IR 05000409/1986017

Insp Rept 50-409/86-17 on 861206-870220.No Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification, Monthly Maint & Surveillance,Ler Followup,Ie Bulletins & Notices & Training & Qualification Effectiveness

ML20212P592
Person / Time
Site:	La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date:	02/27/1987
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212P581	List: IR 05000409/1986017 ML20212P577
References
50-409-86-17, IEB-86-001, IEB-86-1, IEIN-86-106, NUDOCS 8703160163
Download: ML20212P592 (11)

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l 3 f* Region III Report No. 50-409/86017(DRP)

Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45 Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue - South La Crosse, WI 54601 Facility Name: La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Inspection At: La Crosse Site, Genoa,. Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: December 6,-1986 through February 20, 1987 Inspector: I. Villalva Approved By: E iw g* J? - g2 7-/7 ReactorPro)ctsSection2C Date Inspection Summary Inspection from December 6, 1986 through February 20, 1987 (Report No. bO-409/86017(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of Operational Surveillance Safety Verification; Observation; Monthly Licensee Event Maintenance Reports Followup; IEObservation; Bullet ins; IEMonthly Information Notices; Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings; TrainingandQualificationEffectiveness;andOpenItem Results: No violations were identifie ~

PDR ADOCK 05000409 G PDR

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,**' DETAILS 1. ' Persons Contacted

• J. Parkyn, Plant Superintendent

• G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor

• L. Kelley, Assistant to Operations Supervisor L. Nelson, Health and Safety Supervisor R. Wery, Quality Assurance Supervisor S. Raffety, Reactor Engineer P. Bronk, Nuclear Engineer

• L. Goodman, Operations Engineer R. Brimer, Electrical Engineer

• D. Rybarik, Mechanical Engineer The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspectio * Denotes those attending exit interviews during the inspection perio . Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of the crib house, reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for ecuipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation anc direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Alternate Core Spray System to verify operabilit These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility

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operations were in conformance with the requirements established uider

technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure No violations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation

! Station maintenance activities of selected safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted i in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry l codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

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, ' '~ The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using, approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel parts and materials used were properly certified; radiologicalcontroiswereimplemented;and,firepreventioncontrols were implemente Workrequestswerereviewedtodeterminestatusofoutstandingjobsand to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which could affect system performanc No violations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the nuclear instrumentation system for wide range power including the channels 5 and automatic gain 6, and control power range system channels The inspector veri7 and 8,fied that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne No violations were identifie . Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussion with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective actions were accom)lished, and corrective actions to prevent recurrence had been accomplis 1ed in accordance with technical specification (Closed) LER 85-04: Type C Leakage Test Failures - Retention Tank and Demineralized Water Valves. This event was originally opened in Inspection Report No. 50-409/85012(DRP) and left open in interim Inspection Report No. 50-409/85022(DRP)pendingacceptableinstallation of a new retention tank pump discharge valve (valve 54-25-006) and its passing the acceptance criteria for Type C leakage testin .

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• The aformentioned valve was installed on April-4, 1986 and was subsequently tested and met the Type C leakage criteria. The installation and results of the test were confirmed by the inspector. This LER is, therefore, close (Closed) LER 85-17: Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Load Due to Maintenance on ZNB11 and Loss of Offsite Power. The most salient-feature of this event, from a regulatory viewpoint, was the loss of offsite power that occurred while an electrical technician was winterizing a 69 kV oil circuit breaker (2NB11 in the main switchyar This event was left o)en in Inspection Reports No. 50-409/85018(DRP)

andNo.50-409/85022()RP)pendingimplementationofacceptable corrective actions. Corrective actions taken by the licensee included removing the manual trip lever on Breaker 2NB11 to prevent a similar event, and serving the air compressor that charges the air receiver from a power source independent from the affected breaker. Because of other safety considerations, the manual trip lever on Breaker 2NB11 was subsequently reinstalled and a protective bolt was placed through the trip lever to prevent accidental tripping of the breake Although the overall corrective actions taken by the licensee appear to be slanted so as to provide additional protection to Genoa 3 rather than to LACBWR and were not as extensive and systematic as the inspector was led to believe, they meet the licensing requirements of the plant. This LER, therefore is closed. This evaluation also closes Open Iten No. 409/850XX-02: Unusual Event

