IR 05000416/1993012

Insp Rept 50-416/93-12 on 930718-0814.Non-cited Violation Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint & Surveillance Observation & Reportable Occurrences

ML20056G706
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	08/27/1993
From:	Bernhard R, Cantrell F, Hughey C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20056G701	List: IR 05000416/1993012 ML20056G700
References
50-416-93-12, IEB-93-003, IEB-93-3, NUDOCS 9309070070
Download: ML20056G706 (8)

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UNITED STATES

/#p arcNo NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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4 L E 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900

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j Report No.: 50-416/93-12 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In l Jackson, MS 39205 Docket No.: 50-416 License No.: NPF-29

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Facility Name: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station l

Inspection Conducted: July 18,1993, through August 14, 1993

! Inspectors: k8 ld NELM 9/27/93 l R. H. Bernhard, Senfor Resident Inspector Date Signed j

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! 6F 47.1J.LCLLk C; A. Hughey, Residet Inspector s/n/n Date Signed l

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Accompanying Personnel: M. D. Sykes, Reactor Engineer Intern Approved by: ) $ My / //

F. S. Cantrell, Chief ' /

7 R/2 7 7 3 Date Signed Reactop Projects Section IB Division of Reactor Projects

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SUMMARY Scope:

l The resident inspectors conducted a routine inspection in the following areas:

operational safety verification; maintenance observation; surveillance observation; action on previous inspection findings; and reportable occurrences. The inspectors conducted backshift inspections on July 28 and August 9, 199 Results: 4 Engineering for modifications to the reactor water level instrumentation in response to NRC Bulletin 93-03 is complete. Installation is currently scheduled for the refueling outage beginning October 8,1993 (paragraph 3).

Total site exposure was trending below established goals as of the end of July 1993. Inspections in the area of maintenance and surveillance activities did

.not identify areas of concern (paragraphs 4 and 5). One non-cited violation was identified for insufficient control room penetration controls (paragraph 6b).

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REPORT DETAILS l Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J. . Czaika, Nuclear Specialist, SMEPA -

• L. Daughtery, Superintendent, Plant Licensing W. Deck,' Security Superintendent '

• Dietrich, Manager, Training J. Dimmette, Manager, Performance and System Engineeriag

• C. Dugger, Manager, Plant Operations

• C. Hayes, Director, Quality Assurance j C. Hicks, Operations Superintendent ,

• C. Hutchinson, Vice President, Nuclear Operations '

• M. McDowell,. 0perations Assistant  :

( M. Meisner, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs >

! D. Pace, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering

• J. Roberts, Manager, Plant Maintenance  ;

• R. Ruffin, Plant Licensing Specialist

• R. West, Technical Coordinator, Performance and System Engineering

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• G._ Zinke, Technical Coordinator, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs I

i Other licensee employees contacted included superintendents,

supervisors, technicians, operators, security force members, and office l personnel, i l

• Attended exit interview l

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the )

last paragrap . Plant Status I

The plant operated in Mode 1, power operations, during the entire inspection period. At the end of the period, the unit had been on line for 373 consecutive day During the weeks of July 26 and August 2,1993, NRC Region 11 personnel l from the Division of Reactor Safety were on site for licensed operator requalification examinations (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-416/93-300). Oper,ational Safety (71707 and 93702) Daily discussions were held with plant management and various I members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made

! frequent visits to the control room to review the status of equipment, alarms, effective LCOs, temporary alterations, instrument readings, and staffing. ' Discussions were held as appropriate to understand the significance of conditions observed.

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Plant tours were routinely conducted and included portions of the L containment, control building, turbine building, auxiliary l i

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building, radwaste building and outside areas. These observations included safety related tagout verifications, shift turnovers, sampling programs, housekeeping and general plant condition Additionally, the inspectors observed the status of fire protection equipment, the control of activities in progress, the problem identification system, and the readiness of the onsite emergency response facilities. No deficiencies were identifie ,

The inspectors walked down portions of the Standby Liquid Control System. Valve positions were verified to be correct per S0I 04-1-01-C41-1, Rev. 26, Standby Liquid Control System (SLC) Manual Valve Lineup Checksheet. The inspectors visually examined SLC tank temperature, inventory indication, piping heat traces and !

supports. Drawing No. M-1082, Rev. 22, was used to compare plant design to the.as-built plant configuration. Minor drawing discrepancies were found. The inspectors reported these discrepancies to the licensee for resolutio NRC Bulletin 93-03, Resolution of issues related to reactor water level instrumentation in BWRs, requested licensees to perform '

short term compensatory actions to reduce the potential for i reference leg degassing and to alert operators. These short term compensatory actions are discussed in NRC Inspection Report l 50-416/93-09. In adcHtion, the Bulletin requested hardware 1 modifications to the ,evel instrumentation to ensure high !

functional reliability. The licensee, in its response, planned to l implement a hardware modification to the reactor water level 1 system using a continuous backfill system. This system will use !

the control rod drive pump discharge to provide a source of purge

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water to reduce the build-up of non-condensible gases in the four reactor water level reference legs (narrow and wide range instrumentation). This modification is scheduled to be  !

