IR 05000271/1986004
| ML20205N302 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1986 |
| From: | Elsasser T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205N284 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-86-04, 50-271-86-4, NUDOCS 8605020086 | |
| Download: ML20205N302 (15) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report N /86-04 Docket N License No. DPR-28 Licensee: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5, Box 169, Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 Facility: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Location: Vernon, Vermont Dates: February 4 - March 17, 1986 Inspectors: William J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector Th as S. Silko, Resident Inspector Approved by: rfa .
NI /18b Nomas C. Elsasser, Chief, Reactor Projects 3C / Uate Summary: Inspection on February 4 - March 17, 1986 (Report No. 50-271/86-04)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection on day time and backshifts by the resident inspectors of: actions on previous inspection findings; physical security; shutdown operations; followup of outage activities; outage maintenance and testing; review of support modifications as part of the seismic reanalysis program; review of recirculation piping metallurgical test report; and review of staffing change The inspection involved 134 hours0.00155 days <br />0.0372 hours <br />2.215608e-4 weeks <br />5.0987e-5 months <br /> by two resident inspector Results: No violations were identified in 8 areas inspected. One security concern was identified involving the badging of personnel in the protected area, as de-scribed in Section 11.0. One item that warrants licensee and NRC followup is an evaluation of the cause for cracking of the motor operator housing on the HPCI 24 full flow test valve (Section 6.3).
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Interviews and discussions were conducted with members of the licensee staff and management during the report period to obtain information pertinent to the areas inspected. Inspection findings were discussed periodically with the management and supervisory personnel listed belo Vermont Yankee Mr. P. Donnelly, Mairitenance Superintendent Mr. J. Pelletier, Plant Manager Mr. J. Sinclair, Security Supervisor Mr. R. Wanczyk, Technical Services Superintendent A meeting was held with the Vermont State Nuclear Engineer on February 7, 1986 in the NRC Resident Office to discuss NRC inspection of outage activities and recent events. The following items were also discussed: the licensee's in-frared scanning technique for embedment plate anchor bars; inspection results of the NRC NDE van which concluded a site visit on 1/31/86; and, the status of welding on N2 nozzles. A joint meeting was also held with licensee per-sonnel to review the status of welding, recent revisions to the welding pro-cess, and welding purge dam controls. The meeting was beneficial for the review of items of mutual interes \ Summary of Facility Activities The plant remained in a shutdown condition for the recirculation pipe re-placement outage. The most significant licensee activity during the period was the continued installation and welding of the new recirculation syste NRC inspection of this work and additional outage related activities continued during the perio A security inspection was conducted during this inspection period by a Region I specialis The results of that inspection are documented in Inspection Report 86-06 Additionally, a special inspection was conducted on February 9-27, 1986 of the events associated with the discovery of the inoperable Standby Liquid Control System. The results of that inspection are documented in Inspection Report 86-0 .0 Status of Previous Inspection Findings 3.1 (0 pen) Follow Item 85-40-09: Potential RHR Pump Problems. The licensee informed the inspector on February 24, 1986, of his intention not to inspect or perform preventive maintenance on the four Bingham RHR pumps during this outage. The pumps are single-stage, vertical, centrifugal-type pumps, and are similar in design to a pump at another facility that
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failed in November 1985 due to a wear ring failur Followup inspections of 6 pumps at the other facility identified 5 additional wear ring fail-ures or deficiencie The licensee was informed of the above problems through contact with Bingham representatives and discussions with the inspector. The licensee considered this information in developing the following basis for not performing an inspection or preventive maintenance on the pumps: (i) A suitable replacement has not been developed for the suspect wear ring should it be found in a degraded condition; (ii) A solution to the root cause of the problem has not been determined to date. This would likely involve the need to disassemble the pumps again at a later date for per-manent corrective maintenance. The licensee feels that this would not be keeping with ALARA practices; and, (iii) The pumps have not show any signs of deteriorating performanc This item was discussed with licensee management on March 12, 1986 at the NRC Region I Offices. The licensee stated that his review of the item was still in progress and an action plan would be developed by mid-May, 198 Although no plans are in progress to inspect the pumps this outage, the action plan would identify short and long term replacement options, and would specify the enhanced pump monitoring program to be implemented when the pumps are operated. The licensee stated he was familiar with the pump operating parameters identified in LER 50-278/85-20 and considered them useful for detecting an adverse trend in pump performance. The licensee stated he would consider in his corrective action plan a review of historical performance data on the pumps to de-termine whether an adverse performance problem is indicated by the dat This item remains open pending further licensee review of historical performance data for possible degraded operation of the RHR pumps, and subsequent review by the NR .2 (0 pen) Follow Item 86-01-04: Removal of the Station Service Water System from Service. The licensee removed the station service water system from service to allow maintenance on service water valves not serviceable during normal operations, and to allow for the installation of welded attachments to service water pipin A mechanical bypass was established to supply river water to the reactor and turbine building closed cooling water heat exchangers for heat re-moval from the fuel pool cooling system and the station air compressor During the 3-1/2 week period that the service water system was not in operation, cooling water provided by the mechanical bypass was sufficient to maintain spent fuel pool temperatures at 120 degree F or less (average 106 degree F), which was well below the technical specification limit of 150 degree F. The service water system was returned to service on February 26, 1986. The inspector had no further questions on system performance. This item remains open pending NRC review of licensee re-storation action _
