IR 05000416/1993013
| ML20057E988 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1993 |
| From: | Barr K, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057E980 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-93-13, NUDOCS 9310130455 | |
| Download: ML20057E988 (17) | |
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i UNITED STATES
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o jf NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION il
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g 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 rn
'j ATLANTA, GEORGIA 33323-0199 o, -
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SEP 241933 i
Report No.:
50-416/93-13 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Jackson, MS 39205 Docket No.:
50-416 License No.:
NPF-29 Facility Name: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
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Inspection Conducted: August 23-27, 1993
&M Q
7-29-93 f
Inspector: W. M. Sartor, Jr., Teatii Leader Date Signed
Accompanying Personnel:
G. Arthur, Sonalysts, Inc.
E. Fox, Emergency Preparedness Branch
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J. Kreh, Region II Approved by.:
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K. P. Barr;"Ch'ief
/pate' Signed
Emergency Preparedness Section
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Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
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SUMMARY i
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
Emergency organization activation f
and response were selectively observed in the licensee's Emergency Response
Facilities including:
the Simulator Control Room; Technical Support Center; i
Operational Support Center; and the Emergency Operations Facility. The inspection also included a review of the exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's post-exercise critique. This ingestion pathway exercise was
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full participation with the State and local governmental agencies. NRC
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i participation included Headquarters, Regional and Site Team response.
i Results:
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In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. The
response by the emergency organization was fully effective for accident'
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mitigation.
Exercise strengths included the proactive response of the Technical Support Center staff and the Dose Assessment functional area of the Emergency Response Facility. Areas recommended for improvement included
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9310130455 930924 fr
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PDR ADOCK 05000416 TL
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offsite notifications and a clarification needed for the Notification of
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Unusual Event (NOVE) emergency action level for loss of meteorological
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instru' mentation.
Because of the issues addressing offsite notifications l
(Paragraph 7), an exercise weakness from last year's exercise remained open.
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REPORT DETAILS t
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Persons Contacted Licensee Employees I
- J. Armstrong, Technical Assistant
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- D. Bost, Manager, Mechanical Engineering and Safety Analysis
- M. Carver, Radiological Waste Supervisor
- J.
Christian, Security Supervisor
- D. Coulter, Radiation Control Supervisor
- J. Czoika, Nuclear Specialist
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- L. Daughtery, Plant Licensing Support i
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- M. Dietrich, Manager, Nuclear Training
- J. Dimmette, Jr., Manager, Performance and Systems Engineering l
- C. Dugger, Manager, Operations
- J. Edwards, Assistant Mechanicai Support.
- D. Ellis, Emergency Planner l
- C. Ellsaesser, Operations Coordinator
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- L. Freeman, Health Physics Instructors
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- W. Garner, Supervisor, Audits
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- F. Gwynn, Health Physics Coordinator
- C. Hayes, Director, Quality j
- C. Hicks, Operations Superintendent
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- J. Hurley, Health Physics Specialist
- C. Hutchinson, Vice President, Grand Gulf Nuclear Operations
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- D. Jackson, Chemistry Coordinator
- H. Meisner, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs
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- A. Morgan, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- D. Pace, Director, Design Engineering i
- J. Roberts, Manager, Maintenance
- R. Ruffin, Licensing Specialist
- W. Russell, Operations Coordinator, Emergency Preparedness
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- J. Smith, Senior Specialist
- C. Stafford, Operations Assistant
- T. Tankersley, Superintendent, Radiation Control
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- D. Townsend, Emergency Planner
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Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members,
-i technicians, and administrative personnel.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission j
- K.-Barr, Emergency Preparedness Section Chief j
- C. Hughey, Resident Inspector (
- M. Sykes, Resident Inspector Intern
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- Attended exit interview l
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2.
Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine j
whether provisions had been made to test the integrated emergency i
i response capability and a major portion of the basic elements within the licensee's Emergency Plan, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and
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i Section IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
The scenario for this exercise was reviewed in advance of the exercise and discussed with licensee representatives. The scenario was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient emergency information for-a full participation exercise.
It was noted during the critique process that deciding in advance what extent of simulation would be allowed would be an enhancement to exercise control.
It was also noted that the use of
less simulation enhances the opportunities to recognize and correct
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unforeseen problems.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
i This area was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for
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emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and
that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required i
by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that the onsite and offsite emergency organizations were adequately described and the responsibilities for key organization positions were clearly defined in approved plans and
implementing procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine f
whether the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), 10 CFR 50, i
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and a specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.B.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined, the responsibility and authority for directing
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actions necessary to respond to the emergency were clear, and that staff
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was available to fill key functional positions within the organization.
