IR 05000395/2010008
| ML102280494 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 08/13/2010 |
| From: | Nease R Reactor Projects Region 2 Branch 6 |
| To: | Gatlin T South Carolina Electric & Gas Co |
| References | |
| IR-10-008 | |
| Download: ML102280494 (27) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ust 13, 2010
SUBJECT:
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000395/2010008
Dear Mr. Gatlin:
On July 1, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 1, 2010, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Rebecca L. Nease, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000395/2010008 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-395 License Nos.: NPF-12 Report Nos.: 05000395/2010008 Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) Company Facility: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Location: P.O. Box 88 Jenkinsville, SC 29065 Dates: June 14 - 18, 2010 (Week 1)
June 28 - July 1, 2010 (Week 2)
Inspectors: N. Staples, Reactor Inspector (Lead Inspector)
N. Merriweather, Senior Reactor Inspector R. Rodriguez, Senior Reactor Inspector L. Suggs, Reactor Inspector G. Wiseman, Senior Reactor Inspector A. Matos, Trainee Approved by: Rebecca L. Nease, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000395/2010-008; 06/14 - 18/2010 and 06/28 - 07/01/2010; Virgil C. Summer Nuclear
Station; Fire Protection.
This report covers an announced two-week period of inspection by a triennial fire protection team composed of five regional inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC's) program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings were identified.
Licensee Identified Violations
None
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R05 Fire Protection
This report documents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection of the Virgil C.
Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS). The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05TTP, Fire Protection-National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Transition Period (Triennial), dated December 24, 2009. The objective of the inspection was to review a minimum sample of three risk-significant fire areas to evaluate implementation of the fire protection program (FPP) and to review site specific implementation of at least one B.5.b mitigating strategy as well as the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b mitigating equipment. The three fire areas (FAs) and associated fire zones (FZs) were selected after reviewing available risk information as analyzed by a senior reactor analyst from Region II, previous inspection results, plant walk downs of fire areas, relational characteristics of combustible material to targets, and location of equipment needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown (SSD) of the reactor. In selecting the B.5.b mitigating strategy sample, the team reviewed licensee submittal letters, safety evaluation reports (SER), licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and previous NRC inspection reports (IR). Section
==71111.05 - 02 of the IP specifies a minimum sample size of three fire areas and one B.5.b
==
implementing strategy for addressing large fires and explosions. This inspection fulfilled the requirements of the procedure by selecting three fire areas and one B.5.b mitigating strategy. The specific FAs/FZs chosen for review were:
FA IB-20, Safety-Related Switchgear Room 1DA, Elev. 463-0
FA CB-17, FZs 17.1 and 17.2, Main Control Room and Chart Room, Elev.
463-0
FA TB -1 (Room 36.01), FZ TB 1.2, 7.2 KV Switchgear Bus 1A XSW1A-ES Room, Elev. 436-0 The team evaluated the licensees FPP against applicable requirements, including VCSNS Operating License Condition 2.C(18), Fire Protection Program; Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 3, Fire Protection; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R Subsections III.G, III.J, III.L, and III.O; 10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection; Auxiliary Power Conversion System Branch (APCSB)
Branch Technical Position (BTP) 9.5-1, Guidelines for Fire Protection of Nuclear Power Plants; Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1, Guidelines for Fire Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976; VCSNS Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG 0717 with Supplements 3 and 4; VCSNS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System; other related NRC SERs; and plant Technical Specifications. The review of the B.5.b mitigating strategies was based on the VCSNS Operating License Condition 2.C(34), Mitigation Strategy Licensee Condition; licensee B.5.b submittals; and related NRC SERs. The team evaluated all areas of this inspection, as documented below, against these requirements. Specific licensing basis documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
.01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
The objective of the inspection was to evaluate the licensees ability to achieve hot and cold shutdown with and without the availability of offsite power. The inspection activities focused on ensuring the adequacy of systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring instrumentation, and support system functions.
