IR 05000271/1986026

Emergency Preparedness Insp Rept 50-271/86-26 on 861202-04. No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Observation of Licensee 861203 Partial Participation Annual Emergency Exercise

ML20207G768
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	12/22/1986
From:	Conklin C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207G763	List: IR 05000271/1986026 ML20207G760
References
50-271-86-26, NUDOCS 8701070395
Download: ML20207G768 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-26 Docket N License No. DRP-28 Licensee: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5, Box 169 Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 Facility Name: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Brattleboro, Vermont Inspection Conducted: December 2-4, 1986 Inspectors: ft_ /A />2 /%

Rg/tontlin,TeamLeader,4FS,EP&RPB,-DRSS ' dats W. Thomas, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS W. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector J. Martin, Battelle PNL G. Arthur, Sonalysts J. S acher, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS Approved by: M<v Ma

. JAdia , Chief, Emergency Preparedness date'

rection, P&RPB, DRSS Inspection Summary: Inspection on December 2-4, 1986 (Report No. 50-271/86-26 Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's partial participation annual emergency exercise performed on December 3, 1986. The inspection was performed by a team of six NRC Region I and contractor personne Results: No violations were identifie Emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi PDR ADOCK 05000271 0 PDR

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on December 4, 198 Edward H. Salomon, Engineer, YNSD G. Dean Weyman, Senior Chemistry and HP Engineer Edward C. Porter, Radwaste Coordinator Remi Morrissette, Plant Health Physicist Tim McCarthy, ALARA Engineer Elaine Keegan, Environmental Coordinator Alfred Chesley, Simulator Supervisor Dick Slauenwhite, Senior Simulator Instructor John G. Robinson, Director Environmental Engineering, YNSD William Riethle, Manager Radiation Protection, YNSD Thomas P. Fuller, Radiation Protection Engineer, YNSD Edward J. Wojnas, EP Engineer, YNSD John H. Babbitt, Training Fred J. Deal, Training Robert J. Wanczyk, Technical Services Superintendent Donald Reid, Operations Supervisor Cary LeClair, Assistant Operations Supervisor James Pelletier, Plant Manager Warren Murphy, Vice President and Manager of Operations Stanley Jefferson, Exercise Coordinator In addition, the inspectors interviewed and observed the actions of numerous licensee emergency response personne . Emergency Exercise The Vermont Yankee partial participation exercise (limited off-site parti-cipation) was conducted on December 3, 1986 from 7:30 A.M. until 12:15 .1 Pre-exercise Activities -

Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives held meetings and had telephone discussions with licensee representatives to discus. objectives and scope and content of the exercise scenari As a result, changes were made in order to clarify certain object-ives, revise certain portions of the scenario and ensure that the scenario provided the opportunity for the licensee to adequately demonstrate their emergency response capability including those areas previously identified by NRC as in need of corrective actio .

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NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on December 2, 1986, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario. Suggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee. In addition, portions of the scenario were changed in response to procedural changes. These changes were discussed during the briefing. The licensee stated that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scen-ario deviation or disrupti)n of normal plant operation The exercise scenario included the following events:

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Fuel damage as evidenced by a reactor coolant sample with high radioiodine;

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Turbine casing penetration;

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RWCU pipe break outside of the primary containment with failure to isolate,

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Release of activity to the atmosphere (release path through the

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Plant Stack);

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Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert and Site Area Emergency classifications;

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Calculation of off-site dose consequences; and

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Recommendation of protective actions to state official .2 Activities Observed

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During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, six NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:

' Detection, classification and assessment of scenario events; Direction and coordination of the emergency response; Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies of pertinent plant status information; Communications /information flow, and recordkeeping; Assessment and projection of off-site radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; i

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4 Provision for in plant radiation protection; Performance of off-site and in plant radiological surveys; Maintenance of site security and access control; Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; 1 Assembly and accountability of personnel; and 1 Management of Recovery Operation . Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedure The team also noted the following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:

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Actions by plant operators were prompt and effective, and would have placed the plant in a safe condition;

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Event classification was completed accurately and within a reasonable time from event recognition;

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OSC team briefings and debriefings were thorough and complete;

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TSC personnel were knowledgeable and participated enthusiastically in the exercise;

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The EOF was staffed and activated in a timely manner. All areas exhibited good knowledge and use of procedures;

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Dose assessment activities were prompt and correct for the situatio The NRC team identified the following areas which need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action. These items will be evaluated during a subsequent inspectio The off-site monitoring teams reported their locations by use of landmarks. Many of these landmarks were not labeled on the map and presented some difficulty in determining the precise location of the individual teams (50-271/86-26-01).

