. The operators and their management performed well in response to unplanned events such as reactor trips and Hurricane Glori In general, the more difficult activities were handled proficiently. Among these were high radiation exposure work planning and supervision, and minimizing the downtime involved in cor-recting security computer problem ,

This licensee has implemented several important initiatives. For example, under the integrated safety assessment program, probabilistic safety u study information is used to assess operating risks and prioritize plant ,

improvements. In addition, there now are plant specific simulators for each of this licensee's nuclear plant . - . - -- , - - - - - - - ----- - _ - -.- -

, -

l

Problems in the performance and management of the more routine activities, however, led to a slip in performance in the Maintenance and Radiological Controls areas. Three reactor trips during the period were attributed to inadequate attention in the maintenance program to aging equipmen The problem exhibited in the Radiological Controls area generally re-sulted from the licensee's inability to correct previously identified problem areas or weaknesses such as radwaste shipping and radiation area access contro Overall, however, the problems identified were outweighed by the general strength and conservatism of the licensee's approach to nuclear safet Nonetheless, significant improvement is needed to achieve across the board excellenc .

- - , . - - - - ,

. - - , - - - - - , - - , - w --,-----,-,-----,--n-, , ,-c- w--- m

. -

IV. PERFORM CE ANALYSIS Plan perations (726 hours0.0084 days <br />0.202 hours <br />0.0012 weeks <br />2.76243e-4 months <br />, 46%) An This sis @

nctio gl area encompasses operations, housekeeping, fire protect n, ht f performance, review committee activities, event reportin and rective action. The previous SALP rated plant operations as Category 1. Strengths noted were operator attention to detail, iagnostic techniques, attention to emergency power sources, and rompt tte ion to corrective actions. Weaknesses were noted in era r training and correction of Isolation Conden-ser valve motor pera o problem During the current ALP pe od plant operations were observed by theresidentinspectrthr$po,uttheperiod,andduringtworegion-ou based inspection e operat s conducted control room transac-tions carefully and sm thl reful procedure adherence was ob-served to be routin L gs were(0p- -date and detailed enough to permit reconstruction of lant cohd ons. Administrative workload handling was improved by a ignment Shift Supervisor's assist-ant who administers many rou ine evol ions Five unplanned scrams occurred uring t SALP period. Plant and personnel responses were proper. Three of the e are evaluated in the Maintenance area. Of the oth two, one as due to steam line

, high radiation when a condensate de inerali was placed in service.

l This is considered due to either a p sonne eid)or or to an unusual buildup of corrosion products in the

'

sin. An6t r scram occurred during a normal shutdown when the mode itch w ced in the startup position with power still above e associ ed trip setpoin This was a personnel erro Operations immediately preceding, during, an after the passage of Hurricane Gloria was conservatively addressed the license Preparations for the storm were timely and appr riate. Management

!

involvement extended to the Senior Vice President level before the storm and to the company President during the reco ry. During the hurricane, high winds from Long Island Sound create salt spray which caused switchyard loss. Unit I was secured pri to loss of i switchyard capabilities. Recovery actions were carefu accomp-l lishe Observation of control room practices noted consistently a quate management review. An example was unit superintendent tours f the ,

control room and review of operating logs prior to morning me ing Management discussions with operators regarding plant condition

were observed to be regularly conducte Thorough knowledge of

{

l l

- - - . . - . , ,. . ~ . . - . - , . - - -

o 'O I

IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS j Plant Operations (726 hours0.0084 days <br />0.202 hours <br />0.0012 weeks <br />2.76243e-4 months <br />, 46%) Analysis This functional area encompasses operations, housekeeping, fire protection, staff performance, review committee activities, event reporting and corrective actio The previous SALP rated plant operations as Category 1. Strengths noted were operator attention to detail, diagnostic techniques, attention to emergency power sources, and prompt attention to corrective actions. Weaknesses were noted in operator training and correction of Isolation Conden-ser valve problem I During the current SALP period, plant operations were observed by the resident inspector throughout the period, and during two region-based inspections. The operators conducted control room transac-tions carefully and smoothly. Careful procedure adherence was ob-served to be routine. Logs were up-to-date and detailed enough to permit reconstruction of plant condition Administrative workload handling was improved by assignment of a Shift Supervisor's assist-ant who administers many routine evolution Five unplanned scrams occurred during this SALP period. Plant and personnel responses were proper. Three of these are evaluated in the Maintenance area. Of the other two, one was due to steam line high radiation when a condensate demineralizer was placed in servic This is considered due to either a personnel error or to an unusual buildup of corrosion products in the resin. Another scram occurred during a normal shutdown when the mode switch was placed in the startup position with power still above the associated trip setpoin This was a personnel erro Operations immediately preceding, during, and after the passage of Hurricane Gloria was conservatively addressed by the license Preparations for the storm were timely and appropriate. Management involvement extended to the Senior Vice President level before the

,

storm and to the company President during the recovery. During the

! hurricane, high winds from Long Island Sound created salt spray which caused switchyard loss. Unit 1 was secured prior to loss of switchyard capabilitie Recovery actions were carefully accomp-lishe Observation of control room practices noted consistently adequate management review. An example was unit superintendent tours of the control room and review of operating logs prior to morning meeting Management discussions with operators regarding plant conditions 4 were observed to be regularly conducted. Thorough knowledge of

,

-- --

._

.

.

plant conditions was routinely exhibited by plant management during daily management meetings and during discussions with the resident inspector The resident inspectors observed numerous meetings of the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC). Questioning attitudes by PORC members were consistently evident. Inputs, both positive and nega-tive, were sought from all participant Further analyses and re-submittals to PORC were required when questions were not resolved to the satisfaction of the PORC. Overall, the PORC meetings were evaluated as thorough and professional review session Plant staff turnover for the SALP period was very low (less than 2%). Operators are on a 6-shift schedule with an abundance of backup licensed individuals. The total number of licensed personnel at the end of the SALP period was 42. At any time, three shifts are on shift rotation, one is a relief shift, one shift is in training, and one shift is of The training emphasis provided by this rotation is considered a licensee strengt In August 1985, one set of operator license examinations was con-ducted. Three of 4 senior operator candidates and 5 of 6 operator candidates passed. No significant generic weaknesses were note Housekeeping was found to be excellent with a minimum of contaminated area Plant piping and valves exhibited little leakage. Manage-ment review of audits and Plant Information Reports was timely and corrective actions were promptly instituted. However, observations in containment identified a need for improved lighting in a few areas and a need for painting throughou During the SALP period, a fire occurred in a degreasing unit in the tool decontamination facilit The on-site fire brigade and local fire department responded and the fire was extinguished promptly.

<

No safety equipment was involved. To prevent recurrence, the de-l greasing unit was permanently removed.

Management involvement and control in assuring quality in fire pro-tection was evident. The administrative control procedure contains

'

well-defined provisions. Fire brigade training was assessed as

aggressive and well defined. Fire protection audits were generally

!

complete and audit findings were resolved in a timely and satisfac-tory manner. Fire protection staffing was considered adequate. Fire

protection activities were well documented. The responsibility for

'

implementing the fire protection program is shared by various de-partments. No dedicated individual (fire protection engineer or -

< coordinator) is assigned to coordinate the different fire protection activities in the plant. While, with three units operating on site,

'

it may be appropriate to consider assigning a full time onsite fire

-

protection coordinator, the lack of one was not found to result in any fire protection inadequacies.

l l

l 5

. - - - - , - - - , - - - - - _ _ - - - - _

_

.. ..

A region-based team inspected the availability of selected equipment identified as important to the dominant accident sequence (a loss of normal AC power followed by failure of a safety-relief valve to reseat) and the ability of the plant staff to effectively respond to and recover from this event. The potential for human error was evaluated by review of procedures and walk-through simulation of scenarios. The inspection verified that the procedures were well-written and the operators were knowledgeable of these procedure Training programs were found to include adequate instructions for responding to emergency situations. One minor procedural inadequacy was found in the Isolation Condenser operating procedure. This was promptly corrected by the license Management was very involved in plant activities and responsive to NRC inspection finding Ad-ministrative controls over tagging, maintenance, and operations met or exceeded requirements and were effectively implemented. Based on the Probabilistic Safety Study, the licensee took action to im-prove Isolation Condenser isolation valve operatio Procedural

controls were improved. The normally shut isolation valve's disk and motor-operator were replaced.

.

LERs are routinely reviewed by Region I. In addition, a sample of LERs was evaluated by the NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) and was found satisfactory. A strong point noted by AE00 is that information was provided on operator

actions that affected the course of the event and on automatic and safety system responses. Weaknesses identified included a lack of assessment of the potential safety consequences under other condi-tions and a lack of identification of failed component The former relates to the thoroughness of assessment of potential consequences; the latter to the ability of other facilities to readily correct similar problems.

.

In summary, the licensee's operations functions were generally well performe Operator response to changing plant conditions were con-sidered appropriate, and operator performance was considered pro-fessional and competen "

! 2. Conclusion Rating: Category .

Trend: Consistent.

' *

3. Board Recommendation:

Licensee: Non ;

NRC: Non ;

.

_ . . . - _ . - - - . _ _ _ _

- .-_ .-. , . - . . - _ .

, .-

..