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3.3 (0 pen) Follow Item 84-08-03: Station Batteries. This item was previously reviewed in Inspection Report 85-30 and 86-01. The licensee initiated the replacement of both station batteries during this inspection perio Inspector review of this activity is described in Section 5.4 belo This item remains open pending final replacement of the station batterie .4 (0 pen) Unresolved Item 86-01-06: Energy Absorption Panels. The inspector discussed with the licensee the results of his review of the questionable areas of support steel welding for the energy absorption panels. The locations of interest had tac welds where full welds were apparently required. The licensee stated that the energy absorption panels require only enough welds to support their weight, as the tac welds obviously do, and are not required to be supported in such a manner as to withstand seismic events. Accordingly, the licensee stated that although the as-built conditions are not accurately reflected in the drawings, the as-built conditions are acceptabl During a meeting with the Engineering Supervisor, Recirculation Project, on March 17, 1986, the licensee stated that the basis for his assessment that the panel supports are acceptable would be documented. This item will be reviewed further on a subsequent inspection pending completion of licensee actions to document his evaluation, and subsequent review by the NR .5 (0 pen) Unresolved Item 85-40-06: Failure of an Embedded Plate used to Supnort Safety Class Piping. Licensee actions to test embedded plates si lar to the type that failed are documented in Section 8.0 belo This item remains open pending completion of licensee actions to modify and/or disposition other apparently defective embedded base plate .0 Observations of Physical Security Selected aspects of plant physical security were reviewed during regular and backshift hours to verify that controls were in accordance with the security plan and approved procedures Additionally, the inspector accompanied the Security Shift Supervisor during a review of the CAS, SAS and PA fencelin This review included the following security measures: guard staffing; verifi-cation of barrier integrity in the protected and vital areas; verification that isolation zones were maintained; and, implementation of access controls including identification, authorization, badging, escorting, personnel searches, and vehicle searches. One item that warranted further inspector followup is discussed further in section 11.0 belo No inadequacies were identified, except as described in Section 1 .0 Review of Outage Activities Plant tours were conducted routinely during the inspection period to review activities in progress and to verify compliance with regulatory and admini-strative requirements. Plant areas toured included the reactor building,
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steam tunnel, drywell, and the grounds within the protected area. The in-spector attended outage meetings to keep informed of outage activities and the licensee's review and resolution of outage problems. Plant activities and events that warranted further NRC review are summarized belo .1 During the preparation of nozzle N2K for safe-end/ thermal sleeve re-placement, radiographic examination of the joint identified linear in-dications intermittent throughout the 360 degrees of the nozzle in the reactor vessel stainless steel cladding. Original investigation located the indications to be within 1/8" of the vessel carbon steel materia Subsequentmachinegrindingofthestainlesssteelcladdingwassuccessful in removing the linear indications and maintaining the 1/8 minimum cladding thickness requirements. Since the minimum thickness requirements were not violated, post weld heat treatment was not necessary. Weld preparation of N2K was considered complete following acceptable results of the liquid penetrant, visual and radiographic tests at the close of the inspection perio The remaining work on N2K will be conducted per the same procedures used on the previous 9 safe-ends. The inspector will follow this work and additional pipe replacement activities as the outage continue The inspector found no discrepancie .2 General Electric informed the licensee that a review of videotapes taken during the underwater visual inspection performed in September, 1985 of the reactor internals revealed two cracked members on the steam drye The first member was a piece of 2" stainless steel angleiron located on top of the steam dryer, which acts as a spacer and stabilizer for the chevron units. The second member with identified cracks was a lifting rod. The crack appeared in a 1/2" fillet weld located at the interface between the lifting rod and dryer sub-assembly. The licensee plans to inspect the remaining lifting lugs and angleiron spacers during the present outag The inspector will follow the additional investigations and licensee corrective action .3 On February 25, 1986, underwater divers inspected the low pressure ECCS pump suction strainers (RHR and CS) in the torus. The purpose of the inspection was to obtain "as-is" dimensions of the strainers prior to replacing them during the outag The strainers are being replaced due to the new and different type of insulation being used on the recircula-tion piping. In the event of an accident, it is postulated that the new insulation could be carried into the torus and block the ECCS suction strainers. The present strainers are being replaced by larger type strainers that are less likely to be blocked by insulation fragment The safety evaluation for the replacement was still being written at the close of the inspection period. Based on a telephone conversation with