Methodology The team walked down FAs TB-1 and IB-20 and examined the material condition of the fire detection and suppression systems and fire area boundaries. The team compared the fire hazards analysis (FHA) for the areas selected and as discussed in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER) with the Fire Emergency Shutdown Procedures (FEP) FEP 1.0, Fire Emergency Procedure Selection, FEP 3.0, Train B Plant Shutdown To Hot Standby Due To Fire, and FEP 3.1, Train B Plant Shutdown From Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown Due To Fire to evaluate that equipment required for post-fire safe shutdown was adequately protected from fire damage in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability and the FPP. Cable routing information by FA was reviewed for a selected sample of SSD components to verify that cables would not be damaged by a fire in the selected fire areas. In cases where local operator manual actions (OMAs)were in place in-lieu of cable protection of SSD equipment, the team verified that the OMAs were feasible and reliable utilizing the guidance of the NRC IP. The team also verified that the use of OMAs had been addressed by the FPP in the FHA. A list of SSD components examined for cable routing is included in the Attachment.
Operational Implementation The team reviewed applicable sections of FEP 1.0, 3.0, and 3.1 for FAs TB-1 and IB-20 to verify that the shutdown methodology properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain SSD conditions. The team assessed the timeliness of the operators in identifying and assessing the initial plant conditions, response to suspected fire, and subsequent actions credited afterwards. The team performed a walk-through of procedure steps to ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedure. The inspectors verified the licensee personnel credited for procedure implementation had procedures available, were trained on implementation, and were available in the event a fire occurred. The team also reviewed selected operator actions to verify that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.02 Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team evaluated the adequacy of fire barrier walls, ceilings, floors, mechanical and electrical penetration seals, fire doors, and fire dampers for the selected FAs/FZs. The team compared the installed configurations to the approved construction details, and supporting fire endurance test data, which established the fire resistance ratings of the selected fire barriers. The team also reviewed a sample of completed surveillance and maintenance procedures to ensure that these passive fire barrier features were properly inspected and maintained. The team reviewed licensee evaluations of the non-standard fire barrier penetration seals for FA IB-20 and FA CB-17 (FZ 17.1).
The team walked down accessible portions of the selected FA/FZs to observe material condition and the design adequacy of fire area boundaries to assess if they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area. The team verified that the as-built configurations met the engineering design, standard industry practices, and were either properly evaluated or qualified by appropriate fire endurance tests. In addition, the team reviewed licensing bases documentation, such as NRC SERs and deviations from NRC regulations, to evaluate that passive fire protection features met the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, and Appendix A of BTP APCSB 9.5-1. The fire protection features included in the review are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified
.03 Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensees active fire suppression which included fire detection systems, fire protection water supply system, automatic fire suppression systems and manual fire fighting fire hose and standpipe systems. The review of the fire detection systems included a walk down of the as-built configuration as compared to the applicable NFPA standard. The team also reviewed the VCSNS NFPA Code Review Report to determine if there were any outstanding code deviations for the selected areas. The team determined that the acceptance criteria, applied to active fire suppression systems, was contained in applicable codes and standards listed in the as modified by the design basis documents.
The team inspected the material condition, and operational lineup of fire detection and manual fire suppression systems through in-plant observation of systems design and testing of the fire hose and standpipe systems in reference to the applicable NFPA codes and standards. The team also reviewed the detection and suppression methods for the category of fire hazards in the selected FAs/FZs. The team reviewed and walked down operational aspects of the fire detection system such as the location of panels and alarms. The team verified that the spacing and placement requirements of the detector layout drawings and the actual locations of selected detectors met the criteria as described in NFPA Code 72E, Automatic Fire Detectors. The team also reviewed the testing and maintenance program and its implementation for the fire detection system.
Additionally, the team performed inspections of fire hose station locations, hose lengths, and nozzle types. Particular attention was given to location and capacity of hose stations and approach routes to the FZs. The hose stations, as designated in the pre-fire plans for the selected FZs, were reviewed to assess whether adequate reach and coverage was provided.