B. Radiological Controls (191 hours0.00221 days <br />0.0531 hours <br />3.158069e-4 weeks <br />7.26755e-5 months <br />, 12%) Analysis The previous SALP rating in this area was Category 2. Although the licensee's radiation protection program was defined by generally good policies and procedures, there were deficiencies noted in the implementation of procedure changes and in the shipment of radio-active materials to Barnwell, South Carolin During this SALP period, radiation protection was considered to be defined by adequate procedures and policies. Contamination was well-controlled. The extent of contaminated areas was kept to a minimum, reflecting a station commitment towards that en The licensee's program for surveying and posting radiological areas was generally well implemented. Surveys were performed as required to evaluate radiological conditions. Survey information was avail-able at the control point and status boards were frequently update However, NRC inspections of Unit 1 in June 1985 and January 1986 identified instances where doors posted "High Radiation Area - This Door Must Be Locked At All Times," were left open or where the lock had been defeated. The licensee's implementation of routine sur-veillance of High Radiation Area control failed to identify these instances. Corrective actions were shown to be inadequate by the January 1986 identification of recurrent instance Labeling of radioactive material was generally adequate. In one isolated instance, however, a problem did develop from a failure to remove radioactive material labeling from clean structural steel .

used during the Unit 2 outage before it left the sit Although the material was not radioactive, it was noted by members of the general public at a scrapyard and created unnecessary concer Several high-exposure jobs were completed and effectively controlled during this assessment period. During the Unit 1 outage, the work included NDE and weld overlay work on the recirculation piping and jet pump instrument nozzles. The ALARA group ongoing review of jobs in progress included review of exposure status reports and the per-formance of periodic worksite audits to insure specified controls were being implemented. A potential weakness was noted in the Unit 1 ALARA staff's reliance on the HELPORE exposure tracking computer system. Due to computer problems, the Unit 1 ALARA group was not aware of actual versus goal exposure overruns on two separate jobs until ten days into the outage. Alternate exposure tracking meas-ures should be considered when computer support is not timely for relatively high exposure activitie Several deficiencies were noted in the Unit 1 outage control of routine radiological activitie Examples were identified in which .

the radiological controls required by the Radiation Work Permit (RWP)

_ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _

..- ..

l

12 l

l l

.were modified by a HP technician in the field, without supervisory review or documentation of the change on the RWP. This contributed to worker confusion and an excessive reliance on HP verbal instruc-tion. In one instance, the requirement for respiratory protection was dropped by an in-the-field, unreviewed change; this resulted j in the unplanned uptake of radioactive material by a worker. An I unrelated unplanned uptake by two workers performing valve repacking I resulted from a failure to adequately assess the work conditions in the RWP. Neither the RWP nor the pre-job briefing recognized the increased potential for personnel contamination resulting from the worker's position directly underneath the contaminated valve Additional lapses in control occurred when contractor workers vio-lated station procedures by decontaminating themselves and leaving the site without notifying the licensee's HP organization. This prevented HP from promptly locating the source and cause of con-tamination and taking corrective measures. Action was taken, later, to reinstruct the workers and improve the posting of contaminated area The Unit 2 outage work included significant steam generator tube inspection and sleeving / plugging activities. The ALARA group planned and implemented numerous dose reduction methods, including mockup training, temporary shielding, use of remotely-operated NDE equipment, and steam generator decontamination. Of particular note was the dose expenditure savings in the steam generator nozzle dam installation. Licensee development of specialized training and modifications to the nozzle dams made in response to " lessons learned" during the previous outage resulted in a dose expenditure of less than 25% of the previous outage expenditure. Despite these ,

efforts, the collective occupational radiation exposure during the 1985 Unit 2 outages exceeded 1650 man-rem. This indicates a need to reduce the collective radiation exposur The licensee was suc-

! cesstul in promulgating ALARA concepts and philosophy within the

'

radiclogical controls grou Further reduction in the collective l occupational exposure may require more active participation of other

'

licensee organizations and expanding new ALARA initiatives to plant chemistry, maintenance, and operation The preceding analysis notes strong control over high exposure jobs but multiple lapses in routine radiation controls. The latter con-dition is considered to have occurred enough to warrant specific corrective action. In this regard, the assurance of individual worker endorsement of and adherence to radiation protection controls is at least as important as assuring that health physics specialists i

do not allow improper deviation from previously established controls or good practice .

l i

_ _ __

_ . . _ _ _ _ . _ -.__ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ _ . _ _._ _ _ _ - ___._ _ _ -_ _ . _ ____ ___ _- _ ___ -

.- *

A generally ineffective corrective action program in radwaste pre-paration, packaging and shipping activities was evident. During the previous assessment period, 10 discrepant shipments had been identified and the previous SALP noted that the licensee had not effected adequate corrective action. During this assessment period, the special NRC appraisal brought specific programmatic weaknesses to the licensee's attention. Reviews of radwaste preparation,

-packaging and shipping by NRC specialists and Agreement State Rep-resentatives identified multiple violations indicative of program-matic breakdown. In March 1985, external radiation levels on a licensee shipment exceeded 200 millirem / hour on a package shipped on an open, flatbed tractor trailer. This resulted in a Severity Level 3 violation. In March 1986, a licensee radioactive shipping package was mislabeled and the vehicle carrying the shipment was not placarded. The licensee did not have copies of drawings and other documents referenced in Certificates of Compliance for two shipments. Procedures for solidification of radwaste did not pro-vide specific detailed information to assure that the radwastes were properly solidifie The licensee's Quality Control program did not assure compliance with 10 CFR 61.56. Receipt inspections of soli-dification equipment were not performed as required by the licen-see's Quality Assurance procedure Radwaste shipping personnel were not adequately traine Sufficient management involvement in and control over assuring quality in packaging and shipping activities was not evident. Pro-cedures for preparing and packaging radioactive materials for ship-ment lacked step-by-step instructions in the degree of detail necessary to perform the activity. Acceptance criteria against which success or failure of the activity could be judged were lack-in Lack of management oversight of packaging and shipping acti-vities was made evident by inadequate supervision of activities during the absence of the Radioactive Material Supervisor, by an inactive Radwaste Review Committee, and by failure of the Radiolo-gical Services Supervisor to examine the radwaste shipping records and logs as required by licensee procedures. In addition, radwaste shipment records were not readily available for revie The application of the licensee's QA program to radwaste packaging and shipping was found to be ineffective. QA audits lacked techni-cal expertise in shipping-related areas. Corporate QA implementing procedures did not reflect transport packages as a Category I item as established in the licensee's QA Topical Report. The QC program was limited in scope with regard to 10 CFR 61.55 and 61.56. QA monitoring of radwaste packaging / shipping activities was infrequen No effluent release limits were exceeded. Nonetheless, occasional lack of licensee attention to detail was noted during reviews of the effluent control progra QA audits of the readiness to imple-ment Technical Specification changes concerning effluent monitoring

. *

,

l were not performed prior to the effective date of those change Administrative control procedures identifying periodic surveillance tests were not updated to reflect the changes. Station personnel were unable to discuss the scope of effluent monitor calibratio A review of the licensee's environmental monitoring program immedi-ately prior to the assessment period indicated the program was generally satisfactor This analysis addresses items which resulted in the issuance of a total of ten NRC violations. One of these was a Severity Level 3 violation, but no civil penalty was issued by the NR In conclusion, the licensee's system for the identification and correction of radiological deficiencies has shown a decline since the previous assessment period. Several licensee initiatives were taken in the ALARA program; however, the collective occupational radiation exposure remains high in comparison to similar power reactors. A recurrent problem with High Radiation Area access con-trol and continuing repetitive violations indicative of programmatic breakdown in the radioactive waste packaging and shipping areas were noted. Licensee corrective actions in the transportation area have been ineffective. A lack of appropriate management involvement is indicate . Conclusion:

Rating: Category Trend: Consistent 3. Board Recommendation:

Licensee: Improve radiation worker training to stress worker aware-ness of and compliance with Health Physics procedure Improve the effectiveness of the ALARA progra Strengthen assurance of quality in the transportation are NRC: Increased inspection effort to assess adequacy of program improvement .. ..

C. Maintenance and Modifications (224 hours0.00259 days <br />0.0622 hours <br />3.703704e-4 weeks <br />8.5232e-5 months <br />, 14%) Analysis The previous.SALP rated maintenance as Category 1. Positive find-ings were made on the machinery history, working knowledge of tech-nicians,. supervisors and QA inspectors, post-maintenance and post-modification testing, the corporate-wide maintenance management system, procedural compliance, safety, work practices, and documen-

.tation. The equipment classification program, vendor interfaces and QA involvement in post-maintenance testing were assessed to be effectiv During this SALP period, the licensee performed nondestructive ex-amination of the recirculation system piping including the safe-end Needed weld repairs were made in accordance with the latest NRC documents on stress corrosion cracking. Other difficult maintenance performed during this assessment period included reactor vessel jet pump instrument assembly ultrasonic examinations. These indicated several welds in each assembly were rejectable. Repairs were ac-complished by weld overlay. High radiation fields, design of the

' instrument assembly and physical location complicated this entire evolution. Inspection and repair efforts were accomplished follow-ing specialized worker training using a full size mock-u The work was well supervised by management and radiation protection techni-cians, who were active at the job site. The work was also covered closely by engineering and QA/QC personnel. Total job performance was evaluated as outstandin Plant staff competence was also observed in the repairs of the iso-lation condenser steam supply line, the recirculation pipe defect, and the service water piping leak. In each case, the engineering effort, maintenance procedures, advance training, actual repair, and followup documentation were very goo In general, the licensee continues to be responsive to NRC concern For example, in response to inspector concern regarding the failure of standby liquid control system squib valves to fire at another BWR, NNECO took extensive follow up action including testing to

'

verify circuit integrity, upgrading purchase procedures, and revis-ing maintenance procedure No problems with installed components

! were identified.

I A number of the control rod scram solenoid pilot valves were reworked

! during the refueling outage. Some of these malfunctioned during

! post-outage testing at power and caused the associated rods to fail i

to scram. Inadequate testing of the valves after rework and before l power operation is considered to be a prime factor in this failure.

