IR 05000395/2022003

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Integrated Inspection Report 05000395/2022003
ML22304A123
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 10/31/2022
From: David Dumbacher
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB3
To: Stoddard D
Dominion Energy Co
References
IR 2022003
Download: ML22304A123 (10)


Text

SUBJECT:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000395/2022003

Dear Daniel G. Stoddard:

On September 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Virgil C. Summer. On October 20, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. George Lippard and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, David E. Dumbacher, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000395 License No. NPF-12

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000395

License Number:

NPF-12

Report Number:

05000395/2022003

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2022-003-0024

Licensee:

Dominion Energy

Facility:

Virgil C. Summer

Location:

Jenkinsville, SC

Inspection Dates:

July 01, 2022 to September 30, 2022

Inspectors:

P. Cooper, Senior Reactor Inspector

S. Janicki, Resident Inspector

M. Read, Sr. Resident Inspector

M. Schwieg, Senior Reactor Inspector

Approved By:

David E. Dumbacher, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees

performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Virgil C. Summer, in accordance with the

Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for

overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to

https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in

effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with

their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared

complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met

consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection

Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515,

Appendix DProperty "Inspection Manual Chapter" (as page type) with input value "NRC Inspection Manual 2515,</br></br>Appendix D" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of

IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and

interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules

and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-

significant systems from impending severe weather from hurricane Ian on September

29, 2022

External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors evaluated that flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures,

and equipment are consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk

analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding on September 29, 2022

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following

systems/trains:

(1)

Motor driven emergency feedwater train 'B' protected train walkdown on August 2,

2022

(2)

'A' train of the residual heat removal system on June 27, 2022, while the 'B' residual

heat removal pump was inoperable for preventative maintenance

(3)

Electric-driven fire service pump and alternate diesel-driven fire service pump on

September 15, 2022, during maintenance on the diesel-driven fire service pump

(4)

Equipment Building and Alternate Equipment Building diesel generators on

September 19, 2022

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a

walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,

material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1)

Charging pump rooms in the auxiliary building elevation 388 feet on August 30, 2022

(2)

Auxiliary building elevation 374 feet safety-related pumps on September 2, 2022

(3)

Transformer yard elevation 463 feet on September 7, 2022

(4)

'Equipment Building' and 'Alternate Equipment Building' diesel generator buildings on

September 19, 2022

71111.07SIX - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance

Ultimate Heat Sink Containment Device and Dam (IP Section 03.05) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the ultimate heat sink performance containment device and dam

on the following:

(1)

Ultimate heat sink containment device and dam

71111.07T - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance

Heat Exchanger (Service Water Cooled) (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated heat exchanger performance on the following:

(1)

B Diesel Generator Intercooler & Injector Cooling Water Heat Exchanger

(2)

B Diesel Generator Jacket Water Heat Exchanger

(3)

1A RB Cooling Unit

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1

Sample)

(1)

Inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control

Room during activities to secure pressurizer backup heaters using operators under-

instruction on August 22, first time online performance of feedwater booster pump

calibrations on September 6, and testing steam generator blowdown valves on

September 13, 2022.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1)

Inspectors observed a licensed operator requalification simulator session involving a

loss of a reactor coolant pump without an automatic reactor trip, a small break loss of

coolant accident, and a loss of the emergency feedwater system on August 3, 2022

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following

structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1)

Emergency diesel generators, review completed on September 26, 2022

(2)

Control of temporary systems and/or equipment on September 8, 2022

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the

following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and

appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1)

Elevated risk during planned instrument air maintenance activities on July 13, 2022

(2)

Planned elevated risk during scheduled battery and battery charger surveillances and

unit auxiliary transformer XTF0002T maintenance on July 25, 2022

(3)

Elevated risk during planned solid state protection system maintenance during

switchyard thermography and isophase bus duct maintenance on September 2, 2022

(4)

Elevated risk during planned isophase bus duct inspections and switchyard crane

activities on September 9, 2022

(5)

Elevated risk during crane lifting activities near the refueling water storage tank on

August 23, 2022

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the

following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1)

CR1205773, feedwater isolation valve 'C' pilot valve pressure regulator, completed

review on September 9, 2022

(2)

CR1192017, alternate emergency building diesel generator failed to start, completed

review on September 19, 2022

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following permanent modification:

(1)

