IR 05000409/1986011

Insp Rept 50-409/86-11 on 861201-04.No Noncompliance, Deficiencies or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20207H860
Person / Time
Site:	La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date:	12/23/1986
From:	Allen T, Snell W, Williamsen N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207H857	List: IR 05000409/1986011 ML20207H850
References
50-409-86-11, NUDOCS 8701080188
Download: ML20207H860 (17)

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. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-409/86011(DRSS) Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45 Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue - South Lacrosse, WI 54601 facility Name: Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor Inspection At: LACBVR site, Genoa, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: December 1-4, 1986 Inspectors: f$ Ydrare rMn R. Williamsen M/l23/

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td.SJ l T. E. Allen 7" /2/u/aC Date M. J. Smith Approved By: William G. Snell, Chief Ldh 58 /2/n/s Emergency Preparedness Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on December 1-4, 1986 (Report No. 50-409/86011(DRSS)) Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by five NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercis Results: No items of noncompliance, deficiencies, or deviations were identifie Nh $D 0 j9

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. DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed I. Vi11alva, Control Room (CR) and Technical Support Center (TSC) J. Jamison, CR, TSC, Offsite Team T. Allen, Operations Support Center (OSC), Onsite Teams, and Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) M. Smith, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) N. Williamsen, CR, TSC, E0F, and Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) Dairyland Power Cooperative J. Taylor, General Manager, DPC J. Parkyn, Emergency Response Director T. Steele, Emergency Control Director M. Polsean, Shift Supervisor P. Delwiche, Emergency News Director G. Boyd, Operations Parameter Director P. Bronk, Shift Technical Advisor

*D. Rybarik, E0F, Operations Parameters Director
*D. Weiss, E0F, Offsite Dose Trajectory Specialist
*P. Shafer, EOF, Radiological Assessment Director
*L. Nelson, TSC, Radiological Assessment Director
*R. Christians, JPIC Evaluator
*R. Cota, TSC Evaluator
*H. Towsley, EOF, Evaluator
*A. Hansen, Onsite Radiological Assessment Evaluator
*R. Wery, Onsite and Offsite Survey Evaluator
* Personnel who attended the exit interview on December 3, 198 . _ Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Open Item No. 409/83020-03: Emergency classes and conditions should be announced over PA system: in this exercise the classes and conditions were announced. This item is close (0 pen) 409/85007-05: Upgrade PASS procedure, technique, and hardware: The licensee satisfactorily demonstrated PASS sample collection and analysis capabilities during the exercis Laboratory equipment, techniques, and the procedure had been acceptably improved except for extremity monitoring. The PASS sampling Procedure, EPP-6, still requires only one extremity monitoring TLD to be worn. The selection of only one hand to receive the most exposure during emergency contingencies is not reasonable. Accordingly, this item remains open until EPP-6 is revised to require extremity monitoring for both hand y
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l l (Closed) Open Items No. 409/85008-01'and 409/86008-01: Notifications to offsite agencies took longer than 15 minutes: the initial notifications to the States and local agencies were within the required 15 minutes. This item is close . General An exercise of the licensee's Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor Emergency Plan was conducted at the LACBWR plant on December 2, 1986, testing the response of the licensee to a hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a major degradation of plant emergency systems. Attachment 1 describes the Scope and Objectives of the exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenari ! General Observations Procedures ' This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the LACBWR Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedure i Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and generally timely. If the events had been real, the actions taken by the , licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local ' authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the health and i safety of the publi , Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along ! with five NRC observers. FEMA observations on the response of l State and local governments will be provided in a separate report.

! l Critique f A critique was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on j December 3, 1986, the day after the exercise. The NRC discussed , the observed strengths and woaknesses during the exit interview.

, Specific Observations i , Control Room _ l The control room staff reacted promptly and properly to the scenario ' conditions that indicated a damaged fuel bundle. The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) immediately recognized this condition as an Alert and , quickly found the appropriate Emergency Action Level (EAL) which t confirmed his evaluation. The STA showed the EAL to the Shift , Supervisor who classified the accident condition and initiated the I ! l 3 !  !