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Declared 10/22/85 Oue to Maintenance Personnel in Switchyard Inadvertently Tripped Breaker Normal Scra (Closed) LER 86-02: Momentary loss of Power to 120V Noninterruptible Bus 18. This event was left open in Inspection Report No. 50-409/85022(DRP) pending the revision of the operating procedure for Noninterruptible Bus 1 The relevant sections of the procedure for Noninterruptible Bus 1B (procedureVolumeIV section 21) has been revised, approved and implemente ThisL$Ris,therefore, close (Closed) LER 86-08: Auto Start of Emergency Diesel Generators and containment Isolation. This event, which was due to personnel error and disagreement between the power supply wiring diagram and the actual wiring, was left open in Inspection Report No. 50-409/86006(DRP)

pending revision of the affected wiring diagra The erroneous wiring diagram has been revised approved and released as a controlled document. Accordingly, this LER is close _ _ - - - - _ _ - - . . .-_ . ~ . __

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, .(Closed) LER 86-29:: Reactor Scram - 1BLForced Circulation Pump Trip-

~. Due to seal In This event was left open-b .inInspectionhectSupplyValveClosing.50-.409/86013(DRP)

eport N pending com

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The inspector has completed his evaluation of this event,-and'has' *

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e determined.that the reactor scram was caused by low recirculation flow that occurred when Forced Circulation Pump 18 tripped. In P this instance, a faulty. valve controller caused the pump's seal

,' .injectsupplyvalvetoclose,therebycausing'thepumptrip.

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The rebuilding inspector-reviewed the licensee's the air controller, changing corrective actions,'s(e.g.,

the air regulator filter,

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replacing the tubing between the air regulator and the controller,

and revising the operating procedure for forced circulation flow to ,

increase flow during plant startup so that a scram should not occur r upon tripping a forced circulation pump), and found them acceptable.

Accordingly, this LER is closed.

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(Closed) LER 86-30: Spike on Nuclear. Instrumentation Ch. 6 With Points.

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varianceBetweenAlarmandTrip/86013(DRP)pendingcompletionofThis in Inspection Report NO. 50-409 ev the inspector's evaluation.

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i' The inspector has completed his~ review and evaluation of this even i' In brief, this event was virtuall

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described Inspection Report in No. LER 85-18, de DRP).

whose'in In addition toytheidentical to a p  :

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' remedial actions previously taken by the licensee, three commitments . '

to the NRC were implemented prior to restarting the plant. Namely,

! (1)tonotadjustoralteranypartofthedrawerremovedfromNI

{. Channel 6 until an acceptable troubleshooting procedure was.

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developed (2) to issue a directive that the plant be manually

scrammedIfanyfullscramalarmoccurswithout'ascramwhenthe i protectivelogicisone-out-of-two,and(3)toperformsurveillance

tests on NI C,1annels 5 and 6 and check their alarm point versus '

h their trip point following each scra ;

L i Based on the results of the previous evaluation of an identical event and on the corrective actions taken by the licensee, this

LER is closed.

I (Closed) LER 86-31: Start of Emergency Equipment /1B Static Inverter Fransfer. This event was left open in Inspection Report No.

50-409/86013(DRP)pendingcompletionoftheinspector'sevaluation.

p The inspector has completed his review and evaluation of this event

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and the corrective actions taken by the licensee, a brief l- description of which follows. On October 8, 1986, while the plant i

was in a cold shutdown mode, the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator, the

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the 1A High Pressure Service

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1AHighPressureCoreSprayPumplstarted,bothforcedcirculation

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Water / Alternate Core Spray Diese h pumps tripped, most containment isolation valves closed, and approximately 40 alarms annunciated. This event was apparently -

caused by a momentary interruption of power to the 1B 's .