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the YNSD licensing engineer on 3/20/86, the inspector determined that the safety evaluation for the design change was being performed as ECN 7 to EDCR 85-01, which was still under review. The licensee stated that
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an analysis was in progress to address the acceptability of the addi-tional stresses on the new strainers due to torus chugging loads and caused by the increased weight and surface area of the new strainer The licensee stated further that.the HPCI and RCIC suction strainers would not be changed since the concern over strainer plugging arose only for large breaks in the recirculation system. For small recirculation system breaks, relatively little insulation debris would be generated and considerably less energy, when compared to that released during a large break, would be available to transport the debris to the toru The licensee stated that the need to only address the low pressure system suction strainers was further described in a General Electric Report dated 1/22/8 .
Inspector review of the ECN 7 safety evaluation and supporting documents, and the completion of licensee actions to replace the strainers, will be documented in an subsequent routine inspection repor .4 Batteries The licensee received 124 new C&D batteries on site to replace both 125 VDC station batteries. The station batteries are being replaced due to previously noted "mossing" problems within the cells (reference Inspec-tion Report 85-30). The replacement batteries are new C&D Type LC-31 cells, which are considered by the vendor to be less susceptible to the mossing problem due to a thicker coating of lead around the copper ter-minal posts. Upon arrival at the site, the batteries were pressure tested and visually inspected by licensee personnel and vendor represen-tative The inspector also visually inspected 21 of the new cells as they were uncrated on the turbine deck. The inspector reviewed the cells for overall general conditions, seismic supports, electrolyte level, condi-tion of terminal posts, and sealing. The inspector noted one cell (09164 21) had noticeable dents on 1 of the 2 positive posts, and that the vendor representative had rejected the cell due to the marred contact area provided between the post and the cable connector. Overall condi-tions for the remainder of the cells were otherwise acceptable except for the observation of electrolyte on top of several cells, which indi-cated that the seals on the cells had been broken. Further licensee review of this condition identified additional problem The licensee completed visual and pressure tests of the cells on sit The pressure measurement on the cells tested the ability of the batteries to withstand 8 oz. of internal pressure (.5 psi) for 15 seconds. Twenty seven (27) of the 124 batteries tested failed. Failure of a cell to meet this test indicates that a leakage path exists through which the elec-trolyte could escape from the cell, contact the metal support strut *are for the battery, and create a ground in the cell. This failure mode creates a condition that degrades the battery over a long period of tim _-- - -. . - . . - .- .-
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The inspector noted that during seismic qualification tests for the cells, the seals break and the capability for the battery to provide the design load is satisfactorily demonstrate A C&D field representative was brought on site to repair the defective battery seals by the application of a new sealant between the cell jar and top plate. Through the use of licensee approved C&D procedures, the vendor successfully sealed 10 of the 27 cells. The remaining 17 cells were returned to the C&D factory for repairs. The licensee determined that the seals on the cells were broken during shipment from the factory and plans were made to use an air-cushioned van for subsequent transport of the cells from the factor Following discovery of the above defects and pending receipt repaired cells from the vendor, the licensee assembled the "A" station battery bank with 60 new cells, and assembled the "B" bank with 43 of the new cells and 17 " good" cells (i.e., cells without messing apparent) from the old battery bank. The criteria for determining what cells were
" good" are as follows: specific gravity above 1190; cell voltage greater than 2.13 volts; no evidence of "mossing"; and, no adverse physical in-dications (i.e., no corrosion, cracking, etc.). The inspector identified no inadequacies in the licensee's selection criteria or with their plans to use the old cells for an interim perio The licensee plans to place the battery banks on an equalizing and float charge, and then complete a load test per OP 4211. Following successful complation of OP 4211, the batteries will be declared operational. The licensee plans to incorporate the 17 new cells into the "B" bank once they are returned to the sit This item remains open pending the final replacement of all station batteries and subsequent review by the NR .0 Outage Maintenance and Testing 6.1 Shock Suppressor Functional Test The licensee performed functional testing per OP 5203 on 6 pipe shock suppressors per technical specification requirements. The test resulted in one failure, RR-24, which failed the lock-up velocity acceptance criteria in both compression and tension. RR-24 was not rebuilt since the revised seismic analysis for the new recirculation piping system showed it need not be reinstalled. However, the licensee counted the failure in accordance with the Technical Specification 4.6.I requirements and tested an additional group of six (6) snubber Three of the six snubbers tested had questionable results, which required further engineering evaluation. The questionable results exceeded the allowable lock-up velocities or bleed rates as specified by OP 5203, which are based on standard viscosity values for the oil in use. An engineering calculation was performed based on data from an analysis to determine the actual fluid viscosity in the snubbers, which showed that
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the three questionable snubbers were acceptabl The inspector reviewed the licensee's calculation for Snubber RR-34 and identified no discre-pancies. Since all snubbers in the second group tested satisfactorily, the technical specification functional test requirements were satisfie !