The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and l
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mobilize licensee response personnel. Augmentation of the initial i
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'onsite emergency response organization was accomplished through activations of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made, whether arrangements to accommodate State and local personnel _ at the EOF were adequate, and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as specified by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and guidance promulgated in Section II.C of NUREG-0654 (Revision 1).
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An inspector noted that the-licensee's Emergency Plan and procedures identified other organizations capable of augmenting the planned
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response.
State personnel were accommodated with adequate space and communications equipment at the near-site Emergency Operations Facility.
Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt and assistance resources from various agencies were prepared to assist in the simulated emergency. The licensee also accommodated (in the TSC and EOF) the NRC
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t Site Team that participated in the exercise.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Classification System (82301)
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This area was observed to determine whether a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear
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facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
The licensee's Emergency Plan and 10-S-01-1, " Activation of the Emergency Plan" (EPP-1), Revision 18, dated February 7, 1992, established the Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme to identify and classify the simulated emergency conditions. The emergency
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classifications were made in accordance with the licensee's Emergency Plan and implementing procedures with the exception of the Notification of Unusual Event.
In this case, the scenario writers had envisioned a
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NOVE declaration with a complete loss of power to both the main and
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backup meteorological towers. Although the Shift Supervisor reviewed the specific EAL, it was not declared on the interpretation of requiring
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additional loss of vital accident assessment equipment to meet the emergency action level. The licensee identified the need to correct the emergency plan procedure to eliminate the confusion. The inspector
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identified the licensee's corrective action as an open item for
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follow-up.
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' Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-416/93-31-01: Verify the licensee's corrective action to Emergency Plan procedure 10-S-01-1 for the EAL addressing the NOUE for loss of vital accident assessment equipment.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
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This area was observed to determine whether procedures had been
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established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations had been established; and a means to-provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,_Section II.E.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's implementing procedure for notifying offsite authorities and the NRC. The procedures were described in 10-S-01-06, " Notification of Offsite Agencies and Plant On-Call Emergency Personnel" (EPP-6), Revision 22, July 17,1992. The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were used to provide information concerning the-simulated emergency conditions to
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Federal, State, and local response organizations to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization. Timeliness of emergency notifications declaring the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency was marginally acceptable as each required approximately 15 minutes.
This continued to be a problem from the previous year.
Although the notification form had been simplified, the performance of communicators in completing the form remains an area for improvement.
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The licensee's corrective actions to improve notifications will continue to be tracked by the previously identified Exercise Weakness 50-416/92-23-01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for
prompt communications among principal response organizations; and
emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),10 CFR 50,-
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.F.
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The inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the j
licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency
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response organization and offsite authorities,
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed.to determine whether adequate emergency l
facilities and equipment to support an emergency response was provided
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and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, t
Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
j The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of key ERFs, including the SCR, TSC, OSC, and E0F. All ERFs were promptly staffed and activated with qualified personnel.
No significant problems i
addressing facilities or equipment were identified.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Accident Assessment (82301)
l This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
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The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of
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plant status and assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and l
offsite personnel resulting from the accident. Both the engineering i
assessment and radiological assessment were managed to support the
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successful accident mitigation.
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Protective Responses (82301)
i This area was observed to determine whether guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, j
including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented
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promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I.J.
i The inspector verified that the licensee had and used emergency procedures for formulating PARS for offsite populations within the
10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ).
An evacuation of personnel from containment caused some confusion when I
it was announced for all personnel within the protected area to report
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for accountability. A later evacuation of the protected area was
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conducted with only nonessential personnel exiting the gate.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
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Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
I This area was observed to determine whether means for controlling
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radiological exposures during an emergency were established and l
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implemented for emergency workers, and that these means included exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(ll), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I.K.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing emergency workers supplemental dosimeters and by periodic surveys in the emergency response facilities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by
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separate correspondence.
14.
Exercise Critique (82301)
s The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine the deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise, and
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weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were
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formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F,
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and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted facility critiques with exercise players
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immediately following the exercise termination.
Licensee controller and evaluators conducted additional critiques prior to the formal critique to management.
