IR 05000409/1987003
| ML20210B331 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1987 |
| From: | Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210B309 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-409-87-03, 50-409-87-3, GL-87-02, GL-87-2, IEIN-79-07, IEIN-79-7, IEIN-80-11, IEIN-86-003, IEIN-86-104, IEIN-86-3, IEIN-87-006, IEIN-87-6, NUDOCS 8705050289 | |
| Download: ML20210B331 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-409/87003(ORP)
Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45 Licensaet Oatryland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue - South Lacrosse, WI 54601 Facility Name:
Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor Inspection At:
Lacrosse Site, Genoa, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: February 21 through April 15, 1987 Inspectors:
I. Villaiva K. Ridgway Approved By:
I. N.
ac iw
.2/- U Rea Proiects Section 2C Date j
Inspection Summary Inspection from February 21 through April 15, 1987 (Report No. 50-409/87003(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of Licensee Actions on Previous Inspections Findings; Operational Safety Verification; Monthly Maintenance Observation; Monthly Surveillance Observation; Licensee Event Reports Followup; TMI Action Items; and IE Information Notices.
Results: No violations were identified.
hh5050289s70424 G
ADOCK 05000409 PDR
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O DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
~ ***J. Parkyn, Plant Superintendent
- G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor L. Kelley, Assistant to Operations Supervisor L. Nelson, Health and Safety Supervisor
- R. Wery, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- L. Goodman, Operations Engineer D. Rybarik, Mechanical Engineer
- J. Thie
- T. Kettler
- E. Gasser,
- T. Steele The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
- Denotes those attending exit interviews during the inspection period.
- Denotes members or alternate members of the LACBWR Safety Review Committee.
2.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspections Findings Long standing open or unresolved items and bulletins have been reviewed to determine whether additional inspectir.. effort is justified or whether they should be administrative 1y closed.
Based on the reviews, the following open items are administrative 1y closed.
a.
409/79007-88: IE Bulletin 79-07 - Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety Related Piping.
(Note: Any follow-up effort on this item should be resolved under the auspices of Generic Letter 87-02.)
b.
409/80011-8B: IE Bulletin 80-11 - Masonry Wall Design c.
409/82017-04: Open Item - Improve Quality Control of Environmental and Analytical Measurements d.
409/83009-09: Open Item - Provide Shielding for Portions of the Post-Accident Sampling System Piping 3.
Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
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Tours of the crib house, reactor building, and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
By observation and direct interview the inspectors verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Alternate Core Spray System to verify operability.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No violations were identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of selected safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, ragulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while cunoner.ts or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to the maintenance of safety-related equipment which could affect system performance.
No violations were identified.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspectors observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the No. 1 Safety Channel (Reactor Water Level, Reactor Pressure, and Power to Recirculation Flow) and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumenta-tion was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure l
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requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
No violations were identified.
6.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussion with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective actions were accomplished, and corrective actions to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
a.
(0 pen) LER 87-001:
Reactor Scram - Turbine Stop Valve Partial Closure During Simulated Overspeed Test.
On January 7, 1987, a partial reactor scram occurred while the reactor was operating at approximately 96% rated thermal power. The partial scram was due to the turbine stop valve leaving its full open position and occurred while the weekly simulated turbine overspeed test was being conducted. A partial scram at LACBWR causes the center 13 control rods to automatically insert, thereby rendering the reactor subcritical.
Shortly after the partial scram, reactor water level increased and reactor pressure decreased from 1260 psig to 1100 psig, at which time the turbine was manually tripped. Tripping the turbine closed the turbine stop valve which, in turn, terminated the pressure decrease. Shortly after the turbine was tripped, the reactor's water level had reached the high level setpoint and a full scram occurred which automatically inserted the remaining control rods.
Following the full scram, the operating reactor feed pump was tripped manually, thereby terminating the water level increase.
Approximately ten minutes later, other system malfunctions were noted or started occurring, the more notable of which are discussed below.
