IR 05000409/1997001
| ML20199A950 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199A939 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-409-97-01, 50-409-97-1, NUDOCS 9801280130 | |
| Download: ML20199A950 (12) | |
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I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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Y REGIONlli Docket No:
50-409 i
Uoense No:
DPR-45 Report No; 50-40fV97001(L:NMS)
i Uconsee:
Dairyland Power Cooperative
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2615 East Avenus South
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Lacrosse,WI 54601
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Facility:
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Location:
La Crosse Site, Genoa, Wisconsin Dates:
December 9-11,1997 January 7,1998 Inspectors:
D. Nelson, Radiation Specialist R. Landsman, Project Engineer Approved By:
Bruce L. Jorgensen, Chief
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Decommissioning Branch L
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor
NRC Inspection Report 50 40g/g7001(DNMS)
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s l This routine decommissioning inspection covered aspects of liconsee management and control, decommiss; ming support activities, spent fuel safety, and radiological safety.
The licensee performed the appropriate safety reviews before conducting limited
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dismantling of reactor components and systems.
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The licensee had established a program to maintain the temperature in the containment
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buildim and respond if normal heating is lost to the containment building. Loss of heat
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coulo it~ ult in the freezing of systems necessary to retain the integrity of the fuel element
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storage well(FESW).
Short term loss of cooling to the FEWS was not a concem. The licensee can easily
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- accommodate various conditions that might challenge integrity of the fuel, i The radiation protection program was effective in implementing the requirements of the
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Decomm!ssioning Plan, the Quality Assurance Plan and the license, i Concems were %mtified in the licensee's facildies training program. Specifically,.
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deficiencie.. wie noted in the training provided for conducting safety reviews
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(Paragrapn 1.1.b)and the documentation of training provided to individuals who ship radioactive materials (Paragraph IV.10.b).
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REPORT DETAILS
i Summary of Plant Activities
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1. Feellity Management and Centrol
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- 1.1 Bafety Reviews. Deslan Channes. and Metions at Formanentiv Shutdown Reactors
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a.
Inspection Scoce The inspection evaluated whether the licensee had established an adequate program to
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identify if an unresolved safety question results from any facility design change, test,
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expe4 ment, or modification during "safstor".
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Observations and Findinos
- The licensee was removing equipment that no longer is needed to maintain the plant in a safe storage (safstor) condition. Contaminated equipment was thoroughly surveyed and was disposed of as low level solid radioactive waste (See Section IV.g). The remed of plant equipment was performed in accordance with the Decommissioning Plan er
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Technical Specifications. Prior to reraoval of equipment, the licensee performed appropriate management, technical and safety reviews to ensure that safety issues had i
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been addressed.
l A facility change concept may be originated by any personnel at the plant. The concept is then discussed at an Operations Review Committee (ORC) meeting that meets at least
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quartetty, if approvalis recommended, a design change coordinator is assigned from plant staff. The coordinator is responsible for performing a safety analysis to ensure that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. When ths, review is complete it is presented to the ORC for approval. An offsite committee, the Safety
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Review Committee (SC), meets at least annusl'y to review all implemented plant
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changes.
- All fourteen changes completed in igg 6 and the nine changes completed in igg 7 to the L
date of inspection were reviewed by the inspectors. The evaluations applied the l
appropriate rigor of engineering and management review required for each activity.
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- There were no unroviewed safety questions or changes to technical specdications made.
The ORC and SC appeared to be property staffed with personnel knowledgeable of the plant equipment. They also appeared to have the appropriate technical expertise
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accurately present any new facility change or configuration to the staff, the licensee had formed a committee to improve in house training. The inspectors were told that this issue
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will be brought up to the committee for resolution, l
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c. Conclusions
The licensed cor. figuration of the facilsty was not changed withod the appropriate licensee safety review s.
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11.
Decommissioning Support Activities
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ll.1 and Sur.Pmos d Permanentiv Shutdown Reactors (62801)fClosed)lEl 50-409/9200101: Review Zebra Wssel intrusion. The only significant
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g+;=d::M, of Zebra Mussels in the plant was itJ l to be in the plant's river intake bay.
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There was no degradation of flows observed dunne the routine testing of the fire
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protection system or the cooling supply to the Component Cooling Water (CCW) oooler (the only two systems required for safstor that use river water). During August and.
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September 1997 the licensee closed the rfver intake bay structure from the river and
batch treated the boy with an oxygen scavenger, sodWm metabisulfite, with 100 percent
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mortality observed. The licensee is continuing to monitor for any system fisw changes.
The treatment may or may not be done annually depending on their findings. The licensee developed a procedure to introduce a blocide into various systems if Zebra Mussels are
found to be present. This item is closed.
l l1.2 Cold W;;;her Preparations (71714)
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a.
