IR 05000409/1988005
| ML20151R317 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1988 |
| From: | Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151R314 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-409-88-05, 50-409-88-5, IEB-88-004, IEB-88-4, NUDOCS 8808120122 | |
| Download: ML20151R317 (6) | |
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V. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region III Report No. 50-409/88005(DRP)
Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45
. Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue - South La Crosse, WI 54601 Facility Name:
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Inspection At:
La Crosse Site, Genoa, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: May 1 through July 31,1988 Inspector:
K. Ridgway
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Approved By:
I.'
. Jac ief
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R ctor Pro cts Section 2B Date Inspection Summary Inspection from May 1 through July 31, 1988 (Report No.50-409/88005(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of operational safety (IP 71707); maintenance (IP 62703); surveillance (IP 61726); transportation (IP 86721); multiplant action items; and bulletins. Also reviewed were past open items.
Results: The licensee's shutdown SAFSTOR program appears to be adequate.
No violations or other significant safety issues were identified.
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I 8808120122 880803 PDR ADOCK 05000409 O
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. Parkyn, Plant Superintendent G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor L. Nelson, Health and Safoty Supervisor
- R. Wery, Quality Assurance DIR M. Polsean, Relief Shift Supervisor The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
- Denotes those attending exit interviews during the inspection period.
2.
General The La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) was permanently shutdown on April 30, 1987, by authorization of the Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC)
Board. The operating license was changed to a possession-only license by Amendment No. 56, dated August 4, 1987.
The reactor is defueled with water in the primary system and is considered to be in Operating Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) until Technical Specifications (TS)) changes are made or the Decommissioning Plan TS are accepted.
On May 8, 1988, Amendment No. 61 to the provisional license revising the LACBWR Physical Security Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan was issued.
This amendment changes the physical security requirements to the SAFSTOR mode with complete rearrangement of security equipment and after a brief shakedown period, a significant reduction in the security force.
On May 31, 1988, Amendment No. 62 to the provisional possession-only-license was issued.
This amendment removed TS requirements for Operational Conditions, i.e., 1-Power Operations, 2-Startup, 3-Hot Shutdown, 5-Refueling. Most of the coaditions for 4-Cold Shutdown remain.
These changes removed the safety limits, limited safety system settings, limiting conditions of operation for systems used only for an operating reactor, and other miscellaneous operational TS.
On July 8, 1988, the Commission notified the licensee that Revision 10 of their Emergency Plan had been approved.
Because of the significantly reduced potential radiological hazards, the most severe emergency classification is now an Alert and the previous five-mile emergency planning zone has been reduced to the DPC site boundary or owner-controlled area.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (IP 92701)
a.
(Closed) Violation (409/88003-01):
Failure to rneet TS staffing requirements.
The licensee's response to this violation, dated April 29, 1988, stated that an Operations Review Committee meeting was immediately held to discuss-the event.
The involved individual was counseled by the Plant Superintendent and a memo was sent to all Shift Supervisors and Operators emphasizing continued alertness to prevent recurrence.
b.
(0 pen) Open Item 409/88003-02:
Failure of the IB High Pressure Diesel Fire Pump to come up to speed during a monthly test.
The IB Diesel failed the monthly functional test in December 1987 and_was reported in a Special Report dated January 4, 1988. This report was reviewed in IR 88003.
The cause for the failure has not been determined; however, it appears that several problems with the fuel lines and the fuel injection system may have contributed. Since April the pump had passed monthly functional checks; but on July 1, 1988, the pump stopped operating after about half an hour of operation during the fire hose hydrostatic tests.
This failure was attributed to a broken control unit in the injection pump. The injection pump was replaced and the functional test in July was satisfactory.
The IB Diesel has not been declared operable since December 1987 because of the undetermined cause of the fuel supply failure and the imminent installation of new above ground fuel supply tanks and piping.
This remains an Open Item.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (IP 71707)
The inspector reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators.
The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the crib house, reactor building, and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire j
hazards, and fluid leaks, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintanance.
