IR 05000336/1987006
| ML20214V286 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1987 |
| From: | Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214V258 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-336-87-06, 50-336-87-6, NUDOCS 8706120043 | |
| Download: ML20214V286 (14) | |
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. t U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
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Report N /87-06 Docket N ,'
License N OPR-65 Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06101-0270 Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut Inspection Conducted: April 14, 1987 through May 18, 1987
,y 1 Inspectors: T. A. Rebelowski, Senior Resident Inspector
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E. L. Conner, Project Engineer D. H. Jaffe, NRC Project Manager Approved by: b bO(J4 S'/29/B 1 E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B Date j
_ Inspection Summary: Report 50-336/87-06s(4/14/87 - 5/18/87)
p l Areas Inspected: Routine resident (102. hours) and region-based (10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />) inspec-
^4 tion of plant operations, radiation protection, physical security, fire protection, sbrveillance, maintenance, periodic reports, diesel generators, auxiliary feedwater
, pump automatic starting circuits, a turbine / reactor trip, backshift activities, 1 water chemistry, balance of plant repairs, and the licensee's finger printing program. -Also, the licensee's annual media conference was observe Results: This inspection identified satisfactory licensee performance in all area .Nine open NRC items were closed (Detail 3). Inspection of operator performance
' and operational safety identified no inadequitties (Detail 4). However, incomplete
corrective actions were identified in the 0\es 1 Generator Review (Detail 7).
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8706120043 870601 PDR ADUCK'05000336, G PCR
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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Persons Contacted.................................................... 1
Summary of Facility Activities....................................... 1 Licensee Review of Previously Identified Items....................... 'l
, Operational Safety and Personnel Performance......................... 5 Detailed Control Room Observations.............................. 5
, Backshift/ Weekend Inspection.................................... 6 Daily Operational Safety Verifications.......................... 6 Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip-100% Power................................. 7 Wa t e r C h em i s t ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- Diesel Generator Review.............................................. 8 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Automatic Circuit Start..................... 8 Annual State and Utility Media Conference............................ 8 1 Review of Periodic and Special Reports............................... 9 1 Preventive Maintenance............................................... 9 1 Surveillance......................................................... 9 1 Spent In-Core-Instrument (ICI) Removal from Spent Fuel Pool.......... 10 1 Licensee Fingerprinting Program...................................... 10 1 Balance of Plant Repairs............................................. 11
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1 Service Water System Anomalies....................................... 12 1 Management Meetings.................................................. 12
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DETAILS Persons Contacted S. E. Scace, Station Superintendent R. H. Haynes, Station Services Supervisor J. Keenan, Unit 2 Superintenden The inspector also contacted members of the Operations, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Instrument and Control, Maintenance, Reactor Engineering and Security Department . Summary of Facility Operation At the start of the inspection period, the plant was at 100% power. On April 16, the reactor tripped due to an electrical relay sensing a generator faul All safety systems responded as designed (see Detail 7). The Unit was re-started and operated at 100% power through the end of the inspectio . Licensee Review of Previously Identified Items (Closed) Inspector Follow Item 50-336/86-29-01, Status Boards in the Technical Support Center (TSC) Were Inadequate and Disorganized The licensee has placed three revised status boards in the TSC to document plant problems which are under review in the TSC. In addition, status boards will be used to identify key TSC members and corporate contacts. Inspection verified that the status boards were in place and addressed the inspector's concern This item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item 50-336/86-15-02, Yard Evacuation Alarm Tests not Included in Surveillance Procedure The licensee included the evacuation alarms in the yard areas in EPIP 4601- Satisfactory Testing was performed under procedure IST-3-86-032, " Yard Areas Evacuation Alarm Test." This item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item 50-336/86-29-03, The E0F Status Board For Implementation of Protective Actions Contained Both Implemented and Recom-mended Actions, Resulting in Misinterpretations The licensee has added to the EOF status board the following statement: " Place only implemented actions on status board." This item is close (0 pen) IFI 50-336/84-07-01, Modify RCS High Point Vent System to Avoid In-advertent Actuation Due to a Hot Short This issue concerns a possible design deficiency. The present electrical control design for the high point vents does not have grounded shield leads in control wiring or additional switch contacts to break both connections to