No inadequacies were identifie .2 Diesel Generator Maintenance The licensee completed diesel maintenance per OP 5223.01, "I m cancy Diesel Generator Shutdown Maintenance". During the inspecu i, the licensee gave particular attention to the scavenging air blowers due to I reports of a recent blower failure at another facility, and due instruc-tions in a Service Information letter (SIL) received from the diesel vendo The Fairbanks Morse SIL entitled " Scavenging Air Blower Rotor Clearances When Using the Turbo Blower Parallel Scavenging Air System", dated November 15, 1984, cautioned that blower failures are likely if the diesels are run for extended periods at zero or low loads. The SIL recommended that zero load operation be minimize The inspector noted that the licensee's diesel generator operating procedure, OP 4126, in-cludes a precaution specifying that the diesel not be operated at no load conditions for greater than 5 minutes. Based on discussions with control room personnel, the inspector noted operators were familiar with the precaution and the potential consequences if it were not followe The Fairbanks Horse SIL also recommended inspection of the blower lobe and casing clearances. Licensee measurements on the "B" blower found that the clearances met the specifications in the SIL and the licensee decided to use the blower in the "as-found" condition. The inspector reviewed the licensee's data for the "B" blower and identified no in-l adequacie Licensee measurements on the "A" blower showed clearances that were out of specification, and the blower was replace The licensee repeated clearances measurements on the "A" blower following its replacement, which showed radial lobe to housing dimensions, and l rotor to inner end plate dimensions that were greater than the values i specified as acceptable in the SIL. The measurements were accepted i following discussions with the vendor. The inspector noted that this i
information was properly documented in the maintenance request work package (MR 86-0222) and the receipt inspection checklist. The inspector found no inadequacies in the maintenance and replacement of the diesel generator scavenging air blower .3 Cracked Limitorque Valve Body The licensee identified a crack in the operator housing for HPCI valve V23-24 while performing maintenance per MR 85-1275. Valve V23-24 is the full flow test valve and is used only during testing of the HPCI syste Additionally, the normal position for the valve is closed and the valve
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receives a "go closed" signal upon HPCI initiatio The operator is a limitorque Type SMB-1 motor operato The main housing on the operator l is 9 1/2 inches lon The crack was not visible until the housing cover gasket was removed for preventive maintenance. Liquid penetrant and {
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visual examinations showed that the crack went through wall, and extended across the mating face of main housing and the housing cover, and 3 inches down the outside of the housing towards the valv I Licensee corrective actions included the following: (1) Installing a new operator body, reusing as many of the original parts as possible (i.e.,
limit switches, spring packs, etc.); and (2) Performing a M0 VATS test prior to declaring the valve operable. The licensee stated that data from the MOVATS test will be used to determine the thrusting conditions for the valve and could possibly identify the cause of the crack. The MOVAT test was conducted at the end of the inspection period, and the inspector will follow the test results on a subsequent inspectio The inspector noted that, at the tima of discovery of the crack, the valve was capable of performing its intended function when last installed in the HPCI system, and should therefore be considered operabl It was however in a degraded condition and its reliability for future operations was questionabl A Potential Reportable form (PR0 86-09) was completed for the maintenance finding and the licensee determined that the defect was not reportabl Thirty-eight (38) MOVs have been inspected during the present outage and only one failure was identified. The inspector noted that the limitorque motor housing for RHR valve V10-39A cracked while in service in 1984 and was repaired under MR 84-046 The V23-24 problem is the second crack failure in about two years. The inspector noted that the licensee's evaluation also identified the failure history and the assessment docu-mented in the PRO concluded that the subject of reportability should be revisited if additional similar conditions are identifie The inspector has no further questions on this item at present. This item is~ unresolved pending completion of licensee evaluations regarding the housing failure mechanism for V23-24, and subsequent review by the NRC, and pending NRC review of subsequent MOV performance during routine operations to determine whether an adverse trend exists (UNR 86-04-01).