The IB Seal Inject Pump was operating at maximum speed and maximum discharge pressure causing actuation of the seal inject relief system which recirculates a portion of the pt:mp's discharge flow to the pump's suction. (The LACBWR seal inject system supplies seal cooling water to the forced circulation pumps and the control rod drive mechanisms.) Attempts to decrease the 18 Seal Inject Pump's speed by using the seal inject system's pressure controller were unsuccessful. Consequently, the licensee decided to shift to the 1A Seal Inject Pump; however, during the shift both forced circulation pumps tripped on low seal water flow. Normal inject flow was restored after the 1A Seal Inject Pump was vented, indicatinc that the low flow was probably due to air binding.
Troubleshooting on the IB Seal Inject Pump speed controller revealed no problems, neither did transients which were induced in the seal
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inject system. The licensee speculates that the speed controller shifted to and remained at its maximum output following the restart that occurred when station power was transferred from the main feed to the reserve feed following the partial scram. This line of reasoning was based on information provided by the vendor of the seal inject control system on December 4, 1984 regarding a similar problem. The licensee's reviewer of this event has recommended that the Operations Manual be revised to require that the input power to the malfunctioning unit be turned off whenever the speed control unit goes to full speed or for any other malfunction resulting from the loss of input power to the operation unit to cause the standby unit to automatically start.
Regarding the initial event, (i.e., the partial reactor scram while conducting a simulated overspeed trip test), the licensee has postulated two scenarios for the partial scram caused by the temporary partial closure of the stop valve: (1) when the turbine was being reset during the simulated overspeed test, the oil pressure at the stop valve temporarily decreased such that the valve started to close, but almost immediately thereafter the oil pressure returned to normal causing the valve to reopen, and (2) operator error, the more readily assumable cause.
In this regard, the test panel includes two pushbuttons, one for resetting the turbine and the other for operating the turbine stop valve. After repeated tests, the licensee concluded that the only way a partial temporary closure of the turbine stop valve could be achieved was by pushing the turbine stop valve knob in, rather than the reset button, until the "Not Full Open" alarm was generated and then pulling the knob out. Although both pushbuttons are mounted differently and both are clearly labeled, the licensee indicated that, as an improvement item, the pushbutton for the turbine stop valve will be painted bright red.
This LER is being held open pending the results of the licensee's actions regarding the recommendation to revise the Operations Manual and the painting of the turbine stop valve's pushbutton bright red.
b.
(Closed) LER 87-002: Manual Reactor Scram Due to a Scram Alarm Card Failure. At 1702, on February 16, 1987, while the reactor was operating at 98% power, Alarm D7-2, " Turbine Building Motor Control Center IA Voltage Low" annunciated in red (first-out) on the scram annunciator panel. The Turbine Building Motor Control Center IA (TBMCCIA) voltage indicated normal at 445 volts, and there were no other indications of a problem. Nevertheless, the reactor operator manually scrammed the reactor in accordance with an internal directive issued in September 1986, following an event wherein a nuclear instrumentation alarm was annunciated but a scram did not occur.
The undervoltage relays for TBMCCIA were checked and no flags or other malfunctions were noted. At 1725, Alarm D7-2 cleared while other alarms were being cleared. Alarm D7-2 annunciated again at 1815. Again the TBMCCIA relays were checked. The alarm cleared,
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but the operator was able to cause the alarm to come in several
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times with the alarm acknowledge button.
During this time the Shift Supervisor and Shift Technical Advisor (STA) were observing the undervoltage relays and MG-6 relays.
No relay operation was noted.
An instrument technician replaced the alarm card at 1920. The card was carefully checked by the technician and the STA, and its input capacitor was determined to be shorted. A check of the other alarm cards in the scram annunciator panel revealed no problems.
Because of this event, the aforementioned directive regarding the manual scramming of the reactor was changed as follows. The operator is required to manually scram the reactor if a scram alarm is received without an automatic scram provided the relevant indications are that it is a valid scram alarm or a high flux scram alarm is received from either nuclear instrumentation Channel No. 5 or No. 6 while the protective system is in a one-out-of-two logic.
The latter condition applies until new nuclear instrumentation is installed.
This change will reduce the likelihood of an unnecessary manual scram.
The actions taken by the licensee have been reviewed and found to be acceptable.
This LER, therefore, is considered closed.
c.
(Closed) LER 87-003:
Containment Ventilation Isolation Due to Contaircent Building Monitor Spike.
On March 11, 1987, the Containment Gas Monitor spiked and returned to normal causing the containment isolation valves to close. The resulting containment isolation was normal.