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each isolation valve solenoi The September 20, 1983 NRC Safety Evaluation concluded that the NNEC0 design does not meet Task Action Plan (TAP) Item II.B.1, Clarification A (8), in that the system is not protected against in-advertent actuation due to hot short circuit The inspector reviewed a licensee memorandum on this issue and talked with the responsible engineer. The licensee has concluded that this circuit pro-tection change is not required for the following reason Venting for both the reactor vessel and the pressurizer uses two parallel paths with two valves in each path. Venting requires aligning two series valves in either parallel pat In Generic Letter 85-01, the NRC defined the criteria for circuit pro-tection as: "The safe shutdown capability should not be adversely af-fected by any one spurious actuation or signal resulting from a fire in any plant area 7
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Under normal cc,nditions, each series connected valve is close Under accident conditions, venting can occur only if hot shorts occur to two separate circuits in the same venting path. Therefore, the present con-figuration does not require protectio The venting function is not used during normal operation and could be fully disabled by removing circuit fuses. With the fuses removed, hot short venting could only occur if four hot shorts occurred in the correct polarity in the same venting path to two series connected valve The licensee has decided to operate with the fuses in place in order to pro-vide valve position indication in the control room. The inspector reviewed the circuitry, confirmed that two hot shorts would be required to cause un-expected venting, and found no single failure that would actuate the RCS high point vent release. This TAP item remains open pending further NRC revie (Closed) IFI 50-336/85-03-01, Program for Testing Mechanical Snubbers This issue concerns the lack of provisions for mechanical snubber testin Equipment for testing both mechanical and hydraulic snubbers now has been in use for some time. The inspector discussed the testing equipment, the proce-dures used, and the results with the lead engineer. Unit 1 LERs 84-009-01 and 85-026-01, reporting failures of both types of snubbers, were reviewe These failures occurred during the functional testing during the last two refueling outage The inspector reviewed maintenance procedures for hydraulic and mechanical snubber visual inspections (MP 739.5 and .6). In addition, he reviewed a number of completed MP 739 forms for snubber attachment dimensional checks, hydraulic snubber functional test data sheets, and snubber visual checklist Although this review was performed for Unit 1, it applies equally to Unit Also, The Unit 2 snubber testing program was reviewed in NRC Report 50-336/
86-07 and found acceptable. This item is close _
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(Closed) 50-336/85-07-01, Jumper / Bypass Tags Hung before February 1, 1985 This issue relates to jumper / bypass tags that were in effect for several year The inspector reviewed the active and completed jumper / bypass log books. No active jumpers preceded February 1,1985. The quality of the control proce-dures, ACP-QA-2.06, Station Bypass Jumper-Lifted Lead-Bypass Control Sheets, was acceptable; completed control sheets had good safety evaluations, drawings, etc., as needed. There were 24 jumper / bypass actions open at the time of the inspection. Five of these were marked for clearance during the next outag Another five were marked for clearance during the 1988 refueling outag ACP-QA-2.06B Review Step states that "The responsible Department Head shall review the jumper / bypass installations that are installed longer than six months to see if they are still needed or if they should be made permanent."
Several of the " Restoration Required By (Date/ Mode)" entries were blank or outdated. The Shift Supervisor made some corrections to the more recent en-tries. Unit management reviews the jumper / bypass log monthly to ensure the six-month criterion is me No significant discrepancies were found by the inspector, who had no further questions on this matte (Closed) UNR 50-336/85-30-01, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Room Sump Pumps' Electrical Supply During the 1985 inspection, about one inch of water had accumulated in the
- room housing the two (2) motor-driven AFW pumps during a site loss of power t event. The water, from AFW pump shaft packing leaks, was being pumped by an air-operated pump to the steam-driven AFW room sump via a hose through the normally closed watertight door separating the two AFW rooms. At issue was
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lack of emergency power for AFW room sump pumps.
! The licensee's corrective action was to provide emergency power to the sump pump in the motor-driven AFW pump rooms and to one of two sump pumps in the steam-driven AFW pump room. This work was completed in 1987 in accordance with PDCR 2-106-86. One sump pump in each AFW pump room is now powered from MCC-61, a facility emergency bu The inspector reviewed the PDCR 2-106-86 design, safety analysis, and related
! correspondence. With the engineer responsible for this PDCR, the inspector l observed the physical plant modifications. In addition, the inspector dis-cussed this matter with control room personnel. There is no control room indication of AFW pump room sump level / pump operation. Each sump pump has local start /stop level controls. However, no operational problems have oc-curred and the AFW pump rooms are checked by the auxiliary operators during their twice per-shift rounds. These changes have increased the reliability of the sump pump This item is closed.