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. emergency response The staff continued to review the EALs to determine which conditions might require an escalation of the emergency classification. Following the initial classification, the notifications were made in a timely manner. Communications to the TSC and the EOF were satisfactory, except for a few minutes when a temporary problem cut off the Control Roo The main communication problems were when the Control Room was communicating to other facilities over non-dedicated telephone lines and the Control Room failed to precede their message with the statement,

"This is a drill."

b. Technical Support Center (TSC) Upon activation of the TSC, personnel arrived promptly, in an orderly, professional manne Noise levels were low. A good briefing on radiation protection and habitability was given shortly after TSC activation. The habitability of the TSC/0SC was frequently monitored. Communications with the Control Room, and later with the TSC, were established promptly. Command and Control was transferred to the TSC in a satisfactory manner. During the Alert phase of the exercise, the Emergency Response Director's recovery plans for the dropped fuel bundle were conservative and technically soun Detection and classification of the Site Area Emergency was professionally done. Later, when command and control had passed to the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) and a release to the environment had started, the TSC quickly and appropriately recommended a General Emergency to the EOF. However, prior to the release, the TSC failed to make any projection of what the dose rate offsite might be if there were a containment failur Notifications to States and counties were timely but were carried out in an informal and inconsistent manner. The communicator did not have any written message form which would have ensured that the same information was given to all offsite agencies regarding plant conditions and release potential. Because of this lack of a written message, there was no way to ensure that all necessary and required information was provided to each agency. Further problems in communications was observed regarding the State of Wisconsin as follows: (a) Wisconsin was not receiving all the information they desired, which resulted in them having to make repeated phone calls to the TSC and EOF, and implementing protective actions that differed considerably from the licensee's, and (b) calls from the State of Wisconsin were not diverted to the E0F once the E0F was activate These problems in notifications / communications with State and local agencies constitute an exercise weakness and will be tracked as Open Item No. 409/86011-0 , - - - - _ - . _ _ . __--- -

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10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) states that the licensee shall notify the NRC immediately after notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and not later than one hour after the time that the licensee declares one of the Emergency Classes. However, the Site Area Emergency notification from the TSC to the NRC was not completed within one hour. The failure to make the::e notifications within the required times is an exercise weakness and will be tracked as Open Item No. 409/86011-0 In addition to the above open items, the following item should be considered for improvement:

  * Better status boards on which to display radiological information, equipment status, and general plant conditions and trends could be provided in the TS Operational Support Center (OSC) and Onsite Teams The Operational Support Center (OSC) was activated and functional in a timely manner; communications with the TSC and Control Room were promptly established and maintained throughout the exercise; and installed and portable radiation monitoring ' equipment was checked at appropriate times to determine habitabilit The Radiological Assessment Director (RAD) was knowledgeable in his duties and responsibilities and demonstrated adequate management .

control of the OSC. He functioned well within the TSC, set correct

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job priorities, and made several appropriate recommendations for mitigating the simulated accident consequences. He frequently checked Emergency Plan procedures, maintained radio communications with onsite teams, and kept a chalkboard listing of team locations and task Health Physics, maintenance, instrumentation, and radiochemistry personnel were available for inplant surveys, repair actions, and sample collection and analysis. The RAD made assignments in a timely manner and provided clear instructions to the teams with appropriate emphasis on radiation and occupational safety concern The onsite teams responded promptly to assignments, utilized procedures for specific requirements, and usually checked equipment for operability prior to leaving for the assignmen However, the TSC/0SC did not use status boards for the display of plant data, trend information, time of emergency classification, or important radiological data. Consequently, that information was verbally passed to OSC personnel in an inconsistent and incomplete manne Although several out-of plant dose rate surveys were conducted and results communicated to the OSC, the survey results were not recorded on survey maps at the OSC or TSC, nor were they documented on survey records. Also, a simulated high radiation area onsite during the exercise was not posted or controlle . The team selected to collect the first PASS sample was unnecessarily slow collecting the sample. The health physics technician (HPT) did not start with the current revision of the sample procedure (EPP-6) and repeated the inventory and pre-operational tests when he got a correct copy. The operator assisting the HPT left the PASS area to visually check valve lineup, although visual inspection of manual values is not done during emergencies unless there is reason to suspect incorrect valve lineup. Later in the exercise, another team demonstrated the capability to collect and analyze a PASS cample in a timely manne The shielded sample transport cask came open during the transport of the sample to the laboratory. This could have caused unnecessary personnel exposure and additional handling of a high radiation sampl Correcting the transport cask to assure the shield remains closed during transport will be followed as on Open Item (409/86011-03).