Noninterruptible Bu ,

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A blown fuse in the 1B Static Inverter was replaced after which the inverter was thoroughly checked and found to be functioning -

properly. No conclusion was reached regarding the cause of this event, but the symptoms match those associated with a momentary -

interruption of DC power to the inverte Although the actual cause of the event was not determined, the troubleshooting and tests that were performed provide-assurance '

that the relevant safety-related systems will perform their intended functions. This LER is, therefore, close , (Closed) LER 86-32: ScramofControlRod5DuringShui.downDueto Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Ch. 1. On October'27 1986, whiletheplantwasinacoldshutdowncondition,ControlJodN was being withdrawn to measure motor curren When Control Rod N was withdrawn to approximately two-thirds the fully withdrawn -

position, a short period scram occurred on source range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel No. 1, causing Control Rod No. S to fully insert. (Note: The source range channel scrams are only in effect when the reactor is shutdown and a single rod is being withdrawn for testing out-of-two.} during which The cause timescram of the the protective was attributed trip to logic is one-an unstable discriminator circuit that resulted in excessive amplification or a spike that caused the scram. Corrective actions included runnina a '

discriminator curve for Nuclear Instrumentation Channel No. 1 and i-resetting the discriminator to a more stable portion of the curv The inspector has reviewed this event and the actions taken by the licensee and concludes they are acceptable; therefore, this LER is close (Closed) LER 86-33: Control Rod Withdrawal While Containment

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Building Particulate Monitor Was No Operable. The evaluation of this event was documented in Insaection Report No. 50-409/86013(DRP)

prior to its being issued as an LER. As stated in the previous evaluation, the licensee not only identified the event, but also took prompt corrective measures to prevent .its rz:urrence.

Accordingly, this LER is close (Closed) LER 86-34: Containment Ventilation Isolations Due to CB

Immediate Particulate Monitor Spiking. On November 12, 1986, and again on November 13, the Containment Building Immediate Particulate i

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Monitor spiked t;igh, causing the containment building's ventilation dampers and vent header valve.to close. The spiking was determined to have been caused by dirty. contacts on the log rate meter's range

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switch. The rahyc switch's santacts were cleaned with alcohol following the iratial isolation; however, on November 13, a similar spiking Sad isulation event occurred. Following this event, the range switch contacts were cleaned with Freon TF (Trichlorotri-fluoroethane). No additional spiking has occurred subsequent to

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. cleaning the contacts with Freon TF. The Indications on the other

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activity monitors wer6 normal, indicating that the spikes experienced on November 12th and 13th were spurious. The inspector reviewed the event and evaluated the corrective actions and safety significance of this event and has conclrded that this LER should be close ' (Closed) LER 86-35: Reactor s. ram Due to Low Vacuum Relay SK25/1

', Failure with Fast Coo ~ldown. Vn November 18, 1986, failure of the

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low turbine-condenser vacuum relay caused a reactor scram from appioximately 96% power. The relay failure also caused the main

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steSm isolation valve to close which, in turn, brought the shutdown condens.er into operatio ,

Operation of the shutdown co'ndenser resulted in a cooldown rate that exceeded the technical specification limit for a short period of time (i.e., during a 12 minute period, the temperature in a section of the

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reactor vessel dropped approximate'y 43F, resulting in a maximum vessel cooldown rate of>215F/ hour,. However, the maximum hourly cooldown rate experienced during this event was approximately 60F/ hou '

The licensee has evaluated this event and has determined that the maximum resultant stresses were significantly lower than the allowable shesses. The licensee has also determineo that the incident had an insignificant effect on the vessel's usage since the maximum usage factor was less than 0.0005, i.e. 1/2000 cycles. (For actual vessel usage factor calculations, the lic,ensee has assigned a factor of 1/155 for bolts and 1/12,000 for the flange.) Corrective measures taken by the licence include replacing the failed relay and ordering replacement relays for all relays of the same model and vintage.