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(Closed) IFI 50-336/85-30-02, Radioactive Material Labeling not Properly Reclassified Prior to Disposal This was a response to an allegation that radioactive material from the Mill-stone Site was seen at a local scrap yard. State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, NRC resident inspector, and licensee surveys of the scrap yard revealed no radioactivity or contamination. The radioactive material labeling seen by the alleger was apparently removed during the pro-cessing (i.e. torch cutting). No labels were visible during the state, NRC, and licensee inspection The licensee's corrective measures included revision of Health Physics Proce-dure SHP 4917, Unconditional Radiological Release of Material Off-Site, to include instructions for removal of all radioactive identification prior to unconditional release. The inspector confirmed that the statement had been added to SHP 4917. No further discrepancies have been identified in the shipment of scrap. This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-336/85-21-01, Resolution of an Error in Seismic Analysis of Pressurizer Vent Piping The licensee has corrected the computer modeling program for the piping sys-tems. Re-analysis resulted in the placement of two fixed supports on pres-surizer vent piping. A thirty (30) day report, LER 85-008, was submitte Review of closure of the PDCR (2-48-85) identified no inadequacies. This item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item 50-336/85-09-01, Leakage Through Both Con-tainment Isolation Valves in the 6-Inch Hydrogen Purge Penetration During the 1985 outage Type "C" testing, leakage on the Hydrogen Purge Pene-tration (Penetration 82) exceeded the capability of the test equipment. In-spection determined that the outside containment isolation valve (2-EB-92)
was not completely closed by its air operator. The lever arm woodruff key slot for the valve shaft was worn. The lever arm was replaced and a new woodruff key was installed. The inner isolation valve (2-EB-91) "T" ring seat required adjustment. The valves were then local leak rate tested, and the 0.6 La criterion for Type "C" testing was met. This item is close (0 pen) Inspector Follow Item 50-336/85-09-03, Gould Three Pole Molded Case Switch on SCS Isolation Valve 2-51-652 Replacement The licensee has developed a procedure to mount this disconnect switch per Seismic Qualification Report No. NEU-2331R as approved by Northern Instrument Inc. The use of an enclosure box with Unistrut and Hilti Bolt mounts and a determined number of anchors (12) has been developed. A Plant Design Change evaluation concluded that the direct replacement does not reduce design func-tion or change seismic qualification or environmental impact. Upon completion of the installation, a subsequent inspection for adherence to Automated Work Order requirements will be performed. This item iemains ope ..
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4. Operational Safety and Personnel Performance a.' Detailed Control Room Observations The inspector observed areas in which operators must maintain an unob-structed view of the control board, administrative procedures that de-fine control room surveillance areas, operator briefings, senior operator presence in the control room and in sight or in audible range of annun-ciators, and proper briefing of senior operators prior to their assuming shift responsibilitie Shift turnovers were conducted professionally and included individual one-on one exchanges of information, walk-throughs of control panels with identification of equipment status, identification of ongoing operations such as waste transfer, water inventory, tests in progress, and problems that may have occured during the previous shift. Turnover sheets iden-tified applicable Limiting Conditions for Operation. Shift supervisor briefings to oncoming shifts addressed items that could affect plant safet All operators exhibited an alertness to plant conditions. Operators re-mained within the designated areas in the control room until properly relieve A professional attitude was evident in the unit's personnel. An example was the short stay time allowed in the control room for processing work order releases due to the attitude of getting business done and leavin An inspector observation that has been discussed with plant management is the allowing of eating in the control room. This item was addressed in NRC Report 50-336/86-05, Detail 5. Licensee review of this subject is ongoing. This matter will be reexamined during routine inspection During a recent tour of the Control Room, an annunciator on the Loose Parts Monitor was observed to alarm intermittently. A review of the Control Room Annunciator Board (CRAB) Response noted that the corrective actions referenced an incorrect procedure paragraph. The licensee's immediate action was to review all CRAB responses and correct them to reflect procedures in forc A procedure exists to identify, as part of a procedure change, a need for a CRAB response chang An annual review of the CRAB is presently require This item is under further licensee revie On one occasion, an operator trainee placed himself between the operator and the control panel, blocking the operator's unobstructed view. The shift supervisor then appropriately emphasized the need to not block observation of control board _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Personnel strictly limited control room access to outside the red line area boundarie The inspector found the control room environment to be professionally well-controlled by the operators and shift supervisor The dress code instituted on a voluntary basis by the control room staff included the wearing of dress slacks, shirts, and tie Overall, this review found that the operators exhibited excellent pro-fessionalism and accomplished their duties in a safe and well-organized manne No unacceptable conditions were identifie b. Backshift/ Weekend Inspection An inspection of the Millstone 2 Control Room was performed on May 9 (Saturday) from 12:25 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. Activities observed were the transfer of liquid waste from the Aerated Waste Tank to the Circulating Water System, diesel panel alarm checks, and calibration checks on Power Range Safety Channels. The operators and shift supervisors were alert and attentive, and responded appropriately to plant annunciators. Con-trol room log books were properly annotated with management review sig-nature During this period, the inspector also verified control room back panel cleanliness. No loose electrical covers or screws, bolts, or washers were observe In summary, the operators displayed alertness and no signs of fatigue or inattention during this weekend backshift inspection. No unacceptable conditions were identifie c. Daily Operational Safety Verifications The inspector routinely observed plant operation during daily regular and off-hour tours of the following plant areas:
Control Room Intake Structure Auxiliary Building Vital Switchgear 480 Turbine Building Security Building Railroad Access (SFB) Fence Line Spent Fuel Building Yard Area The licensee's response to various alarm conditions was observed. No discrepancies were identified. Control room and shift manning were found to meet regulatory requirement Posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas were inspecte The Spent Fuel Pool area monitors and adherence to procedures that ad-dressed the cutting of the spent In-Core-Instruments and placement of
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scrap into a new container from a previous smaller liner prior to re-ceipt of the shipping cask was observed. Compliance with Radiation Work Permits was observed; proper protective clothing, life vests to prevent injury if personnel fell into the spent fuel pool, and eye protection were in use. Plant housekeeping controls were observed, including stor-age of flammable material and other potential safety hazards. The in-spector also observed plant fire system equipment while inspecting pre-ventive maintenance program overhaul of the fire pump. No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip-100% Power On April 16, 1987, at 7:17 am, an automatic reactor trip occurred from 100%
power. The trip involved opening of the Generator Exciter Field Breaker and a Generator Field Breaker. Personnel and systems responded properl The inspector verified by review of the Sequence of Events Log that, at 7:17 am, the main generator exciter field breaker opened with the resultant tur-bine/ reactor trip. The cause of this event was actuation of Generator Volts /
Hertz Relay 59X2, which tripped the field breakers. The alternator exciter field overcurrent devices are a dual relay system. Relay 59X1 will close relay 59X2 during a normal sequence. In this case, Relay 59X1 did not actuate prior to actuation of Relay 59X2. Both relays subsequently were tested satis-factoril The licensee investigated other possible causes of the trip, in-cluding momentary electromagnetic interference (EMI) and manual actuatio (Personnel were near the relay at the time of the trip.) The root cause of the event was not determine The licensee removed Relay 59X2 from the circuit. This relay protects against over-excitation of the Main Generator only when the Generator is excited but not synchronized to the grid. Voltage measuring and recording instruments were connected to input leads to detect incoming voltage spikes. The inspec-tor verified that these instruments were on line. This monitoring is to be
, performed for a six-month period. The inspector will review accumulated data during normal control room observations and had no further questions at this tim . Water Chemistry I
As a result of steam generator tube inspection defects, the licensee placed an administrative limit on primary to secondary leakage of 0.15 gpm per steam generator, as calculated during steady state conditions. If these limits are exceeded, the licensee plans to shut dow A review of chemistry results as of the end of the report period found no primary to secondary leakage. Air ejector radiation monitor readings support these zero leakage results. This item will be reviewed on a routine basi ________________ __ __ ___ _
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7. Diesel Generator Review During this report period, the NRR Licensing Project Manager inspected the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators. The following items were identified for further followup: FSAR figure 8.3.5 updating to reflect the presence of air start filters and dryers and deletion of the Safety Injection Actuation Signal, (1) Missing valve identification tags and local control panel identifi-cations (C38 and 39).