In addition to the above open item, the following items should be considered for improvement:

* Status boards should be used in the OSC to improve information availabilit * Radiation surveys should be documented in survey record books and on maps in the OSC for improved safety and to minimize repetitive wor * High radiation areas should be posted and controlled as soon as practicable, d. Offsite Team The offsite radiological monitoring team was initially dispatched from the TSC, and after the E0F took command and control, was directed by the Cooperative Radiological Assessment Director in the EOF. The team functioned adequately as a team and there was good coordination with Wisconsin's radiological monitoring team. However, there were a number of problems which together make up an exercise weaknes (1) When the team was initially dispatched, they failed to take a key to the storage facility for the emergency kit. Hence, they had to return to the protected area in order to get the ke (2) The team did not perform an inventory when they picked up the kit and did not realize that a tweezers was missing. Later, when they had to pick a filter cartridge out of the air sampler without tweezers, they damaged the filter and fragments of it were disperse (3) The survey meter used by the offsite team was not zeroed by the Health Physics Technician (HPT). Therefore, whenever the controller told the team that the radiation dose rate was "as read" or was " background," the HPT reported the dose rate to his Radiological Assessment Director as "five mR/hr." This may have contributed to point No. 4 belo .
(4) The Team never found the plume centerlin (5) Occasionally the air sampler was improperly placed under the vehicle's raised hood in such a way that engine air from the radiator fan was interfering with the air flow thru the sample (6) Use of the phrase, "This is a drill" was not generally observed in the radio communications to and from the offsite tea The correction of this weakness will be tracked as Open Item No. 409/86011-0 e. Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)

The E0F was activated and fully staffed within one hour of the Site Area Emergency declaration. The facility was small, but compact, and personnel were able to perform with minimum levels of noise and confusion. Sufficient copies of the Emergency Plan Procedures were available and implemented throughout the exercise. Message forms, log sheets, and checklists were also effectively used throughout the exercise. However, E0F status boards to indicate plant parameters, field monitoring data, and protective actions recommended and implemented were not availabl Communications with the TSC and Control Room were established immediately and maintained. Communication difficulties became evident when calls from the State of Wisconsin for information began to come in on telephone lines designated for outgoing notifications. The lack of sufficient comunication capabilities led to State dissatisfaction with licensee responsiveness to their concerns and also made offsite notifications and upgrades difficul A dedicated E0F State liaison communicator, or an arrangement for State participation in the E0F during future exercises and/or an unlisted phone for Wifications may help to solve EOF / States coordination and notification difficulties noted by the NRC during the last few exercises. This will be tracked as part of Open Item No. 86011-0 Initial notifications to State and local authorities were performed within the required time frame. Informational updates were performed as the accident scenario progressed. When the exercise began to level off, hourly informational calls were performed. The initial notification to the NRC was performed in about fifty-five minutes, but not imediately following State and local authorities; furthemore, there was no justification for the delay. The notification form (EPP-2, Page E3, Issue 20) prescribed the information that communicators would read to offsite agencies. The notification form contained a listing of all offsite agencies including the NRC, but contrary to 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) the NRC was listed before State and local agencies. The ECD did not indicate on this form that the communicators were to notify the NRC regarding the initial classification nor any hourly followup information. The ECD, about 7 _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______ ___ _

