ML20216F908
| ML20216F908 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1998 |
| From: | Modes M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216F843 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-98-05, 50-271-98-5, NUDOCS 9804170275 | |
| Download: ML20216F908 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000271/1998005
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket No:
50-271
License No:
Report No:
50-271/98-05
Licensee:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
Facility:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
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Location:
Vernon, Vermont
Dates:
March 16-19,1998
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Inspectors:
Paul R. Frechette, Physical Security inspector
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Edward B. King, Physical Security inspector
David N. Orrik, Security Specialist, NRR
Ronald J. Albert, Security Specialist, NRR
Approved by:
Michael M. Modes, Chief
Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
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9804170275 980413
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ADOCK 05000271
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
NRC inspection Report 50-271/98-05
in general, the licensee maintained a satisfactory program. Management support is
ongoing as evidenced by adequate manning levels to permit effective program
implementation and some recent security equipment enhancements. Audits were thorough
and in-depth, event logs are being trended and analyzed quarterly, and security equipment,
with the exception of the intrusion detection system (IDS), was being tested and
maintained in accordance with the NRC-approved physical security plan (the Plan).
Performance testing of the IDS, by the regional assist team, resulted in the assist team
successfully gaining undetected access into the protected area (PA) by climbing over the
protected area barrier (PAB) without generating an alarm in six of ten zones. This resulted
in a violation of NRC requirements associated with the protected area intrusion detection
system.
During performance testing of the personnel and package search equipment, a second
violation of NRC requirements associated with access controls of personnel and packages
was identified. Specifically, a test device (concealed in a backpack) was introduced into
the search train by the regional assist team with the licensees knowledge, and was not
detected by the security force member that performed a physical search of the backpack.
As an enhancement to the inspection, Section 6.1 of the Plan, titled "lllumination," was
reviewed. The inspectors determined, by observing the performance of a lighting survey
by security personnel using a calibrated light meter, that the licensee was implementing its
lighting program as required in the Plan.
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Report Details
S1
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
Determine whether the conduct of security and safeguards activities met the
licensee's commitments in the NRC-approved security plan (the Plan) and NRC
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regulatory requirements. The security program was inspected during the period of
March 16-19,1998. Areas inspected included: access authorization program;
alarm stations; and protected area access control of personnel and packages.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Access Authorization Proaram. The inspectors reviewed implementation of the
Access Authorization (AA) program to verify implementation was in accordance
with applicable regulatory requirements and Plan commitments. The review
included an evaluation of the effectiveness of the AA procedures, as implemented,
and an examination of AA records. Records reviewed included both persons who
had been granted and had been denied access. The AA program, as implemented,
provided assurance that persons granted unescorted access did not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public. Additionally, the inspectors
verified by reviewing access denial records and applicable procedures, that
appropriate actions were taken when individuals were denied access or had their
access terminated which included a formalized process that allowed the individuals
the right to appeal the licensee's decision.
Alarm Stations. The inspectors observed operations in both the Central Alarm
Station (CAS), and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS). This observation included
alarm response, and interviews with the, alarm station operators. The alarm stations
were equipped with appropriate alarms, surveillance and communications
capabilities and were continuously manned by knowledgeable operators. No single
act could remove the plants capability for detecting a threat and calling for
assistance because the alarm stations were sufficiently diverse and independent.
The CAS did not contain any operational activities that could interfere with the
execution of the detection, assessment and response functions.
Protected Area (PA) Access Control of Personnel and Hand-Carried Packaaes. On
March 18,1998, the regional assist team conducted testing of the metal detectors
and x-ray machines located at the protected area access building. These tests were
conducted using a licensee test device. These performance tests indicated that
licensee search equipment was performing in accordance with Plan commitments.
In addition, the test device, with the consent of licensee security representatives,
was placed in a backpack containing other articles, and placed on the x-ray
machine. The x-ray machine detected an object in the backpack that could not be
identified and the backpack was physically searched by a security force member
(SFM). However, the test device was not discovered during the physical search.
The licensee's failure to detect the test device is a violation of NRC requirements
(VIO 50-271/98-05-01). With the exception of the above noted violation, positive
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controls were in place to ensure only authorized individuals were granted access to
the PA. All personnel and hand carried items entering the PA were properly
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searched and the last SFM controlling access to the PA was in a position to perform
this function effectively.
c.
Conclusions
The licensee was conducting its security and safeguards activities in a manner that
protected public health and safety and that this portion of the program, as
implemented, with the exception of the noted violation, met both the licensee's
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commitments and NRC requirements.
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Status of Security Facilities and Equipment .
a.