The team reviewed operator and fire brigade staffing, fire brigade response reports, offsite fire department communications and staging procedures, fire fighting pre-plan strategies, fire brigade qualification training, and the fire brigade drill program procedures. Additionally, the team walked down the selected FZs to compare the associated fire pre-plan strategy drawings with as-built plant conditions and fire response procedures. The team verified that fire fighting pre-plan strategies and drawings were consistent with the fire protection features and potential fire conditions described in the FPER. The documents included in the review are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.04 Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
Through a combination of in-plant inspection and drawing reviews, the team verified for the selected FAs/FZs that redundant trains of systems required for post-fire SSD could not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. The team considered the effects of water, drainage, heat, hot gasses, and smoke that could potentially damage all redundant trains or inhibit access to alternate shutdown equipment. Air flow paths out of the selected FZs were reviewed to verify that inter-area migration of smoke or hot gases would not inhibit necessary operator actions. The documents included in the review are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.05 Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The objective of the inspection was to evaluate the licensees ability to achieve hot and cold shutdown with and without the availability of offsite power for FA CB-17. The inspection activities focused on ensuring the adequacy of systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring instrumentation, and support system functions.
Methodology The team walked down the selected fire zones and examined the material condition of the fire detection, suppression, and fire area boundaries. The team compared the fire hazards analysis for the areas selected and discussed in the FPER with FEP 1.0,Fire Emergency Procedure Selection, FEP 4.0, Control Room Evacuation Due To Fire, and FEP 4.1, Plant Shutdown From Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown Due To Fire In Control Building to verify that equipment required for post-fire safe shutdown was adequately protected from fire damage in accordance with the FPP. The team reviewed cable routing information by FA for a selected sample of SSD components credited for use during this shutdown method to evaluate if the components and cables would remain free from fire damage or that acceptable OMAs had been established in the FEPs. In cases where local OMAs were in place in-lieu of cable protection of SSD components, the team verified that the OMAs were feasible and reliable.
For a postulated fire in FA CB-17, main control room complex, the licensee may achieve hot and cold shutdown utilizing alternate shutdown capability. The team reviewed surveillance tests records on the transfer switches or fire switches that are used to transfer plant controls from the main control room to the control room evacuation panel to verify that the switches were periodically tested for operability in accordance with the surveillance test program required by fire protection procedure FPP-027, Safe Shutdown, Rev. 3. Reviews also included verification that alternative shutdown could be accomplished with or without offsite power.
Operational Implementation The team reviewed selected training lesson plans and job performance measures for licensed and non-licensed operators and technicians to evaluate if the training reinforced the shutdown methodology in the FPER and FEPs for the selected FAs/FZs. The team also conducted interviews, reviewed shift turnover logs and shift manning to verify that personnel required for SSD using alternative shutdown systems and procedures were available onsite, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members.
The team performed a tabletop review of FEP 1.0, FEP 4.0 and 4.1 as well as performing a walk-through of procedure steps to ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures and shutdown strategy. The team verified that the SSD procedure included steps to prevent or mitigate the consequences of spurious operations. The team walked down the in-plant location of OMAs specified in the FEPs with operations personnel to evaluate the expected ambient conditions, relative difficulty and operator familiarization associated with each OMA. The team walked down the in-plant location of all operator actions specified in the FEP procedures with operations personnel to evaluate the expected ambient conditions, relative difficulty and operator familiarization associated with each operator action. The team reviewed the systems and components credited for use during this shutdown method to verify that they would remain free from fire damage. The team reviewed selected operator actions to verify that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.06 Circuit Analyses
a. Inspection Scope
This segment is suspended for plants in transition, because a more detailed review of cable routing and circuit analysis will be conducted as part of the fire protection program transition to NFPA 805. However, to support this inspection, a limited scope review of a select sample of SSD components was conducted to evaluate if the existing fire emergency procedures were adequate for a postulated fire in any of the selected FAs.