7.0 Review of Outage Modifications
, The inspector continued a review of licensee activities during this outage l' to upgrade seismic supports on plant systems in accordance with EDCR 84-40 The inspector reviewed the as-built conditions for a sample of modified sup-ports to assure the completed work met the design drawings, and to assure the adequacy of the licensee's modification controls. The inspector determined through direct observation and independent evaluation of work that the licen-see's work control system was functioning properly and that the installation of safety-related pipe supports and restraints was in compliance with NRC requirements, licensee commitments and applicable code _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _
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Inspector review of a support verified the following: weld location; the sur-face of welds did not contain discontinuities, abrupt ridges, valleys, under-cuts, cracks, or other detrimental indications; supports were located and installed as specified on the drawing; support clearances were as specified (includes support to pipe and base plate to ceiling / wall clearances); bolts, nuts, washers properly sized; proper bolt location; minimum bolt embedment and thread engagement requirements satisfied; and overall dimension The inspection included the following hangers, for which construction had been completed and as-built conditions had been verified by the contractors QC group:
RSW-HD254 SA-HDIA RSW-H250 SA-HDIAN RCIC-H52 SW-H76N SLC-H37 SW-H79N Inspector review of records maintained on several of the hangers documented above included a verification that: weld identification and locations docu-mented by QC; welders identifications for personnel performing the work docu-mented by QC; welders qualified to the welding procedures used; torque wrenches properly controlled and calibrated; and, documentatica of materials use No discrepancies were note Additionally, the follcwing hangers received a general review during plant tour The hangers were reviewed to the same criteria stated above but with-out the aid of a detailed hanger drawing. No discrepancies were note RHR-HD37N SLC-H38 ACSP-H220 RHR-HD200E SLC-H36 ACSP-HD203D RHR-HD200D SLC-H35 ACSP-203C HPCI-H99 SLC-7A SA-HD4A HPCI-HD22A SLC-HD37 SA-HD3A HPCI-HD24 RCIC-H79 SA-HD1BN HPCI-H62 RCIC-H96 SA-HD1B HPCI-H108 SA-H79 RCW-H128 SW-H79 The following problems were noted and discussed with licensee representatives for resolutio SW-H76N -
Excessive space between baseplate and wall, up to a maximum SW-H79N gap of .153" SLC-H37 RSW-H250 -
Lack of required welds where support meets ceiling "I" bea (Note: This hanger is not one of the hangers being worked under the SRP, but the inspector noted the deficient condition by verification against as-built drawings.)
The licensee's evaluation and dispositioning for the above apparent discre-pancies will be followed in a subsequent routine inspectio '
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8.0 Followup of Previous Inspection Findings Followup of Unresolved Item 85-40-06. On November 11, 1985 during modifica-tion of MS-HD22E, the embeddad plate to which the support was attached was found to be improperly installed. The licensee determined that the embedment bars on the baseplate had been removed prior to installing the support during initial construction. This incident was discussed fully in Inspection Report 85-4 As part of his followup evaluation of the finding, the licensee developed special test procedure (STP) 85-03 to verify the proper installation of other embedded plates located in the torus room and the HPCI room. STP 85-03 used ,
an infrared scanning technique to evaluate the embedded plates to determine
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whether embedment bars were properly installed. Since only a portion of the embedment bars could be positively evaluated by infrared scanning, STP 85-03 also specified that the plates also be subjected to a functional pull test that would apply a load in excess of any load currer.tly applied to an embedded plate. The pull test was to verify that the results obtained from the in-frared evaluation are adequate to prove proper installatio The infrared test of the embedded plates was conducted during this inspection period. The inspector witnessed the testing of several of the embedded plates and verified that the prerequisites and precautions were met, and that pro-cedural steps were followed. The inspector also independently verified the test results. The inspector noted no deficiencies in the testing procedur The results of the infrared test were inconclusive in determining whether em-bedment bars were actually attached to the plates. Based en the inconclusive results, the licensee cancelled the functional pull test and declared all em-bedded plates of this type inoperable. The licensee is evaluating the correc-tive actions to be taken to adequately support all safety related lines that utilize this type of emb2dded plate. The inspector found no inadequacies in the special test or in the conclusions reached by licensee based on the re-sults of the test. The NRC staff will continue to fo':ow the licensee's cor-rective actions for this ite During the management meeting on 3/12/86, the licensee discussed his proposed plans to use PVRC dampening in his analysis of acceptable piping support load The inspector noted that the NRC staff had accepted the use of PVRC dampening by another licensee, and it was suggested to the licensee that he discuss his plans with NR This item remains open pending completion of licensee actions to rosolve con-cerns with wall mounted embedded base plates used with safety related piping system .0 Review of Recirculation Piping Metallurgical Report The inspector reviewed a report entitled " Evaluation of Vermont Yankee Type 316 Controlled Chemistry Recirculation Piping Counterbore Surface Preparation Techniques" dated January 29, 1986. This report was prepared by the J. .