During the critique process, the licensee recognized the need for additional evaluators in the communications / notification area.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
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(0 pen)
Exercise Weakness 50-416/92-23-01:
Failure to provide clear and accurate Emergency Notification messages transmitted to-the State and local agencies. As discussed in Paragraph 7 of this report, this area continues to be an area needing improvement.
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b.
(Closed)
IFI 50-416/92-23-02: Review licensee corrective action I'
for radiation survey instrument found with expired calibration date in an offsite monitoring kit.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action and inspected selected instruments
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for calibration. No issues were identified and this item is closed.
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Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and results were summarized on August 27, 1993, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described
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'the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results
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listed below.
No proprietary information is contained in this report.
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Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
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Item Number Description and Reference
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50-416/93-13-01 IFI: Verify licensee's corrective action to EAL for NOUE for loss of vital accident assessment equipment (Paragraph 6).
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Attachments:
Objectives and Sequence
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of Events i
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Page 1 of 5 l
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CONFIDENTIAL
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i GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION l
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE AUGUST 25-26, 1993
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OBJECTIVES I
A.
PURPOSE I
This document provides guidance for the conduct of the 1993 Emergency' Preparedness f
Exercise at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.
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The scope of this exercise, with some exceptions, will endeavor to demonstrate by actual performance a number of primary emergency preparedness functions. At no time will
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the exercise be permitted to interfere with safe operations, and plant management may, at their discretion, suspend the exercise for any period of time necessary to assure this goal.
l The August 25 exercise will include the appropriate notifications to Federal, State, Local
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and plant emergency personnel. Full participation by the states of Mississippi and l
Louisiana, Claiborne County and Tensas Parish is expected. Limited participation from plant personnel may be requested on August 26 to support an Ingestion Exposure.
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Pathway Exercise for the State of Mississippi.
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B.
GENERAL OBJECTIVES I
The Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 1993 Emergency Preparedness Exercise program
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objectives are based on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements delineated in
10CFR50.47 and 10CFR50 Appendix E. Additional guidance is provided in NUREG-
0654, FEMA, REP-1, Rev.1.
l The primary objective of the 1993 Emergency Preparedness Exercise is to evaluate the
'f adequacy of the emergency response organization during a simulated accident occurring during normal working hours. The scope of the exercise is sufficient to test the
following emergency res, capabilities:
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The ability of Emergency Response Organization to classify actual or simulated
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emergencies through the understanding of Emergency Action Levels (EAL) and
Initiating Conditions.
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The ability of the Emergency Response Organization to activate the station j
emergency plan and procedures.
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The ability of the Emergency Response Organization to respond to an emergency, i
make proper and timely notifications through each emergency classification
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(Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General
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Emergency), and activate the emergency response facilities in an efficient and
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timely manner.
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4.
The adequacy, effectiveness,' and proper utilization of emergency response
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facilities and their emergency response equipment (Control Room, OSC, TSC, EOF).
5.
The ability of Emergency Response Organization to formulate and make l
protative action recommendations to protect station personnel and the general
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public based on plant parameters, in-plant and on-site field surveys, and/or off-
site field monitoring information.
6.
The ability of Emergency Response Organization to evaluate the source term and make dose projections based on plant parameters and field surveys.
C.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES i
The following specific objectives are broken down by emergency response facility or function. These objectives were used to develop an exercise scenario sufficient to realize the general objectives and provide an aid to drill observers evaluating the exercise.
1.
Control Room a.
Demonstrate the capability of the Control Room staff to classify emergencies in accordance with Emergency Action Levels and Initiating Conditions until the TSC
is operational.
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Demonstrate tile capability of the Control Room staff to notify the Federal, State I
and Local agencies in accordance with established protocols (Operational Hot -
Line (OHL), NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS)).
c.
Demonstrate the capability of the Control Room staff to activate the station
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emergency plan and make appropriate notifications to activate emergency
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response personnel'during an emergency.
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Demonstrate the capability of the Control Room staff to communicate technical information to the Operations Support Center, Technical Support Center, Emergency Operation Facility, and the NRC.
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Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to recognize operational l
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symptoms and parameters indicative of degrading plant conditions.
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Demonstrate the ability of the Shift Superintendent and/or the Shift Supervisor to j
make timely and effective decisions to mitigate the consequences of the event and
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clearly demonstrate control of the response effort.
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g.
Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to adequately turn over control of the event upon activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC).
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2.
Onerations Sunnort Cen'.gr (OSC)
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a.