Insoection Scope (81700)
' Areas inspected were: Testing, maintenance and compensatory measures; PA
detection aids and PA assessment aids.
b.
Obse vations and Findinas
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Testina. Maintenance and Compensatorv Measures. The inspectors reviewed
testing and maintenance records for security-related equipment and found that
. documentation was on file to demonstrate that the licensee was maintaining, and
with the exception of the protected area intrusion detection system, testing
systems and equipment as committed to in the Plan. A priority status was being
assigned to each work request and repairs were normally being completed within
the same day a work request necessitating compensatory measures was generated.
The inspectors reviewed security event logs and maintenance work requests
generated over the last year. These records indicated that the need for
compensatory measures was extremely minimal. When necessary, the licensee
implemented compensatory measures that did not reduce the effectiveness of the
security system as it existed prior to the need for the compensatory measure.
PA Detection Aids. On March 17,1998, the inspectors observed performance
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testing of the perimeter intrusion detection system (PlDS) at the protected area
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barrier (PAB). The testing, performed by the regional assist team, resulted in the
assist team successfully gaining undetected PA access I.y climbing over the PAB
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without generating an alarm in six of ten zones. The PIDS failure to detect climbing
as a means of gaining undetected access into the PA is a violation of the NRC-
aproved security plan (VIO 50-271/98-05-02). The licensee implemented
compensatory measures for.the identified failures.
Assessment Aids. On March 17,1998, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness
of the assessment aids, by observing on closed circuit television (CCTV), a
walkdown of the PA by members of the regional assist team. This walkdown was
accomplished by individuals on both the inside and outside of the PAB. The
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walkdown was observed under both daylight and lowlight conditions. The camera
view, overlap and picture quality were very good. Additionally, to ensure Plan
commitments are satisfied, the licensee has procedures in place requiring the
implementation of compensatory measures in the event the alarm station operator is
unable to properly assess the cause of an alarm.
c.
Conclusions
The licensee's security facilities and equipment were determined to be well
maintained and reliable, with the exception of the noted violation, and were able to
meet the licensee's commitments and NRC requirements.
S3
Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation
a.
Insoection Scone (81700)
Areas inspected were: implementing procedures and security event logs.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Security Proaram Procedures. The inspectors verified that the procedures were
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consistent with the Plan commitments, and were properly implemented. The
verification was accomplished by reviewing selected implementing procedures
associated with PA access control of personnel and testing and maintenance of
personnel search equipment. However, it was determined that the procedure
associated with testing of the PIDS was inconsistent with Plan commitments,in
that the Plan indicates that the PIDS was designed to detect climbing, cutting and -
crawling. The testing procedure contained no criteria associated with climbing as a
means for detecting an intrusion.
Security Event Loos. The inspectors reviewed the Security Event Log for the
previous 12 months. Based on this review, and discussion with security
management, it was determined that the licensee appropriately analyzed, tracked,
resolved and documented safeguards events.
c.
Conclusions
' Security and safeguards procedures and documentation, with the exception of the
IDS testing element noted above, were being properly implemented. Event Logs
were being properly maintained, and effectively used to analyze, track, and resolve
safeguards events.
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S4
Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance
a.
Inspection Scooe (81700j
Areas inspected were security staff requisite knowledge and response capabilities.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Security Force Reauisite Knowledae. The inspectors observed a number of SFMs in
the performance of their routine duties. These observations included alarm station
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operations, personnel and package searches, and visitor processing. Additionally,
the inspectors interviewed SFMs and security management. Based on all of the
above activities, it was determined that the SFMs were knowledgeable of their
responsibilities and duties, and could effectively carry out their assignments.
F.esponse Caoabitities. On March 18,1998,the regional assist team conducted
three table-top time line drills, with security supervision. The drills were developed
by using the target sets developed and refined by the licensee since the 1994'
. Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE). The benchmark for the drills
was the NRC design basis threat. The criteria used by the regional assist team to
determine response capability were; can the licensee: (1) provide a sufficient
number of responders, (2) appropriately armed, (3) in protected fighting positions,
and (4) in time to interdict armed intruders. ' The licensee's protective strategy was
based on the minimum requirements as noted in the Plan. The inspectors
determined by observation and discussions with the regional assist team and
- security supervision, that the licensee's ability to defend against the design basis
threat is adequate.
c.
. Conclusions
The SFMs adequately demonstr' ated that they have the requisite knowledge
necessary to effectively implement the duties and responsibilities associated with
their position.
S6
Security Organization and Administration
a.
Inspection Scone (81700)
Areas inspected were management support, effectiveness and staffing levels.
