IR 05000409/1988003

Insp Rept 50-409/88-03 on 880207-0320.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety,Maint,Surveillance & Surveillance Procedures & Records,Lers,Bulletins,Special Repts & Organization & Administration

ML20151D795
Person / Time
Site:	La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date:	04/01/1988
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151D759	List: IR 05000409/1988003 ML20151D756
References
50-409-88-03, 50-409-88-3, IEB-88-001, IEB-88-1, NUDOCS 8804140449
Download: ML20151D795 (7)

Text

-

-

. .

-

.

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-409/88003(DRP)

Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45 Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue - South Lacrosse, WI 54601 Facility Name: Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor Inspection At: Lacrosse Site, Genoa, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: February 7, 1988 through March 20, 1988 Inspector: K. Ridgway sat /

Approved By: I .R.v'h Jackiw, Chief 7 d-Re,actorPfojectsSection28 Date ,

Inspection Summary Inspection from February 7,1988 through March 20, 1988 (Report No. 50-409/88003(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; surveillance procedures and records; organization and administration; licensee event report; and bulletins and special report Results: One violation was identified in Section 6 involving licensee failure to meet minimum staffing requirements. No other significant safety issues ,

were identifie Q5 PDR ADOCK 05000409 O DCD

-

.

-

. .

.

.

DETAILS Persons Contacted

• J. Parkyn, Plant Superintendent

• G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor L. Nelson, Health and Safety Supervisor

• R. Wery, Quality Assurance Supervisor R. Cota, Shift Supervisor (Training)

_

M. Polsean, Relief Shift Supervisor The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspectio * Denotes those attending exit interviews during the inspection perio . General lhe Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) was pennanently shutdown on April 30, 1987 by authorization of the Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC)

Board. The operating License was changed to a possession-only license by Amendment No. 56, dated August 4, 1987. The reactor is defueled with water in the primary system and is considered to be in Operating Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) until Technical Specifications (TS) changes are made or the Decorrrnissioning Plan TS are accepte On March 14, 1988 Amendment No. 59 to the provisional license revising the Technical Specifications was issued. This amendment removes the TS requirements for Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Testin On December 21, 1987, OPC submitted their proposed Decommissioning Plan, the preliminary Decontamination Plan and a supplement to the Environmental Report. The new TS for SAFSTOR was submitted separately on February 22, 198 On February 10, 1988, the licensee requested that their application of October 9,1974 be amended by deleting their request for a full-term operating license and requesting that LACBWR be placed in a SAFSTOR condition and be maintained as specified in their Decommissioning Pla . Operational Safety Verification The inspector reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operstors. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the crib house, reactor building, and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and fluid leaks, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. By observation and direct interview the inspector verified that the physical security plan was being implernented in accordance ,

with the station security pla l t

l t

i

- . - , - _ - - - - - -

.

-

, .

.

.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector walked down portions of the High Pressure Service Water System, and Fire Protection System to verify operabilit ;

i No violations were identifie i Monthly Haintenance Observation i Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were i observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance ;

with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards l and in conformance with technical specification "

The following items were considered during this review: approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing ,

and/or calibrations were perfonned prior to returning components or systems i to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were 4 accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were Implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemente t Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and ,

to assure that priority was assigned to the maintenance of SAFSTOR equipment which could affect system performanc No violations were identifie .

, Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector reviewed the licensee's surveillance program to assure that ;

required surveillances had been performed and test records were availabl The licens2e has reviewed the surveillance program in light of their i shutdown status and has stopped performing those tests on instruments and '

equipment not needed for TS Operating Condition 4. Surveillances on systems such as the Controi Rods and Safety System, the Emergency Service :

Water Supply System, deactor Pressure and Power Instrumentation, High ;

Pressure Core Spray and Boron Systems, Alternate Care Spray (not including '

the backup fire protection portion) are no longer performed. The licensee has submitted a proposed amendment to delete these systems from T No violations were identifie . Surveillance Procedures and Records [

The inspector reviewed all TS surveillance requirements that are still in 5 effect for the shutdown-defueled reactor (surveillances for Operating Conditions 1, 2, 3 and 5 were exduded) to determine that up-to-date '

procedures reviewed in the last two years were available for each j t

l

!

f 3 i

!

!

~

- - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

'

.

. .