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The inspenor has reviewed and evaluateil the event, including the

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licensee's analyses and corrective measures and concludes that this

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LER should be close . (Closed) LER 86-36 and_LER 86-36, Revision 1: Reactor Scram Due to

, 5cMin Solenoid on Control Rod' Drive NO. le. On December 6, 1986,

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while the plant was operating at ap3roximately 97% power, one of the two scram solenoids on Control Rod io.18 failed open, causinc Control Rod No. 18 to insert (scram). Ins.erting a control roc in this manner results in low accumulator oil level on the affected

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control rod drive mechanism which, in turn, results in a partial

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scram. During a partial scram, the center 13 control rods are

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[# automaticallyJnserted(scrammed),renderingthereactorsubcriticb."',

. In this instance,-the; reactor: operator manuall

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control rods subsequent to the partial scram.:During

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y-scrammed the course theof- remaining i

this event, the-1B Static Inverter Trouble alt.rm also annunciate ' ~

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Because the flange'for Control Rod Nc'. 18 had been le,1 king prior

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to this event it was initially speculated that water robably-led to- the: failure. However, an inspection.of the fai ed solenoid .

l indicated that the failure was not moisture related. Consequently, the licensee-could not determine whether the failure was due to moisture or whether it was a random failure.' The immediate corrective actions included replacing both scram solenoids on Control Rod No. 1 Tha long term corrective actions include the systematic replacement of C the scram solenoids as part of LACBWR's' preventive maintenance progra <

An examination of the IB Static Inverter indicated that it-wa su plying the load, but its INVERTER IN PROCESS OF SYNCHRONIZING li ht was on, the frequency was approximately 60.5 hertz and the yo tage >;as 124 volts. When the electricians checked the inverter they foured its frequency at 60.4 hertz, and they lowered the frequency such that the inverter synchronized with its alternate

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source. The inverter's manufacturer (Solid State Controls) was contacted by the licensee regarding the frequency drift. The- ,

manufacturer suggested changing the oscillator board which was done. When the invetter was placed in service, it. operated for

> approximately two seconds and then blew a fuse. Trou'31eshooting .

revealedthatachokecoilintheconstantvoltage.regulatorhad burned out. The actual cause of this failure was not determined,

.but it is suspected that the choke coil's failure may have been due to an original weakness that' caused it to fail on the restart current, surge. The failed choke coil was repaired and reinstalled after which the inverter was thoroughly checked, inspected and tested by a manufacturer's representative. No anomalies were foun /

The inspector has reviewed this event, inc1hding the analyses and corrective actions taken by the licensee and finds them acceptabl This LER, therefore, is closed.

- (Closed) LER 86-37: Contair. ment Ventilation Isolation. On December

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shutdown and while a plant heatup was in progress, a high activity

, alarm was received in the control room from Containment Building (CB) Immediate Particulate Monitor, causing automatic isolation of the containment building ventilation darrpers and vent header valves.

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r the plant conditions, and the recorder showed no increase in activity i .

from the CB,Immediate Particulate Monito t l-j Y c

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."* Plant heatup was terminated subsequent to the isolation, (primary terperature had reached 280F). The auxiliary operator and a health physics technician were dispatched to the CB to investigate. The auxiliary operator looked for leaks in the accessible portions of the CB but found none; the health physics technician took an air

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sample analysis and found that the activity was above normal but

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within occupational exposure limits. Since the actual cause of the-high activity alarm could not be determined by the licensee, it has J been deemed as being spurious, with a potential contributing factor

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being the closeness of the alarm setpoint to the actual operatin valu The inspector has reviewed this event, including its safety significance and the actions taken by the licensee and has concluded 7 that the manner.by which this event was handled was acceptabl This LER is, therefore, close (0 pen) LER 86-38: Boron Tank Solution Concentration Below Technical

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Specification Limi Subsequent to the performance of the Startup i Test of Boron and Emergency Core Spray Controls and Valves on December 13, 1986, it was noticed that the fluid level of the boron tank was increasing at a low rate. The increase was such that on December the tank's level had increased from 57 inches (720 gallons 16,)1986,to60 inches (750 gallons). This increase prompted the shift su)ervisor to request that a tank sample be drawn and analyzed. Tie concentration of sodium pentaborate decahydrate in

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the sample was 17% by weight vice the minimum concentration permitted by the Technical Specification of 17.8%,