Innoection Scope The inspection evaluated whether the licensee had effectively implemented a cold
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weather program to protect required systems against extreme cold weather.
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Observations and Findmas
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There was no cold weather checklist, but in response to the Dresden Unit i event the licensee developed a procedure for loss of heat to the containment building that would preclude any freezing of essential equipment. Systems that are required to maintain the integrity of the fuel element storage well are alllocated within the containment buelding or can be isolated from the building, leav!ng the storage well isolated.
Temperature in the containment building is monitored in the control room. Heat is
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supplied to the containment building from two air handlers within the building. The air ha?% as well as the station heating boiler that supplies steam to the air handlers recm routine surveillances and preventative maintenance. To ensure electricai power to the air handlers and the heating boiler, electrical power was transferred to the station essential electrical buses which can also be pwered from the two amergency diesel generators. ~ As sa added measure, two additional radiant heaters were installed inside of containment which also can be powered off of the essential buses if regular power is lost.
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c. Conclusions
The licenses had established a program to maintain the temperature in the containment buildmg and/or respond if normal hosting is lost to the containment building to prevent the freezing of systems necessary to retain the ;ntegrity of the fuel element storage well and I
any other systems necessary to contain radioactive material.
lil.
Spent Fuel Safety
lli.1 Scent Fuel Pool Safety at Permanentiv Shutdown Reactors (60801)
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Inspection ScoDe
3-The inspection evaluated whether the licensee had provided appropriate controls ar d maintained required systems to prevent adverse conditions from affecting the stored fuel, i
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Observations and Fir dincs The only postuisted accident that can drain the fuel element storage well (FESW) is a FESW pipe break in '.he CCW System pump discharge piping between the redundant check valves and the FESW liner. Due to FESW leakage, corrosion products hsve been observed on these check valves and associated piping, in response to this, the licensee had developed a yearly surveillance to document and remedy the condition of those check valves and associated piping. The procedure prevents any degradation that could possible lead to a premature failure of those components.
FESW instrumentation consists of level and temperature, which are displayed and provided with alarms in the control room. These are adequate to assure the safe wet storage cf spent fuel. The FESW level / loss collects in the containment sump and is trended to calculate the average daily leak rate. An apparent increase in the amount occurred after the licensee tumed off continuous FESW cooling because it wasn't needed du9 to decreased fuel decay heat loss. The licensee was quantifying if the change is due
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to the increased evaporation from the surface of the pool, because of the increased temperature in the FESW, or represented increased leakage from some system. The licensee had to delay the calculations until the winter months in order to be sure that most of the incoming liquid into the containment sump was from the FESW leakage. During warmer weather, the sump input is composed of containment condensation, air conditioning condensation, various system leaks, and the FESW leakage. The licensee has estimated that at the most, the increase is 2 3 gallons per day of liquid. They are in the process of quantifying where this is coming from; either from the FESW itself or another leak somewhere in the containment.
The licensee has trended those times that there is no pool cooling. From an analysis of the data, it appears that if the cooling were stopped permanently, the pool evaporation and temperature would reach equilibrium at some higher temperature than the pool is presently kept (it increases from approximately 70'F to 105'F). However, due to the required monthly surveillances on the CCW pumps, the " test" has i een limited to one I
- month.- The licensee tums on cooling water to the CCW host exchanger as long as the l
pumps are running and cools the pool down to approximately 70'F.
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Electrical power supplied to required systems has either been supplied from essential
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buses (initial design), has been rerouted to essential buses, or there are redundant supplies of water. Either of two dssel fire pumps can suppey service water to the CCW coolers if normal, non-essential power is lost to the low pressure service water pumps (river water). Both CCW pumps are powered from essential power. One FESW cooling pomp is powered from essential power. Initial plant design had the other pump supplied from normal, non-essential power. This was accommodated for by the plant having the
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capability of cross tioing essential power to the buss supplying this pump.
Water chemistry and clean!iness controls were observed to be adequate. The licensee maintained a cover over the FESW. Critically concems do not exist because no fuel has moved in the FESW since the reactor has been shutdown.
c. Conclusions
Short term loss of cooling to the FEWS is not a concem. The licensee can easily accommodate various conditions that might challenge integrity of the luel.
IV.
Radiological safety
IV.1 Radioloalggi Safety Staffina There have been no significant changes in the staffing or management of the radiation protection (RP) program since the last inspection. The Radiological Safety program is staffed by three technicians, one foreman and the supervisor (Health and Safety Supervisor).
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IV.2 Radioloolcal Safety Audits (83750)e.
Leroection Scope The inspectors reviewed the results of the 1997 audit of the Radiation Sefety program, b.
Observations and Findinas The audit had good scope and range and the auditor identified several Open items and Non-Conformances. The Open items and Non-Conformances were minor in nature and each was appropriately addressed and resolved in a timely manner.