ECR-50522, Replacement of transformer XTF-1, review completed on August 22,

2022

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system

operability and/or functionality:

(1)

STP-112.003, stroke testing for valve XVG-3003B, reactor building spray pump

header isolation valve, following motor repairs, on July 7, 2022

(2)

STP-223.002, 'B' service water train testing following planned maintenance, on July

28, 2022

(3)

SOP-306, 'A' emergency diesel generator testing following control room "KW" switch

replacement on August 17, 2022

(4)

SOP-118, 'B' component cooling water pump testing following outboard seal

replacement on August 22, 2022

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability

and/or functionality:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1)

Spent fuel pool crane and load cell in-service inspection on August 17, 2022

FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1)

480V (300 kW) FLEX diesel generator surveillance on September 9, 2022

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1

Sample)

(1)

On July 20, 2022, inspectors observed an emergency drill involving an Alert

declaration from a resin spill, Site Area Emergency from a loss of offsite power, and

then a General Emergency due to extended loss of offsite power

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)

(1)

Unit 1 July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022

MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)

(1)

Unit 1 July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022

MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)

(1)

Unit 1 July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program

related to the following issues:

(1)

On April 14, 2022, the licensee identified that the auto-start setting for

XAC0014, diesel-driven air compressor, had reset to the 'Off' position in the

Intellisys controller following a grid perturbation. The inspectors reviewed

condition report CR1196185 and associated licensee evaluations. The auto-

start capability for the air compressor mitigates plant risk during a steam

generator tube rupture concurrent with a loss of offsite power. The licensee

identified that severe weather in the area several days prior was the likely

cause of the loss of power to the controller, which reset to factory default

settings. The inspectors reviewed documentation on the Intellisys controller

and determined that there is a history at V.C. Summer and other plants where

Intellisys controllers have lost power for long enough for factory default setting

to be restored. In the example on April 14, 2022, the licensee validated that

the controller would have started the compressor upon a loss of power by

opening the feeder breaker to the battery charger and control panel. As a

result of the successful test, the licensee demonstrated that the compressor

would have functioned during a loss of offsite power. The licensee

reprogrammed the site-specific settings and created a condition report to

enhance standard and abnormal operating procedures to ensure operators

could start the compressor following a loss of power to the controller. The

inspectors completed their review on September 20, 2022 and did not identify

any violations of regulatory requirements.

(2)

On August 23, 2022, while performing a protected area walkdown, the

residents noted lifting activities in progress near the Refueling Water Storage

Tank (RWST). The inspectors observed multiple lifts by a mobile crane which

appeared to have a load path that was within 15 feet of the RWST. The

inspectors noted that one of the lifts included a skid pan loaded with

equipment and debris. Inspectors questioned the "Low Risk" assessment and

compliance with licensee procedures GMP-100.026, "Crane Operations and

Rigging" revision 7, and MA-AA-101, "Lifting and Material Handling" revision

28. The licensee generated condition report CR1206274, evaluated the issue,

and identified enhancements to training and procedural guidance. During a

follow-up inspection, inspectors estimated the loaded skid pans weight was in

excess of 2,500 lbs. based on the skids nameplate weight of 2,250 lbs. and

the inventory of the skid pan. The inspectors determined the load path, which

was within 15 feet of the RWST, and weight met the licensees criteria for a

heavy lift, which would have required additional risk mitigating actions

including a formal risk evaluation, engineering review, and additional

oversight. The inspectors determined through interviews that the riggers in the

field qualitatively determined each lift did not meet the weight or proximity

criteria for a heavy lift, which allowed the lifting activities to be screened as

low risk and allowed the lift to proceed without notifying operations or

implementation of additional risk mitigating actions. In response to the

inspectors questions, the licensee weighed the skid pan and determined the

actual weight of the skid pan to be 1,610 lbs. compared to the 2,250 lbs.

identified on the skid pans nameplate. This additional margin resulted in the

loads total weight falling below the licensees heavy load criteria of 2,500

lbs. and in compliance with licensee procedures. Therefore, inspectors did not

identify a violation of regulatory requirements.

INSPECTION RESULTS

No findings were identified.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On October 20, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr.

George Lippard and other members of the licensee staff.

On July 14, 2022, the inspectors presented the Heat Sink Exit Meeting inspection results

to Mr. Lippard and other members of the licensee staff.

THIRD PARTY REVIEWS

Inspectors reviewed a World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) report that was issued

during the inspection period.