Demonstrate the capability of the appropriate staff to activate the OSC at the
Alert emergency classification and be fully operational within approximately I hour after activation.
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b.
Demonstrate the capability of the OSC coordinator to make timely and effective
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decisions and demonstrate clearly, effective command and control of the OSC and l
response teams.
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c.
Demonstrate the capability of the OSC coordinator and OSC team leaders to
organize, brief, and dispatch repair and corrective action teams in a timely j
manner.
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d.
Demonstrate the capability of the health physics organization to maintain
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appropriate radiological controls throughout the course of the event.
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e.
Demonstrate the ability of the OSC staff to communicate technical information j
with the Control Room. TSC, EOF and in-plant and on-site field teams.
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Demonstrate the ability to interact with the NRC Incident Response Team.
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3.
Icchnical Support Center (TSC)
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Demonstrate the capability of the appropriate staff to activate the TSC at the Alert
emergency classification and be fully operational within approximately I hour j
after activation.
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Demonstrate the capability of the Emergency Director to make timely and
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effective decisions and demonstrate clearly, effective command and control of the
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TSC response effort.
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Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to communicate technical information
with the Control Room, OSC, EOF and NRC.
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d.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to notify the Federal, State and Imcal agencies in accordance with established protocols (OHL, ENS)
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Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to evaluate the source term and make
dose projections based on plant parameters, meteorological data, or other
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simulated information made available by the exercise controllers, f.
Demonstrate the ability to interact with the NRC Incident Response Team.
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4.
Emergency Onerations Facility (EOF)
a.
Demonstrate the capability of the appropriate staff to activate the EOF at the Site
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Area Emergency classification or sooner and be fully operational within I hour i
after activation.
b.
Demonstrate the ability of the Offsite Emergency Coordinator to assume control of the event from the TSC staff, make timely decisions, and demonstrate clearly, effective command and control of the emergency response effort.
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c.
Demonstrate the ability of the EOF staff to notify the Federal, State and Local luels of government in accordance with established protocols (OHL, ENS)
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d.
Demonstrate the ability of the EOF staff to communicate technical information with the Control Room, OSC, TSC, ENMC, NRC and off-site agencies.
e.
Demonstrate the ability of the EOF staff to evaluate the source term and make
dose projections based on plant parameters, on-site /off-site field survey information, meteorological sta, or other simulated information made available by the exercise controllers.
f.
Demonstrate the ability of the EOF staff to make appropriate protective action recommendations to protect station personnel and the general public based on plant parameters, in-plant and on-site field surveys and/or off-site monitoring information.
g.
Demonstrate the ability to interact with the NRC Incident Response Team.
5.
Off-site Monitoring Teams (OMT)
a.
Demonstrate the ability to mobilize Off-site Monitoring Teams within the required time limits of the GGNS Emergency Plan, Table 5-1.
b.
Demonstrate the ability of the Off-site Monitoring Teams to obtain radiation data, collect potentially radioactive contaminated air samples and determine Iodine
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concentration.
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c.
Demonstrate the ability of the Off-site Monitoring Teams to communicate location and radiological field data to the EOF.
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Security l
a.
Demonstrate the ability of the security force to control site access and the protected area evacuation as directed by the emergency director.
b.
Demonstrate the ability of the security force to conduct accountability as necessary.
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Emergency News Media Center (ENMC)
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a.
Demonstrate the capability of the appropriate staff to activate the ENMC at the
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Site Area Emergency classification or sooner.
b.
Demonstrate the ability of the ENMC staff to communicate with the EOF.
c.
Demonstrate the ability of the ENMC to coordinate and assemble timely and accurate information at the ENMC.
d.
Demonstrate the capability of the ENMC to disseminate emergency information
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to the media and/or public (briefings, written statements) in a timely manner.
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c.
Demonstrate the ability of the ENMC to respond to technical inquires during media briefings.
f.
Demonstrate the ability to interact with the NRC Incident Response Team.
8.
Emergency Information Center (EIC) / Media Monitor (MM)
a.
Demonstrate the capability of the EIC to respond directly to questions from the media and/or public concerning real or rumored events at GGNS.
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b.
Demonstrate the capability of the EIC/MM to identify rumors and correct false information concerning events at GGNS.
9.
Activities not Demonstrated
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a.
Actual PASS samples will not be drawn.'
b.
ERF's will not be evacuated.
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c.
Backup ERFs will not be activated.
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d.
Corrective action teams will not manipulate any plant systems or components.