implemented during the next refueling outage (RF06) currently !

scheduled to begin October 8,1993. (The licensee stated that the l necessary hardware will not be available until late September). l The resident inspectors will closely monitor the licensee's implementation of this hardware modificatio As of the end of July 1993, total site exposure was trending below ,

established site goals. Actual total site exposure at the end of 1 July was approximately 29 person-re The year to date goal for that period was 34 person-re No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the report period, the inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below. The observations included a review of the MW0s and other related documents for adequacy; adherence to

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procedure, proper tagouts, t'chnical specifications, quality controls, and radiological controls; observation of work and/or retesting; and specified retest requirement MWO DESCRIPTION '

99608 MOV baseline testing of IE30F594B  ;

(suppression pool level instrument line isolation valve).

101622 Replace standby diesel starting air compressor batter No violations or deviations were identified. The results of the observations in this area indicated that maintenance activities were-effectiv . Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillances listed below. The observations included a review of the procedures for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications and LCOs; verification of test instrument calibration; observation of all or part of the actual surveillance; removal and return to service of the system or component; and review of the data for acceptability based upon the

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acceptance criteri IC-lE31-0001, Rev. 24 RWCU High Room' Temperature, High l Room Differential Temperature (RWCU Isolation) Calibratio l 06-IC-IC71-R-0010, Rev.26 Drywell Pressure Transmitter Time Response Test (IC71-N0500).

06-IC-lC71-R00ll, Rev.23 Drywell Pressure High (PCIS/ SCI)

Electronics Time Response Test (IC71-6500).

06-0P-lP81-M-0002, Rev.33 HPCS Diesel Generator 13 Functional Tes No violations or deviations were identified. The observed surveillance l tests were performed in a satisfactory manner and met the requirements of the Technical Specification . Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700) l The event reports listed below were reviewed to determine if the l information provided met the NRC reporting requirements. The determination. included adequacy of event description, the corrective action taken or planned, the existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each event. The inspectors used the

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NRC enforcement guidance to determine if the event met the criterion for licensee identified violations.

. On July 20,1993, at 10:35 p.m. an isolation of the RCIC system l occurred as a result of an alarm indicating "RHR Equipment Area l Temperature High". The alarm cleared immediately and came tGck in

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i three more times until it stayed sealed in 5 minutes later. The alarm successfully reset at 10:43 p.m. The RCIC system was declared inoperable and the HPCS system was verified to be operable. Room temperature readings of the RHR equipment area Riley temperature switches were verified to be normal. The cause of the isolation was not readily determined. The RCIC system was declared operable the next morning at 12:52 On July 21, 1993, at 2:50 p.m., a RCIC system isolation again occurred after a "RHR Equipment Area Temperature High" alarm. The

RCIC system was declared inoperable and the HPCS system was

! verified to be operable. The licensee's investigation revealed a l faulty Riley temperature indicator. This particular unit was a newer model which had been previously installe'd under a program to

, upgrade all Riley temperature switches. It was subsequently L replaced and sent to the vendor for a failure analysis. The RCIC l system was declared operable at 8:30 p.m. the same day. In both cases the resident inspectors were notified and four hour notifications were made by the licensee to the NRC Operations Center per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii). Operating License Condition C.2(38) requires, in part, that E01 shall operate Grand Gulf Unit I with an allowable control room leak rate not to exceed 590 cf On July 23, 1993, during the performance of Surveillance Procedure 06-EL-SP65-SA-0001, Control Building Fire Detector and Supervisory Panel Functional Test, licensee test personnel observed that one detector to be tested would require the removal of an access cover which was part of the control room envelope. Once removed, the opening would have been greater than 20 square inches which

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equates to be greater than 590 cfm. The actual opening was about

! 550 square inches. Prior to continuing the surveillance the procedure was revised by a temporary change notice to ensure

proper controls including continuous manning of the penetration when it was open.

l Further investigations by the licensee completed on July 27, 1993, i

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revealed; however, that the surveillance had been performed on at least three previous occasions (January 21, 1992, July 20, 1992, and January 20,1993) without assurance of proper penetration controls. This issue was referred by the licensee for a root cause evaluation. This licensee identified violation is not being cited because the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied and is identified as NCV l 50-416/93-12-01, Insufficient Control Room Penetration Controls.