' In addition, a basic problem (Buna-N material) was the subject of much GE and NRC correspondence from 1975 through 198 Recommenda-

!

__ __ __

. .

[onsfor replacement of Buna-N parts and other improvements w e ade i th e letter Included were items such as establish-men preve tiv maintenance schedules to assure disk materials were r laced rio o their end-of-life. NRC review concluded that the 1 e ee's rework program on the scram solenoid pilot valves was not t1 . In response, the licensee committed to rebuild all remainin s oid-operated scram pilot valves by June 1986 and to bench tes c valve following rework. That was accomplishe Aging plant i nt caused problems during this SALP perio There was a s ue to a worn scram solenoid valve's failure to rese Two r ;;~ red because of problems with the main turbine mechanic pressure ulator (MPR). There were also two periods of unsatis ctory perfo ance of the emergency gas turbine generator (EGTG). imm W " Foblems were corrected. In the case of the MPR, the ic see is considering whether replacement with a new design is a ' riate. In the case of the EGTG, proce-dures, training, trendii equipment characteristics, and manage- '

ment overview has been i responsive one ged. But these actions were primarily Another example of responsive c ective action is the reactor feedwater control system. Pas roblems led to a component redesign and replacement program, and th has not been a performance problem during this SALP period. T indicates that corrective actions, once initiated, are effec . The inadequacies which have become apparent relate to not upgra ging equipment before significant component problems aris Discussions with maintenance personnel veale high level of knowledge about current maintenance activ t . his included the scram solenoid rework effort and the EGTG p 'r A special team inspection was performed to as s he environmental qualification of electric equipmen The te d evidence of prior licensee planning and assignment of priori  ; and well stated, controlled, and explicit procedures for E ronmental Quali- .

fication (EQ) activities. Policies were well stat , disseminated, and understandable. Licensee audits were complete, imely, and

,

thorough. EQ records were complete, generally very w i maintained, l

'

and available. Corporate management was involved in a knowledge-able of the program. The licensee exhibited conservatis and reached decisions which were thorough, technically sound, nd timely in almost all cases. They established a 24-hour beeper sys em for calling EQ personnel to resolve maintenance problem The licensee was somewhat slow in dealing with NRC Information o-tices on the EQ program; however, they did make commitments for positive resolution of the associated concerns. Deadlines were m with technically sound and thorough resolutions. Staff positions

.

-- . - . , . -- - - - , . - , . - - . - _

. .

e ide i d and authorities and responsibilities for EQ were w defin d f the Senior Vice President level down. Staffing was a le s evi ced by high quality of the EQ program. Consult-ants s alizing in EQ were used, but only under licensee directio The t i program was well defined and implemented for all in-volve r nnel. Site personnel training was extensive and all rviewed had an excellent awareness of their role in

personn the EQ p r In addition, they displayed a positive attitud The inspe 'on +- cn cluded that this was a well-implemented EQ progra Excellent QA C involvement plant activities was noted during relay install ion work, reworT of T.ha scram solenoid valves, and <

es. For example, the post-outage rework of the

'

other plant ac scram valves was jected to thorough and meaningful QC coverag No violations were ntified in the Maintenance area during this SALP perio %

In summary, much outs h ing maintenance work was noted and the en-vironmental qualificat . program was well implemented. But there were significant proble 16h the scram solenoid pilot valves, with the emergency gas turbin gene p r, and with the main turbine mechanical pressure regul o These indicate a need to more ef-fectively assure that agin or obsolescent equipment is replaced and, where appropriate, red ed so as to minimize the effect upon and challenges to safety syst .

2. Conclusion _

Rating: Category Trend: Consistent 3. Recommendations: D Licensee: Non ,

NRC: Non )

l l

e l

,

. - _

m O l

16a -

l tions for timely replacement of Buna-N parts and other improvements were made in these letters. Included were items such as establish-ment of preventive maintenance schedules to assure disk materials were replaced prior to their end-of-lif NRC review concluded that the licensee's rework program on the scram solenoid pilot valves was not timely. In response, the licensee committed to rebuild all remaining solenoid-operated scram pilot valves by June 1986 and to bench test each valve following rework. That was accomplishe Because of problems with replacement parts, there were two periods

, of unsatisfactory performance of the emergency gas turbine generator (EGTG). Procedures, training, trending of equipment characteristics, and management overview were increased in respons Aging plant equipment caused problems during this SALP perio There was a scram due to a worn scram solenoid valve's failure to rese Two scrams occurred because of problems with the main

turbine mechanical pressure regulator (MPR). The immediate prob-lems were corrected and the licensee is considering whether re-placement of the MPR with a new design is appropriate. But these actions were also primarily responsive one Another example of responsive corrective action is the reactor feedwater control system. Past problems led to a component redesign and replacement program, and this system has not been a performance problem during this SALP period. This indicates that corrective actions, once initiated, are effectiv The inadequacies which have arisen were evaluated as being due, at least in part, to not up-grading aging equipment before significant component problems aris Discussions with maintenance personnel revealed a high level of l knowledge about current maintenance activities. This included the scram solenoid rework effort and the EGTG repairs.

i A special team inspection was performed to assess the environmental qualification of electric equipment. The team noted evidence of l

prior licensee planning and assignment of priorities; and well stated, controlled, and explicit procedures for Environmental Quali-

'

fication (EQ) activitie Policies were well stated, disseminated, and understandable. Licensee audits were complete, timely, and thorough. EQ records were complete, generally very well maintained, and available. Corporate management was involved in and knowledge- able of the program. The licensee exhibited conservatism and reached decisions which were thorough, technically sound, and timely in almost all cases. They established a 24-hour beeper system for calling EQ personnel to resolve maintenance problems.

I The licensee was somewhat slow in dealing with NRC Information No-tices on the EQ program; however, they did make commitments for positive resolution of the associated concerns. Deadlines were met with technically sound and thorough resolutions. Staff positions

- . . - . -

- . . _ _

_.. -.

17a were identified and authorities and responsibilities for EQ were well defined from the Senior Vice President level down. Staffing was ample as evidenced by high quality of the EQ program. Consult-ants speciali71ng in EQ were used, but only under licensee directio The training program was well defined and implemented for all in-volved personnel. Site personnel training was extensive and all personnel interviewed had an excellent awareness of their role in the EQ progra In addition, they displayed a positive attitud The inspection team concluded that this was a well-implemented EQ progra Excellent QA/QC involvement in plant activities was noted during relay installation work, rework of the scram solenoid valves, and other plant activitie For example, the post-outage rework of the scram valves was subjected to thorough and meaningful QC coverag No violations were identified in the Maintenance area during this SALP perio In summary, much outstanding maintenance work was noted and the en-vironmental qualification program was well implemented. But there were significant problems with the emergency gas turbine generato Problems with the scram solenoid pilot valves and with the main turbine mechanical pressure regulator indicate a need to more ef-l fectively assure that aging and/or obsolescent equipment is replaced

'

and, where appropriate, redesigned so as to minimize the effect upon

,

and challenges to safety systems.

!

2. Conclusion Rating: Category Trend: Consistent 3. Recommendations:

Licensee: Non j NRC: Non i

!

% .

'

D. Surveillance (295 hours0.00341 days <br />0.0819 hours <br />4.877645e-4 weeks <br />1.122475e-4 months <br />, 19%) Analysis Surveillance was rated Category 1 during the last SALP. Inadequate technical understanding of the control and planning for the con-tainment leak rate test was noted as a problem. Corrective actions have since been evaluated as acceptabl Surveillance was observed by the resident inspectors throughout this SALP perio In addition, specialist inspectors observed the In-service Inspection (ISI) Program, the containment leak rate program, and other surveillance The licensee's overall surveillance program continues to be compre-hensive. The inservice inspection (ISI) program has strong manage-ment control and provides for non-destructive examination (NDE) that exceeds the ASME Code and ISI program requirement In cases where surveillance test requirements were not met, appropriate measures including repairs and retests were initiated. This was seen when Channel 1 of the air ejector off gas monitor failed its functional test. Documentation was timely and in accordance with test proce-dures. Effective corrective actions were initiate During the first part of this SALP period, no provisions for me-chanical snubber testing, other than simply exercising over the entire stroke by hand, were available. A snubber test facility was subsequently installed, and NRC observation of training on the snubber testers identified no training inadequacie Surveillance procedures reviewed were generally very good, but there were some exception For example, Region I issued a Level IV vio-lation related to failure to establish written procedures for the i calibration of safety-related pressure switches and for incomplete

procedures for identifying misalignment of mechanical snubber rod

) and bushings. These are considered to be isolated occurrences.

Another violation was issued for failure to make notification of

! an emergency diesel generator sequencer deficiency. This was a

! minor item. The corrective actions were reviewed and found accept-l able.

i l Operational surveillance training consists primarily of checkouts i on specific surveillances. That training has been noted by the j resident inspectors to be thorough and rigorous.

{ The licensee takes action on surveillance problems. An example was

the recirculation pump differential pressure (dP) switch setpoint

! drift problem identified during the 1985 refueling outage. These j dP switches input to the logic circuit for selection of an unbroken j

recirculation loop for safety injection. Surveillance of the l

t

= $

switches was increased from once an operating cycle to once a wee Based on the results of the increased surveillance, the licensee intends to either permanently revise the surveillance frequency or change the dP switches to a more reliable desig The licensee has a sound surveillance program, as evidenced by the large number of tests performed in a timely manne . Conclusion Rating: Category Trend: Consisten . Board Recommendation Licensee: Non NRC: None.