I required check, functional test, or calibration; that the surveillance schedule specified the required frequency of the tests; and that the procedure review covered all areas of T ;

The surveillance procedures were reviewed to assure that test prerequisites,

'

preparations, and acceptance criteria were specified; that adequate '

implementing instructions were included; and that systems were restored to an operational condition following the test The selected records were reviewed to determine that the tests were being conducted according to procedures by qualified personnel and at the required frequency; that any discrepancies found were appropriately

. corrected; and that the tests and overall program were being reviewed by managemen No violations were identifie . Organization and Administration The inspector verified that changes in the organizational structure and assignments had been reported to the NRC through the licensee's QA program and verified that persons assigned to new or different positions in the i licensee's organization since the last inspection of this area satisfy qualifications identified in the technical specifications and the licensee's QA progra ,

Since the plant shutdown about one year ago, the onsite staff has been reduced to 43, a fif ty-percent reduction. There has been no change in i offsite line management. The licensee has submitted a proposed TS change to reduce the minimum shiftwise coverage to a Shift Supervisor and one operator. At present the miidmum TS shift coverage for Operating Condition 4 Cold Shutdown, corisisting of a Shift Supervisor (SRO), one

'

Licensed Reactor Operator and one Auxiliary Operator (AO) which is being met by utilizing maintenance craftsmen who have been certified as A0s. They are routinely assigned to shifts to provide minimum TS coverage since the '

number of licensed operators has been reduced to seven.

j The radiation protection staffing continues as described in Inspection Report No. 50-409/8701 The Technical Support Staff has been reduced to three positions with i part-time assistance from corporate engineerin The licensee reported (LER 88-02, see Paragraph 8) that on January 29, 1988 a Shif t Supervisor was not on site for a period of about 20 minutes. Thus

,

the minimum *iS staffing was not met. This is considered to be a violation of TS 6.2.2.a and Table 6.2.2-1(50-409/88-01).

.

+

i i

i 1 4

.-. - - - - - - , . - . _ . - . - - _ _ . . , - _ _ - - . - . . - . - - _ - - . - . _ - - --

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _____

.

.

. .

. . Licensee Event Raports Followup <

Through direct observations, discussion with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event report was reviewed to detennine that reportability requirements were fuli flied, imediate corrective actions were accomplished, and corrective actions to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification (Closed) LER 88-01: Containment Building Isolation Due to a Spurious '

Delayed Particulate Monitor Trip. On January 29, 1988, an automatic Containment Building (CB) isolation occurred when the CB Delayed Particulate Monitor momentarily spiked high. The trip was attributed to welding operations being carried out at the time as no other CB monitoring instruments showed an increase and the delayed particulate monitor was found to be operable by check-out after the trip. Trips have occurred in [

the past when welding operations have been conducted. Spurious isolations

'

of the CB have no safety significance since the CB is normally continuously ventilated to maintain personnel accessibility and to prevet.t CB pressure .

'

buildu (Closed) LER 88-02: Minimum Technical Specification Staffing Requirements Not Me The licensee reported that on January 29, 1988, for about 20 minutes during the lunch period, the minimum TS staffing requirements for one Shift Supervisk onsite was not met. The duty Shift Supervisor during the morning of January 29, 1988 was temporarily assuming the position of '

the regularly scheduled supervisor who was to come in at 1200 and to continue duty Shift Supervisor relief through the 1600-2400 shift. The relief duty Shift Supervisor, a licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO),

is usually assigned to engineering or administrative duties and is infrequently required to relieve as the Shift Supervisor. He assumed the duty at the 0800 shif t turnover and after reviewing the plant status and assuring that no activities needing his attention were in progress, he told the two Reactor Operators on duty he would be working in his office in the Administration Building adjacent to the plant. He proceeded to work throughout the morning in his office with other staff members until noon. Forgetting he was on duty, he lef t for lunch at 1205 with other staff members. At 1225 the regular Shift Supervisor arrived onsite and reported to the Control Room. The Reactor Operators on duty informed this Supervisor that they had paged and could not contact the duty Shift Supervisor. The newly arrived supervisor also tried to contact the duty Shif t Supervisor without success and at that time assumed the dut After returning frcm luach at 1250, the required shift turnover was conducte The absence of a duty Shift Supervisor is a violation of Administrative TS 6.2.2.a and Table 6.2.2-1 Minimum Shif t Crew Composition that for Operating Condition 4, Cold Shutdown, requires a Shift Supervisor with a SR0 license at all times. The additional conditions associated with !

lable 6.2.2-1 are ambiguous. The note under the table states that except for the Shift Supervisor and the Reactor Operator the shift composition

,

-

.

.