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Actual decontamination of vehicles and personnel will not be demonstrated,
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Medical team response and transportation will not be demonstrated.8
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g.
SCBA's will be worn but will ng.t be utilized.
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h.
Shift turnover will not be demonstrated.
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l r Requirement demonstrated through separate drill I
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GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION
1993 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALVATED EXERCISE
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SEOUENCE OF EVENTS Actual Scenario Time Time Summary
0800 00:00 Loss of runnine CRD oumo, control room is j
expected to start other CRD pump and dispatch
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operator to investigate. Maintenance is expected to
also be called to troubleshoot. Maintenance will
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find problem in CRD pump gear box causmg motor
to be overloaded.
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0810 00:10 Loss of ESF-11, control room is expected to f
recover lost electrical busses and restart equipment
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/ systems as required. An operator is expected to be dispatched to investigate.
Maintenance is also I
expected to be called to troubleshoot.
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0815 00:15 Control Room will be notified by Radwaste Control Room to isolated the floor drain tank discharge that l
is in progress. The discharge radiation monitor alarmed in the Radwaste Control Room and the F355 valve failed to close.
They are having i
Chemistry sample to determine if LCO limits have j
been exceeded.
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0825 00:25 Control room receives word, from an outside operator, that both main and backup met towers
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have lost power. The operator is unable to get the
propane generator to start.
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0830 00:30 An Unusual Event should be declared based on
" Loss of vital accident assessment equipment. Loss
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of all meteorological equipment."
i Control room is expected to call maintenance to
troubleshoot and repair the propane generator.
j
.
0845 00:45 A loss of offsite power occurs.
The reactor l
scrams. DIV II & III D/G start and energize their l
respective busses.
0900 01:00 Control Room is notified by chemistry that sample results from floor drain tank discharge verify that LCO 3.11.1.1 limit has been exceeded. During discussion, Control Room will be given results that indicate the LCO limit was exceeded by a factor of 7-4 i
I
L
l
GRAND GULF WUCLEAR STATloN 1993 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE
,
SEOUENCE OF EVENTS Actual Scenario Time Time Summary about 15.
0915 01:15 An Alert is declared due to liquid radiological release greater than 10 times the limit of LCO 3.11.1.1 in the Radioactive Liquid Effluent section of ODCM Spec.
i 0935 01:35 HPCS SSW pump breaker trips. Control Room is expected to secure DIV III D/G due to loss of cooling water.
When operator is dispatched to investigate, breaker will have an over-current flag.
When operator sent to investigate HPCS SSW motor, smell of burnt insulation around motor.
1015 02:15 TSC and OSC must be manned by this time 1015 02:15 DIV 11 D/G develops oscillations in voltage and l
current.
Oscillations will continue to increase.
D/G will trip if not tripped by Control Room.
J 1030 02:30 A Site Area Emercency is declared due to loss of
,
offsite power and all onsite D/G for > 15 minutes.
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1045 02:45 Steam leak develops on DIV I RPV reference leg.
RPV level decreases do to loss of injection.
1100 03:00 The propane generator at the Met tower is repaired
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and returned to service.
1115 03:15 RCIC trips on high steam tunnel temperature
,
isolation.
RPV level decreases do to loss of
injection.
I130 03:30 The EOF must be manned by this time
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1135 03:35 RPV level reaches top of active fuel j
,
1145 03:45 A radiological release starts
.
1215 04:15 A General Emereency is declared due to " Effluent
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monitor confirms release rate corresponding to a site boundary exposure of 5 Rem Thyroid dose
7-5 i
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~
%
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GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION 1993 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCfSE
,
,
SEOUENCE OF EVENTS Actual Scenario Time Time Summary
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commitment" or " Radiation monitoring team reports t
readings indicate > 50 mrem /hr at the site boundary."
1315 05:15 DIV I D/G is repaired and turned over to the control room. Control Room will start D/G and DIV I ECCS. RPV level will be restored to normal
and pressure will decrease to 0 psig. Containment pressure will decrease to 0 psig following reduction
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r in reactor pressure.
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1345 05:45 The radiological release is terminated due to
containment pressure reaching 0 psig. A wind shift of approximately 30* will occur and wind speed will increase due to a front entering the area. The EOF is expected to track the plume until it clears the EPZ.
1445 06:45 The radiological plume clears the EPZ 1500 07:00 The exercise is terminated
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7-6
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P
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t-