The immediate evaluation of the cause was attributed to the test oscillater, since it had been logged on a previous shift as having caused an isolation spike during testing and a Maintenance Request had been written to correct the faulty oscillator.
The isolation signal was reset and the dampers reopened.
On the following shift it was determined that the spike had been caused by oxidized contacts on the ratemeter range switch and not a faulty test oscillator.
Dirty contacts may have also caused the isolation spike on the previous day.
Oxidized switch contacts had been the cause of two previous reports (LER 86-034 and 84-020). Cleaning of the switch contacts during monthly checks had been initiated in late 1986; however, the affected switch was not cleaned during the previous monthly check.
The licensee has now revised the monthly test procedure to include cleaning the switch contacts.
The isolation was not reported within four hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ti) because based on the log entry regarding the previous isolation and the Maintenance Request initiated to repair the test oscillators, the initial conclusion was that the isolator was not unexpected due to the malfunctioning test oscillators.
After determining the actual cause, the 50.72 report was made.
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At LACBWR, in contrast to most other nuclear power plants, containment is normally continuously ventilated to permit personnel accessibility and prevent pressure buildup.
Consequently, the safety implications of short periods of containment isolation are virtually nil. Based on the actions taken by the licensee and the inspectors' review of the event, this LER is considered closed.
7.
TMI Action Items (Closed) 2.D.3.1 Safety Valve Position Indicators.
Position indicators were installed on the three safety valves under Facility Change 64-80-01, dated January 8, 1980. The inspectors verified the installation and reviewed I&E Procedure 62-02, Issue 2, dated August 4, 1983, for the removal, installation and checking of position switch settings which are completed each time the safety valves are gagged for hydrostatic testing or tested every five years in accordance with ASME Section XI.
8.
IE Information Notices For the IE Information Notices listed below, the inspectors verified that they were received by licensee management and reviewed for their applicability to LACBWR.
In addition, the inspectors verified that the licensee had acceptably reviewed the notices for generic implications and that appropriate corrective actions were taken, if required.
a.
(Closed) IE Information Notice No. 86-03:
Potential Deficiencies in Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring. The licensee's "EQ" list was reviewed to determine whether valve operators of the type described in the subject notice were located in a harsh environment.
In addition, the licensee's evaluation and documentation pertaining to the subject notice was reviewed. As a result of the review, it was determined that no EQ Limitorque electric motorized valve operators are located in a harsh environment.
IE Information Notice No. 86-03, therefore, is considered closed.
This inspection also satisfies the requirements of TI 2515/75:
Inspection of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring to Determine if Wiring is Environmentally Qualified.
b.
(Closed) IE Information Notice No. 86-104: Unqualified Butt Splice Connectors Identified Penetrations. The inspector has reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the subject notice and has verified that the splices identified in the notice are not used in LACBWR penetrations.
Such splices, however, are used in EQ applications involving solenoid valves and a level transmitter. The splicing method used at LACBWR is such that the identified shorting to ground or high leakage currents will not exist. This determination is based on the fact that all AMP splices at LACBWR that are required to function in a post accident environment in containment are encapsulated within a condulet with General Electric RTV 11.
Accordingly, this information notice is closed.
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c.
(Closed) IE Information Notice No. 87-06:
Loss of Suction to Low-Pressure Service Water System Pumps Resulting from Loss of Siphon. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's esaluation of the subject notice and agrees that the notice is not applicable to LACBWR.
In brief, the LPSW pumps installed at LACBWR do not utilize a siphon arrangement to provide a positive suction head. The LPSW pumps at LACBWR are vertical turbine pumps installed such that they will be submerged four feet at the recorded low water elevation of the Mississippi river, thus providing a positive suction head.
Accordingly, this information notice is closed.
9.
Safety Review Committee Meeting The resident inspector attended the LACBWR Safety Review Committee meeting held on March 23, 1987. Members of the committee in attendance are denoted in Paragraph 1.
The subjects covered during the meeting included: plant performance and significant events including overview of plant activities, facility changes and tests, operations and Incident Reports, and ORC Minutes and Reports.
10. Open Items
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Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further Ly the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
Section 6.a of this report identifies an open item.
11. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the findings as reported herein and did not identify such documents or processes as proprietary.
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