.

i

, m -, _ _ __ -., - _ - , - - . _ . _ , _ . , _ _ _ , _ _ , , . , , , , , .

,

,, _ , _ . . . , , , . . , _ _ _ , _ - , _ _ , , , , , _ . _ . , , , - _ , . . - - - . . . _ , , , , , _ - , , , _ . . . , - . _ , _ _ ,

O *

E. Emergency Preparedness (0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />, 0%. This is not fully accurate because of the common characteristics of the program at all three Millstone units.) Analysis During the previous SALP, the licensee was rated as Category 2 (Improving) in Emergency Preparedness (EP). This rating was based upon the progress that had been made in correcting previously iden-tified weaknesses, including replacement of the small temporary TSC with a new permanent facility and improvi..g the EP Training Progra This progress was readdressed during the Unit 3 licensing process and subsequent evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of the site EP progra As the Emergency Plan, procedures, facilities, and key response personnel are common for the site, this SALP reflects relevant per-formance at Millstone 2 and 3 as representative of performance on Unit 1. During this assessment period, the NRC review effort in-cluded one inspection at Unit 2 to observe the Annual EP exercis The other major EP inspection effort involved conducting the EP Im-plementation Appraisal for Unit 3 (and the follow-up of issues identified during that appraisal) in preparation for licensin The appraisal covered the areas of facilities and equipment, or-ganization, procedures, and training. The emergency organization which includes corporate response personnel is acceptable. The Site Plan provides for augmentation of key staff personnel within 30 minutes as recommended in the staffing goal The training program has shown improvement over the past two years; however, some draft procedures on testing requirements (identified during inspection in February 1984) were still in draft form during the EP follow-up inspection. These procedures implement the stand-ards for hands-on/ practical training for emergency response. (The associated apparent lack of management attention was also identified in the current SALP for Unit 3.)

In general, the licensee has been responsive to NRC initiative In addition to the " official" November 1985 exercise, two drills were observed demonstrating Unit 3 specific features as part of the EP Implementation. Licensee performance in the exercise and the drills reflected a high level of training and preparation, reflect-ing the recent management attention to this are The licensee's preparation for the appraisal was generally excellent, but not all of the currently accepted guidance concerning Emergency Plans had been incorporated. A meeting to discuss the issues in Region I resulted in implementation of appropriato changes or incorporation of better descriptions of Plan features in the Emergency Pla ,- .

The emergency response capability was also observed during the pass-age of Hurricane Gloria in September 1985. An Unusual Event was conservatively declared at the sit High winds caused damage to some systems. The meteorological monitoring capability became com-pletely inoperable. No onsite backup was available. The licensee plans to install a system to provide backup / supplemental meteorolo-gical monitoring capability on sit Licensee personnel partially staffed emergency response facilities, maintained a ready posture, and tracked the storm system. Afterwards, the licensee addressed the problems and prepared appropriate corrective action Northeast Utilities maintains an excellent relationship with the State of Connecticut and local municipalities, as evidenced by the ,

cooperation demonstrated during exercise Overall, the licensee has a sound emergency preparedness progra . Conclusion Rating: Category Trend: Consistent 3. Board Recommendation Licensee: Reassess effectiveness of commitment tracking syste NRC: None.

i

<

l l

l

'

i

_

o *

F. Security and Safeguards (119 hours0.00138 days <br />0.0331 hours <br />1.967593e-4 weeks <br />4.52795e-5 months <br />, 8%) Analysis The previous SALP rating was a Category 1. Strengths were manage-ment attention to the security program, a comprehensive corporate security audit program, security staffing, and event reportin Minor problems were report content (insufficient details in a few reports) and a potential training weaknes Since security is a site program, this SALP addressed relevant findings at all three Millstone plant Two routine, unannounced physical security inspections and one routine, unannounced material control and accounting inspection were performed by region-based inspectors during this assessment period. Routine resident inspec-tions continued throughout the perio One D .rity Level III violation, with no civil penalty assessed, was cited for the unauthorized introduction of a firearm onsit This resulted from an oversight by a member of the security forc The violation was detected by another member of the security force and was promptly and factually reported to the NRC. The short term corrective actions were prompt and effective and the long term ac-tions were comprehensive and innovativ During this period, the licensee installed and tested equipment and systems at Unit 3 and integrated the Unit 3 program into the program at Units 1 and 2. While that effort consumed considerable resources, the licensee was able to continue a highly effective security pro-gram at Units 1 and 2. This was accomplished through comprehensive planning, effective coordination and appropriate allocation of re-sources. That was reflective of close management oversight and in-volvement, well stated policies and procedures, effective licensee and contractor supervision, and an effective training and qualifi-cation progra Management oversight and involvement was evident in the licensee's decision to restructure its licensee and contractor security organi-zations as it became apparent that modifications were needed to ac-commodate Unit 3. Program implementation was separated into an operational element and a support element. Additional supervisory and technical positions were incorporated. This resulted largely from a comprehensive task analysis, initiated by corporate manage-ment, of both the licensee and contract organizations by a group of licensee corporate, management, site management, and contractor management representative That initiative was evidence of the licensee's commitment to a high quality security progra r

., ,

l The licensee was prompt and comprehensive in responding to two potential weaknesses pointed out by NRC. In both cases, the licen-see upgraded the commitment in their NRC-approved plan, after de-veloping and applying strengthened criteri Personnel in the security organizations were professional and cour-teous in their dealings with NRC personne The licensee's comprehensive security audit program includes planned audits to meet NRC requirements and a licensee initiative to conduct periodically, without notice, audits of program implementatio Auditors are well qualified and professionally carry out the audit Audit findings and recommendations are clearly documented, appro-priately disseminated, and promptly resolved. The audit program is also complemented by frequent corporate staff assistance visits to discuss potential problems, evaluate proposed program modifica-tions, and exchange information of general interes *

.

The licensee submitted a total of 16 Security Event Reports (SERs).

Nine of these identified security computer problems. Due to an ef-fective and dedicated security equipment repair group and a computer

, services group, the cumulative downtime during the entire assessment l '

period was only about five hours. Three SERs involved defective equipment found during surveillance testing. The licensee has recognized the need for and has initiated planning for replacement of aging equipment to avoid such problems in the future. Three j other SERs involved isolated errors by security force members.

t

, SERs were timely and contained the detailed information essential i

for NRC assessment. Compensatory actions for all events were found to be prompt and appropriate to the circumstances. In two cases

,

involving personnel errors, however, the NRC had to contact the licensee for more detail. The licensee's program for identifying and reporting security events is considered adequate but could be l

strengthened by providing greater detail (e.g., time elements and

<

root cause). This concern about SERs is mino Staffing of all aspects of the licensee's security program is ade-i

'

quate and effective. Experience and expertise at both the corporate and onsite levels of management are apparent and are complemented -

l by strong technical support from a security systems project engineer,

'

a computer services group, and a dedicated security instrumentation i

and calibration (repair) group. Additionally, the licensee's

security contractor recently appointed a permanent administrator

!

to oversee the performance of its organization, which substantially increased in size with the inclusion of Unit 3 into the program.

'

,

l l

i

___ .. _ _ __ , _ _ _ -.,-.,,,,__ ____ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ ,. _ _ , . _ , _ . . . _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ , . , , . _ _ . , _ ~ _ _ _ . - . . _ , _ ,

o *

The allocation of sufficient administrative, technical and logisti-cal resources is further evidence of management's commitment to a quality security progra The effectiveness of training of the security force is adequate and improving, as evidenced by few personnel errors occurring during the perio The licensee was prompt to respond to training weak-nesses identified as a result of performance testing of the security force by NRC. New training program criteria were developed and im-plemented to overcome the shortcomings. In a licensee initiative, significant emphasis is being placed on alarm station operator and response team drill training. This emphasis is targeted towards enhancing communications and professional skills among members of the force and was initiated by the licensee as a result of recog-nizing a possible weakness. The licensee's actions to continuously improve professional performance skills and communications via the use of organized drills enhances the capability of the entire security organizatio Two Security Plan changes were submitted to the NRC during this rating period. Both were indicative of thorough knowledge of NRC program objectives. The changes were adequately summarized, clear, and appropriately marked for clarity during NRC revie With regard to material control and accounting practices, the lic-ensee was in compliance with NRC requirement Procedures and practices were adequate _for the control of special nuclear materia Records and reports were complete, well maintained, and availabl Overall program performance was goo In summary, licensee performance in the security and safeguards area, including the controlling programs, management oversight, staffing and training, and reporting, was very goo . Conclusion Rating: Category Trend: Consisten . Board Recommendation Licensee: Non NRC: None.

i

.. _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ . _ _ ..

-- _. __

.

Refueling and Outage Management (32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br />, 2%) Prev us 11 nsee performance in refueling and outage activities s tegory . Problems identified were errors in the installation a PASS system and lack of licensee follow-up to verify complete i% k ntation of commitments made to the NR Duri t s period, a refueling maintenance / outage began on October 25, 19 Sigt ' ant activities included weld overlay repair of the jet ump esse zzles and isolation condenser steam supply lines, re 'a ement of fety related valve motor-operators with environment q ed units and the replacement of the emergency gas turbine rator roto The reactor was returned to power on December 2 O Licensee staffing n ded around the clock coverage with supervi-sion of activities Outage Coordinator supplemented by senior operator and enginee staff assistance. Outage meetings were held twice daily, wit 'tional special meetings held to address expansion or clarificat o tivitie Status of activities was carefully communicated to r ving personne Refueling and outage activit er reviewed by the resident and region-based inspector Evi of pr r planning and adequate procedures in areas of replacin of E al e motor-operators and TMI-based modifications was note -line [ management decisions were made effectively for increase i ec ion, analyses, and repair of jet pump instrument nozzle assemb isolation condenser steam supply lines, and recirculation pipe . The corporate tech-nical review committee and site QA/QC oted to be heavily in-volved in local leak rate testing. Re ere timely, demon-strated conservatism, and were reviewed at I levels of managemen The licensee is staffed with well trained, ex rienced, and knowl-edgable outage personnel. No significant probl s were experienced during the Unit I refueling / maintenance outag ajor in service inspection in the area of Inter-Granular Stress Co osion Cracking (IGSCC) was conducted. Rejected welds (6 of 121) w e repaired without extending the schedule, demonstrating underst ding of IGSCC issues and proficiency in correcting problem An additional outage for turbine blade inspection occurre in May 1986. Management involvement was demonstrated by prior pla ing and control of activitie .