The cables examined were based upon a list of SSD components selected by the team after a review of the FHA, SSD systems piping and instrumentation drawings, and plant FEPs. The team reviewed the electrical control wiring diagrams and identified the cables associated with the SSD components and examined in detail the cable routing and potential for fire damage and the effects on the circuit. The team also reviewed design drawings for a sample of components credited in the alternative shutdown procedures to verify that the transfer switches associated with these components would adequately transfer control and power from the main control room to the control room evacuation panel in accordance with FEP 4.0. Cable routing data was also reviewed for these components to verify that the cables for the sampled transfer switches were not routed in the selected fire areas or were adequately protected. Additionally, the licensee credits several electrical disconnect switches in their fire emergency procedures and inspectors reviewed design drawing and cable routing data, on a sampling basis, to verify that credited disconnect switches were routed in armored cable and would appropriately isolate credited components that could be affected by the fire, in accordance with their FPER. The specific components reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.07 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed plant communication capabilities to evaluate the availability of the communication systems to support plant personnel in the performance of local OMAs to achieve and maintain SSD conditions. The team also reviewed the communication systems available at different locations within the plant that would be relied upon to support fire event notification and fire brigade fire fighting activities to evaluate their availability at different locations. During this review the team considered the effects of ambient noise levels, clarity of reception, reliability and coverage patterns. In addition, the team reviewed radio battery ratings, the electrical power supplies, and cable routing for the communication systems to evaluate if the plant telephones and portable radios would be available to support the operators in the conduct and coordination of their required duties during a fire.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.08 Emergency Lighting
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed plant walk down inspections with licensee staff of the post-fire safe shutdown procedures for the selected fire areas to observe if the placement and coverage area of fixed 8-hour battery pack emergency lights provided reasonable assurance of illuminating access and egress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation and/or instrumentation monitoring for post fire safe shutdown.
The team reviewed maintenance and design aspects of the fixed emergency lighting units to verify that the battery power supplies were rated with at least an 8-hour capacity as required by the FPP. Preventive maintenance and surveillance testing records were reviewed to ensure adequate surveillance testing and periodic battery replacements were in place to ensure continued reliable operation of the fixed emergency lights. The team reviewed the completed 8-hour discharge test records for a random sample of fixed emergency lights to verify they met the minimum rating of at least eight-hour capacity.
The team also discussed with the licensee the maintenance rule status of the emergency lighting systems. A list of documents reviewed is included in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.09 Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
The licensees FPER identified the need for post-fire repairs prior to achieving a cold shutdown condition for a fire in the Auxiliary Building (AB), fire subzone AB-1.1.3. This is the western portion of fire zone AB-1.1. A fire in fire subzone AB-1.1.3 could damage power cabling to B train residual heat removal equipment needed for cold shutdown.
Thus, cold shutdown repair procedures and repair kits were reviewed during this inspection. The inspectors verified that the fire damage repair procedures were current and adequate and repair parts and equipment were being stored and maintained onsite.
The inspectors toured Warehouse B where Tool and Material Kit #E0065 was stored and examined the material condition of the parts being stored in the kit. The licensee annually inventories the kit in accordance with the applicable Emergency Tool Locker and Kit Inventory List in electrical maintenance procedure EMP-100.002, Emergency Installation of Cable for RHR System. The inspectors reviewed the inventory inspection data sheet work order records and compared them to the parts list in EMP-100.002 to verify that all required replacement parts were being accounted for and were available for use. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.10 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the administrative controls for out-of-service, degraded, and/or inoperable fire protection features (e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment, passive fire barriers, or pumps, valves or electrical devices providing SSD functions or capabilities). The team reviewed selected items on the fire protection impairment log and compared them with the FAs/FZs selected for inspection. The compensatory measures that had been established in these areas/zones were compared to those specified for the applicable fire protection feature to verify that the risk associated with removing the fire protection feature from service was properly assessed and adequate compensatory measures were implemented in accordance with the approved FPP. Additionally, the team verified that the licensees short term compensatory measures were adequate to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions could be taken, and that the licensee was effective in returning the equipment to service in a reasonable period of time.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.11 B.5.b Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed, on a sample basis, the licensees steam generator depressurization mitigation measures for large fires and explosions to verify that the measures were feasible, personnel were trained to implement the strategies, and equipment was properly staged and maintained. The team requested and reviewed inventory and maintenance records of required equipment. Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation, and plant walk-downs, the team verified the engineering basis to establish reasonable assurance that the makeup capacity could be provided using the specified equipment and water sources. The team reviewed the licensees capability to provide a reliable and available water source and the ability to provide the minimum fuel supply. The team performed a walk-down of the storage and staging areas for the B.5.b equipment to verify that equipment identified for use in the current procedures were available, calibrated and maintained. In the presence of licensee staff, the team conducted an independent audit and inventory of required equipment and a visual inspection of the dedicated credited power and water source. The team reviewed training records of the licensees staff to verify that operator training/familiarity with the strategy objectives and implementing guidelines were accomplished according to the established training procedures.