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45 minutes following the General Emergency classification, questioned his staff about NRC notification and the RAD placed the call over the ENS and completed the notification about 55 minutes following the actual classification. No other formal notification form was used and the NRC Duty Officer received all infonnation informally. This informal and haphazard notification method was followed throughout the exercise. This will be tracked as part of Open Item No. 86011-0 During an actual EOF activation, the NRC would have required considerably more information than what was provided. The NRC has issued Information Notice 85-78, Event Notification, with a form containing the information the NRC would require during an activation. A copy of this notice and the form is attached to this repor The E0F radiological assessment staff assumed and maintained direction and control of the single field monitoring team. A request for a second team to assist in environmental monitoring was denied due to lack of available qualified personnel. The monitoring team, under

the direction of the Radiological Assessment Director was unable to l locate the plume centerlin The Radiation Assessment Staff began to coordinate and share field team assignments and data with the State of Wisconsin health departmen However, this coordination did not lead to coordinated

, PARS. At the General Emergency classification the licensee used the ! ficw chart in EPP-2 and correctly recomended: shelter, 1-mile radius; evacuate,1-3 miles in Sectors ABCD; and, shelter, 3-5 miles in Sectors ABCD. However, the licensee did not refer to or implement the evacuation time estimate information available. The State of l Wisconsin subsequently ordered evacuation in a " keyhole" of 1 mile radius and Sectors ABCD out to 10 miles. Precautionary shelter in l Sectors PQR for 10 miles was ordered in Minnesota. The licensee and the States could not agree on the appropriate PARS.

' As mentioned above, the licensee staff failed to consider evacuation time estimates in their followup protective action recommendations to State and local authorities. A review of Appendix 2 of the LACBWR i Emergency Plan revealed that population distribution information and i evacuation time estimates are located in the plan; however, the consideration of population distribution or evacuation time were not part of EPP guidance procedures for offsite dose calculations.

i Procedural guidance directing dose assessment personnel to consider evacuation times should be incorporated into the EPP dose assessment guidance. This will be tracked as Open item No. 409/86011-0 The ECD is responsible for approving the dissemination of all media information before it is publicly presented. Discussions were held between the ECD and the Emergency News Director at the JPIC regarding plant status, PARS, and environmental monitoring; however, the ECD

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. was not aware of what information was actually presented to the media. Hard copy press releases were not generated by the utility; nevertheless, the ECD should have received and reviewed hard copies of state releases to the medi Based on the above review, the following items is recomn. ended for improvement:

* Provide status boards in the EOF to indicate plant parameters, field monitoring data and protective actions recommended and implemente * Incorporate the information from IE Information Notice 85-78 into the LACBWR procedures to ensure appropriate and complete information would be provided to the NRC in the event of an acciden f. Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)

The JPIC was activated in a timely manner. The JPIC was spacious and well equipped except that the use of portable room dividers was not able to guarantee audible or visual privacy for conferences and discussion The first press briefing at about 1040 hours during the site Area Emergency was somewhat disjointed because the participants had not sufficiently discussed their information with each other before going to the podium. Subsequent briefings were well coordinated, although the information presented was not always precise. For example, the briefing after the General Emergency was declared attributed the release to a loss of containment integrity due to a " fan control problem." The DPC technical representative did not interrupt the briefing to correct that statement, although he later was invited to the podium and he volunteered that the problem was probably a

" damper". The technical representative of DPC had not talked to the LACBWR site himself, and so his conclusion, although correct, was based on his own general knowledge, rather than on hard facts from the site. Some of the technical issues that caused consternation and communication problems with State and local spokesmen concerned:
(1) The distinction between a minor, but unplanned release of radioactivity which was well below Technical Specification limits compared to a release which would approach the trigger points of PAG (2) The difference between " release within" containment (when the first fuel bundle was damaged) compared to a " release from" containment which triggered a General Emergenc (3) The relatively low importance to the general public of " shine" from containment which gave 30 mR/hr at the site boundary, compared to the same dose rate if it had come from a plume of radioactivit . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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 (4) The magnitude of difference between a refueling accident with the reactor shut down and unloaded and containment at atmospheric pressure and temperature, and major LOC Based on the above review, the following item is recommended for improvement:
 * Enhance training of JPIC personnel to better cope with providing technical information to non-technical individuals and members of the news medi . Exercise Scenario and Control and Critique Although this was a fairly non-challenging scenario, it was turned out to test, challenge, and illuminate a problem in communications between LAC 8WR and the State There was an operational problem with the scenario in that after the time jump, there was inadequate guidance for the E0F and hence the controller /