, O 26 Conclusion R i -

Non (Insufficient hours.)

ren n . a tecomen ations Lic Non NRC: No .

A

D

^0 9

.

i I

._. ._ __ .__ ______ _ _-.__._ ____ _. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ , - _ - _ - _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ , - - _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _

.

r 3 o-i

25a

,

,b G. Refueling and Outage Management (32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br />, 2%)

Analysis Previous licensee performance in refueling and outage activities was Category . Problems identified were errors in the installation of the PASS system and lack of licensee follow-up to verify complete implementation of commitments made to the NRC, '

During this period, a refueling maintenance / outage began on Octobe , 1985. Significant activities included weld overlay repair of the jet pump vessel nozzles and isolation cot: denser steam supply lines,- replacement of safety-related valve motor-operators with environmentally qualified units and the replacement of the emergency gas turbine generator rotor. The reactor was returned to power on December 2 Licensee staffing included around the clock coverage with supervi-sion of activities by an Outage Coordinator supplemented by senior operator and engineering staff assistance. Outage meetings were held twice daily, with additional special meetings held to address expansion or clarification of activitie Status of activities was carefully communicated to relieving persotine Refueling and outage activities were reviewed by the resident and region-based inspectors. Evidence of prior planning and adequate procedures in areas of replacing of EQ valve motor-operators and TMI Action Plan modifications was noted. On-line management deci-sions were made effectively for increased inspection, analyses, and repair of jet pump instrument nozzle assemblies, isolation condenser steam supply lines, and recirculation pipe defects. The corporate

,

technical review committee and site QA/QC were noted to be heavily i

involved in local leak rate testin Retests were timely, demon-l strated conservatism, and were reviewed at all levels of management, i The licensee is staffed with well trained, experienced, and knowl-

,

'

edgable outage personnel. No significant problems were experienced during the Unit I refueling / maintenance outage. Majorin-service inspection in the area of Inter-Granular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) was conducted. Rejected welds (6 of 121) were repaired

without extending the outage. In this effort, the licensee demon-l strated sound technical understanding of IGSCC issues and proficiency

'

in correcting problem '

.

'

An additional outage for turbine blade inspection occurred in May 1986. Management involvement was demonstrated by prior planning and control of activitie Observations in other functional areas also apply to Refueling and Outage Management. For example, control room transactions were conducted carefully and smoothly, with careful procedure adherenc , *

26a Administrative workload was improved by assigning a shift supervi-sor's assistant to administer routine evolution Housekeeping was excellent, with a minimum of contaminated area Several high ex-posure jobs were effectively controlled during the Unit 1 refueling outage, including work on recirculation piping and jet pump instru-ment nozzle However, an ALARA weakness was found in slow compu-terized identification of exposure overruns on two job Routine problems included an in-field change to an RWP without supervisory review or proper documentation, an unplanned uptake of radioactive material due to in-field dropping of the requirement, for respiratory protection, and unplanned uptakes of radioactive material due to failure to assess RWP identified work condition During the refueling outage, recirculation piping welds were re-paired in accordance with the latest NRC documents. Reactor vessel jet pump instrument assembly ultrasonic testing and repair were of outstanding quality. For repairs to the isolation condenser steam supply line, the recirculation pipe defect, and the service water l piping leak, the engineering effort, maintenance procedures, advance training, and actual repairs were very good. However, deficient outage rework of the scram solenoid pilot valves and insufficient post-maintenance testing resulted in rod failures to scram during post-outage testing at powe QC was routinely involved in observing Unit 1 recirculation pipe repairs. The associated procedures were adhered to and were evalu-ated as valid and meaningful checks. Excellent management involve-ment was found in the analysis of fet pump instrument nozzle and isolation condenser steam piping weld . Conclusion Rating: Category 1.

I

'

Trend: Non . Board Recommendations Licensee: Non NRC: Non O A

{ . o

o Assurance of Quality

, Analysis During this assessment period, Assurance of Quality is being consi-dered as a separate functional area. The various aspects of the assurance of quality have been considered and discussed as an in-tegral part of each functional area and the respective inspection hours are included in each one. Consequently, this discussion is a synopsis of the assessments relating to quality work conducted in other area Licensee management emphasizes proper performance on the first try and that quality is each individual's jc Therefore, the QA or-ganization is not looked upon as the central control for quality; line management i Operator performance was assessed as professional and competent, and the pass rate of candidates for Unit 2 operator licenses was goo Only one Unit I reactor scram during this 15-month SALP period was definitively attributed to personnel erro Facility managers actively tour the plant, and management communication with the operators has been eviden Plant Operations Review Committee evaluations were evaluated as thorough and professional. Daily lic-ensee management meetings and discussions with the resident inspec-tors showed thorough knowledge of plant conditions. These factors are all indicators of effective assurance of quality in plant operatio Regular QA/QC department monitoring of the performance of operating procedures and activities was not note NRC checks found, however, careful adherence to operating procedures and effective line manage-ment overview of this aspec Surveillance procedures were found to be of generally high qualit Rigorous checkouts were performed to qualify individuals in specific surveillances. There is a strong in-service inspection progra QC was observed to be routinely involved in observing maintenance and surveillance on numerous occasicas; including Unit 1 recircula-tion pipe repair work, Unit 2 spent fuel pool rerack modifications, Unit 2 service water pipe weld repairs, and both units main turbine inspections. The associated procedures were adhered to and were evaluated as valid and meaningful checks of activity performanc Good performance was noted in addressing the potential applicability of standby liquid control system problems at another facility. How- 4 ever, a need to better assure the quality performance of aging equipment was identified. In this regard, the licensee's perform-ance is considered effective once corrective actions are undertaken, with a need for better preventive upgrading of important components before failures occu Also, the licensee needs to improve post-

r

.

maintenance testing to prevent instances such as control rod scrams occurring at power because earlier post-maintenance testing did not assure operabilit Design change control including appropriate post-modification test-ing was the subject of a management meeting during the SALP perio The specific issue in this case was the Unit 2 drawing errors re-sulting in wiring reversal of pressurizer spray controllers and failure to identify this wiring error during subsequent testin This design control and testing inadequacy was an isolated case:

licensee review of all 65 plant design changes implemented during the preceding refueling outage revealed no other problems. In ad-dition, no other cases of post-modification testing inadequacies were found and appropriate corrective actions were taken. Thus, design change control was generally soun Aggressive corrective actions prevented security computer problems from causing significant computer down time. There was a licensee-initiated restructuring of the security program. Security event reports were conservatively generated. There was extensive security drilling and detailed knowledge of security program objective The undetected entry of a firearm onsite was identified by the lic-ensee and properly reporte Sound corrective actions were applie In licensing activities, this performance appraisal found licensee competence and effective resolution of safety issues. Submittals to the NRC were generally timely and of good quality. The Millstone 1 probabilistic safety study was noted as being a valuable decision making tool for assessing operating risk and prioritizing improve-ment High exposure activities were effectively controlled but weaknesses were evident in the application of routine radiation protection con-trol Radiation worker support of those controls was found lackin In radwaste shipping, ineffective program perforiaance and management were identified. Because effective corrective actions were not ap-plied after previous identification of significant inadequacies, radwaste shipping stands out as an example of inadequate assurance of qualit In summary, the licensee's basically sound approach to assuring quality has been effective in most area There is a need for bet-ter assurance of proper performance of aging equipment. Better worker adherence to and endorsement of routine radiation protection controls are needed. Further, radwaste shipping has significant deficiencies which were not corrected after being identifie .

+

2. Conclusion:

Rating: Category Trend: Consistent 3. Board Recommendations Licensee: Non NRC: Noti ,

l t

l

.

!

. *

!

30 i I. Training and Qualification Effectiveness Analysis During this assessment period, Training and Qualification Effective-ness is being considered as a separate functional area for the first time. The various aspects of this functional area have been con-sidered and discussed as an integral part of other functional areas and the respective inspection hours have been included in each on Consequently, this discussion is a synopsis of the assessments re-lated to training conducted in other areas. Training effectiveness has been measured primarily by the observed performance of licensee personnel and, to a lesser degree, as a review of program adequac The discussion below addresses three principle areas: licensed operator training, non-licensed staff training, and the status of INP0 training accreditatio At the end of this SALP period, no training programs had been ac-credited by INP0. The licensee has reassessed the program goals and milestones and expects to be accredited in all operttor, staff, and technician programs by the end of 198 One set of operator licensing exams was conducted at Millstone Three of four senior operator candidates and five of six operator candidates received their NRC licenses No generic weakness in candidate knowledge was identifie The licensee has recently completed installation of the Unit simu-lators. Although post-installation testing and upgrading is con-tinuing, the training department has declared the machines " ready for training." Requalification training utilizing the simulators has begu The next NRC licensing exams are to be conducted using l the simulators. The licensee's commitment to simulator training l

is one measure of their resolve to keep improving staff performance.