The team also reviewed condition report CR-10-1901, which identified that several PM tasks, assigned for some credited B.5.b equipment, had not performed the required testing and maintenance. This recurrence was previously documented in an NRC inspection report and the licensees corrective action program (CR-08-02820), the team verified, by review of records and physical inspection, that B.5.b equipment was currently being properly stored, maintained, and tested in accordance with the licensees B.5.b program procedures. It was noted that at the time of the inspection testing and maintenance records for this equipment were current.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed corrective action program documents, including completed corrective actions documented in selected condition reports and operating experience program documents related to fire protection, to ascertain whether industry-identified fire protection problems actually or potentially affecting VCSNS were appropriately entered into, and resolved by, the corrective action program process. Items included in the review were NRC Information Notices, industry or vendor-generated reports of defects and non-compliances submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 21, and vendor information letters.
The team evaluated the effectiveness of the corrective actions for the identified issues.
The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The team reviewed recent independent licensee fire protection program audits for thoroughness, completeness and conformance to requirements. Requirements for the independent audits are contained in Regulatory Guide 1.189, Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants, Generic Letter 82-21, Technical Specifications for Fire Protection Audits, and the licensees Operational Quality Assurance Plan. The team reviewed QA-AUD-200904-0, Fire Protection Annual and Biennial Audit, dated March 10, 2009, and QA-AUD-201007-0, Fire Protection Triennial Audit, completed April 19, 2010.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up
(Discussed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-395/2010-002-00, Unanalyzed Condition Due to Wiring Discrepancy in the B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Appendix R Isolation Circuitry Rev. 0 and Rev. 1 The licensee described a condition in Revision 0 of the subject LER (dated June 28, 2010) where a wiring discrepancy could have potentially affected the ability of the B EDG output breaker to automatically close during certain 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R (Appendix R) fire scenarios, when an undervoltage signal was present on the bus. The Appendix R isolation function was not provided by B EDG local/remote/maintenance switch (43-DG02) contact 1-1C. During field walkdowns performed by the licensee, the responsible engineer found that a conductor, not shown on drawings, effectively bypassed switch contact 1-1C. One purpose of this contact is to isolate a section of remote control circuitry from the local control circuitry in the case of certain Appendix R fire events. By bypassing this contact, a faulted section of remote control circuitry would still be connected to the local control circuitry, effectively preventing the isolation of the EDG output breaker automatic close circuitry. As a result, local control of the B EDG may not be available during certain Appendix R fire events. The licensee initiated corrective actions in April 2010, to rewire the affected circuits on A and B EDGs, and to correct the drawings to match the implemented field changes. The team conducted interviews with licensee personnel, performed walk downs of affected cables, reviewed circuits and collected cable routing information to determine if a creditable fire could prevent A or B EDG from isolating the EDG output breaker automatic close circuitry from fires in the control building. The team also reviewed the licensees immediate corrective actions and found the actions to be comprehensive and appropriate. The licensee is still investigating the root cause of this event. This LER will remain open pending NRC review of the results of the root cause evaluation.