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l As a result the resident inspectors were notified and a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

! notification was made on July 27, 1993, at 4:45 p.m. to the NRC l

Operations Center per the Grand Gulf Facility Operating Licensee, paragraph One non-cited violation was identifie . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702) (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-416/92-21-01, Followup on root cause of primary water tank low level trip. - l On August 4, 1992, a reactor scram occurred when the turbine generator tripped due a spurious primary water tank low level trip I signal. This spurious signal occurred when an SR0 trainee was performing a ground check on the 24 Vdc bus that provides power to the electronic generator protection cabinet. This cabinet supplies I power to the primary water tank level switches. Performance of this ground detection test apparently caused perturbations in the tank level detection circuitry causing a turbine trip. This resulted in a reactor scram on turbine control /stop valves fast closure. A temporary modification was installed after the scram to bypass the low tank level trip function until a full i investigation could be performed by the licensee. This l investigation revealed that the original transmitters associated with the primary water tank level instrumentation had been replaced during the last refueling outage (RF05) with a new type of vendor recommended transmitter. The original transmitter used a DC to DC converter between the tank level capacitor probe and the battery ground detection circuitry to provide electrical isolation. The newly installed transmitter did not use a DC to DC i converter on its input. As a result, the operation of the ground  ;

detection circuitry by the SRO trainee caused perturbations in the i tank level circuitry because the batteries' ground detection circuitry was not isolated from the primary water tank level

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detection circuitry thereby creating a ground loop. Tests performed by the licensee verified that noise spikes did indeed occur during the operation of the ground detection circuitr During RF06 (October 1993) the licensee has scheduled a minor change package (MCP) to be implemented to install a DC to DC converter to provide electrical isolation between the 24 Vdc power l supply and the tank level transmitters. The inspectors verified

! that this MCP was on the outage schedule and will follow it to l completion.

1 (Closed) IFI 50-416/92-27-01, Followup on evaluation of fire retardant materials.

l A material nonconformance report (MNCR 0007-90) noted a large

! amount of fire proofing material that had been oversprayed on surfaces not required to have fireproofing. Both types of spray-f

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on fireproofing used contained magnesium oxychlorid Stainless steel that is exposed to chloride contamination is subject to pitting at room temperatures therefore overspray onto stainless <

steel piping / tubing and supports were of concern. Thermal growth

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and loading considerations on piping and tubing were also of concer The inspectors reviewed the results and disposition of this MNCR which included the licensee performing a 100% walkdown of the auxiliary, control and diesel generator buildings. This walkdown identified numerous areas of process piping / tubing and supports with overspray of fireproofing material. Of the areas, a large number would require removal or reduction of the amount of fireproofing so it would (1) not come in contact with stainless steel, (2) allow movement of pinned connections on pipe support brackets or (3) provide clearance for pipe movement during a seismic event. Current licensee plans were for work to begin during the first quarter of 199 c. iClosed) Violation bO-416/92-28-01, Failure to properly man the control room with an SR On January 11, 1993, the only SR0 in the control room left the

, area for approximately 5 minutes while responding to a disturbance

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involving security personnel outside the control room. The inspectors have discussed this event with numerous on-shift SR0s and R0s since to ensure that operations personnel were made aware of this event and its potential consequences. In addition, the inspectors held discussions with security management to ensure the security personnel were also made aware of this incident. The inspectors reviewed and discussed Lesson Plan OP-L0tt-IE-LP-020-00,10 CFR 50.54(x)-Command and Control, with the primary operations instructor responsible for its delivery. This lesson plan is a part of the continuing training program for SR0s. The inspectors concluded that since the event operations personnel ,

were much more cognizant of their control room command and control l responsibilities and were given much more explicit management guidance and expectation I d. (Closed) Violation 50-416/92-28-02, Failure to complete procedure for steam jet air ejector swapove During December 1992, after placing a new steam jet air ejector (SJAE) in service, operations did not properly secure the out-of-service SJAE. This resulted in an unposted very high radiation

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area. The licensee concluded and the inspectors concurred that the root cause of the event was a failure by the operations staff to properly control the SJAE swapover. Procedural deficiencies also contributed to this event. The inspectors reviewed the changes made to procedure 04-1-01-N62-1 as a result of this event.

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two actions into two separate steps, adding a step for posting i l

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signs indicating which SJAE air purge is in progress, and adding a requirement for health physics personnel to perform a radiation i survey after the swapover to ensure that the'out-of-service SJAE

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is properly secured. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a memo ,

issued to all on-shift SR0s by their management emphasizing the l control and tracking of planned evolutions including pre-job briefs, assignment of procedural steps to specific operators, and effective communication . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 17, 1993, with those person; indicated in paragraph I above. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee had no comment on the following inspection finding: i Item Number Tvoe Description and Reference 50-416/93-12-01 NCV Insufficient control room ,

I penetration controls i 10. Acronyms and Initialisms

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AC -

Alternating Current BWR -

Boiling Water Reactor CFM -

Cubic feet per minute-CFR -

Code of Federal Regulations DC -

Direct Current E01 -

Entergy Operations, In HPCS - High Pressure Core Spray IFI -

Inspector Followup Item LC0 -

Limiting Condition for Operation LER -

Licensee Event Report MCP -

Minor Change Package MNCR - Material Nonconformance Report MWO -

Maintenance Work Order NCY -

Non-Cited Violation l RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RF0 -

Refueling Outage RHR -

Residual Heat Removal System R0 -

Reactor Operator RWCU - Reactor Water Cleanup System SJAE - Steam Jet Air Ejector SLC -

Standby Liquid Control System SMEPA - South Mississippi Electrical Power Association S01 -

System Operating Instruction SR0 -

Senior Reactor Operator Vdc -

Volts DC