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The TSC Coordinator was not actively involved in EAL discussions with the Control Room and E0F and in fact declined to participate in an EAL discussion (50-271/86-26-02).

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4. Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The following open items were identified during previous inspections (Inspection Reports 50-271/85-09 and 50-271/85-13). Based upon discus-sions with licensee representatives, examination of procedures and records, and observations made by the NRC team during the exercise the following Open Items were not repeated and are closed:

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(CLOSED) 50-271/85-09-02: Difficulties in use of emergency proce-dures noted during table-top discussion (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13'02: EAL was not identified by licensee players for the Aler (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-03: Free play (in exercise) was limited by Controlle (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-04: Communications between CR and other ERFs was distractin (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-10: The Health Physics Supervisor did not consistently advise or provide any special HP precaution (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-14: Status boards in E0F should include at least: Chronology of significant events; current emergency classifi-cation; PAR; and States Protective Actio (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-15: The Radiological Assistant did not assume a management positio (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-17: Dose assessment procedure U.D. 3513 and 3515 are inadequat (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-19: A) Dose assessment personnel only tracked the release, B) Actual dose projections were never don (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-20: Information flow of radiological and mete-orological data was slo (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-22: Proper radiation units were omitted during

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a number of radio transmission (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-23: Team departure was delayed approximately 30 minutes due to lack of radiation monitorin (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-26: The scenario was difficult to review because of the manner in which it was organized and presente __

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, The following items were identified during the previous exercise (Inspec-tion Report 50-271/85-13). Based upon discussions with licensee represen-tatives, examination of procedures and records, and observations made by the NRC team during the exercise these items will remain open pending further licensee action. Clarification of these findings is as follows:

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(OPEN) 50-271/85-13-01: CR personnel took action independently and were slow to pass information to the TS i The coordination between the Control Room and TSC for operator ' corrective actions should be improved. The operators took actions that were not coordinated (however, not incorrect) with the TSC. Additionally, the TSC did not adequately communicate the basis for their decisions to Control Room personnel. The TSC and Control Room should work together as a team to help ensure the optimum actions are taken for any given situatio (OPEN) 50-271/85-13-05: Overall direction of plant activities (TSC)

did not appear to be fully coordinate Direction of the TSC response was informal and could possibly impair the TSC's ability to perform as evidenced by the following: an informal redi-message system; status board discrepancies; no formal briefings; and infrequent informal briefings. This resulted in staff members not prop-erly prioritizing required tasks, not performing certain tasks (leak rate calculations) and not trending key plant parameters. In addition, although the Control Room and EOF were aware that the TSC had activated, there was never a formal announcement mad (OPEN)50-271/85-13-06: Excessive noise levels in the TS '

Although there has been considerable improvement in this area since the last exercise, the level of noise present does not allow for optimum

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facility operations. The noise was continuous, and at times excessive,

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and often masked PA announcements and internal requests. The noise was compounded by overcrowding of personnel, and by the placement of radios and speakerphones in the TS (OPEN)50-271/85-13-07- TSC did not aggressively followup and coor-dinate plant activitie See response to 50-271/85-13-05.

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(OPEN)50-271/85-13-08: Technical reviews in the TSC were inadequat The personnel assigned to the TSC appear to have the necessary knowledge and training to perform technical reviews. However, the scenario did not present problems of a nature for the TSC personnel to demonstrate their capabilities in this are _ _ .___ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - - - _ . _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ .

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5. Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post exercise critique on December 4, 1986, during which the key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise. The critique adequately highlighted areas for improvement (which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions taken).

6. Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercis The licensee was informed that most previously identified items were adequately addressed. with the exception of those identified in Section 3, and no violations were observed. Although there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that they would evaluate and take appropriate action regarding the At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the license . - _ . .- ..