The source of the dilution was water from the overhead storage tank via back leakage through the boron injection outlet check valve and through an inlet valve for the core spray pump boron solution. The affected inlet valve had apparently failed to fully seat after the startup test had been performed. The inlet valve was subsequently cycled and flushed, after which water leakage into the boron tank ceased. The boron concentration was then raised to the required level.

l l Additional corrective actions taken by the licensee or to be taken I s include the addition of a step to the test procedure requiring that l \ the inlet valves be checked for leakage following cycling. In addition, the boron check valve is scheduled to be dissassembled i

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during the next refueling outage. Pending the completion of these two items, this LER is being held ope . IE Bulletins l For the IE Bulletin listed below the inspector verified that the bulletin l

was received by licensee management and reviewed for its applicability to

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the facilit If the bulletin was applicable the inspector verified that-the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the bulletin, that the licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written respons (Closed) IE Compliance Bulletin No. 86-01: " Minimum Flow Logic Problems that could Disable RHR Pumps." lhe licensee has reviewed this bulletin and has determined that it is not applicable to LACBWR and that the LACBWR design is not subject to the problem discussed in the bulletin. This determination has been confirmed by the inspector; therefore, this bulletin is close . IE Information Notices Fw the IE Information Notice listed below, the inspector verified that it was received by licensee management and reviewed for its applicability to LACBW The inspector verified that the licensee had reviewed the implications of the notice and that previous corrective actions had been performed and that future corrective actions are being evaluated to preclude the event described in the notice from occurring at LACBW (0 pen) IE Information Notice 86-106: Feedwater Line Break. The licensee has reviewed this notice and has prepared an internal document.that responds to NRC's national survey on licensee's actions regarding thinning of secondary piping. The notice specifically states that although written responses are not required licensees are expected to review the information for if applicabIlityattheirfacilitiesandconsideractions,litie appropriate, to preclude similar problems at their faci Although the licensee has reviewed the notice and has responded to the NRC survey this information notice is being held as an openitem(50-409I86017-1) pending the development of additional information by the licensee regarding its evaluation, inspection and surveillance of the affected piping system . Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (409/85017-05): Inservice Testing Instrument Duringthereview,theinspectornotedthattherewasnoobjective evidence that the licensee had evaluated test instruments for com)liance with the range and accuracy requirements delineated in IWP-4110 t1 rough IWP-4115. Accordingly, this shortcoming was considered as an unresolved item. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's observation and stated that an evaluation of this matter would be performed. The licensee has since completed said evaluation and has compiled a

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listing of the relevant inservice test equipment. - Said listing stipulates the calibration fre equipment range, manufacturer'quence, equipment s stated ~ accuracy serial number, and the allowed tolerance of the relevant instruments. This unresolved: item is, therefore, considered close (Closed) Unresolved Item (409/85017-06): Inservice Test Performanc o During-the review, the inspector.noted that the-calibration status of the permanently. installed tachometer on the ACS diesel driven pump was' indeterminate and that'the licensee had not included the tachometer in its instrument calibration program.._The licensee has since imposed-a calibration program for said tachometer and has included it in the inservice test list. This unresolved item is, therefore, considered close .- Training and Qualification Effectiveness The licensee's training and qualification program.is becoming more

' effective and is making a positive contribution, commensurate with procedures ^and staffing, to the understanding of work and adhering.to arocedures with-few personnel errors in the areas covered in this repor :or example,.INP0 has completed its site accreditation visit and the site team has recommended to INP0's Accreditation Board that the following training programs be approved:

Unlicensed Operator Training Licensed Operator. Training Shift Technical / Senior Reactor Operator Training

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Shift Technical Advisor Training

' Technical Staff and Managers Training

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The licensee is presently scheduled to go before the Accreditation Board i on the above programs on February 26, 1987. The remaining programs are presently scheduled to be reviewed by INP0's accreditation team during-

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the week of June 22, 198 . -Open Items

,. Open items are matters which have been discussed _with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Two new open items are described in Sections 5.n and 7.a of this repor . Exit Interview l Theinspectormetwithlicenseerepresentatives(denotedinParagraph1)

l: throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection l and summarized the scope and findings of the inspectica activitie The licensee acknowledged the findings as reported herein and did not-identify such documents or processes as proprietary.

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