.

During this SALP period, the training center staff was reorganized

! and increased in size. Training has been increased, and the simu-

! lators are used to train managers as well as operators.

Licensing Group personnel receive training in plant systems, QA, FSAR, and Technical Specification changes, the nuclear safety ethic, i and unresolved safety issues. They are rotated to the site during i

outages to provide insight into plant activitie These efforts l

.

are considered a licensee strength.

i j During this SALP, fire brigade training and operator emergency re-sponse training were evaluated as very good. Security training was found adequate, with few security personnel errors noted. Security i training weaknesses were noted to be aggressively pursued, and ex-l tensive use of security drills was noted as a strong point. Emer-s i

,

.. .

gency preparedness and security force training is improving, al-though procedures on testing requirements for emergency response training and security response team drill training were weak at the time of each inspectio Little evidence of appropriate training of radweste shipping per-sonnel was found, and lack of such training is considered a signi-ficant weakness in radiological control In summary, both licensed and non-licensed staff training was found to be good overal Improvements were noted in operator training capabilities through addition of the simulators. There is a general strength in training, except for radwaste shipping trainin ?. Conclusion Rating: Category Trend: Consisten . Board Recommendation Licensee: Non NRC: None.

l l

.

- - __ _ _

.

.

=

J. Licensing Activities Analysis This activity was rated a Category 1 in the last SALP, but some recurrent response timeliness problems were note During this SALP period, the licensee continued to show good man-agement overview of licensing activitie Licensee management in-volvement in activities was frequently noted to be excellent by NRC Licensing. An example was the information on and knowledge of the primary coolant piping inspected for stress corrosion crackin Excellent management involvement was also noted in the resultant analyses of defects detected in the circumferential welds on the two jet pump instrument nozzle assemolies and on one circumferential weld in the steam supply piping to the isolation condenser. Safety prudence by the licensee's management was demonstrated by reducing the length of the current operating cycle as a result of keyway cracking in the number four turbine end rotor whee In a continuing activity associated with the environmental qualifi-cation of equipment, the licensee requested a schedule extensio The submittal was comprehensive and thorough and the licensee's presentation to the Commission demonstrated significant management involvement and contro During this SALP period, the Integrated Safety Assessment Program (ISAP) was inaugurated and 48 other licensing activities were com-pleted. The number of NRR open items was reduced from 54 to 4 This activity required and received close involvement by licensee managemen In general, the licensing submittals have been timely and well pre-pare However, a few commitments to provide additional and/or clarifying information were not met and the staff was not always informed when complications arose or licensee resources had to be redirected. Because follow-up information from the licensee has sometimes been late, the resolution of some issues has been inef-ficient. While the associated issues were relatively minor (e.g.,

the exemption extension for the FSAR update required under 10 CFR 50.71), they have complicated the review of licensee input The licensee continues to maintain a significant "in-house" techni-cal capability in most engineering disciplines. A good example of this capability is the four volume summary report of the Millstone '

1 Probabilistic Safety Study (PSS). That report provides informa-tion concerning the factors that dominate the risk associated with operation of the plan It is a valuable tool for technical deci-sionmaking, and for prioritization of improvements and modifications based on safety significanc _ _ _ _

o -.

The licensee has shown a clear understanding of licensing issues and their relative importance. In general, the NRC was satisfied with the licensee's resolution of safety issues. While the NRC has occasionally disputed specific aspects of the licensee's approach, the licensee has clearly presented his assessment of safety signi-ficance and has proposed resolutions that are most often found ac-ceptabl Examples include the environmental qualification schedule extension, fire protection exemptions, and the intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) repai The licensee continues to be responsive to NRC initiatives, often providing plant-unique insights and alternatives that involve more extensive analysis and evaluation than originally envisioned. All NRC initiatives have been, and continue to be, resolved satisfac-torily without the need for formal licensing action Licensee management responsiveness to NRC initiatives is illustrated by the significant effort expended in preparing the PSS and involvement in the ISAP. In addition, the licensee is extensively involved in industry groups that support NRC initiatives, most notably NUMARC, AIR and SQU During this assessment, several of the licensee's submittals re-sulted in meetings and telephone calls that included licensee rep-

• resentatives from the various technical discipline Both the lic-ensce's technical and licensing staff demonstrated a thorough understanding of the issues. Further, the licensee has routinely provided an adequate level of staffing and broad technical repre-sentation to ensure that safety issues are effectively resolve In conclusion, the licensing activities associated with Millstone 1 are conducted by a competent staff with ready access to the various technical resources that contribute to the effective resolution of safety issues. These activities have also been supported by the plant operating staff which is similarly knowledgeable, experienced and dedicated. However, scnedules for written commitments in some areas should be improve ~

2. Conclusion Rating: Category Trend: Consistent 3. Board Recommendations Licensee: Non NRC: Non .

,. 'o l

f V. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES

' Investigation and Allegation Review There were two allegations during this SALP period. One turned out to be about Millstone 2 (radioactive labeling on metal in a junkyard) and is addressed in the Unit 2 SAL 'The other allegation was that contractor (C. N. Flagg) employees art selectively assigned to high radiation work so they can be laid of No violation of NRC requirements was identified and this allegation was close Escalated Enforcement Actions Civil Penalties There were no civil penalties issued during the assessment perio . Orders

.

There were no orders issued during the assessment perio . Confirmatory Action Letters There were no confirmatory action letters issued during this as-sessment perio Management Conferences On March 25, 1985, an enforcement conference was held at the NRC Region I office to discuss radioactive waste transportation problem . On June 18, 1986, after the SALP period, an enforcement conference l was held at the NRC Region I office to discuss repetitive radwaste transportation problems.

. Licensee Event Reports Tabular Listing ( Type of Events: Personnel Errors 7 Design / Man./Const./ Install t External Cause 5 '

.

< Defective Procedure 2 Component Failure 22 Other _4

<

Total 44

_

i

,

w,ya--,-. ,--. - - - , ,

7 -, -,.n - - - - - ---s,

, -,e---- - - - - - - - - - -

,- *

l

35 Causal Analysis (Review Period 3/1/85.- 5/31/86)

LERs 85-03, 85-04, 85-05, 85-06, 85-10, 85-14, 85-30, 86-04, and 86-07 reported security computer malfunction LERs 85-07, 86-11, and 86-15 reported security personnel error E. Licensing Actions Schedular Extensions Granted On March 28, 1985, the deadline for environmental qualification of electrical equipment was extended to November 30, 198 . Reliefs Granted None Exemptions Granted April 11, 1985; Granted a six (6) month exemption from 10 CFR 50.71(e) requirements updating the Facility Design and Safety Analysis (FDSA).

November 6, 1985; Exemption from the require,r.ents of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, Section III G.2 was grante November 22, 1985; Conditionally extended the April 11, 1985 (FDSA

! upgrade) to June 30, 1987, provided specified milestone FDSA sub-mittals are me . Memorandum and Order Issued On November 20, 1985, the Deadline for Environmental Qualification l of 11 MOVs was extended to August 30,1987.

! License Amendments Issued i

Amendment No. 102 issued on June 5, 1985, Reactor Operation with Deinerted Containment Drywel Amendment No. 103 issued on July 1, 1985, Modification of March 14, 1983 Order Confirming Licensee Commitments on Post-TMI Related Issues (Generic Letters 82-05 and 82-10).

l Amendment No. 104, issued on August 6, 1985; Organizational Change /

Training Supervisor.

t l

l

- _ .

. *

i Amendment No. 105, issued on August 12, 1985; Deletion of Environ- l mental Qualification Section from Plant T Amendment No. 106, issued on October 1, 1985; Radiological T Amendment No. 107 issued on December 6, 1985; Reload 1 Amendment No. 108 issued on December 10, 1985; Plant Personnel Overtim Amendment No. 109 issued on December 19, 1985; Guard Training and Qualificatio Amendment No.110 issued on April 4,1986; Disarmed Control Rods.

. _ . . - --

, - -

. *

,

MILLSTONE 1 TABLE 1

, INSPECTION HOUR SUMMARY AREA HOURS % OF TIME Plant Operations 726 4 Radiological Controls 191 12.0

,

Maintenance and Modifications ~224 1 Surveillance 295 1 Emergency Preparedness Security and Safeguards 119 Refueling and Outage Management 32 Training and Qualification Effectiveness Assurance of Quality Licensing Activities Other TOTALS: 1587 100.0 (

.

- - - - - , . - - -

- - - - , , , .-,r,

. .

MILLSTONE 1 TABLE 2 ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY SEVERITY LEVEL AREA 1 2 3 4 5 DEV TOTAL Plant Operations 0 Radiological Controls 1 8 1 10 Maintenance and Modifications 0 Surveillance 2 2 Emergency Preparedness 0 Security and Safeguards 1 1 Refueling and Outage Management 0 Assurance of Quality 0 Training and Qualification Effectiveness 0 Licensing Activities 0 Other 0 TOTALS: 0 0 2 10 1 0 13

.

-

_ , --m

_ _ _ --

.