. .

may be one less than the Table for up to two hours. While the note appended by a ! symbol allows one less than the table it does not exclude the Shift Supervisor or Reactor Operator. The licensee has always operated under the first more conservative conditio The permanently shutdown and defueled plant is considered to be in Operating Condition 4, Cold Shutdown, until the TS for the Decomissioning Plan can be approved. A proposed TS change, now under approval review in NRR, will remove all safety limits, limiting cafety system settings and limiting conditions for operations (LCO) in all Operating Conditions other than Condition 4. Many of the TS safety requirements for Condition 4 will also be deleted since the fuel has been permanently removed from the reacto The licer ~- had also previously submitted a proposed TS change to reduce the min- Ift composition to a Shift Supervisor and Reactor O p rator with th' ' tion that the crew can be one less than r'nimum for up to two houe accomodate unexpected absenc This p oposed amendment is present ,,oder review by NR In the present plant condition, accident response needs have been greatly reduced from that of an operating reactor. In their application to reduce shift staffing, the licensee state that in their analysis of postulated accidents including fire, there i f4 ese where a prompt (in less than eight hours) response is necessar) * iuclear safety. Although ihe safety significance of this event in itsel, .. not great, it is considered to be a violation of LACBWR TS 6.2.2.a and Table 6.2.2-1 (See Paragraph 7). The LER is considered to be closed, but a response is required for the violatio . Review of Special Reports The followir.g special reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled and any required actions were take Cn January 4, 1988, the licensee reported that the 1B High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) Diesel did not come up to rated speed when tested on December 9, 1987. An hour later, after an inspection revealed no cause the engine was started and tested satisfactorily. Since no definitive cause for the failure was found, the engine was put on an accelerated test program. The 1A HPSW Diesel had been found operable prior to the IB failure. The IB HPSW Diesel started successfully during the next six test starts, but on December 14, 1987 it again failed to come up to rated speed. Fuel line blockage was assumed to be the cause and since this occurred during severely cold weather, a frozen water plug or jelled fuel was suspecte The No. 2 diesel fuel, which had been treated for cold weather, was partially removed and filtered with no evider.ce of foreign matter and replaced with a blend of No. I fue The engine performed satisfactorily on an accelerated testing schedulc for 10 weeks, then failed again. At this time the fuel injection pump system was overhauled and pressure and vacuum gauges installed in the fuel injection syste w

.

. .- .

,

. ,

The engine failed again upon testing and the fuel vacuum gauge indicated a blocked fuel line. The licensee is in the process of digging up the fuel tank and line to determine the cause of the blockag The licensee has also approved a Facility Change to replace both the 1A and 18 Diesel buried fuel tanks to bring them into conformance with new Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources requirements for buried tank The HPSW Pumps supply fire suppression water in the event of a power outage. Technical Specification 4.2.18.1.a requires both HPSW pumps to be operable at all times and with one pump inoperable it should be restored to operable in seven days or a Special Report will be made within 30 day Since the reactor is shutdown and defueled, the safety importance of the fire suppression system has been substantially reduced because it is no longer required to protect the safe shutdown and emergency core cooling equipment of an operating reactor. In addition, LACBWR Cperations Manual procedures permit cross connections of the fire water suppression system with the Genoa No. 3 coal plants suppression system. Because of the lesser safety significance and the other backup system, the proposed SAFSTOR Technical Specifications will require only one HPSW Diesel system to be operabl This is considered an Open Item (50-409/88002) until the 1B HPSW Diesel fuel system problem has been resolve On March 17, 1988, the licensee notified the NRC Duty Office by telephone and Region III by facsimile that the internal secMon of the High Pressure Service Water system which supplies fire protection water to the installed sprinkler systems and hose cabinets would be out of service while a hose station was relocated to complete a Facility Change in the laundry area. A written report was also sent an March 18, 1988 to satisfy all reporting requirements of TS 4.2.18 and 6.9.2. Fire hoses from outside hydrants we g ^

laid as a backup fire suppression water system until the work was complet on March 18, 198 "

10. NRC Bulletin Followup (Closed) NRC Bulletin 88-01: Defects in Westinghouse Circuit Breaker The licensee determined that no Westinghouse DS Series Circuit Breakers were installed at LACBWR, and documented this fact in theic'gesponse, '

dated February 25, 1988.

'

11. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted 4n Paragraph 1) ,

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of 2e. inspection '

'

and sumarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The '

!

licensee acknowledged the findings as reported herein and dio not identify

'

such documents or processes as proprietar '

l 3 ,

'

l

.

-

s