IR 05000409/1986007

Safety Insp Rept 50-409/86-07 on 860512-30.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Nonlicensed Personnel Training,Effectiveness of Licensed Operator Training & Followup on Radiation Safety Officer Training

ML20199C483
Person / Time
Site:	La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date:	06/13/1986
From:	Hare S, Hasse R, Lanksbury R, Phillips M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199C468	List: IR 05000409/1986007 ML20199C465
References
50-409-86-07, 50-409-86-7, NUDOCS 8606180174
Download: ML20199C483 (6)

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l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-409/86007 Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45 Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue - South La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 Facility Name: Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor Inspection At: Lacrosse Site, Genoa, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: May 12-30, 1986 Inspectors: b h (3'8(

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Datd Approved By: M. P 1 ips, Chief Operational Programs Section Date 7/f(

Inspection Sumary Inspection on May 12-30, 1986 (Report No. 50-409/86007(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the effectiveness of non-licensed personnel training (Inspection Procedure 41400), effectiveness of licensed operator training (Inspection Procedure 41701), and followup on SR0 candidate training deficiency by three region based inspector Results: In the three areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 0500 G

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Dairyland Power Cooperative

+ Shimshak, Manager, Special Nuclear Projects

+*J. Parkyn, Plant Manager

+*L. Kelly, Assistant Supervisor, Operations and Training Supervisor P. Gray, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance L. Nelson, Supervisor, Health Physics

+L. Goodman, Operations Engineer

• R. Wery, Supervisor, Quality Assurance R. Kota, INP0 Accredidation Coordinator NRC

+T. Burdick, Chief, Operator Licensing Section

+C. Hehl, Chief, Operations Branch

+B. Berson, Region III Counsel

+C. Paperiello, Director, Division of Reactor Safety

+A. Davis, Deputy Regional Administrator

+ Phillips, Chief, Operational Programs Section

+ Boyd, Chief, Section 20, Division of Reactor Projects

+I. Villaiva, Senior Resident Inspector, LACBWR Other personnel were contacted as a matter of routine during the in:pectio * Denotes those attending the exit interview on May 15, 198 + Denotes those attending the Management Meeting in Region III on May 30, 198 . Training Program Effectiveness This inspection was conducted to determine the effectiveness of the licensee's training program for both licensed and non-licensed staf The inspection was not designed to be a detailed evaluation of the licensee's overall training program. This evaluation is currently performed by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) as part of the training program accreditation process. At the time of this inspection, none of the nine training programs subject to accreditation had been submitted to INP0 for accreditation. These programs are (1) non-licensed operator, (2) cont.rol room operator (RO),

(3) senior control room operator (SRO), (4) shif t technical advisor (STA), (5) instrument and control technician, (6) electrical maintenance

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I personnel, (7) mechanical maintenance personnel, (8) health physics and chemistry, and (9) onsite technical staff and managers. The licensee expects to submit these programs to INP0 for accreditation by September 30, 198 To assess the effectiveness of the current training program, the inspectors reviewed 52 Incident Reports (irs) to determine if they were caused by inadequate training and if lessons learned from the event had been factored into the training program. When appropriate, personnel involved in these events were interviewed and their training records reviewe ; The inspectors noted during this review that the licensee does not document the root cause of an incident in the incident report. The inspectors expressed the concern that failure to identify a root cause precludes trending and the determination of appropriate corrective actio Non-Licensed Staff Training Effectiveness (41400)

The training program structure and the personnel responsible for its implementation were defined in ACP-21.1, "LACBWR Training Responsibilities," Issue 1 Skill Training was the responsibility of the Department Supervisor It consisted primarily of on-the-job training and, in the case of maintenance personnel, an apprenticeship progra Formal classroom training appeared to be minimal. General employee training (e.g.,

safety, QA/QC, security) was the responsibility of the department

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supervisor of the functional are The review of events over the 1985-86 period indicated no generic training problems. Inadequate training could be considered the root cause in three of these events. These events were (1) an electrician drilled two holes in the main containment airlock; (2) failure to take a chemistry sample in accordance with Technical Specification 4.2.2.22 Action Statement 0; and (3) a technician lifted the wrong wire in an attempt to "unparallel" two instrument power supplies. Each event involved a different discipline. One event involved a discipline

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knowledge problem (Item 3) and the other two involved more general plant requirements. Based on this observation and the generally adequate

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response to other events, the inspectors concluded that there were no generic training problems. Corrective action for all three events

involved discussion during supervisor meetings. In response to

Item 2, the power increase procedure was also revised to more

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explicitly define responsibilities for satisfying the specificatio A review of the qualifications of selected supervisory and technical support personnel indicated that their qualifications were consistent with Chapter 13 of the FSA Feedback of lessons learned from events was generally through the use of required reading and discussion during supervisor meetings.