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Jones Applied Research Company at the request of Vermont Yankee to determine the susceptibility of Type 316 stainless steel replacement piping material to cold work created by grinding and machining. The material was also evalu-ated for its resistance to intergranular attac The report indicated that the Type 316 stainless steel chosen by the licensee is more resistant to cold work than other previously used stainlass steel Additionally, all test samples showed negative susceptibility to intergranular attac The report will be sent to the NRC Region 1 Office for further review by the NRC staf No inadequacies were identifie .0 Staffing Changes The licensee announced the following staffing and organizational changes on February 28, 1986. Mr. R. Pagodin was selected to fill the vacancy of Ad-ministrative Supervisor left by the departing Mr. R. Milliga Additionally, Mr. R. Pagodin's department was renamed the " Plant Services Department".
These changes became effective on March 16, 1986. Effective March 31, 1986, the Plant-Services Supervisor will report directly to the Technical Services Superintendent, instead of the Plant Manage M r. W. Conway left the office of President and Chief Executive Officer of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation on February 28, 1986. His successor is Mr. J. Gary Weigand, who formerly held the position of Vice President for Nuclear Safety and Environment at Gulf States Utilities Company of Beaumont, Texa Mr. Weigand assumed the new responsibilities at Vermont Yankee on March 3, 198 THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLAN _
THIS PAGE CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION, NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSUR IT IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLAN .
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12.0 Management Meetings A meeting was conducted on March 12, 1986, at 10:00 A.M., at the Region I of-fice in King of Prussia, PA to discuss the licensee's startup and restoration plan Licensee attendees at the meeting are listed in Attachment I. The licensee's presentation was beneficial to the NRC staff in the review of the outage status and the scope and planning of restoration and startup activi-ties, and in the staff's planning for inspection of the restoration and startup effort The following inspection items were discussed with the licensee prior to the 3/12/86 meeting, and the status of licensee actions on the issues was ad-dressed during the 3/12/86 meeting: recently identified pipe support defi-ciencies; drywell electrical penetrations; potential RHR pump problems; leak rate testing of containment valves; repairs to RPS channel 8; original defects in vessel nozzles N1A, N2D and N2K; environmental qualification problems with the containment hydrogen / oxygen analyzer; crossed sensing lines for shutdown cooling pressure switches; and, the status of the seismic reanalysis progra Preliminary inspection findings were discussed with licensee management peri-odically during the inspection. A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspection and prior to report issuance.
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ATTACHMENT I Attendees for the March 12, 1986 meeting in the NRC Region I Office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvani LICENSEE Mr. D. Bauer, State Liaison Officer Mr. S. Jefferson, Assistant to the Plant Manager Mr. G. Johnson, Operations Supervisor Mr. J. Pelletier, Plant Manager Mr. D. Porter, Restoration & Startup Manager Mr. D. Reid, Operations Superintendent & Outage Manager Mr. A. Shepard, Manager, Quality Assurance, YAEC Mr. W. Wittmer, Recirculation Project Manager NRC Mr. T. Elsasser, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3C Mr. A. Finkel, Lead Reactor Engineer, Division of Reactor Safety Mr. W. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector Mr. V. Rooney, Project Manager, NRR Mr. L. Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A Mr. J. Wiggins, Chief, Materials & Process Section
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