=

MILLSTONE 1 TABLE 3 VIOLATION SUMMARY INSPECTION SEVERITY FUNCTIONAL REPORT N LEVEL AREA VIOLATION 245/85-09 5 RAD CONTROL DOSE RATE AT THE EXTERNAL SURFACE OF A 3/11/85 PACKAGE ON AN OPEN TRANSPORT VEHICLE EX-CEEDED LIMITS 245/85-11 4 RAD CONTROL FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT QA PROCEDURES FOR 4/15-19/85 RECEIPT OF THE SOLIDIFICATION SYSTEM 245/85-11 3 RAD CONTROL ABOVE LIMIT RADIATION ON THE OUTSIDE SUR-4/15-19/85 FACE OF A PACKAGE SHIPPED TO BARNWELL, SC 245/85-15 4 SURVEILLANCE SWITCH CALIBRATION / SNUBBER SURVEILLANCE 6/17-28/85 PROCEDURES NOT MAINTAINED ADEQUATELY 245/85-15 4 RAD CONTROL HIGH RAD AREA (SDV ROOM) UNLOCKED 6/17-28/85 245/85-24 4 SURVEILLANCE FAILURE TO NOTIFY NRC 0F A DESIGN DEFI-9/4-10/28/85 CIENCY 245/85-28 4 RAD CONTROL FAILURE TO FOLLOW RADIATION PROTECTION 11/5-8/85 PROCEDURES 245/85-31 3 SEC/SAFEGARD UNAUTHORIZED INTRODUCTION OF A FIREARM TO 11/13-20/85 THE SITE PROTECTED AREA 245/86-06 4 RAD CONTROL PACKAGE IMPROPERLY LABELED 3/24-27/86

-

245/86-06 4 RAD CONTROL PERSONNEL IMPROPERLY TRAINED 3/24-27/86 245/86-06 4 RAD CONTROL FAILED TO HAVE COPIES OF DRAWINGS AND OTHER 3/24-27/86 DOCUMENTS AS REQUIRED 245/86-06 4 RAD CONTROL FAILURE TO CONDUCT PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM

_ 3/24-27/86 AS REQUIRED 245/86-06 4 RAD CONTROL QC INADEQUATE TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE 3/24-27/86

.

. *

MILLSTONE 1 TABLE 4 INSPECTION REPORT ACTIVITIES REPORT / DATES INSPECTOR HOURS AREAS INSPECTED 85-06 RESIDENT 22 PLANT OPS, EQUIPMENT ALIGNMENT & READINESS, 2/25-3/24/85 RAD PROTECTION, SECURITY, FIRE PROTECTION, PLANT OPERATION RECORDS, MAIN, SURV, NRC REPORTING 85-07 SPECIALIST 32 STARTUP TESTING FOLLOWING THE CYCLE 10 REFUEL-3/5-8/85 ING OUTAGE 85-08 SPECIALIST 27 MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO PRESERVATION 3/26-29h 0F CIVIL STRUCTURES AND STRUCTURAL SUPPORTS FROM DETERIORATION 85-09 SPECIALIST 0 REVIEW OF SHIPPING PAPERS, PLACARDING, MARKING 3/11/85 & LABELING, RAD MEASUREMENTS, CONT SURVEYS AND PACKAGE & VEHICLE INSP BY SC-DHEC

~

85-10 RESIDENT 45 PLANT OPERATIONS, rQUIPMENT ALIGNMENT & READI-3/25-5/13/85 NESS, RAD PROTECTION, SECURITY, FIRE PROTECTION, OPS RECORDS, MODS, SURV, REPORTING TO NRC 85-11 SPECIALIST 51 TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM 4/15-19/85 85-12 SPECIALIST 0 MEETING ON TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM 3/25/85 85-13 SPECIALIST 25 SECURITY ORGANIZATION, PROGRAM AUDIT, RECORDS l

'

4/08-11/85 AND REPORTS, TESTING AND MAINTENANCE, BARRIERS, AND ACCESS CONTROL 85-14 RESIDENT 120 PLANT OPERATIONS, EQUIPMENT ALIGNMENT & READI-5/13-6/29/85 NESS, RAD PROTECTION, SECURITY, FIRE PROTECTION, PLANT OPERATING RECORDS

^

l 85-15 SPECIALIST 390 PLANT HARDWARE AND OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES RE-6/17-28/85

'

LATED TO IREP (NUREG/CR-3085)

l 85-16 SPECIALIST 4 CALIBRATION RECORDS FOR THE INSTRUMENTATION USED

'

6/3-17/85 IN LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST -

85-17 CANCELLED 0 6/24-28/85 l

[

_ _ _ _ . .

e T-4-2 REPORT / DATES INSPECTOR HOURS AREAS INSPECTED 85-18 SPECIALIST 33 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE RECORDS, CONTROL 6/24-28/85 INSTRUMENTATION, PROCEDURES, REACTOR COOLANT CHEMISTRY AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS 85-19 RESIDENT 32 PLANT OPS, EQUIPMENT ALIGNMENT & READINESS, RAD 6/30-7/22/85 PROTECTION, SECURITY, FIRE PROTECTION, DESIGN CHANGE & MODS, SURV, CLOSE-0UT OF IEB 80-25 l

85-20 SPECIALIST 39 ISI PROGRAM, EDG INTERPOLAR CONNECTING STRAPS, 7/8-12/85 LICENSEE RESPONSE TO GE SIL-402 (TORUS VENT HEADER)

85-21 SPECIALIST 0 OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINATION 8/12-15/85 85-22 RESIDENT 60 PLANT OPS, EQUIPMENT ALIGNMENT & READINESS, RAD 7/23-9/03/85 PROTECTION, SECURITY, FIRE PROTECTION, DESIGN CHANGES AND SURVEILLANCE 85-23 SPECIALIST 25 DOSIMETRY PROGRAM ORGANIZATION, PERSONNEL QUAL, 8/5-9/85 FACILITIES, DOSF ASSESSMENT, QA, AND RECORD-KEEPING 85-24 RESIDENT 100 PLANT OPS, EQUIPMENT ALIGNMENT & READINESS, RAD 9/4-10/28/85 PROTECTION, SECURITY, FIRE PROTECTION, DESIGN CHANGES, AND SURVEILLANCE 85-25 SPECIALIST 27 FOLLOWUP 0F UNIT 2 RCP MOTOR FAILURE, DEGRADED 10/21-25/85 GRID VOLTAGE DETECTION SYSTEM AND ASSOCIATED OPERATING PROCEDURES 85-26 RESIDENT 147 PLANT OPS, EQUIPMENT ALIGNMENT & READINESS, RAD 10/29-12/30/85 PROTECTION, SECURITY, FIRE PROTECTION, DESIGN CHANGES, AND SURVEILLANCE 85-27 CANCELLED 0 11/6-8/85 85-28 SPECIALIST 38 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS DURING OUTAGE INCLUDING 11/5-8/85 SELECTION, QUAL & TRAINING, EXPOSURE CONTROL, SURVEYS, POSTING & AREA CONTROL AND ALARA 85-29 SPECIALIST 13 NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING 11/12-15/85 85-30 SPECIALIST 0 IMPLEMENTATION OF A PROGRAM FOR ESTABLISHING 11/18-22/85 AND MAINTAINING THE QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 10 CFR 50.49

.

. *

T-4-3 REPORT / DATES INSPECTOR HOURS AREAS INSPECTED 85-31 RESIDENT 5 REVIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES & LICENSEE'S ACTIONS 11/13-20/85 RELATIVE TO AN UNAUTHORIZED & UNDETECTED WEAPON ENTERING THE PLANT'S PROTECTED AREA 85-32 SPECIALIST 27 PHYSICAL BARRIERS, COMPENSATORY MEASURES, AS-12/16-19/85 SESSMENT AIDS, ACCESS CONTROL, DETECTION AIDS, ALARM STATIONS, COMMUNICATIONS, TRAINING & QUAL 86-01 RESIDENT 74 PLANT OPS, EQUIPMENT ALIGNMENT & READINESS, RAD 12/31/85- PROTECTION, SECURITY, FIRE PROTECTION, DESIGN 2/24/86 CHANGES AND SURVEILLANCE 86-02 SPECIALIST 25 FIRE PROTECTION / PREVENTION PROGRAM 2/24-28/86 86-03 RESIDENT 61 PLANT OPS VERIFICATION, SURVEILLANCE, MAINTEN-2/25-4/7/86 ANCE, TEN-YEAR CONT TENDON SURV, SHROUD HEAD BOLTS, FUEL RACKS, ISO COND VALVE PROB, ISAP PROGRAM 86-04 SPECIALIST 16 NON-RADIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY CONTROL PROGRAM 3/17-21/86 86-05 SPECIALIST 49 ROUTINE PHYSICAL SECURITY 3/24-28/86 86-06 SPECIALIST 15 TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM FOR RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL 3/24-27/86 86-07 RESIDENT 62 PLANT OPS, SURVEILLANCE, MAINTENANCE, 10-YEAR 4/8-5/19/86 CONT TENDON TEST, DESIGN CHANGES, SNUBBER TRAINING, SFP RERACKING, MAIN TURBINE INSP PLANNING 86-08 SPECIALIST 23 LIQUID AND GASEOUS RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE CONTROL 4/14-18/86 PROGRAM

- __ _

.

o >^

.

MILLSTONE 1 TABLE 5 LISTING OF LERs BY FUNCTIONAL AREA CAUSE CODES *

AREA A B C D E X TOTAL Plant Operations 1 2 1 8 1 13 Radiological Controls 1 1 2 4 Maintenance and Modifications 1 1 2 Surveillance 1 1 4 6 Emergency Preparedness 0 Security and Safeguards 3 2 2 8 1 16 Refueling and Outage Management 1 1 Training and Qualification Effectiveness 1 1 Licensing Activities 0 Assurance of Quality 1 1 Other _ _ _ _ _

TOTALS: 7 4 5 2 22 4 44

• LER Cause Codes (Assigned during NRC review.)