(2) A synchroscope lamp ("A" EDG) needs replacemen Repair / maintenance of a leaking plug on the air start tank and a diesel fuel oil strainer leak, Designation of the running diesel oil sump level, Identification of the correct procedure for Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Samplin Items b(2), c, and d were were immediately corrected by the license Items a, b(1), and e remain unresolved and will receive further NRC revie This is unresolved item 50-336/86-06-0 Good housekeeping practices were evident. Maintenance personnel contacted were knowledgeable. The Emergency Diesel Generators were found operable in accordance with the Technical Specification . Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Automatic Circuit Start The inspector discussed with the licensee an Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Auto-matic Circuit Start single failure that had occurred at a similar facilit The licensee determined that both Millstone 2 electrically driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and the auxiliary feed flow control valves are fully indepen-dent including their 2 out of 4 logic, actuation relays, timer relays, over-ride circuits, logic power supplies, ESAS sequence relays, and override con-trol This review was conducted by the plant engineering staff in an expe-ditious manner. The inspector had no further questions on this ite . Annual State and Utility Media Conference On May 6, the licensee conducted a media conference at the Simulator Buildin In attendance were press, radio, and local TV media representatives. State of Connecticut officials included the Director of the State Office of Civil Preparedness and two other official The licensee representatives were the Manager of Nuclear Information and the Director of the Training Facilit (
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Presentations on.the Connecticut Yankee Media Manual, the Nuclear Engineering Plan Information Guide, the Connecticut Emergency Broadcast System State Plan, and Radiological State Plan Classifications were made by State and utility official At the conclusion of the conference, the media toured the Millstone Unit 1 and 3 simulator facilitie The inspector had no questions about the media conferenc . Review of Periodic and Special Reports Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report 87-04, April 1-30, 1987, was reviewed pursuant to Appendix A Technical Specification Section 6.9.1.3. The review verified that the reported information included the NRC required data. No inadequacies or errors were identifie .
1 Preventive Maintenance The inspector witnessed part of the overhaul of Fire Pump P-82. This three year inspection procedure, 270314, listed under the Plant Performance Main-tenance Schedule (PPMS), was authorized and performed under work order M2-84-
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0800 Removal of the fire pump rotating assembly and replacement of the worn
$' casing ring wear ring were observed. The fire pump shaft exhibited packing
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box wear. The fire pump shaft, shaft sleeves, and casing and wear rings were replaced. The inspector verified that the QA tool used (a Dial Indicator)
e, was properly qualified. The mechanic was knowledgeable and had the procedure
.i and latest maintenance manual at the job site. Material certification was i available. Pump return to operations control was accomplished to perform a j pump test. The inspector had no further question q
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12. Surveillance
The inspector witnessed selected surveillances conducted by licensee Instru-1 ment and Controls (I&C) technicians to determine whether properly approved
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procedures were in use, test instrumentation was properly calibrated and used, technical specifications were satisfied, testing was performed by qualified personnel, procedure details were adequate, and test results satisfied ac-ceptance criteri Special attention was given to review of completed docu-mentation. Surveillances observed included:
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IC-2401E-1, Calibration of Excore Nuclear Instruments This procedure adjusts the >15% " Trip Permissive" and <15% Power " Trip Block." Observation of Channel Calibration and the accompanying computer printout identified no discrepancie (TS 4.3.1.1.1)
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IC-2418A, Loose Parts Monitoring System (LPMS) Periodic Test Based on a number of false indications, this test was conducted and identified three required repairs (the recorders, the Channel 3 decibel setting, and the Channel 8 alarm response). Repair work orders were issued (M2-86-01148, old work order 86-04584, and M2-87-00563). These l items will be reviewed during a subsequent inspectio SP 2410A, Acoustic Valve Monitoring Functional Test This test monitored the noise levels at Safety Valves RC 200 and RC 40 Filtered and unfiltered readouts matched the predicted value l The surveillances were well coordinated, executed, and evaluated. Communica-tions between test locations were adequately conducted on a dedicated circui I&C personnel were adequately prepared and knowledgeable of test requirement The