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On July 1, 2010, the inspection team leader presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. D. Gatlin, Site Vice President Nuclear Operations, and other licensee staff members. The licensee acknowledged the results. The team leader informed the licensee that proprietary information would not be included in this inspection report, although none was identified.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- A. Barbee, Director - Nuclear Training
- L. Bennett, Manager, Plant Support Engineering
- L. Blue, Manager, Nuclear Training
- G. Douglass, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
- M. Fowlkes, General Manager, Engineering Services
- D. Gatlin, Site Vice President - Nuclear Operations
- E. Hamilton, Public Affairs
- R. Haselden, General Manager, Organizational/Development Effectiveness
- R. Justice, Manager, Nuclear Operations
- M. Kammer, Design Engineering Supervisor
- T. Keckeisen, Fire Protection Specialist
- G. Loignon, Supervisor, Probability Risk Assessment
- R. Ray, Manager, Planning and Scheduling
- S. Shealy, Electrical/I&C Design Engineering
- D. Shue, Manager, Maintenance Services
- W. Stuart, Manager, Design Engineering
- B. Thompson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
- G. Williams, Supervisor, Design Engineering
- S. Zarandi, General Manager, Nuclear Support Services
NRC personnel
- J. Polickoski, Resident Inspector, VCSNS
- R. Nease, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
None
Closed
None
Discussed
LER 2010-002-00 Unanalyzed Condition Due to Wiring Discrepancy in the B Emergency Diesel Generator Appendix R Isolation Circuitry (Section 4OA3)
LIST OF FIRE BARRIER FEATURES INSPECTED (Refer to Report Section 1RO5.02- Passive Fire Barriers)
Fire Door Description Door TB-206 Room (Rm.) TB 36-01 to TB EL 436 Door TB-207 Rm. TB 36-01 to TB EL 436 Door IB-408 FA IB-20 (Rm. 63-01) to Rm. 63-05 Door CB-510 Fire Zone 17.1(Rm. 63-05) to Rm. 63-07 Door CB-513 Fire Zone 17.1(Rm. 63-05) to Rm. 63-03 Door CB-514 Fire Zone 17.1(Rm. 63-05) to Rm. 63-03 Door CB-514A Fire Zone 17.1(Rm. 63-05) to Rm. 63-03 Fire Window Shutter CB-529 Fire Zone 17.1(Rm. 63-05)
Fire Damper XFD-220-VL Rm. TB 36-01 XFD-231-VL Rm. TB 36-01 XFD-176-VL FA IB-20 (Rm. 63-01)
XFD-177-VL FA IB-20 (Rm. 63-01)
XFD-178-VL FA IB-20 (Rm.. 63-01)
XFD-176-VL Fire Zone 17.1(Rm. 63-05)
XFD-251-VL Fire Zone 17.1(Rm. 63-05)
XFD-252-VL Fire Zone 17.1(Rm. 63-05)
XFD-258-VL Fire Zone 17.1(Rm. 63-05)
Fire Barrier Penetration Seals IB-332 FA IB-20 (Rm. 63-01)
IB-429 FA IB-20 (Rm. 63-01)
IB-432 FA IB-20 (Rm. 63-01)
IB-632 FA IB-20 (Rm. 63-01)
CB-1101 Fire Zone 17.1 (Rm. 63-05)
CB-2257 Fire Zone 17.1 (Rm. 63-05)
CB-2348 Fire Zone 17.1 (Rm. 63-05)
CB-2937 Fire Zone 17.1 (Rm. 63-05)
Fire Proofing Insulation Fireproofing for structural steel Rm. TB 36-01 Fireproofing for structural steel Fire Zone 17.1 (Rm. 63-05)
LIST OF COMPONENTS REVIEWED (Refer to Report Section 1R05.01 / 1R05.05 / 1R05.06 - Circuit Analyses)
Component Identification Description Valves FCV-3551 Motor Driven EFP to Steam Generator C FCV-122 Charging Flow Transfer Switch PCV-445A Pressurizer PORV Transfer Switch DS-2 Disconnect Switch for ILV-459 & XTV-8147 DS-33 Disconnect Switch for IPV 455B IFV-2030 Main Steam to EFW Pump Isolation Valve Pump Motors XPP-39C Service Water Pump C Transfer XPP-39B Service Water Pump B Transfer XFN-46B Charging Pump B Cooling Fan Component Cooling Water Pump B HVAC Chilled Water Pump Process Instruments LI-496 Steam Generator C Narrow Range Level PI-402 RCS Wide Range Pressure LI-461 Pressurizer Level PI-402B Wide Range Pressure LI-497B Steam Generator C Level LI-459B Pressurizer Level PI-402D RCS Pressure