IV.3 Trainina (83750)
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jnpoection Scope The inspectors reviewed the General Employee Training (GET) records for 1996 and 1997. The inspection included reviews of the material covered during training and a review of the attendance records for the training.
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Observations and Findinos The records indicated that all station personnel who were required to receive GET I
training had attended the GET training classes. The records also indicated that required radiation worker training had been conducted during the GET training classes.
IV.4 Ext ( nel Exposure Control (83750)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the dosimetry records to determine if workers had been issued the proper extemal dosimetry and the extemal dosimetry records had met regulatory requirements.
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Qhservations and Findinos The reviews of the extemal dosimetry records indicated that approximately 50 personnel
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were issued extemal dosimetry (film badges) in 1996 and 1997 et t.ACBWR and all persuin.! who were required to be monitored had been !ssued dosimeters. Individuals entering restricted areas were also issued pocket chambers. The film badges were issued every six months and supplied by a NAVLAP certified vendor.
The maximum individual worker extemal doses for 1996 and 1997 were 410 mrom and 216 mrom respectively. The inspectors reviewed the work records for the individuals receiving the dose and determined that the doses reflected good controls, considering the work pe# formed.
IV 5 Intemal Apot.ure Control (83750)a.
Inspection ScoM The inspectors reviewed the intamal dosimetry records to determine if workers had been property evaluated for intomal exposures, b.
Observations and Findinos The licensee's procedures require that all individuals who enter contaminated areas be body counted eve:y six months. The records indicated that for 1996 and 1997 the licensee had complied with this requirement. The records indicated that none of the individuals who had been body counted in 1997 had received an uptake of radioactive materials.
IV.6 gytygys and Monitorino (83750)a.
Inspection 49921 The inspectors reviewed the direct radiation survey results for 1997. The inspectors also reviewed the results of smear samples collected during 1997.
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Observations and Findinas Dired radiation surveys were required to be per*ormed quarteriy in all accessit.:e areas of
restricted areas. The 1997 records indicated that the licenses had complied with this
tequirement.
Smear surveys were required to be performert once a week in normally clear areas of the restricted areas and once a month in contamir.ated areas within restricted areas.
Selected reviews of the 1997 records indicated that the licensee had complied with this requirement. The inspectors noted that contamination levels within restricted areas were generally very low and even in the most contaminated areas (reactor sub basement) the
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contamination levels were less than 60,000 counts per minute (cpm).
To save dose, surveys in high radiations were only performed when authorized individuals required entry into high radiation areas. To pre /ent entry prior to conducting surveys, all doors leading into high radiation areas were posted " Contact Health Physics Prior to Entry".
All personnel leaving contaminated or potentially contaminated areas were required to
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surv ny themselves using survey instruments posted at the exit points. All personnel were
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also required to pass through a Personnoi Contamination Monitor before leaving the Reactor Building. The inspectors observed individuals using the exit point survey instruments and the Personnel Contamination Monitor. No problems were noted.
IV.7 Al. ARA (63750)a.
Insoection Scoce The inspectors reviewed the report of the licensee's 1996 annual ALARA review.
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Observations and Findinas inspection Report 50 409/94004(DRSS) reported concems raised by licensee Quality Assurance (QA) auditors about the overall effectiveness of LACBWR's ALARA program.
In response to those concems, the licensee took actions to improve job specific ALARA reviews and the annual ALARA review process. The inspector noted significant improvement in the annual ALARA reviews to those preformed prior to the 50-409/94004(DRSS) inspection. The 1995 and 1996 ALARA reviews were broader in range and scope and the reviewers provided concrete dose reduction proposals.
Implementation of Just one of those proposals, a reduction in the number of radiation surveys, resulted in reductions of station oose of as much as 300 person-mrem per year.
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IV.8-Process and Effluent Radiation Monitors UP 84750)
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Inspection Scope
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The inspectors reviewed the 1997 calibration records for the licensee's primary and secondary stack monitors and the containment nionitor, r
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Observations and Findinas The primary and secondary stack monitors were opvational during 9997 and had been
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property and timeh celerated. The containteent monitor was also operational during 1997 and had been propert/ and timely alibrated.
l A review of the liquid release records %dicated that liquids are released in batches and samples from those batches are analyzed in the licensee's on-site laboratory. LACBWR
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has no real-time monitors on their liquid releene lines.
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IV.9 Solid Radioactive Waste (86750)l
a. Inspection Scope
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The inspectors toured the restricted areas to determine if the licensee was in compliance
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with their program for identifying and storing radioactive waste, t
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Observations and Findinas During the tour the inspectors noted that containers marked at containing radioactive
waste were located throughout the restricted areas. The containsrs appeared to be j
appropriately placed and were clearly marked as containing radioactive waste.