evaluator had to give extra instructions to the ECD which still left the DPC participants uncertain as to their future actions. Also, there were no instructions for recovery and reentry. In the next exercise, the scenario should provide for recovery and reentry management of the hypothetical acciden The controller / evaluators performed their tasks with a minimum of interference with the scenario and provided excellent exercise critique Both the critiques which immediately followed the exercise as well as the overall critique given on the following day prior to the NRC exit meeting, showed good comprehension of emergency preparedness issue . Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview the day after the exercise on December 3, 1986, with the representatives noted in Section 1. The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary. The licensee responded that none of the information was proprietar Attachments: LACBWR Exercise Scope and Objectives LACBWR Exercise Scenario Outline NRC Information Notice 85-78

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1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES i Scope , ~ The scenario will begin with the Reactor Plant simulated to have been shutdown for approximately 72 hours for refueling. A simulated fuel , handling accident will occur that results in minor fuel damage and i subsequent release of radioactivity to the Containment Building. This will lead to an " ALERT" declaration which will cause the Technical Support Center to be staffed. Approximately 1-1/2 hours later, an accident will be simulated on the refueling floor causing asjor damage to

the spent fuel. This will lead to a " SITE AREA EMERGENCY" declaration

. and subsequent staffing of the Emergency Operating Facility and Joint
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Public Information Center. Approximately 1-1/2 hours later, a telease will be simulated that will lead to & "CENERAL EMERGENCY" declaratio The exercise will last for approximately 8 hours and will demonstrate the emergency response capabilities of the States of Minnesota and Wisconsin j as well as the LACBWR and DPC headquarters staff .2 Objectives a j 1. Demonstrate the ability to notify and assemble licensee smergency ! response personnel and to activate the licensee's onsite and nearsite j emergency facilities (TSC, EOF and JPIC).

i i 1. Demonstrate the ability of Control Room, TSC and EOF personnel to carry out all emergency notifications of federal, state, and local emergency response personnel within the allowable time frames.

i 1. Demonstrate the ability of Control Room, TSC, and EOF personnel to j assess, classify, and mitigate a simulated plant accident.

t l 1.2.4 Demonstrate the adequacy of communication links between the Control Room, TSC, EOF, offsite agencies, and the JPI .2.5 Demonstrate the ability to dispatch and direct onsite and offsite radiological monitoring teams and assess the data supplied by the .2.6 Demonstrate the ability to obtain and analyze a simulated contaminated Containment Building atmosphere sample using the Post Accident Sampling System. (If a decision is made during the exercise to NOT obtain a PASS sample, this will be demonstrated at a different time.)

1. Demonstrate the ability to conduct an orderly evacuation of onsite personnel and to account for personnel at the evacuation assembly poin WMO -1-L

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1. Demonstrate the ability of the EOF staff to make appropriate protective action recommendations to offsite agencie . Demonstrate the ability to activate the Joint Public Information

• Center and carry out orderly releases of information to the news media in coordination with state and local emergency personnel. Access control to the JPIC will also be demonstrate .2.10 Demonstrate the ability to make decisions regarding emergency radiation exposure contro .