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observation and direct interview the inspector verified that the'
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physical security pl:in was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
The inspector walked down portions of the High Pressure Service Water System and Fire Protection System to verify operability.
No violations were identified.
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Monthly Maintenance Observation (IP 62703)
Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention-controls were implemented.
Maintenance Requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to the main +enance of SAFSTOR equipment which could affect system performance.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's instrument and electrical preventive maintenance (PM) programs.
Computer runs for the months of January 1988 through June 1988.of the electrical PMs were reviewed and appeared to be current and complete.
Only a few electrical PMs have been placed on extended schedules to remove them from the current program.
Computer runs of the instrument PMs for the months of June and July 1988 were also reviewed. Many of the instruments have been placed on special schedules so they remain in the computer program but will only be scheduled if requested. The inspector noted that the programs appeared to be effective; however, many of the instrument PMs had not been completed and there are still many items that could be placed on the special schedule.
This was discussed at the closeout meeting.
No violations were identified, i
6.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (IP 61726)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's surveillance program to assure that required surveillances had been performed and test records were available.
The licensee has reviewed the surveillance program in light of their shutdown status and has stopped performing those tests on instruments and equipment not needed for TS Operating Condition 4.
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The inspector observed the functional test of the Flooding Detector, Zone 2 on July 26, 1988.
No viclations were identified.
7.
Transportation (IP 86740)
On June 14, 1988, the licensee shipped one container of dewatered resins to Barnwell, S. C. for burial. This was the shipment scheduled in April 1987 but found to exceed Department of Transportation (DOT) dose rates, see IR 409/87008) The High Integrity Container (HIC) was placed back in the Waste Treatment Building and later in attempts to lower the radiation levels, the HIC was everflowed, see IR 409/87014. The overflow resulted in high contamination levels on the outer surfaces of the HIC. DPC requested and obtained permission to ship to the Barnwell Waste Management Facility by using an outer plastic coated fabric bag completely covering the HIC.
Special handling techniques were required to load the HIC into the bag and the Hittman HN 100 Container.
This resulted in higher than normal personnel exposures for this operation.
The inspector observed the loading and verified radiation dose rates prior to shipping.
Shipping records were reviewed to verify completeness and compliance with DOT regulations.
On July 15, 1988, the licensee shipped 26 unusti fuel elements to the Babcock and Wilcox Fuel Facility in Lynchburg, VA. General Electric Co.
Model RA-3 Containers were used in this shipment.
The use of these containers was approved by a letter amendment to Certificate of Compliance No. 4986, dated April 13, 1983. The inspector observed the loading of the first container and the loading of the containers onto the truck for shipment. The empty containers have been returned for the second and final shipment scheduled for the first week of August 1988.
No violations were identified.
8.
NRC Bulletin Followup (Closed) NRC Bulletin 88-04:
Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss.
The licensee responded to this Bulletin on June 6,1988, stating that they no longer have any systems considered to be safety-related'
since they are no longer operating.
9.
Multiplant Action Items (MPA)
j The inspector reviewed the following MPA and the applicability of them to the LACBWR facility.
(Closed) MPA B-58, Scram Discharge Volume Capability (TI 2515/90).
This MPA was not applicable to LACBWR.
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10. NRC Information Notices For the NRC Information Notices (IN)_ listed below, the inspector verified that they were received-by licensee management and reviewed for their applicability under the possession-only licensee status of LACBWR.
In addition, the inspector verified that the licensee had taken appropriate action.
a.
(Closed) NRC Information Notice No. 87-56:
Improper Hydraulic
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Control Unit Installed at BWR Plants.
This type of equipment-is not used at LACBWR.
b.
(Closed) NRC Information Notice No. 88-01:
Safety Injection Pipe Failure. This In is not applicable to LACBWR since they are shutdown.
c.
(Closed) NRC Information Notice No. 88-09:
Reduced Reliability of Steam-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.
There are no steam driven AFPs at LACBWR.
11. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period ud at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope ar.c' lindings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged the findings as reported herein and did not identify such documents or processes as proprietary.
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