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Based on these observations, the inspectors concluded that the training program for non-licensed personnel was effective, b. Licensed Operator Training Effectiveness (41701)

Of the 52 events reviewed, the inspectors chose three incident reports for further review:

Incident Report Number Description 85-06 Shift Supervisor left sit Alternate Core Spray lined up to river during hydr Seal Inject Leak and Scram during shutdown due to downscaling NI channel too rapidl Incident Report 85-06 addressed the circumstances surrounding a Shift Supervisor leaving the site. The responsible Shift Supervisor was interviewed and training records reviewed. The inspector noted the competency of the individual and found the training records appeared to be in order. The event did not violate Technical Specifications and was not a result of deficient trainin Incident Report 85-15 dealt with the Alternate Core Spray System being inadvertently lined up to the river rather than the reactor vessel. This was identified as partially a procedural deficiency and inadequate communication during a shift turnover. The inspectors witnessed portions of two shift turnovers during this inspection and found them commensurate with plant conditions (shutdown and plant startups) and in accordance with procedural requirements. The inspectors reviewed training records of the personnel involved with the event and found them adequat Incident Report 85-18 described a Reactor Scram that occurred while shutting down the plant due to the downscaling of a nuclear instrument too rapidly. The person involved with the incident was interviewed and his training records reviewed for adequacy. The inspectors found no indication that the incident was caused by inadequate trainin While the majority of the licensed training program consists of on-the-job training with minimal formal classroom training, the program

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appears to be effective as denoted by the relatively few personnel

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errors. Interviews with plant personnel revealed that while being generally satisfied with the training program, improvement could be realized by having more direct training regarding all procedural l

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changes (majority covered by required reading) and more training regarding problems encountered with equipment / components in the plan The inspectors noted that when required reading was routed to the

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operating shifts and management SR0s, long periods of time elapsed before they were returned to the training coordinator. The licensee stated the reason was that after the operating shifts reviewed the information, delays were encountered when routed through management. The licensee committed during the exit interview on May 15, 1986, to address the inspectors' concern The licensee provided the following statistics regarding their license exam results for operators:

License Type Year Number of Exams Given % Passed R0 1982 4 50 SRO 1982 4 75 R0 1983 5 100 SR0 1983 5 100 R0 1985 8 50 The overall pass rate was consistent with the industry averag i The inspectors also verified that the licensee's training program satisfied the commitments in Chapter 13.2 of the Lacrosse Safety Analysis Repor Based on these observations, the inspectors concluded that the

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training program for licensed personnel was effective.

3. Followup on SRO Candidate Training Deficiencies During this inspection period, licensee personnel were being administered two Reactor Operator and one Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) examinations by Region III specialist During the examination process, it came to an examiner's attention that the SRO candidate was lacking in SR0 and Shift Supervisor administrative knowledge even though his personal quali-fication statement (NRC Form 398) stated that he had 48 weeks training in these areas. The licensee is committed , in the Lacrosse Technical Technical Specifications Section 6.3.1, to Sections A and C of the March .8, 1980 NRC letter to all licensees. This letter requires that a non-degreed individual participate in an SR0 training program that includes 3 months on shift as an extra person. The NRC interpretation of this requirement is that the duties of the extra person be commensurate with the position he is applying for and for any position he may fill

, requiring the SR0 license (specifically, Shift Supervisor or Refueling

Supervisor).

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Subsequent investigation by the inspectors and an NRC license examiner determined that the licensee considered this requirement satisfied by a 48 month on-the-job training program which cycled evenly an individual through the four duty stations in the control room. These consisted of Reactor Operator, Turbine Operator, Auxiliary Operator, and Switchyard Operator. None of these positions require a Senior Reactor Operator's license. The only operating crew positions requiring an SR0 license were the Shift Supervisor and the Refueling Superviso The inspectors performed selected interviews with recently licensed SR0s and R0s and the aforementioned applicants and determined the following:

(1) The SR0 candidate that was being examined had minimal training as a Refueling or Shift Superviso (2) The SR0's personal qualification statement did not accurately reflect training in SR0 dutie (3) The licensee had no formal training requirements for SR0 candidates in the area of Refueling Supervisor or Shift Supervisor responsibilitie (4) The currently licensed SR0s interviewed had not received the 3 months SR0 training prior to licensin It was also determined during these interviews that some training in Refueling or Shift Supervisor responsibilities was given prior to an SR0 filling these positions. However, it typically did not consist of the three months required by the NRC letter. Further, there was nothing to re p(e.clude g., in ananemergency SR0 fromsituation).

filling one of these positions with no training A management meeting was held on May 30, 1986 in the Region III office to discuss the above issue As a result of this meeting in which Region III stated its concerns, the licensee committed to provide recently licensed SR0s three months training at the Shift Supervisor level. This training will be documented by the use of qualification cards. This training will also be incorporated into the program for all future SR0 candidates. Completion of this effort is considered an open item (409/86007-01). Exit Interview and Management Meeting The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

on May 15, 1986 and summarized the purpose, scope, and findings of the inspection. A management meeting was held on May 30, 1986 in the Region III office (attendees-are denoted in Paragraph 1) to discuss problems with the licensed operator training program identified during the inspec-tion. The licensee stated in the exit interview that the inspectors had n

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