A - Personnel Error B - Design, Manufacturing, Construction, or Installation Error

,

C - External D - Defective Procedure 4 E - Equipment Malfunction X - Other k

a

. *

MILLSTONE 1 TABLE 6 LER SYNOPSIS CAUSE LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CODE * DESCRIPTION 85-003-00 04/17/85 E SECURITY RELATED - COMPUTER MALFUNCTION 85-004-00 05/16/85 E SECURITY RELATED - COMPUTER MALFUNCTION 85-005-00 06/19/85 E SECURITY RELATED - COMPUTER MALFUNCTION 85-006-00 07/01/85 E SECURITY,RELATED - COMPUTER MALFUNCTION 85-007-00 07/06/85 X SECURITY RELATED - VITAL DOOR FAILURE 85-008-00 01/14/85 C RECIRCULATION FLOW CHARACTERISTIC CHANGE 85-009-01 08/13/85 X** REACTOR TRIP ON MSL HI-HI RADIATION 85-010-00 07/15/85 E SECURITY RELATED - COMPUTER MALFUNCTION 85-011-00 07/19/85 X ANOMALOUS RADI0 ACTIVITY OBSERVED IN OYSTERS 85-012-01 07/17/85 A SECURITY RELATED - VITAL 000R UNPROTECTED 85-013-02 08/29/85 B DIESEL GENERATOR / LOW PRESSURE COOLANT IN-JECTION SEQUENCE DESIGN DEFECT

!

85-014-00 09/12/85 E SECURITY RELATED - COMPUTER MALFUNCTION 85-015-00 09/26/85 A SECURITY RELATED - VITAL DOOR UNPROTECTED l 85-016-00 09/16/85 C ESF ACTUATION - REACTOR BUILDING VENT ISOLATED ON HI STEAM LINE RAD SPIKE 85-017-00 09/23/85 D REACTOR SCRAM DURING SHUTDOWN DUE TO CHANGING MODE SWITCH WITH APRM HI-HI l

85-018-01 09/20/85 C ESF ACTUATION DUE TO LOSS OF OFF SITE POWER CAUSED BY HURRICANE GLORIA

• • This item is classified as "other", recognizing that the cause may be either an unusual buildup of corrosion products in the resin or personnel error. This is discussed in the plant operations functional are *Cause Codes were assigned during NRC Revie !

l

. *

T-6-2 CAUSE LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CODE * DESCRIPTION 85-019-00 09/28/85 E EXCESSIVE RCS LEAKAGE INSIDE THE DRYWELL

'

85-020-00 10/07/85 B REACTOR TRIP - LOW SCRAM AIR HEADER PRESSURE 85-021-00 10/08/85 E ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION - REAC-TOR PROTECTION OUTPUT BREAKER TRIP 85-022-00 10/31/85 E PIPE CRACKS IN THE ISOLATION CONDENSER PIPING 85-023-01 11/04/85 E LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING OF MSIV'S - TWO FAILED 85-024-00 11/13/85 A SECURITY RELATED - FIREARM PROBLEM 85-025-00 11/10/85 B TORUS TO DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS' ALARM -

MICR0 SWITCHES OUT OF CALIBRATION 85-026-01 11/16/85 E MECHANICAL SNUBBER FAILED FUNCTIONAL TESTS 85-027-00 11/21/85 A LOSS OF NORMAL POWER AND FAILURE OF GAS TURBINE DUE TO IMPROPER TRIP SEQUENCE 85-028-00 11/22/85 E CRACKS IN JET PUMP INSTRUMENTATION ASSEMBLIES 85-029-00 11/26/85 E SETPOINT DRIFT OF THE SIX MAIN STEAM SAFETY / RELIEF VALVES ,

85-030-00 12/04/85 B SECURITY RELATED - COMPUTER CVFRLOAD t

85-031-00 12/15/85 E FAILURE OF "A" CONDENSATE B0OSTER PUMP TO START DURING LOSS OF NORMAL P3WER/MCA TESTING

.

85-032-00 12/28/85 A NOT APPLICABLE: SECURITY RELATED UNIT 3

! REPORT l

l 85-033-00 12/19/85 E SETPOINT DRIFT - LPCI LOOP BREAK SELECTION LOGIC 85-034-00 12/24/85 E THREE CONTROL RODS FAIL TO SCRAM DURING TESTING DUE TO SCRAM PILOT VALVE FAILURE 3 86-001-00 01/05/86 E NOT APPLICABLE: SECURITY RELATED UNIT 3 REPORT l

• Cause Codes were assigned during NRC Review.

L -- - --

... *

T-6-3 CAUSE LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CODE * DESCRIPTION 86-002-00 01/18/86 A NOT APPLICABLE: SECURITY RELATED UNIT 3 REPORT 86-003-00 01/25/86 E NOT APPLICABLE: SECURITY RELATED UNIT 3 REPORT 86-004-00 02/04/86 E SECURITY RELATED - COMPUTER MALFUNCTION 86-005-00 02/05/86 E REACTOR TRIP ON APRM HI-HI DUE TO PRESSURE OSCILLATION FROM MALFUNCTION OF MPR 86-006-00 02/06/86 E DUAL POSITION INDICATION ON MSIV DUE TO LIMIT SWITCH FAILURE 86-007-00 02/18/86 8 SECURITY RELATED - COMPUTER OVERLOAD 86-008-00 02/06/86 A ISOLATION CONDENSER INITIATION DURING SURVEILLANCE 86-009-00 02/08/86 A AVERAGE RATE OF RCS TEMP CHANGE EXCEEDED 100 DEGREE F/HR LIMIT 86-010-00 03/26/86 0 VALVE 1-IC-3 FAILED TO OPEN DURING SUR-VEILLANCE TESTING l

l 86-011-00 04/10/86 E SECURITY RELATED - VITAL DOOR ALARM

\

l

'

86-012-00 04/12/86 A NOT APPLICABLE: SECURITY RELATED UNIT 3 REPORT 86-013-00 04/14/86 A NOT APPLICABLE: SECURITY RELATED UNIT 3 REPORT 86-014-00 04/21/86 C SECURITY RELATED - BOM8 THREAT 86-015-00 04/28/86 E SECURITY RELATED - VITAL DOOR ALARM 86-016-00 05/01/86 A NOT APPLICABLE: SECURITY RELATED UNIT 3 REPORT 86-017-00 05/21/86 E MPR CAUSES REACTOR PRESSURE TRANSIENT 86-018-00 05/24/86 X SRM WITHDRAWAL CAUSES RPS ACTUATION DUE TO A NOISE SPIKE

• Cause Codes were assigned during NRC Review.

!

-

. __ - - - _ _ _ - - . . - . - _ .

-

.

' l T-6-4 CAUSE LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CODE * DESCRIPTION 86-019-00 05/31/86 E STEAM TUNNEL RADIATION MONITOR TRIP CAUSED TUNNEL AND REACTOR BUILDING INSULATION AND STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM INITIATION

• LER Cause Codes A - Personnel Error B - Design, Manufacturing, Construction, or Installation Error C - External D - Defective Procedure E - Equipment Malfunction X - Other

.

!

i

!

!

l

.

l

!

i l

l l

i

• Cause Codes were assigned during NRC Revie __ _ ._ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ .

4 MILLSTONE 1 TABLE 7 REACTOR TRIPS AND UNPLANNED SHUTDOWNS POWER DATE LEVEL ITEM ROOT CAUSE 8/13/85 100% UNIT TRIP AUTOMATIC SCRAM AND ISOLATION DUE TO HIGH STEAM LINE RADIATION SIGNAL WHEN PLACING A CONDENSATE DEMINERALIZER IN SERVICE. CAUSE MAY HAVE BEEN PERSONNEL ERROR OR HIGH CORROSION PRODUCTS IN THE RESI /27/85 15% UNIT TRIP AUTOMATIC SCRAM FROM 15% POWER DUE TO PREMATURE MODE SWITCH CHANGE (PERSONNEL ERROR) DURING PRECAUTIONARY SHUTDOWN INITIATED IN PREPARATION FOR HURRICANE GLORIA 10/7/85 100% UNIT TRIP AUTOMATIC SCRAM CAUSED BY WORN SCRAM PILOT VALVE DUE TO INADEQUATE MAINTENANC /5/86 70% UNIT TRIP AUTOMATIC SCRAM ON HI-HI APRM FLUX DUE TO A MECHANICAL PRESSURE REGULATOR (MPR) PROBLEM, THE CAUSE OF WHICH IS ATTRIBUTED TO INADEQUATE MAINTENANC /21/86 100% UNIT TRIP PRECAUTIONARY MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO MPR PROBLEM DURING ROUTINE SHUTDOWN FOR TURBINE INSPECTIO THE MPR PROBLEM IS ATTRIBUTED TO INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE.

!

_ . - __ _ , _ _ _ . _

, .-

T-7-2 FIGURE 1 MILLSTONE 1 NUMBER OF DAYS SHUTDOWN PER MONTH I

MAR l l

I APRIL i l

l MAY l 1 l I

9 JUNE l I

8 .

JULY l 5 1 I

AUG l/ 11.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> - Air in Coolant i

I SEPT l/// 67.2. hours - Hurricane " Gloria" l

i OCT l//////// 186.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> - Refueling / Maintenance Outage I

NOV l////////////////////////////// 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> - Refueling / Maintenance Outage l

DEC l////////////////////// 542.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> - Refueling /Maintenace Outage l

JAN l i

1 1 FEB 1// 41.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> - MPR Failure i

9 l l

8 MAR l l

! 6 l APRIL l

)

I i

I i MAY l//////// 183.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> - Turbine Inspection l~ l i

l i i l i I I

5 10 15 20 25 30 NUMBER OF DAYS

!