inspector had no further question . Spent In-Core-Instrumentation (ICI) Removal from Spent Fuel Pool High level radioactive waste consisting of material from spent ICIs was trans-ferred to a new disposable liner, 3-58, which will be transported by cask from the site on June 4. Special Procedure 87-2-4, Rev. O, ICI Waste Removal, was written to address this transfer. Licensee safety evaluation addressed radi-ation monitoring and handling of the liner and shipping cas The inspector reviewed the Radiation Work Permits and Automated Work Order to assure that proper protection for personnel such as life vests, safety belts, and additional alarming fixed radiation monitors were specified. Ob-servations at the spent fuel pool verified personnel adherence to this proce-dur In addition, tool and equipment inventory was accomplished. Transfer of waste occurred with no discrepancies identified. The cask liner remains in the spent fuel pool awaiting transfer to a shipping cask that will be on-site on May 2 The inspector had no further questions in this are . Licensee Fingerprinting Program The federal Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 re-quires that operators of nuclear power plants fingerprint persons who are granted unescorted access privileges. The licensee has fingerprinted ap-proximately 1000 utility personnel at the Millstone site. Outage personnel may number up to 800 people and have not as yet been fingerprinte (Note:
the Unit 1 outage will commence June 13.) Fingerprinting is included as part of the qualification process for new workers requesting unescorted access prior to commencing wor l l
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o The fingerprint records have been sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion (Washington) to be forwarded to the FBI for review. Results of the FBI review are expected within 30 days. The inspector had no further questions at this tim . Balance of Plant Repairs During this inspection period a number of steam leaks were repaired by the injection of a hard setting epoxy / metal fluid. These repairs were conducted under approved procedure EN 21190. Areas repaired were:
Automated Work Order Area M2-87-05626 Second Stage Reheater Drain Tank Lower Instru-ment Root Valve M2-87-05594 Instrument LC 5333 on the 18 Heater-Flange leak M2-87-02758 Steam Generator Supply-Air Actuated Check Valve-Leaking Flange (see paragraph 8)
M2-87-05306 Leaking Flange between steam dump controller LC 4141 and Lower instrument root valve The inspector had no questions on these repair No. 2 Steam Generator (SG) Main Feed Supply Air Assisted Check Valve Assembly 2-FW-5B (Category I)
The hinge pin cover gasket was repaired by injection sealant. A steam cut in the gasket seat area was sealed. This is a temporary repair, and work order M2-87-5123 placed this item on a shutdown outage list for replacement of the cove Production Maintenance Management System Program (PMMS) package 2-87-02758 documents initial housekeeping, final housekeeping, and use of the work package on sit A leak repair calculation established a maximum sealant injection pres-sure of 4230 psi. Calculations were verified correct by the resident inspector. Sealant chemical specifications were met and verified by QA/Q Stud bolt conditions were observed by the licensee. No deficien-cies were noted. Examination by the leak repair group noted previous leak repair holes. No valve cycling was performed because the valve is on-line and open. At the time of cover replacement, examination of check valve internals is schedule The inspector had no further questions on the procedure, work package, or the temporary repai .
0 16. Service Water System Anomalies The Service Water System experienced the following two failures during this report perio Service Water Expansion Boot (SWEB) Failure The Service Water Expansion Boot (SWEB) on the discharge line of SW Pump
"A" ballooned out and was rubbing against the installed bolt Boot re-placement was performed. The inspector observed the replacement and examined the damaged boot. It appeared to have missing material due to overexpansion. Review of inventory lists indicated that the boot was in service for less than one yea Service Water Pump A Excessive Vibration Service Water Pump "A" was removed from service when high vibration readings were identified on the pump shaft. Repair required renewal of the pump bearings and packing. The failure was tentatively attributed to momentary loss of bearing cooling water. The repairs were completed and the pump was tested and declared operational per Technical Specifi-cation 4.7.4.1.a.1.2.3. Observation of the final test indicated a runout of less than 3 mills on the pump shaft at three locations. Vibration measurements were acceptabl The piping expansion boot failure can be attributed to the high vibration readouts on SW Pump "A". The failure to supply cooling water to the pump bearings is under licensee investigation and will be addressed in a subsequent inspection report. The inspector had no further questions on the licensee's maintenance and immediate corrective action . Management Meetings At periodic intervals during this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the finding No proprietary information was identified as being in the inspection coverage.