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Observations and Findinas -
Manaaement Sucoort. The inspectors reviewed various program enhancements
made since the last program inspection to determine the level of management
support. These enhancements included the allocation of resources for the
procurement of two new x ray machines to enhance package search, ten new
radios to enhance communication capabilities and rolling mirrors to enhance vehicle
search capabilities.
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Manaaement Effectiveness. .The inspector reviewed the management organizational
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structure and reporting chain. ' The Security Manager's position in the organizational
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structure provides a means for making senior management aware of programmatic
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needs. Senior management's positive response to requests for equipment, training
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and resources in general have contributed to the effective administration of the
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security program.
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Staffina Levels. The inspectors verified that the total number of trained SFMs
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immediately available on shift met the requirements specified in the Plan.
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c.
Conclusions
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The level of management support was adequate to ensure effective implementation
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of the security program, and was evidenced by adequate staffing levels and the
allocation of resources to support programmatic needs.
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Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities
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a.
Insoection Scope (81700)
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Areas inspected were: audits, problem analyses, corrective actions and
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effectiveness of management controls.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Audits. The inspectors reviewed the 1997 QA audit of the security program,
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conducted October 20- 31,1997,(Audit No. 97-04). The audit was conducted at
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' the frequency specified in the Plan. To enhance the effectiveness of the audit, the
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audit team included an independent technical specialist.
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The audit report identified two event reports and five recommendations. The
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findings were associated with improper transfer of custodianship of Safeguards
repositories and controls for long term storage of security records. The inspectors
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determined that the findings were not indicative of programmatic weaknesses, and
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the findings would enhance program effectiveness. _ inspectors' discussions with
security management revealed that the responses to the findings were completed,
and the corrective actions were effective.
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Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the responses to the 1997 combined audit of
the fitness-for-duty (FFD) and access authorization (AA) programs, (Audit No. 97-
19). During the previous security inspection conducted in May 1997, the responses
to the audit were not finalized, and it was noted that the responses would be
reviewed during a subsequent inspection. The inspectors determined that the
responses to the findings were completed and the corrective actions effective.
Problem Analvses. The inspectors reviewed _ data derived from the security
department's self-assessment program. Potential weaknesses were being properly
identified, tracked, and trended.
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Corrective Actions. The inspectors reviewed corrective actions implemented by the
licensee in response to the QA audits and self-assessment programs. The
corrective actions were effective, as evidenced by a reduction in personnel
performance issues and loggable safeguards events.
Effectiveness of Manaaement Controls. The inspectors observed that the licensee
has a program in place which was effective in identifying, analyzing and resolving
problems. The corrective actions taken by the licensee, in response to audit
findings were adequate and should prevent recurring problems.
c.
Conclusions
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The review of the' licensee's audit program indicated that the audits were
comprehensive in scope and depth, that the audit findings were reported to the
appropriate level of management, and that the program was being properly
administered.
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Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors met with licensee representatives at the conclusion of the inspection on
March 19,1998. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed,
and the preliminary findings were presented. The licensee acknowledged the preliminary
inspection findings.
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Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
A recent discovery of a licensee operating its facility in a manner contrary to the UFSAR
description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices,
procedures, and parameters to the UFSAR description. Since the UFSAR does not
specifically include security program requirements, the inspectors compared licensee
activities to the NRC-approved physical security plan, which is the applicable document.
While performing the inspection discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the
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licensees Plan commitments in Section 6.1, titled "lliumination." The inspectors
determined, by observing the performance of a lighting survey by security personnel, using
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a calibrated light meter, that the licensee was implementing its lighting program in
accordance with the Plan.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
LICENSEE PERSONNEL
Gregory Morgan
Security Manager
John Moriarity
Security Operations Specialist
Gary Sherer
Security Operations Supervisor
Ed Wright
Project Manager, TWC
John Jasinski
Security Training Supervisor, TWC
Frank Helin
Tech. Services Superintendent
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION - REGION I
William Cook
Senior Resident inspector
Paul Frechette
Security inspector
Edward King
Security and EP specialist
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-HEADOUARTERS
David Orrik
Ronald Albert
John MacPhee
USNRC - Contractor
Marc Eckard.
USNRC - Contractor
Anthony Qualantone USNRC - Contractor
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 81700:
Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
-AA
access authorization
closed circuit television
SFM
security force members
quality assurance
the Plan
NRC-approved physical security plan
protected area
PAB
protected area barrier
PIDS
perimeter intrusion detection systems
central alarm system
secondary alarm system
OSRE
operational safeguards response evaluation
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
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