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f i WP90 -2-

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5.0 Narrative Summary

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Initial Plant Conditions

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72 hours af ter reactor plant shut down following 100 days at 100% powe Wind from SW (approximately 220') at 2 ap Stability Class: " moderately stable"

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Spent fuel handling in progres T-00:10 Initial conditions given to applicable participant *

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[ T+00:00 Exercise begins: Fuel grapple malfunctions and element is dropped f

  (0810) releasing fission product gases to the Containment Buildin a T+00:02 Area Radiation Monitor #2 (fuel handling floor) alarms leading to (0812) evacuation of fuel handling floo T+00:05 " ALERT" should be declared within several minute (0815)

l , T+01:20 Fif ty-ton crane and supporting s,tructures topple into Fuel Element ! (0930) Storage Well causing asjor spent fuel damage. " SITE AREA EMERGENCY" ! should be declared within minute l ' L i T+01:22 Containment Building Gaseous Monitor alarms, causing Containment l (0937) Building isolation and evacuation. . )

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T+02:35 Short circuit develops in Containment Building Ventilation damper (1045) control switch causing the ventilation dampers to open. " GENERAL EMERGENCY" should be declared within minute T+05:05 Time Jump to 1315, December 3,198 I (1315) Time Jump Conditions: Containment Building Ventilation Dampers have* gone closed and Containment Building is isolated as of 1400, December 2, 198 . SPING 3/4 readings have returned to normal shutdown reading . Emergency classification has been downgraded to " SITE EMERGENCY."

l T+31:20 Terminate Exercise (1530) WP90 - 29 - Revision 1, 11/18/86

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, SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-18

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM1ISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCENENT WASHINGTON, ' , September 23, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-78: EVENT NOTIFICATION Addressees:

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All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (0L) or a construction permit (CP).

. Purposes: i This notice is being issued to revise guidance to power reactor licensees regarding specific event notification information that should be provided to the NRC Operations Center when reporting events in accordance with 10 CFR 50.7 , 198 This guidance supercedes that provided in IN 83-34 dated May 26, Suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is require Description of Circumstances: Significant events reported to the NRC Operations Center receive prompt i evaluation by NRC technical staff at headquarters and regional offices. To

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assist in obtaining adequate information for evaluation, the worksheet has been revised for the Operations Officers manning the NRC Operations Center. The !

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event notification worksheet has been provided for your information as an attachment to this information notice. We recognize that this list is not all i inclusive, nor are all of its items applicable to each event. Rather, it lists certain key items on the basis of past experience that are required for most notifications. The checklist is intended to provide the licensee with the type of information that should be provided to the NRC Operations Center when reporting events.

! It is suggested that copies of the worksheet be made available to employees ! responsible for reporting event related information to the NRC to replace copies of the worksheet provided in IN 83-34.

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To prevent misunderstandings and reduce callbacks by the Operations Officer as a result of incomplete information, the description should provide sufficient detail for the Operations Officer to understand the event, including all system interactions.

t . The NRC welcomes any recommendations for improvements to the event reporting process, t

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8509190432 SEP 301985

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e IE 85-78 September 23, 1985 Page 2 of 2 No specific action or written response is required by this information notic If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the NRC Headquarters incident response contacts listed in this notic wa Jordan, Director . Divisi of Emergency Preparedness and gineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contacts: Don Marksberry, IE (301) 492-4156 Ray Priebe, IE (301) 492-4333 Attachments: 1. Event Notification Worksheet 2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

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IN 85-78 . i AbDITICNAL INTCRMATICN FOR RADIOU)CICAL e IMb R UQu!D stuaSt ruMNts SounCtts) o CASCOLf3 SELEASE RIN9 TANNED SELEAst AATE (CL/ sect s EST TOTAL ACTIV!TY (C1)s St*.tASE DV M T!OK s EST TOTAL 10DZNC (CL)s i.3. U METS s *

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Cass SAMPLt MOW! TOE SCAD!bc , Areas evacuated ? Y n List beJew Personnel esposed/ contaminated Y N Describe below Plant Mealth Physics backup requested 1 Y M Notes OnJy if T.S. escoeded or actual contanination

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MDITIONAL INroptMATION

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR REACTOR COOLANT or STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKS SvDcts On !ck: TEM Dtvt:Drntxt ? START DAtt e . STAnt T!Mt s LtAK MTt

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