The inspectors also noted that contaminated materials from the limited dismantlement of
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contaminated systems had been placed in a sea van coniainer. The sea van container was also property marked and labeled as contatning contaminated materials.
The inspectors tourad the licensee's low level waste processir.g facility. The facility was located within the restricted area and had been used primarily for processing spent resins. The facility, however, had seen little use since decommissioning began in 1986.
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Personal monitoring devices and portable particulate air monitors were available if needed.
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IV.10 Transportation of Radioactivo Materials (86750)
a. Inspection Scope
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The inspectors reviewed the shipping papers generated for radioact2vs shipments made by 1.ACBRW in 1996 and 1997. The inspectors also interviewed tt :.ndividual responsible fu ensuring that the shipments were made in compliance with NRC and DOT requirements.
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Observations and Findinos From January 1996 to December 1997, the licensee made ten shipments of radioactive materials from the LACBWR facility. Three shipments contained radioactive filter and water samples and one shipment contained activated neutron absorber coupons. The remaining six shipments involved solid low level radioactive waste packaged in sea van -
containers. The shipping documents indicated that the filters, samples and coupons had
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been sent to an off site laboratory for analyses and the waste had been shipped to a i
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vendor (Amedcan Ecology) for processing and eventual disposal. For each of the
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shipments LACBWR was the shipper of record.
i The records maintained by the licensee for those shipments were excellent and the shipping documents demonstrated that the shipments had been made in full compliance
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with the applicable NRC and Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements.
The inspectors interviewed the Health and Safety Supervis;r who had been responsible for the shipments. The supervisor indicated that he had been trained in the handling and i
processing of haz6tdous n.aterials, However, he indicated that the training records did not identify the specific MC and DOT shipping regulations that had been addressed
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during the training. This was identified as a conoom because tne DOT requires that
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shippers and packagers of hazardous materials be trained in their specific areas of responsibility and the specific t,aining should be documented.
I Even though the shipping records indicated that the Health and Safety Supervisor had been property trained, the licensee agreed to provide those individuals involved in future radioactive shipments with forme! NRC and DOT hazardous materials shipping training.
The licensee also indicated that the specific areas addressed during training would be documented in the training records.
IV.11 Tours (8378)
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inspection Scope The inspectors toured the reactor building, the radioactive waste processing building, the pump house and containment.
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Observations and Findinas All areas appeared to be generally clean and well maintained and all areas were adequately posted and controlled.
IV.12 Radioloalcal Safety Conclusions The radiological safety program appeared to be effective in implementing the
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requirements for the Decommissioning Plan and the License.
i One concem about the documentation of training provided for the shipping of hazardous (radioactive) materials was identified.
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Management Meeting The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of liansee rnanagement at.
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the conclusion of the inspection on December 11, igg 7 snd during a telephone call on January 7,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The licensee did j
not identify any of the documents or process reviewed by the inspectors as proprietary.
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i PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
- M. Witchinski, Shift Supervisor
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'J. Jiraoek, Plant Maintenance l
- A. Hans.vi, Health Physics Foreman
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+R. Christians, Pia,W Manager
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- R. Cola, Trainin9 8eounty supervisor i
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- D. Egge, Quality Assurance
+*L Nelson, Health and Safety Supervisor
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+*M. Johnson, Tech Support Enginetw
- R. Lewton, Plant Electrician
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- M. Moe, Sums Security
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'J. Henkelman, Quality Assumnos/ Control Techniolan
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on Dooer,1ber 11,1997.
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+ Denotes those present during the telephone call'an January 7,1998.-
The inspectors also interviewed other licenses personnel in various departments in the course of the inspection.
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DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
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ACP-04.1, * Design and Facility Change Control," Revision 23, Dated 10/17/97
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OM, Volume I,4.1, * Loss of Heat to the containment Sullding with Outside Temperature <32 F,"
Revised 9/1/95
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OP 58-05, ' Annual Visual inspection of FESW Retum Line and Retum Line Check
Valves 68 26-007 & 56 26-008,* lesue 0, Dated 3/13/9'l
OP-75-02, " Zebra Mussel Treatment at LACBWR," issue 1 Dated 10/2/96
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. Annual ALARA Review, dated March 1997
Quality Assurance Audit Report of Health Physics, dated 11/25/97
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Shipping Documents: 11/20/96, 5/6/96, 5/6/96,11I19/97,10/17/97, 7/2/97, 7/16/97, 4/8/97,
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4/8/97,1/22/97 and 1/3/97
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ccw
component cooling water
cpm
counts per minute
FESW
fuel element storage well
IFl
inspector followup item
IP
Inspection Procedure
IR
Inspection Report
mrom
millirem
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ORC
Operations Review Committee
C '.
Quality Assurance
radiation protection
BAFSTOR
safe storage
Spent Fuel Pool
TS
- Technical Specification
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